UNITA DIAMONDS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIAMONDS
AND VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Lee J.M. Seymour
M.A. Candidate
Department of Political Science
Dalhousie University
Subrnitred in partial fulfilment for the requirements of the degree of Master of
Arts, Political Science at Dalhousie University, I September 2000.
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ABSTRACT
This study analyses the origins and impact of, and prospects for, efforts to sever the connections between UNITA diamonds and conflict in Angola. An analyticai approach focused on UNïTA's past and present roles in Angola's political economy of violence reveals unintended consequences and unforeseen dangers in the present sanctions-based approach to peacemaking in ~n~olî.The Fowler process and conflict diamond initiatives represent pragmatic forms of peacemaking governance that have prompted long overdue shifts in global secunty and diplomatic practices, processes and architectures. Empowered sanctions regirnes and efforts to curb the international trade in conflict diamonds are beginning to degrade UNITA'S conventional mi1itary capacity. However, this does necessarily increase the prospects for peace in Angola or the broader region due to a recumng disconnect in the rnyopic sanctions approach, namely, the failure to reconciIe efforts to reduce WA'sability to pursue the military option with the more fundamental objective of encouraging a sustainable peace. The sanctions approach alone will prove ineffective at best, and counterproductive at worst. Tt is therefore imperative that sanctions against UNITA be ernbedded within a comprehensive set of interventions focused not on UNITA diamonds, but on Angola's pervasive political economy of violence as the central impedirnent to human security/development. LIST OF ACRONYMS
ASC Angola Sanctions Committee COIPEA Comite Inter-Eclisial para paz ern Angola / Inter-EcclesiasticaI Committee for Peace in Angola DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECOWAS Economic Cornrnunity of West Afncan States EO Executive Outcornes FAA Forças Amadas Angolanas / Angolan Anned Forces FLEC Frente Libertacâo do Enclave de Cabinda / Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave Frente Nacional de LibertaçZu de Angola / National Front for the Liberation of Angola GURN Govemment of National Unity and Reconciliation HRD Hoge Raad voor Diamant / Diamond High Council IDMA International Diamond Manufacturing Association MF International Monetary Fund MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertaçiïo de Angola / People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola NGO Non-governmentai organisation OAU Organisation of African Unity OCHA Offrce for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs PRS Partido da Renovacao Social / Party of Social Renovation RENAMO Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana / Mozambique National Resis tance United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Lreland Unicza Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola / National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Nations United Nations Angola Verification Mission The United States of Amenca United States Agency for International Development Countless intellectual influences and personal experiences converge on the following pages. I gratefully thank the friends, colleagues and mentors who have shaped this study: Tim Shaw for supervising the thesis project and sharing the breadth and depth of his knowiedge; David Black, as much for his encouragement as his perceptive critiques; Sandra MacLean for gleaning constructive criticism from poorly-edited drafts; Frank Harvey for critical theories on critical theory; participants of the 'IPSA RC#40 Workshop' at Dalhousie University, August, 2000, and the 'Measured Steps: Implementing the Ottawa Convention' colloquium at Meech Lake, April, 2000; Dalhousie graduate students of the Political Science, Econornics and International Development Studies departrnents for lively debates; Andrew Grant and Zoë Wilson for their editing and shared interests; John Harker for his comments; Jean Daudelin of the North-South Instinite for providing me with an outstanding venue to continue my research after Dalhousie; and Mark Zacher and Brian Job for a push in the right direction. It would be remiss of me not to acknowledge the financial support of the Canadian Department of National Defence's Security and Defence Forum, Dalhousie University, the Doris Boyle fund, the Mines Action Research Programme, and the past generosity of the University of British Columbia. This study would not have been possible without the generous support of these sponsors. Finally, my deepest appreciation goes out to my farnily for their unfailing support (and the 'enhanced structural adjustment facilities' they have provided over the years!). And, but of course, Shauna Labrnan for suffering my love.
Lee J.M. Seymour, Halifax, August 2000
vii The diarnond, a symbol of purity, makes a market that functions both above and below ground, in which the licit and illicit rningIe freeiy and comfortably, the line between them almost imperceptible, usuaily irrelevant. Diamonds bring out the worst in men - and women.' - David Koskoff, The Diamond World
No study on Angola cm begin without reference to the contrast between the country's economic prospects and the destitution in which the vast majority of the population struggles to survive. War is central to the disparities between the potentiai and the actual in Angolan political economy. Paradoxicaily, the war that condernns Angolans to a Iife of poverty and insecurity is fuelied by the country's rich resource wealth. Oil and diamonds, in particular, have fùnctioned as modes of rentier accumulation to fund the violence perpetrated by the principal waning factions over the past twenty-five years: the governing MPLA and UNITA.'
Violent struggles over resource access and control have become central to
Angola's conflict and the threats it presents to human security/development.'
' D Koskoff quoted in 1 Smillie. R Hazelton and L Gberie. The heart of rhe marrer: Sierra Leone, diamonds and human securizy, Ottawa: Partnership Afnca Canada, 2000, p iv. ' Following defections in 1998. there are currently three UNITA factions: WTA-Renovada a governrnent-sanctioned parliamentary group headed by Eugenio Manuvakola. a UNITA bloc led by Abel Chivukuvuku and Jaka Jamba that distances itself fiorn both the government and Jonas Savimbi. and finally Savimbi's militarist wing. Unless otherwise noted, 'UNITA' refers to the hard-line faction headed by Savimbi. ' Given the multiple Iinkages between human security and human development. I group the two concepts into 'human security/deveiopment'+ This should not, however, be understood to imply thac the terrns are synonymous. It is not my intention ro delve into the important debaces concerning the merits of human security and human development perspectives, in both theory and practice. See chapter one for a note on the close conceptual relation between the political economy of violence and hurnan security/deveIopment perspectives (United Nations Development Programme, Human development report l994/lW9, New York: Oxford University Press). -7
An awareness of powerful economic agendas in Angola's conflict implies that interventions to promote peace - diplornatic, economic, military, humanitarian, corporate or otherwise - rnust take account of the extant political economy of violence in Angola and the broader regione4Indeed, retrospectives on the failures of previous Angolan peace efforts stress a disregard of the economic motivations of parties to the conflict in the planning and execution of peace initiatives. Thus, in a recent report, Human Rights Watch argued that 'It was a critical mistake in the Lusaka peace process not to have irnposed an embargo on UNITA'S diamond sales much earlier' .5
The international comrnunity's spectacular failures in Angola have resulted in a steep learning curve. Current efforts to foster peace are therefore predicated upon a particular reading of the conflict's political economy, with specific focus on the illicit diamond trade estimated to have generated $3.72 billion in revenues for UNITA berween 1992-1998.~In an attempt to pressure this diamond-based war economy, the Secunty Council's Angola Sanctions Cornmittee has targeted
UNITA with progressive sets of sanctions, most recently prohibiting the trade in iliicit diamonds iri July 1998. Related initiatives on 'conflict diarnonds' also target UNITA diamonds as part of broader efforts to stem the conspicuous connections between diamond revenues and insurgency in conflicts such as
4 As indicated by the wide-array of 'interventions' Iisted, 1 use the term in its broadest sense. As used below, 'intervention' refers to outside influence on an interna1 actor's allocation of values and matenal goods. Intervention therefore encompasses non-traditional forms such as commercial 'transactions' and reliefIdeveIopment assistance. * Human Rights Watch. Angola unravels: The rise and fall of rhe Lusaica peace process, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC. A similar sense of purpose underlies
sanctions regimes and conflict diamond initiatives: it is hoped that by reducing
revenues, increasing costs and choking off supply, UNITA will be coerced into
returning to dialogue. As current Chair of the ASC and Canadian Ambassador to
the UN Robert Fowler declares, 'The underlying objective of the sanctions is to foster a durable political settlement to the civil war in ~ngdaby curtailing
UNITA'S ability to punue its objectives by rnilitary rnean~'.~
Multilateral attempts to sever the links between UNITA diarnonds and conflict in Angola offer a useful case-study for evaluating policies informed by an analysis of the political economy of vi~lence.~In testing this novel approach and the policies it generates, the following study has theoretical and practical relevance: it advances literatures on the causes and consequences of interna1 and regionaiised wars, and evaluates rapidly evolving policy responses for handling economic agendas in conflict situations. Obviously, it is difficult to isolate the effect and impact of the embargo against UNITA from other relevant considerations, most notably the Angolan government's rnilitary offensives.
Further, sanctions against UNITA diamonds have only been in place since July
1998. One can nevertheless attempt to disaggregate the set of coercive pressures facing UNITA in order to draw tentative conclusions regarding the degree to
6 Global Witness, A rorigh trade: The role of cornpanies and governmenrs in the Angolan conflict, London: GIobal Witness, December 1998. Al1 monetary figures in US dollars. 7 R Fowler, 'Noces for an Address by Robert Fowler on the Report of the panel of experts estabIished by Security Council Resolution 1237 (1999)', New York: United Nations, 15 March 2000. 8 Given the role of non-state actors in sanctions-enforcement and conflict diamond initiatives, 1 refer to the 'new' muttilateralisms, as distinguished from the state-centred 'old' variant. 4
which the embargo has moved events in Angola closer to the stated (though not
necessarily synonymous) objectives of 1imit.int UNITA's ability to pursue the
military option and fostering a durable peace.
A key finding of this study confirms the belated efficacy of UN sanctions in pressuring UNITA'S war economy. Since Canadian Ambassador to the UN
Robert Fowler's appointment to chair the ASC in January 1999, unprecedented action has been taken to empower the UN embargo against UNITA. Concerted pressure has been brought to bear on a heterogeneous mix of actors to abide by the ietter and spirit of sanctions regimes, monitor and report violations, and push for reforrns and technologies that decrease the potential proceeds from illicit diamond production and marketing. Though it is too early to determine the long- terrn impact of these measures, sanctions have aiready had a dernonstrable impact by rendering UNITA'S commercial transactions more dificuit and more expensive. Conflict diarnond initiatives are further reinforcing sanctions regimes by tightening regulations in the global diarnond market. As a result, UNITA'S ability to sustain a conventional military apparatus has been impaired.
As concerns the more fundamental objective of fostering the conditions for peace in Angola, however, the argument below suggests that sanctions aione wiil prove ineffective, and perhaps even counterproductive. Proponents of the
'sanctions approach' to peacemaking in Angola - to be distinguished from those, including myself, who consider sanctions as a positive but inadequate step in the right direction - have misunderstood the political economy of Angola's conflict, and have consequently overestimated the contribution of sanctions to peace. 5
There is a fundamental disconnect between the stated objectives of degrading
UNITA'S conventional rnilitary ability and creating the conditions conducive to a
negotiated and sustainable peace- Advocates of the sanctions approach have
rniscaIculated the effect of the embargo on UNITA'S propensity to peace and have
f'urther overlooked threats to human security brought about by UNITA'S
sanctions-induced shift frorn a globally-oriented criminai economy to a locally-
oriented predatory economy.
Yet the inherent shortcomings of current efforts do not reflect the
undesirability of the embargo against UNITA- In fact, sanctions regimes and
conflict diarnond initiatives are representative of novel and prabgnatic forms of
governance that could impact positively upon conflict in Angola and elsewhere.
The problem with the sanctions approach therefore concems the neglect of
alternative avenues of engagement. Complementary efforts are urgently required
to offset the negative externalities of the embargo and focus on factors promoting
and perpetuating conflict and impeding broad development beyond UNITA
diamonds. The unaccountable oil economy under MPLA control is the most
obvious obstacle to a peace characterised by more than the absence of war.
Sanctions must be combined with other measures in an overall peacemaking and
peacebuilding agenda that is specifically focused on the region's politicai
economy of violence as the central impediment to human security/development.
Organisation of the study Before proceeding to analyse the connections between UNITA'S diamond operations and conflict in Angola and the broader region, 1 first outline the elements of the 'political economy of violence' approach that frarnes this study.
Looking at the nexus of politics, economics and violence, this perspective focuses on how politico-rniiitary violence transforrns economic patterns, structures and processes, and the corollary of how econornically-motivated violence impacts upon the politicai and military spheres- Elements of such an approach are found in the burgeoning literature on the economics of political and criminal violence, and recent works on African politicai economy and developrnent. After delineating both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, 1 conclude with a lamentable observation of the tendency to bury the 'political' under the
'economic' and thereby abandon the greatest strength of the perspective: its interdis~i~linarit~.~Conflating economic motivations in advocating a 'greed- rnotivated' reading of contemporary wars ignores the complex and idiosyncratic motivations underlying conflict dynarnics. While a political economy approach offers novel and penetrating insights, an awareness of its limitations leads to advocacy of a 'mixed-motive' perspective that merges multiple narratives of the motivations underlying violence. While problematising theory and praxis, only such fine-grained approaches can capture the 'real' political economy of interna1 and regionalised wars.
The second and third chapters chronologically analyse UNTTA's remarkable and unparalleled efforts to finance its insurgency. Chapter two looks at the historical foundations of UNITA'S war economy from 1966 to 1991 and shows
9 I am indebted to participants of the International Political Science Association RC#40 Workshop at Dalhousie University, August 2000, for reinforcing my own arguments about the need for 7
the non-diamond aiternatives to UNITA'S contemporary economic configuration-
Building on this account, the third chapter examines UNITA'S successfbl transition to a diamond-based war economy as a response to the challenges of the post-bipolarity/apartheid eras and introduces the motley cast of actors central to
UMTA's contemporary economic activities, including Afncan presidents,
Lebanese diamond merchants, Zairian migrant labourers, Eastern European mercenaries, South African pirate. air charters and rnining houses, Belgian customs agents, Zambian patallel traders and compt Angolan officiais. The adaptable, covert nature of these hydra-like networks linking local diamond production to regional and global markets for arrns, fuel and other matériel poses challenges to robust sanctions enforcement.
A historical context demonstrates how economic considerations have exercised a profound influence over UNITA'S politico-military strategies and organisation. As with other well-organised and sustainable insurgent movements,
UNITA has demonstrated an ability to adapt its war economy to respond to pressures and opportunities within and outside its environment, a flexibility suggesting that market access for UNITA diarnonds is not necessarily a determining factor in its ability to pursue its objectives through violence. Beyond the difficulty in enforcing the embargo, it is apparent that, even without large- scale diarnond revenues, UNITA will still be able to obtain the resources
interdisciplinarity and multiple narratives in approaching the complexities of ilIicit economies, in particular Morten Boas, Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw.
I necessary to fimd its efforts - almost inevitably in ways that undermine human security in its area of operations.
An andysis of UNITA'S war economy leads into the fourth chapter's exploration of the genesis and initiai impact of, and prospects for, attempts to foster peace in Angola through sanctions and related measures to tackle the issue of conflict diarnonds. The pioneenng efforts of the ASC are being watched closely. Elements of the Fowler process are already being applied to Sierra Leone and the DRC. Therefore, the dificulties of studying a rapidly evolving situation are offset by the imperative to evaluate on-going efforts in the hopes of enlightening these initiatives. Elaborating on the shortcomings of the sanctions approach, 1 conclude with an outline of potential strategies to supplement the embargo on UNTïA diamonds, particularly dong the peacebuilding and reiief/development axes, and offset its unintended consequences in the hopes of developing a comprehensive approach to fostenng a 'positive' peace (Le. a peace that goes beyond the absence of war).
Finally, the conclusion reflects on the theoretical and practical implications of the preceding discussion for international relations, the discipline with which 1 am affiliated. Ultimately, the most important contribution of the sanctions approach to resolving conflict in Angola may not be its putative aim of ending the conflict.
Rather, by bringing together stakeholders in Angola's political economy of diamonds and violence, from the local to the global, the sanctions approach has attuned scholars and policy-makers to the importance of non-state actors in the politicai economy of violence that inflicts not only Angola but much of Africa. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE
Despite the devastation that armed conflicts bring, there are many who profit fkom chaos and a lack of accountability, and who rnay have littie or no interest in stopping conflict and much interest in prolonging it." - Kofi Annan, 1998
A study covering periods of war and peace in Angola is not well-served by relevant literatures, which tend to focus narrowly on particular stages in what is, in reality, a seamiess historical process of managing (or, more &en, failing to manage) conflict in complex societies. For example, one finds ample information on civil war in Afica, or peacebuilding and reconstruction in Africa, yet these subjects are too often treated as discrete. Perhaps this reflects anachronistic mindsets that consider 'war' and 'peace' as absolute rather than relative conditions, and make hasty normative judgements regarding universal and unequivocal preferences for 'peace'. It is necessary to make a conceptual recognition that peace may be characterised by Ievels of violence, broadly defined, that equal or exceed those experienced during war. It is therefore imperative to develop a framework of anaiysis that bridges these analytical solitudes.
'O United Nations, The couses of conjlict and rhe promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General, New York: United Nations, April 1998, p 14. To that end, the following chapter attempts to merge recent literatures on the
politicai economy of war with insights into the structures and processes of Afncan
poiities, economies, and societies, and the ways in which these interact to frustrate
development and encourage violence, In combining these related strearns of
analysis, the 'politicai economy of violence' frarnework outlined below attempts
to overcome their respective weaknesses. With reference to the political economy of war, exarnining the economic functions of violence in wars ignores the ways in which 'peace' can be institutiondise and legitirnate violence; elements of continuity can be greater than those of rupture in transitions from war to peace.' '
Conversely, to simply examine the factors underlying Afnca's 'condition of cnsis7 ignores the qualitative distinction between war and peace, however relative these concepts may be.
A central prernise of this study concerns the utility of a political economy of violence perspective. Yet it is necessary to temper the haphazard enthusiasm with which rational-choice readings of conflict emphasising pervasive loot-seeking - so-cdled 'greed-motivated7 approaches - have been embraced. Acknowledging the inherent limitations of economic understandings of violence guards against the tendency to overemphasise material narratives while ignoring the influence of histoncal context, identity construction and mobilisation, gender and generation, geography, anthropology, psychology etc., and the ways these al1 intersect with the red politicai economy. An interdisciplinary perspective on the causes of conflict undoubtedly complicates analysis and problematises policy approaches.
II R Marcha1 and C Messiant, Les chemins de la guerre et de fa pak Fins de conflir en Afrique However, attempts to grasp at the 'me' dynamics of conflict must abandon the facile cornfort of reductionism by recognising the multiplicity of reai interests pursued by an increasingly diverse array of actors (state and non-state, local to global) in contemporary conflicts. Analytic and policy approaches to contemporary internai and regionaiised conflicts must therefore be based on a
'rnixed-motive' assessrnent of the factors underlying violence.
War as economics by other means The 1990s witnessed the mutation of false hopes for a 'New World Order' into the excessive fatalisrn of pronouncements of 'New World Disorder', a transition mirrored in African studies by the passage from 'Afncan renaissance' to a resurgent to Afro-pessimism. Forced to come to terms with scenes in Mogadishu,
Srebrenica and Kigali, and brutal actors such as the Groupe Islamique Armée,
Lord's Resistance Army and Interaharnwe, anaiysts recast the dynamics of civil wars to privilege local historical, structurai, psychologicai and environmental variables. In such discursive narratives, conflict is ascribed to ancient hatreds, ethnic fragmentation, primordialisrn, trïbalism, fundamentalisrn and enviro- dernographic stress" - what Paul Richards tems the 'new barbarism' thesis.I3 As a 'chaos theory' of organised violence, such explanations remove the elements of rationality that ordered previous understandings of war. A reIated school of thought portrays civil war as an atavistic, dysfunctional obstacle to political,
orientale er australe, Paris: Karthala, 1997. " These variables come together in R Kaplan. 'The corning anarchy*. Atlanric Monrhly. February 1994, pp 44-76. economic and social development. Thus, prevalent conceptions consider war as
'breakdown': the failure and collapse of institutions that manage the demands of competing groups in society through non-violent means.
While these ideas accord with popular impressions, many of these andytical assurnptions have proved untenable. Dissenting voices have challenged the core propositions regarding war's causes, dynamics and consequences, with implications for policy responses or non-responses. Arnong these alternative approaches, the politica.1 econorny of war perspective is lately the most prominent.
To illustrate the degree of revisionism entailed in this approach, consider three assumptions of the 'new barbarism' thesis: 1) ethnic heterogeneity and historical grievances create a propensity to violence; 2) resource scarcity is central to conflict; 3) war is an 'irrational' and 'dysfunctionai' enterprise. Certain political economy approaches not only disputes the above hypotheses, but suggests the opposite in every case, with profound implications for Our understandings of the conternporary con flic t.
Replacing the politico-ideological factors that dominated discourse during the
Cold War with an ethnic reading of conflict stressing 'ancient hatreds' proves to have very little diagnostic or policy relevance. Though histoncai or identity- based readings potentially illuminate 'root causes', they Say comparatively Iittle about the escalation of conflict or the objectives of belligerents. In turn, outsiders have little control over the ingrained identities and vaiues of belligerents, and cannot anticipate the actions of 'irrational' agents. Moreover, there is a sound
13 P Richards, Fighting for the rain-forest: Yortth, war and resources in Sierra Leone. Oxford: empirical bais for asserting that, contrary to previous rnisconceptions, 'highly fractiondised societies are no more prone to war than highiy homogeneous ones'.14 Using data sets spanning from 1960-92, economist Paul Collier finds that
'the evidence on the causes of conflict points to economic factors as the main dnvers of conflict'.'*
It is tempting to see the Angoian conflict as an ethnic conflict with deep histonca1 roots: UNITA draws its principle support from rural Ovimbundu peoples representing 37 per cent of the population; the MPLA's main constituency is the Kimbundu cornmunity comprising 25 per cent of the population; and the largely defunct FNLA is based among the Bakongo, who account for 13 per cent. Yet neither the MPLA or UNITA have portrayed the conflict in exciusiveiy tribal, racial or ethnic terms- Instead, geographic or class identities are superimposed on ethnic affiliations, with the Ovirnbundu composed largely of rural agriculturists occupying the highlands of the planalto, the
Kimbundu representative of a relatively privileged class residing dong the Coast, and the Bakongo a northern constituency with Zainan diaspora. These divisions are particularly strong in a UNITA mythology that distinguishes between the peasantry of Angola profunda from the rich whites, assimilados (Portuguese- oriented Angolans) and mestiços (mixed race) in Luanda. Since the creation of
James Currey, 1 995. 14 P CoIlier and A Hoeffler, 'Economic causes of civil wars', Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 1998, p 572. The authors explain ethno-linguistic fragmentation as a bamer to conflict due to the co- ordination costs irnposed by the fragmentation of the potentiaI rebels themselves, l5 P Collier, 'Doing well out of war'. in D Malone and M Berdal. eds. Greed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, p 1 1 1. The study employs income and asset inequality. ethnic and religious divisions, and poIitical repression as proxies for grievance. 'Angoia' as a political entity by Portuguese colonialists through to the present- day, these fractures have been deliberately exacerbated for political and economic gain by key actors in coloniai and post-colonial governance. Identities are therefore both a cause and an effect of the historical bi-rnodalism and dis- articulation of Angolan political economy- As elsewhere, identity construction and mobilisation has occurred through a complex and histoncal inter-penetration of the political, economic and social spheres.
