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I Atomic Energy of Canada Limited EXPERIENCE with ZIRCONIUM-ALLOY PRESSURE TUBES

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I Atomic Energy of Canada Limited EXPERIENCE with ZIRCONIUM-ALLOY PRESSURE TUBES I 1 Atomic Energy of Canada Limited EXPERIENCE WITH ZIRCONIUM-ALLOY PRESSURE TUBES by P.A. ROSS-ROSS, W. EVANS and W.J. LANGFORD Presented at the HI Inter-American Conference on Materials Technology Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 14-17, 1972 Chalk River, Ontario August 1972 AECL-4262, EXPERIENCE WITH ZIRCONIUM-ALLOY PRESSURE TUBES1 by P.A. Ross-Ross, VV, Evans and W.J. Langford ABSTRACT Pressure tubes, which contain the fuel and coolant, are the pressure vessels of tin- Canadian designed CANDU nuclear reactor. A power reactor basically consists of a large number of identical pressure tuoe assemblies. Zirconium alloys are used as tube material because of their good strength, good corrosion resistance, and low neutron absorption. The advantages of the pressure tube include simplicity of design, ease of fabrication, and development of inspection and testing methods with low investment costs. Because pressure tubes are relatively small, prototype lubes can be irradiated at full power raactor conditions in the test reactors. Their behaviour is monitored periodically and finally they are removed for destructive evaluations. The results from strength, corrosion and other evaluations are applied to the design of tubes for power reactors, and to an assessment of their safety. In-reactor creep tests showed that creep was enhanced by fast neutron flux, but also provided the information the designer needs to accommodate creep deformation. This paper briefly describes the Canadian experience with pressure tubes. Of major importance has been the tube irradiation program, which has provided the information and confidence needed to proceed with an ever expanding power reactor program. 1 Presented at the III Inter-American Conference on Materials Technology, Rio do Janeiro, Brazil, August 14-17, 1972. Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories Chalk River, Ontario August, 1972 AKCL-1262 Experience acquise avec les tubes de force en alliage de zirconium' par P.A. Ross-Ross, W. Evans et W.J. Langford Resume Les tubes de force qui contiennent le combustible et le caloporteur sont les cuves sous pression des reacteurs de la filifire CANDU. Le reacteur de puissance de type canadien est constitue, essentiellement, par un grand nombre de tubes de force identiques. Ces tubes sont fabriques en alliages de zirconium parce que ceux-ci om, entre autres, les proprietes suivantes: solidite; bonne resistance a ia corrosion et faible absorption des neutrons. Les tubes de force ont, entre autres, les avantages suivants: simplkite de conception, fabrication aisee, methodes d'essai de l'inspection n'entrafnant pas de grandes depenses en immobilisation. Du fait que les tubes de force sont relativement petits, leurs prototypes peuvent etre irradies, en reacteur d'essai, dans les conditions reelles des reacteurs de puissance. Leur comportement est verifie periodiquement et finalement on leur fait subir des essais destructifs. Les resultats obtenus dans les essais (solidite, corrosion, etc.) sont employes dans la conception c!es tubes destines aux reacteurs de puissance, ce qui permet d'evaluer leur fiabilite. Des essais en reacteur ont montre que les flux de neutrons rapides aggravent le fluage des metaux. Les renseignements ainsi obtenus permettent a l'ingenieur-concepteur de prevoir les deformations dues au fluage. On decrit dans le present rapport, l'experience ^cquise, au Canada, avec ies tubes de force. Le programme d'irradiation de ces tubes a joue un role de premier plan dans le developpement sans cesse grandissant du programme electronucleaire canadien. Communication presentee au Troisieme Congres interamericain sur la technologie des materiau:-: (Rio de Janeiro, Bresil, 14—17 aout 1972). L'Energie Atomiquedu Canada, Limitee Laboratories Nucleaires de Chalk River Chalk River, Ontario aout, 1972 AECL-4262 INTRODUCTION tube and is joined to the steel end-fittings. A cut-away of the Pickering power reactor, which has Pressure tubes are the pressure vessels of Canadian 390 fuel channels, is shown in Figure 2. designed CANDU (Canada Deuterium Umnium) nuclear reactors. They are about 10 cm in diameter, 0.3 to 0.5 cm thick by 6 m long and contain the fuel and cooling water operating at about 9.6 MN/m2 (1400 psi) and 300°C. A power reactor basically consists of many identical pressure tube assemblies. The Nuclear Power Demonstration reactor (NPD), the first CANDU reactor, was originally designed with a steel pressure vessel. In 1956, however, the design was changed to that of a pressure tube reactor, so that future CANDU reactors would not be restricted in size by the technological limitations of large steel pressure vessels. Since then we have come to appreciate the