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The Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine

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The Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 70 The Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine Brigadier General (Ret) Naeem Salik Salik is currently a PhD candidate at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies in the Political Science & International Relations Department at the University of Western Australia Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 71 6 The Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine Naeem Salik Preamble doctrine is the foundation on which organizational and force structures are built. It provides the guidelines for force configuration and the nature, type and number of weapons and delivery systems that would be needed to implement the doctrine. Nuclear A weapons are unique since the development of these weapons and even their first employment in war preceded any nuclear doctrine. An alternative view has been articulated by Lawrence Freedman who has argued that strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons existed in the form of the Strategic Bombing Doctrine being followed during the Second World War.1 Nuclear weapons are generally believed to be weapons of deterrence rather than weapons of war. Interestingly, however, the first use of nuclear weapons was not for the purpose of deterrence but for war termination. Basically, the dropping of nuclear bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was seen as an extension of the strategic bombing campaign. In the immediate post-war period there was a feeling of revulsion towards considering these terrible weapons as useful military instruments and no serious effort was made to incorporate nuclear weapons in the overall military strategy. Whatever, weapons were available were under the control of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and in the absence of any political guidelines it was left to the discretion of the SAC to formulate a targeting list.2 Some serious developments in the international arena such as the Berlin Crisis (1948), the first Soviet nuclear test (August 1949), victory of the Chinese Communists (October 1949), the Korean War (1950-1953) forced a rethink. The Eisenhower Administration’s New Look Policy was aimed at avoiding an economic meltdown as a result of the heavy expenditures involved in building up and maintaining large conventional forces to meet the Soviet threat to Europe and other areas of vital US interests. It was decided to exploit the advantage the US enjoyed in nuclear weapons as long as it lasted as the nuclear weapons were seen as a more cost effective option compared to the conventional forces.3 However, it was not until early 1954 when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the Massive Retaliation Doctrine.4 As the nuclear powers moved along the nuclear learning curve and the Academic debate on the issue gathered momentum the nuclear doctrines also evolved and became more sophisticated and nuanced than the massive retaliation. The doctrines however, remained dynamic continuously adjusting to the developments in technology as well as the changing nature of the relations between the two superpowers.5 1 Lawrence Freedman, ‘The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, eds. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 736. 2 Colin McInnes, “Nuclear Strategy,” in Warfare in the Twentieth Century- Theory and Practice, eds. Colin McInnes and G.D. Sheffield (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 146. 3 Freedman, ‘The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” 740. 4 Ibid. 5 McInnes, “Nuclear Strategy.” Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 72 In selecting the type of doctrine whether conventional or nuclear the freedom of choice does not lie entirely with the concerned states as they are constrained by their geography, the size of their populations, economic resources including strategic raw materials and the industrial potential. Pakistan for instance, is constrained by its geographical shape, size, location and orientation to adopt a forward defensive posture vis-a-vis India as it does not have the luxury to trade space to gain time especially due to the fact that some of its politically significant cities and strategic communication arteries lie very close to its border with India. Again in terms of adopting a nuclear posture and nuclear use doctrine Pakistan is mindful of India’s advantages in the size of conventional forces. As a natural corollary of the desire to deny India the opportunity to exploit this advantage it makes perfect sense for Pakistan to refuse to adopt a ‘no first use’ nuclear posture. Peculiarities of South Asian Nuclear Environment South Asian deterrence situation does not lend itself to an easy comparison with the traditional deterrence model that developed between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact led by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively during the Cold War years. It may be pertinent here to highlight some key characteristics of the South Asian environment which have provided the backdrop to and influenced the doctrinal development of both India and Pakistan. Some of these features are: • Unlike the US - Soviet rivalry during the Cold War years, India and Pakistan share common borders, have fought three major wars and some minor border skirmishes and have unresolved territorial disputes. • Both India and Pakistan share common borders with China, another nuclear armed state. This triangular security environment would become more complicated if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. • There is a considerable disparity in terms of area, size of population, resource base and the size of conventional as well as nuclear forces. • Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces are still evolving, and would remain vulnerable to a pre- emptive strike either with conventional or nuclear which would enhance uncertainty during a crisis situation and may lead to temptation for such a strike at least in the short term future. It would be immaterial as to whether such a strike would be efficacious or not. • India has a fairly advanced space program though it is nowhere near the real time capabilities like the US. Pakistan has also re-energized its own space effort especially with the expertise gained through a successful missile program. Pakistan can, therefore, be expected to acquire a limited space surveillance capability in the near to medium term. Despite these efforts, both countries lack real time surveillance, early warning and target acquisition capabilities at present. In the near term this lack of realm time ISR will impact not only on their employment options but could have an adverse impact on crisis stability. • The command, control, communications and intelligence infrastructure will remain susceptible to the threat of a decapitating strike given the fact that the two capitals as well as other major cities and key bases and installations are within reach of either side’s land based missiles and aircraft. This vulnerability can be very destabilizing especially during periods of heightened tensions and may give rise to pre-emptive tendencies. Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia | 73 • Both India and Pakistan are striving hard to develop an assured ‘second strike’ capability. In the short term, deterrence instability will be the likely norm in the region. • India’s well known efforts to acquire Anti- ballistic missile systems, and the strong Pakistani perception that India’s fissile material production capacity will get a boost as a consequence of the implementation of the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement, are likely to disturb the evolving strategic balance and could lead to an undesirable nuclear/missile arms race. • Contiguity of the two countries and short flight times of ballistic missiles are likely to result in hair trigger postures, and may lead to the adoption of Launch-on-Warning strategies once the respective strategic forces are operationally deployed. Due to technical deficiencies in the surveillance and early warning systems this increases the chance of launching of weapons in response to inaccurate or misinterpreted information. The need for the adoption of confidence building and restraint measures therefore. Assumes great significance. • South Asians have peculiar value systems, emotive tendencies and a proclivity for risk taking. Such tendencies coupled with politically weak governments, can create an explosive mix resulting in uncertainties of responses during crises, highlighting the need for mutually agreed and institutional risk reduction mechanisms. Absence of institutional crisis management mechanisms is likely to result in impulsive decision-making. • There is a general lack of awareness of the devastating effects of a nuclear conflict amongst the masses on both sides. This ignorance of the gravity of the situation will generate undesirable public pressure on decision makers during crises. • In Pakistan the military is fully integrated into nuclear command and control, and decision making mechanisms, while in India the armed forces are still kept out of the loop. This may create problems when they are asked to take over the operational responsibility in a crisis situation. • The non-state actors have also emerged as a factor with a considerable potential to upset the strategic stability given the tendency to hold the governments or governmental institutions culpable for the acts of individuals beyond their control. • The two sides have not adopted a common strategic lexicon and the leadership in both states have the tendency of making loose statements that may have serious repercussions because it could be easily misperceived by the other side. This kind of miscommunication could be detrimental to peace and stability in an environment already fraught with acute trust deficit.6 Development of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine Though Pakistan had the advantage of hindsight and a whole body of literature available especially on the development of US and NATO nuclear doctrines its doctrinal development lagged far behind its nuclear weapons development. Thinking on issues related to nuclear doctrine, command and control and safety and security etc was virtually non-existent until after the nuclear tests in May 1998.
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