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How Al Qaeda Moved Into the Diamond Trade

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How Al Qaeda Moved Into the Diamond Trade Recommendations contained on pages 2 & 3 global witness For a Few Dollar$ More How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade A Report by Global Witness. April 2003. 1 For a Few Dollars More Table of Contents North Atlantic Ocean Recommendations 2 MOROCCO ALGERIA LIBYA WESTERN EGYPT Executive Summary 6 SAHARA MAURITANIA NIGER SENEGAL MALI ERITREA GAMBIA CHAD Introduction 8 GUINEA BURKINO SUDAN DJIBOUTI BISSAU FASO GUINEA NIGERIA SIERRA CÔTE EHIOPIA D’IVOIRE LEONE GHANA CENTRAL AFRICAN SOMALIA LIBERIA REPUBLIC Part One: Background to al Qaeda 10 CAMEROON EQUATORIAL UGANDA GUINEA KENYA GABON DEM REP RWANDA OF THE BURUNDI CONGO CONGO TANZANIA CABINDA Indian Origins of al Qaeda 10 Ocean South MALAWI Atlantic Ocean ANGOLA ZAMBIA Command structures 11 ZIMBABWE NAMIBIA MOZAMBIQUE BOTSWANA SWAZILAND MADAGASCAR Financing structures 13 SOUTH LESOTHO AFRICA Indian Ocean Role of commodities in financing al Qaeda 13 Gold 15 Key ■ al Qaeda Hizbullah ◆ Diamonds ● Key players Tanzanite 17 Map of Africa showing countries that produce diamonds, and al Qaeda and Hizbullah diamond trading activity Part Two: Diamonds and Terrorism – Precedents 20 Hizbullah and diamonds 20 Part Three: al Qaeda and diamonds 28 Tanzania and Kenya 28 Sierra Leone and Liberia 39 Part Four: Global response to 9/11 63 ‘I’m aware there is a connection.That connection is specific. They (al Qaeda) are moving diamonds as a commodity to launder their funds.’1 Conclusion 72 David Crane, Chief Prosecutor, Special Court United Nations, Sierra Leone. 9 February 2003. Annexes 1 – 8 73 ‘The sinews of war are unlimited money.’ Cicero References 91 For a Few Dollars More 2 Recommendations The international community should: The Kimberley Process 1. Ensure that the International Convention Certification Scheme (KPCS): for the Suppression of Financing of The credibility of the KPCS depends on Terrorism of 1999 is ratified and ensuring that all governments fully implemented by all member states; implement the scheme. However crucial 2. Take action against known illicit elements of the KPCS are yet to be diamond traders; implemented, and in some cases defined. 3. Encourage Interpol and the World These include the lack of a monitoring Customs Union to proactively investigate function, the current lack of agreement on the use of diamonds by terrorists; handling of statistical data and the issuing 4. Include measures against illicit diamond of certificates. trading in national laws and regulations particularly in relation to money The KPCS should: laundering and terrorist financing; 1. Establish a working group to proactively 5. KPCS member governments should investigate the role of diamonds in funding monitor and ensure that diamond-trading terrorism and its impact on the KPCS; activities in national jurisdictions comply 2. Design and immediately implement a with KPCS minimum standards and any credible and effective monitoring international agreements on money mechanism; laundering and terrorist financing; 3. Ensure that the recommendations listed 6. Develop a greater understanding for the in Annex II of the KPCS be made potential of precious commodities to mandatory requirements for countries finance terrorist activity. with alluvial diamond production; 4. Ensure that KPCS members only trade in Civilian intelligence, military rough diamonds with other participating intelligence and law enforcement KPCS governments; agencies tracking the sources of 5. Ensure that the diamond industry terrorist financing should: is properly audited by independent 1. Recognise the use of diamonds as a source third party auditors with adequate of terrorist financing; government oversight; 2. Carry out an immediate assessment of the 6. End ongoing participant intransigence diamond trade to establish the full scope on statistics by immediately establishing of illicit trading structures. and implementing a system to capture 3. Establish a mechanism for the full data on the production, import and coordination and exchange of export of diamonds; information on individuals and 7. Assist in establishing a credential system companies involved in the illicit for artisanal diamond miners, buyers diamond trade; and traders. 