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Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan. Riffat, Sardar University of Massachusetts Amherst

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Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan. Riffat, Sardar University of Massachusetts Amherst University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1985 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan. Riffat, Sardar University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Sardar, Riffat,, "Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan." (1985). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1865. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1865 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IblPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN A Dissertation Presented By RIFFAT SARDAR Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY September, 1985 Political Science Copyright Riffat Sardar All Rights Reserved ii SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN A Dissertation Presented By RIFFAT SARDAR Approved as to style and content by: Anwar H. Syed, Chairperson of Committee Karl W. Ryavec, Member of Committee Surinder Mehta, Member of Committee iii Dedicated to My Dear Mummy, Sajida Begum iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Anwar Syed. I benefited immensely from his knowledge, and wisdom. His guidance, advice, and constructive criticism helped me in the production of this work. His continuous support made my experience as a student at this university a pleasant and memorable one. I will forever remain indebted to him for his kindness. And, for those times when he gently had to put his foot down, I know it was for my own benefit and for the promotion of competent scholarship. I would also like to express my appreciation to Professor Houn, Professor King, Professor Braunthal, Professor Fleiss, and Professor Shanley. The courses that I took with them extended my knowledge. I would like to thank Professor Ryvec of the Political Science Department, and Professor Mehta of the Sociology Department for reading my dissertation and providing suggestions for improvement. I want to thank the Campus Center, the Student Security Office, and the Housing Assignment Office, for hiring me on their student positions, and training me in preparation for facing the real world! Finally, I do not think I would have made it without the moral support of my friends and family here and back home. Thank you very much to all of you. V ABSTRACT Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan And its Implications for Pakistan September 1985 Riffat Sardar, B.A., University of Peshawar M.A., University of Peshawar Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Directed by: Professor Anwar H. Syed This study investigates whether the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a threat to Pakistan, and how it affects Pakistan's relations with both its neighbours and extra-regional powers. The immediate problem, from the Pakistani point of view, is that the existence of a communist regime in Kabul, and Soviet military actions to sustain it in the face of domestic opposition, have caused the Afghan refugees to come into Pakistan. The problem from the Soviet-Afghan perspective is that the insurgents use Pakistani territory for launching attacks on Soviet-Afghan forces inside Afghanistan and that Pakistan serves, with or without its government's consent, as a conduit for the supply of weapons and funds to the insurgents. The Soviets are poised for an extended stay in Afghanistan. The to cost of their operations in Afghanistan is not high enough for them They may abandon the strategic gains they have made in Afghanistan. vi withdraw but they will make sure that they leave behind a regime which is responsive to their wishes. The prospects of the Geneva talks do not look very promising. The Afghan refugees in Pakistan will perhaps never go back. This refugee problem has become a permanent problem with which Pakistan must learn to live. The Muslim countries were not able to take any concrete actions which could move the Soviets out of Afghanistan. The dimensions of American interests in Pakistan are modest. The US will continue to assist Pakistan and the Mujahideen to resist the Soviet-Afghan coercion as long as, and to the extent, they can. The Afghan crisis has given Pakistan a reason to normalize its relations with India, and it offered to sign a no-war pact with India. The Zia regime could not bring the Afghan crisis, and the problems it has generated, much closer to a solution. A regime which is not popular at home cannot deal effectively with external crisis. vii LIST OF TABLES 1 . Soviet Financial Aid to Afghanistan as of June 1959 55 2. US Economic Loans And Grants to Afghanistan 59 3. Communist Economic Credits and Grants to Afghanistan 60 4. Afghan Military Personnel Trianed in Communist Countries 5-1 5. Communist Military Technicians in Afghanistan 61 6. Communist Economic