In a second revisionist thrust, the fashionable trend of attributing conflict tu
'resource scarcity' has been revisited. A recognition of the mutuai interdependence between human societies and the natural environment is to be applauded. Evidence of 'eco~iolence"~is nevertheless overshadowed by cases where it is resource abundance, not scarcity, which fuels violence. A recent study by Indra de Soysa demonstrates a positive correIation between an abundance of sub-soi1 resources such as rninerals and oil. and levels of intra-state conf~ict." An under-populated country with abundant resource wealth, Angola is an archetype of the 'honey pot' thesis that rapacity rather than paucity drives conflict.
However Collier and Hoeffler find the relationship of natural resources and conflict to be non-monotonic, that is, at a certain level a plentifùl resource base increases a country's propensity to violence while at a higher level natural
l6T Homer-Dixon. The environment, scarciry and violence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999; T Homer Dixon and J Blitt, eds, Ecoviolence: Links arnong environmenr. population and securiry, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. 1999. " I de Soysa. 'Narural resources and civil war: Shrinking pie or honey pot?'. paper presented to the 41st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 14-18 March 2000, Los Angeles, 20 March, 2000; 1 de Soysa, 'The resource curse: Are civil wars driven by rapacity or paucity', in D Malone and M Berdal, eds, Creed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp 1 12- 130. resources reduce the likelihood of war. The authors explain the phenornenon as
reflecting the government's financial capacity to defend itself through rnilitary e~~enditure.'~Recent events indicate, however, that Angola wiii likely prove an outlier in such analyses, as the FAA's oil-fuelled rearmament and its subsequent victory over UNITA'S conventional forces has done little to decrease either side's propensity to violence, Nor is it clear that the absence of war will lead to significant improvements in the lot of the Angolan people given the governance and development practices of the MPLA.
Dire predictions for Angola's human secunty/deveiopment prospects are supported by recent works that elucidate the correlation between high-Ievels of resource wealth and violent conflict, as well as Iow levels of economic, human and insûtutional devel~prnent.'~In Angola, resource rents have clearly insulated both the MPLA and UNlTA 'from the economic and political consequences of their malfeasance', aliowing them to ignore interna1 and extemal pressures for reform." The MPLA, in particular, has used the oil rent to finance self-serving forms of 'narrow development' that exacerbate inequdities, thereby accelerating relative deprivation and playing into üNïïA's hands by magnifying grievances, decreasing the opportunity cost of UNITA labour and increasing the attraction of
'* P Collier and A Hoeffler, 'On economic causes of civil war', 1998. p 570. l9 1 Sachs and A Wamer, 'The big push. natural resource booms and growth', Journal of Development Economics, 59, 1999, pp 43-76 'O D Sogge, 'Angola: Surviving against mllback and peuodollars', in M Duffield, J Macrae and A Zwi, eds, War and kunger, London: Zed, 1994, p 98. Witness the divergent outcornes between aid-dependent, resource scarce Mozambique, where actors proved susceptible to international pressures, and AngoIa insurgency as an economic, as much as a political, strategy for would-be rebels."
But encouraging broad-based development threatens the economic and political
pnvileges enjoyed by the MPLA, the majonty of which are contingent on the
existence of the cover of war and the excuses it brïngs. Indeed, one begins to see
a vicious circle: conflict provides the regime with an alibi for failed development
and the authoritarianism and praetorianism central its (mis)rule: in tum, this
foments UNITA'S insurgency and provides it with an ostensible raison d'êrre.
Such recognition of the political and economic hnctionaliîy of violence has
undermined 'dysfunctional' views of war. A third revisionist debate has therefore
led to the notion that war can be beneficial for certain individuals and groups
within conflicted societies. 'To understand the range of possible relationships
between war and socio-politicai development', argues Mark Chingono, 'war has
to be viewed as a dialectical and historical process capable of multiple consequences, positive as well as negative7.?' Anyone familiar with the
devastation wrought by contemporary conflicts will find the 'benefits of war'
thesis discornforting. It replaces facile notions of war as disorderly wiih a more refined view of war as 'functional disorder', and in so doing, challenges the ontological assumption in orthodox international relations that 'life, tmth and property' are the elementary and universal goals of social order? Clearly, much of the vioIence in civil war is directed towards the maintenance of systems of
" See T Addison, P Le Billon and S Mansoob Murshed, 'Finance in conflict and reconsrruction', paper presented to the InternationaI Political Science Association RC#40 Workshop, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, August 8- 1 1,2000. " M Chingono, The srare. violence and developrnent, Aldenhot: Avebury, 1996, p xiii. disorder in which security, contract and possession are subject to the whims of
those with rneans of coercion at their disposal. 'War is not just the breakdown of
society: it is the reordering of society in particular ways'." And if war creates
constituencies of 'winners' and 'Iosers', then there are strong inducements to ally
oneself with groups that benefit from violence - a reaiisation with implications for
the initiation, perpetuation and renewai of conflict.
While denying that contemporary patterns of sub-state warfare are random
and chaotic, a political economy of war perspective does suggest that belligerents
may act in ways contrary to conventionai expectations. In particular, the apparent
confusion of contemporary conflict may result from the fact that the aim of war is
not necessarily to 'win' in the sense of achieving political or military objectives
such as control of the state apparatus, or defeat of the enemy- Accepting that
violence can be Functiond, it follows that belligerents rnay orient themselves
towards the maintenance of violence and the purposes it serves by intentionally
prolonging war. The suspension of legality, for example, is required to redise asset transfer through parallel and black markets by rneans that would otherwise
be prosecuted or considered illegitimate, Conflict dso produces changes in inter- personal and gender relations that subvert cultural custom, allowing such practices as forced marriage 'war brides' and rape. Psychological rationales for war among disaffected segments of the population, particularly among young men, aiso need to be considered. In recognition of these incentives for continued
" H Bull, The anarchical sociew A srudy of order in world polirics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, p 5. violence, David Keen proposes that we be ready to overtum prevailing assurnptions about conflict in proposing that 'the "end" is to engage in abuses and crimes that bring imrnediate rewards, whereas the "means" is war and the perpetuation of war9.=
Beyond refuting key tenets of the 'new barbarism', a key strength of the literature on the political economy of war is its focus on the link between processes of contemporary globalisation and the dynamics of interna1 and regionalised conflicts. Transformations in the international trade and financiai systems and the intensification of transborder commercial transactions have profoundly shaped war econornies and the conflicts they sustain. The timing of the new dispensation of 'globalisation' conveniently coincided with the end of the era of Cold War largesse in the Gnancing of insurgency. In lieu of outside support, the criminal econornies developed to sustain and pursue violence have increasingly tapped into the formal economy and networks of trade, production and finance. 'Today's so-called warlords or failed States may act locally, but to survive they have to think globaily' argues Mark Duffield. 'In this respect, a high level of cornplicity arnong international companies, offshore banking facilities and northern govemments has assisted the development of war e~onornies'.'~
24 A de Waal quoted in L Cliffe and R Luckharn, 'Cornpiex emergencies and the state: Failure and the fate of the state', Third World Quanerfy,20(1), 1999, p 38. '5 D Keen, 'Incentives and disincentives for violence', in D Malone and M Berdal, eds, Greed and rievance, 2000, p 29. f6 M Duffield, 'Globalization, transborder trade and war econornies', in D Malone and M Berdal, eds, Greed and grievance, 2000, p 84. The political economy of disorder War represents the apex of organised violence. Yet violence - either defined narrowfy as the arbitrary exercise of physical force, or threats thereto, in order to achieve cornpliance, or broadly in terrns of 'structural vioIence7 - is a dominant feature of political, economic and social relations in times of peace as well.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Afnca, as recent rationd-choice and neo- institutional works, and the post-positivist, second-wave French school of African studies shrewdly demonstrate. Despite diverse, even contradictory, rnethodological and theoretical approaches, these literatures can be grouped together under the rubric of the political economy of disorder, wherein disorder is not simply 'chaos', but rather a different kind of order." This perspective demonstrates how Mrica 'functions' both in spite of, and indeed because of, the absence of security and development,
Just as scholarship has stmggled to come to terms with contemporary conflict,
Africa's condition of cnsis has similarly engendered scholarship that resorts to narratives of 'dysfunctionaiity' and 'breakdown'. Consider two pieces of orthodox scholarship. In William Zartman's textbook definition of state collapse, one returns to the farniliar notion of 'faiiure': 'State collapse is marked by the loss of control over political and econornic space7.'' The assumption here is that the regime attempted, and failed, to satisfy the demands of various groups in
" P Chabal & JP Daloz. Africa work: Disorder as a poliricd instncmenr, Bloornington: Indiana University Press for the International African Institute, 1999, p 155. " IW Zmrnan. ed, Co flapsed stares: The disin regration and resrorurion of legitimare authoriry. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1995, p 9. ~ociet~.'~State collapse is the ultimate failure of the process of state building,
which Mohammed Ayoob cktims is the central preoccupation of state dites
attempting to impose political order on temtories and populations under their
control. He wntes: 'the interna1 dimension of security, which is inextricably
intertwined with the process of state making, is the core variable that determines
the Third World state's secunty problematic'.30
Opposite these theoretical assumptions, recent analysis of the African
situation reveais that the fia-gmentation of the post-colonial African state represents neither an inability to meet societai demands, nor the breakdown of the state making enterprise. Rather than atuibuting the continent's condition to dysfunctionality, one should look towards the linkages between politics, economics, and the high-degree of violence prevalent in certain Afica societies.
Examination of this nexus is found in studies variously describing contemporary
Africa in tems of 'crirninalisation of the state', 'warlord politics', 'shadow states' or the more comprehensive paradigrn, 'the political instnimentaiization of di~order'.~'A common element in these works is the observation that modes of governance, responding to the pressures and opportunities presented by globalisations, have intertwined politics and economics in ways inimicai to human security/development.
39 Ibid., p 8. M M Ayoob, The third ~vurldsecuri~ predicamenr: Srare making, regional conflicr arrd rhe international sysrem, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995. p 21. " JF Bayart- S Ellis and B Hibou. The criminalisafiun of rhe srare in Afnca. Bloomington: Indiana University Press for the International Africa Institute, 1999; W Reno, Warlord politics and African states. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; and P Chabal & JP DaIoz, Africa works, 1999. In Corruption and state poiitics in Sierra Leone, Reno demonstrates that
processes of state collapse often represent an adaptive, ruthlessly pragrnatic, and
deliberate strategy for rnaintaining political power and its rentier privileges. As
Reno argues, Sierra Leone's leaders 'become rich, control diverse avenues of
illicit exchange and exercise considerable power. .. because of the collapsing
formal state's incapacity to reverse the sharp contraction of revenue^'.^' Much as
with Freetown, so key rnembers in Luanda's Futungo (the Angolan Presidentid
Palace) engage in politically and economicdly motivated illicit activities under
the cover of war and state collapse, including non-transparency in oil accounts,
dual-foreign exchange schemes, kickbacks for arrns purchases, the privatisation of
rnilitary services (often into enterprises run by senior military officials) and
military ventures in the rnining and secunty sectors. The legal fiction that is the state in these situations disguises a real entity exercising parochially-wielded power in pursuit of economic rents, what Reno terrns the shadow state (and its intra- and extra-factional challengers).33
Instead of engaging in state building then, Angolan elites have responded to internal insecurity by purposely emaciating state structures and institutions, with the obvious exception of a bloated and semi-autonomous secunty apparatus dependent upon continued strife to guarantee its privileged political and commercial roles. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz explicate how
'' W Reno. Corruption and srare politics in Sierra Leone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p 2. 33 Ibid.: for a description of Angola as the quintessenrial shadow state, see R Cornwall and V Gamba, 'Arms,elites and resources', in D Malone and M Berdal, eds, Greed and grievance, 2000, p 164. conditions of disorder are politicaily instrumentaliseci through a 'process by which political actors in Mica seek to maximise their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty, and sometimes even chaos, which charactenses most African polities'.3J In a sirnilar vein, Reno's Wadord politics und African srates demonstrates how a rational strategy of politicd survival can entai1 the complete neglect of the representative, developmentd, bureaucratic and even rnilitary functions of the state. Frequently, weak state regimes, as with warlords, do not unintentionally 'lose' popular legitimacy so much as 'abjure' the option of cultivating broad legitimacy. The logic of neopatrimonidism demands as much: in order for it to function, patrons must impose negative externaiities in the fom of insecurity and impoverishment on subjects who must then seek the favour of the mler in order to exempt themselves from these condition^.'^ What cornes to be acknowledged as 'the state' represents nothing more than a infra-institutional arrangement between a select group of rulers and their private security apparati.
In this analysis, the primary function of the 'state' is the coerced accumulation of economic rents by wielding 'sovereignty' as a politico-legal resource for mediating economic transactions between the local and the
The above studies highlight the role of foreigners in creating incentives for modes of govemance that thrive on disorder. Reno's work attributes contemporary shifts from bureaucratic to arbitrary rule founded on the control of
Y P Chabal and JP Daloz, Africa workr, 1999. p xviii. '* W Reno, 'Shadow states and the political economy of civil wars', in D Malone and M Berdal. Greed and grievance, eds, 2000. p 47. informal markets to the unintended consequences of neo-liberal structural
adjustment. Sirnilarly, Jean-François Bayart observes that pressures for 'good
governance' via conditionalities meant to encourage democratisation,
privatisation and the promotion of civil society have often produced centrifuga1
pressures that induce 'power hoiders to beat a path to the strategic niches of the
criminal underworld' .37
While fostering pessimïsm, this line of thinking also hints that properly
framed interventions could promote the opposite effects and, in the process,
alleviate the dismal security and developmental conditions facing most Afncans.
The challenge facing external actors, including proponents of the sanctions
approach to the AngoIan conflict, is therefore the complex task of reversing the damage of past rnistakes without compounding present problems, a task requinng subtie and sophisticated analysis that informs like responses.
Power, accumulation and violence In The Crirninalisation of the State in Africa, the importance of the
'crimindisation' phenornenon is frarned ir, terms of a transformation of 'the fundamental determinants of any political order: power, accumulation, and the exercise of violence'.38 These three cenîral axes - power, accumulation and violence - map a political economy of violence, a terrn used here to refer to the linkages between modes of power and accumulation underwritten by violence. In
For a cornprehensive account of how the negative sovereignty regime supports illegirimate Third WorId state behaviours see R Jackson, Quasi-srares: Sovereignry, International and the Third Worfd, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. " IF Baya S Ellis and B Hibou. The crirninalisation of the srare, 1999. p 48. this sense, the concept is closely related to notions of human security and human development insofar as these focus on violence as an impediment both to the secunty of persons, but also as an obstacle to meaningfbi developrnental progress.
As implied in the 'political economyo aspect, the focus is on patterns and structures of political and economic interaction. But whereas a political economy approach might stress political conflict's generation of economic structures, in the cases examined below a reversai of cause and effect equally obtains: conflict over the control of markets results in a reconfiguration of political structures, including the state, its coercive apparatus and the organised armed actors challenging the state's authority, The conjoined notion of 'violence' can be considered both as a rneans and an end. Where actors lack Iegitimacy, actual or potentid violence forces reluctant cornpliance. And when a particular politico-economic arrangement is at risk, violence may be instrumental in its maintenance. Yet violence cm aiso be an end in itself. Breakdowns of the state's monopoly on the means of physical coercion create security vacuums with politicd md econorn.ic potential. Violence might therefore be most usefully organised around a situation of perpetual threat that impedes efforts to impose legd order and state authority, but without the large-scale fighting that rnight disrupt modes of accumulation and the actual exercise of power in territones under the control of belligerents.
In one sense, this chapter serves as a somewhat belated cal1 to recognise the utility of a political economy of violence analysis given the increasing influence of the discourse in theory and praxis. A recent volume argued that 'little systematic attention' is being given 'to the precise role of economically motivated actions and processes in generating and sustaining contemporary confli~ts'.'~
However, a series of publications, research programmes and policy initiatives demonstrate a mainstreaming of political economy approaches. The Red Cross, for example, recently published an edited volume on the subject titied War,
Money and ~urvival.~~Similarly, the World Bank has organised a network of scholars researching 'The economics of political and criminal violence' in order to instruct policy initiatives4' Most prominently, the sanctions approach to conflict in Angola, initiatives on 'blood diamonds', and sustained pressures from
NGOs are indicative of a direct focus on the war econornies of insurgents and their connections to global markets (see chapter four).
However, just as the tenets of the 'new barbarism' obscure the underlying causes of conflict, often to the benefit of actors disinclined to intervene, a focus on economic agendas in civil wars may be Iikewise distorting poky approaches to conflict in ways that reflect vested interests. One wonying indicator is the andogous 'media-friendliness' in the presumed causal frameworks advanced by the two schools of conflict analysis: witness the mono-causal sirnilarity between the discursive narratives of the new barbarism, wherein conflict is the result of
'ancient hatreds ', and the materiai empbasis of political economy approaches that attribute violence to 'Loot-seeking'. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the
'' M Berdal and D Malone, 'Introduction', in D Malone and M Berdal, eds, Greed and grievance. 2000, p 1. 40 ICRC, War.money and survival, Geneva: International Cornmittee of the Red Cross. 2000. 4 1 See World Bank, World development report 1997, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p 159; see the unit's web-site at http://www.worldbank.org/researcfi/conflict.htm theoretical limitations of a politicai economy of violence approach in order to
prevent or detect their manifestation in policy responses.
First, models that lean too closely towards rationalchoice methodology
assume a hyper-rationality that borders on the absurd. Thandika Mkandawire,
citing a number of problems with the portraya1 of certain conflicts as rational,
contrasts individual and collective rationalities: 'in most communities concerned,
the wayward behaviour of youth and the mayhem they have perpetuated
symbolise a breakdown of order, an erosion of values or a confounding of
collective wisdom and rationdity'; he continues: 'there is a whiff of arrogance to
the view that a visiting scholar sees rationality where no one else does'."
Certainly there is good reason to temper the degree to which we infuse conflict
with rationality. In fact, were belligerents the profit-motivated homo econornicus that models assume them to be, predicted outcomes in many 'greed-driven' rebellions would be quite different. Why, for example, would Jonas Savirnbi nsk death to renew UNITA'S attempts, against the odds, to capture power in Angola?
Afier successfully looting hundreds of millions of dollars of diamond revenues and enshrining UNITA in key positions of patronage during the Lusaka process, the risks assumed by continuing to prosecute the war defy a purely econornic explanation. Until recently at Ieast, UNITA'S rnilitary successes belie attempts to poruay the movement as a criminal syndicate focused on accumulation given the self-defeating Iogic of purely econornically-driven violence: 'stealing from everyone inevitably results in the isolation of the lebels from every possible support group and, as the foot soldiers rob the leaders, organisational coherence
will suffer. Economic logic is not the sarne as the logic needed for effective
combat organisation'.43 As Lionel Cliffe and Robin Luckharn warn. a political
economy perspective on conflict potentially reduces anaiysis to a 'single common denorninator... what one might term a warlord rational actor approach'.?4
Such an approach finds perfect expression in models that expiain greed-driven rebellion in terms of micro-economic and game-theoretic principles including transaction costs, collective action, opportunity cost, expected utility etc. Though useful in establishing generalised conditions through statistical analysis, this approach is often obscuring. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler are representative of this school:
Civil wars are less Iikely the higher is their opportunity cost, the fewer are Iootable resources, and the more substantiai are the obstacles to collective action. The variable which is insignificant is the dernand for justice. We found no evidence that the Ievel of grievance is an important influence on civil war' .45
The insignificance of 'grievance' as an independent variable, however, more likely reflects the difficulty of operationaiising discursive factors into statistical formulae. It is impossible, for exarnple, to consider individual histones of indoctrination, coercion and suffering, much less the degree to which complex and subjective cultural practices animate behaviours consistent with 'grievance'.
42 T Mkandawire. 'The terrible tol1 taken by post-colonial "rebel movernents" in Africa', in War, money and survival, 2000, p 33. 43 J Herbst, 'Organisation of rebellion in Africa', paper presented to the Conference on the economics of criminal and political violence, Princeton University, March 2000, p 16. Another exampie would be Foday Sankoh's decision to abandon the Lomé peace, for which he now faces potential war-crimes charges. 4.4 L Cliffe and R Luckham, 'Cornplex political emergencies', 1999, p 39. Another factor to bear in mind is the inaccurate portrayal of insurgents as unitary actors. Efforts to trace the econornic agendas of belligerents in civil wars will fail unless they recogise the heterogeneity of interests represented in actors like UNïïA and the MPLA. At times, factions within these movements are closer to one another than to their respective leaderships, as when generals carve up exchange relationships in the production and marketing of diarnonds. Ultimately, it is worthwhile to beâr in mind that understanding econornic agendas starts not with actors Iike UNITA, the MPLA or De Beers, but wiih andysis of the individual guerrilla, the bureaucrat, the consumer and shareholder; a reminder that also has relevance for those who would reify the structural elements of a political economy of violence framework.
