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When Friends Let Friends Go Nuclear: What America’S Learned

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When Friends Let Friends Go Nuclear: What America’S Learned WHEN FRIENDS LET FRIENDS GO NUCLEAR: WHAT AMERICA’S LEARNED By Zachary Keck Sponsored by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center 1600 Wilson Blvd., Suite 640 Arlington, VA 22209 December 2020 Table of Contents: Chapter 1-- Introduction: 1 Part I—Allies: 25 Chapter 2—Ultimate Betrayal (Britain, 1939-1946): 26 Chapter 3—Stuck in the Mud (Britain, 1947-1955): 41 Chapter 4: Full Cooperation at Last (Britain, 1956-1962): 53 Chapter 5: A Bomb is Born (France, 1945-1960): 65 Chapter 6: Chapter 6: The General’s Bomb (France, 1961-1975): 78 Part I: Partners: 101 Chapter 7: A Nuclear Cat and Mouse (Israel, 1950s-1963): 102 Chapter 8: Chapter 8: Dirty, Little Nuclear Secret (Israel, 1963-1979): 119 Chapter 9: The Bomb From Hell (Pakistan, 1973-1990): 144 Chapter 10: Pandora’s Box (Pakistan, 1990-Present): 163 Chapter 11: Conclusion: 189 Words Without Footnotes (84,188) Words with Footnotes (101,199) Chapter 1: Introduction How does allied proliferation impact U.S. national security? This question preoccupied U.S. officials during much of the Cold War, when numerous allies and partners considered acquiring the bomb. In the immediate post-Cold War era, its importance has diminished. Most friendly countries that once considered nuclear weapons abandoned these ambitions. The few that hadn’t, such as Israel and Pakistan, already acquired the bomb by 1991. Thus, the proliferation concerns of the first two decades after the Cold War mainly revolved around small, hostile nations like North Korea, Iran, and Libya. This has begun to change. Saudi Arabia is pursuing the capabilities to build its own nuclear weapons, and its leaders have openly threatened to do so if Iran goes nuclear. President Kennedy was consumed by fears the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would acquire nuclear weapons, and preventing that outcome was one of America’s greatest nonproliferation successes. This achievement is now in jeopardy as Germany openly questions its nuclear abstinence.1 Periodic polls out of South Korea show strong public support for acquiring nuclear weapons. Although most South Korean political leaders haven’t endorsed this position, there have been calls for Washington to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the Peninsula. Moreover, Seoul continues to push Washington to allow it to produce its own fissile material. Turkey and Egypt are also increasingly flirting with nuclear programs that make no economic sense. Although many claim Japan has a nuclear allergy owing to the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a rapidly deteriorating security situation has led Tokyo to consider revising its Pacifist constitution. It’s hardly unthinkable that Japan may eventually decide that rearmament should include a nuclear element, especially if China seizes the Senkaku Islands or Taiwan. If Tokyo did make this decision, no country is better prepared to rapidly build nuclear weapons. In Brazil, the president’s son, a member of Congress himself, has advocated for building nuclear weapons. Like Japan, Brazil’s existing nuclear infrastructure would make this a relatively simple enterprise.2 If U.S. policymakers are going to properly deal with allies’ nuclear ambitions, they need to understand how allied proliferations impacts U.S. security. There has long been a debate on this issue among pundits and scholars. While this debate has generated a lot of claims, these are almost entirely based on theory. Their propositions have not been tested against the historical record. This book seeks to correct this by seeing how the four cases of allies and partners acquiring nuclear weapons actually impacted the United States. The cases make clear that allied proliferation doesn’t allow the United States to reduce its overseas commitments; instead, it often 1 Christian Hacke, "Why Germany Should Get the Bomb," The National Interest, August 12, 2018 and Tristan Volpe & Ulrich Kühn, "Germany's Nuclear Education: Why a Few Elites Are Testing a Taboo," The Washington Quarterly, Number 40, Issue 3 (2017). 2 Richard Mann, “Eduardo Bolsonaro Defends Possession of Nuclear Weapons,” The Rio Times, May 15, 2019. 