Anglo-Arnerican Relations, 1945- 1949, the Manufacture of Atomic Weapons, and the Labour Governent of 1945

Catharine B. Grant

Submitted in partial fulnlment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts

Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada December, 1999

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Table of Contents

Abstract

Acknowledgeme~ts

htroducbon

Chapter 1 The Anglo-Arnericun "Special ReZutionsh@, '" 1945-1949 10

Chapter II The Anglo-Arnerican Atomic Relations and British A tomic 44 Decision-Making Structures

Chapter III neAtomic Bomb and the Labour Left 93

Conclusion

Appendices

Bibliography The British decision in 1947 to manufacture atomic weapons was greatly inauenced by its changed international status in the post-World War II era. Britain emerged ftom the war near economic collapse and was unable to maintain its strategic interests abroad. As relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, BritaUi increasingly relied on Amencan economic and rnilitary support. British officiais believed that British atomic capability would convince the United States that Britain was a secure political and rnilitary dyand would also allow a certain degree of British strategic independence. hglo-Amencan relations strengthened significantly in the years following the Second World War. However, the development of atomic energy/weapons became an issue of contention in the post-war relationship. Wle the United States was willing to cooperate with Bntain in the realm of basic foreign policy it was unwiiiing to cooperate with Britain in the development of atomic energy despite the fact that Britain has pioneered the project and the two nations had worked jointly on atomic energy during the war. Mer Britain was officiaIly exchded fiom participation in the Amencan atomic project in 1946, it proceeded with the developrnent of its own independent project, hoping that the United States would eventually be persuaded that Britain was worthy of fidl and equd atomic partnership. However, without American cooperation in key fields, Britain was unable to produce its own atornic bomb unnl 1952. It was ody after Bntain had successfidly tested its own bomb that the United States was willing to resume Ml atomic collaboration. The decision to manufacture a British "independent nuclear deterrent" was made by a small group of Labour ministers. The full Cabinet was not consdted and the decision was kept secret fiom Parliament for more then a year. However, when Labour M.P.s found out about the development of a British atomic bomb, there was very Iittle criticism of the govexnment's secret decision. Although the Labour party had strong traditions of socialism and even pacifism, there was littie discussion by the lefi-wing of the Labour party about the moral implications of the atomic decision for a Labour govemment. It was not until the mid-1950fs, after the advent of thenno-nuclear weapons, that the Labour lefi began to grasp the moral consequences of the atornic age and began to push the Labour party to adopt a policy of unilateral British nuclear disarmament. By examining the evolution of Anglo-Arnerican relations after 1945, the development of British atornic policy and the Labour left's reaction to this policy, this study attempts to understand why the Labour government decided to manufacture atomic weapons in 1947 and how this decision impacted the credibility of the govenunent and the Labour party as a whole. '1 would like to thank the following people for their help and support during the writing of this thesis: my supervisor, Dr, Stephen Brooke; the Social Sciences and Humanities reference staff at the Killam Library; Tma Jones and MqWyman at the Dalhousie history department; fellow graduate history students, particuiarly Sara Butler, Ruth McCleiland-Nugent, and Renee LafTerty; and finally Dominic Cardy and William Grant. Introduction

In 1947, Britain, under a Labour government, began to develop atomic weapons-

The decision to manufacture these weapons was made in complete secrecy by a small group of Labour ministers and was hidden fiom Parliament dl1948. Much of the

British public knew nothing of the British bomb until it was successfully tested in 1952-

Those responsible for the manufacture of atomic energy thought of the bomb as a British

"independent nuclear deterrent." This term was loaded with significance and suggests much about the British position in the post-World War II era. British officiais wanted to achieve independence from the United States and deter Soviet expansion; for them, the development of atomic weapons was essentid to both these goals-

There were many reasons why Britain chose to develop its own atornic bomb.

This thesis attempts to understand the British atomic decision through three avenues.

First, it sets the context for the atomic decision by examining Britain's international position in the years immediately following World War II. Secondly, it examines the decision itself in light of foreign and domestic political considerations by studying the

Anglo-American atomic relationship and the atomic decision-making process under the post-wax- Labour government. Finally, it Iooks at the Labour party's particular response to

Britain's atomic role by cornparing the left's views on general foreign policy issues with its views on the bomb. In this way, although the thesis focuses on a foreign policy decision, it is not just about British foreign policy. It is also about the political structure of the Labour party and the interactions between the left and the party leadership. The thesis thus places a decision, which has been largely understood as having implications primarily outside Brïtain, within the context of British domestic political culture.

British atomic policy cannot fully be understood as only a series of strategic or military decisions. The international political and economic clirnate conûibuted to the

Labour governmentyspolicy. The first chapter of the thesis, "The Anglo-American

Special Relationship,

1945-1949"' addresses international issues. One cannot begin to understand the 1947 decision outside the context of the Britain's international position. Britain had been reduced to a second-class power during the war. Afier the war, it Iacked the resources to maintain its Ulfluence abroad. The main goal of the British Foreign Secretary throughout the 1940's was to gain Amencan suppoa for British policy abroad, which required

Arnerican military and economic aid as well as ideological support. Chapter I examines

British encouragement of the development of the anti-Soviet Anglo-American alliance. It demonstrates increasing Amencan support of Bntain fier 1946, while emphasizing the unevenness of the relationship and Britain's junior status in relation to the United States.

The first chapter establishes the cold war context for the British development of atomic weapons but dso serves to distinguish the larger Anglo-American relationship from the

Anglo-American atomic relationship which is discussed in Chapter 2. The foundation of the first chapter is two series of pubrished foreign policy documents: the first senes of R.

Bullen and M.E. Pellen's Documents on British PoZicy Overseas (which is still incomplete), and the State Department's series The Foreign Relations of the United States.' Unpublished British Cabinet and Foreign Office documents @eId at the Public

Record Office in London) are also essential to understanding of the development of the hglo-American alliance.

The histonography of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' is large and, for the most part, uncontroversial. Most historians of this period agree on the dignrnent of

AngIo-Amencan policy and the increasing dienation of the western powers fiom the

Soviet Union. They also recognize the weakness of Britain's position vis-à-vis the United

States. The more important works on the subject are those of Christopher Thome,

William Roger Louis, Victor RothweU, Kenneth Morgan, Ritchie Ovendale, Robin

Edmonds, Elisabeth Barker, Richard Gardner, Alan Bullock and Peter Weiler.' Sorne are more critical than others, but al1 agree on the basic developments of the Anglo-Amencan

' Other important materials are United Stufes Statures-at-Large and the United States Code Congressional Service, which provide guides to the laws established by the United States Congress. The US.Congressional Record and Hansard' s Parliamentary Debates are also essential sources. ' See Christopher Thome, Allies of a Kind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); William Roger Louis, lmperialism at Bay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, l984), and me Special Relationship (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Kenneth Morgan, Labour In Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Ritchie Ovendale, The Foreign Policy of the Labour Governrnents, 1945- 1951 (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 1984), and Englirh-Speaking Alliame (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985); Robin Edmonds, Setting the Mouid (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1986); Elisabeth Barker, The British Behveen the Superpowers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (New York: McGraw-Hi11 Inc., 1969); Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1982); Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (New York: Oxford University Press, 198 5); Peter Weiler, Ernest Bevin (Manchester: Manchester Universis Press, 1993). 4

alliance. This body of secondary Iiterature supplements the important foreign policy

documents.

The second chapter of the thesis, "The Anglo-Arnerican Atomic Relationship and

British Decision Making Structures" has the dual task of examining the British atornic

decision in Iight of both foreign and domestic policy. It traces the development of the

Anglo-American atomic relationship and attempts to demonstrate how atornic matters

were dealt with separately fiom larger foreign policy issues. While British and American

foreign policies converged after 1945, cooperation in the field of atomic energy,

established during the war when both nations worked together to develop the bomb,

ceased. The field of atomic energy was the one area in which a "special relationship"

between Britain and the United States did not exist during the late 1940's. I have chosen

to look at the Anglo-American atornic relationship and the process through which the

Labour goverment decided to manufacture atomic weapons in the same chapter because,

when set against each other, it becomes very clear that most of Britain's secret atomic

decisions were deeply influenced by the status of atomic relations with the United States.

Britain's primary goal in the realm of atomic energy was to establish close collaboration

with the United States. The decision to develop an atomic bomb was clearly an attempt

to maintain independence fiom the United States in the realrn of atornic energy. However,

it was dso believed that an independent British programme was the best way of securing

increased Anglo-Amencan atomic collaboration in the future. Officiais believed that

Britain had to prove to the United States that it was worthy of partnership; what better way than by building its own bomb? This chapter relies on British Cabinet documents, parficularly the minutes and memoranda of the GEN 75 and 163 Cornmittees and Atomic Energy Ministerial

Committee, which were prirnarily responsible for the post-war deveiopment of atomic energy. The wartime and post-war Anglo-American atomic agreements are in the PREM series. The minutes of the meetings of the Combined Policy Committee (at which Anglo-

American-Canadian atomic collaboration was discussed) are in the State Department's

Foreign Relations of the United States, and the relevant correspondences between Mr.

Attlee and PresidentTnurian have been reproduced in Documents on British Poiiq

ûverseas.

The works of Margaret Gowing, the official histonan of the United Kingdom

Atomic Energy Authority, are also crucial to my understanding of the early development of the British deterrent, Gowing was given access to the relevant Cabinet documents before they were released and thus corrected some widely held misconceptions about the

British bomb.) Again, the historiography of the British bomb and atomic relationship with the United States is largely uncontroversial. The relevant American and British documents are revealing and unambiguous.

Chapter Three, "The Atomic Bomb and the Labour Left", departs fiom the est

Gowing's most important works are: Britain and Afomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: MacMillan & Co., 1965) and Independence and Deterrence, Volumes 1 and 2 (London: MacMillan & Co., 1974). There are other important secondary works on this subject, such as Andrew Pierre's Nuclear Politics (London: Odord University Press, 1972)' Gregory Herken' s Arnerican Atomic DipZornacy, 1945-1947 (Princeton University: PhD. Diss, 1974), Richard Rhodes's The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1986), and Martin Sherwin's A World Destroyed (New York: Alfied Knopf, 1975). Parts of Edmond's Setting the Mould and Morgan's Labour in Power are also helpful. 6

two chapters. While they attempt to understand Britain' s atomic policy in light of foreign

policy considerations and British political structures, the third chapter attempts to gauge

the opinion of the Labour party, particuiarly Labour le&, regarding the British

development of atomic weapons. The chapter contrasts the late 1950'~~when nuclear

disarmament was the cornerstone of the Labour left, with the late 19401s,when Britain

first embarked on its nuclear programme. Esinvolves a survey of Left wuig views on the

Labour govemment's foreign policy, which serves to establish the climate in which the

atomic decision occurred. Power was concentrated in the leadership of the Labour party ,

and, ultimately, the left was relatively powedess in influencing the govemment's foreign

policy decisions. Nonetheless, the left was, at times, extremely vocal in its criticism of

Labour's foreign and defence policies. 1have found that despite this, there was virtualIy

no substantial criticism of the British manufacture of atomic weapons either fiom the

Labour lefi in Parliament or in the Ieft-wing press. Before 1948, this can be attributed to

the left's basic ignorance about the British programme. However, afier 1948 the left

proved to be ambivalent and inconsistent on the question of a British 'independent

nuclear deterrent'. This was because, Iike much of the British public, spokespersons for

the left failed to understand the implications of the new weapon during the pre-detonation

period. Additionally, the lefi in Parliament and the press gradually came to accept

Labour's foreign policy, the notion of deterrence fiom the Soviet Union, and the

inevitability of the cold war, al1 in which the bomb played a significant role.

The third chapter relies on two bodies of literature. The fkst traces the development of the Carnpaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the late 1950's and the struggie of the Labour left to push for a policy of unilateral disarmament, which culminated in the Labour party's adoption of unilateralism at the 1960 Scarborough

Conference. Important secondary works include Richard Taylor's Against the Bomb

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988)- and Christopher Driver's meDisamers

(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1964): 1have also looked at the Labour party's Annual

Conference Reports, and F.W.S. Craig's compilation, Conservaiive and Labour

Conference Decisions, 1945-1981 (Chichester: Parliamentary Research Sevices, 1982), for the development of unilateralist sentiment in the Labour party. The second body of literature deals with the concentration of power in the Labour party and the interactions of the left with the Labour government in the 1945-195 1 period. Many usefiil works on the subject are available.' Within this body of secondary literanire, while there is general agreement on the composition and activities of the left, there is some disagreement about how effective the lefi was as a political force in the 1945-51 Labour goveniments. 1 adhere to the view that although the ieft was a significant presence, it did not have much

' Stephen Haseler's The Gaitskellites (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1969); Peggy DesLep, Le#, Le8 (London: Allison and Busby, 1971); John Minnion and Philip Bolsover's The CND Story (London: Allison and Busby, 1983); and A.J.R. Groom's British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter Ltd., 1974), are some other important sources on thk subject. Al1 these sources clearly identiQ the right-left split that occurred around the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Exceilent works on this subject include, Jonathan Schneer's Labour's Conscience @oston: Men& Unwin, 1988); Peter Weiler's British Labour and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Eugene Meehan's The British Le$ Wing and Foreign P olicy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Universiv Press, 1960); John Saville's The Politics of Continuity (London: Verso, 1993); Robert Jackson's Rebels and Wh@s &ondon: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1968); Mark Jenkins' s Bevanism (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1979); David Coates's The Labour Party and the Shuggle for Socialism (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979, and others. influence over foreign policy decisions until after the 1940's. Important primary documents on this subject include left wing jounials such as the New Statesman and

Tribune (which were associated with the Labour left), the Labour lefi publications Keep

Loft (1947) and Keeping Le$ (1950), the Annual Conference Reports and fïnaUy

Parliamentary debates.

Whiie most of the sources available on the Labour lefi discuss the nuclear split in the party in the 19S01s, none deals with the subject of atomic weapons in the 1940ts.

Margaret Gowing, Andrew Pierre, Kenneth Morgan, and A.J.R. Groom do mention in passing that the atornic bomb was non-controversial in the Labour party, but none specifically examines the Labour left's reaction to the British development of atomic energy and later the atomic bornb. Therefore 1have relied almost solely on an exarnination of the more important left-wing journals, Keep LeJi and Keeping Lep and comments made in the House of Commons to assess the left's reaction to the British atomic programme. It is somewhat difficult to portray lefi-wing sentiment regarding the

British atomic programme because it involves elucidating both silence and inconsistency.

However, 1make it dear that, while nuclear disarmament was a moral issue for the

Labour lefi in the 1950ts,it simply was not in the 1940's.

Each chapter has a slightly different chronology. The first chapter covers the period 1945- 1949 because it was in 1949 that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and as a consequence, the Anglo-American alliance formalized. The Korean conflict, which began in 1950, is not discussed in detail except in relation to left-wing views on the atornic bomb. Chapter Two extends to 1952, for while Anglo-American atomic relations 9 for all intents and purposes ceased in 1950, it was not until 1952 that Britain detonated its first atomic bomb. Chapter Three opens with a brief discussion of the development of the

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the Iate 1950's but then moves back to the 1940's in order to contrat Labour's position on nuclear weapons. It also closes with the 1952 atomic test.

