a tangled web: many players in a complex war

July 2000

A report by World Vision UK, produced on behalf of the World Vision partnership. contents page Abbreviations 7

Executive summary 9

Introduction Anne Mesopir 17

1 Angola in perspective Ben Campbell & Siobhan O’Reilly-Calthrop 19 1 Colonial Angola 19 2 The first war – the war for independence (1957–75) 19 3 The second war – the ‘War of the Bush’ (1975–91) 20 4 The third war – the ‘War of the Cities’ (1992–94) 20 5 ‘Peace’ under the 20 6 The fourth war – 1998 to present 22 7 Conclusion 23

2 …meanwhile the children suffer Randini Wanduragala 25 1 Introduction 25 2 Focusing on children 25 2.1 Landmines 26 2.2 Violence and forced recruitment 26 2.3 Psycho-social stress 27 2.4 Health 27 2.5 Food 28 2.6 Education 28 3 Angola’s children and human rights 28 4 Conclusions 29

3 The economics of conflict Kelly Currah 31 1 Growth with inequity 31 2 The stake of the international community 32 3 Corporate social responsibility? 34 3.1 Disclosure 34 3.2 Crude credit (or creditors with interest) 35 3.3 Illegal trading 35 3.4 Social investment 35 4 Economic measures for peace 36 4.1 Sanctions 36 4.2 Certification 36 4.3 IMF 37 4.4 OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises 37 5 Conclusion 37

4 The quest for peace Siobhan O’Reilly-Calthrop 41 1 The 41 1.1 Historical role 41 1.2 Problems and obstacles 41 1.3 Recent improvements 42 1.4 Future role? 43 3 page 2 Role of African regional bodies 43 3 Angolan civil society 44 3.1 Growing years 44 3.2 The Church – an emerging actor 45 4 Conclusion 47

5 Recommendations 51 1 Humanitarian need 51 2 Children 51 3 Corporate actors 52 4 Peace process 52 4.1 United Nations – a new approach for a critical player 53 4.2 Sanctions – the need for a multi-pronged approach 53 4.3 Regional actors – a gap needing to be filled 53 4.4 Civil society – urgent support needed for the most promising actor 54

Bibliography 55

4 contributors

Ben Campbell Programme Officer for Southern , World Vision US

Kelly Currah Macro Issues Officer, World Vision UK

Anne Mesopir National Director, World Vision Angola

Siobhan O’Reilly-Calthrop Conflict and Reconciliation Officer, Policy and Research Department, World Vision UK

Randini Wanduragala Child Rights Officer, Policy and Research Department, World Vision UK

5 6 abbreviations

ADRA Action for Rural Development and the Environment AEA Evangelical Association in Angola CICA Christian Council of Angola CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child FAA Angolan Armed Forces FDI Foreign Direct Investment FONGA Forum of Angolan Non-Governmental Organisations FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola GAP Angolan Group for the Promotion of the Culture of Peace GDP Gross Domestic Product GEIPA Inter-Church Group for Peace in Angola GARP Angolan Reflection Group for Peace IDP Internally Displaced Person IMF International Monetary Fund LDC Least Developed Countries MONUA United Nations Angola Observation Mission MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola NGO Non-Governmental Organisation OAU Organisation for African Unity OCHA Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance (United Nations) OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development SADC Southern Africa Development Community TNC Transnational Corporation UCAH Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit UNAVEM III United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNOA United Nations Office in Angola UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade, Aid and Development UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola UNSC United Nations Security Council WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organisations

7 8 executive summary

ar has ravaged Angola and its people for over 40 years. As a result, humanitarian W need within Angola has reached staggering proportions, whilst two whole generations of Angolans have never known what it is to live in peace. Social development indicators identify Angola as one of the world’s poorest countries (see box 1). One third of the population is displaced or destitute due to war. Thirty per humanitarian cent of Angola’s children die before they reach their fifth birthday. Tens of thousands of children have been forced to fight in armies and commit atrocities. Many more have been need within denied basic rights to food, education and health. Angola has Since 1989, World Vision Angola has responded by seeking to address the immediate and medium term needs of war-affected populations in northern Angola through multi- reached sectoral, developmental relief and rehabilitation programs. Yet this in itself can only have limited impact whilst the war rages on. This report was birthed out of a desire to see the staggering root causes of this humanitarian crisis addressed. It is based on World Vision’s experience proportions and knowledge gained from working in Angola over the last 10–15 years. By identifying the ‘tangled web’ of actors involved in the crisis, both directly and indirectly, we hope to highlight the action that needs to be taken by governments, civil society and the business community world-wide to see an end to this war and the suffering it is causing. the ongoing war The conflict in Angola cannot be neatly defined as one single war but rather a series of four distinguishable cycles of fighting which began in 1957 with the war for independence and has since been punctuated by periods of negotiations and fragile peace. After several years of re-arming and poor implementation of the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords by both warring parties, the latest period of ‘peace’ ended in December 1998 when fighting broke out between the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and UNITA. This war continues today. The 1990s has been the most violent decade and the worst in terms of humanitarian suffering. The fighting this decade has targeted civilian populations through town sieges, laying of landmines, harassment of local communities, and the obstruction of aid deliveries. As a result, Angolans experience daily trauma, dispossession, powerlessness, vulnerability and abject poverty. The latest period of fighting has further deteriorated the situation. By April 2000, a total of 2.5 million people were estimated to be internally displaced (IDPs). In November last year, the UN estimated 3.7 million to be ‘war affected’, defined as ‘those who depend on emergency humanitarian assistance due to war and the resultant loss of assets and earning opportunities’. As a result, more people than in the past 4 decades of war are suffering homelessness and destitution, hunger and disease. Yet the war shows no sign of abating in the near future. Landmines continue to be laid and atrocities committed. Delivery of humanitarian assistance has been difficult and highly dangerous due to insecurity and access being denied to many UNITA and government-controlled areas. This situation is ongoing and humanitarian agencies continue to face Box 1 many obstacles: a lack of safe, regular access to field Per capita income US$674 operations, a lack of Life expectancy at birth 46.5 years (1997) consistent funding for Under-five mortality rate 292 out of 1,000 live births longer-term rehabilitation Population without access to safe water 69% and development work, Population without access to health services 76% difficulties in obtaining visas and getting non-food items Enrolment rate – primary 31.9% (of relevant age group) cleared at customs. Statistics taken from 1999 UNDP Human Development Report 9 meanwhile the children suffer Despite the shocking statement by UNICEF that Angola is the worst place for a child to grow up, the international community appears to be paralysed in its attempts to find a suitable response which will alleviate the suffering of Angola’s children. Almost half of Angola’s population are children. Sixty five per cent of the 2.5 million displaced are children. Yet their needs have been given little priority in the last three decades of political manoeuvring and they have been ignored by policymakers seeking solutions. Direct impacts on children include violence, abuse, forced recruitment and psycho-social trauma, whilst the indirect impacts have contributed to problems of health, education and malnutrition. Although Angola is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the government has not yet filed any reports to detail precisely how Angola’s children are faring or what they are doing to safeguard and protect the rights of children during this time of conflict.

the economics of conflict Angola’s economy is booming. Inward investment in the oil industry and exports of oil and diamonds make it one of the fastest growing African economies. Despite having some of the largest oil reserves and diamond resources in Africa, the Angolan people are worse off today than they were before the large off-shore oil fields were discovered in 1995. The disparity between the enormous profits made from mineral resources in Angola by foreign corporations and the social and economic state of the country is a damning indictment of the role of foreign actors working in the country. It also reveals the international community’s inability to take responsibility for the problems of a country from which it is profiting economically. The improvement of society via inward investment corporate has not occurred, or led to equality of growth, social development or investment in the social infrastructure of the country. responsibility Corruption, lack of transparency and the purchase of military equipment by both sides of the conflict undermine the ability of the people of Angola to build their own stable is failing communities. The Financial Times commented on this fact:“Government [Angolan] officials have for years blamed this poverty on the civil war, but a series of army offensives since Angola last September has severely diminished the rebel threat, exposing the war as an excuse to hide economic mismanagement”.

Corporate social responsibility Although most of the companies working in Angola have established corporate social responsibility strategies, there is little evidence that they are implementing these policies. This is because peace is not a necessary condition for corporations to operate in Angola. As a recent article in The Economist pointed out, it is profitable to work in conflict countries. It states:“For brave business folk, there are thus rich pickings from grim places.” Corporate social responsibility is failing Angola and yet, in these days of globalisation, the international community and transnational corporations are in a pivotal position to help end the war.

Crude credit The Global Witness report, A Crude Awakening, in its investigation of the Angolan oil revenues, revealed the high level of interest repayments on lending by global banks to the state-owned oil companies. Not only is the debt load of the country increasing as a whole, but the loans are incurring heavy interest rates. It is a vicious cycle where loans are repaid using oil receipts against which new loans can be made. If lending continues this way, any downturn in the oil market will have serious repercussions on the economy. A new government may not stand by any such loan agreements and foreign lenders therefore, have an interest in ensuring that the battle between the government and UNITA is won by the present government.

Economic measures for peace The greatest steps forward in controlling the illicit diamond trade did not come from or other businesses working in the diamond industry, but from threats of action and action taken by the international community. The role of equity in growth and the 10 economic empowerment of the Angolan people is critical in ending the conflict. Therefore, the international community must take a positive role in regulating and monitoring the economic resources of Angola to ensure ‘leakage’ of all types are prevented. Further initiatives at the international level are continuing to impact on the diamond trade.The UK government’s efforts to spearhead the diamond certification scheme are part of a broader effort to curb illicit diamond trading worldwide. The agreement from the G8 in December 1999 for an international project to embark on a diamond certification scheme marks the first attempt for states to consider vetting the origin of diamonds for sale. Certification is being presented as a conflict prevention tool. the quest for peace Elusive, long and arduous efforts of the ‘international community’ to find peace through the United Nations have not borne fruit. Political stalling and manoeuvring, duplicity, slow or the war in partial implementation of the accords, and violations of humanitarian and human rights law have characterised the approaches of both UNITA, and to a lesser degree, the government. Angola is Added to this were ineffective monitoring of the accords by the UN, a narrow group of too complex states with vested interests directing the peace process (the ‘Troika’ – USA, Russia, ) and an agenda that sought military peace without involving the Angolan people. and multi-

The role of the UN dimensional to Since the end of the Cold War the United Nations has been the main peace broker, making be ‘solved’ by repeated efforts to steer Angola toward peace. Up until recently the UN’s efforts have been conspicuous for their failure. The UN’s inability to fulfil its mandate satisfactorily has the UN alone, been documented by human rights NGOs, criticising the UN for its failure to act on violations of the 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords, human rights abuses and sanctions-busting. and a different, Responsibility, however, cannot fall entirely on the UN’s shoulders. Serious constraints multi-track were placed on UNAVEM III and MONUA by the Government of Angola and by the approach is environment in which the UN missions worked. Responsibility must also be attributed to the Troika for providing inadequate resources and pressure on warring parties to comply vital and with the Accords. Ultimately, however, responsibility for the failure of the peace process must rest with UNITA, which failed to meet various obligations agreed in the Protocol urgent and consistently violated UN sanctions. Since early 1999, the UN has adopted a more aggressive approach to the violation of sanctions placed against UNITA through the appointment of Canadian Ambassador Fowler to the chair of the UN Sanctions Committee. With a panel of experts, Fowler directed a six-month investigation culminating in a controversial report which found several African and European countries guilty of assisting UNITA in accessing fuel and arms and of acting as conduits for diamond sales. Although the report is weak on recommending action against international oil companies and government officials who are alleged to be violating sanctions, the Fowler report has succeeded in pushing this issue further up the political agenda of international governments and has raised the profile of the need for stricter international regulations on arms and diamond sales. The UNSC has, somewhat disappointingly, responded by setting up another monitoring committee to conduct further investigations before taking action in the autumn of 2000. In spite of the UN’s past difficulties, there are several areas in which it has a unique and important role to play in building peace, particularly as it is the only body with an official mandate for this work in Angola. Civil society is keen that it remains, continuing the valuable human rights training and civic education programmes for NGOs, government officials and security forces. However, the war in Angola is too complex and multi-dimensional to be ‘solved’ by the UN alone, and a different, multi-track approach is vital and urgent.

11 Role of African regional bodies The call for ‘African solutions to African problems’ cannot be ignored. The necessity for African nations to be centrally involved in seeking peace in Angola is clear. However, this has all too often been difficult to realise due to the very complicity of most African nations in each others’ wars.The UN Sanctions Committee Report (the Fowler Report) demonstrated this with regard to the war in Angola. The Development Community’s (SADC) peace building role has historically been paralysed by internal political disagreements amongst its members which makes it difficult for SADC to address crises within its region. In the area of peace brokering, the Organisation of African Unity would, therefore, be a more appropriate body than SADC as the majority of its members have fewer vested interests in Angola. However, the recent spotlight placed on three member countries for violating sanctions in the Fowler report demonstrates the care that would need to be taken by the OAU in approaching negotiations. Positive signs are emerging that certain African states, particularly Angola’s neighbours, are beginning to take a more proactive role in seeking peace. In February 2000, South Africa called for dialogue between the two warring parties stating their belief that a military solution no longer exists, which is a radical departure from past South African policy.

Angolan civil society Civil society in Angola has historically been excluded from the peace process but has recently begun to emerge as a crucial player. The unfavourable environment within Angola has historically restricted the growth of local NGOs, women’s groups, trade unions, churches and community groups since independence. As a result,‘civil society’ has traditionally been weak. Yet in the last few years, particularly 1999, Angola has witnessed a marked growth in this sector, not only in numbers of civic groups formed but in the vision, goals and unity of its members. With the majority of the Angolan population professing to be Christian, and a 5% annual growth rate in membership, the church is a very significant part of civil society. The fact that the church straddles both warring parties also gives it a unique ability to potentially the battle bridge divides. Since the resumption of fighting in December 1998, the churches have against the increased in boldness in speaking out against the continuation of war. The Catholic Church, traditionally pro-government, sent strongly worded pastoral letters and public war in Angola statements in 1999 calling on the government and UNITA to negotiate, decrying violations is at a critical of human rights and calling the nation to reconciliation. Angolan civil society is for the first time this century beginning to grow and emerge as a juncture – a credible player not only in facilitating negotiations, but in building a culture of peace at the window of grass-roots level which will be owned by Angolans themselves.This is a crucial ingredient for the sustainability of any official peace process that is re-started. However, this opportunity emerging constituency is young, fragile and vulnerable, and requires strong moral, political, financial and spiritual support from international civil society if it is to have any success. exists to act What is most important about this move toward civic education and strengthening civil decisively society is the fact that it is helping to build a democratic culture, albeit slowly. With presidential and parliamentary elections due to be held in 2001 (for the first time since 1992) this is a crucial moment for such education to be supported and accelerated.

The battle against the war in Angola is at a critical juncture. A window of opportunity exists to act decisively. Without each of these actors working innovatively, imaginatively, responsibly, and above all, in solidarity, any future peace negotiations will only be another brief reprieve in the cycle of violence and war in Angola.

recommendations Humanitarian need: urgent and long-term support required • The Government of Angola and the international community must respond as swiftly as possible to the immediate humanitarian needs of the 3.6 million ‘war affected’, by releasing funds for the UN Consolidated Appeal and NGO operations. • Increased pressure must be applied on the Government of Angola and UNITA to provide safe access for the humanitarian community to the IDPs and affected 12 populations and to cease all military activity that targets civilians. Corridors of tranquillity and days of peace ought to be introduced to allow safe humanitarian access. • The laying of landmines must be stopped immediately by both sides in accordance with the Ottawa Treaty and legal measures threatened against those who continue. Landmines awareness programmes, de-mining and victim assistance require continued funding. • Family re-unification programmes must be introduced particularly for unaccompanied children in IDP camps. • The education and health infrastructure require urgent attention, as do the road networks and airstrips. Pressure must be brought to bear on the government of Angola to invest in these areas. • Innovative humanitarian programmes are required which provide relief and rehabilitation whilst investing in the longer-term needs of the community, including investing in civil society. • In both the immediate and longer term, the psycho-social needs of the population, particularly the children, urgently require attention for any future peace to be sustainable.