Finally, one must recognise the historicity of contemporary patterns and processes. The end of the Cold War and apartheid did not necessarily signify a clear rupture in the strategies employed by weak-state rulers and the warlords that challenge their authority. Viewing the political economy of war as a novel development, characterised by the degeneration of rnovements previously motivated by ideological factors into criminal syndicates, ignores the economic aspects of earlier revolutionary movements that very rarely had purely ideological motivations. Even UNITA's transformation into the world's largest criminal diamond smuggling syndicate predates the end of the Cold War. Bayart remedies the short-sightedness of placing undue emphasis on the elements of discontinuity:
'the crirninalization of the political societies and the economies of the sub-
* P Collier and A Hoeffler. 'Justice-seeking and loot-seeking in civit wars', World Bank mimeo, continent, if it indeed cornes about, can onfy occur as the product of specific
historical e~periences'.'~It goes without saying that mechanisms, relationships,
and habits developed during wars also transcend the confiict period, often
working to subvert transitions to peace.
A rnixed-motive approach Understanding the cornplexity of economic agendas in conflict situations and their
influence on the political and rnilitary spheres is fundamental, but the task does
not end there. In understanding violence, no less than in the formulation of
lasting solutions to protracted conflict, one must adopt a more comprehensive
approach to the mixture of motives for resorting to violence in war-tom societies.
In terms of analysis, as demonsuated in the above critique, a political
economy narrow1y focused on material elements Ioses much of its value if not
supplemented by alternative narratives steeped in cultural anthropology,
ethnography, geography, history, psychology and other social sciences. These
disciplines provide insights into the non-material registers of political, econornic
and social intercourse, and advance understandings of the inteisect between the
material and non-material dimensions. In general terms, a non-economic reading
shows that war econornies have multiple functions beyond the econornic, political
or rnilitary. For example, in Angola one sees the intersect between the political and moral econornies whenever accumulation occurs not merely for materiai gain
17 February 1999, p 15. 46 JF Bayan. 'The social capital of the felonious state'. in JF Bayan. S Ellis and B Hibou, The criminalisation of the srate, 1999, p 33. but also serves a variety of social fbnctions in Hyden's economy of affection, with
Savimbi an archetypal 'Big Man' deterrnined to maintain a prestigious social
standing arnongst his foll~wers.~' Likewise, subjective moral ternplates
sanctioning behaviours deemed 'illegitimate' in western cultures, such as petty
graft, verticai corruption, and on occasion violence, cannot be explored through
traditionai politicai economy. Understanding these phenomena, as particular
elements determining conflict trajectories, requires a refined and subtle approach
cognisant of the rnulti-faceted dimensions of violence that is approximated in
certain cnticd political economy perspectives-
B y attempting to pressure the diamond marketing that underwri tes UNITA'S
war efforts, the sanctions approach seeks to create an incentive for peace.
However, this blunt approach fails to reflect a more refined understanding of the
functions served by UNITA'S war economy or local inter-subjective motivations underlying regional violence. Collier has argued that because rebels attempt to justiQ loot-seeking with narratives of grievance, that narrative provides 'no informational content' to the researcher as to their motivations. The arrogance of that assertion goes a long way towards explaining the single-common denominaior approach underlying the embargo on UNTïA, and efforts to marginalise Savimbi from dialogue while neglecting to engage moderate UNITA factions.48
47 See G Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, London: Heinemann, 1980. '* P Collier. 'Doing well out of war', paper prepared to the Conference on economic agendas in civil wars, London, 26-27 April 1999, pp 2-3. There are legitirnate ethical objections to engaging in negotiation with brutal warlords and their henchrnen, let alone recognising the legitimacy of their claims.
What they have to Say, however, may provide key insights. And where violence is the language of political interaction, we should not necessarily be deterred if opposition to authority perceived as illegitimate assumes a violent, even brutal, character.
In terms of examining conflict narratives, Angola presents clear difficulties.
As Savirnbi and other senior UN-lTA officiais have argued, 'UNITA keeps control of diamond areas for the sake of its own survival', and 'Diarnonds are UNITA's life blood. Without them UNITA would not be able to maintain its options ...
UNITA needed to maintain military reserves so that the government doesn't destroy us'.49 These oft-quoted statements are used to support the notion that curtailing diamond revenues will lead to UNITA'S extinction. h fact, these statements are UNITA rhetoric designed to defend its refisai to allow the extension of state authority into diamondiferous regions during the peace processes; in other words, they approximate attempts to justify 'loot-seeking7 through a discourse of grïevance.
A more revealing narrative is the popular Angoian slogan 'UNITA kills, the
MPLA steak'. This simple staternent attests to the broad illegitimacy of both
UNTTA and the MPLA, It also proclaims the incornplete nature of the sanctions approach, which attempts to justify the exclusive focus on UNITA by arguing that Savimbi's overwhelming responsibility for the current conflict somehow exempts the MPLA - and its extemal partners - from similar scrutiny. UNITA's bloody insurgency is clearly related to the MPLA's gross corruption, and vice
versa, but no approach claiming to be cornprehensive or effective can address
'UNFA killing' without a corresponding focus on 'MPLA stealing'.
49 Quoted in Global Witness. 'A rough trade'. 1998. p i: Human Rights Watch, Angola unraveLs. 1999. 2
UNITA IN POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE,
1966-1991
When UNlTA was formed in 1966, it faced the critical chaiiengè confronting ail
insurgencies: how to satisfy the resources needs essential to the survival of an
effective armed political movement; needs that Christopher Clapham breaks down
into armaments, food, publicity and diplomatic reco-pition, dl of which require
rn~ne~.~~Throughout its history, UNITA has constnicted multiple economies for
satisfying these needs, ofien by exploiting several commercial networks at once.
There is a fundamentai relationship between these economies, almost exclusively
rooted in coercion, and the politico-rnilitary power at the movement's disposai.
Correspondingly, UNITA'S politico-militâry objectives, strategies and
organisation reflect the economic requirements of an effective insurgent war.
Demonstrating a high degree of flexibility in reconfigunng its war economy to
changing interna1 and external realities, UNITA has successfûlly responded to the
challenges of financing a large-scale insurgency for the better part of three
decades.
The following chapter chronologically examines UNITA'S efforts in this
regard from its inception in 1966 through to 199 1, while the third chapter canies
" C Clapham, 'International relations of Africa's guerrilla movements'. The South African Journal of lnrernarional Affairs, 3(1), I995, p 86.
33 through to the present-day. This chronology coincides with UNITA'S shift to an
almost exclusive focus on diamond rnining after the Bicesse peace in 1991, but
should not overemphasise distinctions between UNITA'S pre- and post-Cold
Wadapartheid war economies. Indeed, the two chapters demonstrate the
transcendence of critical cornmerciai networks, structures, and practices in
UNITA'S political and military economy. As UNITA'S economy cannot be
understood without reference to that of the governrnent, this section dso examines
the MPLA's role in Angolan political economy of violence.
International isolation, as enforced by the sanctions regime, is only the latest
challenge threatening UNITA'S econornic survivai. By examining UNITA'S
previous - and overwhelrningly successfuI - adaptations, and the non-diamond
alternatives to its present configuration, prospects for the sanctions regime are
pIaced in historical context and infüsed with a dose of sceptical realism. While
sanctions will certainly affect the politico-rniIitary options pursued by UNITA,
they rnay not necessady promote a pacification of the movement or hasten its rniiitary destruction by the FAA.
The 'liberation' stmggle Violence has been the dominant feature of Angolan political economy thoughout recorded history, beginning with the arriva1 of Portuguese slave traders in the 15" century. Since then, 'arrned aggression' has been 'a continual counterpoint in the rhythrns of Angolan hi~tor~'.~'That humans were Angola's first globdy-traded
'' D Sogge. 'Angola'. 1994, p 93. 'cornmodity' is perhaps indicative of a path-dependence in Angolan political
economy of violence. As with the slave trade, the development of diarnond and
oil industries, founded in 19 12 and 1955 respectively, perrnitted a small coastal elite to benefit to the overwhelming detriment of the general population. Under conditions of inequality fostered by the Portuguese regime, opposition to colonial rule was born. In a process al1 too familiar in Afnca, however, the end of the colonial project merely accelerated processes of elite accumulation and further reinforced violence as the currency of Angolan political economy.
Modem organised resistance to Portuguese rule began in eamest in 196 1.
Eventually three nationalist movements ernerged, and despite attempts to draw their support nationally, al1 three had distinct ethno-regionai constituencies -
FNLA from the Bakongo, the MPLA from the Luanda alliance of creoles, assimiIados and the Mbundu, and the UNITA from the ~vimbundu.~~In the initial stages, these rnovements received the limited support of liberated Afncan
States and interested extemal powers: the FNLA from a newly independent Zaire, as well as Chinese ams and the interest of the US; the militant MPLA's from its ideological mentors in the Soviet Union, Cuba, Yugoslavia and, briefly, China.
UNITA was the last movement to emerge and had its genesis in the defection of Jonas Savimbi and an Ovimbundu bloc from the FNLA. Afier the MPLA rejected Savimbi's offer to join at his FNLA rank of foreign-secretary, he founded
UNITA. The group's platform initially called for nationalism and a Maoist doctrine of economic self-reliance and peasant education. Savimbi's espousai of
52 K Sommerville, 'Angola - Groping towards peace', 1997, p 15. an 'anti-Soviet social-impenalist' rhetoric contradicted his previous attempt to join the Soviet-aligned MPLA, but nevertheless gained WAChinese support; as evidenced throughout its history, the movement's ideology has been infinitely malleable. Initially, UNITA operated dong the Zambian border with the support of Kenneth Kuanda's independent governrnent, After attacking the Benguela railway (serving Zambia and Zaire's copper mines), UNITA Iost Zambian support. Thereafter, UNITA is alleged to have collaborated with the Portuguese military against MPLA forces in eastem ~ngola."
When not fighting one another the insurgents focused their limited military resources on efforts to disrupt Portuguese interests in the rnining and agriculture sectors. But the disorganised war of Iiberation led by the MPLA was far from capturing power when Portugal abruptfy announced its intention to depart its colonies after Lisbon's 'revolution of the carnations' in 1974. Planning for the transition process was hasty and half-hearted and, not surprisingly, the situation degenerated into a civil war among the three main movements. Portugal's subsequent withdrawal hastened external interventions and the regionalization of the conflict, providing ample opportunities for the MPLA and UNITA to obtain crucial resources through patronage and access to global markets.
The large power vacuum left in Portugal's wake drew the attention of regional and super powers intent on seeing their Angolan dies in power. Confined to the capital Luanda, the MPLA faced rnilitary offensives from an FNLA backed by intervening Zainan forces, and UNITA guerrillas supported by South African
'' G Wright, The destruction of a nation: United Srares policy rowards Angola since 1945, forces operating out of South African-administered Narnibia, To prop up the
MPLA in the face of a potentially decisive South African-UNITA offensive, Cuba
intervened with Soviet logistical assistance and proved crucial in defeating the
combined assault. African States reacted negatively to reports of UNITA'S
association with apartheid South Africa and the MPLA subsequentiy becarne the
diplornaticaily recognised government of Angola (with the notable exceptions of the US, Zaire and South Afnca). Defeated in its bid to capture the state, UNITA withdrew to the sanctuary of Narnibia to attempt to consolidate its authority in southern Angola.
Foreshadowing a long history of support for cross-border insurgencies that continues to piague any hopes for a 'security community' in southern/central
Afiica, Luanda offered its support to SWAPO insurgents and Katangan secessionists to retaliate for South African and Zairian interventions. When
Luanda and Kinshasa agreed to end their support of insurgencies operating in one another's territory, the Zairian-backed FNLA ceased to pose a military threat.
Several efforts to negotiate a sirnilar rapprochement with South Africa failed to hold until 1988.
The post-colonial period During the late-colonial period, the difficulties of obtaining adequate extemal support rnitigated the consequences of in-fighting arnong Angola's geographically limited Iiberation movements. Following independence, however, large-scale
London: Pluto Press, 1997, p 1 1.
\ u-ansfers of arrns, direct military interventions and pnvate investment created the conditions for a bloody civil war that, Save for two periods of armed peace, continues to this day. During this time, access to the global econorny, as much as the opportunity to place themselves in the context of regiond and superpower geo-politics, was crucial to the survival of both the Angolan govemrnent and its
UNITA opponent.
After its failed bid to capture the state, UNITA set about creating a fiefdom under the protection of South Africa. Assisted by the covert operations of South
Afiica's infamous 32 or Buffalo Battdion, UNITA waged a classic guemlla war frorn its headquarters in Jamba in Angola's extreme south-east and later moved into the central Angolan planalto. Denied access to the formal Angolan economy,
UNITA undertook a two-part economic strategy. First, UNITA worked to disrupt segments of the formal economy that benefited the govemment, in part hoping that this pressure would lead to popular revolt or state collapse. Secondly,
UNKA set about creating its own illicit, parallel and informal economies in the temtories it controlled.
Destabilisation and the oil rent
UNITA had good reason to be optimistic about the prospects for state collapse in
Angola. Besides facing military challenges, the MPLA was threatened on the econornic and political fronts. The govemment inherited an economy devastated by the effects of war and the exodus of Portuguese human and financial capital between 1974-1976. Non-oil GDP collapsed by 55 per cent between 1973 and 1977." Economic recovery was impeded by the failures of a decade-long experiment in state socialism, and politically, the consolidation of state authonty was hampered by the govemment's lack of appeal outside its traditional Luanda-
Mbundu constituency. Compounding these difficuities were internai power stniggles within the MPLA that culminated in a 1977 coup attempt.
There is a popular misconception of the Angolan government during the Cold
War as an African outpost of the Soviet empire, kept afloat only by comrnunist- bloc patronage and Cuban intervention. It is methat Cuban military assistance and Soviet arms at concessionary terms were essential to the capital intense warfare waged in Angola through the late-1970s and 1980s. Cuban troops eventually numbered almost 50 000, while Soviet military assistance between
1976-86 totalled $4 billion."
Far from being a Puppet of Soviet imperialism, however, the Angolan government initial1y advocated non-alignment and sought to independentiy fuel its war economy through a strategic alliance with multinational oil companies.
Unlike other sectors, the oil industry was never nationalised. Forgoing the development of an 'onshore', diversified and articulated economy, the government accelerated its reliance on petrodollars, forrning an enclave economy based on oil extracted from Cabinda and the northern Angolan Coast, predominantly in Soyo - an advantageous geographical concentration for the
" P Le Billon, *A land cuned by its wealth? Angola's war economy 1975-1999'. Helsinki: Worid lnstitute of Development Economics Research, p 4. IS Africa conremporary record estimates quoted in K O'Neill and B Munslow, 'Angola: Ending the Cold War in Southern Africa', in O Furley, ed, Conflict irz Africa, London: Tauns, 1995, p 190. beleaguered government- From independence onward, oil has been the keystone
in the government's political economy which, in turn, is geared towacrds two
functions that have become increasingly indistinct in Angola's political economy
of violence: prosecution of the war against UNITA and the enrichmentr of the
privileged elite connected to the MPLA regime.
A petroleum economy has several political and military advantages relevant to
MPLA rule. Most importantly, an oïl-dependent economy lends itrself to
centralised political control. PetroIeum operations were placed in the hands of
foreign multinationals beholden to the governent alone. Measures were devised
to circulate oïl revenues through channels centred on the Presidency, chereby
centralising patronage networks. Perhaps learning from the failed 1977 yutsch
launched by dissident factions within the party in conjunction with civil society
interests, an oil based economy allowed the MPLA to avoid the tbreats associated with independent powedwealth bases in a diversified pnvate sector.
Increasing reliance on petrodollars throughout the post-colonial era also reflected the ease with which the oil rent was integrated into the war ecomnomy, pnmarily through the role it played in procunng arms from the Eastern bloc until the late-1980s. Outside pnvileged sections of the population receiving the benefits of the oil rent - the 'oil n~rnenklatura'~~- the main beneficiary of
Angola's petroleurn development has been the ~nilitary.~'To defen-d the government against UNITA and its South African ally, the govemment created a
56 ME Ferreira. 'La reconversion économique de la nomenklatura pétroiiére', Politique africaine. 57, 1995, pp 1 1-26. 57 Global Witness, 'A crude awakening', 2000. bloated military apparatus that numbered some 127,000 by 199 1." Throughout the 1980s defence-related spending was upwards of 40 per cent of GDP. At levels close to $1 billion per year, such rnilitary spending was equalled in Afnca only by ~thio~ia.'~Fittingly, the govemment has now begun to pay off the $6 billion debt accumulated from Soviet anris purchases by granting oiI and diamoncl concessions to Russian c~rn~anies.~~
On top of these advantages, Angola's dependence on oil was partly infiuenced by UNITA'S politicai and military offensive against the government, UNITA destabilisation and propaganda largely precluded a revival of the agriculture and mining industries that forrned a substantial part of the colonial economy. The government distrusted the non-Mbundu labour required to run these industries and they were vulnerable to sabotage and UNITA pressure on transport links.
Together with South Afncan covert forces, UNITA periodicaily cut-off electricity and water supplies to major cities, and attacked the main Angolan railway running from Zaire's Shaba province to the port of ~obito.~'Extensive mine warfare dong roads and railways reduced govemment control over inland Angola to cities accessible only by costly air links. The country's iron and diarnond mines were likewise under perpetual threat of UNITA attack.
Hurnan Rights Watch, Angola: Amstrade and violarion of the laws of war, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994, p 25. 59 K Sommerville, 'Angola - Groping towards peace', p 23; Human Rights Watch, Landmines in Angola, New York: Afnca Watch, 1993. 'Angolan diamonds. De Beers' worst fnend', Econornisr, 22 August 1998. South Afica encouraged selective attacks on infrastructure. Denied this transport link much of Angola and southern Africa's trade was re-routed through South Afncan ports, thereby increasing these country's dependence on South Afnca and allowing opportunities for sanctions-busting on mis-Iabelled goods (RT Naylor, Parriors and profireers: On economic warfare. embargo busting and state-sponsored crime, Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1999, p 176). Petroleum's centrality to the MPLA wai- economy is nowhere better
demonstrated than in an unlikely episode of cold war CO-operationthat saw Cuban
troops assigned to defend the oil production sites of US muitinationals from
UNITA sabotage. In fact, during the struggle for independence, Gulf Oil (later
Chevron) was the MPLA's main financial backer even as the CIA backed FNLA
forces6' Sirnilarly, diamond production by Anglo-South African De Beers, in
association with parastatal Diarnang, was guarded by the MPLA between 1975
and 1980 with revenues indirectly funding UNITA &ter being recycled through
De Beers' corporate taxes in South ~frica.~~
The South Afican connection
For UNITA, attempts to paralyse the forrnal economy have always dovetailed
with its own commercial activities. Thus, tactical mine Iaying is used as part of a
CO-ordinatedstrategy of route denial that allows UNlTA to extract road taxes.M
Similarly, supplies of humanitarian relief are manipulated through control of
ground transport and population movements in ways that ailow UNITA to attract
aid to areas under its contr01.~~Along with rendering agricultural areas unusable
through cxtensive landmine use and a 'manioc war' designed to attack food supplies, controllinp the food supply allows local UNITA cornmanders to profit
'' K O'Neill and B MunsIow, 'Angola: Ending the Cold War', 1995, p 193. Jay Epstein speculates that De Been' presence in Angola was facilitated b y a Oroader agreement the cartel suvck with the Soviet Union to market its production whereby the Soviets used their influence arnong Afncan revolutionary rnovements to help De Beers retain conuol over Afncan production (see J Epstein, The rise and fa11 of diamonds, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982, p 11. & Hurnan Rights Watch, Angola: Berween war and peace: Arms rrade and humn righrs abuses since rhe Lusaka Protocof, 8( 1 A), February 1996, p 34, from artificially inflated food prices. Other local sources of revenues include the extraction of food taxes, and forced labour in agriculture and rnining. Coercion underwrites the economies of both sides, but UNITA is especially prone to using terror.
While methods of accumulation through predation are important, they ultimately work to undermine UNITA'S legitirnacy arnong affected populations.
Therefore, dunng the 1980s7greater emphasis was pIaced on the opportunities presented by South Af'can interests in Angola. The ideologicai paradox of a black AErican 'liberation movement' pairing with apartheid South Afrïca was ignored in favour of a shared anti-comrnunism, overlooking, of course, Savimbi's early flirtation with Maoism. Through the South African connection, UNITA'S commercial operations became integrated into the complex regional illicit econorny constructed by the apartheid security apparatus to circumvent sanctions and finance its regional military excursions. Importantly, the networks constnicted during this era continue to play an important role in the regional economy of crime by capitalising on opportunities created by UNITA?