This thesis examines a.important British foreign policy decision fkom seved vantage points. It moves beyond the scope of traditional foreign policy by discussing

Labour's decision-making structures, political culture and traditions, as well as Anglo-

Amencan atomic relations and the post-war intemational situation. While the focal point of the thesis is Britain's development of the atomic bomb, it attempts to link this foreign policy decision with domestic political concems. The factors that motivated the 1947 decision were largely grounded in foreign considerations, such as the need for increased closeness with the United States and the preservation of Britain's international prestige and influence, as well as fears about Soviet aggression. However, the consequences of

Bntain's atomic decision were felt at home as well as in international politics.

While an examination of the British atomic decision can demonstrate much about the early cold war penod and the tensions in the Anglo-Amencan relationship, it equally provides the opportunity to understand the composition and structure of the Labour party after World War II, the relationship between the leadership and the parliamentary party, how the party chose to govern and, finally, the ideals and priorities of the Labour left. Chapter One: The Anglo-Amerïcan "Special Relationship," 19454949

Secretary of State Dean Acheson once discovered British and Amencan diplomats workïng on a paper defining their countries' 'Special Relationship'. Homfied, he ordered al1 copies of the 'wretched paper' destroyed. The Secretary believed that a special relationship did indeed exist- But he knew that efforts to define it wodd raise severe difficulties, since the British, who had coined the term and almost monopoiized its use, wodd seek to define it in expansive terms. Acheson feared that the formalization of a privileged position vis-à-vis the United States would disturb other allies and home Amencan opinion.'

Maintainhg the Anglo-Arnencan "special relationship" that began during the war

years was Britain's top policy priority in the post-World War II era. As K. O. Morgan has

asserted, British Foreign Minister Emest Bevin's policy fkom August 1945 c%ms clearly

designed to promote a closer and more consistent relationship with the United States," for

he understood that Bntain's status in the post-war era would be fimdamentally iduenced

by this relati~nship.~Britain was largely successfd in its attempt to maintain an Anglo-

Amencan partnership, and through the 1940's areas of tram-Atlantic cooperation

mdtiplied, extending into economic, political and strategic realms. However, the nature

of the relationship remained consistent with the wartime relationship: the United States

continued to be the dorninant partner, and Britain never became completely secure in her

relationship with the United States. This was largely because Britain emerged fiom the

war dependent on the United States and remained so throughout the 1940's.

' Bradford Perkins, "Unequal Partners: The Truman Administration and Great Britain", in Wrn. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds.) The Special Relafionship (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)' p.44.

2 Kenneth Morgan, Labour in Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p.263. 11

The closeness of the Anglo-Amencan relationship was mitigated by the Amencan

perception of the Soviet threat in the post war penod. Increased Amencan concem over

the Soviet Union was provoked, in part, by Soviet aggression in eastern Europe after the

war, but aiso by steady British pressure. Bevin sought to create an anti-Soviet Anglo-

Amencan alliance. He succeeded in this attempt for, by 1946, the Americans backed the

British in every major dispute with the Soviet Uni~n.~

in the first months after the war the intimacy of Anglo-American relations became

uncertain. With Harry Truman assuming office after Franklin Roosevelt's death and the

opening of a new Congress, as well as Clement Attlee replacing Winston Churchill as

British Prime Minister, some changes in policy were inevitable. This was particularly tme

of the relationship between a Republican-dominated Congress and the new Labour government, intent upon domestic social reform and an increased role for state planning

in the economy. During this period Britain was concemed that the closeness of Anglo-

Amencan wartime relations would disappear in the post-war era. Soon after Japan's surrender, the United States terminated Lend-Lease aid, which could only be maintained for the purpose of the war effort and had to contribute to the defence of the United States.

On 20 August 1945 Leo Crowley, the U.S. administrator of Lend-Lease, Uiformed the

British Embassy in Washington that:

(1) There would be no new contracts on lend-Iease. (2) Supplies in process of manufacture or awaiting shipment couid be received only against payment or on appropriate conditions. (3) Al1 existing supplies which had already been transferred could be retained against payment. (4) Requisitions on terms of cash reimbursement could still be made during the next sixty days after which they would cease. . .

The end of Lend-Lease was sornething of a shock to Britain. Truman had not given Attlee

pnor notice and British officiais were certainly not expecting such a brisk termination of

aid.' Although the Lend-Lease Act provided that ai1 funds allocated had to be necessary

for the defence of the United States, Britain hoped that aid would continue to ease the

transition fiom a wartime to a peacetirne economy! By the end of the war, Britain had

only £1 billion in reserve - over a quarter of its national wealth had been liquidated to pay

for the war? In addition, Bntain had overseas debts of over £3.35 billion by 1945.8 In a

report on Britain's riancial situation economist John Maynard Keynes wrote:

It seems, then, that there are three essential conditions without which we have not a hope of escaping what might be described, without exaggeration . . . [as] a

Foreign Office, Note of a meeting held at 6r30p.m. on 20 August in the Foreign Secretary S Room at the House of Cornmons, document No. 12, in R. Bullen and M.E. Pelly (eds.), Documents on British Policy Uverseas, Series 1, Volume III (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1986), p. 55 (hereafter DBPO).Truman announced the tennination of Lend-Lease to Congress on 30 August 1945.

Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplornacy (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1969) pp. 184-5.

Elisabeth Barker, The British Beîween the Superpowers, 1915-1951 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, l983), p. 12. British officiais assumed Lend-Lease would continue because at the Second Quebec Conference in 1943, Roosevelt agreed to continue Lend-Lease during the period between German surrender and Japanese surrender (Gardner, Sterling-Dollar, p. 180)- It seems that Churchill assurned that this arnendment would extend Lend-Lease into a transition period.

'Robin Edmonds, Setting the Mould, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986), p.99.

Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.25. financial Dunkirk. These conditions are (a) an intense concentration on the expansion of exports, (b) drastic and immediate economies in our overseas expenditure, and (c) substantial aid fiom the United States on tems which we can accept. . . What does one mean in this context by 'a financial Dunkirk'? What would happen in the event of insufficient success? That is not easily foreseen. Abroad it would require a sudden and humiliating withdrawal from our onerous responsibilities with great loss of prestige and an acceptance for the thebeing of the position of a second-class Power, rather like the present position of France. . . At home a greater degree of austerity would be necessary than we have experienced at any tirne during the war. And there would have to be an indefinite postponement of the realisation of the best hopes of the new Government9

in such circumstances, the abrupt end of Lend-Lease dismayed the British

government. However it was clear before the termination of Lend-Lease that the United

States, understanding Bntain's financial crisis, was prepared to discuss the allocation of

Meraid. In early August 1945, Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton visited

London to discuss future commercial policy and "[tlhe ternis, duration and size of any

financial aid required by the United Kingdom &er the end of Lend-Lease.'"' During

Clayton's visit it was decided that taks would resume at a Iater date in Washington.

Mer Truman's announcement to Congress on 30 August of the termination of

Lend-Lease, Attlee wrote to the President:

I hope therefore that you may feel able to give an urgent directive that supplies in the pipeline corning forward for shipment, Say within the next month, may proceed to the United Kingdom and that the tems and conditions of payment for such supplies will be discussed and agreed upon between the United States

John Maynard Keynes, Our Overseas Financial Prospects, 13 August 1945, document No.6 in DBPO, Senes 1, Volume III, pp.36-7. Keynes speculated that the British post-war deficit (1946-9) would approximate $5 billion (DBPO, p.33).

'O Memorandum by Mr. Hall-Patch, 3 August 1945, document No. 1 in DBPO, Senes 1, Volume III, pp.1-2. E.L. Hall-Patch was the Assistant Under Secretary of State responsible for economic affairs. Administration and the Special Mission Ped by Lord Keynes and British Ambassador in Washington, Lord HaLifax] which has been sent to Washington for this purpose. We have recognised that with V.J. Day Lend-Lease as we have known it, and as you have described in your recent strikïng report to Congress, is at an end, We have redised that in some form or other we shall henceforth have to pay for the urgent supplies that we need fkom the United States. Therefore it is hardly necessary for me to assure you that if these supplies for the next month come forward to us as 1 have suggested, they will be paid for."

Despite the fact that Congress had explicitly stated that Lend-Lease aid could not be used for post-war recon~tniction,~'on 5 September the British Mission in Washington sent word to London that the "order stopping rnovement [of Lend-Lease supplies] has been rescinded" for the duration of the Anglo-American financial negotiations.13

The British delegation was directed to settle the Lend-Lease debt and to attempt to secure a grant-in-aid, or at least an interest fiee loan. Britain's reason for seeking

American aid went beyond domestic economic considerations. Britain's main priority in the immediate post-war era was to maintain a close relationship wiSi the United States.

The Foreign OEce feared that Britain's economic circumstances would jeopardize relations with the United States and believed that the ody way to avoid the breakdown of the relationship would be to secure substantid aid:

" Telegramfi-om Attlee to Truman, reproduced in a telegram fiom Bevin to Baifour, 1 September 1945, document No. 20 in DBPO, Series 1, Volume III, p.85.

'' On 16 April 1945, the Lend-Lease Act was amended to read that Mutud Aid "shall not be deemed to be for postwar relief, postwar rehabilitation or postwar reconstruction." (Statutes at Large, Volume 59, part 1 Washington: Govemment Printing Office, 19461, p.52).

I3 British Missions (Washington) to Cabinet Ofices, 5 September 1945, document No. 23, DBPO,Senes 1, Volume III, p. 11 1. If we get no support fiom the U.S. until our balance of payments has once more become normal, we shall be faced with the following consequences . . - Trade with the United States would practicdly cease in a short time . . . In order to readjust our extemal trade, we should have to have recourse to al1 kinds of expedients in order to obtain supplies fiom elsewhere. The result would be a very specidised system of bilaterai deals which would exclude any possibility of our joining an International Trade Organisation, based on general principles of non- discrimination, of the kind hitherto under discussion . . . Sterling could not, in the foreseeable hture, become convertible into dollars, and in these circurnstances it would be diffTcult for us, in good faith, to enter into the commitrnents of Bretton Woods. The effect of this on Amencan opinion rnight be very grave. . . . We shouid have many minor causes of fiction with the Americans. Our exchange conîrol would have to be so strict as to discriminate against them in various ways . . . Our economic relations with the U.S. would inevitabiy deteriorate rapidly and there would be a tendency for cut throat cornpetition in al1 the export markets in the world. Nor could we maintain any form of economic collaboration with the Americans on the lines of the Combined Boards.'"

The tone the British delegation adopted in the negotiations echoed Foreign Office sentiments. Keynes argued that Amencan assistance to Britain was absolutely essential in the interests of the multilateral system the United States so clearly desired." The negotiations proved to be difficuit for Britain. Keynes' hope of receiving a gant-in-aid fiom the United States was almost immediately disappointed- The US. delegation, led by

Secretary of the Treasury Fred Vinson and Assistant Secretary of State for Econornic

Affairs Will Clayton, clairned that a gant or even an interest-fkee ioan would never be approved by ~ongress.'~In addition, the Amencan delegation felt compelled to take into

l4 Foreign OBce Mernorandum on Anglo-American relations, 16 August 1945, document No. 10, DBPO, Senes 1, Volume III, pp. 50-1.

l5 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar, p. 19 1.

l6 Ibid., pp.201-2 See aiso British Missions telegrnrn to Cabinet Ofices, 18 October 1945, document No. 74, DBPO, Senes 1, Volume III, p. 228 . consideration the recommendations of the report of the House of Representativesy

Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, The Cornmittee suggested that

"the advantages afforded by United States loans and other settlements are our best bargaining asset in securing political and economic concessions in the interests of world stability ."17

En retum for a low-interest loan, the U.S. delegation insisted that the British meet certain financiai conditions. Britain had to commit to 'liberalizingy the sterling economic area and British commercial policy in general. Mer 1946, there could be no "quantitative restrictions on US. exports to the U.K." Britain also had to recommend to Parliament the ratification of the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement. Finally, Britain had to institute the fkee convertibility of sterling into dollars one year after the loan came into effect.ls

On 6 December 1945, the Truman administration, through the Anglo-American

Financial Agreement, agreed to lend Britain $3 -75 billion to be repaid over a period of fifty years (allowing a grace period of six years), with an interest rate of two percent. The loan also cancelled al1 the Lend-Lease debt except for $650 million, which wouid also be repaid at an interest rate of two percent.I9

" Gardner, Srerling-Dollar, p. 198.

Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 123-4. See also Gardner, Sterling-Dollar, pp.208-223.

l9 Edmonds, Setting the Mould, pp.94-5. (For full texts of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement and the Settlement of Lend-Lease, see Srnutes at Large, Volume 60, part 2 Washington: Government Printing Office, 19471, pp. 1840- and 1564). The stated purpose of the loan was '90 facilitate purchases by the United Kingdom of goods and services in the United States, to assist the United Kingdom to meet transitional postwar deficits in its curent balance of payments, to help the United Kingdom to Although the Truman administration approved the loan, it still had to be ratified by the U.S. Congress and British Parliament. Approval for the loan was oot inevitable; many Members of Parliament felt that Britain was giving away too much in return for the loan fiom the United States. They believed that the conditions of the loan would dismantle the British empire and the system of imperial trade preference, reducing Britain to a second class power. Robert Boothby, a Ieading Conservative, argued:

. . . Lord Keynes once described Mr. Lloyd George as 'a witch flying through the murky streets of Paris fiom the hag-ridden bogs of antiquity.' My description of Lord Keynes is 'a siren beckoning us to our doom fiom the murkier depths of Bretton Woods.' That is the danger. He is a siren, with his persuasive tongue. In defiance of ail the teachings and precepts that he has told us for years, he has now driven us into this position . . . [Tlhere is one mandate that His Majesty's Govenunent never got fiom the people of this country, and that was to sel1 the British Empire for a packet of cigarettes."

Labour M.P.s had other concems as weII. Norman Smith, a long-time member of the party criticized Hugh Dalton, who had presented the motion to accept the conditions of the loan, on these grounds:

. . . my right honourable Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer . . . combines in his person two very distinct personalities. The story of Jekyll and Hyde is very apt in this case . . . The war of independence has begun. These proceedings in this House and the action that some of us are taking in dividing the House, are, 1 assert, the beginning of the British war of independence against the domination of Amencan capitalism during the post war period. On the ultimate success of that war will depend our ability to build up in England a Socialist system, a Socialist economy; because you cannot have restrictionism at home combined with laissez maintain adequate reserves of gofd and dollars and to assist the Government of the United Kingdom to assume the obligations of multilateral trade, as defined in this and other agreements."