8. Embark upon peer review mechanisms with countries in the KPCS. 3 For a Few Dollars More The diamond industry: The UN should: The industry must take concerted action 1. Immediately make the KPCS an against the extensive illicit trading networks internationally legally binding agreement, within all sectors of the diamond trade. using a UNSC resolution under Chapter Failure to face up to this endemic problem VII of the UN charter; will result in the continued use of diamonds 2. Immediately place an embargo on by terrorists. There is cause for serious unofficial diamonds from the DRC; concern about the diamond industry’s 3. Ensure that countries are not allowed to proposed measures for voluntary self- join the KPCS until a credible monitoring regulation, a requirement defined under mechanism has been established; the KPCS. If the measures and subsequent 4. Ensure all member states fully comply implementation prove to be inadequate with UNSC 1373. then further government regulation will be required. The Chairman of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to The diamond industry should: UNSC resolutions 1363 (2001) and 1. Immediately launch an investigation into 1390 (2002) should: the extent of illicit trading activity and 1. Establish a task force to examine the role of develop measures to combat it. The precious commodities in terrorist financing; findings of the investigation and resultant 2. Undertake a detailed diagnostic of the recommendations should be given to the illicit diamond trade; KPCS and to the UNSC Counter 3. Actively encourage the full participation Terrorism Committee; of governments in the KPCS; 2. Work with governments and civil society, 4. Actively encourage the establishment of a through the KPCS, to establish an monitoring mechanism for the KPCS. accreditation standard for third party independent auditing and further work to The UN Policy Working Group on ensure its adoption by all sectors of the the United Nations and Terrorism industry; should: 3. Ensure the implementation of anti-money 1. Undertake specific work on the link laundering proposals as required by the between commodities and terrorist US Patriot Act. Similar action should be financing; taken by companies and sole traders 2. Examine the current effectiveness of the throughout the entire industry; KPCS to restrict terrorist financing 4. Engage with governments to develop through the diamond trade. credential systems throughout the alluvial diamond sector. The banking sector should: 1. Ensure that financing of the diamond trade be dependent upon proof of independent third party auditing; 2. Increase vigilance on transactions linked to diamond trading; 3. Adhere to the Wolfsberg Principles on money laundering. For a Few Dollars More 4 Acronyms OECD Organisation of Economic Community and Development ADF Allied Democratic Forces PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation AFRC Armed Forces Ruling Council RCD-Goma Le Rassemblement Congolais pour AMAL Afwaj al Muqawamah al la Démocratie Lubnaniyyah RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army APG Asia Pacific Group RUF Revolutionary United Front ATUAnti-Terrorism Unit SADR Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic AU African Union SIGINT Signals Intelligence AUC Autodefensas Unidas de SSS Special Security Service, Liberia Colombia TFRG Terrorism Financial Review Group BGI Binladin Group International TPB Terrorism Prevention Branch CAR Central African Republic UAEUnited Arab Emirates CFR Council on Foreign Relations, US UMFF Ugandan Mujahidin Freedom Fighters CIA Central Intelligence Agency UN United Nations DIA Defence Intelligence Agency, US UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone DRC Democratic Republic of UNGA United Nations General Assembly the Congo UNITA National Union for the Total ECOMOG Military Observer Group Independence of Angola of the Economic Community UNSC United Nations Security Council of West African States US United States EU European Union USAID United States Agency for EUC End User Certificate International Development FATF Financial Action Task Force WDC World Diamond Council FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation WFDB World Federation of Diamond Bourses FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program FSU Former Soviet Union GAO General Accounting Office, US Osama bin Laden GIR SA Grupo de Representaciones T- shirt, Freetown Sierra Leone Internationales March 2002 HRD High Diamond Council HUMINT Human intelligence IIRO International Islamic Relief Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund ISI Inter Services Intelligence JA Jewellers of America KGB Committee for State Security KPCS Kimberley Process Certification Scheme LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy MAK Maktab al Khidmat Lil Mujahidin al-Arab NCIS National Criminal Intelligence Service NDC National Diamond Company NGO Non Governmental Organisation NIF National Islamic Front NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia NPP National Patriotic Party NPRC National Provincial Ruling Council NSA National Security Agency US NSC National Security Council OASOrganization of American States 5 For a Few Dollars More Key Players Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah Fazul Abdullah Mohammed aka Abu Mohamed al-Masri Was indicted for his involvement Saad al Sharif, Saleh and Abu in the 1998 African embassy Marium. Egyptian national bombing. He was a senior aid to possibly of Saudi origin. Wadih El Hage. He prepared Indicted by a US
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