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The American Papers Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973

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The American Papers Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973 THE AMERICAN PAPERS SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL INDIA-PAKISTAN-BANGLADESH DOCUMENTS 1965-1973 COMPILED AND SELECTED BY ROEDADKHAN INTRODUCTION BY JAMSHEED MARKER OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Contents Preface xxiii Acknowledgements xxv Introduction xxvii 1965 1. Highlights of Foreign Minister Bhutto's Conversation with McConaughy on Rann of Kutch. 30 April 1965. 3 2. Indo-Pakistan Conflict: Information Memorandum. 30 April 1965. 6 3. Pakistan's Response to Wilson's Request for an Immediate Ceasefire: Correction. 30 April 1965. 8 4. Provocative Indian Overflight: Asghar Khan's Information. 15 May 1965. 9 5. Meeting with Ambassador Bowles: Briefing Memorandum. 2 June 1965. 11 (i) Summary of Bowles Memorandum on United State's Policy in South East Asia. 1 June 1965. 12 (ii) US Ambassador Chester Bowles Letter to the US Under Secretary of State, George W Ball. 21 May 1965. 14 6. Ambassador Bowles Telegram from American Embassy in New Delhi: Indian Military and Political Objectives Unclear. 6 September 1965. 15 7. McConaughy's Meeting with President Ayub and Foreign Minister Bhutto. 6 September 1965. [5 Documents Partial Accounts] 17 8. Telegram from American Embassy in Karachi on how USG should respond to GOP's request for Action. 6 September 1965. 19 9. MAAG Chief Contacts General Musa. 6 September 1965. 21 10. Kashmir: Comment on GOP's Mood. 7 September 1965. 32 11. McConaughy's Meeting with Ayub. 7 September 1965. 35 12. Message from Shoaib. 7 September 1965. 37 13. GOP's Request for Help: Shah's Briefing. 8 September 1965. 38 14. Memorandum of Conversation: Indo-Pakistan Dispute. 8 September 1965. 40 Vlli CONTENTS 15. Indo-Pakistan Conflict: Partial Accounts of UK and Canadian High Commissioners talks with Ayub and Bhutto. 8 September 1965. 43 16. McConaughy's Meeting with Bhutto on GOP's Request. 9 September 1965. [2 Documents]. 45 17. GOP Proposal for Settlement of Indo-Pak Conflict. 9 September 1965. 48 18. Dean Rusk's Memorandum for the US President: India-Pakistan. 9 September 1965. 53 19. Suspension of Military Aid and Shipments to Pakistan and India: Bhutto Informed. 10 September 1965. [2 Documents Partial Accounts]. 55 20. Suspension of Military Aid: Full Account of McConaughy's Meeting with Bhutto. [3 Documents]. 10 September 1965. 58 21. Situation in Karachi. 10 September 1965. 68 22. Afghan Support for Pakistan. 11 September 1965. 69 23. GOP Proposal for Settlement of Indo-Pak conflict. 11 September 1965. 70 24. Private Meeting with Shoaib: Indo-Pak Crisis. 19 September 1965. 73 25. Reflections from Dacca on Indo-Pakistan Hostilities. 23 September 1965. 74 26. Ceasefire: Public Attitudes. 26 September 1965. 76 27. Altaf Gauhar on the Third Option in Kashmir Dispute. 7 October 1965. - 77 28. (i) Confidential Memo from American Friends Service Committee. 1 November 1965. 78 1966 1. Indo-Pak Views on the Tashkent Meeting. 1 January 1966. 93 2. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi's Analysis of the Tashkent Agreement. 6 January 1966. 96 3. Finance Minister Shoaib's Analysis of the Current Political Atmosphere. 8 January 1966. 98 4. Law Minister and Acting Foreign Minister's Views on Tashkent Agreement. 12 January 1966. 100 5. Foreign Minister's Report on Tashkent Conference. 13 January 1966. [2 Documents]. 103 6. Tashkent Aftermath. 13 January 1966. 108 7. The US Vice-President and Secretary of State's Meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, Nanda. 13 January 1966. 109 8. The Vice President and Secretary of States' Meeting with L.K. Jha. 13 January 1966. Ill CONTENTS IX 9. Ayub Report to Cabinet Members on Tashkent Talks: Shoaib's Account. 13 January 1966. 113 10. Tashkent Reaction. 15 January 1966. 115 11. Outgoing Telegram on Ayub's US Visit. 17 January 1966. 117 12. Dacca rumours: Serious Political Trouble in West Pakistan. 17 January 1966. 118 13. Bhutto on Tashkent. 17 January 1966. 119 14. Military Displeased with Tashkent. 18 January 1966. 120 15. Tashkent Reaction: PAF. 18 January 1966. 121 16. McConaughy's Meeting with the Opposition Leader Nurul Amin. 18 January 1966. 123 17. Indo-Pakistan Relations: British Messages. 20 January 1966. 125 18. Tashkent: Karachi Press Indications. 20 January 1966. 126 19. Press Report: Correction. 21 January 1966. 128 20. India and Pakistan: Next Step in US Policy. 1 February 1966. 129 (i) Scenario for Pakistan 130 (ii) Scenario for India 134 21. Sidelights on Tashkent Meeting. 1 February 1966. 139 22. Rumours about Cabinet Reshuffle: Ayub's Denial. 5 February 1966. 143 23. Text of Ayub's Letter to the US President. 5 February 1966. 144 24. Tashkent Reaction: GOP officials report to US Ambassador & other Embassy officials. 7 February 1966. 146 25. Information Secretary Altaf Gauhar's Review on Tashkent reactions and Resumption of US Bombing in Vietnam. 