Children • Both sides to the conflict must, as a matter of urgency, make a strong and public commitment to putting the needs and interests of Angolan children before any other consideration and provide all necessary assistance to ensure their well-being and safety. They should also provide appropriate and safe access for humanitarian agencies so that a proper assessment can be made as to how children’s lives are and have been affected by the conflict. • Both warring parties must respect the Geneva Conventions and Protocols regarding the international laws of war and protect Angolan civilians. They must take all measures, in addition to the protection from landmines, to protect Angolan children from the effects of armed conflict. • The Government of Angola must, in accordance with its international obligations, submit a report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the status of children in Angola or alternatively and in the absence of such a report, the Committee on the Rights of the Child should make its own findings and provide recommendations on the situation of children in Angola. • African states charged with selecting a Committee of Experts under the African Charter must provide adequate resources for the Committee to carry out its work, and when elected, the Committee of Experts must make the situation of children in Angola its first priority. • Children are also important actors in achieving a solution to the conflict and must also be included in the peace process from its very inception and not just at implementation.

Corporate actors • The international community needs to continue to push for greater regulation of the diamond industry. A certification scheme will help ensure that conflict diamonds do not make their way onto the international markets. The US and EU need to strictly monitor the origins of diamonds entering their markets. • International regulations need to be extended to the oil industry. In the absence of a voluntary industry-wide standard, the international community needs to establish regulations regarding transparency of financial exchanges between the corporations and governments. Regulations should also ensure that oil companies are signed up to the human rights agreements and follow codes of conduct concerning their operations in conflict countries. 13 • The international banking industry should consider the recommendations made by the pressure group Global Witness and fully publish all loan arrangements including payments made to recipients. Loans should go through a centralised system rather than the current multi-channel routes. • The IMF needs to continue its monitoring of the Angolan economy and set social conditions to the use of any money it may lend the country. The IMF and the World Bank should continue to pressure the government to use international accounting standards and reform current financial structures. • The international community must support and encourage all governments to implement the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises. Individual corporations should sign up to the guidelines as well as the UN declaration of human rights. In countries where they operate, corporations must publish their corporate social the responsibility commitments, their codes of conduct and the UN conventions to which international they are a signatory. community Peace process The war in Angola is complex and multi-dimensional. A multi-track approach which draws must support on the strengths of Angolan civil society, regional bodies, corporations and the international and implement community is needed. The co-ordinating role of the UN is essential but needs a more robust mandate to be effective. the OECD United Nations – a new approach for a critical player guidelines for • A radical re-assessment of how the UN oversees the implementation of future peace multinational accords is crucial. This must include a clear mandate to proactively monitor and publicly report human rights abuses, and to call violators of accords to account. enterprises • Pressure should be put on the Troika (USA, Russia, Portugal) to allow the broader- based ‘committee of friends’ to oversee any future peace process. Countries which actively armed the various factions as part of their respective Cold War struggles in the past have an obligation to ensure that a state of peace is returned to the people of Angola. • The UN should consider co-ordinating meetings by SADC, the OAU and other regional bodies which presently are fumbling for direction.Their role is currently very small and requires strengthening if the local and regional dimensions of the war are to be factored in. • If peace is to be maintained, it must be owned by the people. Meaningful participation of Angolan civil society in the peace process is, therefore, a critical area to which the UN ought to give due attention. • The UN could also play a vital role in creating a platform for the co-ordination of advocacy initiatives by Angolan and international civil society. Children also have much to contribute as peace-builders and deserve a helping hand in expressing their views. • The UN has a unique role to play in facilitating forums between the humanitarian community and the protagonists, to discuss humanitarian and human rights issues. In addition, the valuable civic education training for government officials, local leaders and other parties to the conflict, needs to be continued and expanded.

United Nations sanctions – the need for a multi-pronged approach • The latest efforts by the UN to combat sanctions-busting have succeeded in placing this issue high on the political agenda. However, Ambassador Fowler’s recommendations must be acted upon. The second expert committee, ordered by UN Resolution 1295, must be formed without further delay if it is to produce an authoritative report in October 2000. Governments throughout the world must do all they can to comply with the recommendations of the report. The ongoing accession negotiations of several Eastern European countries to the European Union, as well as the expansion of NATO into Eastern , ought to take into account these states’ compliance with the UN sanctions. • Tougher legislation on arms brokering and end-use certification, and more stringent 14 accountability in legal arms sales are essential if arms exporter states are to play their part in restricting the supply of weapons to UNITA.

Regional actors – a gap needing to be filled • The responsibility facing many African states to acknowledge their role in the conflict and to pursue an alternative strategy is stronger than ever. Compliance with sanctions against UNITA is critical, as is providing information and assistance where available on contravention of sanctions. The international community could encourage this by offering technical and financial assistance. • The vested interests of SADC and its members in Angola make it an inappropriate body to broker peace. However, it holds the potential to play a crucial role in monitoring borders and strengthening controls on arms, oil and diamond flows and its members would do well to pursue the recommendations of the Fowler report in order to strengthen controls. The OAU presents a more viable option for brokering peace and ought to be encouraged, although mechanisms would need to be put in place to ensure member states which continue to violate the sanctions are excluded.

Civil society – urgent support needed for the most promising actor • Angolan civil society is the most promising new actor in the quest for peace, yet it is young, fragile and vulnerable. The government and UNITA must comply with international human rights law and respect the rights of Angolans, particularly the freedom of association and speech. • The church throughout the world needs to express urgent, practical solidarity with the Angolan churches which are beginning to work together for the first time in decades. Their ability to connect with communities loyal to both warring sides has enormous peace-building potential. • Women and children have a powerful role in advocating peace and in contributing their ideas for peace-building, and their participation ought to be taken into account more seriously by all actors. • Building a democratic culture is the key to long-term peace, and support for this is of particular need in the run up to the country’s second ever elections, to be held in 2001. An organised, united and supported opposition to the war is critical for any kind of end to the fighting.

15 16 introduction Angola the tangled web

any who read this report soon realise that the full extent and complexity of the M factors that have shaped modern day Angola is far greater than they had first understood. One hopes that by reading it, many will take up the challenge of making a positive difference in reshaping a nation torn asunder by numerous contradictions. Whole generations of Angolans have never known what it is to live in peace and determine their own destiny. For more than five hundred years the people of Angola have suffered invasion, imposition, infringement and subjugation in all aspects of their cultural, political, socio-economical and spiritual life. Periods of slavery, colonialism and neo- colonialism have clouded Angola’s emancipation and self-determination. These periods have been dominated by various wars, worsened and perpetuated by ethnicity, slave trading, colonialism, and, most recently, the scramble for diamonds and oil. In Chapter One, the form that the war has taken since 1975 up to the present day is explained. It also explains that the net effect of this constant bombardment on many ordinary Angolans has been characterised by trauma, dispossession, powerlessness, vulnerability and abject poverty. One third of the population are displaced or destitute due to war, 65 per cent of whom are children under 14 years. As Chapter Two explains, tens of thousands of children have been forced to fight in armies which violate human rights and commit atrocities. Many more have been denied basic rights to food, education, and health. 30 per cent of children die before they whole reach the age of five years. The children and their parents (about 12 million) face the daily danger of landmines planted in fields, roads and generations towns that are estimated to number in the region of 6–15 million. of Angolans Since 1989, World Vision Angola has sought to address immediate and medium term needs of war-affected populations in four have never provinces in northern Angola through multi-sectoral, developmental, relief and rehabilitation programmes. With known what substantial private and government donor support,World Vision it is to live Angola has played a significant role in facilitating resettlement and rehabilitation of returnees and vulnerable populations. Yet, this in in peace itself can only have limited impact whilst the war rages on. This report was birthed out of a desire to see the root causes of this humanitarian crisis effectively dealt with. It is based on our experience and knowledge gained from working in Angola over the last 10–15 years. The irony is that Angola is potentially one of the richest countries in Africa. Chapter Three explains how Angola’s economy is one of the fastest growing with the largest rates of Foreign Direct Investment. Yet Angola ranks as one of the least developed countries in the world with the largest number of poor children. Paradoxically, the cause of this poverty is the country’s wealth in oil and diamonds. Instead of being a blessing, the riches of Angola have become a curse to its people. Oil and diamonds are fuelling conflict, prompting the loss of millions of lives and creating widespread poverty. Major players that have been and are responsible for facilitating this situation are powerful institutions and individuals both within and outside Angola. Putting self-interest above everything else, these collaborators ignore the impact of their actions on millions of ordinary Angolans. 17 And so, havoc reigns and the bloodshed Angolans have witnessed for many years continues. The big questions are, who will stop this brutal war? And while the war rages on, who will mitigate the suffering of the displaced and other war-affected Angolans, especially the children? Chapter Four outlines efforts made by world and regional organizations and governments to bring about an end to the war. The United Nations in particular has made commendable efforts. There is no doubt that great strides have been made yet much more remains to be done by the world. Most importantly, it is the Angolan people themselves who have a crucial role in finding solutions to their problems. In the past few years, civil society, including the church, has begun to bravely speak out for an end to war and is educating its constituents about how to work toward peace. This is potentially very powerful, yet civil society is young and will require support from both within and outside Angola to succeed in this area. The complexities that the Angolan situation presents are beyond the reach of one single organisation or government. The international, African and Angolan communities all have a responsibility and a role to play in ending the war. The first thing to do is to understand the various factors at play. The second is to take action. This paper contributes significantly to understanding the ‘tangled web’ of actors involved in this war and its impact, and provides recommendations for action by policy makers, civil society, and the business community worldwide. If Angola is to have any hope of a bright future, these recommendations must not be ignored. Indeed, in this age of globalisation, responsibility for addressing this crisis must be shared by all actors if peace is ever to become a reality.

18 one Angola in perspective an historical overview of the conflict and its humanitarian impact

n a recent series of articles, the BBC referred to Angola as “the longest and most I miserable civil war in Africa”.1 Although an apt description, the conflict in Angola cannot be neatly defined as one single war but rather a series of four distinguishable cycles of fighting with periods of peace negotiations and fragile peace in between. It is currently in the midst of what many refer to as the ‘Fourth War’. There is little doubt that this has been one of the most miserable civil wars in Africa. Indeed, the depth and extent of human suffering that the accumulation of these wars has waged on Angola’s long-suffering people is difficult to describe. By April 2000, a total of 2.5 million people were estimated to be internally displaced (IDPs). In November 1999, the UN estimated 3.7 million to be ‘war affected’, defined as “those who depend on emergency humanitarian assistance due to war and the resultant loss of assets and earning opportunities”.2 This amounts to one third of the total population of Angola. Three-quarters of IDPs are women and children.3 150,000 people are estimated to have either been killed or permanently maimed due to landmine accidents.4 Two-thirds of the population live in absolute poverty. 30 per cent of children die before they reach their fifth birthday.5 This chapter will attempt to briefly explain the history of this conflict, and how it has “Angolans are come to impact the inhabitants of this beleaguered nation in such a cruel fashion. experiencing colonial Angola a level of Angola is a former Portuguese colony situated on the southwest of the continent of Africa.The Portuguese involvement in Angola dates back to 1483 when their ships despair that started exploring the coastal areas. Rich in agricultural and mineral resources, Angola held attractive prospects and for many years it enjoyed a strong agricultural economy, exists virtually exporting coffee, cotton, rice and tobacco. Up until the eve of the 19th century however, nowhere else Portugal’s rule was characterised by plunder and destruction, drawing on Angola as a source of slaves. in the world Angola was home to three major tribal groups making up 75 per cent of the population: today” the Ovimbundo, Kimbundo and the Bakango. Other smaller groups were scattered Catherine Bertini, throughout the country. Executive Director of It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the Portuguese finally WFP, August 1999 conquered the three major tribes. However, each of those tribes continued to resist Portuguese rule. Some, like the Omvibundo, resisted to a greater extent than the Mbundo tribe.The Portuguese played ethnic groups off against each other and used legal distinctions between whites, assimilated and blacks to keep the population divided and repressed. Economic development under colonial rule was unequal as parts of the country with resources were developed while other areas were virtually ignored.

the first war – the war for independence (1957-75) Eventually, an elite group emerged whose frustration with colonial rule fostered the independence movements of the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1957, the Portuguese rulers established the secret police or PIDE (Policia International de Defensa de Estado) that brutally cracked down on the young groups, infiltrating them and fostering inter-group rivalry. Two specific massacres in Uige and Malange provinces prompted the start of the First War, the ‘War for Independence’. 19 From this elite group arose the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola) mainly from the Mbundo tribe, Portuguese communists and mestiços, and the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Liberação de Angola) representing mainly the Bakango tribe lead by Holden Roberto. In 1966, these rebel movements were joined by UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) whose members principally came from the Ovibundo tribe of the central highlands and under the charismatic leadership of .When not fighting the Portuguese armed forces, these three groups fought each other over territory, fighting which many believe was fostered by PIDE. Militarily, the MPLA and FNLA were the most powerful of the rebel movements. UNITA, instead, dedicated its efforts to hit-and-run attacks and the development of a rural support for their cause.

the second war – the ‘War of the Bush’ (1975-91) By 1975, the armed forces in Portugal, who were tired of the various wars in the with the colonies, led a coup and in a short period all of Portugal’s colonies were granted their end of the independence.6 A subsequent scramble for power took place in Angola and the conflict swiftly became a proxy Cold War struggle. The MPLA received substantial backing from Cold War the Soviet Union and Cuba, UNITA from South Africa and the USA, and the FNLA from in the late Zaire and the USA. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, international support for a military 1980s, solution waned. As a result, MPLA’s President dos Santos made an offer to UNITA’s international Savimbi to enter into peace talks which were brokered by 18 African nations. Although a cease-fire was signed in 1989, it quickly disintegrated and a period of fierce fighting support for commenced. In response, a serious effort to secure peace through diplomacy was initiated. Rounds of talks were organised by the UN, mediated by Portugal and observed a military by the USA and Soviet Union. In May 1991 the Bicesse Accords were signed. The ceasefire solution prohibited both sides from purchasing new supplies of weapons, and authorised the MPLA to continue acting as the legitimate government until the elections. The ceasefire was waned monitored by UNAVEM (UN Angola Verification Mission) and was the start of a long and expensive involvement by the UN.7 What is important to note here is that it was around this time that military tactics changed – the fighting began to target civilians and violate the laws of war. The battle for Cuito Cuanavale in 1987 is seen as the watershed. By the time the Bicesse Accords were signed, it is estimated that between100,000 and 300,000 had died due to the fighting. It was also during this period that humanitarian agencies began to operate. World Vision first arrived in 1984, but due to insecurity was forced to leave the country twice (first in 1986, returning 1989, and then in 1991, returning in 1993).

the third war – the ‘War of the Cities’ (1992-94) With the Bicesse Accords, there was hope for a final peace settlement. Elections were scheduled for September 29–30, 1992, the first nationwide elections in the country’s history. However, Savimbi refused to assist with the organisation of the elections and continued to amass weapons. Hence, when UNITA lost the presidential election by 9 per cent, they rejected the results and returned the country to civil war. Thus started the bloodiest period of fighting to date in Angola. In what has become known as the ‘War of the Cities’, UNITA besieged and bombarded provincial capitals throughout the country. Cities and infrastructure that had not been touched until then were destroyed. Roads, railways and bridges were blown up or mined. For the civilian population this represented the first time that many of them were displaced. Most fled to MPLA-held areas such as Luanda to escape the fighting. A humanitarian crisis was underway with camps for the displaced set up, such as Viana on the outskirts of Luanda which remains to this day. It is estimated that 300,000 people, 3 per cent of the population, were killed by the fighting between October 1992 and late 1994 – more than in the preceding 16 years.8

‘peace’ under the Lusaka Protocol In November 1994, the fighting came to an end when, after a period of talks, Savimbi agreed to a ceasefire and reconciliation process known as the Lusaka Protocol.This period of ‘peace’ lasted longer than the Bicesse Accords – approximately four years. 20 However, it was characterised by brinkmanship and ‘foot-dragging’ over the implementation of the Protocol, coupled with sporadic fighting, continued insecurity for the civilian population and preparation for future war.9 It is widely acknowledged that although UNITA had gained control of 70 per cent of the territory, the military gains of the government forces (FAA) in 1994 prompted Savimbi to call a halt to the fighting. The fact that he did not attend the signing ceremony himself demonstrated his attitude toward the Accords. This explains what Kofi Annan referred to as the ‘foot-dragging’10 that UNITA displayed in complying with the Accords, particularly in disarmament, demobilisation and the setting up of a Government of National Reconciliation(GURN) which was not established until 1997.11 Others, however, cite the poor incentives given to UNITA leaders to work in the GURN.12 Landmines continued to be laid by both sides,13 UNITA continued to control its territory with fear campaigns and both sides were guilty of re-arming during this period. The Lusaka Protocol did, however, provide a window for the humanitarian community (UN agencies, NGOs) to begin repatriating IDPs to their home areas or to the countryside where they could return to farming. Food aid distribution and provision of agricultural inputs and training was the top priority, followed by health, water and sanitation programmes. Mines awareness, which included the training of children in identifying mines, and de-mining programmes began in earnest. Under the co-ordination of the UN agency UCAH, NGOs were assigned specific areas of the country to work in. The humanitarian community also established demobilization camps for UNITA soldiers. World Vision,along with other international NGOs, actively participated by providing food aid, and health and civic education programmes to the soldiers and their families.