20 The Hansard Parliumentary Debates, 5th series, vol. 417 - House of Comrnons Fondon: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946), 12 December 1945, pp.468-9. faire abroad. I beg honourable Members to take their courage in both hands, and do what 1 intend to do, vote against these proposais, because it is right to vote 2 l against them ,. -

However, there was mounting pressure on British proponents of the loan to have it

quickly approved by Parliament for, according to the loan agreement, Britain had to ratie

the Bretton Woods Agreement by 3 1 December 1945. Parliament was divided on the

issue, but eventually realized how essentiai the American Ioan was to imrnediate British

economic survival." Even many of those who supported the Anglo-American Financial

Agreement did so somewhat wistfully. When Lord Pethwick-Lawrence (Secretary of

State for India and Bunna) moved to resolve the bill in the House of Lords, he said:

It would be idle to pretend that the settiement 1 am asking you to accept today is in full accord with the desires of the British people and His Majesty's Government. We had hoped to secure acceptance by the Government of the United States and Iater by Congress, of our clah that, as we had thrown into the common struggle al1 our resources, and had stripped ourselves bare in the process, the generous help known as Lend-Lease would be extended for the whole penod, right up to the restoration of the peace economy of our country . . .We failed, and Merwe had to make concessions which we should have preferred not to make . . . This Agreement, therefore, is a compromise; and, like al1 compromises, it falls fkr short of what either party set out to obtain. It has been reached by hard bargaining, and personaiiy 1 am convinced that at the end there was no rnargin on either side for Mer concession^.^

Ibid., pp.474-9.

" The Anglo-Arnerican Financial Agreement was passed by the House of Cornmons on 13 December 1945 by a vote of 345 to 98 (see E-iouse of Cornmons, vo1.417, pp.735-40). It was ratified by the House of Lords on 18 December 1945 by a vote of 90 to 8, (see The Hansard Parliamentury Debates, 5th series - House oflords, Volume 138 pondon: His Majesty 's Stationery Office, 19461, pp.895-8). The Bretton Woods Agreement was ratified by Parliament on 20 December 1945. " Lord Pethwick-Lawrence, 17 December, House of Lords, vo1.138, pp.677-8. Even Keynes expressed some regret about the economic tems of the loan. However, he

took the Foreign Office's view that the political benefits of the Anglo-American Financial

Agreement, such as a close relationship with the United States, were imperative.

Therefore, much of these policies seem to be in the prime interest of our country, little though we may like parts of them. They are calculated to help us regain a fidl measure of prosperity and prestige in the world's commerce. They aim, above ail, at the restoration of multilaterd trade which is a system upon which British commerce depends. .. Above dl, this determination to make trade truly international acd to avoid the establishment of economic blocs which limit and restrict commercial intercourse outside them, is plaùrly an essentid condition of the world's best hope, an AngIo-American understanding, ~hichbrings us and others together in international institutions which may be in the long nin the frrst step towards something more comprehensive. Some of us, in the tasks of war and more lately in those of peace, have learnt by expenence that our two countries can work together. Yet it would oniy be too easy for us to walk apart. I beg those who look askance at these plans to ponder deeply and responsibly where it is they think they want to go?

Truman presented the Ioan agreement to Congress on 20 January 1946. Congress was also extremely critical of the 10a.n.~Dissatisfaction stemmed from three sources:

first, Congress did not want to give Britain any special treatrnent, especially after the billions of dollars in aid the United States had siipplied during the war effort. Senator

" Lord Keynes, 18 December 1945, House of Lords, vol. 138, pp. 793-4. Richard Gardner points out that Keynes' speech in the House of Lords had a significant effect on public opinion regarding the loan (Sterling-Dollar, p.235).

ZS The Truman administration genuinely wanted to O btain congressional approval of the loan; however, it did not hesitate to use congressional recdcitrance as a negotiating tool with Britain over the cession of military bases in British territones to the United States. On 19 April 1946 Secretary of State James Byrnes sent a letter to the Earl of Halifax which "stated in particular that it would help in 'pending legislation' if in the next few weeks an Anglo-American 'exchange of notes describing an agreement in principle on Bases . . . carefully worked out fiom the public relations standpoint of both nations' could be published." (DBPO, Series 1, Volume IV, footnote 2 to document No. 78, [London: Her Majesty 's Stationery Office, 19871, p.258). Bilbo argued:

In the beginning I want it distinctly understood that 1 am pro-British, but I am tired of being a sucker and playing the role of Santa Claus to my cousins of the British Empire. In my mind any member of Congress voting for this preposterous and unthinkable so-called agreement commonly referred to as the British loan, will under al1 the rules of decency and honor be comrnitted to vote for a loan of equal amount . . . to Russia, France, China, Italy, Greece, Belgium, Finland, and al1 the rest of our allies. A failure to go through with this lending spree which will be started by this Ioan will make them infarnously inconsistent . . . This sociaiistic government promises to pay us ody 2 percent interest when we are making our own GI boys pay 4 percent interest on their loans?

As Bilbo's remark suggests, many members of Congress were suspicious of the

c'socidist" nature of the new British Labour govemment. Even during the loan

negotiations, cntics of the Labour government had voiced their concerns. In November

1945, the financier Bernard Baruch warned Congress to resist aiding foreign nations 'to

nationalize their industries against This suspicion continued during the 1946

Congressional debate of the loan. One Congressman argued:

Once the goods which the line of credit will purchase came into the hands of the British Government they would be arbitrarily distributed to its citizens, Say, to meet its cradle-to-the-grave comrnitrnents; or in the form of various kinds of Ioans; or for cash. Competition, the heart of fkee enterprise, would in no way enter into the process. The disposition by the British Government of the $3,750,000,000 wouid be a purely collectivist procedure. So we see that this whole transaction, the raising of the fund by our Government and the disposition of it by the British Government, would be a collectivist transaction and the very antithesis of fkee private enterprise."

26 Senator Bilbo, 24 April 1946, United States Congressional Record - Senate, Volume 92, part 3-4, p. 4 1 16.

27 Quoted in Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 122.

Congressman Smith, 12 July 1946, Cong. Rec-- House, Volume 92, part 7-8, p.8826. The £inal argument against the loan to Britain was that the Anglo-Arnerican Financiai

Agreement, in its attempt to impose multilateral trade and the fiee exchange of currency, only seemed to duplicate the Bretton Woods Agreement. Senator Taft argued:

1may Say that the Bretton Woods agreement was presented as one way of securing the exchangeability of currency; we were asked to put up $6,000,000,000 for that purpose and, according to Mr. White, that would solve the problem. . -1think it would have been a better method to have refused the $6,000,000,000 under the Bretton Woods agreement. In that event 1 would not be opposing the British loan. But now we are asked to do over again almost exactly the same thing we were doing when we passed the Bretton Woods agreement. . . [A portion of the British loan] is for the vague purpose of stabilizing the currencies of the world and creating multilateral trade, which was a problem supposed to be solved entirely by the expenditure of $6,OOO,OOO,OOO for Bretton ~oods?

From the end of the war and into 1946, relations between the United States and

Britain were tumultuous and uncertain. Truman's Secretary of State, James Byrnes, discouraged the formal Anglo-American 'special relationship' to which Britain aspired.

On 16 March 1946, in response to Winston Churchill's "lion Curtain" speech at Fulton,

Missouri, which descnbed the expansionist nature of the Soviet Union, Byrnes declared that the United States was no more interested in an alliance with Britain against the

Soviet Union than it was in an alliance with the Soviet Union against ri tain." In the

29 Senator Tafl, 24 Apnl 1946, Cong. Rec.- Senate, Volume 92, part 3-4, p.4111.

'O Edmonds, Setting the MouZd, p.6. British suspicions of ''the Soviet Union's role in the post-war world began aimost as soon as the Soviets [entered the war]."@. C. Watt, "Bntain, the United States and the Opening of the Cold WarJ' in R Ovendale [ed.], The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governrnents peicester: University of Leicester Press, 19841, p.54). As early as 1943 Britain was preparing for a post-war conflict with the Soviet Union. The Post-Hostilities Planning Committee was secretly instructed to consider "the probable long-term impact of Russian policy on British strategic interests." early post-war period, it was not at al1 clear that the United States shared British suspicions toward the Soviet Union, let alone was prepared to support British interests against those of the Soviet Union.

Yet, despite Amencan caution in the immediate post-war period, by rnid-1946 an

Anglo-American "special relationship" was clearly developing. D.C. Watt has suggested that "the underlying bais" of the relationship was "interest and not . . . emotion . . .The intimacy of the relationship was conditional on Britah rernaining the single most effective adjutant in the task of containing the Soviet Union and its allie^."^' Through

1946, as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union detenorated, British and American interests converged."

In 1944 the British Chiefs of Staff suggested that British post-war security against the Soviet Union would depend on the creation of a Western European alliance that would have to include Germany (Barker, The British Beiween, pp.7-9). RooseveIt and Truman did not feel as threatened by the Soviet Union as Britain did. In April 1945, Churchili requested the mobilization of British and American troops to Eastern Europe so that Prague and Berlin would be liberated by Anglo-Amencan, as opposed to Soviet, forces. This request was denied by the Amencan army. Thus in the closing stages of the war, the Soviet Union was able to occupy " Rumania, Bulgaria, PoIand, Hungary, Czechoslovakia . .. parts of Germany and Austria, including both capitals, Berlin and Viema'' (Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 1 0).

31 D.C.Watt, "The Anglo-American Relationship" in The Special Relationship, pp.3-4.

32 Elisabeth Barker argues that it was Churchill's speech at Fulton on 5 Mach 1946 and Stalin's violent reaction to it, as well as the virtuai Soviet take-over of the Czech and Romanian govemments (which the BrÏtish and Arnericans nonetheless recognized) which led to American anxiety about the Soviet Union (The British Berneen, pp.45-48). George Keman's "long telegram" fiom Moscow in January 1946, which discussed the expansionist nature of the Soviet Union, also contributed to American suspicions. However, it was after Churchill's speech that the United States ccpublicly adopted a robust line against Soviet policy" in Iran, a traditional British sphere of influence which was being threatened by Iranian autonomists with the help of the Red It was increased American awareness of the Soviet threat, as opposed to arguments about the benefits of the conditions of the loan to mdtilateralism, that led to the ratification of the Anglo-Amencan Financial ~greernent?~As one Senator put it:

In our actions today we determine for years to corne whether there shall be a coalition between the British sphere and the Americm sphere or whether there shail be a coalition between the British sphere and the Soviet sphere. That to me is fundamentai thinking that tracends dollars and cents investment. The question here before us is not: can we af5ord to make this agreement? The question is: cm we afford not to make this agreement? If we refuse to enter into this agreement then, . . . we compel E3ntai.n because of the exigency of her economic condition to enter into bilateral agreements with other countries, notably the Russian sphere of infl~ence?~

From mid-1946, the United States showed itself increasingly willing to provide

Britain with economic assistance. In July 1946 Britain and the United States agreed to merge their zones of occupation in Germany (formal unification was established on 1

Army (Edmonds, Setting the Mould, p.73). Kenneth Morgan argues that Soviet rejection in April/May 1946 of Byrnes' proposal for a twenty-five year non-aggression pact between the USSR and Western powers also contributed to Amencan distrust of the Soviets. He also points out that although positive results were achieved at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1946 "stabilization achieved by Cpeace] treaties, concluded with what were seen as Russian satellite powers . . . masked a growing divergence between the Arnericans and the Russians on Germany and aJi other major questions . . . From the meetings in March 1946 onward, the Arnericans had generally stood with the British on every major issue in dispute . . . The breakdown of substantive negotiations with the Soviet Union that finally took place in Moscow in March 1947 was fidly in prospect'' (Morgan, Labour in Power, pp.246-7). For detailed discussion of Anglo-American conflicts with the Soviet Union over Germany and Eastern Europe, see Victor Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1982), chapters six and seven.

33 See Gardner, Sterling-Dollar, pp.248-54. The Anglo-Amencan Financial Agreement was passed by the House of Representatives on 12 Juiy 1946 by a vote of 2 19 to 155. The loan went into effect on 15 Juiy 1946.

34 Senator Wolcott, Cong. Rec.- Senate, Vol 92, part 7-8, p.89 13. 24

January 1947). By September, plans were under way for the "joint administration of food agriculture, trade, industry, finance, and transport in the fused zone, together with cornmon import and export policie~."~~The cost of occupying the British zone was more than £130 million annually? This cost placed a burden on the population of the United kgdom; the 1946 rationing of bread was partly the result of the huge costs of occupation and the fact that Britain supplied 70% of its zone's food needs." The financial agreement reached on "Bizone" was advantageous to Britain, which "had to accept haif the financial burden, which still favaured it considerably as the British zone accounted for two-thirds of the Bizone's deficit.'"?* However, as Morgan points out, Britain had to accept certain concessions after unification; for exarnple, "pians to nationalize the steel industry were quietly shelved, after American objection^.'^^ This pattern of Anglo-

American compromise continued tillough the 1940's. Bevin worked to maintain close

Anglo-American cooperation; it was the primary goal of his foreign policy.

However, public and Congressional opinion in the United States remained hostile to Britain's irnperial tendencies. It was oniy "[slo long as the British genuinely seemed to be making progress toward 'coloniali independence' [that] the colonial issue was relatively unimportant in Anglo-berican relations" and cooperation in Europe remained

'* Morgan, Labour in Power, p.259. Rothwell, Briîain and the Cold War, p.297.

" Morgan, Labour in Power,. p.256.

" Rothwell, Britain and rhe Cold War, p.33 1.

39 Morgan, Labour in Power, p.260. Primacy was given to the Anglo-American alliance. Everything possible was done to pacLQ an Arnerïcan opinion sensitive to the idea of Britain as a colonial and Mperial power?

Therefore on 13 February 1947, the Cabinet agreed that the Prime Minister should issue a statement "declaring the Goverment's intention to transfer power in Lndia by June, 1948

- - ."4' The same week Attlee's Cabinet also decided that Palestine should be referred to the United Nations, and that a statement declaring such should be made to Parliament and the United Stated3The cessions of India and Palestine were perhaps Britain's two greatest imperial retreats, The same day Britain announced its intention to withdraw fiom india and Palestine, it informed the State Department that Britain would have to reduce anti-Communist assistance to the governments of Turkey and GreeceP4 On 13 February

Wm. Roger Louis, "American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire" in The Special Relationship, p.273.

Ritchie Ovendale, introduction to The Foreign PoZicy, p.8.

" CAB 128/11 [CM (47j 2 1, conclusion minute 41 .The Indian Independence Act was passed by Parliament on 18 July 1947.

" CAB 128/9 [CM (47)22, 231. "[The] abandonment of Palestine [was] essentially forced by the United States . . ." (Watt, "The Anglo-American Relationship", in The Special ReZationship, pl 1). The Truman administration also used the British loan as way a way to pressure Britain to cede to Zionist demands in Palestine (Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 125). The British mandate in Palestine was an area of conflict between the United States and Britain until Britain agreed to abandon its mandate and allow the United Nations to solve the Arab-Zionist conflict. For a full treaiment of the Palestine issue see section IV of William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

44 A senes of civil wars afflicted Greece through the 194Qts,as the reactionary Greek monarchy was challenged by comrnunist insurgents. Similarly, in Turkey, stability the Foreign Office sent a draft letter to the British embassy in Washington, which read:

Your aim should be to make General Marshall redise quite clearly that ou fuiancial assistance to Greece has been all and more than ail we can afford, and that we cannot undertake any Mercommitments. If a policy of effective and practicai support for Greece is to be maintained, the US. Governent must now bear the financial burden . .?