many other benefits, in design, manufacture, and safety, associated with the relatively small and very simple pressure vessel. Of major importance has been Canada's ability to gain experience by the irradiation of pressure tubes at full power reactor conditions in the test reactors [lj. Tube irradiations and evaluations have provided the information and confidence needed to proceed with an ever expanding power reactor program. THE PRESSURE TUBE REACTOR INQ SHI11O COO I \HD JMIIlO IIT 111 The Canadian reactors are designed for good :HO« fiA'i I StflllC "HO neutron economy; they use heavy water as moderator 3 Mil MAI Mnl and neutron economic zirconium alloys in the core C*L*NDIiA mtLl II SHIlt imeiD CALAHD^IA &HIIL SHLILDS 3b Hflru** «<LAHCI UNI CO""*Ol ANO SMUIOfi «ODi IT D,O OUtili [ 2,3]. We were fortunate chat practical zirconium I D,O 5'ttr C3OIIMC )l HtltUM PUIOt AND HtllU* l*l*HCf AND tUI»l[« i'Hli alloys were developed just in time to be exploited in ItOV OFf L1NIS IV PJMT tANK IUPPOIT1 the basic design of CANDU reactors. Short fuel f t>io iHiit NOIIILS )' tmi»ii*i rAdiirt bundles [4| are moved periodically through the core Figure 2 — Reactor assembly, Pickering Generating for maximum burnup. On-power fuelling, which Station. permits optimized fuel handling and long periods of Eleven pov/er reactor., with a total capacity of continuous full power operation, is facilitated by the 5475 MWe are operating or are being built in Canada. pressure tube concept. Table I gives design data relevant to these reactors. Figure 1 is a schematic of a fuel channel showing There is one Canadian designed reactor operating in the pressure tube that passes through the calandiia Pakistan (KANUPP - 125 MWe). Two reactors of Canadian design (similar to Douglas Point) are being built by India. The first is scheduled to begin operation in late 1972 (RAP.^ 200 MWe). A third and fourth reactor are being designed and built by India. One advantage of the pressure tube design is its adaptability. The Pressurized Heavy-Water (PHW) K; f reactors of Table I have horizontal channels and fuelling is done from both ends. Final assembly is Figure 1 — Schematic of a fuel channel for a CANDU done at-site. In the Boiling Light-Water (BLW) reactor, the channel is vertical; there is single ended reactor with piessurized water coolant. -1- to an inner diameter of approximately 10 cm. The TABLE I I)KS1C;N UATA KELH AN I TO PKtSSl UK ITBKS 1\ lAMJL HLACTUI1S hollow billets are usually clad in copper, or steel NPIl I pickKint and copper, depending on the extrusion temperature within the range 650-850°C. Copper improves the fc J PIIW HLW L'ooluni • HW" i extrudability of the billets and prevents excessive lli-d.l..r [...I,, r irsl ¥.<* W! ].'7J oxidation, while the steel prevents alloying of zir- <•"•-""• conium and copper at high extrusion temperatures. UN , v™,p. <• •2711 The extrusions are chemically declad and abrasively cleaned. Strength is developed either by cold crawing lr,,,m.l DiiimrK.r about 20% [6], or by quenching from 880°C and Wall 1 h aging at 500°C [7]. During extrusion, the hexagonal zirconium develops strong crystallographic textures [8], which car. be controlled by the fabrication schedule. l>t".!|;ii Sin-i I'-1 PRESSURE TUBE PROPERTIES [.udirc huh The strength properties of zirconium allo- are anisotropic, i.e., they differ in the three principal directions according to the crystallographic texture, which depends on fabrication history. Typical tube properties are listed in Table II [9]. •rki-d /.r l!.:i wi ; Mi. .•uUtl Zr-11.5 wt; Mb. TABLE II. PRESSURE TUBE PROPERTIES AT 300"C fuelling, and th-^ channel is shop assembled. In both Matt-rial Testa 0.2% Yield Ultimate Burst Elongation Reductinn Strength Tensile Strength |%) in Area designs, the pressure tubes can be identical with only psi Strength psi the end-fittings different. (MN/.n;) (MN/mJ) (MN;m!) The first material to be used for pressure tubes was LT •15,000 5-1,000 26 55 Zircaloy-2, an alloy of Zr—1.5 wt% Sn with small 13101 1372) TT 50,000 52,000 •u 54 additions of iron, nickel and chromium [5J. 13-151 Zircaloy-2 is also extensively used as fuel sheathing B 611.01)0 C3.000 28 35 and core structural components in many reactor 14111 (435) systems. However, Canada's interest in neutron Cold-Worked LT 53,000 76,000 15 50 /r 2 5 wt'. Nb |3«5| (524) economy led to the development of the stronger TT 77.000 81,000 23 54 Zr—2.5 wt% Nb alloy; tubes in the cold-worked [6J 1530) (559) and in the heat-treated [7j conditions have been used U 75.000 85.000 3-7 30 in CANDU power reactors. 1517) (585| MealTreated LT 69,000 86,000 19 61 Zr-2.5»-f; Nb (475| (5931 FABRICATION OF PRESSURE TUBES TT 95,000 98.000 12 50 (655| 1675) The zirconium-alloy pressure tube is of simple B 92,000 109,000 2-5 20 shape, thin section, and homogeneous; the fabrica'ion (635) (7511 process is repetitive and subject to close control by " Ai)breviat:onr, -LI IonsiLudinal tensile;TV.
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