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Paying the Price of German Unification: Männer Planen, Rf Auen Baden Aus

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Paying the Price of German Unification: Männer Planen, Rf Auen Baden Aus GDR Bulletin Volume 17 Issue 2 Fall Article 2 1991 Paying the Price of German Unification: Männer planen, rF auen baden aus Joyce Marie Mushaben University of Missouri-St. Louis Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/gdr This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Mushaben, Joyce Marie (1991) "Paying the Price of German Unification: Männer planen, rF auen baden aus," GDR Bulletin: Vol. 17: Iss. 2. https://doi.org/10.4148/gdrb.v17i2.1000 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in GDR Bulletin by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, please contact cads@k- state.edu. Mushaben: Paying the Price of German Unification: Männer planen, Frauen bad PAYING THE PRICE OF GERMAN ing shortage, owing to special interest-free marriage loans that could be expunged according to the number of chil• UNIFICATION: MÄNNER PLANEN, dren one bore [abkindern]. The proviso that loans of 5,000 FRAUEN BADEN AUS Marks were only accessible to those age 25 or younger contributed to a proliferation of "youth marriages," which Joyce Marie Mushaben, also accounted for an above average divorce rate. The University of Missouri-St. Louis number of divorces doubled between 1960 and 1985, two- thirds of which were filed by women. The rate of dissolu• Prior to the collapse of many an East European regime, tions peaked in 1986 when 137,208 marriages were coun• the question as to whether socialism constituted a prerequi• tered by 52,439 divorces, over 38%; this compares with a site for the institutionalization of feminism—or whether rate under 28% in the West.3 By 1989 the marital loan had feminism would inevitably serve as the foundation for a been raised to 7,000 Marks and the age-limit extended to truly socialist society—appeared to be about as unresolvable 30; statistics suggest that there had already been a slight as the age-old debate over the historical precedence of the trend towards postponing childbirth. By mid-year 1991 chicken versus the egg. Looming large in the feminism- the birth rate in the Five New States dropped 52%, owing versus-socialism debate is the strategic deliberation whether largely to economic disruptions and insecurity. gender equality might best be secured on the basis of "eman• Over 90% of all women aged 15 to 60 engaged in paid cipation from above," or whether it ought to rely primarily labor, compared to a figure of 55% among working-age on the process of "emancipation from below." The history females in the FRG. The chronic deficiencies of the planned of the women's movement in the Federal Republic prior to economy posed special hardships for many single mothers 1989 suggests that feminist consciousness comes more forced to juggle the double burden of family and career, quickly to those who mobilize themselves. Experiences in long deprived of numerous labor-saving devices routinely the former GDR nonetheless indicate that real changes in found in western households. Their day-to-day tribula• policy occur more quickly when orchestrated from the top tions notwithstanding, an empirical comparison of the down. Paradoxically, women in the New Germany are economic status and social-policy benefits accorded women about to witness significant roll-backs in their respective in the two states prior to unification suggests that women campaigns for Gleichberechtigung, rather than a logical fu• in the now-defunct GDR stand to lose significantly more sion of the gains that have been secured on both sides of the than their chains. border over the past forty years. As manifested by the changing composition of the au• tumn 1989 demonstrations, East German women were A. Demography and its Discontents consistently less enthusiastic about the idea of unification Assessments of demographic developments in the two than men. Polls conducted under the auspices of the German states have frequently been subject to qualification Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung (ZIJ) determined that based on references to the so-called "missing generation" women accounted for one-third of those who regularly phenomenon, attributable to the population losses of two attended the candle-lit, silent marches in October-Decem• World Wars. The Frauenüberschuß'in the East was further ber 1989. Their banners called for free elections, the right exacerbated by a greater proclivity on the part of men to to travel and reconstruction of the GDR in the mode of make use of legal as well as illegal escape routes in order to "socialism with a human face." The period of January- seek a new life in the West (for example, 56% men: 44% March 1990 witnessed a shift in the tone and composition women in 1989).1 The