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141 Unpublished Sources and Primary Documents Chadwick Britain and the atomic bomb: MAUD to Nagasaki. Item Type Thesis Authors Gorman, Claire L. Rights <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-nc-nd/3.0/"><img alt="Creative Commons License" style="border-width:0" src="http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by- nc-nd/3.0/88x31.png" /></a><br />The University of Bradford theses are licenced under a <a rel="license" href="http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/">Creative Commons Licence</a>. Download date 28/09/2021 18:33:51 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10454/4332 Bibliography: Unpublished Sources and Primary Documents Chadwick Papers CHAD 1/12/2, Minutes of MAUD Technical Committee 9/4/41, Churchill Archives Centre (henceforth CAC) CHAD 1/19/8, Letter from Francis Simon to James Chadwick, 19/9/41, CAC CHAD 1/19/8, Letter from Pye to James Chadwick, 19/9/1941, CAC CHAD 1/19/8, Letter from Pye to James Chadwick, 16/10/41, CAC CHAD 1/19/8, Letter from Francis Simon to James Chadwick, 20/1/43, CAC CHAD 1/28/2, Relations between American and British S1 Project, CAC CHAD 1/29/2, General Policy on atomic Energy, British scientific office, 2/1/43, CAC CHAD 1/28/6, Notes of a meeting at Liverpool University, 30/6/40, CAC CHAD 1/28/6, MAUD Report on Uranium as an explosive, CAC CHAD 1/28/6, MAUD Committee Report on Uranium Fission, 26/8/41, CAC CHAD 1/30/3, 4TH Meeting of Tube Alloys Technical Committee, 23/4/42, CAC CHAD 1/30/3, 11TH Meeting of Tube Alloys Technical Committee, 13/11/42, CAC CHAD 1/30/3, 12TH Meeting of Tube Alloys Technical Committee, 11/12/42, CAC CHAD 4/4/4, French Members of Montreal staff, 31/1/45, CAC CHAD 4/4/4, Preserving Security over the French scientists working on the Canadian Project, 20/1/45, CAC CHAD 4/4/4, James Chadwick to Mackenzie King, CAC CHAD 4/6/1, Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee, 22/1/45, CAC CHAD 4/6/29, Statement on sentence passed on Dr. Alan Nunn May, 1946, CAC CHAD 4/8/1, Sources of Uranium, CAC Cockcroft Papers CKFT 10/1, Letter from Mark Oliphant to John Cockcroft, 6/7/40, CAC CKFT 10/1, Report on telegram of 9/5/40 received by Cockcroft, CAC 141 Thomson papers TMSN 3, A Report on Uranium Fusion, CAC TMSN 4, Letter from Hans Halban to G P Thomson, June 1940, CAC TMSN 4, Letter from John Cockcroft to Dr. Fowler, 4/1/40, CAC TMSN 7, Notes of meetings and discussions of the United States MAUD Committee, CAC The National Archives, Kew AB 1/38, Personnel - Sir George Thomson‟s Committee – Staff for Tube Alloy in U.S.A and Canada AB 1/91, Heavy water from Norsk Hydro electrisk kvaelstoff aktieselscab, 1945 AB 1/93, Progress reports Cambridge University (Feather and Bretscher), 1941-1945 AB 1/106, Lord Cherwell‟s papers – Miscellaneous notes and reports of Uranium projects, 1940- 1941 AB 1/170, Lord Cherwell’s Minute to the P.M. re use of Atomic Energy for bomb, 1941 AB 1/368, Tube Alloys: Technical Committee Correspondence, 1941-1945 AB 1/451, Tube Alloys: Technical Committee; meeting of 19th September 1943 AB 1/543, Progress reports, Birmingham University, Professor R Peierls, 1941-1944 AB 1/568, Letters to Sir James Chadwick from Professor Peierls and Dr. Moon at Los Alamos AB 1/573, Professor R.E Peierls personal papers: correspondence with Akers, Arms, Blackman, Blok, Born, Brown, 1942-1944 AB 1/575, Professor R.E Peierls Personal Papers: correspondence with Feather, Fowler, Frisch, Fuchs etc, 1943-1944 AB 1/577, Professor R.E Peierls Personal Papers: correspondence with Placzek, Simon etc, 1942- 1944 AB 1/585, Quebec Agreement 1943; Lord President negotiations, 1942-1945 AB 1/638, Professor R.E Peierls personal papers, 1941 AB 1/695, Michael W. Perrin interviews with Dr. Klaus Fuchs following his arrest for espionage, January to March 1950 142 AB 1/700, Tube Alloy Project; organisation of an independent British and Anglo-Canadian effort, 1st January 1943-31st December 1943 AB 3/86, Notes on tour of United States and Canada, August-October 1943: Peierls and others, 1943 AB 3/90, Rudolf Peierls correspondence with Simon, Arms, Kurti etc, 1942 AB 3/91, Rudolf Peierls correspondence with Simon, Arms, Kurti etc, 1942 AB 3/101, Clarendon Laboratory diffusion papers: Simon’s correspondence with Kearton, Appleton etc, 1942-1943 AB 3/102, Clarendon Laboratory diffusion papers: Simon’s correspondence with Kearton, Appleton etc, 1942 AB 3/110, Tube Alloys correspondence with Simon and Akers in the United Kingdom and United States, 1942-1945 AB 4/130, Radioactive Poisons, August 1942 AB 4/39, Interim Report on the progress and programme concerning the fast neutron reaction, Author(s) K. Fuchs, R. Peierls, c.1942 AB 6/641, Visit to U.S and Canada by Sir John Cockcroft, 1949 AIR 8/1767, Vemork, Norway: SOE attack on heavy