On 21 February the Foreign Office officially informed Washington of this position, presenting a near-ultimatum that without American assistance in the Mediterranean,

British aid would have to be withdrawn altogether.

Bevin understood that in order to retain key Imperid possessions, Britain would have to reduce its commitments abroad. The Middle East became Britain's primary sphere of influence after World War II, especially after the cession of India. American responsibility for Mediterranean stability would reduce British financial and rnilitary responsibilities while buffering Britain's sphere of influence, the Middle East, fiom

Soviet expansion.

Again, faced with the possibility of Soviet expansion, the United States proved itself willing to relieve Bntain of its financial crisis. On 12 March 1947, Truman outlined his Soviet containment policy, recornrnending to Congress that the United States take over British comrnitments in the Mediterranean:

was perceived to be threatened by communist insurgents. British and American officials feared that the Soviet Union would take advantage of politicai instability in the region and expand its influence into the Mediterranean. In 1945-6, the British governrnent provided the Greek govemment with £132 million in aid. (Morgan, Labour in Power, p.252). The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorkt activities of several thousand armed men, led by the Communists, who de@ the Govemment's authority . . . the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the Government . . . Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention . . . I therefore ask Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 . . . In addition to funds, 1ask the American Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey . . . The fiee peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their fkeedoms. If we fdter in out leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world - and we shall surely endanger the wekeof our own Nation?

The "Truman Doctrine" had immediate Congressional support. By 1947 AngIo-

American views on the Soviet threat had largely converged and a distinct cold war

mentality had surfaced in Congress. On 2 1 May 1947 Congress passed the "Act to

Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey," signing over $400 million in military and

civilian aid.47

46 Truman's request for assistance to Greece and Turkey before a Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947, Cong. Rec.- House, Volume 93, part 1-2, pp.1980-1.

47 The bill was passed by 289 to 89 (see Cong. Rec. - House ,Volume 93, part 5-6, p. 5626). For an excerpt fiom the 'Tniman Doctrine', see appendix 2. Despite increased U.S. rnilitary assistance, Britain kept troops in Greece until 1950, after the civif war was over. By 1947 the United States was very willing to provide Britain with strategic support. Although the Middle East had long been an area of tension in Anglo-American relations because of the British monopoly over vast oil fields and its policy toward the mandate of Palestine, in October 1947 the United States held Pentagon talks on the Middle East, at which it was decided to support British interests in the region. Cooperation in the Middle East became closer in the context of the cold war when the Soviet Union had shown interest in Iranian oil, which supplied most of Western Europe. (See Peter Weiler, Ernest Bevin Manchester: Manchester University Press, 19931, pp.35- 8). ARer the Palestine issue was de& with to its satisfaction, the United States prefened to maintain the status quo in the Middle East by supporthg British dominance in order to obstruct Soviet expansion. As early as July 1947 the United States was contemplating sbategic cooperaîion with Britain in the Middle East. A memorandum written on 8 July by the State-Navy-War Coordinating Cornmittee declared: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff 28

Yet al1 was not well in Europe; countries continued to suffer Grom economic

dislocation long after the war ended. While the United States prospered economically,

Europe floundered. One of the most pressing problerns was that by 1947, Europe was

importing fiom the United States seven &es what it was exportingo*This was paaly due

to a reduction in European production, as well as "the liquidation of overseas

investrnents, the accumulation of externai indebtedness, the loss of shipping, and the

continued burden of foreign rnilitary and political expenditure" which resulted fiom the

wd9In addition, the European economic clirnate changed signincantly with the advent

of the cold war:

The politicai crisis had disrupted trade between Eastern and Western Europe, making the West much more dependent than formerly on non-European sources of foodstuffs and raw materials.'*

Moreover, the Bretton Woods institutions, designed to provide assistance to Europe

during its post-war transition to multilateralism, were unable to supply the extensive aid

consider Great Bntain and her Empire to be our most probable and most important allies, in the event of war with the USSR, A fïrm hold in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean is one of the basic tenets of British strategic policy. Facilities mut, therefore, at al1 time be available somewhere in the area Palestine- Egypt- Cyrenaica which will enable United Kùigdom sea, land and air forces to operate effectiveiy in the Middle East . . ." (Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1 947, Volume III mhington: United States Govemment Printing Office, 19721, p.593 (hereafker FR US). For a full treatment of the October Pentagon Talks, see Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, pp. 1 09- 1 12.

48 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar, p.295.

49 Ibid., p.294.

'O Ibid., p.295. which Europe needed for economic survival. The Bank for Reconstruction and

Development ody had the lending potential of $3 -2 billion, despite the original grandiose plans of the United States ad~ninistration.~'In addition, "it had never been intended that the International Monetary Fund should be used for reconstruction purposes.'*2 The

European economic crisis also caused political concem. In some European nations, such as Italy and France, economic chaos led to the rise of radical political movements; the

State Department feared that under such conditions, comrnunism might flourish.

Politicdly stable nations faced different problems. With a serious balance of payrnents problem and drawing on the U.S. loan much more quickly than anticipated in 1945,

Britaùi was becoming increasingly unable to uphold its commitments abroad? While the

'Truman Doctrine' was being debated in Congress, the State Department established a

Conmittee on the Extension of U.S. Aid to Foreign Governments. It completed a report on 2 1 April 2 947, which deciared:

It is taken to be the policy of the United States: a, To support economic stability and orderly political processes throughout the world and oppose the spread of chaos and extremism. b. To reduce or to prevent the growth or advancement of national or international power which constitutes a substantial threat to U.S. security and well being and to oppose programs of coercion and infiltration . . . c. To orient foreign nations toward the US, toward support of the U.N. And toward procedures in international relations which are consistent with the purpose of the U.N. A, Objectives of the Aid Program

'' Ibid., p.292-

52 C.C.S. Newton, 'The Sterling Cnsis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plany', Economic Hislory Review 1984 (3 7), p.394. '' Morgan, Labour in Power, p.269. 1. To take positive, forehand and preventative action in the matter of promotion of US. interests through assistance to foreign nations. By timely provisions of moderate arnounts of assistance to avoid the development of crises which will demand urgent, much Iarger expenditures. 2. To apply assistance, under a system of priorities, where it will do the most good from the standpoint of promoting US. security and national interest. Specifically, to give highest prioriq to the nations or areas which are vital to our national security and national interest."

On 5 June 1947, ody two months afier the successfid adoption of the "Truman

Doctrine," the new Secretary of State, George MarshalI, delivered a speech at Harvard

University.

Marshall's speech made no explicit promises about a European recovery prograrn, but did suggest that recovery couid not be "on a piecemeal bais as crises develop. Any assistance that this Goveniment may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliati~e."~~He also suggested that:

It wouId be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a prograrn designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans, The initiative, 1 think, must corne from Europe. The role of this country should consist of Eendly aid in the drafling of a European prograrn and of later support of such a program . . . 56

" FR US, L 947, Vol. III, pp. 204-1 9. " The text of Marshall's address at Harvard University was reprinted in the New York Times the foliowing day (see New York Times, Friday, 6 June 1946, "The Address of Secretary Marshall at Harvard",p.2).

56 Ibid., p.2 It should be noted that in May 1947, a month before Marshall delivered his famous speech, the Policy Planning StaEwas established in the State Department. It was directed by George Kennan. In a memorandum written on 16 May

1947, Kennan wrote: " The program for American aid, should beyif possible, supplementary to a program of intrarnural economic collaboration arnong the western European couniries . . ." (FRUS,1947, Vol III, p.221). Therefore, the principles of European cooperation and preventative assistance existed in U.S. Policy long before Bevin immediately took the initiative on behalf of Europe. On 13 June he

delivered a speech in which he declared:

We are more than ever Iinked with the destinies of Europe. We are, in fact, whether we like it or not, a European nation and must act as such. But we are not just a little island on the West of Europe. We are Great Britain on the West of Europe, a link and bridge between Europe and the rest of the world . . . The speech which Mr. Marshall delivered at Harvard may well rank as one of the greatest in the world's history. It seemed to me to focus on the need for a conception of great CO-operationbetween Europe and the wonderfiil and powerful western hemisphere. In this country we are explorhg actively and urgently how best to respond to this Iead. We must consult with France. France, Great Britain and the United States, almost in direct line geographically, have a great common interest . . . 57

On 14 June the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, sent word to Secretary Marshall

on behalf of Bevin:

My Dear Secretary of State: 1have this morning received a telegram fiom Mr. Bevin asking me to inforrn you that, in pursuit of the intention to cooperate with the French in studying the new American approach to Europe adwbrated in your recent speech at Harvard, he proposes to take the initiative by visiting Paris early next week to discuss the matter personally with the Prime Minister of France and M. Bidault . . . In a speech which he delivered yesterday in the United Kingdom, Mr. Bevin ïndicated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are specidly mindfiil of the part France can play in the economic reconstruction of Europe and he stated that it had been decided to consult her and other European nations to see how best advantage could be taken of the great Amencan prop~sd.'~

On 17 June 1947, Bevin presented a cabinet memorandum which provided an outline for

Marshall's speech.

57 FO 37 l/62399 4683/168/53] .

58 FR US, 1947, Vol III, p.253. British economic cooperation with the rest of Europe; it was approved." Although the

Soviet Union was formally invited to join in the plans for European cooperation, it declined to do so at the Paris Foreign Ministers' Conference on 27 June 1947.~'Through the sumrner of 1947 Bevin chaired the Conference on European Reconstruction, which formulated a detailed European response to Marshall's offer. The Soviet Union and

Soviet bloc countries did not participate; the conference was attended by delegates fiom

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Eue, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, SwitzerIand, Turkey and the United Kingdom, but as Morgan has pointed out, "[t]he organizational framework for the Marshall Aid scheme was always British, or to a lesser degree Anglo-French, and so it remained.'"'

While Bevin was busy organizing the European initiative for econornic recovery, sterling becarne convertible. The official date for convertibility was 15 July 1947, one

" CAB l28/lO [CM 54 (47) 51.

60 Morgan, Labour in Power, p.271.

Ibid., p.270 Peter Weiler argues that Bevin responded quickly to Marshall's speech partly in order to "prevent the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, on which the Soviets sat, fiom becoming involved" in the plan (Ernest Bevin, pp. 166-7). This view is supported by a 19 June L947 communication fbm the British Embassy in Washington to Marshall, which stated: "Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault are convinced . . . that the initial steps must be taken outside the Economic commission for Europe" (FRUS, 1947, Vol DI, p.263). Bevin's views on Marshall aid and the Soviet Union coincided with American views. Dean Acheson pointed out that Soviet participation rnight be "fatal to [the plan's] Congressional support." Similarly, Congressman James Wadsworth suggested that his colleagues viewed icMarshallAid" as a chiefly strategic plan (Morgan, Labour NI Power, p.86), and George Kennan believed the plan had an implicit "political purpose7' (Weiler, Ernest Bevin, p. 166). year after the signing of the Anglo-Amencan Financial Agreement. As the date for convertibility approached, British officials seemed unconcernedd' However, Britain yet again faced financial crisis: not only did Britain continue to have a balance of payments deficit in 1947, but aIso had a £469 million gold and dollar deficit during the fust half of

1947.63 Soon after 15 July the gravity of the British economic position became apparent.

Between 1 Jdy and 20 August, $300 million had been converted and $970 million had been drawn fiom the US. loan to compensate for convertibility and to fund other British expen~es.~~Gardner explains the massive drain on British dollar reserves because of convertibility :

pritain's creditors] noted Britain's greatly adverse balance in visible trade and its increased rate of drawings on the American loan. They put these facts together with the fact that the date for the implementation of convertibility had been deterrnined, not by the British Government in its own good time, but by a fixed obligation drafted eighteen months earlier- Accordingly they had little confidence in Britain's ability to maintain convertibility. They pressed for dollars as quickly as possible whenever they were entitled to a payment on curent account. . . In short, Britain's creditors passed an unfavourable judgment on Britain's economic prospects and employed every available means of exploiting their convertibility

62 As Robin Edmonds points out, Bevin's preoccupation with Marshall aid and the Cabinet's preoccupation with whether to nationalize the iron and steel industries detracted fkom the issue of convertibility. On the other side of the Atlantic, despite the concems of certain officials like Marshall, the US. Treasury seemed oblivious to the fact that Britain might not be able to sustain convertibility. "Until the very last moment, the British pride and the American prejudice that had cornbined to produce the ternis of the Financial Agreement of 1945, were too powerfid to allow either side to face reality" (Setting the MouZd, pp. 1 04-5).

63 See Morgan, Labour in Power, appendices III and W.

Gardner, Sterling-Dollar, p.3 17. These figures should be compared with those of the period January to June 1947, when $270 million was drawn fkom the loan. privileges before it was too late?

The British Cabinet did not meet until 1 August 1947 to discuss the convertibility crisis.

Finally, at a Cabinet meeting on 17 August 1947, the Chancellor of the Exchequer

"proposed . . . that immediate action should be taken . . . to Iimit the convertibility of

sterling." 66 The next day a delegation headed by Sir Wilfied Eady lefi for Washington to

inform the United States of Britain's intention to suspend convertibility. Bevin contacted

the U.S. Embassy in Britain and the American Ambassador wrote to the Secretary of

State, informing him of his conversation with the Foreign Minister:

During the five days, August 10-15, there had occurred a drain on British dollar resources in the amount of $175,900,000 . . . The Bank of England and the Treasury estimate the very minimum future drain at $ l7S,OOO,OOO each week and a probable maximum drain of about $300,000,000 each week. . . The British calculate that on this basis, the remaining $700~000,000of the American loan may last about two ~eeks.~~

Finally on 20 August, by means of a correspondence between the British Chancellor and

the Secretary of the US.Treasury, Louis Snyder, convertibility was officiaily suspended.

Dalton wrote:

His Majesty's Government have to Somthe United States Govemment that they have found it necessary to take immediate stringent measures to counter the recent excessive drain on their dollar resources. Uniess this drain is checked at once his Majesty's Goverriment will be unable to pursue the objectives of the international rnonetary and economic policy of which the Anglo-Arnerican

65 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar, pp.3 17- 18.

66 CAB 128/10 [CM 71(47)].

67 FRUS, 1947, Vol III, p.60. The figures the Ambassador provided were given to him by Bevin. Financial Agreement is a signal expression. Accordingly the system of transferable accounts will be rnodified at the close of the business day to-day, August 20, so as to make it possible effectively to control dollar out-payments. This action is of an emergency and temporary nature, which His Majesty's Govemment consider to be within the intentions and purposes of the Financial Agreement. . .