Box 1: World Vision’s response

Since 1989, World Vision has sought to address immediate and medium term needs of war-affected populations in northern Angola through multi-sectoral, developmental relief and rehabilitation programmes. Luanda, Malange, Kwanza Norte and Cabinda delivery of provinces have been our primary focus. The effectiveness of World Vision’s humanitarian interventions is now evident as communities have reduced their dependency on external food sources. Harvest yields have increased, access to basic health and assistance nutrition services and clean water has increased, and there is heightened awareness of the danger of land mines and how to deal with them. However, the current conflict was slow makes any sustained development initiative difficult. and highly To illustrate the impact of World Vision’s work, in just the last two years,World Vision dangerous Angola (WVA) has distributed over 10,000 tonnes of food aid commodities to approximately 890,000 vulnerable people in its target areas. WVA has also distributed due to 700 tonnes of seed and 300,000 agricultural tools to over 170,000 people. WVA trained over 59,000 farmers (at least 40,000 of these being women) and held 32 insecurity agriculture courses to train over 242 government and NGO staff. In the health sector, WVA maintained 20 health clinics and provided basic health care to over 500,000 people. In addition, it admitted over 20,000 people into 14 feeding centres and assisted over 130,000 people to recover from malnutrition. WVA provided growth monitoring to over 49,000 children and pre- and post-natal care to over 19,000 mothers. World Vision also held 1,900 health training sessions to train over 200,000 community members. WVA also made its impact in the water sector by providing over 200,000 people with access to clean water through the construction and rehabilitation of over 190 wells and the construction of five gravity fed systems. World Vision continues to work amongst vulnerable people to address their needs, despite the war.

21 However, delivery of humanitarian assistance was slow and highly dangerous due to insecurity and access being denied to many UNITA and government-controlled areas. In general, the civilian population remained skeptical of the peace process and reluctant to move back to their areas of origin. During this entire period, whole populations became dependent on the international community for their well-being. the fourth war – 1998 to present Despite a range of sanctions imposed by the United Nations on UNITA to restrict its ability to wage war14, UNITA continued to re-arm through illicit diamond sales. During 1998, tensions continued to increase along with insecurity. By July, nearly two-thirds of the provinces were declared unsafe and large numbers of people were displaced. In December 1998, full-blown war broke out when the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) attacked UNITA headquarters. UNITA responded by surrounding and bombing the main cities in a repeat of its tactics in 1993. However, this time the suffering of the civilian population has arguably been more severe – the bombing of cities has been more intense and the number of internally displaced people greater. Rural populations flooded into the major cities to seek refuge from attacks in the villages.This placed an incredible strain on the coping mechanisms of urban communities and services which were already on their knees as a result of so many years of war deprivation.15 Some observers believe this was a deliberate UNITA tactic to overwhelm the government who were in control of these cities.

Box 2: Malange city

Malange city, one of the cities assigned to World Vision for relief, was one of the worst affected. According to humanitarian workers familiar with both periods, UNITA’s bombardment of Malange city between December 1998 and August 1999 was indiscriminate and with a greater intensity than during 1992–94. The road connecting it to the capital, Luanda, was also highly insecure. As a result, humanitarian agencies were by the forced to abandon or reduce their programmes.World Vision was forced to reduce its presence in Malange at the end of March 1999. As a result, the residents and IDPs summer, the received no aid deliveries for four months until 4 August when WFP managed to humanitarian deliver food aid. A total of 211,000 IDPs sought refuge in Malange, many coming from as far as 300kms away but were put in camps outside Malange city, and as a result situation had were (and still are) without basic sanitation and health facilities. Malnutrition rates increased alarmingly in early 1999 and although these have since stabilised, remain at reached crisis high levels. World Vision continues to assist the camp residents, most of whom remain, point with through emergency feeding, health and sanitation, and agricultural programmes. 1.6 million people having By the summer, the humanitarian situation had reached crisis point with 1.6 million people having fled their homes and 200 people dying each day.16 Some two million were fled their in need of assistance but only 600,000 were receiving aid.17 In spite of this, international homes and donor aid commitments were relatively low. Other international crises, particularly Kosovo, and donor fatigue with yet another Angolan war, forced the Secretary General, 200 people Kofi Annan, to personally appeal to the donor community for funds in June 1999. dying each After September 1999, when the FAA captured UNITA headquarters and dislodged UNITA from its strongholds in the central highlands, the humanitarian situation eased. The day sieges were lifted from the cities and some displaced populations began to return to their homes, though slowly. Many problems remained, however, and new problems arose associated with the cumulative effect of these wars. First, the number of displaced actually increased as a result of the fighting in September 1999, raising the number of IDPs since January 1998 to an estimated 1,732,284 by the end of 1999.18 This figure does not include those who have fled across the borders into Namibia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, estimated to be over 40,000 and to whom access is extremely difficult.19 Secondly, the timing of the offensive, which was during the planting season, meant that little was planted and there will be no harvest in the summer of 2000. This entails the need for food aid up to March 2001. Thirdly, 22 there exists a large proportion of the population who were not displaced but who have become aid-dependent due to the hang-over of the sieges last summer which ran their reserves dry. Since January, the situation has deteriorated further. According to the OCHA IDP monitor, Jean Luc Tonglet,“Since the beginning of the year, there are at least 200,000 newly displaced IDPs in various provinces of the country.”20 This brings the total number of IDPs created since December 1998 to an estimated 2.5 million, one million of whom are officially registered.21 He went on to say that with the new government offensive, Operation Restore, starting soon, OCHA are planning for that number to increase with the renewed fighting in the eastern and southern region of the country.

Box 3: OCHA report

OCHA released a revealing report in April this year which details the extent of the suffering amongst the one million registered IDPs in camps and the precarious situation that exists in many provinces.22 Conducted in early April and including areas that were previously inaccessible, OCHA says that the majority of displaced persons are completely dependent on food assistance, do not own essential items to survive (eg blankets, clothing), have inadequate shelter and have no access to safe drinking water. The situation for the rest of the population is not much better – food supplies are limited, none of the hospitals visited had sufficient medicines and more children are malnourished than at any time during the three decades of war. It describes the situation as ‘alarming’ and, although it is the first phase of a two-part assessment, urges immediate action by the international community and the government.

Constraints for aid delivery are much the same: a lack of safe, regular access to fields of operation in government and UNITA areas, forcing the regular postponement or cancellation of aid deliveries, and a lack of consistent funding for longer-term rehabilitation and development work. Humanitarian agencies are also facing difficulties the obtaining visas and getting non-food items cleared at customs.23 Add to this the impact of soaring inflation, associated price rises and the continuous peril of landmines, and the humanitarian humanitarian situation remains bleak indeed. situation Donor commitments have increased but the need is even greater.24 Moreover, the fighting is far from over. In fact, civilians continue to be displaced, particularly on the southern remains bleak borders as neighbouring countries become involved, and there are fears that UNITA indeed and the FAA are re-organizing for a protracted guerilla war. conclusion Events change on a weekly basis in Angola and it is difficult to forecast which direction the war will take. Fluctuations in oil prices directly affect the government’s capacity to fight. However, for the people of Angola, it is clear that the situation is changing at an ever-deteriorating rate. More people than in the past three decades of war are suffering homelessness and destitution, hunger and disease. The war shows no sign of abating in the near future, landmines continue to be laid and atrocities committed. To say Angola has reached crisis point is an understatement – it is in a permanent state of crisis. What is peculiar about the current situation is that it has reached a state of ‘cumulative crisis’ and the capacity of the people to cope has been stretched beyond the limit. Many are literally ‘on the edge of an abyss’.25 This calls not only for immediate action to address the current immense needs, but also to do everything possible to bring an end to this war.

23 endnotes

1 Goldman, A (1999) Angola:The Roots of Conflict, 28th January 1999, see BBC website: news.bbc.co..uk/hi/english/special_report/1999/01/99/angola/newsid_263000/263954.stm 2 UN Consolidated Appeal for Angola for Jan-Dec 2000, November 1999 3 IRIN (2000a) 4 ibid 5 UN Secretary General’s report to UN Security Council, 23 November 1998. 6 From 1970 to 1973 Portugal maintained 150,000 troops in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. Approximately 11,000 Portuguese were killed and 30,000 wounded. 7 See Ch. 4 The Quest for Peace for more details on the UN’s role in Angola. 8 Vines, A (1998), pg 3 9 See footnote 5 in Ch. 4 The Quest for Peace for more details on the contravention of the Lusaka Accords. 10 In his report to the UNSC, 14 April 1997, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, expressed concern over UNITA’s ‘foot-dragging’ in implementing the provisions of the Protocol. 11 The GURN was inaugurated on 11 April 1997, a few days after the Angola National Assembly swore in 63 UNITA deputies. UNITA Renovado formed after the failure of Savimbi to meet the 31 August 1998 deadline for extending the State administration to UNITA-held areas. 12 According to some observers, UNITA parliamentarians were given inferior salaries and benefits compared with those of the MPLA. 13 For more information on the problem of landmines, see section 2.1 in Chapter Two. 14 Sanctions imposed against UNITA include: Purchase of Arms and Petroleum, September 1993 (UNSC Resolution 864),Travel abroad, August 1997 (Resolution 1127), Export or Sale of Diamonds, June 1998 (Resolution 1173), Freeze of UNITA’s financial resources and assets, June 1999 (Resolution 1173) 15 MSF reported in November that the national health service was virtually paralysed as a result of the conflict. In 1998 infant mortality rates had increased dramatically from 40 per 1000 live births in 1989 to 270 per 1000 live births in 1998. 16 According to UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit (UCAH), now called OCHA. (See IRIN (1999) Weekly Round-up). In August 1999, the estimated number of IDPs in Luanda was 600,000, and in Cuito, Huambo and Malange provinces combined was 460,000. 17 ibid 18 OCHA IDP Fact Sheet, (1999) 19 The UN reported in May that there were 22,000–25,000 refugees in Zambia, 10–15,000 in Namibia (IRIN 18 May, 2000) 20 Interview, in IRIN report 24 May 2000 21 UN OCHA Humanitarian Update, 23 May 2000 22 UN OCHA, Angola: Report on Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs, 25 April 2000, 23 ibid 24 70 per cent of the UN Consolidated Appeal for 1999 was pledged by October (US$82 million). But this year, the amount being requested by the UN is more than double last year’s at US$258 million. 25 See 22

24 two …meanwhile the children suffer

1 introduction espite the shocking statement by UNICEF that Angola is the worst place for a child D to grow up in, the international community appears to be paralysed in its attempts to find a suitable response which will alleviate the suffering of children in Angola. As the previous chapter reveals, the cumulative impact of the war on the ordinary people has become critical, prompted by the latest resumption of hostilities. Whilst the international community dithers in gathering the necessary momentum to initiate an appropriate response, every day children in Angola are severely affected. Almost half of Angola’s population are children. Of the people displaced by the conflict, 65 per cent are children.1 Yet their needs have been given little priority in the last three decades of political manoeuvring and they have been ignored when formulating policy to find a solution. Whilst both sides to the conflict can afford to arm themselves through the sale of diamonds or oil, one in three children dies before the age of five due to lack of adequate food or healthcare.2 Most are denied basic human rights and casualties have reached such high proportions that they are no longer being recorded.3 As commentators have observed, many children have only known conflict and are growing up without “Angola is the knowing what it is like to have normal lives. The legacy for the next generation of children is bleak as, due to the conflict, those responsible for their upbringing and worst place in development have themselves never had any structure or stability in their own lives.4 the world to These children have no aspirations and little or no hope for the future unless the political will and commitment can be found to break through the inertia and to find a lasting be a child” solution. This should include involving children in the peace building process. UNICEF, June 1999 This chapter looks at how this intractable and apparently interminable conflict has affected the lives of the children. It examines the direct impacts (violence, abuse, forced recruitment and psycho-social trauma) and the indirect impacts (health, education and malnutrition). It will also discuss the ways in which the international community needs to focus on the rights of the children and the imaginative approaches they will need to adopt to ensure that children in Angola are not forgotten. Whilst the initial focus for most local communities and governments will tend to be more concerned with physical and economic problems of food, water, shelter, medicines, jobs and money, it is also necessary to keep in mind and address the trauma that the children have faced throughout the hostilities and the impact it is likely to have on post-conflict reconciliation in Angola.

2 focusing on children Children make up more than half the population of Angola yet they are the forgotten people in this conflict. It is estimated that up to 4,000 children died every month during the war of 1992–94 and that 65 per cent of the one million displaced persons registered by the UN are estimated to be 14 years and under.5 Tens of thousands of children have been forced to fight. They have lost their homes, families, friends and possessions and their development has been impoverished. Attempts by the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) to obtain access to both sides involved in the conflict have been rebuffed or only partial access has been granted. This has made it extremely difficult to give a clear assessment of the humanitarian situation 25 facing children. Some information is available from international organisations like UNICEF and NGOs working in Angola. These portray a sorry state of affairs for Angola’s children. The Child Risk Measure compiled by UNICEF places Angola as the highest risk country in the world for children.6 A further factor, which has added to the economic and social instability, is Angola’s external debt repayment which, as a percentage of its GNP, is a massive 232 per cent measured against a regional average of 69 per cent7 This means that as war continues to eat up Angola’s wealth, even8 fewer resources are used for the welfare of children.

direct affects

2.1 Landmines The three decades of war have caused widespread social and economic upheaval and although the disruption and one of the most potent weapons used to wreak this destruction is landmines. Angola is reported to have the highest number of landmines of any country in the world – number of 15 to 20 million landmines in this country of 12 million people9 – more than one destructive mine-related landmine for each man, woman and child. Despite the Government of Angola’s signing up to the Ottawa Convention banning the use or stockpiling of landmines, it maintains its incidents has stockpiles. The widespread use of landmines by both the government and UNITA is reported to be part of a strategy on the part of UNITA to destabilise the government,10 to decreased, the make normal life as difficult as possible and, on the government’s side, to prevent civilians proportion from entering rebel held areas. Recently, both sides have begun laying new landmines. In 1997 UNICEF and the Government of Angola undertook a Plan of Action for a of children programme of co-operation which included the issue of landmines. Although the number affected of mine-related incidents has decreased, the proportion of children affected by these incidents has increased and is higher than expected. The overall level of decrease has by these been attributed to NGO efforts in running mine awareness programmes,11 including World Vision’s well-respected programme, which has contributed to a change in the incidents has ‘risk taking behaviour’ of the local population. Unfortunately,World Vision’s programme increased has had to stop due to a lack of funding. The Angolan government has gone some way towards taking up the issue of mine-related incidents by including a mines awareness component in the national school curriculum.12 NGOs also work closely with the government agency responsible for mine clearance (INARROE) but there has been a reluctance on the part of donors to fund de-mining programmes.