water plant, 1943 CAB 98/47, Tube Alloys Consultative Council, 1941-1945 CAB 126/146, Decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan, 29th March 1944-31st March 1947 CAB 126/171, Heavy water (deuterium oxide): general file. Includes report of operations against the Norsk Hydro plant at Vemork in Norway and return of heavy water to Professor Joliot- Curie, 19th November 1942-8th August 1954 CAB 126/183, The Hyde Park Memorandum, Sept. 1944 (agreement between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill on control and use of the atomic bomb) Provision of a copy for the U.S archives, 25th March 1945-17th February 1947 CAB 126/209, Reactions of scientists to the atomic bomb: Atomic Scientists Association, 29th May 1946-9th April 1948 CAB 127/18, Correspondence with Lord Cherwell and others on Bacteriological warfare, August 1941- April 1944 FO 371/81734, Interrogation of Dr. Fuchs by the FBI: United States request to be allowed to interrogate Dr. Fuchs in prison; United Kingdom agreement subject to certain conditions, 1950 143 FO 371/82902, Arrest and conviction of Dr. Fuchs on charges of spying for Russia; American reactions; copies of confessions for U.S.A and Canada; security clearances of Mr Eaton and his staff, 1950 FO 371/82903, Arrest and conviction of Dr. Fuchs on charges of spying for Russia; American reactions; copies of confessions for U.S.A and Canada; security clearances of Mr Eaton and his staff, 1950 FO 371/93222, Anglo-U.S discussions on ways to combat atomic security leaks following the cases of Pontecorvo, Fuchs, Professor Infeld and Dr. Burhop, 1951 FO 371/93223, Anglo-U.S discussions on ways to combat atomic security leaks following the cases of Pontecorvo, Fuchs, Professor Infeld and Dr. Burhop, 1951 FO 954/9A, France: President to Prime Minister, No. 649, French Provisional Government should not take part in next Big Three Conference, 19/11/44 KV 2/1245, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs: German/British, Security Service file, 1st January 1938- 31st December 1949 KV 2/1246, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs: German/British, Security Service file, 1st January 1949- 31st December 1949 KV 2/1247, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs: German/British, Security Service file, 1st January 1949- 31st December 1949 KV 2/1259, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs: German/British, Security Service file, 1st January 1952- 31st December 1953 KV 2/1270, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs: German/British, Security Service file, 1st January 1950- 31st December 1950 KV 2/2209, Alan Nunn May: British. Security Service file, 1st January 1937-31st December 1945 KV 2/2226, Alan Nunn May: British. Security Service file, 1st January 45-31st December 1951 KV 2/2421, Otto Robert Frisch: British. Security Service file, 1st January 1940-31st December 1954 KV 2/2422, Hans Heinrich Halban: French. Security Service file, 1st January 1944-31st December 1955 KV 2/2589, Lew Kowarski: French. Special Branch note 29/4/48, Security Service file, 1st January 1940-31st December 1950 144 KV 2/2589, Lew Kowarski. French. Departure 45a, 22/1/47, Security Service file, 1st January 1940-31st December 1950 KV 2/2590, Lew Kowarski: French. Security Service file, 1st January 1940-31st December 1952 KV 2/2591, Lew Kowarski: French. Security Service file, 1st January 1952-31st December 1955 KV 2/2592, Jules Gueron: French. Security Service file, 1st January 1940-31st December 1953 PREM 3/139/2, Tube Alloys Declaration of Trust, March-June 1944 PREM 3/139/4, Tube Alloys: Operation against heavy water plant in Norway, May 1945 PREM 3/139/11B, Tube Alloys, 1944 PREM 8/1279, Exposure of Dr. Klaus Fuchs: correspondence with the Security Service Published Secondary Sources Books Alperovitz, G Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, London, Secker and Warburg, 1966 Alperovitz, G The decision to use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth, London, Fontana, 1996 Bernstein, J Hitler’s Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall, New York, American Institute of Physics, 1996 Bertin, L Atom Harvest, London, Secker and Warburg, 1955 Bickel, L The Deadly Element: The Story of Uranium, London, Macmillan, 1980 Bird, K and Sherwin, M. J American Prometheus: the triumph and tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer, New York, Vintage Books, 2006 Blackett, P. M. S Political and Military Consequences of Atomic Energy, London, Turnstile Press, 1948 Blake, R and Louis, W R (Ed.) Churchill, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993 Brown, A The Neutron and the Bomb: An Autobiography of Sir James Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997 Burchett, W Shadows of Hiroshima, London, Verso, 1983 Byrnes, J.
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