Snyder replied:

The United States Govemment acknowledges the United Kingdom's letter and takes sympathetic note of the grave drains to which its douar resources are currently being subjected. These drains have nui at a rate greatly in excess of the normal flow of current transactions with consequent peril to the recreation of the mdtiIateral payments system which is a major objective of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement. Zt is appreciated that the action described in the first paragraph of your Ietter is of an emergency and temporary nature . . .The United States notes with satisfaction the assurances of the United Kingdom that it will be possibIe to work out the proposed action within the fiamework of the Financial Agreement . . .68

Because Dalton described the suspension of convertibility as of "an emergency and temporary nature," the United States was able to consider it consistent with the clauses of the Financial Agreement. Subsection 2 of section 8 of the 1946 Anglo-American

Financial Agreement stated, "[tlhe Governments of the United States and the United

Kingdom agree that not Iater than one year after the effective date of this agreement unless in exceptional cases a later date is agreed upon after consultation, they will impose no restrictions on payments and transfers for cunent transactions." The United States adopted a very Ioose interpretation of "exceptional cases," for the suspension of convertibility was not only instituted with one country but in general. AIthough the remainder of the U.S. loan was fiozen, the suspension of convertibility was not

The Dalton-Snyder correspondence was printed in The Times (London), 21 August 1947, p.4. considered by the United States to be a breach of the agreement?'

By 25 August 1947, the British delegation had persuaded the U.S. Treasury to

allow the British govemment to "draw a further $150 million on 29th August. This would

leave $400 million of the credit on which, in accordance with our promise in the

exchange of letters with the Secretary of the United States Treasury, no merdrawings

would be made pending Merconsultation between the two Government~."~~

Nevertheless, on 21 October, in response to British assurances of their adherence

to the Anglo-Amencan Financiai Agreement and request to draw the remaining $400

million of the loan, the Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade Policy

suggested:

It is, however, most urgent i?om an economic and political point of view that the British be in a position to know that they can definitely count on the $400 million during the coming months. In the event that the British cannot definitely rely upon the availability of the $400 million, they may have to institute controls which would not only retard their recovery program, but which would probably lead them into larger violations of the loan agreement and may force them into complete bilateralism . . . It is recomrnended that the State Department . . . immediately approach Congressional Ieaders . . . In the event that the

69 ''In a w.S.]Cabinet meeting on August 29, 'the Secretary of the Treasury reported on the concluding stages of the British loan agreement talks and indicated that it was expected that the British would continue to operate within the terms and conditions of the Act, using such latitude as was pemiitted in Sections 8 and 9."' (FRUS, 1947, Vol III, p.69, footnote 1). However as Newton points out "After the suspension of convertibility the sterling area becarne a discriminatory economic bloc once more. The dollar-pooling arrangements were reintroduced, and in September 1947 the leading members of the area agreed to tighten both their import controls against dollar goods and their exchange controls to prevent leakages of hard currency" C'The Sterling Crisis'', p.401). Convertibility was not restored until December 1958 (Edrnonds, Setting the Mould, p. 104).

CAB 128/10 [CM 74 (47)l. This arrangement was considered a "secret understanding" (CAB l28/lO [CM 73 (47)]). 37

Congressional leaders personally approve the release of the remainder of the credit and state that they wiil support before Congress an executive decision to release the $400 million. . . it is recommended that withdrawals be permitted.''

On 3 December 1947 the Secretary of the Treasury appeared before the Senate and House

Bankuig and Currency Cornmittees with a request that they suppoa the resumption of

British drawing of the loan. On 4 December the same request was made of Senator Taft,

the Chairman of the Joint Econornic Committee. Ai1 Congressional committees gave their

approval and the United Kingdom was permitted to draw the final $400 million of the

U.S. loan? Yet again, the United States was willing to Save Britain fiom economic cnsis.

On 19 December, shortly fier his release of the remainder of the loan, Truman

presented an outline of the European Recovery Program to the Senate Foreign Relations

~ommittee."Truman requested that Congress appropriate $6.8 billion in aid to Europe

71 FRUS, 1947, Vol III, pp. 8 1-2.

See FRUS, 1947, Vol III, pp.93-4.

" For text see United States Code Congressional Service - Laws of the 80th Congress, First Session (St Paul's, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1948), pp. 1879-91. This outline was taken fiom the Committee for European Economic Cooperation report. The original report indicated that the western European deficit between 1948-1952 would amount O $28.2 billion (Newton, "The Sterling Crisis" p.403). However, ''the State Department was unsatisfied by the proposals emerging fiom the CEEC. Lovett [the Under Secretary of State] complained that the Paris Conference had merely produced 'sixteen shopping lists' . . . In these circumstances, a consensus developed in Washington that the United States should 'lend fi-iendly aid in draftingy- 'fÏiendly aid' meaning pressure for more cooperation; and the most effective sanction lay in suggesting that the Republican- dominated Congress, hostile to large programs of federal spending, would refuse to approve a plan on the scale of that proposed in the CEEC report . . . By December, through the work of the technical committees, the United States had whittled the request . . . down to $17 billiony'(Newton, "The Sterling Crisis", pp.404-5). for the period from April 1948 to June 1949." In the opening months of 1948 the United

States Congress demonstrated its wiliingness to commit itself to post-war western

European recovery. Mer three months of debate, Congress ratified the Economic

Cooperation ~ct." On 3 April 1948 Tnunan signed the Act, known as the "Marshall

Plan.'776 Congress appropriated $4.3 billion for the first fifteen months of the program. A total of $13.3 billion was allocated for the period 1948-195Z'7

Marshall aid was crucial to Western European economic recovery, particulariy to the economic su~valof Britain. Out of the sixteen European nations partïcipating in the program, Britain was the largest beneficiary of the aid, receiving $3.2 billion? By 1951,

British economic recovery was such that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was able to announce that Britain no longer needed its quota of Marshall aid."

74 United States Code Congressional Service, p. 1884.

75 The Soviet coup in Prague, Czechoslovakia on 25 February provided Congress with the motivation quickly to pass the Economic Cooperation Act (Ritchie Ovendale, English-Speaking Alliance bondon: George Allen &Unwin, 19851, p.76).

76 For text of the Economic Cooperation Act, see appendix 2. The Act was passed by a vote of 3 18 to 75.

77 Perkins, "Unequal Partners", p.57.

78 Ibid., p.57.

79 Morgan, Labour in Power, p.272. However, as Peter Weiler points out, Marshall aid was a method of extending American control over the British economy: ''The slow Pace of European economic revival, the need to revive Germany, the continued appeal of Comrnunism - were solved by the Marshall Plan. By providing West European counties with massive amounts of capital, the Marshall Plan raised productivity and successfully diverted political attention from ownership and distribution of wealth to economic growth . . . At the same time the plan provided the tremendous leverage the United States needed to push European economies dong the lines it preferred, both by In 1948 Anglo-American collaboration intensified. Not only did the Prague coup encourage Congressional support for aid to Europe, but it aiso inspired a series of talks on western European defence. The first of these were the discussions between Britain,

France and the Benelux coutries on mutual defence. The Brussels Treaty, which committed each nation to defending any other if attacked, was signed on 17 March

1948." The Brussels Treaty was the European initiative for a western defence system; it was designed to draw an Amencan commitrnent to the security of western Europe:

No more than anyone did Bevin expect the Brussels treaty to lead to effective defence. Indeed no military buildup of forces followed. He sought to create a vehicle for military CO-operationwith the United States and, by showing the Amencans that Britain was willing to do its share, to lessen resistance to what would be a shatte~gdeparture fiom the American tradition against alliances, especially peacetime ones. The Brussels treaty was 'in Bevin's eyes, really littie more than a carefidly arranged trigger for an American ~ommitment.'~~

Bevin's plan ultimately worked. The day the treaty was signed Truman announced: ''1 am sure that the determination of the free nations of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them."" In March 1948 secret defence taiks between Britain, the United States and Canada took place in Washington,

direct intervention (American administrators oversaw al1 spending) . . .and by requirements for monetary and financial meaçures that accepted the full logic of the capitalist market . . ."(Ernest Bevin, p. 166).

'O Edmonds, Setting the Mould, p. 175.

8' Perb, "Unequai Partners", p.57.

Quoted in Barker, The British Befween, p. 128. and a plan for a collective North Atlantic defence pact was conceived."

In response to the Brussels Treaty, a U.S. bill on the collective security of western

Europe was presented to the Senate on 19 May 1948. It had been approved by Marshail and Tnunan and had circulated in the National Secunty Council. The bill, called the

Vandenberg Resolution, was adopted on Il June as a Senate resolution." The bill read:

Whereas peace withjustice and the defence of human rights and fundamental fieedoms require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore it be Resolved, . . . That the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives . . . (2) Progressive developrnent of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, p~ciples, and provisions of the Charter. (3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as effect its national security. (4) Contributhg to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the nght of individual or collective self-defense under Article 5 1 should any armed attack occur effecting its national security. . .85

These US. initiatives took place against the backdrop of increased Soviet aggression. On

1 April 1948 the Soviet Union imposed a partial blockade on Berlin, cutting off the unified Western zone from land access to the West. On 24 July al1 "rail, road and water routes between the Western zones and Berlin" were severed? The blockade lasted until

83 Ibid., p.128. The U.K-US-Canadian "Pentagon Programme", as the plan was referred to, never reached fruition.

" See FRUS, 1948, Vol III, p. 118, footnote 1.

8S Ibid., pp. 135-6-

86 Ovendale, The English-Speakhg Alliance, p.79. the end of May 1949. During the Berlin bIockade, Britain and the United States took joint

action in providing the city with supplies by air. In addition to cooperation during the

blockade, the British and Amencan governments agreed to the transfer of an Amencan

strategic bomber force to British bases. By August 1948 there were three groups of

atomic-capable B29s stationed in ri tain.'^ On 11 June the State Department circulated a

secret policy statement:

The basic objectives of US policy toward Britain are to obtain maximum British cooperation in the establishment of a just and lasting peace and in the protection of ounational interest. It is our dual objective that peace shall be maintained by cooperation with other like-minded nations, of which Britain is the outstanding example . . . British fnendship and cooperation is not only desirable in the United Nations and in dealing with the Soviets; it is necessary for Amerïcan defense . . . As a defense measure, it is our object to continue to deveiop, on an informal basis, wartime cooperative military arrangements with the United Kingdom, particularly as they relate to the exchange of information, the exchange of oEcers' training, arrns standardization, and the mutuai use of each other's naval and air ports. . .We must guard against any subterfige by the Soviets designed to create a sense of fdse securïty in Bntain and other western powers which wodd result in less determination to create a western union, political, economic, and military . . . 88

This extension of rnilitary cooperation was the bais of Bevin's vision for American

involvement on the European continent.

A few months after the signing of the Brussels Treaw, Britain, France, the

Benelux countrîes, Canada and the United States met in Washington to discuss plans for .' western securïty. Discussions began on 9 September 1948, and by 24 Decernber al1

" See Edmonds, Setring the Mould, pp. 180- 1. '' FRUS, 1948, Vol III, pp. 1091-1 108. 42

nations agreed to a report which in essence embodied the North Atlantic Treat~.'~In April

1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, committing the western

democracies to mutual defence against aggression?' Emest Bevin had stnven since the

end of the war to secure this kind of explicit US. commitrnent to the security of westem

Europe. NATO was the ultirnate achievement of immediate post-war British foreign

policy, as it appeared to fomalize Britain's alliance with the United States. Bevin's role

in sectukg this American cornmitment is considered to be "his most important and most

lasting a~hievernent.''~'As Bevin's biographer Aian Bullock has noted, the signing of

NATO was the climax of Bevin's career as Foreign Mini~ter.~~

The Anglo-American relationship f?om 1945 to 1949 was undoubtedly a special one. Through the 1940's the United States demonstrated its wilhgness to provide Britain with substantial economic and militay aid, preventing British economic coiiapse and maintainhg Britain's traditionai sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and Middle

East. The loan of 1945; assistance to Turkey and Greece; allowing Britain, without consequence, to suspend convertibity; providing Marshall aid, the largest portion of which went to Britain; and finally formalizing a military conunitment to Europe, were al1 essential to British political and financial survival.

89 Morgan, Labour in Power, p. 175. The seven-power cornmittee report was almost a duplicate of the "Pentagon Programme" devised in March 1948 during the tripartite Anglo-herican-Canadian defence talks.

For text of the treaty see appendix 3.

91 Barker, The British Between, p. 13 1.

92 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p.672. 43

Britain was clearly a junior prirtner in the Anglo-Arnerican relationship; assistance was not provided without conditions. In the period 1945 to 1949 Britain ceded major imperid interests. Zndia and Palsistan were granted independence and the mandate of

Palestine was abandoned, Further, Britain committed itself to muhilateral trade, The

United States certainly demanded concessions in remfor its aid to Bntain, and there were clear tensions in the evolving post-war relationship. However, in generai terms, the

Anglo-American relationship strengthened in the years after the war; by 1949 the two nations were intricately bound in an economic, political and rnilitary alliance. Chapter 2: Anglo-American Atomic Relations and British Atomic Decision-Making Structures

The atomic relationship between the United States and Britain is in some ways a

niicrocosm of the larger relationship between the two countries; dthough British

scientists contributed substantially to the atomic project (Iike many o*er rnilitary aspects

of the war), it became dominated by the United States by 1945. However, der 1945, the

atomic relationship differed significantiy f?om the broader relationship. Despite a general

alignment of policy after 1946, Britain was excluded fiom atomic partnership with the

United States. As has been discussed, Britain gained significantly fiom its 'special

relationship' with the United States. In return for collaboration and cornpliance with

United States' economic and foreign policy, it gained security fiom the Soviet Union in

Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, as well as vast arnounts of Arnerican

capital to rebuild its econcmy. However, in atomic matters, despite British efforts, the

relationship ceased to exist afier the war. It was not until 1958 that full atomic collaboration between the two nations was revived.'

In March 1939 the results ofsplitting an atom of uranïÜm were discovered by

' In July 1958 the "'Agreement for Cooperation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes" was signed by Britain- and the-United States. "Under it Britain was able to receive technical information on production of nuclear warheads, as well as fissile matenal , and was the only nation to be so privileged . . ." (Alistair Horne, "The Macmillan Years and Aftenuards", in The Special Relationship, pp.8-9-90) . However, as Margaret Gowing points out, the 1958 agreement contributed to the perpetuation of British dependence on the United States. "Today, what Bntain calls her independent nuclear deterrent is dependent on the provision of missiles, though not of nuclear warheads, fiom the United States . . ." (Gowhg, 'Nuclear Weapons and the 'Special Relationship "', in-Ths SpeciaZ -Rdations?zip;pA 17). 45 -

Hungarian physicists Eugene Wigner and Leo Szilard? These results were published on

the-eveof World Wâi'II, but were met with scepticism because of the difficdties of

creating ~Ïss~o~?o~natmal uranimrr? Because of this dilemma and the diff~cultiesof

separating uranium atoms, many scientists did not believe that-ucanium fission was

practical. Atomic research was undertaken in many countries, including the United States

and Britain, but was not thought to be a valuable contribution to the war against

Germany 3

Ground-breaking research that enabled the development of atomic energy

occurred in 1940. At Birmingham University, the refugee Austrian and German physicists

Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls, building on the work of Nieis Bohr, decided that the

' Lawrence S. Wittner, One World Or None (Stdord: Stanford University Press, 1993), p-7. It was found that when neutrons - the fundamental particles at the heart of the atom - bornbarded an atom of uranium, not only were various fission fragments and an immense amount of energy released but also some spare neutrons which could fly off and split .other.uranium-atoms,.so. that .achain reaction-waspossible-wih- the release of-more and more and still more energy (Margaret Gowing, "Britain, America and the Bomb", in D.Dilks- [ed.], Retreutfiorn Power, Volume 2 [London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 198 1'1, p. 121).

