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Canada's Nuclear Export and Non-Proliferation Policy

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Canada's Nuclear Export and Non-Proliferation Policy Atomic Middle Power: Canada’s Nuclear Export and Non-Proliferation Policy Susan Khazaeli Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Doctorate in Philosophy in Political Science School of Political Studies Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ottawa © Susan Khazaeli, Ottawa, Canada, 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................... v LIST OF ACRONYMS ......................................................................................... vii INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 2 Canada’s Nuclear Ambivalence ................................................................. 3 3 The Literature ............................................................................................. 5 4 Argument .................................................................................................... 8 5 Contribution to Scholarship ...................................................................... 15 6 Case Selection and Methodology ............................................................. 16 7 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 21 CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................. 23 A Theory oF Middle Power Nuclear Decision-making .......................................... 23 2 The Literature ........................................................................................... 25 2.1 Regime Theory .................................................................................. 25 2.2 Economic Theory .............................................................................. 29 2.3 Strategic Theory ................................................................................ 31 2.3.1 Material Power as an Independent Variable .............................. 32 2.3.2 Relationships as the Independent Variable ................................... 36 3 Insights From the Domestic Politics Literature on Demand ....................... 40 4 Towards A ‘Middle Power’ Theory ............................................................ 45 5 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 52 CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................. 55 From Manhattan to Bomarcs ............................................................................... 55 2 A Nuclear Power is born ........................................................................... 57 2.1 Explaining the Decision ..................................................................... 61 3 Post War Years......................................................................................... 64 3.1 Explaining Canada’s Post-War Program ........................................... 70 4 Why not Nuclear Weapons too? ............................................................... 73 4.1 Explaining Canada’s Nuclear Abstinence ......................................... 79 5 Indecision on Nuclear Weapons .............................................................. 86 5.1 Explaining Canada’s Nuclear Ambivalence ..................................... 105 6 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 112 CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................ 115 Fuelling a South Asian Rivalry .......................................................................... 115 2 Alternative Explanations ......................................................................... 117 3 India, 1956 – 1977 ................................................................................. 118 3.1 RAPP-I and RAPP-II ....................................................................... 128 4 Explaining Indo-Canadian Nuclear Cooperation .................................... 133 5 Pakistan, 1959 - 1977 ............................................................................. 138 6 Explaining Pakistani-Canadian Nuclear Cooperation ............................. 147 7 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 151 ii CHAPTER FOUR .............................................................................................. 153 Business Is Business, Juntas and Tyrants ........................................................ 153 2 Alternative Explanations ......................................................................... 156 3 Argentina ................................................................................................ 161 3.1 Embalse Reactor ............................................................................. 167 3.2 Atucha II .......................................................................................... 174 4 Explaining Argentine-Canadian Nuclear Cooperation ............................ 176 5 Romania ................................................................................................. 180 6 Explaining Romanian-Canadian Nuclear Cooperation ........................... 186 7 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 205 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 210 APPENDIX ........................................................................................................ 216 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 217 iii ABSTRACT This dissertation examines Canada’s nuclear export and non-proliferation policy. It demonstrates that contrary to the received wisdom on nuclear behaviour, Canada does not think ‘strategically’ in the nuclear field. I argue that while the decision-making of great powers may be straightforward in the nuclear field, non-great powers can afford to be more ambivalent and even less cautious. The focus of the dissertation is on Canada’s nuclear export decisions from the 1950s to the late 1970s. My contention is that middle powers, like Canada, are rarely influenced by military-strategic interests, but that they, nonetheless, act according to their own particular self-interests when determining whether or not to export nuclear materials and technology. In looking at Canada’s nuclear decision-making from its entry into the nuclear age until the late 1970s, the dissertation offers three findings. First, Canada does not make decisions that fit a military-strategic calculus. Second, Canada is often ambivalent in the nuclear field. I argue that Canada can afford to be ambivalent because constraints on its decision-making do not stem primarily from security concerns or existential threats but from beliefs as to what Canada should do and should be in global affairs. Finally, Canada’s nuclear export and non-proliferation policies have been defined primarily by its place – both real and imagined – in the world as a middle power. The argument rests on insights draw from liberal IR theory as well as domestic politics explanations of nuclear behaviour. My contention is that Canada’s decision-making has been influenced by domestically held beliefs and perceptions of its identity – that is, where Canada ranks on the figurative power spectrum and what values it professes in relation to other actors in the international system. My research thus makes a contribution to the literature on nuclear supply and on the broader literature on nuclear behaviour, more generally. Key Words International relations, international security, nuclear proliferation, nuclear cooperation, middle power, foreign and economic policy. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Academics like to say that a good dissertation is a done dissertation. In that, I take solace for any infelicities and oversights in this otherwise good dissertation. I would like to start by thanking my supervisor Peter Jones for his encouragement, support, and boundless patience. I would also like to recognize my committee members, Matthew Paterson and T.V. Paul. They are all exemplary scholars in their respective fields. I truly hope that my work meets their high standards. Beyond my committee, I am grateful to Adam Kochanski, Alexander Lanoszka, Daniel Stockemer, and Nicole Waintraub. Adam eased the pain of writing – or, as was more often the case, not writing – a dissertation. Thanks for all of the hysterical memories. Alex was an intellectual sparring partner at the start of this journey. He also happened to give me a kick when I needed it most. Not one to hold back criticism, Daniel was incredibly supportive as well as generous with both his time and resources. Nicole has been there through many highs and lows since I claimed her as a friend on that fateful first day of school. This endeavour would not have been possible without funding from the Simons Foundation, Global Affairs Canada, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and of course, the University of Ottawa. I am also indebted to those few anonymous individuals who were willing to spare time and answer my questions, despite the unfortunate muzzling of bureaucrats at that time. To my wonderful husband: You make me happy every single day, even when you would tease me for
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