1 makes it more difficult for America to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The ways that this occurs, however, is different from what those who oppose allied proliferation anticipate. This chapter begins by reviewing the current literature on the topic. This debate can be broken into three separate camps: optimists, relativists, and pessimists. The optimists argue that allied proliferation will allow America to reduce its overseas commitments and avoid getting entangled in unnecessary wars. The relativists oppose allied proliferation but ultimately believe other geopolitical issues should receive priority. The pessimists oppose nuclear proliferation, arguing it will lead to nuclear dominos and allies becoming more autonomous. This latter issue, they insist, could entangle the United States into wars it doesn’t want to fight. After the reviewing the current debate, the second section discusses how a stronger reliance on history could better inform policymakers grappling with these issues. The third section outlines the major conclusions from the four case studies in the book. Specifically, the case studies make clear that allied proliferation doesn’t allow the United States to reduce its overseas commitments. In some cases, the opposite occurs. At the same time, friendly states acquiring the bomb makes it more difficult for America to achieve its objectives overseas. The relativists’ argument that America should prioritize geopolitics over nonproliferation is also not supported. In many cases, allied proliferation and geopolitics are far too interwoven to be compartmentalized. There is no evidence from the case studies that allied proliferation causes nuclear dominos to fall, but it does contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons in other ways. On the other hand, there is some evidence to support the pessimists’ concerns that acquiring nuclear weapons leads allies to act more independently of the United States. The fourth section discusses how the lessons from previous cases could apply to future ones. Finally, this chapter outlines how the rest of the book is organized. I. Literature Review Bombs for Peace? The debate over the impact of the spread of nuclear weapons can really be divided into two separate questions. The first is whether nuclear proliferation enhances global peace. Building off the arguments made by the French finite deterrence proponents, the eminent international relations scholar, Kenneth Waltz, popularized the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons reduces the chances of war. Since the costs of attacking a state with a secure, second strike nuclear capability overwhelmingly outweighs any prospective gains, and retaliation is so certain, no nuclear-armed country would start a total war with a nuclear-armed peer. Many other scholars followed Waltz’s proliferation optimism, with others—whom Peter Lavoy labels “proliferation relativist”— more circumspect in their arguments. For instance, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and 2 William. H. Riker argue that in certain cases the spread of nuclear weapons enhances peace, but unlike Waltz don’t claim more is always better.3 Stanford University’s Scott Sagan provided the most thorough challenge to Waltz. Just as Albert Wohlstetter countered the arguments of the finite deterrence proponents, Sagan put forth a number of reasons why Waltz’s arguments would not translate to the real world. In particular, he used organizational theory to demonstrate that military organizations, like other bureaucracies, would not act as coolly rational as Waltz’s arguments required. For instance, military organizations might not build large enough arsenals to deter surprise first strikes or invest in the safety features necessary to prevent unauthorized launches.4 Allied Proliferation The second question about the impact of nuclear proliferation is how it impacts the United States. This book is particularly focused on the effects of allies and partners acquiring nuclear weapons. This debate divides on similar lines as the previous question, with proliferation optimists, relativists, and pessimists. At certain moments, including after China conducted its first nuclear test, some parts of the U.S. government favored allies and partners getting nuclear weapons.5 Ultimately, Washington decided to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to both friends and foes, although other interests sometimes took precedence. The debate is now back in vogue, with many security analysts arguing that U.S. allies and partners acquiring nuclear weapons would be beneficial for America. For the most part, they make two arguments. First, if allies acquired nuclear weapons, they would be able to protect themselves, allowing the U.S. to reduce its defense spending and overseas commitments.6 Second, and relatedly, if allies could protect themselves, America wouldn’t risk getting entangled in unnecessary wars.7 3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William. H. Riker, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982) and Peter R. Lavoy, "The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1995). Also see, John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1993) and Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91). 4 Scott D. Sagan in "More Will Be Worse," The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), pp. 46-87. Also see, Peter D. Feaver, "Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995): pp. 754-72; Stephen R. David, "Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 773-78; and Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993), among many others. Wohlstetter’s arguments are captured in Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country," Foreign Affairs, (April 1961) 5 Masakatsu Ota, "U.S.
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