2.2 Violence and forced recruitment There have been alleged abuses of children by both government and rebel forces. Children have also been the targets of forced recruitment and brutal and indiscriminate acts of violence.13 They have been murdered, beaten, raped and enslaved for sexual purposes and forced to work. Reports of mass burial grounds containing children’s bones have been publicised.14 Girls have become primary targets of widespread rape, sexual slavery and violence. The impact of these atrocities on children is overwhelming and these abuses should be denounced under international humanitarian law. For example, the Geneva Conventions and Protocols prohibit rape in both international and internal conflicts. In addition, both the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter, to which Angola is signatory, have no derogation clauses in times of war or internal conflict and their protective rights extend to children in times of conflict as they do in times of peace. An analysis of child recruitment and participation in Angola showed that whilst the government denied that minors were being recruited, international agencies confirmed that particularly in the suburbs and rural areas, forced recruitment of minors was common with children as young as 14 being forced to enlist.15 In 1998 the Angolan government lowered the minimum age of conscription from 18 to 17. Current estimates are that there are more than 3,000 child soldiers in the Angolan armed forces.16 UNITA pledged not to recruit child soldiers after the partial demobilisation in 1996 but it has continued to recruit minors and current estimates are of 3,000 child soldiers with UNITA.17 26 While both sides continue to deny the recruitment and participation of children, the InterAfrican Network for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch and the US Department of State have reported that forced recruitment and participation still takes place including that of minors throughout all of the country’s disputed territory and that abductions of children were still taking place.18 Recruits are taken to isolated camps and subjected to psychological stress and extreme hardship and any who attempt to desert are executed. Girls as young as 13 were recruited forcibly to serve as porters and camp followers and reports of sexual assault and brutality are widespread.19 Children as young as eight years old are reported to be fighting for armed opposition groups like the FLEC-FAC, a breakaway group who are reported to have forces which comprise 30–40 per cent girls.20

2.3 Psycho-social stress Both the protracted nature of the conflict and the danger from landmines mean that psycho-social stress is a very real problem for children, yet it is one that is given little attention.21 A study carried out on the psycho-social impact of war on Angola’s children showed that of the sample studied, 91 per cent displayed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder including flashbacks, sleep disorder, suppressed memories and psychosomatic illnesses.22 Large numbers of children were found to have witnessed torture, suffered starvation and witnessed landmine explosions.23 Psychological stress on this scale is a significant source of suffering and is a severe impediment to post-conflict reconstruction, national reconciliation and violence prevention, particularly as research carried out shows that children exposed to violence, or those who are direct victims of violence, are at risk of future involvement in violence. Healing children’s emotional wounds of war is as important a priority as ensuring their physical well being. These must be addressed to avoid an ongoing cycle of violence and poverty. indirect affects healing 2.4 Health As the previous chapter discussed, the conflict has prompted large numbers of people to children’s flock to urban locations which has placed a severe burden on urban services that were emotional already overstretched.24 The national health system is virtually paralysed as a result of the conflict. Most births take place without trained birth attendants and this is reflected in wounds of the infant mortality rate, which has increased dramatically from 40 per 1,000 live births in 1989 to 270 per 1,000 live births in 1998.25 Very few drugs are provided by the state and war is as patients have to pay to be treated. Where the GNP is $700 and the average monthly important a wage between $5 and $10, the cost of medical care is prohibitive and this has also been a further factor in the huge increase in the infant mortality rate with internally displaced priority as people facing even worse situations. ensuring their Angola has one of the lowest rates of immunisation for children.26 In 1995, Angola had one of the worst rankings for progress in eradicating polio, due in large part to the physical well dilapidated health infrastructure.27 Angola is only one of 15 countries in this category. being One of the first steps for eradicating polio is a high level of immunisation during days of national immunisation, which can push the virus to the edge of extinction. However, apart from some days of tranquillity, which allowed children to be immunised, the coverage rate in Angola is patchy. Angola was ranked low in a league table of progress the country is making towards adequate vitamin A intake for children.28 Severe deficiency can cause blindness and death. Less severe deficiency impairs the immune system, making common diseases more likely to be fatal. This ranking means that Vitamin A deficiency exists as a public health problem. Programmes are being implemented but present coverage is inadequate. Significant acceleration would be required to reach the goal of 80 per cent of children under two receiving Vitamin A but the current conflict makes this coverage virtually impossible. In 1999 an emergency vaccination programme was carried out, when 66,625 children between the ages of nine months and five years were vaccinated against measles, 45,014 children up to the age of five were vaccinated against polio and Vitamin A was administered.29 27 Angola has no national plan or programme to counter pneumonia/acute respiratory infections, which account for half of all deaths in children and malnutrition often exacerbates such illnesses. The under five mortality rate is one of the worst in the world with one in three children not surviving to the age of five. In addition, only 32 per cent of the population have access to clean water and sanitation which makes the chances of catching various diseases a real possibility. A complicating factor is that the number of children under 14 infected with HIV/AIDS has doubled from 1994 to 1997.30 The recent resumption of fighting has resulted in the displacement of even more people. The re-mining of areas that were considered either safe or previously cleared of mines, and the huge shifts of population to the urban centres has led to fears of the risk of epidemics like malaria. In 1999 the World Health Organisation reported outbreaks of the state is polio, malaria and meningitis.31

bound by law 2.5 Food to continue to UNICEF estimates that 42 per cent of children in Angola are moderately or severely underweight.32 Malnutrition is a huge problem and in a country where children are at the safeguard and mercy of a number of diseases, malnutrition weakens their ability to survive. The World protect the Food Programme estimates that the population growth rate is 12.7 per cent and it has expanded food aid to target children. The food situation has been described as ‘extremely rights of fragile’33 with large numbers at risk of starvation. UN Agencies have access to only 14 out of the 18 provinces. The situation in Angola continues to deteriorate and its children are children even suffering. in times of 2.6 Education conflict Angola ranks 31 in UNICEF tables showing the country’s national performance gap in primary education. Only 34 per cent of children are reaching grade five, when the expected figure is 65 per cent. According to 1995 estimates, 66 per cent of all Angolan children have had less than five years of school attendance.34 Understandably, school attendance has fallen dramatically as a result of the war and will require a great deal of effort to return to anything like average levels for Africa. Higher education is accessible only to the elite and teachers pay of approximately $5 per month means that they prefer to try to earn their living elsewhere. On average earnings of $5 – $10, few can afford to send their children to school even if schools are available and accessible.35 3 Angola’s children and human rights Angola is a signatory to a number of International Human Rights Conventions.36 Human Rights monitoring in Angola, though ongoing, is restricted and it is difficult to access documented evidence of abuses especially on children. Some investigative work was carried out by the Human Rights Unit of MONUA but this was minimal and included little monitoring of abuses of children’s rights.37 UN Agencies like UNICEF have regularly reported on the situation of children where they have had access to areas.The human rights monitors in Angola (OCHA) have not made an assessment of how the children are being affected by the conflict save in the cases of child combatants. A number of NGOs, like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have catalogued allegations of human rights abuses. Angola is also a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, neither of which contain derogation clauses in times of war or armed conflict. Therefore, the state is bound by international law to continue to safeguard and protect the rights of children even in times of conflict. However, the situation of Angola exposes the weaknesses of the Human Rights system when it comes to setting standards, ensuring enforcement and the monitoring and protection of children’s rights in situations of conflict. For example, prior to the coming into force of the CRC, both the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and the Declaration of Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (1974) provided that all efforts and all necessary steps should be taken to spare women and children from the ravages of war and that all operations should be directed against military objectives. However, under Article 34 of the CRC, states are required only to take ‘all feasible 28 measures’ to protect children in times of conflict which is a significant lowering of the standard even though states parties are required to link this duty with their existing obligations under international humanitarian law.38 In addition, under the CRC, Angola is required to file state reports detailing precisely the situation of children in the country. In Angola’s case these are well overdue39 and it is difficult to take action to ensure that any obligations, so far as the children are concerned, are being met. At the very least, it would be beneficial if the Angolan government made some attempt to document or report on the problems facing the children. The current weak system of enforcement and implementation means that even though UNICEF, the ICRC and other NGOs are working on the ground in Angola, they cannot file reports for consideration by the Committee on the Rights of the Child until the Angolan government files its own report and in the absence of this, their voices are silenced so far as the Committee on the Rights of the Child is concerned. The Committee is powerless to children also request an investigation or to use NGO reports to conduct its own investigation and report on its findings. have a part The African Charter does have a more radical system of implementation whereby the to play in the Committee of Experts can receive communications from any person or group relating to any matter covered by the Charter. This appears to include communications from third peace building parties. The Committee is also empowered to collect documentation, commission studies and make recommendations and is given unfettered powers of investigation. The system process of enforcement and implementation under the Charter is, however, in its infancy. The African Committee of Experts charged with implementing the Charter is due to be elected at the OAU summit in Lome, in June 200040 and it is hoped that the OAU countries will elect a committee that has the expertise to deal with children’s rights whilst also providing adequate resources for the Committee to carry out its work. Most importantly, the OAU countries should propose that when the Committee convenes, it should give the situation of the children in Angola the highest priority.

4 conclusions The current assessment of the situation in Angola has been described as ‘hopeless’41 which has inhibited the international community in attempting to find solutions. What is required is a fresh approach that puts at its heart the rights and futures of the children and, in the quest for peace, their needs must not be forgotten. Clearly the most urgent needs include the immediate halt to recruitment, conscription or abduction of children into the conflict and indiscriminate attacks on them, coupled with free and unimpeded access by international agencies42 and NGOs. Building on this, corridors of tranquillity and days of peace must be negotiated for the movement of aid and for immunisation purposes. The provision of educational facilities that are inviolable must also be seen as a priority. In the long-term, the question of meeting the psycho-social needs of the children, equipping and training children who have suffered from landmine explosions coupled with effective landmine clearance programmes must be implemented. Finally, children also have a part to play in the peace building process. They make up almost half of Angola’s population and if peace is to be meaningful, their voices must also be heard and taken into account in shaping Angola’s future. In considering the position of children it is important to move beyond the rhetoric and to find ways in which their rights are also respected.

29 endnotes

1 UNHCR Country Paper 2 The Observer 22nd August 1999. Interview with Peter Hawkins, Save the Children Fund. 3 Robbins,A The Abandoned Emergency: The Civil War the World Ignores, Humanitarian Affairs Review Review No. 8,Winter 2000, Brussels. 4 Interview with Peter Hawkins, Save the Children Fund, ibid. note 2. 5 UNHCR Country Paper, ibid. note 1. 6 The Child Risk Measure (CRM) compiled by UNICEF considers 5 key factors, namely under 5 mortality, percentage of underweight children, percentage of primary school aged children not attending school, a conflict security rating and HIV/AIDS prevalence. Angola is given the worst risk measurement of 96, where the world average is 30. 7 UNICEF Progress of Nations Report, 1999. 8 Antara Dev Sen, Not such a Fashionable War, New Statesman,August 1999. 9 Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, also see note 7. 10 Richardson, A Internal Displacement in Southern Africa: Focus Angola,April 1999. Human Rights Watch Angola Unravels:The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, Sept 1999. 11 Dastoor,T and Mocellin, J Mine-related Problems in Angola, UNICEF Working Paper Series, 1997, New York. 12 ibid, note 11. 13 Radda Barnen Children of War, March 1999. 14 Amnesty International July 1996. 15 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers: The Use of Children As Soldiers in Africa – A Country Analysis of Child Recruitment and Participation in Armed Conflict, 1999, UK. 16 ibid. note 15. 17 ibid. note 15. 18 ibid. note 15. 19 ibid. note 15. 20 ibid. note 15. 21 Richardson, A Internal Displacement in Southern Africa: Focus Angola,April 1999. 22 This study was carried out by Christian Children’s Fund (CCF) in 1999, ibid. note 13. 23 In the CCF study 20 per cent had been separated from their families because of war. 55 per cent were IDPs and 10 per cent had fought. 66 per cent had made long journeys by foot and 82 per cent had lost everything. 42 per cent had witnessed land mine explosions, 88 per cent had survived artillery bombing, 85 per cent had seen dead bodies, and 54 per cent had witnessed torture, 71 per cent had to leave schools and 85 per cent suffered starvation. 24 Medecin Sans Frontieres, Angola Update, 3 November 1999. 25 ibid. note 7. 26 ibid. note 7. 27 ibid. note 7. 28 ibid. note 7. 29 Report from Pan African News Agency, 1 March 1999. 30 UNICEF Progress of Nations Report, 1999. 31 WHO Reports, 28 April 1999. 32 UNICEF and Statement from Kofi Annan reported in IRIN, 21 January 2000. 33 Human Rights Watch Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, Sept 1999. 34 UNHCR Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Angola, April 1999, Centre for Documentation and Research. 35 Antara Dev Sen, Not such a Fashionable War, New Statesman,August 1999. 36 These include the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 37 See Chapter 4, The Quest for Peace for further discussion of the problems associated with the UN’s monitoring of human rights abuses. The report of the UN Secretary General on the UN office in Angola (April 2000) pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1268 failed to mention the impact of the conflict on children in either the human rights or humanitarian sections although in the January report it mentioned that 42 per cent of children under five are severely or moderately underweight. 38 Vanbueren, G International Law on the Rights of the Child, 1996, Kluwer. 39 Angola has two reports outstanding which were due to be filed in 1993 and 1998. 40 Angola has announced that it will not be attending the OAU summit. IRIN report, 17 May 2000. At the time of writing this chapter, no information was available as to the composition of the committee 41 ibid. note 10. 42 ibid. note 3.

30 three the economics of conflict

or would-be grooms looking to buy a diamond engagement ring, but do not know F how much to spend, De Beers, the international diamond cartel, has some discrete advice:“use the two months salary guideline”.1 Presumably this advice is for people with a regular wage as it would take the average Angolan substantially more than two months to afford a diamond. Despite having some of the largest oil reserves and diamond mines in Africa, the Angolan people are worse off today than they were before the large off-shore oil fields were discovered in 1995. The disparity between the enormous profits made from mineral resources in Angola by foreign corporations, and the social and economic state of the country is a damning indictment of the role of foreign actors working in the country, and reveals once again the international community’s ability to avoid responsibility for the problems of a country that they profit from economically. Indeed, corporate social responsibility has failed Angola. Although most of the companies working in Angola have established corporate social responsibility strategies and consult widely with international NGOs and social justice groups, there is little evidence that they are implementing these policies in the countries in which they operate.The most positive advancements in controlling the illegal mining of diamonds in Angola has come not from the internal policies of corporations, but from regulation and the threat of regulation by the international community. A recent World Bank report2 considers the role of economics in conflict as the most important element in understanding conflict, and corporate recommends solutions that address the inequality and corruption as the most effective social way of ending conflicts. In these days of globalisation, the international community and transnational corporations have a pivotal position in which to help end the war. responsibility This chapter will examine the poor state of the Angolan economy despite record has failed investment and booming exports and consider the role of international business in the on-going conflict. It will show that, contrary to their stated ethical positions, many of the Angola transnational corporations working in Angola are failing to recognise their impacts on Angolan society. The chapter will conclude with recommendations for corporations and the international community which would help to address the social and economic crisis and put right some of the injustices.