Technicians in Afghanistan 62 7. UN General Assembly Vote on the Afghan Resolution 199 8. UNHCR Estimated Requirement 230 9. UNHCR Expenditure in Pakistan 231 10. Analysis of UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1983 in Pakistan 232 11. Analysis of UNHCR Activities in 1983 in Pakistan 233 12. Profile of Selected Refugee Camps in NWFP 234 13. Ethnic Groups in Jalozia Refugee Camp 235 14. Ethnic Groups in Azakhel Refugee Camp 236 15. Ethnic Groups in Gandaf Refugee Camp 237 16. Ethnic Groups in Tindo Refugee Camp 238 17. Ethnic Groups in Mera Bara Kai Refugee Camp 239 18. Ethnic Groups in Bada ber Refugee Camp 240 viii Map of Pakistan TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ^ ABSTRACT LIST OF TABLES viii MAP OF PAKISTAN ix CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. THE REGIONAL SETTING (1947-78) 13 Pakistan And The Soviet Union 13 Initial Barriers Towards Good Relations 14 Diplomacy of Pressure Continued 18 A Change in Attitude 22 Improved Relations 23 End of Good Relations 25 Pakistan and Afghanistan 28 Stormy Beginnings 28 Daoud's First Era — Relations at its Worst 32 Post Daoud Era — Mildness in Relations 36 Grievances and Reconciliation 38 Afghanistan, the US and USSR ^0 Background ^0 Daoud's Reversal of Afghan Policy 45 The Issue of Military Aid 48 Afghanistan's Economic Relations with US and USSR ... 52 An Assessment 63 X III COMMUNIST TAKEOVER AND THE RESISTANCE 6? Communism in Afghanistan 67 Factionalism *.*.*.*.*.*** Among Leftists 72 The 1973 Coup 73 The Saur (April) *.*.*.*.*.*.'.*.*.*.*. Revolution, I978 77 Khalq * Gaining Power Over Parcham 78 Khalq * Policy and Performance qq The Resistance 82 Government Response to Resistance 85 IV INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE AFGHAN CRISIS 90 US Response 93 India's Response 102 Muslim World Reaction IO7 The Limitations of International Opposition 117 V PAKISTAN'S REACTION CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS 102 Pakistan's Initial Reaction 121 Afghanistan Blames Pakistan 125 Pakistan Floats in Instability 129 Pakistan and the US After the Communist Takeover In Afghanistan 131 Pakistan and the USSR After the Communist Takeover 140 Pakistan and India in the Aftermath Of the Afghan Crisis 146 Background 147 The Issue of Arms 150 Talks on No-War Pact and Treaty of Friendship 152 VI POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE AFGHAN CRISIS I66 Soviet And Kabul Regime's Initiatives For a Settlement European Peace Initiatives for the Afghan Crisis 174 Organization of Islamic Conference Efforts on Negotiating A Settlement of the Afghan Issue 179 xi United Nations Efforts on the Afghan Crisis i82 VII THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN 200 The Refugees 200 UNHCR Policy of Finding Permanent Solutions 203 Relief Assistance Activities for the Refugees 208 Refugees Activities and its Effects on Pakistan 214 International Aspects of the Refugee Problem and Prospects for Solution 223 VIII CONCLUSION 241 ENDNOTES 262 BIBLIOGRAPHY 3O8 xii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In April 1978 two factions of a communist organization in Afghanistan, called the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), joined together to overthrow the regime of Sardar Mohammad Daoud, who himself had seized power in 1973 by ousting King Zahir Shah. In less than three months, the two factions — Parcham, led by Babrak Karmal, and Khalq, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki in association with Hafeezullah Amin — fell apart. Taraki and Amin emerged victorious and jailed some of their Parcham opponents. Other Parcham leaders, including Karmal, went into exile in Eastern Europe. As the Taraki regime moved to institute socialist reforms in the economic and social life of the country, many Afghans saw these as being antithetical to their Islamic faith and revolted. The revolt soon developed into a large-scale insurgency that the regime could not suppress. Partly as a result of disagreement over how to deal with the insurgency, Hafeezullah Amin, apparently without consulting the Soviet Union, staged a coup in September 1979 and ousted Taraki. His moves toward improving the internal situation and Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan and the West did not meet with Soviet approval. Moscow, it would seem, determined that Amin could not subdue the rebellion or act as a dependable Soviet ally, and decided 1 2 to put Babrak Karmal in his place. Accordingly, claiming that it had been invited by the government of Afghanistan to come into the country to help defeat the insurgents, the Soviet Union moved 85,000 combat troops into the country starting December 27, 1979. In other words, the Soviets invaded their own ally. Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal was installed as head of the communist government in Kabul. Five years have passed since the Soviet invasion, but the insurgency goes on as does the Soviet military presence.
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