From an economic perspective, South Africa7sinterest in the conflict supplied
UNITA with a ready source of ms, finances, and critical resources including fuel, medicines and food, much of it funnelled through UNITA'S Namibian sanctuary. With this assistance, South Africa facilitated the growth of an economy that would achieve a 'GDP' of well over half a billion dollars by the
" Human Rights Watch. Landmines in Angola, New York: Africa Watch, 1993. See S Ellis, 'The new fionriers of crime in South Africa', in JF Bayan, S Ellis and B Hibou. The criminafisation of the srate, 1999. 1990s. In 1980, South Afncan Military Intelligence founded Frarna Inter-trading
(Pty) Ltd., a private front Company created to supply UNITA. Frarna's vehicles participated in the contraband trade of illicit animal parts, especiaily ivory and rhinoceros horn, and traded rare hardwoods through ~amibia.~'UNITTA also counterfeited Angolan currency, traded in illegal dmgs such as cocaïne and
Mandrax, and began exploring the production and marketing of gold and diarn~nds.~'Additional support came by way of corporate sponsors and independent businessmen, in part as a result of Savimbi's professed free-market o~ientation.~~Elf-Aquitaine hedged its support of the government with financial support for UNITA in the event Savimbi assumed power.70 Similarly, Lonrho
Corporation backed UNITA in the hopes of future minera1 concessions,
South African engagement in Angola peaked with large-scale invasions between 1981-83, and again in 1987-88 with the decisive defeat at Cuito
Caunavaie, after which South Africa realised that victory was out of reach." In
1988, South Afnca agreed to a phased withdrawal from southern Angola and
Namibia on the condition that Cuban forces quit Angola. Importantiy however, departing South African forces left behind massive amounts of war matérial and
South Africa's Directorate of Military InteIligence continued to covedy supply
67 Republic of South Africa Justice ME KurnIeben, 'Commission of enquiry into the alleged smuggling of and ikgal uade in ivory and rhinoceros horn in South Africa', Report, Pretoria: State Pnnter, 1996. RT Naylor, Patriots and Profireers. 1999, p 178. 69 F Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A key to Africa, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988. 'Total-Elf, guerre de l'ombre', La lettre du continent, 2 September 1999; RT Naylor. Patriors and Profiteers, 1999, p 177. '' K O'Neill and B Muslow, 'Angola: Ending the Cold War', 1995, pp 183-197. UNITA until at least eariy 1993." Importantly, however, rnany of the individuais
operating in covert public agencies simply relocated to the private sector. Air
charters operating from South Africa, Namibia and Zarnbia have been a crucial
lifeline for UNITA and continue to supply its forces in defiance of UN
sanctions." Further, the notorious private rnilitary Company Executive Outcomes,
composed largely of former members of 32 or Buffalo Battalion, was also
involved with UNITA during 1993 and early 1993 after which time it secured a substantial contract with Luanda (see chapter three).'"
US support and the reconfguration of UNITA operations
Despite continued South African support, pubiic and private, UNITA lost the smctuary on its south flank with Narnibian independence. Faced with new geo- strategic realities and a shifting international environment, UNITA radicaily reorganised its war econorny. Its success in adjusting to the loss of overt South
African support and the winding down of the CoId War surprised even the
Angolan govemment. At the time, senior members of the MPLA predicted that
UNITA would 'cease to exist within a year'.75 Against al1 expectations, in the
i? Human Rights Watch, Angola: Ams rrade and violarions. 1994, pp 53-54. Human Rights Watch suggests that South Afncan arms manufacturer, Armscor, may have continued to covertly supply UNTTA nght up until 1994. 73 M Berdal, 'The resurnption of the civil war in Angola', Jane's Intelligence Review. June 1993, pp 284-85. K Pech, 'Executive Outcomes - A corporate conquest', in J CiIliers and P Mason, eds, Peace. profit or plunder: The privatisation of securiq in war-tom Aflcan States, South Afnca: Halfway House for the Institute of Security Studies, 1999, pp 81-109. '' Luis Neto Kiambata. former Angolan ambassador to Zarnbia. quoted in A Malaquias, 'Angola: The foreign policy of a decaying state', in S Wright, ed, African foreign policies, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999, p 28. irnmediate post-apartheidhipolar eras, UNlTA's power and wedth grew exponentiaiiy.
Initially, the loss of South Afnca was partidly offset by the renewal of
American covert support in 1985 with the repeal of the 1976 Clark Amendment prohibiting US support for Angolan factions. As a beneficiary of the Reagan
Doctrine, UNITA wouid become the second largest recipient of US covert assistance after the Afghani mujahadeen. Between 1985 and 1991, this aid totalled approximately $250 million excluding unknown funds from the 'Irangate'
~candal.~~When Savimbi visited Washington in 1986, he was praised by
President Reagan as a 'freedom fighter' against 'Soviet expansionism', a warm reception reflecting a costiy lobbying campaign conducted by US public relations firm Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly on Savimbi's behalfe7'
In preparation for South AfÏ-ica7s departure and the loss of Namibian sanctuary, UNITA began to extend its range of operations into northern Angola dui-ing the mid-1980s. In 1988, the US and Zainan militaries conducted joint manoeuvres to provide logistical support for a northern UNITA base within
aire.^' The expansive and remote border provided UNKA with a safe rear-base and a conduit for CIA weapons uansfers. Further, UNITA could now conduct joint operations against Angolan oil production with the FLEC, a Cabindan separatist group.
76 Human Rights Watch, Angola: Ams trade and violations. 1994. p 9; P Nesbitt, 'Terminaton, cmsaders and gladiators: (Private and Public) Western support for RENAMO and UNITA', Review of African Political Economy, 43, 1 988, pp 1 1 1 - 1 24. n K O'Neill and B Munslow, 'Angola: Ending the CoId War', 1995. p 192. Human Rights Watch. Landmines, 1993, p 7. But UNITA'S primary motivation for extending its operations north was econornic. In order to survive South Afncan disengagement and Amencan enthusiasm to end the Cold War in southern Aftica, UNITA was forced to reconfipre its war economy. Cenîrai to UNITA'S strategic plan were diamonds, a commodity in abundance in north-eastern Angola. 3
UNITA DIAMOND PRODUCTION AND MARKETING
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, South African disengagement and CO-operative moves by the superpowers to promote peace generated a false sense of optirnism regarding the prospects for sustainabIe peace in Angola. In particular, it was felt that, as a creation of Cold War tensions, UNITA would be forced to seek peace in the absence of the patronage required to sustain its politico-military ambitions.
Such predictions, based on a myopic Cold War reading of dl conficts as an extension of- the global superpower stmggle, grossly underestimated UNITA's ability to independently finance its insurgency.
Adopting a greater self-reliance, UNITA shifted its war economy to rely airnost exclusively on diamond production and marketing, a transition examined below. Diamonds would prove central to UNITA's ability to confound al1 expectations and extend its revenue base to levels far exceeding those reached during the era of patronage. In tum, this Lucrative mode of accumulation underwrote an expanding capacity for violence that reflected UNITA'S growing rnilitary power. If the MPLA government is an '~ili~arch~',~~then analogously,
UNITA created a 'gemmocracy': 'a mode of power based on the control of
79 Global Witness uses the term 'oiligarchy' in reference to key power brokers in the Presidency; see Global Witness, 'A crude awakening', 1999. diarn~nds'.~~But advocates of the sanctions approach have incorrectly presumed the existence of a direct causal relationship between UNlTA diamonds and the perpetuation of conflict in Angola. UNITA'S power/wealth has historically been, and could again be, based on alternative modes of violent accumulation,
Origins of the trade Violence has been a pervasive feature of the Angolan diamond industry since the commercial discovery of diamonds in 19 12. During the war of independence, the diamond mining parastatd, Diamang, maintained order with a private army that included helicopters and artillery. Upon Portugal's departure, the Angolan diamond industry was producing 2.4 million carats of diamonds. Within a year of independence production had dropped to 340 000 carats as Portuguese technicians departed, labour supplies dwindled due to military mobilisation and war otherwise disrupted production.81 Until recently, the MPLA had never been able to consoIidate its control over the diamond industry. Part of the reason concerns the corruption that pervades the Angolan state: following independence up to six times the value of registered production di~a~~eared.~'The main irnpediment, however, has been UNITA.
Just as the government was blessed with oil resources centralised in areas of its traditiond strength, from UNITA'S perspective diamonds are fortuitously dispersed geographically and have properties that Iend them to exploitation by
See F Misser and O Vallée, Les gemmocraries: L*econornie politique du diamant africain, Pais: Desclee de Brouwer, 1997, p 2 17. " F Misser and O Vallée, Les gemnzocrnries, 1997, p 98. Ibid.. p 98. ir~sur~ents.~~Mining regions are rernote and insecure, vulnerabilities that prevent the exploitation of kimberlite deposits requiring capital-intensive production techniques and high levels of investment. With the exception of the Catoca mine, the bulk of Angola's production has therefore concentrated on massive alluvial deposits that cover sorne 300,000 square kilornetres of the country's north-east?
Alluvial deposits scattered in rivers and former riverbeds are difficult to monitor, and require only minimal production technology and investment. These deposits are easily rnined by small groups or individual artisanel miners. Further, the properties of diamonds as a primary commodity make them a convenient method of accumuiation. Diamonds are the world's most concentrated form of weaith.
Their high value, srnall size and easy marketability greatly facilitate smuggling and laundering, as do difficulties in distinguishing the provenance of rough diarnonds. Contemporary identification techniques are easily frustrated by rnixing diamonds from various sources within a single parce1 or rendered impossible by polishing. Moreover, cornpetition within the international diamond trade has historically made De Beers eager to buy up 'unofficial production' (the part of the market that exists outside its CSO). Conversely, the uptake of 'outside market'
(Le. unofficially produced) diamonds is intense as dealers attempt to circumvent the monopoIistic marketing and pricing structures of De Beers.
'' Indeed, one can see clear parallels in the impact of the economic geographies of Angola. Sierra Leone, and the DRC on their respective conflicts. In Sierra Leone, the Kono diamond fields are along unstable border regions located doser to Monrovia than Freetown. Simiiarly, in the DRC resources are concenuated in areas tsar from the capital, Kinshasa. Southern Sudan. Indonesia's Aceh province, and dmg-producing regions of Columbia and Peru are further examples. a For a discussion of how the geographical distribution of resources has influenced conflict trajectones in Angola see P Le Billion, 'A land cursed', 1999. As with the country's oïl weaith, a properly governed diamond industry - dong the lines of Namibia, Botswana and South Afnca - could do much to alleviate the grim developmental and secunty situation facing so many Angolans.
The country is singularly blessed with high-quality gems: up to 95 per cent of
Angolan diarnonds are of gem quality; by cornparison, gem quality diamonds compose only 5-10 per cent of world production.85 &gola has alluvial reserves estimated at 30-140 million carats and proven kimberlite reserves at 180 rniliion carats, with 5 to 10 pipes showing econornic potential.86 Yet reforming the industry requires more than simply àriving out UNITA production. So far, the revival of official production has merely replaced UNITA operations with heavily-protected foreign investment that has tenninated - sometimes literally - thousands of garfmpeiro (illegal artisanel miners) rnining operations and fostered regional dienation among the Chokwe peoples of the Lunda provinces.87 These fortified production sites have provided lucrative opportunities for pnvate military/security companies with connections to the MPLA and FAA, but have few linkages with the formal economy. Le plus ça change, plus de rnérne?88
Diarnonds in the guerro do mat0 UNITA'S entry into the international diarnond made had its origins in efforts to disrupt the formal economy under the control of the Angolan government during
85 Global Witness, 'Conflict diamonds: Possibilities for the identification, certification and control of diamonds*. London: Global Witness, June 2000, p 18. 86 S McCormick, The AngoIan econorny: Prospects for growth in a posr-)var environment. Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies; Global Witness, 'Conflict Diamonds', June 2000. 87 See 'Eastern dissent', The Economist, 16 December 1995. the Guerra do Mato (War of the Bush), as Angolans cal1 the second war of 1975-
199 1, Throughout this period, UNITA progressively established a war economy
on the production and marketing of diamonds.
Destabilisation efforts dunng the 1980s met with great success. Largely as a
result of UNITA sabotage, production levels fell from a high of $890 million in
1980 to just $130 million in 1985.8' Attacks launched on mines in this period
yielded UNITA significant stocks of captured diarnonds. In addition, UNITA
targeted garimpeiros and companies for raiding or racketeering, 'taxed' comptoirs
(middlemen) purchasing diamonds in UNITA temtory, secretiy infiltrated
govemment mines and organised frauds within the industry. Diamonds
assembled through these means were traded with South African forces, pnvate
Portuguese traders or Lebanese merchant middlemen.
Building on its experience, WAbegan to rationalise production in the rnid-
1980s through industrialisation and the establishment of forma1 commercial
networks. In 1985, UNITA captured the Andrade mine. The next year it purchased scuba equipment for rnining the diamondiferous sands of the Lunda provinces' deepest nvers. UNITA also reopened mines abandoned by the government as a result of their vulnerability to attack. Labour requirements were satisfied by the use of UNlTA soldiers supplernented by local and Zainan labourers attracted to the 'Afncan kl~ndike'.~~To market its production UNITA established forma1 cornrnercid and diplornatic representation in Antwerp, the
French proverb mnslated as 'The more ihings change. the more they stay the same'. 89 F Misser and O Vallée, Les gemmocmfies, 1997, p 98. centre of the global made in rough, polished and industrial diamonds?' Estimates during the penod attribute UNITA'S fluctuating revenues at between $50 000 and
$4 million per month between 1986 and 1987." UNITA'S Economic Minister at the time, Eduardo Sdupeta Pena, claimed that UNITA had increased its production from 5,000 carats in 1979 to 100,000 carats by 1990. At this level, dimonds accounted for 80 per cent of UNITA'S independent revenues, othenvise supplemented by the trade in gold and hardw~ods.~~Meanwhile, a flounshing trade in consumer goods, medicines and food, in part to supply diarnond production, emerged dong the Zambian border. This war economy would underwrite UNITA'S decision to abandon the Bicesse peace process after unfavourable election returns in September 1992.
Garimpeiros and the Bicesse 'peace' Having fought to a standstlll after perhaps the most violent fighting of the war in
1989-90, the MPLA and UNITA conceded to pressure from the USSR and the US to enter into talks rnediated by a troika of the superpowers and Portugal. Ln May
1991 talks yielded the Bicesse Accord, bringing a temporary halt to a conflict that had already killed anywhere from 1CDaIû to 350000.94 The main provisions of the
Bicesse Accord called for a ceasefire, an arms embargo on both sides, demobilisation and the integration of the two amies into a 50000 strong national
F De Boeck, 'Domesticating diarnonds and dollars: Identity. expenditure and sharing in south- western Zaire ( 1 984- 1997)', Developrnent and Change, 29, 1 998, p 783. '' F Misser and O Vallée. Les gemrnocraties, 1997, p 100. 92 F Bridgland, Savimbi, p 130. 93 ~uotedin F Misser and O Vallée. Les gemmocraties, 1997. p 1 M) " Human Rights Watch estimates. -y. Surprisingly, there was no fomal provision for a UN military deployment
to supervise the 'self-implementing' provisions of the agreement. In the end,
UNAVEM II (United Nations Angola Verification Mission), an under-funded and
under-staffed mission was deployed with only 840 observer^.^^ The MPLA
continued to head the government and set the date of national legislative and
presidential eiections for September 1992-
As the process unfolded, Angola's political economy of violence underrnined
prospects for peace. Many cornmentators believed that AngoIa's fabulous
mineral wealth might be the basis of a power-sharïng arrangement whereby oil
and diarnond rents could be equally divided between the MPLA and UNI TA.'^
Instead, the opposite occurred and econornic considerations were largely
responsible for the coilapse of the Bicesse process.
A key stumbling block was the extension of govemment administration into
UNITA-controlled areas, which was vehemently resisted for politicai reasons, but
also because the restoration of sovereign authority in these areas compromised
UNITA diamond production. Savimbi advanced the now farniliar argument that
control of diamonds was necessary to ensure UNITA'S survivai as a political
force in Angola.
The climate of relative peace produced by the ceasefire created an economic
boom in UNITA temtories. Thousands of garimpeiro rniners sought their
fortunes in the Cuango river valley. Taxed in a 5050 product sharing agreement,
95 See M Antsee, Orphan of the Cold War: The insider story of rhe collapse of the Angolan peace process, 1992-93,Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1996. 96 Afrka Confidenrial quoted in K Sommerville, 'Angola - Gropinp towards peace', p 27. illicit artisane1 mining allowed UNITA to augment its production to some $600
million in 199 1 and $650 million in 1991.97 Further, the hiatus in fighting sparked
a rush of relief aid and development assistance, much of it subject to 'Ieakage and
repressive patterns of disuib~tion'.~~While the govemment neglected its military
spending dunng the peace process, UNITA mounted its largest-ever independent
procurement of war supplies through Zaire using the profits from its expanded
diamond rnining operations. With UNITA'S decision to abandon the peace
process, the maments and supplies purchased dunng the peace proved crucial to
the movement's survival against government forces. Though UNTA did
demobilise significant numbers of troops, these were still under rnilitary
cornmmd and were sirnply housed, clothed and fed at no cost. Governrnent
demobilisation was much more chaotic, with many soldiers abandoning squalid
quarters in favour of banditry."
In the September 1992 elections - Angola's first - more than 91 per cent of
registered voters participated in a vote deemed 'generally free and fair' by the
UN. The presidential race retumed 49.6 per cent of the vote for President dos
Santos, the MPLA presidential candidate, and 40.7 per cent for Savimbi, a result
requiring a second mn-off. The legislative elections indicated 54 per cent support
for the MPLA and only 34 per cent for UNITA. Savimbi agreed to an October
run-off that would never occur.
'' P Le Billon, 'A land cursed', 1999, p 15. " D Sogge, 'Angola: Surviving rollback', 1994, p 106. Human Righü Watch. Angola: Arm mde and vioiations, 1994, pp 12-15. The guerra das cidades and UNITA9sdescent into illegitimacy In early October, UNITA launched a series of offensives to consolidate its control over its sîrongholds before the presidential mn-off. A government counter- offensive brought street-fighting to Luanda, resulting in heavy casualties and the deaths of senior UNITA members. These events foreshadowed a bloody mode of urbanised conventional warfare. It is not yet clear. whether or not UNITA intended to plunge Angola into its third war, and rnuch speculations centres on the breakdown of lines of cornmand and control between leaders and field cornrnanders.'" In any case, the escalation of localised conflicts resulted in the breakdown of the Bicesse Process. Widespread perception of UNITA as the aggressor turned international opinion towards the government and prompted
UNITA'S rapid descent into illegitimacy.
For UNITA, the consequences of fighting were immediately beneficial.
Within six months UNITA forces had dealt the government sound defeats in extending UNITA'S control over 70 per cent of Angolan temtory. These captured areas included strategic locations throughout the country, incIuding the Lunda diamond fields and the on-shore Soyo oiI fields, thus improving its own econornic prospects while reducing government revenue^.'^' Between 1992 and eventual govemment successes on the battlefield in late 1993, UNITA enjoyed a near- monopoly on Angolan diamond production and licensing Indeed, UNITA'S entire war strategy was based on controlling areas outside Luanda in order to
'bring the economy to a standstill, crearning off assets - especialiy diamonds and
100 See Human Rights Watch. Angola: Arms trade and violations, 1994, pp 18- 19. oil - to fund fûrther conflict with the government and strengthen its hand in
negotiations. ' 'O2
In 1993, however, diplomatic and military events influenced Savimbi to seek
a negotiated solution. On the diplornatic front, UNITA'S resistance to negotiation
and the brutality of UNITA sieges on government-held towns prompted a series of diplomatic setbacks. In 1993, the US officially recognised the Angolan government, an event shortly foIlowed by majorïty rule in South Africa. These difficuities were compounded by the imposition of a UN arms and fuel embargo with Security Council resolution 864 (1993)' an event coinciding with the lifting of the oft-violated arms embargo on the governrnent contained in the Bicesse
Accord's 'Triple Zero' clause. Meanwhile, a government counteroffensive reduced UNITA-held territory to 40 per cent of the country by 1994. The recapture of the diamond town of Cafunfo and the Soyo oilfields were particuIarly costly for UNI TA.''^ Forced into a serni-conventional defensive war, UNITA was at a disadvantage against better armed government forces backed by air support and with more experience in conventional operations. The reason for UNITA'S shift to a war of positions was the burden of defending diamond captured mines at
Cafunfo, Luzamba and Kapenda. For UNITA, 'diarnonds modified the style and orientation of the war' in costly and unsustainabie ~a~s.'~
'O' K SornrnerviIle. 'Angola - Groping towards peace'. 1997, p 30. lm Hurnan Rights Watch, Angola: Ammade and violations. 1994, p 21. 'O3 The loss of Cafunfo was largely responsible for reducing the value of UNITA diamond sales from $600 million in 1992 to a low of $320 million in 1995 (Figures cited in Global Witness, 'A rough uade', 1998. Enter E'xecutive Ourcomes
With its on-shore oil resources under UNITA control and Savimbi ready to march
on Luanda, the MPLA government entered into an arrangement unthinkable years
earlier when it contracted Executive Outcomes (EO) to conduct offensive
operations against UNITA in late 1993.~" This signalled the acceleration of
shadow state tendencies by integrating privatised security - and economic
accumulation in infra-institutional (personalised and informai) networks of power
and wealth now integral to the survival of the Dos Santos regime. EO's expenence in Angola is a caricature of the war itself, revolving around the control of diamonds and oil, and is indicative of evolving patterns of African civil- military relations.
The Company first privately entered Angola in an arrangement to capture and defend the Soyo production sites of Heritage Oil from UNITA attack. EO knew
UNITA well: the company's origins are 'found in the complex and still shielded web of civilianised front cornpanies set up by the former SADF"" and linked into UNITA'S war economy until at least 2992. Indeed, many of the South
African firm's members fought with UNITA as mernbers of apartheid-era forces.
Some reports suggest EO was even working with UNXTA until the moment it signed with the Angolan government. 'O7
'O4 F Misser and O Vallée, Les gemmocraties, 1997. p 104. 'OS Executive Outcornes disbanded in December 1998 for undisclosed reasons, however the move came shortly after South Africa enacted legistation restricting mercenarism in Apnl, 1998, rompting speculation of a connection between the two events. Pm K Pech, p 84. 'O7 Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms made and violations, 1994. p 53. The contract EO signed with the Angolan government was partly financed by
oil-parastatal Sonangol, and invoived oil and diamond concessions for EO-
affiliate Branch Holdings, now ~iarnond~orks.~~~in a $40 million per year
contract over two and a hdf years, EO established a large support operation to
assist in the capture of the Soyo oilfields and the Cafunfo diamond rnines.log
According to UNTïA, EO introduced a 'disequilibrium' in the balance of forces
that gave the MPLA the upper-hand.'1° By al1 accounts, E07sassistance was the
decisive factor in government victories that convinced Savirnbi to seek political
compromise.