The results of uranium fission were published by Danish physicist Niels Bohr. Szilard and Wigner, fearing that any developments in atomic research might be used by Hitler to create a weapon of mass destruction, urged Bohr and other physicists to refiain fiom publishing the results. However, Bohr refused, partly because he "doubted the feasibility of nuclear fission for explosives . . . and considered it unlikeIy that an atornic bomb-would bë built for many years, if ëverWwttner, One Worid,p.71.

Natural uranium contains "99.3% of uranium 238 atoms and only 0.7% of uranium 235 atoms. If a chain reaction in natural uranium is to succeed you have to slow dom - or moderate - the neutrons which cause the fission so that they have a better chance of hitting the fissile U235 atoms. But if you slow the neutrons down you do not get the f~ticalLy-fast-reaction youneedfor anexplosion - for a bornb."(Gawing, - . "Britain, Arnerica and the Bomb", p.122). construction of bombs based on a 'buclear chah reaction in uranium" was in fact possible? Frisch and Peierls discovered that pure uranium 235 could give off the quick chah reaction necessary to create an explosion. They aiso discovered that U235 could be separated fkom natural uranium. This discovery Ied to the establishment of the MAUD

Comrnittee, responsible, under direction of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, for investigating the feasibility of making a uranium bomb! The Cornmittee began working in Apd 1940, and in July 1941 it compiled a report asserting that the construction of a uranium bomb was possible before the end of the war and recommending that the project be given high-t priority. It aiso suggested that collaboration with the United States be extended,'

While the MAUD Cornmittee's work was in process there had been some collaboration with the United States, mostly in the form of the exchange of information.

5 The 'Frisch-Peierls Mernorandum' is in Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1 945,(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., l965), appendix 1, p.3 89.

Gowing; Bntain and Aromic Energy, p.82. The name MAUD was chosen because: "When Denmark was overrun by the Gemans Niels Bohr had sent Dr. Frisch a telegram, the latter part of which read 'Tell Cockcroft and Maud Ray KentThis was believed to be a garbled message about radium or perhaps about 'uranium disintegration' and it was ody afier the war that it was found that there was in fact a lady called Maud Ray in Kent who had been a governess to the Bohr children and to whom Bohr wanted a message sent" (Brifain and Atornic Energy, p.45). See also Ronald Clark, The Bi& of the Bomb, (London: Phoenix House Ltd,, l96l), pp.76-7. '"Report by the M.A.U.D. Cornmittee on the Use of Uranium for a Bomb" is in Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, Appendix 2, p.398. For a detailed discussion of the MAUD Cornmittee's work fiom its inception until the completion of its report, see chapter 2. The United States had been working on its own uranium project since October 1939,8but

had been concentrating on slow neutron reactions.

[A]lthough-they-had, early-in--1 941, dernonstrated the fissile properties of plutonium . . .the Pace was desultory and the Americans had not really grasped the point about the fast reactions for bombs. Their effort till then was rather like the German effort; they made progress but did not ask the leading scientific questions. -1tms ody whenthey. rea&the bxilliantMaudReportthat they took the -- project seriously . . ?

James Conant, who later became the Chairman of the US. National Defense Research

Council, admitted that before his visit to London in March 1941 he had not even heard

"about even the remote possibility of a b~rnb."'~The MAUD Cornmittee sent its report to

Vannevar Bush, Director of the US. Office of Scientific Research and Development, in

the summer of 1941." Before the compilation of the MAUD Report, there were "no

significantmilitary -applications-yetin sight" in-the- American projectI2 David-Diiks-

suggests that Roosevelt hïmself admitted that the scientific knowledge supplied by Britain

was .the.fcmost-valuable. cargo ever -to reach-American shores.'.'"-Aware. that British

Gowing, 'cc~fitain,America and the Bomb", p. 124.

'O Quoted in Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1986), p.359. See also Martin Shenvin, A World Deshoyed (New York: AlfÏed Knopf, 1975), p.69.

l1 Sherwin, A World Destroyed, p.69.

'' Gowing, Brituin and Atomic Energy, p. 1 16.

l3 Diks, introduction to Retreatfi-orn Power, p.3. During the war, atomic information as well as other scientific secrets (such as radar), were exchanged by the British for Arnerican material aid. (See Clarke, The Birth of the Bomb, p. 160 and scientists were much farther ahead in their research, President Roosevelt requested the

establishment of a joint atomic project. In October 1941 he wrote to Churchill, requesting that "any extended efforts may be coordinated or even jointly conducted." l4

A meeting was held in November to discuss nuclear collaboration but no commitments were made to establish a joint project. The meeting concluded only with plans for the exchange of atomic information between the two nations.15 What Britain did not foresee was how soon after these negotiations the United States would job the war.

Roosevelt had been sent a memorandum conceming the feasibility of atomic weapons in late November 1941. On 6 December 1941 a new uranium research organization was established under the direction of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which also directed the National Defense Research Cornmittee. One day later, Japan attacked the U.S. base at Pearl Harbour. "From [that] me onward the Amencan effort multiplied exceedingly and within six months had fa outstripped the British effort in terms of reso~rces."'~As the official historian for the United Kingdom Atomic Energy

Sherwin, A World Destroyed, pp.68-9).

14 Quoted in Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p.123. See also Shenvin, A WorZd Destroyed, pp -69-70.

l5 Gowing suggests that the British were wary of full coIlaboration because, as the United States was not at war, atomic matters were being openly discussed at universities and in some journals. The British were willing to provide the Amencan project with some suggestions, but collaboration ended there (Britain and Atornic Energy, pp. 123 -4). Authority puts it, the British "missed the bus-" By spring of 1942 the Amencan uranium

project - now called the Manhattan Project - had been taken over by the War Department

and was much more advanced than the British pr~ject.

Some US. administrators, fully remernbering Britain's supenor tone during the

1941 negotiations for collaboration and aware that their project had far surpassed that of

the British, believed that the exchange of atomic information with Britain should cease.

Wow that the project had moved beyond the stage of basic research, Conant saw 'no

reason for a joint enterprise as far as development and manufacture is concemed.'""

Afte~Jan---1.943 the United-States -adopted.apolicy-of "restricted interchange" of

atomic information with Britain, on Conant's re~ommendation.'~On 1 1 January 1943, Sir

John Anderson, the Lord President of the Council and atornic advisor to Churchill,

informed the Prime Minister of the United States' recent policy of restricted interchange

of atomic information:

Recently, however, apparently for budgetary reasons, control of the project in the United States has been handed over to the United States Army Department . . . In the meantirne in pursuance of the policy of full coIIaboration agreed on between the President and yourself, we have been keeping the United States Authonties fully informed of our position and progress. I have today been informed that the United States Authorities have receîved an order which restricts interchange of information on this subject . . . It appears that this p~cipleis being interpreted to mean that information must be withheld from us over the greater part of the field

l7 Quoted in Sherwin, A World Destroyed, p.71. Conant resented the fact that the United States had done most of the atomic development work after 1941. He also believed that Bhinwould attempt to use atomic energy for industrial purposes and feared potential commercial rivaky (A World Destroyed, pp.7 1-2).

l8 Ibid., p.73 and Gowing, "Nuclear Weapons and the 'Special Relationship"', p.119. of tube alloys . . .19

Mer learning about the new American atomic policy and after being advised that the

British project did not have the resources to complete an atomic bomb before the end of the ~ar,~'Churchill "did not hesitate to initiate a major effort to have the new policy reversed,"" and atternpted to enter the American project as an equal partner in the construction and manufacture of atomic bombs." In January 1943 Churchill approached

Harry Hopkins, a Roosevelt aide, for it had become clear that collaboration would only be achieved through a Presidential-Prime Mlliisterial agreement? Churchill used -the rationale that the bornb would cleariy be developed more quickly if the Amencans and the British worked in cooperation, while reminding the Americans that "we must always remember that the Russians, who are peculiarly well equipped scientifically for this kind of development, may well be working on the Tube Alloy project somewhere beyond the

Urals and making great progress.""' Fear of the progress of the German and Soviet bornb projects and the desire to manufacture an atomic weapon-as quickly as possible led to

'O As early as July 1942; Anderson-advisedthe-.PriïneM~steri "In these- . . circumstances, 1have corne to the conclusion . . .that we must now make up our minds that the full scale plant for production . . . can only be erected in the United States" (PREM 3/139/8A).

" Gowing, ''Nuclear Weapons and the 'Special Relationship"', p. 119.

Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, p. 159.

24 Minute fkom Anderson to Prime Minister, 29 Apnl 1943 (PREM 3/13 9/8A). Rooseveit's decision to resume atomic collaboration with Britain on the basis of fidl and equal parinership. On 19 August 1943 the secret Quebec Agreement was signed- It declared:

It is-agreed berneen us First, that we will never use this agency against each other. Secondly, tm we will not use it againg thud parties without each other's consent. ThirdIy,-that wewilk not -either-ofus-communicate-any-informatiorr about Tube Alloys to third parties except by mutual consent. . . . And FiMy, that the following arrangements shall be made to ensure full and effective collaboration between the two countries in bringing the project to fition . . . . In the field of scientific research and development there shall be full and effective interchange of information and ideas between those in the two countries engaged in the same sections of the field?

The agreement called for British participation in the massive Manhattan Proje~t.~~After the Quebec Agreement was signed, '' almost al1 of British physicists workingon uranium

235 and fast neutron bomb calculations joined the United States pr~ject."'~

The Declaration of Trust. signed by Churchill and Roosevelt on 13 June 1944,

25 Edrnonds, Setting the MouZd, p.52. .

L6 The full text of the Quebec Agreement can be found in PREM 3/139/10. The Quebec Agreement established the AngIo-American Combined Policy Cornmittee, where atomic policy was formulated.

27 The Manhattan Project was completely secret; although Roosevelt requested that Congress allocate $2 billion to the project, he referred to it only as a secret defence project. He refked to disclose specific details but insisted that the project was necessary to the war effort.

Gowing, "Bntain, Amenca and the Bomb", p. 126 (see also Clark, The Birth of the Bomb, p. 1%). British scientists were "found in several, but not ail, parts of the United States project: the biggest British contingent was at Los Alamos, the rnost secret holy.of holies where the bomb was fabricated, but no British scientists were admitted to the US factones where plutonium was to be produced" (Gowing, "Bntain, Amenca and the Bomb", p. 127). increased Anglo-American atomic collaboration. The Declaration established the

Combined Development Trust:

Whereas it is the intention of the Two Governments to controt to the Mlest extent practicable=the--supplies.of uraniurri. and.tho~~ ores -;. . The Trust shali:use its - best endeavours to gain control of and develop the production of the uranium and thorium supplies . . . and al1 uranium and thorium and al1 uranium and thorium ores and supplies and properties acquired by the Trust shall be held by it in tnist for the Two Govemments johtly . . . Ai1 fhds properly required by the Trust for the performance of its functions shall be provided as to one-half by the Governmentof the .United-States of-America and the ,other hdf by the Govenunent of the United Kingdom ."

This meant that the United States and Britain would seek jointly to monopolize and

administer as much uranium as possible. The Declaration also had another major

significance, for its last clause stated:

The signatories of this Agreement and Declaration of Trust dl,as soon as practicable after the conclusion of hostilities, recommend to their respective Governments-the- extension- and- revision. of this .wartime.emergency .agreement to cover post war conditions and its fomalization by treaty or other proper rnethod.

The- 19 September-HydeTarkAide=Memokfurther cornmitteclthe-United States and Bntain to a monopoly on atomic information and post-war collaboration:

The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding tube alloys, with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a 'bomb' is finally available, it might perhaps, &er mature consideration, be used against .the.Japanese,-who- should -bewarned .that-this.bombardment .util1.be - repeated until they surrender. . . Full collaboration between the United States and the British Govemment in developing tube alloys for military and commercial purposes should continue afier the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by

29 The 'Declaration of Trust' is in PREM 3/l39/lO. joint agreement, . . .30

Churchill told his colleagues in September 1944 that the atornic agreement with

Roosevelt was based on "indefinite collaboration in the post-war period subject to termination by joint agreement.'" He later said that the only thing "that would intempt

[the atomic relationship] . ..wodd be if he and the President, Bush and Chenvell

[Arnerican and British atomic advisors] were alf killed in one railway accident since they dl saw eye to e~e.'"~Ironically, only rnonths after his conversation with Churchill at

HydePark, Roosevelt was dead. As wartime atomic documents had been kept secret, few officials in London or Washington knew of their existence." Even the US. Secretary of

War, Henry Stimson, did not see the Hyde Park Aide-Mernoire until 18 June 1945, when

Churchill sent Truman a photocopy." Although the British had no fear that Roosevelt wouid not honow the secret-wartimeagreements, Truman "would not be bound by [them]

. . . unless Congress endorsed tJ~ern."~~

30 The 'Aide-Memoire of Conversation between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, 19th September, 1944' is in PREM 3/13 9/10.

31 Telegram fiom Prime Muiister to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 21 September 1944 (PREM 3/l 3W8A).

32 Quoted in Gowing, Britain and Atornic Energy, p.3.4 1.

33 Martin Shenvin points out that: "The Piesident at tiine made décision on atomic energy in consultation with Churchill without the advice of knowledge of his advisors . . . This secret, idiosyncratic approach led, naturaily enough, to considerable confusion in Anglo-American atomic energy relations . . ."(A World Destroyed, p.68).

34 Edrnonds; Sening the Mould, pp.-52-3.

35 Gowing, Briiain and Atomic Energy, p.342. 54

After Roosevelt died in April 1945, Bntain began to feel less sure about the future of the Anglo-Amencan atornic relationship but rernained committed to promoting collaboration. Churchill believed that Anglo-American atornic collaboration "would be but one facet of a profound Anglo-Amencan understanding which would be a foundation of stability in the post-war ~orld.'"~Therefore, in accordance with his agreement with

Roosevelt at Hyde Park, on 29 June 1945 Churchill approved the use of the atomic bomb.