1 growth with inequity Angola’s economy is booming. Inward investment and exports of oil and diamonds make it one of the fastest growing countries in Africa. Angola receives some of the highest levels of foreign direct investment in Africa. In 1998, $396m was invested in Angola, down from $412m the previous year. As one of the Least Developed Countries, Angola’s level of FDI comprises 13.4 per cent of total investment in all 44 LDC countries, more than double the next highest country.3 The forecasted real GDP of Angola is 8 per cent for the year 2000 and 10 per cent for 2001.4 This is up from GDP of just 1 per cent in 1998.5 The real driver of the Angolan economy is oil. In 1998, GDP comprised 12.6 per cent from agriculture, 16.3 per cent from services, 8.2 per cent from other industries, and 44.9 per cent from oil.6 The Economic 31 Intelligence Unit forecasts that due to increased oil prices along with higher production levels, Angolan total oil receipts will be $5.6bn in 2000 and $6.3bn in 2001, leading to an increase in government revenues of income from $2.3bn a year.7 After oil, diamonds are the next largest income earner for Angola, and look set to increase as the government forces take back more UNITA territory where most of the diamond reserves are located. In 1998, government mines produced $188m worth of diamonds with another $240m from independent operators. In addition to the official diamond figures, the rebel group UNITA itself mined between $200m and $250m worth of diamonds in the same year.8 In 1995, UNITA is believed to have raised $553 million through diamonds sales due to their control of 60–70 per cent of the diamond production. It is estimated that the actual total income raised through diamond sales in the period 1992 to 1998 for UNITA is £3.7 billion.9 the Yet, despite nine years of record investment and revenues, indicators show that the social development of Angola is one of the poorest in the world. Since the beginning of the improvement 1990s, Angola’s ranking on the UN’s Human Development Indicators has dropped from of society 74th to 160th out of 174 countries. UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan said of the plight of the children of Angola:“With a mortality rate of almost 30 per cent among children via inward under the age of five, Angola ranks among the world’s worst for this critical health 10 investment indicator.” The statistics speak for themselves. has not Box 1: Social Development Indicators

occurred, or Human Development Report Index 1999 Ranked 160th out of 174 countries led to equality Per capita income $674 of growth, Life expectancy at birth 46.5 (1997) Infant mortality rate 170 out of 1,000 live births social Under-five mortality rate 292 out of 1,000 live births development Disabled land mine victims 200,000 or investment Population without access to safe water 69% in the Population without access to health services 76% Population without access to sanitation 42% infrastructure Enrolment rate – primary 31.9% (of relevant age group) of the country Statistics taken from 1999 UNDP Human Development Report

The government’s mismanagement of its revenues, the bypassing of proper channels by diamond traders, expenditure on military equipment by both the government and the rebel groups have all taken their toll on the social spending in the country and have amounted to an enormous debt. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2000, in 1998, Angolan external debt amounted to $12,173m of which $10,616m is public and publicly guaranteed.11 The Angolan government pays 58 per cent of government revenue to service the debt, although the actual total debt service equalled 124 per cent of government revenue.12 The improvement of society via inward investment has not occurred, or led to equality of growth, social development or investment in the infrastructure of the country.

2 the stake of the international community When the Angolan economy is examined, the actual actors are few in number and large in weight.The oil industry makes up over 80 per cent of the government revenue. Oil was first discovered in Angola in 1955 and after a wildcat strike by Elf in 1995, there has been a dramatic acceleration in exploration resulting in the proven reserves of oil doubling to over 10 billion barrels, according to Angolan oil minister Botelho Vasconcelos.13 Forecasters are predicting that Angola will reach production levels of 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2005 and over 2.5 million bpd by 2015.14 The state owned oil company, Sociedade Nacionao de Combustiveis (Sonangol) believes investment by foreign companies in the oil sector will reach $4 to $5 billion per year from 2000–20003.15 In the oil sector there are 32 primarily six foreign corporations working with the government. Of those six, two companies control 85 per cent of the oil market, and consequently, most of the government revenue. As a non-OPEC country, Angola is quickly becoming a major supplier of oil to North America and Europe – at current production levels, Angola accounts for 7 per cent of US oil imports.16 The second largest industry, diamonds, makes up 6 per cent of government revenue, yet, the largest diamond cartel, De Beers, has until recently controlled up to 65 per cent of the rough diamond market of which the majority are alleged to go to the Antwerp market that deals with over 80 per cent of the rough diamond sales. Of the total Angolan exports, 85 per cent goes to the EU and US. Much of the public debt is held by the international regional banks and bilateral debt, controlled by the G8 countries.Therefore the number of large economic actors is actually very few. Clearly, the international community has a great deal more invested economically in Angola than it is willing to transnational show in terms of political and civil support. As the social indicators show, however, revenues from the oil, diamonds and loans are not corporations reaching Angolan society. Corruption, lack of transparency, purchase of military equipment continue to by both sides of the conflict undermine the ability of the people of Angola to build their own stable communities. While the triggers of the conflict are due to long standing issues deny their between the Government of Angola and UNITA (as discussed in Chapter 1), the role of finance resources generated by foreign companies plays a significant role in the longevity culpability of the conflict. The Financial Times commented on this fact:“Government [Angolan] in fuelling a officials have for years blamed this poverty on the civil war, but a series of army offensives since last September has severely diminished the rebel threat exposing the war as an devastating excuse to hide economic mismanagement.”17 That much of the $3.5 billion earned by Angola from oil is spent on military arms is not in doubt.The UK spokesperson on conflict and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when asked whether oil revenue was used for refute claims purchasing arms stated (sartorially) in the House of Lords recently,‘Oil accounts for approximately 80 per cent of Angolan government revenue. Defence spending forms the that their largest part of the Angolan budget. There is no doubt that oil revenues are used to fund the purchase of arms.’18 operations What does this have to do with the international community and transnational have corporations? As the World Bank report states,‘if the governments and the international contributed community can defuse the risks from its [a conflict country] primary commodity exports, generate rapid growth, and provide credible guarantees to minorities, then the risk of to the war conflict can be radically reduced.’19 Probably the largest contribution to ending the conflict can come from the economic actors in Angola and careful regulation and monitoring of their activities in conflict countries. Businesses operating in Angola, however, do not seem to recognise the wider impacts of their activities or accept that there are measures that they can take that would go a long way to reducing the conflict.This inability of corporations to place themselves in the political, social and economic context of the country in which they are working has been highlighted in a recent publication by the human rights group, Amnesty International. In Human Rights – is it any of your business? Geoffrey Chandler of Amnesty points out,“Civil conflict and human rights violations present companies with new challenges and dilemmas for which few have shown themselves prepared”.20 Transnational corporations continue to deny their culpability in fuelling a devastating conflict and refute claims that their operations have contributed to the war. A BP Amoco representative has stated that the war in Angola has nothing to do with oil or diamonds.21 It cannot be disputed, however, that the enormous revenues generated by the transnational corporations are leading to significant social disruption by funding the on-going conflict.The fact that the latest offensive by the government came after a rise in oil prices demonstrates this. Indeed, the connection between transnational corporations, the revenue that they generate and continuing conflicts is no longer solely recognised by NGOs, but even the World Bank and the international press now stress the role of economics in promoting conflicts, and transnational corporations, by their very nature, are at the heart of this problem. As Geoffrey Chandler comments:“their influence upon the global political economy is growing and their [corporations’] presence affects the societies in which they operate.”22

33 3 corporate social responsibility Transnational corporations have promoted themselves over the past 10 years as ethical actors working abroad, and many column inches in their brochures are devoted to their measures for improving the societies in which they operate. One of the most ‘progressive’ oil companies that works in Angola is BP Amoco, which is reputed for its forward thinking in social issues. It supports the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and uses Amnesty International’s code of conduct. Chris Gibson-Smith, BP Amoco’s Managing Director for Policy, sees BP as influential in promoting human rights and a stable society:“What we do believe is that by engaging in the debate and by helping establish safe, stable and peaceful societies, responsible business can promote good human rights behaviour. And where society thrives business thrives”23 De Beers chairman, Nick Openheimer, agrees with this sentiment. In a 1997 interview discussing De Beers’ performance, he commented there is specifically on Angola that “we do have certain areas where we’re prospecting and work is taking place now but it is difficult with the uncertainty and also the dangers inherent in little social operating in country… So peace would be helpful to everybody.”24 investment, Although corporations may wish for peace, it is not a necessary condition for them to operate in Angola. As a recent article in The Economist pointed out, it is profitable to work and equitable in conflict countries.The article quotes statistics from UNCTAD’s Least Developed Countries Report, 1999 that the average return on investment in Africa was higher than distribution any other region during the years 1991–1997, and states:“For brave business folk, there of the wealth are thus rich pickings from grim places.”25 Again and again, from Sudan to Burma, large oil companies continue to involve themselves in countries where there is on-going conflict, that the oil without any visible signs of helping the civil society to resolve the conflict. It is time, therefore, that corporations and the international community take action to implement has generated corporate social responsibility policies at the national level and codes of conduct at the international level.To start with, corporations need to address their role in the Angolan conflict, from a lack of transparency, avoiding international controls on exports to turning a blind eye to misuse of funds.

3.1 Disclosure According to observers, the lack of transparency in the payments by oil companies is contributing directly to much of the corruption within Angola.The IMF stated in a document in 1995 that: “The fiscal implications of the absence of a mechanism ensuring the recording of accounts for government operations related to all transactions, are perfectly clear in the data uncovered, which shows that about 40 per cent of estimated expenditure up till September was carried out bypassing the Treasury’s [Angolan] purview and as such were not reflected in the budget execution accounts”26 The Angolan government, through complicated accounting procedures, has effectively bypassed the Treasury for the majority of oil receipts.27 Consequently, there is little social investment and equitable distribution of the wealth that the oil has generated.While the Angolan government could do much to resolve this by establishing a more straight forward system of receiving payments, oil companies themselves can promote an atmosphere of transparency through full disclosure. The main oil companies working in Angola are BP-Amoco, MobileExxon,TotalFinaElf and Chevron as well as a number of other companies.28 In order to operate in Angola these companies need to agree either a joint venture or production sharing agreement with the state oil company, Sonangol which, under Angolan law, has sole oil exploration rights.To secure these explorations rights, oil companies must pay an up-front signature fee which has become quite a significant sum given the excitement over the potential of these fields. In 1999, a signature fee of $900 million was paid to secure a 5000 sq. km block. The small London-based pressure group, Global Witness, has examined this oil trail in their publication A Crude Awakening and has shown that much of the money from these fees is siphoned off into a number of trusts and corporations. The Financial Times has commented that “Though Sonangol is usually seen as an efficient partner by foreign oil companies, it also lies at the heart of a complex system of extra-budgetary financing fed with loans from foreign banks, which provide opportunities for corruption”.29 34 While transnational corporations work within Angola, they need to follow the laws and regulations of the country. However, the industry has avoided listing payments made in relation to Angolan oil exploration and production. A small amount of openness by the oil companies to their shareholders could go a long way in helping increase transparency and reduce the ‘opportunities for corruption’.

3.2 Crude credit (or creditors with interest) The international banking community has been very active in Angola.The Global Witness report, in its investigation of the oil revenues, revealed the high level of lending by global banks to the state-owned oil companies. According to Global Witness, $2.819 billion in privately funded oil-backed loans have been provided over the past few years.30 These loans have come from a collection of international banks, including ING Barings, Credit Lyonnais, Bank of Scotland, HSBC Equator Bank and UBS.31 This is a particularly devastating trend. Not only is the debt load of the country increasing as a whole, but the loans are incurring heavy interest rates. It is a vicious circle where loans are repaid using oil receipts against which new loans can be made.This may be an effective way to use oil revenue when the price of oil is rising but dangerous once the price falls and will make it more difficult to meet the repayments on these private loans.The only way to repay these loans will be to increase oil production, or release more blocks in order to raise more signature fees. If lending continues in this way, any downturn in the oil market will have serious repercussions on the economy. This exposes the real problem the oil has contributed.While the revenues of the oil fields come in and are mortgaged, the lending banks will have a large stake in the well being and maintenance of the status quo. Although any overthrow of, or interruption to, the workings of the government would probably not effect the oil operations off-shore, the real losers might be the banks and private lenders that hold the mortgages over future oil revenues. A new administration may not stand by any such loan agreements.Therefore, these foreign lenders have an interest in ensuring that the battle between the government and UNITA is won by the government. Global Witness believes that this was the reason that international lenders agreed to a $75 million loan which was, unusually, not for specific oil-related expenditure, but could be used by the Angolan Government at their own discretion. a small The government must be able to fund the army in order to protect its investments. amount of 3.3 Illegal trading openness The chairman of De Beers, Nicky Oppenheimer, stated in his annual chairman’s address in 1998 that all the company’s activities in Angola are undertaken in partnership with the by the oil state-owned diamond company, Endiama. Indeed, counter to much of the literature about companies illicit mining and selling of diamonds, De Beers “continues to adhere fully to both the letter and the spirit of the UN ‘diamond sanctions’ and has offered its full co-operation to their and assistance on this issue to the President of Angola and to the Secretary General of the United Nations.”32 A year later, despite this commitment, De Beers announced that shareholders they would cease buying diamonds in Angola due to the uncertainty of their origin. It could go a wasn’t until March 2000 that De Beers could fully guarantee that its diamonds were not from conflict zones. long way in De Beers’ retraction from its 1998 statement and culpability in buying diamonds from the helping to rebel group UNITA was exposed in a 1998 report from Global Witness, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict.33 The report successfully increase revealed the role of international diamond companies in exploiting the conflict, as well as contributing revenues from diamond sales.The report showed that De Beers’ annual transparency reports admitted purchasing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of diamonds from and reduce the Angola during the 1990s, when UNITA was in possession of most of Angola’s diamond producing areas.34 ‘opportunities

3.4 Social investment for corruption’ Most companies operating in Angola have invested some of their profits back into the society, either through the government-sponsored trust fund, or through local NGOs and international donors. While this is welcomed, it is far from the amount needed to create the strong, healthy societies that the corporate literature advocates. ExxonMobil is a major oil company with global operations and is another example of a corporation investing in social programmes where its money will be most visible. Rather than invest in the 35 communities where the profits originated, ExxonMobil’s philanthropy is concentrated in the marketplace where it sells its products, showing that it is focused more on marketing needs than social inequalities. While there are no statistics relating to corporate donation to Angola particularly, the total contributions to all of Africa, Europe and the Middle East came to $4.6m in 1998. This is compared to the approximately $30m donated to charitable programmes in the US. In 1998, ExxonMobil contributed $3m alone to US think tanks and policy research organisations.35 In 1999, to great international publicity, and as part of the World Health Organisation’s Global Vaccine and Immunisation Partnership to eliminate polio, De Beers donated a one-off payment of $2.7m to help inoculate the children in Angola.36 This is in addition to a further $322,000 given to other projects in Angola. While this charity is welcomed, it pales against the $45m the corporation gave through social investment in its native South Africa from 1993 to 1998. Considering that Angola has probably been one of the most important countries to De Beers’ profits in the past 100 years, the rate of social spending in the country is poor. Corporations working in Angola should reinvest more of their profits in the country as part of a reconciliation policy.

4 economic measures for peace The greatest steps forward in controlling the illicit diamond trade did not come from De Beers or other businesses working in the diamond industry, but from actions taken and threats of action by the international community. The international community needs to stop separating peace from economics. While the role of the UN and civil society is critical in ending the conflict, so too is the role of equity in growth and the economic empowerment of the people of Angola. Therefore, the international community must take a positive role in regulating and monitoring the economic resources of Angola to ensure ‘leakage’ of all types is prevented.