The trend towards sub-contracting state functions, in Angola as elsewhere,
shifts control from threatening bureaucracies to market actors, ofien foreign, who
are accountable to the ruler alone. Thus, in addition to the military and econornic
pressure EO placed on UNITA, the Company, and other private security fms
linked to mining interests, play vital roles in securing centralised control over the
MPLA7s war economy. In Angola, private rnilitary firrns reign in garimpeiro
generals seeking to establish autonomous powedwealth bases by entering into implicit arrangements with UNITA to came up diarnond production.1' ' These military forces have no incentive to restore peace to their area of operations, given that an environment of disorder facilitates their mining operations. 'The most attractive foreign firm partners for rulers such as dos Santos', argues Reno, 'are
'O8 K Pech, 'Executive Outcornes'. 1999, pp 88-90. For detailed assessrnent of the operation see D Shearer, 'Private amies and rnilitary intervention', Adelphi Paper, 3 16, 1998. ' 'O F Misser and O Vallée, Les gemrnocraties, 1997, p 1 O8 ' " W Reno, Warlord poliiics. 1998, p 66. those willing to use private profitable violence against rogue rnilitary units and
not just rebels'.' "
By the same token, 'privatisation' allows for profit-seeking in the rewarding of contracts through non-transparent processes, removes bureaucratic checks against unrestrained embezzlement and provides the government with a ready supply of capital. In rnany cases, there are clear commercial relationships between members of the Angolan politico-military establishment and the private mininp and military security companies, domestic and foreign, that have assumed key roles in Angolan political ec~norn~."~These strategies for surviving in and profiting from disorder feed further violence; in some cases quite literaliy:
Angolan generals, with connections to the Presidency, reportedly control a $720 million contract to feed the armed forces for the next five years, giving one reason among others to doubt their desire for peace.'14
To Lusaka and beyond In 1994, UNITA faced a rapidly deteriorating military situation and sought a cease-fire. With government forces on the ascendancy it was only under immense diplornatic pressure that Luanda signed the Lusaka Protocol in Novernber, 1994, bringing an end to a two-year period of conflict that killed more than 300 000
' '' lbid., p 66. Foreign security companies engaged in Angola include Keeni Mini Services, Defence Services Ltd, Saracen International, Shibata Security and Stuart Mills International. Security companies with connections to the MPLA and FAA include Alpha 5 and TeIeservice (Global Witness, 'A rough trade', 1998; Global Witness, 'A crude awakening', 1999; Reno, Warlord politics, 1998) . 114 'Generals profit from food rations', Africa Analysis, 29 October 1999. See also Entraide Missionaire, 'Vers un spirale de la Violence? Les Dangers de la privatisation de la gestation du people, representing 3 per cent of the population and more deaths than the
previous sixteen years of war.' l5 The Protocol's main provisions, which are still
regarded by the Angolan government as the basis for a future peace, cal1 for a
cease-fue, the integration of 'CiTIITA generals into a non-partisan and civilian
controlled medforces, demilitarisation under UN supervision, completion of the
electoral process, the repaviation of mercenaries, and a process of national
reconciliation providing for a general arnnesty and the granting of govemmentai
positions to UNITA. Significantly, neither party was wholeheartedly comrnitted
to the peace process. Savimbi himself did not sign the document.
Correspondingly, hard-liners in the Angolan regirne opposed the agreement,
particularly Chief of Staff Generd Joao de Matos. Into this environment of bad
faith UN peacekeeping mission UNAVEM III, Iater MONUA, was deployed at a
cost of over $1-5billion-
As the process unfolded it became apparent that UNITTA was only offerinp
insignificant concessions in order to deny the govemment a pretext to abandon the
uneasy peace. In spite of a UN mandate to monitor and enforce an embargo on
UNITA'S importation of fuel and arms, peace facilitated rearmarnent and diarnond stockpiling. UNITA'S behaviour during the Lusaka process is therefore consistent with the core objectives of its long-time economic strategy of filling its own coffers and depriving the Angolan govemment of revenues while waiting for the state to implode.
risque des investissement en Afrique: Les activités minières et l'Emploi des Compagnies Privées de Sécurité', Ottawa and Montreal, 1 999. lis Human Rights Watch estimates. The issue of diamonds is not specifically addressed in the Lusaka Protocol,
but was played out in subsequent negotiations. Under the Protocol, UNITA had
technical obligations to withdraw its rnilitary presence from diarnondiferous
regions in cornpliance with the demilitarisation process and the extension of state
authonty throughout Angola. Be that as it may, the reality of the Lusaka process
was characterised by UNITA7s continud violation of Lusaka cornmitments. To
defend its intransigence on the diarnond issue, UNITA'S Economic Minister
Fatima Roque questioned, by way of analogy, '1s the MPLA ready to leave its oil
platforms? 7 .II6 According to US mediator Paul Hare, dl parties 'understood that
this issue would have to be resolved in direct talks between the two parties and
that if an understanding was not reached, war might erupt in the Lundas and spi11
over to other parts of the country'.' "
Prophetically, diamond-related cease-fire violations in the Lundas contributed
to Lusaka's collapse. In the initial stages of the peace process, however, it
appeared as if a compromise had been reached. During the parcelling out of governmental ministries, UNITA worked successfully to secure control of the
Ministry of Mines and Geology conveniently charged with overseeing diarnond production and marketing. ' '' Yet localised clashes threatened to derail peace efforts. In 1995 a full-scale war over control of diamond mines erupted in the chronically unstable Lundas, and subsequent clashes took place dong the Zairian
' '6 F Misser and O Vallée, Les gemrnocraties, 1 997, p 1 M. 117 P Hare, Angola's lasr besr chance for peace: An insider's accounr of the peace process, Washington: US Insritute for Peace Press, 1998, p 125. frontier. Significanùy, UNITA did withdraw from its main source of diamonds,
the lower Cuango valley, but industry sources suspect that UNITA had exhausted
the valley 's alluvial diamond deposits.
In 1996, negotiations advanced after UNITA and the governrnent signed a
memorandum of understanding on the diarnond issue following a visit to
Savimbi's Bailundo headquarters by the president of diamond parastatal Endiama.
The document outlined an mangement whereby UNITA'S operations would be
legitimated by granting UNITA, through a legally recognised holding Company,
rights pertaining to diarnond exploration and production, including the abiiity to
negotiate with foreign companies interested in mining UNïïA territone~.~~~It bnefly appeared as if UNITA's war economy would be radically transformed as a legitimate business operation. Senior US diplomats even supported atternpts by
US firm Lazare Kaplan International to purchase UNITA production with govemrnent export financing"'
Remarkably, UNITA production totalled $1.72 billion before the collapse of the Lusaka process in Iate 1998.'" The value of diamonds exported varied by year, reaching a high of $700 miIIion in 1996. UNITA'S departure from the
Cuango valley combined with the government's capture of diamond areas
''' There are clear parallels here with the RUF's Foday Sankoh securing the vice-presidency and the head of Sierra Leone's 'Strategic Resources Commission' as a precondition to signing the Lomé peace agreement in July, 1 999. II9 Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels, 1999, p 80. "O 'Angola. The diamond cut'. The Economist, 13 Juiy 1996; P Hare, Angola's last best chance, 1998, p 125. 12' 'Gem of a plug', US News and WorfdRepon. 19 May 1997, p 19. '" Human Rights Watch. Angola Unravels, 1999. Hurnan Rights Watch incorrectly cites 'net' earnings. UNITA is estimated to have grossed $1.72 billion during this penod, however, Philippe throughout 1997 to reduce the value to $600 million. With the Ioss of production
sites, a drop in world prices for rough diamonds, and deprived of traditional
export routes, UNTïA's diarnond exports were just $200 million in 1998.
But, in an episode of dé@ vu eerily rerniniscent of the Bicesse process, these
diamond revenues were not used to reinvent UNITA as a legitimate politicai
movement. Instead, UNITA neglected its obligation to turn in weapons stocks
and undertook a massive diamond-financed rearmament in violation of UN
sanctions that, when hostilities resumed by late 1998, left the movement better
anned than ever? The uneasy peace in Angola facilitated the two-way exchange
of diamonds for arms, petrol and other war supplies dong a network of trade
circuits, personal relationships and commercial relations that remains largely
unchanged since the days of the South Afncan connection.
UNlTA 's illicit procurernent of arms and fuel
Somewhat incredulously, UNITA'S international diamond sales were technically
legal until mid-1998. Even after the embargo on unofficial Angolan diamonds
(those not accompanied with a legitimate Angolan government Certificate of
Origin) it was not until 1999 that serious efforts were made to enforce mandatory international sanctions against UNITA. And, until the implementation of regulatory reforms in 1999, Angolan law permitted individuals to legally posses, buy or sel1 diamonds within Angola. In actuality however, in UNITA'S near-
Le Billion estirnates net earnings at 25 to 50 percent of the total value for UMTA diamonds and 7 percent of gros government diamond sales (P Le Billon, 'A land cursed', 1999, p 15). castiless economy most of its diarnonds are bartered for weapons and fuel -
transactions prohibited by UN sanctions in place since 1993. Nevertheless, as a
result of the non-enforcement of the 1993 sanctions regime the regional criminal
economy into which UNITA was networked, and which had formed around
opportunities created by UNITA, operated with relative impunity-
By the tirne sanctions were implemented during Angola's third war in 1993,
UNITA had developed a highly sophisticated chain of regional and international
supply stretching from Africa to Europe, and based on personal relations with key
arms brokers, illicit transport fixers, international financiers and diamond brokers.
Thus, before Mobutu's overthrow a majoriry of UNJTA7s diamond production exited Africa via buying offices in the Zairian diarnond town of Mbuji-Mayi and the capital Kinshasa. Arms and fuel also entered dong these routes, with many of the shipments destined for UNITA'S territories originating in Eastern Europe.
Bulgaria and the Ukraine were particularly prominent sources for UNITA weapons.'" After Mobutu was overthrown Savimbi7s close relationship with
Congo-Brazzaville's President Pascai Lissouba made airports at Pointe-Noire and
Brazzaville key trading centres in UNITA'S regional network until Lissouba himself was overthrow in 1997. South Africa was another important transit point, with up to fifty flights a month destined for UNITA teetories in 1997.lS
Indicating the diversity of its supply network, UNTA entrepôts hâve also
UNITA did hand over one significant 770-tonne amis cache in July 1996 that included new weaponry, however, this proved to be an isolated event. 12' 12' Hurnan Rights Watch, Angola unravels. 1999: United Nations. 'Report of the panel of experts'. S/2000/203, 1 O Marc h 2000. 125 South African police document quoted in Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels, 1999. included Uganda, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mozambique,
Narnibia, Botswana, Swaziland, Togo and Rwanda? Sanctions-busting was
undertaken with the support of many of these regimes, or elements thereof, for a
variety of reasons, including strategic objectives (Zaire and Rwanda), personai
gain (Togo and Burkina Faso) and commercial advantage (Zambia). Other times, criminai elements used national territory for transhipment despite attempts to shut down the trade, as with Narnibia and ~ost-1994South Africa. Significantly, a large volume of UNITA'S fuel was even obtained within Angola itself, with involvement extending to the Governor of Malanje province and senior Sonangol and army officiais who have subsequently been pro~ecuted.'~~
In response to UNITA'S intense procurement operations, Angola's government has worked to sever UNITA'S overland and aerial supply lines through diplornatic and military means. After 1997, the Angolan government lobbied hard internationally to have sanctions against UNITA extended and better enforced. h Angola meanwhile, government ceasefire violations were almost wholly related to UNïïA's overland cross-border procurement pipelines. In its boldest move, however, the Angolan military has worked to isoiate UNITTA through the creation of a cordon sanitaire around UNlTA territories. What initidly changed patterns and volume of UNITA procurement was therefore not international enforcernent of the embargo, but rather the Angolan government's
126 Human Rights Watch, 'Angola: Between war and peace', 1996; Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels. 1999; Global Witness, 'A rough trade', 1998; United Nations, 'Report of the pane1 of experts on violations of Security Council sanctions against UNITA', S/2000/203, 10 March 2000; Action for Southern Afi-ïca, 'Waiting on empty promises: The hurnan cost of international inaction on UN sanctions', London, April2000. unilateral use of rnilitary force and coercion. Indeed, it can even be said that non-
enforcement of sanctions has increased levels of violence in Angola and abroad.
Even as hopes for an 'Afican renaissance' centred on a southem Afncan security
cornmunity were being proposed in the rnid-1990s, UNKA'S war economy and
the host of malign regionalisms it exacerbated was creating regional 'insecurity'
cornmunity.
Regional conflict and UNITA 's trade networks
Throughout 1997, Angola proved that 'after oil and diamonds, its main export is violence' by launching a concerted rnilitary and diplornatic offensive to isolate
UNT.A.128The aim was to strike at crucial transhipment points and trading centres in the regional criminal economy so important to UNITA'S internationat links,
The first step in the governrnent's strategy involved eliminating Mobutu. To that end, Angola's military assisted Laurent Kabila's May 1997 victory with a large contingent of tro~~s."~Kabila's victory deprived UNITA of its main international patron and dealt a blow to Cabindan separatists based in Zaire. In
August 1998, however, Angolan forces returned to reluctantly defend newly- installed President Kabila from a rebel offensive from the east Iaunched by his former backers in Uganda and Rwanda. UNITA fought on the rebel side and
117 Human Rights Watch, Angola unravek, 1999; United Nations, 'Report of the panel of experts', 2000. "' 'Angola - Bad neighbour, no fences', The Economisr, 15 January 2000. became a mercenary force and arms exporter in its own right after assisting
Rwandan forces, for which Kigdi would reward UNITA with the facilitation of sanctions-busting. During its tenure in the DRC, the Angolan military sustained heavy territorial losses to UNITA forces in northern Angola, gains that ultimately forced the buk of Angola's force to pull out in early 1999.'31
After Mobutu's fall, the majority of UNITA'S trade was diverted to Point
Noire and Brazzaville. Thus, the second step towards UNITA'S geographical isolation was overthrowing UNITA ally, President Pascal Lissouba. During the final days of the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville, Angolan forces in the Cabindan enclave intervened decisively to assist the coup of former President Denis Sassou-
Nguesso. UNITA had been fighting on the side of Lissouba dong with a division of Mobutu' s Division Speciale Pre~identielle.~3'
To tighten the noose around UNITA, Angola has also threatened Zambia over its quiet support of UNITA and the connection of senior government officiais to sanctions-busting across the Zambian frontier. Wiîh the two Congos secured,
Luanda regards Zarnbia as the weakest link in efforts to isolate UNITA. Relations between the two States deteriorated to the point where Angolan agents detonated a
1 29 Estimates of Angola's contributions range from 2000 to 10000 (W Thom, 'Congo-Zaire's 1996- 97 civil war in the context of evolving patterns of rnilitary conflict in Africa in the era of independence', Journal of Conflicr Srudies, Fail, 1999. pp 93-1 23). D Shearer, 'Afrka's great war', Survival. 4 1(2), 1999, p 96. Hurnan Rights Watch reports that, rather than surrender heavy weapons in compliance with Lusaka commitrnents, WTA reciprocated Zairian assistance by shipping arms to Mobutu's Rwandan and Burundian Hutu allies (Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels, 1999: see also United Nations, 'Report of the panel of experts', 2000). 13' Angola Peoce Monitor, 2(5),28 October 1998. ''' Africa Confidenrial, 24 October 1997. dozen bombs in Lusaka in February 1999, targeting electric and water supplies.133
Angola is now asking for Lusaka permission to launch attacks on UNITA forces
in Moxico province from western Zarnbia even as border tensions increase.
Opposite the Zambia, Namibia recently agreed to host Angolan forces for
raids against UNITA bases in south-eastern Angola, primarily by air. UNITA has
retaliated with a series of cross-border raids into the Caprivi Strïp, threatening the relative peace on which Namibia7s tourist industry th rive^.'^^ Namibia has increased arms purchases as a result, a development that further threatens to accelerate regional arms spending. These events have only reinforced Zambia7s resolve to refuse the Angolan military permission to cross the Zarnbian border in hot pursuit of WïïA.13'
Angola 's ail-mortgagecifuture
Ernbarking on these military expeditions exacted a heavy cost on the government's budget. While UNITA used the peace to remthrough intensified commercial operations, the government struggled to manage economic decline.
The key factor in Angola's ebbing economic fortunes has been the regime's
'inclination towards central planning, and to the entrenched interests which benefit from the opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption offered by current economic dis tort ion^'.^^^ There are multiple, inter-linked distortions in the
133 Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels, 1999, p 58. 'Y Amnesty International, 'Angola and Namibia: Human righrs abuses in the border area.' March 2000. '35 'Pursuit eastwards', The Economist, 19 May 2000. 136 'Angola: Country outlook', Economisr Intelligence Unir, 14 October 1999. Angolan economy, but the key impediment to sustainable economic management
is internal corruption centred on the 'Bermuda Triangle' - the name Angolans
give to the nexus of the presidency, the central bank and Sonango1 where money
is said to vanish without a trace."7
In 1998, the government faced a serious econornic crisis just as the
government embarked on costly regiond interventions. A fall in the global price
of oil dealt a double blow: first decreasing the goverriment's main source of
revenue, but more importantly, increasing the arnount of cmde oiI that must be
delivered to creditors to ensure debt repayrnent on oil-mortgaged high-interest,
short-term loans. A potential solution was to accept the IW's annual offer of a
bail-out, thus paving the way towards the preferential lending terms available through the restmcniring of its estimated $12.6 billion A pre-condition of the IMF agreement, however, was a full audit of the country's oil accounts.
Instead, the governrnent turned to commercial creditors, particulariy Union Bank of Switzerland, for a $575 million loan to refinance earlier debts, avoid defaults and secure discretionary fünds towards the war against UNI TA."^ It also defaulted on internal debts in the forrn of civil sector wages and debts to industry.
The government resisted IMF conditionalities until April 2000, when an
"''Tracking Angola's oil money'. The Economisr. 15 January 2000. 13' United Nations, 'Repon of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Officein Angola'. S/2000/304, 11 Apri12000. 13' Analysts suspect that rumoun UMTA had acquired advanced fighten aircraft were a covert attempt to sabotage this oil-rnortgaged loan by presenting the possibility of attacks on offshore oil production (see Global Witness, 'A crude awakening', 2000). agreement finally paved the way towards a staff-monitored programme that may
eventually lead towards an 'Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility .140
Resistance to IMF conditionaiities cannot be understood without reference to
the rent-seeking mechanisms of Angola's non-transparent oil accounts. First, anns purchases cm be hidden by purchasing arms through oil-collaterïsed, short- term Ioans that pass directly through Sonangol. These procurement contracts often place more emphasis on available kickbacks than military utility. The oil rent also finances the lifestyles of the 'oïl nomenklatura', both directly through transfers and indirectly by financing macro-economically unsound measures such as the artificial overvaluation of Angola's dual currency exchange scheme.
Between 1992 and the termination of this exchange system in 1998, individuals with access to foreign currencies at the official rate could, on average, essentially buy dollars at one-third the real price.'4' Finaily, the main avenue for corrupt accumulation was through signature bonuses in the awarding of offshore oil blocks. The Presidency Is entitled to 55 per cent of the value of signature bonuses, representing $480 million in 1999. Global Witness also aileges that equity partners involved in the ultra-deep oil concessions are providing the govemment with an avenue for covert arms ~hiprnents.'~~
With a rise in oil prices in mid-1998, the Angolan govenunent engaged in a massive mikuy build-up that ailowed it to defeat UNITA in a series of battles
'IoThe World Bank estimates that the govemment's recourse CO private sector lending cost the government an estimated $50-100 million between 1991 and 1997 when private lending rates are compared to those available through Bretton Woods institutions. 14 1 P Le Billon, 'A land cursed', 1999, p II; Global Witness, 'A crude awakening', 2000. throughout 1999. Estimates of military expenditures during the peace process
ranged from $400 million in 1995 through to $840 million in 1998.'" These
figures represent some 36 per cent of the 1997 budget and compare to 13.3 per
cent spending on education, health and social secunty, welfare and housing, and a
meagre 0.6 per cent on the peace process.'"
Lusaka collapses
The recovery of oil prices in 1998 gave the government renewed confidence as
the Lusaka process appeared increasingly irrelevant, even illegitimate, to the two
parties in the face of mounting violations. By late 1998, periodic cease-fire
violations degenerated into full-scale war. At the MPLA Congress in December
1998, the government formally renounced its commitment to the Lusaka Protocol and called on the UN to withdraw.