When given the minute entitled the

"Operational Use of T.A.[Tube Alloy]", Churchill initialed it, authorizing the use of atomic weapons against f apad7

On 16 July 1945, the opening day of the Potsdam Conference, the British Chiefs of Staff received a telegram fkom Washington "saying that the Americans had issued instructions that information on research and development in the defense field should not be passed on unless it could be applied to the war against ~a~an."~*Before this matter could be addressed by Churchill, he was replaced by Clement Attlee as Prime Mir~ister?~

Before July 1945, Attlee and his Shadow Cabinet had not been informed about the development of atomic weapons, Britain's participation in the Manhattan Project, or of

36 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence,Volurne 1, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1974), p.7.

37 Ibid., p.53 The minute, written by Anderson requesting British authorization of the use of the atomic bomb on Japan is in PREM 3/239/8A. '' Barker, The British Between, p.28.

39 Attlee was swom in on 27 July 1945. Churchill's wartime atomic agreements with the United States.40CfiurcbïIl had fostexed the sarne secrecy as Roosevelt around the issue of atomic energy. No Labour membeirs of the wartime governrnent had ever been informed about the atomic project and even the

British Chiefs of SMwere not informed about the development of atomic weapons until

1945:' Despite the lack of discussion of the implications of the use of atomic weapo-ns by the members of the Attlee govemment, Churchill's decision was not questioned- As

Gowing points out, "the British govemment's consent was duly asked for and duly gi~en.'~~On 6 August 1945 a uranium 235 atomic bomb, nicknarned Litrle Boy was dropped on Hiroshima and on 9 August a plutonium based atomic bomb, Fat Mm, was dropped on ~a~asaki.~'The bombs, dropped by American bombers with British consent, killed approxirnately 200,000 Japanese civilians."

Christopher Thome suggests the British govemnent's role in the decision to use atomic bombs on Japan was only a forma1 one:

40 Barker, The British Between, p.28 See also Gowing, Independence and Detemence, Volume 1, p.5.

" Gowing, "Britain, Amenca and the Bomb", p. 127. " Paul Boyer, Promises to Keep, (Lexington: D.C.Heath and Company, 1995p, p.33.

44 The-US..Strategic-Bombing Survey's imrnediate-post-waxestimate-of deaths at Hiroshima was 78,000 (Witiner, One WorZd, pp.3 50- 1, endnote 47). However later Japanese estimates submitted to the United Nations in 1976, place the nurnber of immediate deaths at Hiroshima and Nagasaki at 140,000 and 70,000 respectively. (See John Dower, "Three Narratives of Our Humanity", in E. Linenthal and T. Engelhardt [eds.], Hisrory Vars pew York; Henry Holt and Company hc., 19961, p.263, endnote 28). At the end of 1944, General Groves, in charge of the project in the U.S.A., had informed Marshall that a bomb would be ready around the beginning of August . . . London, for its part, was informed in April[1945] of the intention of the United States autfiorities to mort to the new weapon 'some time -inAugust' . More detailed plans followed at the end of June, accompanied by a request for Britain's approval of what was intended. That approval was duiy given . . . with 'never a moment's hesitation', as Churchill later put it, and without any knowledge of the various arguments which had been taking place among Americans involved in the project. In the words of an official historian, the British Government 'had found that they were most successfiil when they acknowledged the limits of their contribution , and the rnanner in which they now gave their consent to the use of the weapon was designed to respect that fact. The balance of power, both in the atomic project and in the Pacific, lay too heavily with the United States for the British to be able, or to wish, to participate in this decision.' This accomrnodating attitude was sustained by Churchill at Potsdam . . . Attlee. too, never doubted that it was right to go ahead?

After the bombings, the new-Labour government attempted to formulate some kind of coherent atomic policy. Attlee was particularly concemed about the possibility of a nuclear arms race if atomic information was not shared with the Soviet Union. In a letter to President Truman in September 1945, he proposed that the United States, Britain and Canada meet to discuss possibIe atomic cooperation among United Nations rnernber~!~A meeting was set to discuss international collaboration and the future of

45 T'home, Allies ofa Kind, p.53 3. "What is certain is that it was not until after the two atomic bombs had been dropped on Japan that the British began to take an active part in the eamest debate about the bomb's implications that had begun in Washington at the beginning of May I 945."(Edmonds, Setting the Mould, p.55) Moreover, as Michael Anirine points out in The Great Decision, there was "barely a line in the P.S.] record to show any consultation with the British. . . the various cornmittee considering the use of the bomb hardly gave a moments' consideration to the British position in the mattery7 (Quoted in Clark, %e Birth of the Bornb, p. 193).

46 Letteer.j?onz-Mr..Attlee tu President. Truman,.document -No. -1-96,DBPO, Series - 1, Volume II (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1985), pp. 544-547. See also PREM 811.1 7. Anglo-Amencan collaboration on 9 November 1945:' Three documents were produced during the November conference. The (public) 15 November Washington Declaration recomrnended the establishment of a United Nations Commission responsible for

"extendhg between dl nations the exchange of basic scientific information . . . control[lingJ . . .atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes . . . elimùiat[ing] from national armarnents . . . atomic weapons . . . The secret ccGroves-Anderson"Memorandum, signed on 16 November, reiterated the principles ofthe -wartime atomic agreements-andexplicitly cdedfor "full. and-effective cooperation in the fieid of basic scientific research . . . developrnent, design, construction, operation of plants . . ." between the United States, Britaui, and canada." The fmai document was a secret "briefer document" to record an agreement between Truman and

Attlee until a formal document could be drawn up to replace the "Quebec Agreement" and ccDeclarationof Trust", which were only applicable during wartime. The document, signed by Attlee, Truman and MacKenzie-King, stated:

1. We desire that there should be full and effective CO-operationin the field of atomic energy between the United Stares, the United Kingdom and Canada. 2. We agree that the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust should be continued in a suitable form.

48 The "Washington Declaration" is in PREM 8/117, document No. 233 in DBPO, Series 1, Volume II, pp.6 18-620 and United Sfates Sratufes at Large, Volume 60, part 2 (Washington: United States Govemrnent Prïnting Office, 1947), pp. 1480-1482.

49 The "Groves-Anderson Memorandum" was signed by John Anderson (who remained a chief atomic advisor for the Labour government) and General Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project. The memorandum is in CAB 130/3 and in Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, appendix 5, pp. 85-6. 3. We request the Combined Policy Cornmittee to consider and recommend to us appropriate arrangements for this p~rpose.'~

Despite these hopefui agreements, close Anglo-Arnericanatomic collaboration

began to disintegrate after 1945. Although general relations between Bntain and the

United States warmed after 1946, as European economic recovery and containment of the

Soviet Unianbecme the facdpaints a£ A&-AmeScanpaLicy,. atamic relations

became drastically more distant, paradoxically reaching a low point "in August 1946, just when Amencan attitudes to the British began to thaw.'"' The deterioration of atornic collaboration cm be attributed to several events, such as the legislation of the McMahon

Act, the simdtaneous breakdown of Anglo-Amencan collaboration on the executive level, and negotiations at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

The Atomic Energy Act was introduced by Senator Brien McMahon in December

1945. The bill was presented in opposition to the May-Johnson Act, a bill legislated in the

War Deparûnentwhich proposed themilitary-controlof atomic energy.?' The original .-

McMahon bill primarily prornoted the establishment of civil control over atomic energy.

It also called for international control and collaboration. However international circumstances changed the nature of the bill to the disadvantage of the British. In

February 1946 a Canadian spy ring was exposed and the British physicist, Dr. Alan Nunn

'O PREM 8/117.

Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.95.

52 Gregory Herken, American Diplomacy and the Atomic Bomb, 1945-1947 (Princeton University: PhD. Diss, 1974), p.206. May, was discovered to be involved? This, paired with increasing anxiety about the

expansion.of the -Soviet.Unionand-the -failure of the -U.N. commission to achieve Angle-

American-Soviet atomic cooperation, created feelings of suspicion and mistrust in the

United States, By April 1946 the substance of the act had changed significantly through various amendments made by a Senate Specid Committee:

When the Bill reappeared in the open in April 1946, 'the cornmon defense and security' of the state was included for the first time in the preamble as the prime objective of policy. A new clause (IO@)) introduced a new concept of 'restricted data' which covered al1 data about the manufacture or utilisation of atomic weapons, the production-of fissionablematerial orits. use in the production-of power?

While the bill was being debated in Congress, atornic relations in the Combined Policy

Committee were also deteriorating. A part of Brïtain's post-war atomic program was to build large scde atornic plants in the United Kingdom (the only such plants in existence were in the United States). The British Cabinet Committee responsible for atomic energy had -decided-on3. October 1945.to proceed with pIans .for the-constructionof a Research-

Establishment in the United Kingdom to explore al1 aspects of the development of atomic energy? In Januaiy 1946 it decided to build a large-sale graphite pile for the production

'' The5oviet spy ring in Canada was exposed when Igor Gouzenko, a clerk at the Soviet Embassy defected. The-informationbecarne publicon 15 Pebmary 1946 and Byrnes was questioned at a 19 Febmary press conference. (DBPO, Series I Volurne IV, p.124, note-10) For full account-see Margaret-Gowing, Independence and Deterrence,.

Volume 2, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1974); pp.14124. *

54 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, pp. 105-6.

55 CABl.3 [GEN75/3 rd meeting]. of pl~tonium?~This intention was announced to the Amencans at a meeting of the

Combined Policy Cornmittee on 15 February 1946, when the British representatives requested technical assistance to facilitate the developrnent of the British production pile?- On 17-Febmary.LordHaiifaxandField Marshal -Wilson@ritish~epresentati\tes~. . for the Combined Policy Cornmittee), sent word home:

Chadwick recently gave Groves an indication of the kind of information we shodd need to assist-us in our programme of development. Groves was disturbed by the implications of the request .. . In the course of the C.P.C. meeting reference was made to -the-intention of the -words 'full and effective CO-operation' in the memorandum signed by the President and the Prime-Minister on Novernber 16th . . . In the course of this discussion Groves referred to Chadwick's request and said that in the opinion of the War Department and General Eisenhower, the effect which might be given to it largely depended on the location of out large- scale production plants . . . [They] took the view that the British pile, for strategic reasons, should be located in Canada . . .58

However, Britain decided that it was both fmancially impractical and unreasonable for the

British pile to be located in Canada and continued to press for the full exchange of information in accordance with the two secret agreements signed at Washington in

While negotiations were taking place over the exchange of Somation for the construction of the British pile, another problem in collaboration arose for the British.

56 See CAB 130/3 and Memofrom Earl of Ha[iàx to Mr. Bevin, 30 January 1946, document No. 20 in DBPO, Senes 1, Volume IV, p.71.

DBPO, Senes I, Volume IV, pp. 120-1.

s8 CAB 13O/3 [GEN 75/26].

59 CAB 13 0/2 [GEN 75/11th meeting]. According to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter, dl agreements made between governrnents had to be registered with the U.N. secretariat and published. Formai peacetime agreements replacing the secret "Quebec Agreement" and the "Declaration of

Trust" would have to be made public. The American representatives to the C.P.C. argued that these agreements, if made public, would appear to contradict the purpose of the U.N.

Atornic Energy Commission and would outrage Congress. However, as Lord Halifax pointed out to John Anderson:

Although he took cover behind article 102 of the Charter, [Secretary of State] Bymes' real preoccupation is with the Senate. In the last three rnonths the relative power of the executive and the legislature has moved in favour of the latter. The consequences of the disclosure of a mersecret agreement concluded by Roosevelt have not encouraged the administration to make others. Moreover Bymes evidently thinks that the President has given an undertaking to the McMahon Cornmittee to disclose al1 relevant documents relating to atornic energy 60 .m.

When the Combined Policy Cornmittee met in April 1946 %e Americans made it clear they would not enter into any agreement" in the realm of atomic collaboration despite the agreements made in Washington in November 1945.~'Therefore collaboration would only continue on the basis of the rather vague wartirne agreements?

60 CAB 13013 [ANCAM 5401.

ci ' Ovendale; The English-Speaking Alliance, p.32. -See dsoBullock, Ernest Bevin, p.245.

" British officials believed that the "Quebec Agreement" and the "Declaration of Trusty3-could he amended infody_~hrmghaseriesexecutive correspondences,-thus - avoiding a formal agreement. The drafts. of these can be found in CAB 130/3 [GEN 75/25]. However at the C.P.C. meeting on 16 April 1946 'Yhe Amencans said that their legal advisers did not agree that this device solved the problem and they could not accept it .They pointed out that the arnendments proposed were arnendments of substance to the Prospects for collaboration only worsened through Apd 1946. After the newly amended Atomic Energy Act emerged from the Senate cornmittee, atomic relations on the executive level aiso began to deteriorate. On 20 April Truman abruptly rejected the exchange-of:infomation.to-assist the-British build a production.pileTsuggesting that technical assistance.was never intendedand went-against the principle of the tripartite -

Washington Declaration. In a telegram to Attlee, Truman stated:

The Secretary of State has informed me of the discussions in the Combined Policy Cornmittee with reference to the request of the representatives of the United Kingdom that they be furnished wiih fidl information as to the construction and operation of the atomic energy plants in this country in order that they may proceed to construct a plant somewhere in the United Kingdom. The Secretary advises me that the request is based upon . . .the rnemorandurn dated November 16, 1945, signed by Harry S. Truman, CR. Attlee and MacKenzie-King . . . 1 would regret it very much if there should be any misunderstanding by us as to this memorandum . 1think it is agreed by al1 of us that during the war under the Quebec Agreement the United States was not obligated to furnish the United Kingdom in the post-war period the designs and assistance in construction and operation of plants . . . "Full and effective collaboration' is very general. We must consider what was the intention of those who signed the memorandum. 1must Say that no one at any tirne informed me that the memorandum was proposed with the intention of having the United States obligate itself to fiirnish the engineering and operation assistance necessary for the construction of another atornic energy plant. Had that been done 1would not have signed the memorandum. . . As to ou entering at this time into an arrangement to assist the United Kingdom in building an atomic energy plant, 1think it wodd be exceedingly unwise . . . On November 15, the day prior to the signing of the memorandum first above referred to, the United kgdom, Canada and the United States issued jointly a declaration of our intention to request the United Nations to establish a commission to control the production of atomic energy so as to prevent its use for military purposes . . . 1 would not want to have it said that on the moming following the issuance of our declaration to brïng about internationai control we entered into a new agreement, original agreement . . . Whatever fonn was used the fact remained that it was proposed to change the basis of the wartime cooperation . . . [and] in fact, did constitute a new agreement and did not overcome the diEculty of Article 102 of the Charter" (Joint Staff Mission's report to Prime Minister,document No. 70 in DBPO, Series 1, Volume IV, pp.240-24 1). the purpose of which was to have the United States fùmish the information . . . which would enable the United Kingdom to construct another atomic energy

In-thesame telegram, Truman claimed that he had not been aware of the existence of the

Groves-Anderson Memorandum, "but believed it showed that, even in the minds of the gentlemen who had prepared the agreement we signed, the words 'fidl and effective co- operation' applied only to the field of basic scientific inf~rmation."~

On 1 June 1946, the Senate passed the Atomic Energy Act, which now expIicitly restricted the interchange of certain atomic information.65Attlee irnmediately contacted

Truman, urging for the renewal of atomic collaboration:

63 LetterfrOm President Truman to Mr. Aîtke, document No. 79 in DBPO, Series 1, Volume N,pp. 260-262. See also FRUS, (1946), Volume 1, pp. 1235-1237. British officials were given some indication that this might occur in the autumn of 1945, when Truman announced in the New York Times that the United States 'would not give away its engineering know-how which produced the atomic bomb to any nation. . . only the United States had the combination of indushial capacity and resources necessary to produce the bomb . . .although Britain and Canada had the bIueprint of the atomic bomb secret, they would be unable to apply the knowledge for lack of plant facilities" (Quoted in Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics pondon: Oxford University Press, 19721, p. 112). These fears had been alleviated , however, by the signing of agreements in November. " Ibid. At the April C.P.C. meeting, problems in Anglo-Arnencan atomic collaboration also arose over the issue of the allocation of uranium. It had become clear by March 1946 that supplies of uranium were going to start to dwindle by the end of 1947. The Americans thought that ailocation of uranium should be based on the needs of each nation's respective programmes. Britain, on the other hand, believed that uranium should be divided "on a 5050 bais between the United States on the one hand and the United Kingdom and Canada on the other . . ." General Groves, the head of the Manhattan Project, vehemently opposed this. In the end Britain managed to secure enough uranium to sustain its atomic project until the end of 1952 (See Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, pp. 102-4).