7 February 1966. [2 Documents]. 149 26. Finance Minister Shoaib's Reports on Pak Tashkent Reaction and Bhutto's Position. 7 February 1966. 153 27. Anti-Indian Propaganda. 31 May 1966. 155 28. Governor Kalabagh on Pak-Indian Relations and Kashmir. 17 June 1966. 157 29. David Linebaugh's Letter to Gordon Schull: Memorandum on Kashmir. 29 July 1966. 158 (i) Implications of a Unilateral Indian Settlement of The Kashmir Issue, with Concessions to Pakistan Outside the Vale: A Exploratory Memorandum. 159 30. Indo-Pakistan Relations: Memorandum of Conversation. 19 August 1966. 163 (i) Note to High Commissioner of India in Islamabad. 168 (ii) Indian High Commissioner's Note to Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Yusuf. 169 (iii) Detail of Pakistan Army build up in Pakistan. 170 (iv) Build up of Pakistan Army, Air Force and Navy 171 (v) Major Military Hardware by Pakistan. 173 X CONTENTS 31. Jammu and Kashmir: A Year After the September Conflict. 16 September 1966. 174 32. Memorandum of Conversation with New Indian Ambassador Kewal Singh. 20 September 1966. 182 (i) Memorandum of Conversation. 13 September 1966. 183 (ii) New Indian Ambassador Arrives. 30 August 1966. 185 33. Attitudes of Pakistan Military Officers in the East Wing. 23 September 1966. 186 34. Indo-Pakistan Relations. Memorandum of Conversation. 30 September 1966. 188 (i) "Working Paper" on Indo-Pakistan talks. 190 35. Conversation with General Manekshaw. 15 October 1966. 192 (i) Memorandum of Conversation. 193 36. Bhutto Making Opening Bid? 25 November 1966. 196 37. Indo-Pak-US Political and Military Relations. 16 December 1966. 197 38. Foreign Minister Pirzada's Reference to Indian Hardline on Kashmir. 16 December 1966. 199 (i) K.C. Saxena's Book: Foreword. 23 March 1966. 201 39. Indo-Pak Relations: Ambassador Locke's Meeting with Foreign Secretary S.M. Yusuf. 17 December 1966. 202 40. Indo-Pak Relations: Belonia Firing. 17 December 1966. 205 41. Indo-Pak Relations: Memorandum of Conversation. 23 December 1966. 206 (i) Implementation of Tashkent Declaration. 207 1967 1. Meeting with Information Secretary, Altaf Gauhar. 11 January 1967. 213 2: Bhutto's Present Outlook. Memorandum of Conversation. 26 April 1967. 214 3. Letter from Norman B. Hannah to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 3 May 1967. 218 (i) Memorandum for Mr. Walt W. Rostow: Letter to the President from Ambassador Eugene A. Locke. 9 May 1967. 219 (ii) Letter to the US President from Ambassador Eugene A Locke. 1 May 1967. 220 4. Extraordinary Personnel Action Request. 19 May 1967. 228 5. Memorandum of Conversation between Makhdumzada Syed Hasan Mahmud Shah and American Consul-in-Charge, Craig Baxter. 31 July 1967. 229 CONTENTS Xi 6. Memorandum of Conversation between Syed Hadi Shah Bokhari, former Mayor of Lahore and Craig Baxter. 4 August 1967. 231 7. EBDONIANS: Views of Hasan Mahmud and Hadi Ali Shah of Qazilbash Camp. 11 August 1967. 233 8. Bhutto Visits East Pakistan — A Political Foray. 7 November 1967. 235 9. East Pakistan: Dacca Author Requests US Support for Bengali Coup Plot. 28 November 1967. 239 10. Abortive Coup — Assassination Plot: Dacca. 28 December 1967. 243 1968 1. Arrests of Three Prominent Bengali Officers. 6 January 1968. 247 2. An Exercise in Conspiracy: A Resume. 12 March 1968. 248 3. East Pakistan: Memorandum of Conversation on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman role in the Agartala Conspiracy. 10 July 1968. 250 4. President Johnson's Letter to President Ayub. 14 July 1968. 251 5. Trial of Alleged Conspirators in East Pakistan Tarnishing Government Image. 7 August 1968. 253 6. Mahmood Haroon to London? 27 September 1968. 254 7. Reactions to Bhutto's Arrest and Asghar Khan's entry into Politics. 25 November 1968. 257 8. Reactions in Karachi Consular District to Bhutto's Arrest. 29 November 1968. 259 1969 1. Pakistan: Martial Law 'Who's Who'. 26 March 1969. 265 2. Message from Chief Martial Law Administrator to President Nixon. 27 March 1969. 267 3. A.K. Brohi's Comments on Martial Law. 1 April 1969. 269 (i) Memorandum of Conversation. 31 March 1969. 270 4. Belief that Yusuf Haroon is US Agent. 28 May 1969. 272 5. UK Deputy High Commissioner's View of East Pakistan's Future. 9 June 1969. 274 6. Meeting with President Yahya. 10 June 1969. 276 7. Yahya's 'Documents'. 20 June 1969. 277 8. Amir Ahmed Khan a CIA Agent? 3 July 1969. 279 9. Memorandum of Conversation with Pir Pagara. 22 August 1969. 280 (i) Memorandum of Conversation. 20 August 1969. 281 10. Memorandum of Conversation with J.A. Rahim. 29 August 1969. 283 (i) Memorandum of Conversation. 27 August 1969. 284 Xil CONTENTS 11. The US Secretary's Conversation with Pakistan Minister of Information and National Affairs. 30 September 1969. 286 12. Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Comments. 24 October 1969. 290 13. Current Pakistani Scene—Comment. 7 November 1969. 293 14. Current Pakistani Scene—Constituent Post Assessments. 14 November 1969. 298 1970 1. Pakistan Muslim League—Second Coming? 6 January 1970.
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