In intense fighting, UNITA came close to capturing the key government stronghold of Cuito. Though UNITA's rearmament was an open secret, its rnilitary had made the surprising shift towards conventional operations. As
Angolan chief of staff General Joiio de Matos claimed, criticising the UN for failing to ensure UNITA demilitarisation, 'UNITA is better equipped than ever before! 7 .145 After heavy fighting, the government captured the traditiond UNITA
1-lZ Global Witness, 'A crude awakening', 2000. The report accuses companies Prodev, Falcon 0i1 and Gas, Naptha and Levdan of arms running, but does not suggest that the major operators of the blocks - BP-Amoco, Elf Aquitaine and Exxon - were aware of their equity partners' connections. '" International Institute of Suategic Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute figures cited in Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels, 1999. 144 IMF, 'Angola: Statistical annex 1999', Washington: IMF, 1999; Global Witness, 'A crude awakening', 1999, p 8. Quoted in Angola Peace Monitor, 4(5), 18 December 1998. strongholds of Bailundo and Andulo in late 1999, although UNITA reponedly tacticaily withdrew with its arms and sympathisers- Africa's largest army, numberîng some 110000, is now engaged in an offensive to 'snap the backbone' of
ZTNITA.''~ Luanda now daims to be in control of 92 per cent of Angola's 157 districts, but UNITA continues to be active in Uige, Zaire, Soyo, Lunda Norte and
Moxico provinces. 14'
'" 'Snapping the backbone', The Economist, 30 October 1999. 137 Angolan minister of social assistance Albino Malungo at the UN Security CounciI, 27 July 2000 (United Nations, S/6899,27 July 2000). 4
THE SANCTIONS APPROACH
It is essentially illusory to suppose, as did many at the beginning of the 1990s, that the disappearance of a certain resource condemns armed movements to beg for forgiveness and peacefully resign themselves to civilian life. - J-C. Rufin, 'Les économies de guerres dans les conflits internes'
In 1997, the UN attempted to anest escalating violence in Angola and related regional instabiiities by abandoning its impartial mediating role in favour of a more authoritative response to UNXTA intransigence. In an effort to coerce
Savimbi into compliance with Lusaka commitrnents, the UN imposed a second sanctions package, resolution 1135 (1997), prohibiting the travel of UNTI'A officials and demancihg the closure of UNITA'S foreign offices. When UNITA continued to vioiate its Lusaka obligations, the UN imposed additional sanctions with resolution 1173 (1998) in July. This package specificaUy targets UNITA'S economy by freezing LJNITA bank accounts, preventing al1 unauthorised transport into and out of UNITA territones, and banning ilkit diamond exports. Related initiatives have attempted to curb the trade in so-called conflict diamonds by presswing government, industry, corporate, and police and customs officials to enforce sanctions such as resolution 1173 (1998), and create a global system of controls on conflict diamonds. These dual-track initiatives comprise the
'sanctions approach' to peacemaking in Angola. 75
The foilowing chapter provides a critical andysis of the origins and initial
effect of, and prospects for, the sanctions approach that now overwhelmingly
dorninates extemai efforts to foster peace in Angola. From preliminary evidence,
the embargo has already begun to achieve its first objective, namely, Limicing
UNITA'S ability to pursue the conventional military option. One cm therefore
point to partial successes in this attempt to frame extemal interventions through a
political economy pnsm. As a pioneering approach to multilateral stakeholder peacemaking govemance, the 'Fowler Process' and associated conflict diamond
initiatives have modelled pragmatic diplornatic and secunty architectures bringing together heterogeneous actors from different areas of the state - pnvate sector - civil society nexus in a promising effort to target UNITA'S war economy.
Yet there are a rnyriad of unresolved problems with the sanctions approach.
These recurring shortcomings reflect the basic fallacy of the sanctions calculus that degrading UNITA'S military capacities through the embargo necessarily moves the situation closer to a negotiated 'peace'. Alternative interpretations of the conflict's political economy reveal fundamental misunderstandings concerning the impact of the embargo. Sanctions will not impede UNITA'S ability to pursue protracted guemlla terrorism and a weIl-enforced embargo is already inducing a reconfiguration of UNITA'S war economy in ways that increase criminal predation, promote fragmentation and radicaiisaîion, and degrade human security. Sanctions have also implicitly encouraged a misguided attempt by the MPLA to seek a military solution to the conflict. The international community has done little to counteract these rnilitarist tendencies through peacebuilding efforts designed to increase the capacity of Angolan society to 76
resolve conflict through non-violent means, Rather than strengthening Angola's
nascent civil society opposition, the sanctions approach's attempts to marginalise
UNrrA and failure to push for negotiation have undermined civil society efforts
to promote inclusive national diaiogue and reconciliation, Findly, there is the glaring omission of other facets of Angola's political economy of violence in the intemationai community's singular focus on UNJTA diamonds as the pnmary obstacle to peace. Reflective of thk neglect is the lack of pressure for sustained refonn in Angola's oil industry. Together, these inadequacies point to the need to broaden efforts to promote peace in Angola to complement the nevertheless encouraging sanctions approach and counter its unintended consequences.
Towards resolution 1173 Given the sheer scale of revenues UNITA derives from its diamond operations, it seems obvious that the UN erred in not sanctioning the diamond trade until afier
UNITA had earned almost $4 billion. Therefore, how does one explain the hesitation over implementing the embargo on UNITA diamonds?
From the UN'S perspective, the delay on sanctions was calculated - or rather rniscalculated - on the basis numerous factors. First, it was felt that technical considerations made it impossible to implement and enforce sanctions on diam~nds.'~~UNITA7s proven sanctions-busting ability, its highly evolved diarnond marketing network and Zairian non-cornpliance with existing sanctions further compounded these difficulties. In Belgium, parliamentarians introduced legislation banning the importation of UNITA diamonds in 1993 that resembled UN resolution il73 (1998), but the proposal was deemed infeasible and was
never put to a vote.'49 Even UN sanctions on South Afnca did not extend to
diamonds. As Harry Oppenheimer opined twenty years ago, 'no cornmodity [is]
less susceptible to dangers frorn UN sanctions than diarnonds r - 150
The international diamond trade, and particularly De Beers, also had
objections to an embargo. For De Beers, sanctions would impede its ability to
stabilise pnces given the large Angolan contribution to global unofficial
production. By way of cornparison, De Beers sold $4.83 billion of rough
diarnonds in 1996, accounting for 80 per cent of worjd diarnond sales, while
UNITA produced an astonishing $700 million ~onh.'~'Production at this level
forced De Beers to tie up capital in increased outside buying whde almost halving
sales £rom its CS0 in order to stabilise the market."' Further, the major diarnond
centres womed that highly mobile diarnond importers and polishers would
gravitate towards less-regulated markets. These problems were compounded by
the absence of regulatory controls within Angola. The government had even
changed its legislation on the diamond industry during the Bicesse peace to
encourage small-scale artisinal rnining in a way that facilitated UNITA marketing.
Perhaps most importantly, as a senior official observed, the UN felt 'obligated
to behave impartialiy between the two sides in helping them implement the
IJS See Global Witness, 'Conflict diamonds', 2000. IJ9 F Misser and O Vallée. Les gernmocraties, 1997, 1997. IM Quoted in E Epstein, The rise and full, 1982, p 20. As Naylor argues, moreover, 'India, the first to impose a uade embargo [on South Africa], remained studiously silent about the origins of so many of its rough diamonds' (RT NayIor, Patriors and Profiteers, 1999, p 166). ''' De Been, 'Chairman's statement' in 1996 Annual Report, 1996. 152 See 'Chairman's statement', 1996 Annual Repon, De Beers, 1996; 'Angolan diamonds. De Beers' worst fiend', The Economist, 22 August 1998. [Lusaka] Protocol.. . [even ifJ there were doubts about the sincenty of Savimbi's cornmitment to doing SO'.'~~Savimbi had responded to resolution 1 135 (1997) by conducting a bnef military offensive after sevenng contact with the government and the UN. On June 6 1998, Savimbi threatened that the irnplementation of further sanctions would be 'an act of ~ar'.'~~As it happened, he ordered the shooting down of UN aircrafi in reaction to the perceived pro-government bias in the UN'S operations; the order was successfûlly executed on two occasions in
December 1998 and January 1999.IS5Mindîul of the futility of previous sanction regimes, the UN must have been pessimistic about the potential for an embargo that would potentially de-rail peace efforts, but serve no purpose beyond a moral statement of international condemnation.
It is also conceivable that the prominence of political economy approaches in conflict analysis shaped UN policy. In terms of the content of relevant sanctions resoiutions, one can clearly discem a shift from a Cold War emphasis on arms control in the provisions of resolution 864 (1993) to a focus on the econornics of political violence with resolution 1173 (1998). Even as Human Rights Watch criticises the UN for not implementing an embargo on UNITA diamonds earlier, sanctions on diamonds do not figure arnong the listed recommendstions in the two major Human Rights Watch reports on Angola in 1994 and 1996. Observers were not unaware of the role of UNITA diamonds in the conflict, but without the systematic attention paid to the economics of insurgency in contemporary
Is3 Sir Marrack Goulding, former UK arnbassador to Angola and head of UN Department for Peace Keeping Operations quoted in P Le Billon, 'A land cursed', 1999, p 22. '" 'UN envoy dies in air crash', Angola Peace Monitor, 10(9), 2 July 1998. '" United Nations. 'Report of the panel of experts*, 2000, p 168. 79
scholarship and media reportage, the obstacles to implementing a diarnond embargo likely outweighed its potential contributions in the eyes of policy- makers,
As a result of these considerations, it was only after UNITA'S persistent refusal to hand over its traditional strongholds that sanctions were implemented, on July 1, 1998.'~~Resolution 1173 (1998) built on the threat contained in resolution 1127 (1 197) to impose trade and financial restrictions. The most important provision of 1173 (1998) is the dernand 'that al1 states shall take the necessary measures-.. To prohibit the direct or indirect import from Angola to their temtory of al1 diarnonds that are not controlled through the Certification of ongin regirne of the GURN' .
The Towler process': Making sanctions work Predictably, the diarnond embargo was no more effective in its initial stages than previous sanctions on arms and fuel procurement, or foreign travel and representation. Immediately following the implementation of resolution 1173
(1998), Africa Energy and Mining reported that 'the ban on irnports of Angolan diarnonds without certificates of ongin raises a laugh among UNITA ~talwarts'.'~~
According to Global Witness in December 1998: 'the impact of the embargo has been minimal and resulted in changes of export logistics rather than major alterations in volume. Diamond traders and analysts confirm that the embargo
Is6 Savirnbi met personally with UN rnediator Alouine Blondin Beye the day before his June 26 death in a plane crash in the Ivory Coast. Savimbi reponedly told Beye that UNITA had no intention of handing over control of its temtories (Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels, 1999). '57 Africn Energy and MNling, 235.9 September 1998. has not had a major impact on trade7.l" Ernpowering the sanctions regime would require a new approach.
Ln January, 1999, Canadian permanent representative to the UN, Robert
Fowler, assumed the Chair of the 'Security Council Cornmittee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola' - the
Angola Sanctions Cornmittee. His arriva1 signalled the beginning of efforts to reverse the ASC's mediocre record of sanctions enforcement. Though the Fowler process is broadly mandated to increase sanctions cornpliance, in practice, it has focused on the international diamond trade and it connections to the financial and arms sectors. The process is characterised by efforts to tighten the embargo on
UNITA and devise a regulatory framework for an international diarnond industry that has, with various degrees of complicity, fuelled conflict throughout Africa.
From the begiming, the Fowler process has been reflective of a 'new multilateraIism7 - a multilateralism inclusive of non-state actors. At the first meeting of the ASC chaired by Arnbassador Fowler in January, 1999, officiais were briefed on UNITA'S sanctions-busting by Global Witness and other
~~0s.'~~Close collaboration and communication between the state, private and third sectors has characterised subsequent efforts in what cm be called
'peacemaking govemance' .'60 The earlier and ovenvhelrningly ineffectual efforts of the ASC faiied to address the critical contribution of non-state actors such as
Is8 Global Witness, 'A rough trade', 1998, p 12. Is9 Human Rights Wacch, Angola unravels, 1999. '" 'Peacemaking govemance* builds on Timothy Shaw's description of policies and process of 'peacebuilding govemance' involving close coordination between the trio of state - private sector - civil society actors at al1 levels. See T Shaw, 'Conflict in Africa at the turn of the century: More De Beers to sustaining Angolan conflict. In contrast, an examination of the itinerary of the Chairman of the ASC's recent travels indicates the breadth of actors involved in contemporary efforts: Interpol, the World Custom's
Organisation, the OAU, SADC, NATO, countiess govemment ministries and customs officiais, state arrns manufacturers, diamond industry representatives, De
Beers, mining parastatals, NGOs, think-tanks, and others.
The centrepiece of the ASC1s efforts has becorne an investigative report from a panel of experts created pursuant to Secunty Council resolution 1237 (1999)!'
Visiting over thirty countries, and building on two fact-finding trips Arnbassador
Fowler conducted to Europe and ~frica,'~'the international panel of experts produced a precedent-setting and highly controversial report that broke diplornatic protocoi with a willingness to 'name and sharne' at the highest level. The report contains detailed information regârding UNITA'S circumvention of UN sanctions,
how diarnonds were used to buy arms, and how inadequate arms export control regimes, largely in Eastern Europe, coupled with the secretive practices and opaque operations of the international diamond market and the advent of ample and freewheeling 'pirate air services' in the post-Cold War era, combined to rovide UNITA with just-in-time deliveries of state- of-the-art weaponry. 18
In addition to naming individuals and companies believed to be complicit in sanctions-busting, the report indicts the governments of Togo, Burkina Faso and
of the same?', in A Legault and M Fortman, eds, Les conflits dans le monde / Conflicrs in the World. 1999-2000, Quebec: IQHES, Université Laval. 2000 (forthco mi ng). 16' The cornmissioning of an expert panel was suggested in an earlier report issued by the Secretary-General in cornpliance with Secunty CounciI resolution 1213 (1998). The report recommended that the panel examine 'possible ways of tracing violations of the mesures regarding arms trafficking, oil supply and the diarnond trade, as well as the movement of UNITA funds' (United Nations, S/1999/49, 17 January 1999, p 14). '''For copies of the reports of these uips see United Nations, S/1999/644, 4 June 1999; United Nations, S/l999/829,28 July 1999. Rwanda and past leaderships of Côte d'Ivoire, Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville in the
contravention of sanctions against UNITA.'& Other countries implicated for either directly or indirectly facilitating sanctions-busting include Bulgaria,
Belgium, South Africa, Zarnbia., Morocco and abo on.'" Though vehemently and predictably criticised by most parties narned in the report, the ASC7s bold approach was generally well-received as an imaginative method of empowering sanctions.
Key recommendations in the report cal1 for three-year arms embargo on states found to be violating sanctions on weapons uansfer to UNITA, boycotts on internationai conferences held in sanctions-breaking states, and the basing of admission to the EU and NATO on cornpliance with UN sanctions. With reference to diamonds, recomrnendations include: forfeiture where the legai origin of rough diarnonds cannot be proven; imposition of restrictions on individuals and enterprises proven to be intentionaily complicit in breaking sanctions; prohibitions on dealing in undeclared rough diarnonds in countries hosting diamond centres; the development and implementation of effective arrangements for ensuring that members abide by sanctions regimes; and convention of a conference of experts to establish transparent and accountable controis for determining diarnond provenance. '66
1 63 'Notes for an address by Ambassador Robert Fowler to the United Nations Securiry Council,' New York, United Nations, 15 March, 2000. United Nations, 'Report of the panel of experts', 2000. 165 Additionally, numerous countries were cited for failing to enforce uavel and representation restrictions and allowing UNITA to maintain 'unofficial' representation. These countries include the US, France, Belgium, Portuga!, Switzerland and South Africa (United Nations, 'Report of the panel of experts'. 2000. p 155). 66 United Nations, 'Report of the panel of experts', 2000, pp 109-1 14. 83
The importance of the Fowler Process extends beyond the situation in Angola,
and the approach is regarded as a test-case for determining the ability of the UN
to impact upon conflicts in which economic agendas figure prorninently. Indeed,
it is already being applied elsewhere. The UN'S approach to conflict in Sierra
Leone, for example, has mirrored the ASC's recent initiatives on Angola. Wiih
resolution 1306 (2000), the UN has placed an 18-month embargo on Sierra Leone
diamonds until a proper certificate of oripin scherne can be put in place?'
Likewise, the Secunty CounciI has begun formal investigations into 'illegal
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of weaith7 in the on-going war in
the DRC.'~'
Despite these enthusiastic applications of the ASC model, there are problems already evident. Human Rights Watch, while welcorning the report of the expert panel, argued with an eye on lessons Iearned, that panelIists writing the Fowler
Report suffered from 'the lack of a centralised office to CO-ordinateits works, the failure to involve Interpol in its efforts and the failure of Member States to share intelligence with the Panel r .169 Perhaps the strongest Iesson, however, concerns the United Nations' institutional culture of incrementdism and timidity. The
Secunty Council has shied away from the strong action called for in the report.
Instead, it followed up the Fowler report with resolution 1295 (2000) establishing a five-person 'monitoring mechanism' to investigate leads and recomrnend appropriate measures against those contravening UN sanctions. The panel was not established until mid-July, Ieaving just three months for it to complete its
16' 16' United Nations, S/RES/1306(20ûû), 5 July. 84
~ork."~In response to the UN'S inertia on the issue, several of the more
promising efforts are taking place outside the UN system in the form of initiatives
focused on the issue of 'conflict diarnonds'.
Conflict diamonds For Angolans - as for Sierra Leoneans, Liberians and Congolese - the
relationship between the diamond uade and violence is nothing new. But the
recent irnpetus to make sanctions against UNITA effective has focused attention
on the 'gemmo-poiitics' of African ~onflict.'~'Reflecting this interest, a unique
ad-hoc coalition organically Iinked with the Fowler process has been brought together to curb the trade in conflict diarnonds, defmed as those 'which originate from areas in Africa controlled by forces fighting the legitimate and internationally recognised government of the relevant country r .173 The publications, pressures and policy refonns generated by conflict diamonds advocacy and lobbying are bolstenng the UN diamond embargo on UNITA, with serious consequences for conflict trajectories in Angola.
An important catalyst for conflict diamonds initiatives was a series of reports from NGOs that generated an unexpected degree of publicity due to media attention on events in diamond-related conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone and the
16' United Nations, S/PRST/2000/20, 2 June 2000. '" 'UN Sanctions Cornmittee on Angola: Lessons leamed?'. Human Righü Watch, 17 Apnl2000. I7O See 'UN fails to appoint panel', Angola Peace Moniror, 10(6), 28 June 2000. "' The term is adapted from F Misser and O Vallée, Les gemmocraties: L'economie politique du diamant africain, Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1997, p 195. '72 This is De Beers' definition of a 'conflict diamond'. In a rare display of consensus. Global Witness accepts this as a working definition (see Global Witness, 'Conflict Diamonds', June 2000, pp 3-4). However, one can foresee problems in defining the 'legitimacy' of any internationally recognised government, e.g. Liberia under elected warlord, President Charles Taylor. 85
DRC. Ln Iate 1998, the Global Witness report, 'A rough trade: The role of companies and governments in the Angolan conflict', implicated states and corporations in the financing of conflict in Angola. The study, funded by the UK
Foreign Office, concludes that 'the international trade in diarnonds has become a major obstacle to any possible progess towards peace 7 .173 Revealing the breadth of the conflict diarnonds issue, a similar report has investigated the political economy of war in Sierra Leone. According to the authors of The heart of the marrer Sierra Leone. diarnonds and human security, 'Diarnonds ... have fuelled
Sierra Leone's conflict, destabilising the country for the better part of three decades 3 .174 Action for Southern Africa also released 'Waiting on empty promises: The human cost of international inaction on Angolan sanctions' just prior to the release of the Fowler report. As these reports indicate, NGOs have been at the fore of lobbying efforts for action on conflict diamonds, including such groups as the 'Fatal Transactions' codition comprising Global Witness,
Medico International, the Netherlands Institute for Southern Afnca, and Novib.
A flurry of diverse policy initiatives have built on the interest generated by their efforts. As laid out by US Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Howard Jeter, and repeated elsewhere as the unofficial Hippocratic mantra of conflict diarnond initiatives,
The central foreign policy challenge we face is to reconcile two critical imperatives: 1) First, to devise feasible rneasures to curb the powerful contribution to Afncan Conflicts of illegitimate diarnond trading: both through a tightening of global marketing practices and direct assistance in building capacity to manage the diarnond sector in conflicted states such
Global Witness, 'A rough trade', 1998, p 4. 174 I Smillie, R Hazelton and L Gberie, Hean of rhe Marrer, 2000, p 1, as Sierra Leone; 2) Second, and equdly important, to ensure that we do not harrn stable market democracies - Botswana, South Afnca, Namibia - who depend heavily on gemstone diamond production and international consumer confidence. 17'
There has been a wide-array of multilateral efforts in the pursuit these objectives-
The links between diamonds and conflict were formaily discussed at the
December 1999 Berlin G-8 ministerial on conflict prevention. Subsequently, the
UK and Canada pushed to have the Okinawa G-8 summit support the 'Kimberley
proposais', a diarnond certification. plan brokered by South Africa and major
producing countries at a May 2000 mini-surnrnit in South Africa that convened
States, industry representatives, corporations and NGOs to discuss diamond
production in conflict zones.176 This event was followed up by a June meeting of
the Africa technical group on diamonds in Luanda to draft and clarify specific measures to combat conflict diamonds, and another meeting in London that
sought to incorporate India and Israel, as key importing countries on the margins
The EU has sirnilarly been active on the issue as an eariy supporter of the embargo against UNITA diamonds. More recently, as a result of President
Charles Taylor's support for the Revolutionary United Front and its role in the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afncan Affairs Howard Jeter, 'Testimony before House Comrnittee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa', 9 May 2000. 17' The summit brought together key actors, but Russia and Israel were conspicuous in their absence. in A Parker and F Guerrera, 'Diamond plan makes headway', Financial Times, 26 June 2000. Suspicion of British govemment influence has also surrounded the decision of an independent advisor to refuse approval the listing of a merged Onyx-Peua Diamonds mining firm on London's Alternative Investment Market. The firm's links to the Zimbabwean and Congolese governments and a belief that revenues would fund conflict in the DRC arc Iikely behind the advisor's statement that listing the firm would endanger the 'integrity' of the London market ('Diarnond row scuppers float', BBC News, 1 2 June 2000). Sierra Leonean diamond trade, the EU revoked $47 million in development
assistance from Liberia. '"
Correspondingly, USAI.is sponsoring mining-sector reforms in Sierra Leone
and Angola to combat confiict diamonds. Congressional attention has also been
drawn to the issue by the introduction of the 'Consumer Access to a Responsible
Accounting of Trade Act' (CARAT Act) proposing to infonn Arnerican
consumers - who form 65% of the global market for rough diamonds - of the
provenance of the diamonds they purchase. 17'
Certain African organisations and states have moved in similar directions. The
OAU has tentatively supported the implementation of the measures against
UNITA. At the regional level, SADC has attempted to boost efforts to monitor
Angola sanctions, especially in regard to the crucial issue of customs and airspace
violations through the creation of an ad-hoc body under the Inter-state Committee
of Defence and ~ecurit~.'~~SADC has also been a key forum for diarnond producing nations such as Botswana, Narnibia and South Africa given that over
60 per cent of the region's foreign exchange is derived from the mining sector.'*'
Correspondingly, ECOWAS, representing both states wracked by diarnond- financed insurgency and those sponsoring rebellion in order to profit from diarnond smuggling, has mounted a regional inquiry into the illegal trade in diarnonds.