4.1 Sanctions The UN Sanctions Committee, under the leadership of the Canadian, Robert Fowler the greatest (as discussed in Chapter 4) has made significant advances in putting pressure on the international diamond trade to increase transparency and reduce its use of illegal steps forward diamonds. In March 2000, Fowler produced a hard hitting report37 that, after many months of investigation, condemned many of the actors in the diamonds trade, from the mining in controlling companies to the markets in Europe and Asia. The review of the UN sanctions concluded the illicit that diamonds were still being smuggled out of rebel held territories in Angola and sold in the diamond markets of Europe. The UN report criticised the international markets diamond through which diamonds are bought and sold for a lack of regulatory supervision of the market, including Antwerp, Mumbai and Tel Aviv. Antwerp is the largest market for rough trade… came diamonds, accounting for 80 per cent of all sales and the Sanctions Committee was highly from actions critical of the Belgian government for its lax attitude to restrictions “largely influenced by the often expressed fear that stricter regulation would simply cause traders to take their taken and business elsewhere”.38 The report goes on to say that “the unwillingness or inability of the diamond industry, particularly in Antwerp, to police its own ranks is a matter of special threats of concern to the Panel. Persons known within the industry to be dealing in UNITA action by the diamonds have as a general rule neither been exposed by the industry, nor subjected to any sanction by the industry”.39 international 4.2 Certification community Further initiatives at the international level are continuing to impact on the diamond trade. US House Representative Tony Hall took steps to regulate the diamond trade after visiting Sierra Leone to develop other methods for implementing the sanctions. Congressman Hall has introduced a bill into the House of Representatives calling for regulation. Called the ‘Consumer Access to a Responsible Accounting of Trade Act of 2000’, or the ‘Carat Act’, it calls for ‘gem-quality diamonds imported into the US market to be accompanied by a certificate listing where they were mined.’40 He has proposed labelling diamonds with certificates of origin as, according to the Global Witness report, diamonds can be visually distinguished even in a mixed batch. With the US buying 65 per cent of the diamonds in the world, Hall means to identify the country of origin so that American consumers are aware that the diamonds they buy may be fostering wars in African nations. 36 In the UK, Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook raised the issue at a meeting of the G8 foreign ministers in December and got agreement from the Japanese government, leaders of the G8 in 2000, to investigate the issue and report back in July 2000.41 The UK government’s efforts to spear-head the diamond certification scheme are part of a broader effort to curb illicit diamond trading worldwide.The agreement from the G8 in December 1999 for an international project to embark on a diamond certification scheme, marks the first attempt for states to consider vetting the origin of diamonds for sale.This will have implications not only for Angola but for a number of wars being fought in central and western Africa, and is being presented as a conflict prevention tool. The pressure from the UN and governments has changed the way diamonds are mined and has gone a long way to reduce the revenues for the rebel groups. The role of the corporations mining the diamonds in these actions was non-existent and despite their good intentions, companies like De Beers were brought to the table reluctantly. Regulation and monitoring at international level is critical to check the operations of corporations and increase transparency in the market.

4.3 IMF Recently, the International Monetary Fund has been instrumental in addressing the issue of transparency in the Angolan economy. In early April 2000, the Angolan government entered a nine-month the economic monitoring agreement with the IMF which will look at the sources of government revenue and should be instrumental in highlighting discrepancy, as fiscal contradiction transparency is one of the IMF’s major concerns.42 This is a precursor for a possible IMF programme in the country, which may go some way to improving the lax regulations.The between the Angolan government needs to take on board World Bank and IMF recommendations to growth in conform to international standards of accounting. revenues 4.4 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and GDP and The OECD is currently reviewing its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises43 to establish standard operating procedures on a number of different issues.The guidelines include the socio- employment, environment, bribery, competition and taxation amongst others. An international standard code of conduct is desperately needed to ensure corporations economic implement ethical guidelines in every country they work in.The international community reality on the should look to establish these guidelines as a mandatory international standard with effective implementation procedures. National governments should incorporate the ground is a guidelines into their national legislation and monitor their own corporations’ use of the guidelines. devastating indictment 5 conclusion of the lack of The contradiction between the growth in revenues and GDP and the socio-economic reality on the ground is a devastating indictment of the lack of responsibility of the responsibility international community. International actors with a stake in the country; oil companies, the diamond industry, banks, and governments must take responsibility to help end of the the conflict. Many of the developed countries have greater interests in Angola than they international admit. That Angolan oil makes up 7 per cent of US oil imports shows the reliance that their economy has on keeping Angolan oil flowing. community Corporations have expressed their commitment to ethical and social programmes as part of their core responsibility, but are failing to deliver them in Angola.They need to implement effective internal procedures that connect their international stance on corporate social responsibility to their actual operations in country.The international banking community must take responsibility for its lending and ensure that there is no leakage of funds.The international community has taken much-welcomed steps in beginning to regulate the diamond trade, but for the measures to be effective they must extend regulation to the diamond and banking industries. 37 The international community can play a greater role in reducing the conflict through regulation and monitoring of the monies raised through the exploitation of commodities. Corporations have shown that although they are concerned about their role in societies in general through their social responsibility programmes, they are not willing to see their full implementation at the country level.Therefore, the international community must take a more serious role in regulating the workings of transnational corporations in conflict countries. There need to be economic solutions to a conflict that is fuelled by economic conditions. While the off-shore oil industry in Angola is largely unaffected by the conflict, and the diamond industry is allowed to work on the margins without proper certification, the main actors do not need to get involved.The oil will still flow, the private debt servicing will still take place. However, the humanitarian crisis is enormous.Those countries that rely on Angolan commodities to sustain the livelihoods of their industries and citizens owe Angola more than the price of a barrel of oil or a carat of a diamond.The market rules in Angola, but the resulting social crisis will destroy the heart of the country.

38 endnotes

1 Taken from the De Beers website at www.adiamondisforever.com/M/m4b.htm. Accessed on the 6 June 2000. 2 Collier, Paul, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,World Bank, 15 June 2000. 3 UNCTAD, The Least Developed Countries Report, 1999, p. 45, Geneva, 2000. 4 Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report – Angola, 4rth Quarter 1999, London. 5 Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report – Angola, 4rth Quarter 1999, London. 6 ibid. 7 ibid. 8 ibid. 9 Global Witness, A Rough Trade:The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict, November 1998. 10 Angola Reflections of Peace Building, p3. 11 The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, p. 248,Washington, 2000. 12 Unfinished Business: the world’s leaders and the millennium debt challenge p. 31, Jubilee 2000, London, 1999. 13 Shaxson, Nicholas, War-torn Angola on brink of great expansion of oil output as black gold starts to flow, Financial Times, 7 January, 2000. 14 ibid. 15 ibid. 16 ibid. 17 Angolan IMF deal could lead to loan agreement, Financial Times, 6 April 2000. 18 Baroness Scotland of Asthal,Written Answers, Hansard, 16 March 2000. 19 Collier, Paul, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy,World Bank, 15 June 2000. 20 Griffin, Rob, Amnesty International sets out its better-business guide, Sunday Business, 4 June 2000. 21 CNN, BP defends big Angola payment, denies fuelling the war, http://www.cnn.com, 1 June 2000. 22 Griffin, Rob, Amnesty International sets out its better-business guide, Sunday Business, 4 June 2000. 23 BPAmoco website, www.bpamoco.com/humanrights/article.htm. Accessed on 31 May 2000. 24 Interview with Nick Openheimer as posted on De Beer’s website, www.edata.co.za/debeers/interview1.html, 22 December 1997. Accessed on 7 June 2000. 25 Business in Risky Places: Risky Returns,The Economist, 20 May 2000. 26 IMF Statement, 1995, taken from Global Witness, A Crude Awakening:The Role of Oil and Banking in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets, London, January 2000. 27 ibid. 28 TotalFinaElf has a reputation for working in conflict countries which other oil companies avoid. In addition to its work in Burma, the company is rumoured to be considering purchasing oil rights in Sudan from Talisman, a Canadian oil company. 29 War-torn Angola on brink of great expansion of oil output as black gold starts to flow, Financial Times, 7 January 2000. 30 Global Witness, A Crude Awakening:The Role of Oil and Banking in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets, London, January 2000. 31 ibid. 32 Chairman’s Statement, www.edata.co.za/debeers/Annual_Report/1998/chairman_statement.html. Accessed on 7 June 2000. 33 Global Witness, A Rough Trade:The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict, November 1998. 34 ibid. 35 Information taken from the ExxonMobil website, www.mobil.com/contributions.htm. Accessed on 31 May 2000. 36 De Beers gives $2.7m, Financial Times, 10 July 1999. 37 United Nations Security Council, Report on of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, GENERAL S/2000/203, 10 March 2000. 38 ibid. paragraph 89. 39 ibid. paragraph 91. 40 Congressman Hall, The Carat Act, from a Floor Statement, House of Representatives,Washington DC, 1 November 1999. 41 Hooper, John, Cook urges end to trade in illicit gems,The Guardian, 18 December 1999. 42 Shaxson, N Angolan IMF deal could lead to loan agreement, Financial Times, 6 April 2000. 43 OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Accessed at www.oecd.org.

39 40 four the quest for peace the role of the UN, African regional bodies, and civil society

he search for peace in Angola to date has been conspicuous for its failure. Elusive, T long and arduous, the efforts of the ‘international community’ through the United Nations have not borne the fruits of peace. Essentially a top-level approach, the process has been dogged by difficulties. Political stalling and manoeuvring, duplicity, slow or partial implementation of accords, and violations of humanitarian and human rights law have characterised the approaches of both UNITA, and to a lesser degree, the government. Added to this were ineffective monitoring of the accords by the UN, a narrow group of states with vested interests directing the peace process (the ‘Troika’) and an agenda that essentially a sought military peace without involving the Angolan people. top-level This chapter will give a brief overview of the main player in this peace process so far, the UN, which has attempted to broker a military peace since 1989. It will briefly look at approach, the these attempts, past and present, their impact, and future prospects for the UN as an agent for peace in Angola. The chapter will then go on to examine the other actors that process has must be involved in this quest for peace, looking particularly at Angolan civil society. been dogged 1 the United Nations by difficulties 1.1 Historical role Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been the main peace-broker, making repeated efforts to steer Angola toward peace.The first half of the decade involved intense diplomatic activity, headed by the ‘Troika’ (Portugal, Russia and USA), which led to a ceasefire under the Bicesse Accords in 1991 and the first election in Angola’s history in 1992. Shortly after the MPLA were declared the winners, Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, plunged the country back into a vicious war. Efforts to salvage the accords, via the Zambia-led, UN-mediated Lusaka process, succeeded in 1994 when UNITA’s military losses rendered a peace deal attractive to them. Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was to be overseen by a joint commission made up of UNITA and government representatives and the UN. UNAVEM III, which later became known as MONUA, was charged with peacekeeping, demobilisation of UNITA and government soldiers, monitoring of the ceasefire and human rights abuses, training in human rights for national NGOs and government officials and strengthening civil society. Co-ordination of humanitarian assistance and provision of funding was, and still continues to be, administered under a separate UN unit, OCHA,1 which has played a very useful humanitarian role. Since war resumed in 1998, the role of MONUA has become almost obsolete and, with the exception of its human rights division, it has closed. The new mission, renamed UNOA, was due to begin work in October but is being blocked by the Angolan government which objects to it having any political role.2