changing of the political guard and of the demonstrations; protesters engaged in rowdier calls commencement of a "long march through the institutions" for a "Germany united Fatherland," accompanied by much by women was nevertheless much more restricted in the flag-waving and chanting (often directed against "reform• GDR, despite a faster rate of reproduction among the citi• ers"); during this phase the proportion of female marchers zens at large. fell to less than one-fourth.4 By the 1980's, the average marrying age for East German Surveys executed after the breaching of the Wall pro• women was 22.5 years, 24.6 for men. Western women were duced even more compelling evidence along these lines. In more likely to enter into matrimony at 24.4 years, their male late February/early March 1990,80% of the women claimed counterparts at age 27. Even more significant, however, is to favor unity, compared to 88% of the men; by the end of the difference in average child-bearing ages reflected in the April, the proportions had shifted to 80% among females two systems prior to the transformative events of 1989/90. and 92% among males. Of this group, 41% of the women In 1987, roughly 60% of all live births in the GDR were were "strongly in favor of" unification, versus 58% of the registered to women aged 25 or younger, 75% ascribed to men; among "workers," strong support was voiced by 43% those 27 or under; one-third of all births took place out of women but 61% men. One-fifth of the female sample wedlock, resulting in 340,000 single mothers by 1989.2 Ex• overtly opposed unity, a position held by only 8% of their cluding resident foreigners, the Federal Republic reported male counterparts. When questioned as to the most appro• 31 % of its new arrivals born to women aged 25 or less, rising priate time-frame for forging the two systems, 43% men to 49% among those 27 or younger. Hence, the average and 38% women cited the end of 1990, while the idea of birthing-age fell between 21-23 in the East, between 27-30 in delaying the process until after 1992 only appealed to 12% the West. Close to 90% of all GDR women capable of bearing of the males but to 21 % of the females.5 children did so through the 1980's, in sharp contrast to a fertility rate of roughly 65% in the FRG. Pre-unity surveys B. The Politics of Social Choice and Economic dating back two decades reveal that an overwhelming ma• Autonomy jority of GDR men and women consistently desired two Although the GDR proved quite deficient with respect children. to the realization of democratic freedoms, it nonetheless The jump into family life was one way of minimizing afforded a frameworkiox women's rights as human rights, economic dependency and circumventing the chronic hous- ^ despite the non-feminist objectives of its policy-makers. Published by New Prairie Press, 1991 1 GDR Bulletin, Vol. 17 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 2 The driving force for the operationalization of women's women would have accrued by retiring five years later. rights in the GDR was ideological in theory, yet demo• Those who raised more than three children were entitled to graphic and economic in praxis. Seeking to compensate for pension bonuses at the rate of "three years' worth of earn• a scarcity of skilled labor, the state had to convince women, ings" per child. Yet inequities persisted in the East where first, to enter the industrial labor force and, second, to have women accounted for 74% of all retirees in 1989. That year (more) children. Last but certainly not least, it had to 131 men and 103,000 women received the absolute mini• motivate its skilled female workers to return to the paid mum pension of Ost-Mark 330, with 423 men and 63,000 labor market post-haste if not immediately post-partem. women receiving only 10 Marks more.11 Under capitalist democracy, equality of all kinds is con• The imposition of Western health care regulations means tingent upon a broad, albeit abstract societal consensus that contraceptives will no longer be free for women in the regarding the inalienable nature of rights, blended with a East. A 1981 study by ZIJ researchers found that GDR measure of pragmatic, "rugged individualism." In the citizens' first experience with sexual intercourse took place, context of Marxism-Leninism, the gender question com• on the average, at the age of 16 years, 9 months—auguring prises but another manifestation of the class question.6 The a dramatic rise in the number of unwanted teen pregnan• constitutions of both German states guaranteed the equal• cies in the months ahead.12 As of July 1990, the "birth ity of men and women, in addition to according special benefit" paid to all women after delivery irrespective of protection to marriages and families [two Articles in the income fell from Ost-Mark 1,000 to DM 150—in spite of the FRG, nine separate Articles in the GDR].
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