17' 17' Though Liberia is a major conduit for Sierra Leonean diamonds entering international markets, pressure from the US allowed Liberia and Burkina Faso to remain outside the sanctions piaced on Sierra Leone, with reference to Liberia's roIe reduced to a preambular expression of concern in resoiution 1306 (2000). 'The link between dirty diamonds and war', Africa News Online, 14 December 1999. ''O 'SADC to rnonitor sanctions on Angolan rebels', Xinhua, 24 July 2000. 88
The international diamond industry, uniquely dominated by the De Beers
cartel, has also responded to the negative attention focussed on its trade. Fearïng
a consumer campaign backlash - the so-called 'fur-factor' - De Beers has
announced its intention not to buy diamonds from 'conflict areas' and has begun a
certification scheme to assuage consumer fears. Indeed, conflict diamonds are
prompting global structural change in the diarnond business. Since the 1930s, De
Beers' business suategy has hinged on an ability to control the global supply of
rough diamonds. But the Company is abandoning this role. Instead of controlling
price volatility through manipulation of world supply, De Beers is working
towards increasing demand and brand-marketing its product as a luxury goods
fim.
De Beers has publicly portrayed this revolutionary decision as the result of its
noble efforts to renounce purchases from conflict areas: 'since the imposition of
UN diarnond sanctions against UNITA, De Beers has - at some considerable cost
to itself - gone much fürther than the legal requirernents to ensure that the
diarnonds it sells are from conflict-free regions?' In truth, De Beers' new
marketing strategy represents nothing short of an about-face on the issue. Back in
1998, De Beers was vehemenrly opposed to the embargo on WïïA diamonds,
clairning that it was impossible for its buyers to determine the ongins of the rough
diamonds; an interesting argument given that the company's entire marketing suategy is now based on its ability to make a clearly identifiable distinction
18' 'Southeni Africa to draft policy on conflict diamonds'. Reuters, 1 August 2000. "2 'Chairman's starement'. Annuaf Report 1999, De Been, . between conflict and non-contlict diarn~nds!"~The decision to restrucnire
marketing practices is equally motivated by market forces such as increased
production from mines outside De Beers' control and pressure to increase the
share prices.184In fact. a recent USAID report observed that,
ironically, the diamond giant De Beers may stand to gain the most from disruption or boycott of trade in alluvial diarnonds from conflict countries ... because De Beers has the greatest likelihood of being able to certiQ the onoia of its traded Stones due to the high proportion of vertical 1 8? integration' ,
Irnportantly, however, even with moves to tighten its buying operations, De Beers
is sti11 selling conflict diamonds: the company's stockpile of diamonds stood at $4
billion in 1999, and on De Beers' own admission many of these diarnonds came
'indirectly' frorn UNI TA.'^^ Thus, the company's ernphasis on the ongins of present purchases ignores the histories of diarnonds in present sales. As one report argues, 'unless De Beers managed the rernarkable feat of selling around $2 billion worth of the world's second most valuable gems before sanctions fell, during a 15-month recession without depressing diamond prices,' the world
18' The Company told Global Witness that 'whatever the potential for posirive identification you have not a clue where they came frorn. Just to be clear if [a diarnond seller] says they're Scottish diamonds, you take his word for it ... they could be diamonds from the moon' (Global Witness, 'A rough trade*, 1998). *Washed out of Africa', The Econornisr, 3 June 2000. 185 United States Agency for International Development, Office of Transition Initiatives, 'Diarnonds and armed conflict in Sierra Leone: Proposa1 for a new diamond policy and operations', Washington: USAID, 8 June 2000. 186 Though claiming to have never 'directly* purchased UNITA diamonds, De Beers did position buyers on the DRC's border with Angola until Mobutu's fa11 in 1997, undoubtedly knowing that the diamonds purchased were coming from UNITA forces across the border (Global Witness, 'Conflict Diamonds', 2000, p II ; 'UNITA gems went to De Beers', Mail and Guardian, 17 March 2000. 90
diarnond supply must ultimately be regarded as contarninated with conflict
diamonds. '"
Along with lobbying De Beers, pressure has been brought to bear on
representatives of the internationai diarnond industry with great effect. The
activities of key industry organisations such as the DMA and Belgium's non-
profit HRD have been subjected to public scrutiny. & the uncharactenstically
high-profile World Diarnond Congress in July 2000, the IDMA agreed to adopt a
certification system for creating an unbreakable 'chah of warranty' to monitor a
diamond from the mine to the end-consumer in order to ensure that only 'conflict
free' diamonds were part of the legitimate industry. This regime is to be overseen
by the International Diamond Council, a completeIy new organisation comprising
producers, manufacturers, traders, governments, and international organisations,
including the Security Council. The move was welcomed by the chair of the
ASC, himself a keynote speaker at the World Diamond Congresses, as 'a comprehensive approach' that makes the diamond industry part of the solution rather than part of the pr~blem.'~*NGOs have likewise applauded the relevant
World Diamond Congress resolution as going a long way towards 'meeting many of the concems that have been expressed about conflict diamonds by NGOs in
Europe, North America and Africa - 189
Action for Southern Africa. 'Waiting on empiy promises'. 2000. p 16. 'Press conference by Canadian permanent representative', ReliefWeb, 2 1 July 2000. lB9Global Witness. 'Joint press staternent by civil society organisations following the World Diamond Congress 17-19 July 2000'. London, 19 July 2000; 'Controls on conflict diamonds', BBC News, 18 July 2000. The sanctions approach: Impact and outcornes Obviously, insofar as this study is concerned, the true rneasure of these initiatives is not the number of reports, meetings or resolutions they generate, but rather their implications for Angola's conflict- Disapgregating the impact of sanctions from and other factors - Angola's complex web of military offensives, factional intrigue and regional developments - is difficult, but it is possible to make tentative observations regarding the immediate impacts of the embargo on
UNITA's war economy and the multiple responses this engenders. Frorn current trajectories and an understanding of Angola's political economy of violence, moreover, one can also forecast the effects of the sanctions approach on the prospects for a sustainable peace in Angola. In this andysis, the sanctions approach appears unlikely to increase the prospects for human security/development in Angola without a broadening of current efforts.
Impact: UNITA diamonds, July 1998-
Although UNITA continues to trade in rough diamonds, sanctions were never expected to cornpletely sever its cornmerciai links to the outside world; nor are conflict diamond reforms expected to prevent al1 illicit diamonds from reaching legitimate marketing channels. Rather, the objective has been to render sanctions
'far more effective than they had been in the past, with the result that UNITA's capacity to wage war would be diminished .190 Much remains to be done in terrns of implementing and enforcing proposed refoms. Nevenheless, these measures
'" United Nations, 'Report of the Chairman of the Angola Sanctions Cornmittee's visit to Africa'.
S/1999/644,4June 1999, p 6. ' 92
are already pressuring UNITA'S 'current account' and hurting its terms of trade:
the possible suppliers of imported ms, fuel and other vital rnilitary supplies have
declined and these goods have been rendered relatively more expensive by the
depressed value and volume of UNITA'S diamond exports, which are essentially
the 'currency' of its near-cashiess economy.
In terrns of diamond revenues since sanctions, UNITA is estimated to have earned $200 million in 1998 and anywhere between $100 to $200 million in
1999.I9l These figures are well under 1997 levels of $600 niillion. The major factors in UNITA'S declining revenues were its eviction fiom mines by the FA& the disniption of traditionai overland and aeriai trade routes, and the exhaustion of older mines under UNITA control. Significantly, however, a large portion of recent UNITA sales emanate from stockpiled diamonds. Another noteworthy development is the rnerging of Angola and the DRC's iliicit diamond economies.
Congolese diarnond traders have began using UNITA smuggling channels in order to circumvent controls on the industry introduced to the DRC in 1998.'~'
Along with UNITA'S diamond stockpile, the existence of this practice indicates that UNITA may continue to market diamonds irrespective of its ability to engage in new production.
Relative to military developments within Angola, it is unlikely that sanctions exercised much influence over UNlTA's declining diamond revenues in 1998 and
1999. Yet as reforrns to the international diarnond trade and vigilant sanctions enforcernent gain momentum, there is every indication that UNITA is beginning
19' Action for Souchern Africa. 'Waiting on empty promises', 2000. to feel their impact. The authors of the Fowier report, confirming the increased
efficacy of sanctions, obsemed that UNITA'S capacity to sel1 diamonds is based
on three factors. The first is UNITA's access to diamond rich terrkones, which is
largely determined by politico-military outcomes in Angola. Recent efforts to curb UNITA diamonds have therefore primarily impacted upon the second two factors, 'the ease with which iliegal diamonds can be soid or traded on major diamond markets' and 'the easy and protected access whïch UNITA has had to external locations where diamond deais can be transacted' .Ig3
By making it more difficult for iliicit diarnonds to reach legitimate marketing channels, and ultimately the consumer, sanctions have depressed black market prices for UMTA diamonds and decreased its sales volumes. UNITA'S access to the world's major rough diamond centre in Antwerp has been decreased by embarrassing publicity for the Belgian government and industry representatives.
As a result of severe criticism for its lax regdation of the Antwerp bourse, the
Belgian government and the HRD have begun to enforce prohibitions on the purchase of contentious or uncertified Angolan rough diarnonds and have introduced stricter import controls. This has already decreased the volume of laundered UNITA diamonds passing through Antwerp: in 1998, 'Zambian' exports to Belgium - largely composed of UNITA and other illicit production - were only 14593 carats, a small fraction of UNITA'S total sales.194As a result of
192 Human Rights Watch, Angola unravels, 1999. 193 United Nations, 'Report of the Expert Panel', 2000, p 105. 1% Human Rights Watch, Angola rinravels, 1999; Global Witness, 'A rough uade', 1998. Assuming an average pnce of $250 per carat for Angolan gem diamonds (and keeping in mind that some production rnight be Iower grade diamonds from the DRC) 'Zambian' exports to Belgiurn would total just over $3.6 million. 94
these measures, a senior defector from Savimbi's faction reported that UNITA
diamonds are now fetching only half of their previous market pnce.'gs
NonetheIess, further work remains to be done in Antwerp and in other major
centres, particularly Tel Aviv and Bombay, two bourses receiving a growing
share of UNITA production.196
In the future, proposed measures for an international diamond certification
scherne, if legally enforceable, transparent and verifiable, will also do rnuch to
curb the profits derived from UNITA diamonds. For example, certification may
bring about a bifurcation of international diamond pnces, with certified diarnonds
conceivably fetching much higher prices than either unofficial diamonds sold to
less discriminating consumers, or laundered illicit diamonds subject to hidden
marketing costs such as bribes, smuggling fees, risk of seizure and forfeiture.
Related efforts to deprive UNITA'S access to extemal sites to conduct
business have met with less success- The Fowier process and related NGO
publications rely on tacrics of 'naming and shaming', hoping that international
opprobnum and the prospect of punitive measures wiil increase sanctions compliance among States, corporations and individuds operating with relative impunity. Yet in spite of the negative publicity generated by recent publications, key actors appear willing to continue to flaunt LN sanctions, regardless of the rïsks - a clew affront to the authority of the Security Council, but no doubt a reflection of its previous laxity in ensuring sanctions compliance.
Ig5 'Angola: IRIN focus on new sanctions monitoring mechanism', IRIN. 4 August 2000. '% Action for Southern Africa. 'Waiting on empty promises', 2000. The problem is particularly acute in Africa, where the lack of sanctions
enforcement represents nothing less than a 'cnsis of African so~idarit~'.'~~Rather
than helping to increase UNTïA's transaction costs by ceasing to facilitate
meetings between UNITA and diamond dealers, states such as Togo, Burkina
Faso, Rwanda and Gabon continue to assist WTA in this capacity.lg8Despite
evidence of Togolese complicity, particularly in the Office of President Eyadema,
Angola failed in its recent attempt to have fellow SADC members forrnally
boycott the OAU summit set to be held in Togo.
Outside these states, however, attaching potential risks to deding with UNITA
seems to be working. Stigmatised, UNITA is either isolated or faces demands for
greater compensation for abetting its sanctions busting. UNZTA defectors have
reported that regular arms and diamond traders were 'in touch' with UNITA less
frequently: 'they know they are being watched so they have to take care'.Ig9
Charges that Bulgaria was the major exporter of arms destined for UNTïA bas raised the nsk, though admittedly quite minimal, of having its aspirations for membership in NATO or the EU denied as per FowIer report recornrnendations.
Even suggesting such measures has drarnatically aitered the Bulganan government's approach towards sanctions enforcement.
Somewhat ironically, much of UNITA'S diarnond laundering appears to be conducted through official Angolan channels in spite of the governrnent's extemal lobbying for the strict enforcement of sanctions. The MPLA has, for the first
Ig7 Anonymous minister quoted in the Report of the Chairman of the Angola Sanctions Cornmittee's visit to Africa, S/I999/644,4 June 1999, p 7. '9g 'Angola: IRIN focus on new sanctions monitoring mechanism'. IRIN, 4 August 2000; 'Gabon surprised at British diarnond daims', BBC News, 2 August 200. 96
tirne, begun to assert its control over Angola's diamond industry. Official
production in 1999 was estimated at over $600 million.'" A significant portion of
this may be UNITA diamonds, however. Angola's certificate of ongin scheme,
created to comply with resolution 1 173 (1998)- contains numerous loopholes
including easily forgeable do~urnents.'~'Although Angola has since begun an
overhaul of its industry replations under intense international pressure, it is less
than clear that UNITA diamonds are not still being marketed ihrough official
channels. There are well-documented reports of senior govemrnent officids
purchasing UNITA diamonds and certificates of ongin are alleged to be available
on black markets.'*' UNITA reportedly continues to purchase 'protection' to engage in diarnond production from compt Angolan generals.'03 Finally, companies operating in Angola have not yet publicly announced the measures they have taken to reduce the leakage of UNTïA diarnonds into oficial channels.
With past histories of arrangements between cornpanies and UNITA to end attacks on production sites, it is conceivable that illicit diarnonds are being marketed as licensed production through protection rackets. Global Witness has caIIed on the monitoring mechanism established in Juiy 2000 to make an investigation into the Angolan government its first priority.'O? Without co-
'99 .Angola: IRiN focus on new sanctions monitoring mechanism'. IRIN, 4 August 2000. '" Global Witness, 'Conflict diamonds', 2000. p 5. "O' See Global Witness, 'A rough uade', December 1998, 'O2 Human Rights Watch, Angola unravefs, 1999; United Nations, 'Report of the panel of experts'. 2000; Global Witness, various publications. 'O3 'Angolan government tightens squeeze on UNITA'S finances', Financial Times, 30 March 2000. 201 Quoted in 'Angola: IRIN focus on new sanctions monitoring mechanism', IRIN, 4 August 2000, 97 operation from the Angolan regime, and the companies operating with its consent, any extemal efforts to curb UNITA diamonds will have a marginal impact-
Thus, despite the embargo's ear1y successes, there is clearly a mixed record.
Against the backdrop of previous UN sanction regimes throughout the 1990s, however, the embargo against UNITA has been relativeIy e~ective.'~~In fact, a cnticai report on UN sanctions over the past decade cited the 'smart' sanctions on
UNITA diamonds as an effective method of reducing its finances.'" Yet this is somewhat of a false anaIogy given that the entire approach of the Fowler process was to overcome the traditional lack of enforcernent that has characterised past regimes - especially the ASC's own shamefül record in enforcing the anns and fuel embargo imposed under resohtion 864 (1993).
To tmly break the aura of impunity that surrounds sanctions-busting, the current approach must make the difficult transition from 'threats' to 'action', and begin to impose punishment upon sanctions transgressors. November 2000 has been set as the date for a decision on appropriate actions against States found to be violating UN resolutions on UNTTA. Only then will we know if there exists the requisite degree of politicd will and diplornatic consensus for such a transition.
Ominously, the authors of the Fowler Report concluded with the warning that
205 It is perhaps significant that UN sanctions were only applied two tirnes prior to 1990, against Rhodesia and South Africa, Since, sanctions have been used 12 times. For a comparative perspective, see also N Crawford and A KIotz, How sancrions work: Lessons from Sortth Africa, London: Macmillan, 1999. 106 L George and D Cortright, The sanctions decade: Assessirzg UN straregies in the 1990s. Boulder: Lynne Rienner for the International Peace Academy 98
'there is a very real risk that when the focus has been turned off UNITA and its partners will go back to doing business as us~al'.'~'
Outcornes: Dangers in the sanctions approach
In the best hopes of proponents of the sanctions approach, UNITA is weakened by the combination of tightened international sanctions and rniiitary offensives, foregoes the military option, and either sues for peace or is marginalised as a politico-miiitary force. But a number of factors confront the positive developments of this 'best-case' scenario and increase the likelihood of more ominous outcornes, The slim prospects for sanctions achieving their stated objective of promoting peace begins with a fundamental and recurring disconnect, narnely, the failure to reconcile the twin objectives of degrading UNITA7s military capacities - the 'means' - and fosteririg a durable peace settlement - the
'end'. The sanctions approach treats these two aims as sequential and compatible, with one flowing naturally from the other. However, degrading UNITA'S rnilitary capacity, an objective with unrealistic expectations, is unlikely to move the situation closer to peace. Meanwhile, the impact of the embargo has pitfails which have been largely overlooked. Without a meaningful broadening of external efforts beyond the sanctions-based approach, the embargo will prove ineffective at best, and counterproductive at worst.
207 United Nations, 'Report of the panel of experts', 2000, p 183. John Harker reinforced my suspicions that such a face rnight befall the Fowler report. As the author of a report entitled 'Human security in Sudan: The report of a Canadian assessrnent mission', he has cenainly witnessed the lack of substantive action chat follows controversial reports which receive intense but fleeting interest in media, public and policy circles (personal communication, 9 August, 2000). 99
To begin, conflated expectations of denying UNITA the rnilitary option by
crippling its war economy should be kept in perspective. Notwithstanding recent
improvements in sanctions enforcement, UNITA will aiways be abIe to circumvent the embargo. And if international attention shifts elsewhere, as it
aimost inevitably will, UNITA'S sanctions busting prospects will only improve.
Further, a histancai view reveals UNITA'S proven ability to reconfigure its economy on non-diamond alternatives, albeit with the assistance of outside patrons, However, with a series of interrelated conflicts in southern/centrd
Africa's 'insecunty comrnunities', and given the past enthusiasrn with which a myriad of actors have profited from Angola's conflict, UNITA is uniikely to have problems attracting or buying externzl assistance. UNTA'S finances are not going to recover to the spectacuk levels of the past decade, rendering a conventional mFlitary apparatus beyond its reach. The guemlla cerrorism it has employed to frustrate counter-insurgency efforts for almost three decades is nevertheless Iikely to continue. Thus, the optirnism that surrounded the FAA7s routing of UNITA in 1999 has dissipated. Though it appears to be suffering the economic impact of sanctions and the loss key foreign backers, UNITA maintains an estimated core of 15 000 fighters and much of its weaponry. With this force it can easily recreate a politico-rnilitary situation analogous to the sort of violent cease-fires of 1991-92 and l994- 1998; in fact, these are the ideal conditions for the illicit diamond trade that will continue in spite of the embargo.
As a quintessential reflection of the 'means-end' discrepancy in the sanctions approach, rather than increasing UNITA'S predilection for negotiation, the embargo could be recreating UNITA in the worst image of those who consider it 1O0
as a 'greed-motivated' warlord insurgency. Present transformations of UNITA'S
political and rnilitary economy have disquieting parallels in RENAMO's
transformation following the decline of extemal patronage in the rnid-1980s.
Without centralised revenues there was an inevitable fragmentation and
radicalisation of RENAMO, and human security declined as rnarauding cnminal
bands preyed on local populations, engaging in destabilising atrocities and
econornic warfare. For UNITA, numerous factors suggest the possibility of a
sirnilar fate: a decline in diarnond revenues and the centrifugai force they
represent; degraded conventional capabilities; isolation from Angolan and
international political life; and a breakdown of centralised command as
communication and supply lines are severed. Recent events including the
targeting of humanitarian aid convoys, orders to kidnap foreign humanitarian
workers, renewed atrocities against civilians, and agressive mine-laying hint at
UNITA'S increasing proclivity towards criminal predation, a trend with serious implications for human security/development.
Nor has the sanctions approach increased the government's propensity to negotiation. It has consistently been reiterated that sanctions 'are intended to help establish the conditions for a resumption of political dialogue to achieve a durable resolution of the confiict in Angola'. Contrariwise, the embargo has tacitly encùuraged the Angolan govemment to seek a battlefield solution. In fact, implicit in certain interpretations of the stated aim of 'curtailing UNITA's ability to pursue its objective through rnilitary means' is an invitation for the FAA to 101
seek a military solution to Angola's c~nflict.'~~British Minister of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Peter Hain, a staunch advocate of the
embargo, recently confirmed as much with the controversiai statement in Angola
that 'military action against UNITA rebels will have to continue'.'0g
Enthusiasm for the sanctions approach and quiet hopes for UNITA'S
destruction are clearly (and quite understandably) motivated the spectacular
failures of the UNAVEM and MONUA missions, especially in the area of
sanctions enforcement, and Savimbi's role in the coliapse of these efforts. That
UNITA bears a large share of historical culpability for the current situation is indi~~utable;"~the notion that UNITA can or should ipso facto be excluded frorn a political solution to the conflict is not. In pragmatic terms, it is cIearly impracticable to exclude the 'men with guns', and hopes for UNITA'S final defeat betray an ignorance of military realities. The historical record does bear out the paucity of lasting negotiated settlements as opposed to rnilitary settlements in civil wars. Since 1945 only one-quarter of civil wars have ended with negotiation and of these, renewed violence erupts within five years in 50 per cent of cases."'