1.2 Problems & obstacles The UN’s inability to fulfil its mandate satisfactorily has been well documented by NGOs, particularly in the past few years.3 A four-year study by Human 41 Rights Watch (HRW), released in September 1999, severely criticised the UN for its failure to act on violations of the accords, human rights abuses and sanctions-busting. It also criticised the slow deployment of peacekeepers and the decision not to impose an arms embargo on both parties. More seriously, HRW accused the UN of eroding confidence and respect for the accords by what HRW calls a policy of “See no evil, hear no evil” for fear of upsetting the process. It must be acknowledged that serious constraints were placed on UNAVEM III and MONUA by the Government of Angola and by the environment in which the UN missions worked, which severely hindered their ability to carry out their mandate. Responsibility must also be attributed to the Troika and to the member states for providing inadequate resources.4 Ultimately, however, responsibility for the failure of the peace process must primarily rest with UNITA, which failed to meet various obligations agreed in the 5 since early Protocol. However, it is interesting to note that senior UN officials have not refuted the claims of the HRW report, and have even commended its recommendations.6 Kofi Annan 1999, the UN himself, the UN Secretary General, has admitted that the UN should have done more.7 has adopted 1.3 Recent improvements a more Since early 1999, the UN has adopted a more aggressive, robust approach. Annan’s replacement of the narrow Troika with a wider ‘committee of friends’ was a positive aggressive, move, although pressure from Lisbon, Moscow and Luanda is believed to have rendered this committee largely ineffective.8 Of most significance has been the appointment of robust Ambassador Fowler to the chair of the UN Sanctions Committee in January 1999. approach Energetically committed to his mandate of catching violators of sanctions placed against UNITA,9 Fowler directed a six-month investigation by a Panel of Experts.10 The findings of this panel, which were released on 15th March 2000 in a report to the UN Security Council,11 found several African and European countries guilty of assisting UNITA in accessing fuel and arms and of acting as conduits for diamond sales.Togo, Burkina Faso, , and Bulgaria were the main countries to receive blame.12 Controversially, the report breaks from UN Security Council tradition and names individuals and heads of states. It calls for sanctions against these countries and individuals which have violated sanctions and challenges the UNSC to act or fear losing all credibility as a sanctions enforcer. As a result, it has sparked off controversial rows between many African countries and the UN.13 Furthermore, its recommendations are directed not just at the violators or at the UNSC, but at the international community by calling for tighter regulations over arms and diamond sales. The UNSC has responded by setting up a monitoring committee made up of five experts to conduct further investigations and to submit a report of their findings on 18 October, 2000.14 However, there is great concern about how this committee will complete its work given the fact that in late May, the experts had yet to be appointed. The degree to which the Fowler report will reduce UNITA’s military capability is not clear. It will undoubtedly raise the cost of military supplies, and, as the report itself acknowledges, the efforts of the panel, sympathetic governments and NGOs have already made it more difficult for UNITA to trade diamonds and arms.15 However, intelligence reports are emerging which suggest that UNITA is continuing to receive supplies.16 Furthermore, the report falls down in what is omitted. No recommendations are given that substantively deal with the problem of international oil companies selling fuel to UNITA, or that call to account those government officials who are allegedly facilitating illicit oil and diamond deals.17 Neither does it provide information on alleged Israeli, Russian, Indian or American diamond dealers. A second area in which the UN’s approach has improved has been in the area of human rights work.The UN has become somewhat more robust and proactive in this area by conducting workshops and seminars in human rights training for NGOs, government officials and the public. Since the resumption of fighting at the end of 1998, MONUA’s work has been severely curtailed. However it continues to fund small, national NGOs to engage in civic education and awareness raising. One church organisation received such funding for seminars which were attended by local government officials, the police, Ministry of Justice staff and lawyers throughout 1999. These were very successful according to feedback from the participating groups, however the seminars had to stop due to an end to funding. MONUA also apparently had tentative plans to organise a forum 42 of churches, NGOs and donors which would engage in international advocacy work and if it (UN) dialogue with the government and UNITA.18 continues 1.4 Future role to take a The UN is the only body with an official mandate to conduct vital peace-building initiatives in Angola and therefore has an important role to play. Yet in the light of the no-nonsense, above findings, what kind of a role can this be? robust First, the latest efforts to combat sanctions-busting under Ambassador Fowler have certainly boosted the UN’s credibility. If it continues to take a no-nonsense, robust approach, its approach in implementing the recommendations of the Fowler Report, its efforts could be pivotal in reducing the means to pursue the war. efforts could Secondly, in order to retain its role, the UN must radically re-assess its oversight of the be pivotal implementation of peace accords: a clear mandate to proactively monitor and publicly report human rights abuses, and to call violators of accords to account is the only way forward.Thirdly, a broader-based ownership beyond the Troika is essential if the process is not to be dogged by political machinations and duplicity: Annan’s ‘committee of friends’ is more appropriate and requires strong support by the international community if opposition from the Troika countries is not to succeed. A fourth step, and related to the previous point, would be for the UN to co-ordinate meetings by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and other regional bodies which presently are fumbling for direction.Their role is currently very small and requires strengthening if the local and regional dimensions of the war are to be factored in. Concerning facilitation, a further useful role for the UN would be to facilitate regular forums in which the NGO and donor community could discuss important issues relating to humanitarian and human rights issues (eg access, staff security, etc) with government and UNITA representatives.The UN could also act as a platform for information sharing and co-ordination of advocacy work amongst Angolan and international civil society. Lastly, the valuable civic education training for government officials, local leaders, donors and other parties to the conflict needs to be continued and expanded. Consideration ought to be given to broadening funding for such training to international NGOs in order to scale-up delivery which presently is confined to national NGOs. 2 role of African regional bodies The call for ‘African solutions to African problems’, although becoming a cliche, cannot be ignored.The necessity for African nations to be centrally involved in seeking peace in Angola is clear. However, up until very recently this has all too often been difficult to realise due to the very complicity of most African nations in each others’ wars – the current war in the Democratic Republic of Congo being the most notable example. The Fowler Report has shown the depths to which certain African states have been complicit in the prosecution of the Angolan war. Ambassador Fowler himself identified this after his tour of Africa last year when he concluded that there was “a crisis of African solidarity”.19 This goes some way to explain the difficulties that the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) have had in taking a lead in pursuing peace for Angola. SADC’s role has been paralysed by the disagreement amongst its members over how SADC should address crises within its region. Whether these disagreements are resolvable or are themselves symptomatic of a broader regional crisis is the current question.The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has extensively studied SADC’s dilemma and reports: “When the countries of… SADC meet to discuss issues relating to politics, defence, security, conflict management and disaster relief, they are supposed to do so under the auspices of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (established in Gaborone on 28 June 1996 to fill the gap left by the Front Line States). Unfortunately, the SADC Organ was never made fully operational due to a difference of opinion over whether it was meant to be a part of SADC or an independent body. …Many suspected that a Mandela-Mugabe tug-of-war for sub-regional power underpinned the debate.” 20 43 The most recent SADC summit held in Maputo, Mozambique in August 1999 directed the Council of Ministers to revisit SADC’s structural problems and report back within six months. However, the upsurge in regional crises21 led ACCORD to report: “The new turbulence is precisely what the SADC Organ was envisaged to stamp out… Unfortunately, with the Organ in limbo, the crises are finding SADC unprepared or lacking the political will to react as a region. The question… is whether the Maputo directive has the potential to unlock the deadlock and to bring vitality to the SADC Organ.” 22 Clearly, internal political disagreements amongst SADC’s members makes it unable to resolve or manage regional conflicts.Without serious attempts made to resolve this problem, in particular the deepening divide between the two camps,23 any role for this regional body to engage in peace-building can only be superficial. However, positive signs are emerging that certain African states, particularly Angola’s positive signs neighbours, are beginning to take a more proactive role in seeking peace. are emerging First, the spilling over of the war in Angola into neighbouring territory which began October 1999 has begun to stir the surrounding nations into calling for dialogue. In early that certain February, South Africa began urgent talks with Namibia on the build-up of tensions along African states its border with Angola. Of particular note was the statement given on national television by the South African Defence Minister calling for dialogue between the parties and stating are beginning their belief that a military solution to the crisis no longer exists.“No matter who may win 24 to take a the war, there will be no lasting peace, so we have to get the parties to talk”. The skirmishes along the border have also roused Namibian church leaders to speak out more against their government’s decision to support the Angolan government militarily. Saying proactive role that they “could no longer watch the war in Angola with folded arms,” they met with the President and urged him to rethink his support.25 in seeking Secondly, international pressure is mounting for the region to take stronger leadership in peace pursuing peace, particularly relating to the implementation of sanctions against UNITA. The Fowler Report and the subsequent UNSC resolution (1295) made a clear case for SADC to play a much more central role in strengthening the control of illicit arms, oil and diamond flows. By presiding over committees and conferences on these issues, establishing monitoring procedures at the borders and information exchange mechanisms, SADC could indeed have a powerful role. If lack of technical and financial resources is an issue, there are several non-African states with strong enough commitment to sanctions- busting likely to offer assistance. In the area of peace brokering, the OAU would be a more appropriate body considering the fact that its members have fewer vested interests in Angola than do SADC members. However, the recent spotlight placed on Togo, Burkina Faso and Rwanda for violation of sanctions in the Fowler Report demonstrates the care that would need to be taken by the OAU in approaching such negotiations. For example, the OAU may need to consider ways of preventing offender nations from participating. It is conceded that the OAU’s role in brokering peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea was not entirely successful. However, observers believe it was hampered by the fact that its headquarters are located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This does not predispose the OAU to failure in brokering peace between the Angolan government and UNITA; however the OAU must seriously consider action in this area.

3 Angolan civil society Civil society in Angola has historically been excluded from the peace process but has recently begun to emerge as a crucial player. The unfavourable environment within Angola has restricted the growth of local NGOs, women’s groups, trade unions, churches and community groups since Independence. As a result,‘civil society’ has traditionally been weak.Yet in the last few years, particularly 1999, Angola has witnessed a marked growth in this sector, not only in numbers of civic groups formed but in the vision, goals and unity of its members.

3.1 Growing years The Bicesse Accords of 1991 were a quiet but significant turning point for civil society in Angola. They required the government to pass legislation allowing freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech, and lifting restrictions on domestic travel. Although 44 these rights have by no means always been respected, particularly the freedom of speech.26 The 1990s have seen a huge growth in the number of national non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and civil society organisations.27 Many of these are neighbourhood groups, trade and professional organisations, environment and women’s groups, and humanitarian organisations.With the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accords and the reduction in fighting, these latter groups began to conduct civic education initiatives in the mid-1990s to increase knowledge amongst NGOs and the public of their civic rights and responsibilities, and the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.These efforts have included education seminars, workshops and media activities, as well as capacity building work with NGO staff in conflict resolution. ADRA (Action for Rural Development and the Environment) and FONGA (Forum of Angolan NGOs) were amongst the earliest NGOs to engage seriously in this sort of work, believing that sustainable peace can only be achieved through broad understanding and ownership of human rights.28 FONGA’s members work in social assistance, human rights, disabled rights, peacebuilding, education and health.The international NGO, Development Workshop, has tried to make rights education relevant to people’s daily struggle to survive by, for example, educating shanty-town dwellers and market traders on laws regulating who has rights to land and trade.29

3.2 The Church – an emerging actor No discussion of civil society in Angola is complete without reference to the Christian church which has become increasingly engaged in civic education, humanitarian, advocacy and peace work.With the majority of the population professing to be Christian, and a 5% annual growth rate in membership, the church is a very significant part of civil society.30 The fact that the church straddles both warring parties (for example, certain church leaders are known to be respected by both Savimbi and Dos Santos) also gives it a unique potential to bridge divides. Although it is very difficult to talk about ‘the church’ in Angola as a single entity – it has traditionally suffered from deep divisions between denominations – this sector has benefited like other groups from the more positive environment that the peace accords civil society have brought.31 Not only has church membership substantially grown, but churches from all denominations have begun to engage energetically in peace education and awareness in Angola has raising amongst their congregations and the wider community. Seminars and workshops that discuss the constitution, the responsibilities and rights of citizens, and peace and historically reconciliation issues are run by the Evangelical Association in Angola (AEA) and the been excluded Christian Council of Angola (CICA), amongst others. These workshops are not restricted just to church members but encourage local level government and traditional leaders to from the attend.32 Radio programmes on the importance of democracy and tolerance are broadcast regularly by CICA and the Catholic church. peace process Since the resumption of fighting in December 1998, the churches have increased in boldness and vigour in speaking out against violence and the continuation of war. Church leaders have publicly appealed to the warring parties to respect the Lusaka Accords and the population suffering the effects of war. The Catholic Church, traditionally pro-government, sent strongly worded pastoral letters and public statements in 1999 calling on the government and UNITA to negotiate, decrying violations of human rights and calling the nation to reconciliation.33 A commitment toward concerted and co-ordinated prayer has also emerged, to the extent that national prayer meetings and conventions have become regular events. In January 1999 more than 1,000 women gathered in Luanda to pray for peace and reconciliation. These peace efforts culminated at the end of 1999 with an international tour by prominent Angolan church and civil society leaders to lobby western governments to support their efforts for peace.34 Most significantly, a trend has slowly begun to emerge of church unity and increased church co-operation to work 45 Box 1: Mobilising churches to work for peace

In September and December 1999 World Vision organised two very successful workshops for church leaders in Angola, with the aim of encouraging and empowering the churches to become more engaged in working towards peace. Specifically, the workshops aimed to foster stronger relationships across denominations and focused very much on prayer and reconciliation between the churches. Nearly 50 representatives from Protestant, Catholic, Evangelical and independent churches attended the first workshop which included very powerful times of confession and reconciliation. Many pastors have since commented on how this workshop led directly to a series of inter-church prayer meetings for peace which were unprecedented. One pastor recalled how umbrella church organisations such as CICA and AEA had never held such prayer meetings together before.“For the first time”, he said “the the fact that churches in Angola pray together in only one name – God”. Another commented that before the initiative church division had been a serious problem, but no longer the church continued to be so. straddles both The follow-up seminar took this a step further, facilitating the church leaders to warring identify how they could become more actively involved in seeking peace. Many pastors have come away envisioned and encouraged by the potential of their church. parties gives it a unique together towards peace.World Vision has contributed to this momentum through two potential to workshops which it organised last year (see Box 1). bridge divides Another example of this move toward church co-operation is the recent launch of an ecumenical peace movement by three leading church bodies (Episcopal, Anglican and Evangelical). The Inter-Church Group for Peace in Angola (GEIPA) is, in fact, the fourth peace movement to be launched since beginning of 1999: The Catholic Movimento Pro Paz, the secular Angolan Group for the Promotion of the Culture of Peace (GAP) and the Angolan Reflection Group for Peace (GARP) were all formed in an effort to vocalise civil society’s fatigue with the war. GEIPA differs from these in that it is an inter-church movement and plans to act as the national co-ordinating ecumenical body for these churches’ contribution to the peace effort. These include human rights monitoring, mediation, advocacy and training of church leaders. The common call of each group, however, is the need to include and empower Angolan civil society in the peace process. There is a universal sense of fatigue and frustration with the war which is seen as being pursued for the sake of aggrandisement rather than for the good of the people. Indeed, there exists an overwhelming consensus amongst the churches and broader civil society to pursue real, sustainable peace that is more than an end to fighting. To achieve this, a wide range of actors must be included, not just top-level officials and foreign diplomats. They assert that ownership of the peace by the people is essential if it is to be maintained. The marginalisation of civil society is viewed as an important contributor to the failure of past peace processes. One member of the delegation visiting the UK pointed out that if the Angolan people had ‘owned’ the peace process or understood it, they would have sought to hold the warring parties accountable for their abuses. The impact of all these efforts and initiatives is difficult to assess at this early stage. Not only are there few mechanisms to measure the impact of the civic education initiatives, but a dilapidated infrastructure and war restrictions inhibits communication flows. The peace groups are very new and so far lack one co-ordinating body or secretariat. Without this, they are vulnerable to competition, duplication and persecution. However, there are some indicators of progress. Peace and reconciliation initiatives are taking place around the country, even if small and modest, and there is an eagerness amongst many people to know about their rights.35 For example, some women in Cabinda who have attended peace education seminars given by the church are choosing not to send their children to fight in the war.36 Above all, people are talking of a ‘current of democracy’ emerging within Angolan civil society and there is a sense that the awakening of the church is likely to add critical weight to this current. 46 Whilst not wishing to overestimate what civil society can achieve (it is still very young), it is clear that this sector could have considerable influence not only in bringing the two sides to the table, but in shaping and upholding future accords. The energising of the church towards unity, prayer and action is likely to be a critical factor in this. Training in management, conflict mediation, technological support, organisational skills and education in the meaning and practice of democracy are all areas of need. Improving current programmes is also a need, particularly in tailoring approaches with a gender and age sensitivity.37 Churches, NGOs, consultancies, trade unions and donor agencies from around the world can all contribute to this capacity-building. In particular, expertise from post- conflict civil societies whose countries have had similar experiences would be of tremendous benefit. But above all, lobbying UNSC member governments and exposing human rights abuses internationally are vital in ensuring the success and protection of civil society’s efforts in a country where restrictions on members of this sector are still formidable. Yet what is most important about this move toward civic education and civil society strengthening is the fact that it is helping to build a democratic culture, even if slowly. Two mass protests have been conducted this year for the first time since 1977, indicating a change in the political climate.38 With presidential and parliamentary elections due to be held in 2001 (for the first time since 1992) this is a crucial moment for such education to be supported and accelerated. The lack of a democratic culture throughout Angola’s modern history has been attributed by many leading Angolans as lying at the root of not only the cause of the war, but of the failure of the peace process. Thus it is this culture that must be supported and built if another peace process is to begin or succeed.

4 conclusion Although the United Nations has been the main prosecutor for peace, the past decade has shown that the war in Angola is too complex and multi-dimensional to be ‘solved’ by the UN alone. A top-down diplomatic approach that seeks a military solution, marginalises indigenous communities and is vulnerable to manipulation by the warring parties, can only hope to bring short-term, superficial peace. Clearly, the need for a different approach is vital and urgent. the war in Rather, the various dimensions of this long-running conflict point to the need for a multi- Angola is track approach which tackles the various political and social dimensions, as well as the financial and trade dimensions.39 too complex The UN’s recognition of its past failure and its more radical, aggressive stance on and multi- sanctions is welcome and is earning it some credibility for having a continued role to play in ending the fighting. However, the release of the Fowler Report is not sufficient without dimensional an energetic commitment to pursuing its recommendations. Angolan civil society’s to be ‘solved’ support for the continued presence of the UN and its recognition of the UN’s important role adds to the case for the UN to have a future in the peace process. by the UN The UN, indeed, plays a valuable role in co-ordination and facilitation of humanitarian assistance, funding civic education initiatives and government capacity building. Yet this can alone only be the case if the UN adopts a broader understanding of the causes and solutions to this war, thus enabling civil society and African states to assume a bigger role. In addition, a radical re-assessment of how to oversee the implementation of peace accords is critical, including a clear mandate to proactively monitor and report human rights abuses. A reformed, tougher, accountable UN that works in partnership with other actors, creating strategic alliances with government and civil society can be the only way forward. The responsibility facing many African states to acknowledge their role in the conflict and to pursue an alternative is stronger than ever. Not only has the recent spilling over of the war into neighbouring states prompted calls for dialogue, but the Fowler Report has confirmed suspicions of the complicity of many African states in this war. The vested interests of SADC and its members in Angola make it an inappropriate body to broker peace, however, it holds the potential to play a crucial role in monitoring borders and strengthening controls on arms, oil and diamond flows. The OAU presents a more viable option although mechanisms would need to be put in place to ensure sanctions violators, such as Togo, are excluded.