As Charles King observes, however, 'rditary victory in civil wars is ofien associated with wide-spread human-rights abuses, atrocities, genocide,
208 United Nations, 'Report of the Chairman of the Angola Sanctions Cornmittee's visit to Europe and Algena', S/1999/829,29 July 1999, p 23. 209 'Hain visit stirs conuoversy', IRIN, 7 July 2000. A British diplomat defends Hain in the article, arguing that 'Hain does not support the war. He understands why it continues and why it isn't oing to stop tomorrow'. 'O Notably, however, the Angolan governrnent itself places much of the blarne for the current war on the UN. 211 R Licklider, 'The consequences of negotiated settlernents in civil wars, 1945- 1993', Arnerican Political Science Review, 89(3), 1995, pp 68 1-90. 102
environmental degradation and a host of other ills which make economic
reconstniction and political reconciliation especially difficult'."'
Thus, more important still are the normative objections. No alternative
political force has emerged to replace UNITA in the narrow political space within
which the Angolan government permits opposition poIiticians or civil society
groups to operate. One must therefore question just who wiLl be participating in
the dialogue that sanctions purportedly promote? In an environment in which
military solutions have long been sought to political, economic and social
problems, a pacific civil society opposition has little chance of affecting positive change without external assistance. There is therefore the danger that whatever interests UNITA represented in pst political life - and daims to represent now - will be disenfranchised by a regime with a long history of systematic discrimination against large segments of the population. Government spending in
1996, for exarnple, allocated 86.5 per cent of the national budget for Luanda, leaving over sixty per cent of the population with only a 13.5 per cent ~hare."~At the very least, efforts to undercut Savimbi as a valid peacemaker should be accompanied by serious efforts to bolster an alternative political opposition through overtures to factions of UNITA moderates who have defected from the militarist wing,
Yet rather than working against the mqinalisation of opposition interests, the sanctions approach has undermined peace overtures and efforts to foster dialogue.
Opposite calls to isolate Savimbi, key elements of Angolan civil society have
212 C King, 'Ending civil wars', Adelphi Paper, 308, 1997. p recently called for reconciliation in what could be a historic juncture. At a July
meeting of the Cornite Inter-Eciisial para paz em Angola, delegates called for
nationai reconciliation and dialogue involving dl politicai parties, institutions and civil society. UNITA responded favourably to this initial overture, but for even raising the prospect of dialogue with Savimbi key figures in COIEPA were labelled '~avimbists'."~Since, however, even the MPLA appears to be changing its approach to the conflict with declining military gains. Backing off previous statements cailing for Savimbi's prosecution, President dos Santos hinted in June that 'maybe one day, those who created such pain, such suffering, such destruction, will repent. Maybe even Savimbi himself. .. We have backed a policy of pardoning al1 those who search for a path of reasoning and show regret for the path they chose'."5 These recent openings for peace could signal a crucial juncture that could be seized by the international community to great effect. The
ASC has maintained that it will, 'continue to review UNITA'S willingness to engage in political dialogue and calibrate Council-imposed sanctions ac~ordin~l~'."~Though it is clear that diamond, arms, fuel, and financiai embargoes are required to deny UNITA greater military capacities, the lifting of sanctions such as those on the travel of family members rnight be considered, perhaps applied to a certain moderate UNITA faction, as a progressive incentive for peace.
213 T Hodges, Angola: From Afro-Stalinisrn tu jungle capiralisrn, Oslo: Frid tjo f Nansen Institute, 2000; quoted in P Le Billon, 'A land cursed', 1999. 'IRIN feature on a new church initiative for peace'. IRIN. 2 August 20. 215 'Angolan dialogue in Maputo', Angola Peace Monitor, 10(6), 28 June 2000. United Nations. 'Report of the Chairman of the Angola Sanctions Cornmittee's visit to Africa'. S/1999/644,4 June 1999, p 18. Toward a comprehensive approach It is worth reiterating that the problern is not with sanctions regdes per se.
Indeed, sanctions provide a useful staning point for extemai engagement by
framing policies that address the economic dimensions of conflict trajectories in
Angola. However, constructing an architecture for strengthening the embargo
against UNITA - the 'sanctions approach' - has dorninated external efforts to
bhg peace to Angola, resulting in a the neglect of rneasures required to offset its
negative externalities and complement its myopic focus. Indeed, the key
deficiency in the sanctions approach is its failure to contextualise UNITA
diamonds. There is a misidentification of the Fundamental bamïer to peace, which
is not UNITA diamonds, but rather the pervasive politicai economy of violence
that has consistently undermined hopes for peace.
A first step towards a comprehensive approach must be rernedying the
dangers outiined above. Here, the consequences of both UNITA'S increased
reliance on criminal predation and the international cornmunity's implicit
encouragement of a rnilitary solution need to be addressed. The humanitarian
situation in Angola is precarious, with 3.7 million persons affected by renewed
violence, of whom two million are intemally displaced."' Relief for vulnerable
populations has been inadequate, however. When compared to the generous
funding for the sanctions approach, consistent delays in meeting the OCHA's co- ordinated inter-agency appeais for Angola raise critical questions about the
"'United Nations. 'Repon of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola', Sl20001304, 1 1 ApriI 2000, 105
distribution of reso~rces.''~Likewise, the lack of peacebuilding initiatives to
cornpiement the explicitly peacemaking thst of the embargo requires scrutiny.
A programme for 'capacity building for civil society', for exarnple, was dropped
frorn th3 year's OCHA appeal in order to strearnline funding requests.
Admittedly, there are important questions regarding the sequencing of these efforts. However, peacebuilding programmes abandoned for lack of funding or in reaction to renewed conflict are complementary to the sanctions approach. The need for strategies of peacebuilding is particularly conspicuous given the international comrnunity's indirect contribution io the ascendancy of hard-line elements of the MPLA convinced of the necessity and possibility of a rnilitary soiution. Clearly, outside assistance is urgently required to remedy power/wealth imbdances between Angolan civil society and anned actors such as UNITA and the MPLA regirne if coercion is to be displaced as the central feature of Angolan politics.
The irnbalance between support for sanctions enforcement and peacebuilding partly reflects the MPLA's hostiIity to a more robust role for the UN given its past mediation failures. And, as reflected in the Iirnited mandate of the UN Office in
Angola, the UN and key rnember States have been too ready to assume that blarning UNITA as the primary cause of the current war involves adopting a compIacent attitude towards Luanda. Moving beyond this deferential posture
218 In lune 1999 an emergency appeaI was launched to spark donor interest in Angola's unfoiding complex emergency. The OCHA's June 2000 mid-terrn review reports that 'only three of the 29 projects submitted by UN Agencies to the 2000 Consolidaced Inter-Agency AppeaI are fully funded, with the rest receiving between zero and 60 per cent of requirements. In an effort to radically strearnline funding requests, 14 projects are being dropped from the mid-term review' would be assisted by the commissioning of a formal report sirnilar to those recently released on the Rwandan genocide and the Bosnian civil war - fighting between 1992 and 1994 cost 300 000 Iives and there has still not been a critical introspective of the UN'S accountabi~it~.~~~Frank acknowledgement of the UN'S own responsibility, and that of other actors, for the coilapse of the Bicesse and
Lusaka efforts does not absolve UMTA of its culpability. It would, however, remedy narrow interpretations of historical responsibility for the present situation.
Furthemore, a properiy tirned report could help sustain international interest and policy momentum on the Angolan conflict-
Even judging the sanctions approach within the context of LNlTA diamonds, there ha. been a iack of attention on the nature of the consolidation of forrnal control over the mining sector. Little systematic attention has been paid to the links between private military companies and mining interests, despite recommendations frorn the ASC to work with the UN Special Rapporteur on the question of the use of mercenaries. Foreign direct investrnent in the diamond indusuy currently takes the form of enclaves protected by heavily-amed security service personnel. If the sanctions approach merely replaces one set of armed actors exploiting the country's narural wealth without regard for the general population with another, it is diff~cuitto assert that progress is being made. Nor have the human security/development implications of the government's
(United Nations, 'Mid-term review: Inter-agency consoIidated appeal for Angoia', New York and Geneva, Iuly 2000, p 18). '19 '19 United Nations, 'Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Rwandan genocide', 15 December 1999; United Nations, 'Report on Srebrenica', A/544/539,15 November 1999. 107 crackdown on garimpiero miners and the regionalist aspirations of the Lunda- based political party Partido da Renovacao Social been fully addre~sed.~~
In his critique of sanctions, Duff~elddraws a comparison between sanctions enforcement and the war on dmgs in larnenting the UN'S failure to consider
UNITA diamonds as a particular manifestation of the general phenornenon of cross-border trading and war economies: 'The UN is approaching the matter as a specific policing problem.. . [Ilt is an approach that resembles so-far unsuccessful attempts to lirnit the dmgs trade'. This analogy can be extended to the lack of consideration of the complex nature of the illicit diamond economy. Local and migratory labourers engage in illicit diamond production in collaboration with
UNITA for multiple and various factors, including survivai strategies in response to regional underdevelopment and internai displacement. While the sanctions approach has hitherto focused on the links between this illicit economy and the covert and fonnal global criminal economy, the problem cm usefully be frarned at the level of these micro-processes, which are themselves symptomatic of the lack of econornic/human development in the region, regional insecurity comdors, and patterns of cross-border and intemal migration. A transition is required from the forrns of peacemaking governance inaugurated by the sanctions approach to foms of peacebuilding governance that would reconfigure relations between the state, mining corporations and communities in ways conducive to democratic and sustainable development.
The PRS raised objections to the government's 'clean-up' carnpaign in the diamond belt which involved cordoning off main concessions and evicting artisanel miners, on one occasion reportedly killing 150 people ('Eastern dissent', The Economisr, 16 Decernber 1995). Perhaps the most serious deficiency of the sanctions approach concerns the conspicuous lack of action on Angola's oil industry. En contrast to the unprecedented strengthening the diamond embargo, ùiere has been little pressure on governance structures in the oil industry and their links to the financial, private security/military and anns sectors- The obvious rejoinder to the argument for engaging the oil industry concems sequencing, and it is tempting to see wide-ranging econornic and political reform as a post-conflict priority to be undertaken after 'peace' is achieved. Bearing in mind that an end to conflict remains a distant prospect while increasing oil riches are a contemporary reality, the argument for sequencing ignores the intrinsic connections between the oil rent and prevailing patterns of narrow development which are themselves at the roots of the conflict. Global Witness argued that war resumed in 1998, in part, because it was the basis for the wealth and power of key individuals in Luanda:
In Angola today, it is clear that for some of these individu&, the war is the end game and a clear conflicr of interest prevails-. mi the war continues this is not a problem because war is lucrative. It goes without saying that such a situation provides little or no incentive for these individuals to look for a real peace initiative? ln addition to the oiligarchy's interest in continued instabiiity, economic distortions related to the oil rent are also responsible for low levels of development that facilitate grievance mobilisation and increase the allure of insurgency. The conflict in Cabinda, for exarnple, is directly related to local perceptions of unfair oil revenue distribution. Moreover, as the main mode of accumulation undenvriting the MPLA7s war economy, oiI has financed the high levels of violence that have degraded hurnan secunty throughout the war.
Another factor underrnining the argument for priontising pressure on UNITA
diamonds and waiting until an end to the conflict to push for reform of the oil
industry is the relative irnmunity from outside pressure of oil-rich regimes upon
which the West/North is strategically dependent. Perversely, the present political,
economic and rnilitary insecurity of the MPLA regime does provide a form of
Ieverage that will be absent should cails for reform corne after the war.
Establishing accountability and transparency in the oil account is irnperative
given the estimated future contribution of the oil sector to the Angolan economy.
Oil earnings are set to increase from $4 billion in 1999 to over $10 billion by
2005." At these levels, oil production will provide the Angolan govemment with
between $1.4 and $3.7 billion per year over the next half decade, excluding
signature and other one-off bonus payrnents." The fantastic growth of this sector
has been dnven by foreign direct investment that is expected to exceed $18 billion
over the next four years.z'
* Indeed, it is impossible to understand foreign policies towards the Angolan conflict without an understanding of the importance of these investments, and
their proceeds, to western corporations and economies. On a visit to Luanda in
late 1997, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albnght revealed that Angolan oil now supplies America with 7 per cent of its imports. Tellingly, she placed
"' Global Witness, 'A cmde awakening: The role of the oil and banking industries in AngoIa's civil war and the plunder of state assets', London: Global Witness, 1999, p 4. "Wood Mackenzie estimaies quoted in 'Oïl earnings set to double'. Economisr Inrelligence Unir, 30 September 1999. "Global Witness, 'A crude awakening', 2000. '"?" Global Witness, 'A crude awakening', 2000; P Le Billion, 'A Iand cursed', 1999. emphasis on the fact that this represented over three times the amount Amenca
received from Kuwait before the Iraqi inva~ion.~Cornrnenting on the
international cornrnunity's lack of action on the issue of AngoIan oïl, Hurnan
Rights Watch expert Alex Vines argued that 'Angola has become strategic to the
West [because of its resources]. .. there is a clear cut agenda'? This agenda goes some way towards explaining the singular focus on WITA diamonds in external efforts to bnng peace to Angola, and the ignorance of the narrow development pursued by the Angolan regime in spite of the costs for human secunty/development,
Outiining Angola's dire prospects for a peaceful and prosperous future, Barry
Munslow echoes Vines in arguing that 'the mineral wealth has corrupted al1 those involved'."' A basic premise of the sanctions approach has been the need to overcome such vested, corrupted interests in the international diamond trade.
Similar strategies must be applied to the oïl sector, and lessons Iearned from the
Fowler process and conflict diamond initiatives might usefully be applied to a carnpaign for reforrn of the international oil industry and its connections to conflicts such as Angola. Notably, however, there are basic differences in the structures of the global diamond and oil trades, and in the nature of diamonds and oil as pnmary commodities, which will render the energy sector much more resistant to reform. The vertical integration of the diamond industry, uniquely dorninated by De Beers, facilitated engagement with the private sector, whereas
'Savimbi's choice', The Economisr, 17 January 1998. n6 'BP defends big Angola payment, denies fuelling war', GulfNews. 6 February 2000. 3 MUIIS~OW,*Angoli: The politics of unsustainable development'. Third Worfd Quanerly. 20(3), 1999, p 552. 111
the massive size of the oil industry and its cornpetitive dynamic pose serious
obstacles to reform. Much the same can be said regarding the strategic nature of
oil, versus the nature of gem diarnonds as a luxury cornmodity. In Angola, the
only real progress on the oil issue to date is the April 2000 IMF Staff Monitored
Program, which introduces a modicurn of transparency and accountability to the oil account- Yet there are serious problems with the arrangement, beginning with the fact that the scope and scaie of the agreement, dong with the findings of the monitoring prograrn it establishes, are not publicly available - this in an agreement meant to foster greater transParency!"'
Parallels between the above critique of the sanctions approach to peacemaking in Angola and Reno's distinction between Afrique utile and Afrique inutile are disturbing. Resumected from the jargon of French colonialism, Afrique utile refers to the sought-after, economically viable portion of Africa, and Afrique inutile represents the expendable, obstructionist social interests with claims of economic redistribution and political inc~usion.~~Applied to Angola, this distinction reveals that the objectives of the sanctions regimes mn conveniently parallel with the interests of actors who wish to appropriate Angofan resources with the help of local rulers. By removing the threat UNITA poses to the stability of Angola's mining and energy sectors, while simultaneously failing to extend externai pressures into other dimensions of Angola's political economy of violence, the sanctions approach potentially fosters an outcome privileging the interests of foreign firms and their Angolan allies in the MPLA regime.
Human Rights Watch, The IMF and Angola: Oil and Human Rights'. 23 June 2000.
I 112
One should therefore adopt a cntical disposition towards the peace envisioned
by proponents of the embargo. 'Everyone favours peace, at least ostensibly. But
it is important to ask what kind of peace one is working towards. .. Whose peace?
Peace on what terms? Peace in whose interests? And peace negotiated by which
individuals or groups?'."O Failing to broaden current engagement decreases the prospects for improvements in the area of human security/development through any impending peace, and ultimately, renders the international community complicit in its faiiings.
229 W Reno, 'African weak States and commercial alliances', African Affaairs, 96(383), 1997, pp 180-83. 130 D Keen, 'Incentives and disincentives for violence', in D Malone and M Berdal, eds, Greed and grievance, 2000, p 38. CONCLUSION
Just as no study cm begin without reference to the gross disparities between the
potential and actuai conditions facing Angolans across the security and developmental spectra, it is tempting to conclude on a frustrated note. Yet the continued search for peace - however elusive, whatever the obstacles - is a testament to the capacity for human hope in the midst of desperation and seemingly endless conflict; especiaily amongst the majority of Angolans who have known nothing but war and its socidisation, and yet uncategorically reject violence, In this spirit, the above discussion has atternpted to introduce a number of critical insights relevant to theory and praxis and flag prornising developments.
In the past, it was clear that outrnoded analytic assumptions harnpered responses to conflict. As one group of analysts argued in 1994, the predictable failure of the Bicesse Process pointed to a 'frightening and negligent degree of naivety on the part of the international community' regarding the depth of the
'structural problems exposed and exacerbated by years of war? Increasingly, however, there appears to be an nascent understanding - if not perfect than at least adequate and progressive - of the causai nexus of contemporary protracted conflicts. In part, theoretical advance can be attributed to a bridging of ideological and acadernic solitudes across the sub-fields of international relations
23 1 M Duffield, J Macrae and A Zwi, 'ConcIusion', in M Duffield, J Macrae and A Zwi, eds, War and Hunger, 1994, p 229. and development studies, with the blurred borders between these subjects
reflecting a trend away from compartrnentalisation.
Nuanced and qualified perspectives copisant of the mufti-faceted 'real'
dynarnics of internalised and regionalised wars are emerging. The shift from
dichotomous interpretations of local-regional-global, state-society, traditional-
modem, public-private, power-wealth etc, towards an examination of notions of
intersect, overlap, nexus and the like captures the source of strength in current
scholarship. Thus, the pendular oscillation between African renaissance and
Afro-pessimism seems to have given way to cntical acknowledgement of the co-
existence of multiple African trajectories and typologies. Normative conceptualisations of informal markets also bear out this trend. Informal markets
have gone from being conceived as positive strategies of 'exit' with benign developmental implications, to instruments of warlordism and state collapse, to the present acknowledgement of the complex duality of the second economy and its unpredictable security/development implications. So too with regiondisrn, wherein the recent focus on host of malign regionalisms in critical security studies, including criminal syndicates, mercenarism, and msflows complements the more positive bottom-up 'new' regionalisms such as NGO networks promoting refigee issues, environmental awareness, and gendered perspectives, as wefl as a more traditional concern with the fomal regional institutions which advance or impede the prospects for management of these 'new' security threats. Related evaluations of the capacity of external actors to influence upon the directions of African polities, econornies and societies also reflect improved links between theory and praxis. Consider the following appraisal:
where disorder has become a resource, there is no incentive to work for a more institutionalised ordenng of society ... [un the absence of any other viable way of obtaining the means to sustain neo- patrimonialism, there is inevitably a tendency to iink politics to realrns of increased disorder, be it war or crime. ~hereis therefore an in-built bias in favour of greater di~order'.~'
Even in this unapologetically pessimistic evaluation of the continent's crisis, there is reaiistic scope for framing engagement through inducements that seek to remove disorder as a resource and foster incentives for institutionalised ordering.
Indeed, such is the strategy approximated by the sanctions approach which could be successful if carried to the logical conclusions of the political economy of violence perspective. That is, one could conceive of a comprehensive approach offsetting the dangers of the embargo with engagement dong the peacebuilding and relief/development axes, and accompanied by corresponding initiatives that remove the salience of violence from the diamond and oil, finance, and private security/military sectors.
By extension, where and when such policy responses fdl short, it reflects not necessady obsolete or incorrect theoretical assumptions, but more so the complex realities that confront policy animation and implementation, including finite diplornatic and financial capital, bureaucratic CO-ordination and inertia, entrenched interests, inadequate political will, fickle public interest etc. Thus, regardless of incomplete or rnisguided execution, the positive ramifications of the Fowler process and conflict dimond should be emphasised, Setting aside of the
unintended effects of the embargo on outcornes in Angola, positive externalities
include a focus on modes of violent accumulation and their impact on conflict trajectories; emphasis on the complicity of the private sector in sustaining conflict; demonstration of the potential to decisively impact upon the links between global markets and war economies; and the development of diplornatic and secunty architectures, practices and rnechanisrns for transcending the state- centricity that hampered previous efforts to enforce sanctions. Proposals for an
International Diarnond Council combining industry representatives, corporate actors, international organisations, NGOs and the UN Security Council even indicate an institutionalisation of the ad hoc new multilateralism of conflict dimond initiatives. And, against those who see an Africanisation of conflict, the sanctions approach is indicative of a resurgent westernhorthern interest in the continent and an acknowledgement of its complicity in sustaining African violence and underdeveloprnent, not least because of the myriad of threats these supposedly 'African' conflicts present to security beyond the continent.
ln short, as the sanctions approach amply demonstrates, analytical recognition of the diversity of interests underlying contemporary conflict has been translated into novel and praagnatic foms of peacernaking governance incorporating multi- stakeholder interests across the state, corporate and civil society spheres.
=' P Chabal & JP Daloz, Africa works, 1999. p 162. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
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