47 the battle Angolan civil society is for the first time this century beginning to grow and slowly emerge as a credible player not only in facilitating negotiations, but in building a culture of against the peace at the grass-roots level which will be owned by Angolans themselves. This is a crucial ingredient for the sustainability of any official peace process that is re-started. war in Angola However, this emerging constituency is young, fragile and vulnerable and requires strong is at a critical moral, political, financial and spiritual support from international civil society if it is to have any success. An organised, united and supported opposition to the war is critical for any juncture, a kind of end to the fighting. window of Finally, the onus on the international community to assist is paramount. The UN Security Council must continue to pressurise both parties to a negotiated settlement and hold opportunity abusers of international humanitarian law and human rights to account.Violation of the exists to act Ottawa Treaty Ban on Landmines must also be accounted for. An international war crimes tribunal to try Jonas Savimbi for the crimes committed in his name ought to be decisively considered. Lastly, tighter regulations and controls on arms exports is a continuing concern which countries such as the UK and USA have particular responsibility to act upon. Strengthening the EU Code of Conduct on Arms and pressing for an International Code of Conduct are important tools in the battle to reduce arms availability in the region. The battle against the war in Angola is at a critical juncture. A window of opportunity exists to act decisively. Without each of these actors working innovatively, imaginatively, responsibly, and above all, in solidarity, any future peace negotiations will only be another brief reprieve in the unending cycle of violence and war in Angola.

48 endnotes

1 Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which was formerly known as UCAH. 2 Under Resolution 1268, the 30-member mission has a mandate that covers diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights and capacity building activities “for restoring peace, assisting the Angolan people in the area of capacity- building, humanitarian assistance, the promotion of human rights, and coordination other activities”. 3 Angola Unravels by Human Rights Watch is the most recent (September 1999). CIIR’s Peace Postponed (1998) by Alex Vines is similarly critical. Also, see Kibble’s article, No room for peace(1999) which discusses the deep frustration felt by UK NGOs for the UN’s role. 4 MONUA comprised only1,500 rapid reaction troops, 345 civilian police and 85 military observers. 5 In his report to the UN Security Council, 14 April 1997, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, expressed concern over UNITA’s ‘foot-dragging’ in implementing the provisions, particularly in the area of demobilisation. Disarmament was equally problematic, with both sides re-arming. Landmines continued to be laid by both sides, even after the Government signed the Ottawa Treaty in 1998 (ICBL Report, pg 113–116). UNITA’s propaganda radio continued, and the government refused to allow the UN radio station to be set up. 6 Ambassador Fowler, chair of UN Sanctions Committee, is reported to have commended its recommendations: see Africa Confidential, (1999). 7 IRIN-SA report, (2000b). 8 Africa Confidential, (1999). 9 Sanctions imposed against UNITA include: Purchase of Arms and Petroleum, September 1993 (UNSC Resolution 864),Travel abroad, August 1997 (Resolution 1127), Export or Sale of Diamonds, June 1998 (Resolution 1173), Freeze of UNITA’s financial resources and assets, June 1999 (Resolution 1173). UNITA’s violation of UN sanctions were only recently confirmed in the UN Sanctions Committee report this year. 10 See paragraph 7 of the final report (cited in next endnote) for full list of names and nationalities of panel members. 11 Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, UN Sanctions Committee, March 2000. Referred to in this report as the Fowler Report. 12 Other countries accused of harbouring sanctions violators are , South Africa, DRC, Congo Republic, , Zambia and Namibia. 13 The latest row has been over Angola’s decision to boycott the OAU annual summit in Togo in June 2000 and to call on the OAU to prevent Togo’s president from assuming the presidency of the OAU this year. 14 See UN Resolution 1295, 18 April, 2000 . 15 See Conclusion of the Fowler Report (UN Sanctions Committee Report, March 2000). 16 See Brittain (28 April, 2000) whose newspaper article cites intelligence reports indicating that UNITA have received fresh supplies of weapons. 17 See Global Witness report A Crude Awakening. 18 A member of staff from MONUA shared these plans with a World Vision staff member in 1999. 19 See paragraph 7 of UN Sanctions Committee report (1999). 20 De Coning, C, (1999). 21 The invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo by Rwanda/Uganda/Burundi in 1998 and the subsequent retaliation by Zimbabwe/Namibia/Angola is the principal example. 22 Tapfumaneyi, A, (1999), p. 2. 23 Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and the DRC on one side and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola on the other. 24 IRIN-SA report, South African warns the warring parties, (2000c) 25 IRIN-SA report, Clerics meet President, (2000d). 26 Rafael Marques, an outspoken Angolan journalist, has for many years exposed the serious press constraints, prompting several arrests. He was last arrested 16 October 1999 and on 5 April was imprisoned for 6 months and heavily fined by the courts. Angola’s poor human rights record is acknowledged not just by HRW. Freedomhouse, a UK based human rights NGO, the US State Department and Coalition for a Livable World all ranked Angola as one of the worst African offenders in their 1999 reports. 27 Kibble (1997), and section XI on Civil Society and Human Rights in HRW (1999). 28 HRW (1999) Section XI on Civil Society and Human Rights. 29 ibid, see also Kibble (1997). 30 Exact numbers of Christians are not possible to obtain. Although the majority of the population profess to be Christian, the practice of traditional religions is widespread and ingrained in Angolan culture. 31 Christians have suffered oppression for periods of time during the 25 years of official Communist rule between 1979 and 1991. 32 Discussion with Angolan church leaders, 3 Feb, 2000. 33 A published collection of pastoral letters on war and peace can be found in A Igreja em Angola Entre a Guerra e a Paz, Missionarios Espiritanos (eds) (Lisbon: Missionarios Espiritanos, 1999) 34 The delegation included representatives from NGOs, all the main church denominations, trade unions and academics.They visited the USA, , Holland, Belgium and UK in December 1999. 35 According to the Delegation mentioned above. 36 According to a church leader who was a member of the UK Delegation.

49 37 For example, according to research by USAID conducted into the role of women in Angola, the majority of Angolan women tend not to listen to the radio and yet the radio is often used to promote peace messages. (Women in Development Women’s Participation in Angola’s Reconstruction and in its Political Institutions and Processes, Volume 1, July 1997) 38 The Progressive Democratic Party, PADPA, staged a protest in February and March 2000 in response to the massive price hike in fuel by 1,600%. After the first was brutally repressed, the latter passed peacefully, to the amazement of those who took part. Many opposition politicians took part in the march, some wearing bullet proof vests. (IRIN report (2000e), and The Economist, 18 March, 2000) 39 As discussed in the previous chapter on The Economics of Conflict.

50 five recommendations

1 humanitarian need The humanitarian need of the people of Angola is staggering. Indeed, it is greater than it has ever been in the past 40 years of war. It is, therefore, critical that the Government of Angola and the international community responds as swiftly as possible to the immediate humanitarian needs of the 3.6 million ‘war affected’ by releasing funds for the UN Consolidated Appeal and NGO operations. In addition, it is crucial that increased pressure be applied on the Government of Angola and UNITA to provide safe access for the humanitarian community to the IDPs and affected populations and to cease all military activity that targets civilians, in accordance with international humanitarian law. Immediate needs include medical supplies, shelter, food and agricultural provisions. The laying of landmines must be halted immediately by both sides in accordance with the Ottawa Treaty and legal measures threatened against those who continue. Landmines awareness programmes, de-mining and victim assistance require continued funding, despite the war, if the population is to be given the chance to return to agricultural self-sufficiency. The education and health infrastructure require urgent attention, as do the road networks and airstrips. With expanding government revenues accrued from oil receipts there are more than sufficient resources to meet these needs and pressure must be brought to bear on the Government of Angola to invest in these areas. Innovative innovative humanitarian programmes are required that provide relief and rehabilitation whilst investing in the longer-term needs of the community, including investing in civil society. In humanitarian both the immediate and longer term, there is an urgent need to address the psycho-social needs of the population, particularly the children, if the cycle of violence is to be broken. programmes Efforts to assist street children in this area have been started by the wives of the are required diplomatic community. The government should emulate this example and expand it, perhaps with the participation of the wives of the top government officials. that provide 2 children relief whilst Children’s needs both in terms of humanitarian assistance and human rights, tend to investing in be overshadowed in times of conflict. They make up almost half the population of Angola yet they are the forgotten ones. If Angola is to have hope for the future, that the long-term hope lies with its children. All parties must, as a matter of urgency, make a strong and needs of the public commitment to putting the needs and interests of Angolan children before any other consideration and provide all necessary assistance to ensure their well-being and community safety. There must be an immediate commitment by both sides to halt the recruitment, conscription or abduction of children under 18 into the armed forces or rebel groups. This must be coupled with an immediate cessation of indiscriminate attacks on children. In addition they should provide appropriate and safe access for humanitarian agencies, including corridors of tranquillity and days of peace, so that a proper assessment can be made as to how children’s lives have been affected by the conflict. Family re-unification programmes are needed, particularly for unaccompanied children in the refugee and IDP camps. 51 Both warring parties must respect the Geneva Conventions and Protocols regarding the international laws of war and protect Angolan civilians. In particular, they must take all measures to protect Angolan children from the effects of armed conflict in addition to the current measures to protect them from landmines. The Government of Angola must be urged to submit a report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the status of children in Angola and technical assistance can be given by the international community for this purpose.The Office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict also has a role to play in this process. African states charged with selecting a Committee of Experts under the African Charter must provide adequate resources for the Committee to carry out its work. Once elected, the Committee of Experts must make the situation of children in Angola its first priority. Finally, children can and must play a role in the search for a solution to Angola’s conflict and are important actors in this process

3 corporate actors World Vision welcomes the efforts being made by the UN and certain governments to ensure the integrity of the UN sanctions against illicit trading in diamonds.The impact of international regulation and monitoring can be significant when enforced at the country level.The international community needs to continue to push for greater regulation of the diamond industry, especially where the markets of Antwerp and Tel Aviv are concerned. A certification scheme will go a long way to ensure that conflict diamonds do not make their way onto international markets, but the US and EU need to strictly monitor the origins of diamonds entering their markets. International regulations need to be extended to the oil industry. Oil companies have shown that their corporate responsibility programmes are either inoperable or not implemented at the national level.Therefore, in the absence of a voluntary industry-wide standard, the international community needs to establish regulations regarding national transparency of financial exchanges between the corporations and the governments. Regulations should also ensure that oil companies are signed up to the human rights governments agreements and follow codes of conducts concerning their operations in conflict countries. should The international banking industry should consider the recommendations made by the incorporate pressure group Global Witness and fully publish all loan arrangements including payments made and recipients of those payments. Loans should go through a centralised system the OECD rather than the current multi-channel routes.The international banking industry should support the IMF and World Bank and call on the Angolan government to use international guidelines accounting standards and reform its current financial structures. into their National governments should incorporate the OECD guidelines into their national legislation and monitor their own corporations’ use of the guidelines. Individual national corporations should sign up to the guidelines as well as the UN declaration of human legislation rights. Corporations should report to their national governments on their implementation of the guidelines and report any infringements. In countries where they operate, and monitor corporations must publish their corporate social responsibility commitments, their codes of conduct and the UN conventions to which they have signed up.These should be their own translated into the local languages and distributed to local communities as part of the corporations corporation’s commitment to ensure the development of civil society. use of the The IMF needs to continue its monitoring of the Angolan economy and set social conditions on the use of any money it may lend the country. The international finance guidelines institutions should work with the other actors, including banks and oil companies in an open and transparent way, to push the Angolan government to increase its openness to the Angolan people.The IMF and the World Bank should continue to pressure the government to use international accounting standards.

4 peace process The war in Angola is complex and multi-dimensional. A multi-track approach which draws on the strengths of Angolan civil society, regional bodies, corporations and the 52 international community is needed.The co-ordinating role of the UN is essential but needs a more robust mandate to be effective.

4.1 United Nations – a new approach for a critical player A radical re-assessment of how the UN oversees the implementation of future peace accords is crucial.This must include a clear mandate to proactively monitor and publicly report human rights abuses, and to call violators of accords to account. Responsibility lies with the government and UNITA to allow the UN and NGOs to monitor and report human rights abuses. Pressure should be put on the Troika (USA, Russia, Portugal) to allow the broader-based ‘committee of friends’ to oversee any future peace process. Countries which actively armed the various factions as part of their respective Cold War struggles in the past have an obligation to ensure that a state of peace is returned to the people of Angola. meaningful If the peace is to be maintained, it must be owned by the people. Meaningful participation of Angolan civil society in the peace process is, therefore, a critical area to which the UN participation ought to give due attention. This involves listening to the ideas and recommendations of the various elements of civil society, drawing on their potential as mediators, and of Angolan equipping them to empower and enlighten their own communities on how to contribute civil society in to the peace process. Women, in particular, deserve empowering owing to their strong understanding of the impacts of the war on communities and children.The UN could also the peace play a vital role in creating a platform for the co-ordination of advocacy initiatives by Angolan and international civil society. Children also have much to contribute as process is peacebuilders, as experience in other countries has shown, and deserve a helping hand critical in expressing their views. The UN has a unique role to play in facilitating forums between the humanitarian community and the government/UNITA to discuss humanitarian and human rights issues. In addition, the valuable civic education training for government officials, local leaders and other parties to the conflict needs to be continued and expanded. Consideration ought to be given to broadening funding for such training to international NGOs.

4.2 Sanctions – the need for a multi-pronged approach The latest efforts by the UN to combat sanctions-busting have been very welcome and have succeeded in placing this issue high on the political agenda. However, the work of Ambassador Fowler will only have a minimal effect if the recommendations are not acted upon. Evidence is already emerging that UNITA is continuing to receive military supplies. Therefore, it is paramount that the UNSC follows through and acts decisively. The second expert committee, ordered by UN Resolution 1295, must be formed without further delay if it is to produce an authoritative report in October. Governments throughout the world must do all they can to comply with the recommendations of the report, and those who are yet to co-operate (such as Russia, Belarus) do so.The on-going accession negotiations of several Eastern European countries to the European Union, as well as the expansion of NATO into , ought to take into account these states’ compliance with the UN sanctions. Tougher legislation on arms brokering and end-use certification and more stringent accountability in legal arms sales are essential if arms exporter states are to play their part in restricting the supply of weapons to UNITA. Sharing of knowledge and expertise in curbing corruption associated with illicit trafficking must also be a priority. The recommendations on Illicit Trafficking and Controlling Small Arms in the NGO Agenda for Action for the G8 on Conflict Prevention ought also to be supported.

4.3 Regional actors – a gap needing to be filled The responsibility facing many African states to acknowledge their role in the conflict and to pursue an alternative is stronger than ever. Not only has the recent spilling over of the war into neighbouring states prompted calls for dialogue, but the UN Sanctions Committee report has confirmed suspicions of the complicity of many 53 African states in this war. Compliance with UN sanctions against UNITA is critical, as is the provision of information and assistance where available on their contravention.The international community could encourage this by offering technical and financial assistance. The vested interests of SADC and its members in Angola make it an inappropriate body to broker peace. It does, however, hold the potential to play a crucial role in monitoring borders and strengthening controls on arms, oil and diamond flows. The OAU presents a more viable option although mechanisms would need to be put in place to ensure member states who continue to violate the sanctions are excluded. The UN could assist in facilitating such mediation or arbitration.

4.4 Civil society – urgent support needed for the most promising actor Angolan civil society is the most promising new actor in the quest for peace, yet it is young, fragile and vulnerable. For it to flourish will require a greater commitment to respect for human rights from both the government and UNITA, particularly regarding freedom of association and speech. The various groups will also need strong, committed support from the international community – financial, political, logistical, moral and spiritual – in their efforts to advocate for peace and to educate the populace on these issues. Women and children have a powerful role in advocating peace and in contributing their ideas for peace-building, and their participation ought to be taken into account more seriously by all actors. The church throughout the world needs to express urgent, practical solidarity with the Angolan churches which are beginning to work together for the first time in decades. Their ability to connect with communities loyal to both warring sides has enormous peace-building potential. Their efforts in civic education need encouragement and strengthening if they are to have widespread impact. Building a democratic culture is the key to long-term peace, and support for this is of particular need at this time in the run up to the country’s second ever elections, to be held in 2001. An organised, united and supported opposition to the war is critical for any kind of end to the fighting.

54 bibliography

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