65 The section in the onginal bill titled "Dissemination of Information" was changed to "Control of Informationyy. 1redise that an-additional complication- may arise fiom-the fact that-the McMahon Bill containhg stringent provisions about the disclosure of information has within the last few days been passed-by the Senate. 1would nevertheless most strongly urge that for the reasons I have given for our continuing CO-operationover raw materials shall be balanced by an exchange of information which will give us, with dl proper precautions in regard to security, that full information to which we believe that we are entitled, both by the documents and by the history of our common efforts in the past?

When the McMahon Act was introduced into the House of Representatives it was

again arnended to tighten security. By the end of July 1946 Section 10 (a) of the

McMahon Act included the restriction of the exchange of al1 atomic information with any

foreign nation for military and even industrial use, until Congress decided, by joint

resolution, that the exchange of information would not constitute a threat to national or

international security. It read:

Sec. 10 (a) It shall be the policy of the pnited States Atomic Energy] Commission to control the dissemination -of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. Consistent with such policy, the Commission shall be guided by the following principles: ( 1) That until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards agaùlst the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been established, there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes . . . (b) RESTRICTIONS. -- (1) The term 'restricted data' as used in this section means al1 data concerning the manufacture -orutilization-of atomic weapons; the-production .of fissionable= -

66 Letterfrom Mr AttLee to President Truman, document No. IO7 in DBPO, Senes 1, Volume IV, pp.339-343. See also FRUS (1946), Volume 1, pp. 1249- 1253. Atttee referred to raw materials because the agreements to secure uranium ores fiom nations rich in that resource had been conducted primarily by Britain. Truman did not respond to this telegram, material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power . . .67

Stringent enforcement of the restriction of atomic information was also established.

Section 16 read:

Whoever wiilfùlly violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to vioIate, any provision . . . shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, except that whoever commits such an offense with the intent to injure the United States or with the intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by death or imprisonment for Me . . . 68

Gowing explains the transformation of the McMahon bill, which had begun as an

attempt to secure civilian administration over atomic energy:

One .of the.chief.reasonswhy .some membersof Congresswanted the military-to .. have a Iarger role than the first drafi of the Bill proposed was because they believed that the military woujd be much more reliable than civilians in keeping the 'secret' of the bomb. . - [which was associated] with the security of the Arnerican state . . . h tiïese circumstances, fàr stricter provisions in the Bill-about the dissemination of information were to some extent the price for retaining the principle of civilian contr01.~~

Congressman McCormack, who supported civilian control of atomic energy, argued:

1am firmly wedded to the fact that under democratic institutions of government, when-war-is over the military should.go-back.to its normal -and.properplace in democracy . . . There is adequate protection within this bill fiom the security angle

67 Excerpt fiom the "United States Atomic Energy Act", approved 1 August 1946, in United States Sfatzrtes at Large, Volume 60, part 1 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 766.

Ibid., p.773 .

" Ibid., p..105. A War Department aide observed at the time that the arnended McMahon bill "guarantees greater rnilitary participation than does the May-Johnson bill" (Quoted in Herken, American Diplomacy, p.288). to protect our country in case any situation arises where the security of our nation is involved . . .70

When the Atornic Energy Act was £Indy passed, and officially approved by Truman on 1

August 1946, Congress still had no knowledge of a the series secret and post-war

documents committing the United States to collaborâtion-with Britain. When asked in the -

Houe of Representatives on 18 July 1946 whether any secret international agreements on atomic energy existed, Congressman Brooks stated:

1have just told the gentleman that the State Department stated that there was no secret agreement on the subject. As to whether or not another agreement covers the subject, the gentleman is aware of what has been published in the daily press just as well as 1, and I presume he has read them as carefully as I did.'l

It was not until months after the legislation of the McMahon bill that Congressional leaders were-informed.ofthe -real.nature.of Anglo-Americanatomic collaboration-before

1945: "After 12 May 1947, when [Secretary of State] Acheson at last gave the Joint

Congressional Committee, in secret, an oral summary of the Quebec and Hyde Park

Agreements, the terms of reference of the Combined Development Trust, the membership ofthe Combined Policy Committee, and the outline of Anglo-American agreements on raw materials; the Cornmittee's initial expression.[was one ofl ~hock."~

The Truman administration was content to allow the bill to pas, for it eliminated the previous administration's awkward comrnitments. As Gordon Ameson, Special

70 Cong. Rec.- House, 18 July 1946, Volume 92, part 7-8, p.9372.

71 Ibid., p.9366.

Edrnonds, Setting the Mould, pp.86-7. 67

Atomic Assistant in the State Department, said years later, the McMahon Act was "an

easy, tacit way to end the relationship begun by Roosevelt and Ch~rchill.''~Thus the

British were expelIed fkom a project they had begun; the McMahon Act closed Anglo-

American atornic cooperation for more than a decade."

In addition to this chi11 in Anglo-Amencan atornic relations, little progress was

made in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, which had been established in January

1946 by the U.N. General Assembly afier American, British, and Soviet Foreign

Ministers agreed to request the Commission in December 1945. The purpose of the

Commission kvas to extend the exchange of scientific information for peaceful purposes; extend control of atomic energy to ensure it would be used only for peacefùl purposes; eliminate atomic weapons from national amiaments; establish a system of inspections to ensure that atomic energy would be developed only for peaceful purposes? An advisory cornmittee had been established in the United States to recommend possible implementation of international regulation. However, both the British and the Soviets were suspicious of the American recornmendations, for they seemed to jeopardize their national security. By 1947 negotiations had, for dl intents and purposes, broken down.

The deadlock was Iargely between the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of weapons inspection. However, the British also feIt threatened by US. proposals for, as

" Quoted in Edrnonds, Setring the Mould, p.87: 74 Although the exchange of information to Bntain was forbidden, the Combined Policy Committee remained in existence. Bevin put it, "[they] seemed to us . . . [to] have the effect of preventing counuies like ours fiom ever developing the manufacture of atomic energy . . .7776 Negotiations limped dong until May 1948 when the Commission was suspended for lack of progress?

Even derthe legislation of the McMahon Act and the failure of the U.N.

Commission to agree on international atomic regulations, British policy makers remained intent on resuming Anglo-American atomic collaboration. The resurnption of collaboration was at the heart of al1 atomic policy decisions. Even Bntain's decision in

January 1947 to deveIop what it called an 'independent nuclear deterrent' was aimed partiy at impressing the Americans and asserthg Britain's great nation statu:

The British decision to make an atornic bomb had 'emerged' fiom a body of general assumptions . . . a feeling that Britain as a great power must acquire al1 major new weapons, a feeling that atomic weapons were a manifestation of the scientific and technologicai superionty on which Bntain's strength, so deficient if measured in sheer numbers of men, must depend, , . .The decision was also a symbol of independence. . . As it was, American atomic attitudes in this period hardened Britain's resolution not to be bullied out of ~iebusiness and not to acquiesce in an Arnencan monopoly; it encouraged her determination to be a nuc1ea.r powerfor the sake of influence this was expected to give her in--

76 CAB 134/21 [AE(M) (47) 51. "In early 1946, the United States produced two new plans to deal with the control and release of American nuclear information: the Lilienthai plan and the Baruch plan. London disliked both. The Lilienthal plan seemed to offer non-nuclear nations too much information too soon, endangering whatever advantage the United Kingdom had possessed. The Baruch plan, which protected the Amencan atomic monopoly and denied British access to vital knowledge, was worse. It would, in the Foreign office's opinion, contribute to increased international tensions" (J.L. Gormly, "The Washington Declaration and the 'Poor Relation': Anglo-American Atomic Diplomacy, 1945-6", Diplornatic Nistory Spring 1984, 8[2]: pp. 141-2).

Gowing, lndependence and Deterreme, Volume 1, p.92. For a discussion of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and plans proposed for international control of atomic energy see Independence and De ferrence, Volume 1, pp. 87-92, and Wittner, One World, pp.250-6. Washington."

The decision to manufacture a British atomic bomb was made by a small group of

Labour rninisters. A cabinet committee had been established in August 1945 to formulate

Britain's atomic energy policy. The Committee, called GEN 75, or to those who p*cipa!ed in it, 'the atomic bomb committee', was comprked of a handfid of senior mini~ters?~The fûU Cabinetwas-notcomulted.on.ttieissue of atomic energy afbr the war and it is possible that the Cabinet was not even aware of the existence of the GEN

Cornmittee. " It was decided early on that "thegeneral responsibility for policy on the use of atomic energy wouid continue to rest with the Prime Minister, who would consult fiom time to tune with those of his colleagues p~cipallyconcemed.'"'

Although the forma1 decision to build a British bomb was not made until 1947 and was provoked in part by the breakdown of Anglo-Amencan collaboration, British atomic policy makers assumed as early as autumn 1945 that Britain wouid need to

78 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, pp. 184-5.

79 The Prime Minister (Attlee), -the Foreign Secretary.(Bevin), Lord President of the Council (Herbert Morrison), President of the Board of Trade (Stafford Cripps), Lord Privy Seal (Arthur Greenwood), Chancellor of the Exchequer (Hugh Dalton) and the Minister of Supply (John Wilmot).

Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.21.

'' CAB 130/2 [GEN 75, 3rd.meeting]..-Thisprecedent had-been set by murchil1 during the war. Attlee also followed Churchill's example by appointhg Sir John Anderson as chair of the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy (which was responsible for advising GEN 75), for it was believed that "in order to retain the fullest cooperation with the Americans, some continuity with the previous form of organisation was desirable" (CAB 13 0/2 [GEN 79I st meeting]). possess the bomb:

In the discussion there was strong support for the view that if it was in fact impossible .to.preventthe-manufacture of atomic -bombs,-it.was.an.illusion to suppose that their use could be controlled. We must, therefore, base our foreign policy on the assumption that if another war took place, these weapons would be useci, ..a

Based on this view and the uncertainty of how effective the United Nations would be at maintaining international security, the Bntish Chiefs of Staffrecommended in January

1946 that two atomic piles for the production of plutonium be built. They argued:

We are convinced that the best method of defence against the atomic bomb is likely to be the deterrent effect that the possession of the means of retaliation would have on a potential aggressor . . . p]n order to be effective as a deterrent we must have a considerable number of bombs at our disposal. It is not possible now to assess-theprecise number which.wemiglit require-but we are-convinced that we should airn to have as soon as possible a stock in the order of hundreds rather than

It was decided at the next meeting, on Attlee's recommendation, that ody one pile should be constmcted in addition to the Research Establishment at Harwell. Finally on 25

Novëmber 1946-it was decided that a gaseous diffusion plant would be-constructed to create the Uranium 235 necessary for a nuclear chah reaction."

When the issue of the development of a British atomic weapons project was brought up in late 1946 only Dalton and Cripps protested, believing that a full scale

CAB 13 0/2 [GEN 75/7th meeting].

83 CAi3 1300 [GEN 75/22].

" CAB 130/2 [GEN ïYl5th meeting]. 71 - independent programme would be too ~ostly8~In January 1947 a new cornmittee was established to replace GEN 75. Its membership was slightly different fiom the previous atomic cornmittee; significantly the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President for the

Board of Trade (Dalton and Cripps) were excluded, and the Secretary of State for

Dominion Affairs (Viscount Addison) and the Minister of Defence (A.V. Alexander) were invited to join the new commïttee, called GEN 163. On 3 January 1947 the Minister of Stipply circulatdarnemorrandum recommendingthat adecisïon bernaderegardhg the

- development of atomic weapons. men the GENI63 Comwtttee met on 8 Sanuary l947 it decided that Britain should proceed with its own independent nuclear weapons programme.86 For, as Bevin put it: "We could not afford to acquiesce in an Amencan monopoly of this new de~elopment."~~

During the year following the decision to devote the atomic energy programme to the development of weapons, the secrecy surroundmg the 5eld intensified. Pnor to 1947 there had been some discussions regarding atomic energy in the House of Cornmons. On

29 October 1945 the Prime Minister was asked in the House of Commons what "steps were being taken to develop research on the use of atomic energy in this country?" Attlee responded by Manning the House that on the advice of the Advisory Cornmittee on

Atomic Energy cc a research establishment is being planned at Hanvell, under the

85 Morgan, Labour in Power, p.282.

86 CAl3 130/16 [GEN 163/1st meeting].

" Quoted in Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p. 183. jurisdiction of the Minister of ~upply."~~It was decided that if atomic energy was indeed

to be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Supply, there would have to be legislation

resolving such. On 4 April 1946, the GEN 75 Cornmittee decided that-an atomic energy

bill would be introduced during the current session. The biil was introduced on 9 May

1946 and passed-on-6November.. The bill in essence.gave monopoly wer atomic energy -

to the Govenunent of the United Kingdom. It stated: "It shall be the generd duty of the

Minister of Supply . . .to promote and control the development of atornic energy.'" It

declared that atomic energy could only be developed under the authority of the Minister

of Supply and that Yany person. who,. without the-authority of the-Mlviinister, discloses any

hkimiation obtaihed in the exercise of powea under this Act, shall-be-guiltyof an

offence under this ~ct."~~The Act aiso required that the Minister of Supply be responsible to Parliament both in his activities and expenditure:

Every order made by the Minister under this Act . . .shall be laid before parliament forthw-ith after it is made, and if either Hoiise of Parliament within a penod of forty days . . . resolves that the order be annulled, the order shall cease to have effect . . . Any expenses incurred by @e Minister in the exercise of functions under this Act and any sums required by or under any provision of this Act to be

'' CAB 104/285.

89 See Atomic Energy Act in The Public Generul Acts und Church Assembly Measures of 1946 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office), pp. 1 10 1-1 118.

Ibid., p. 111l; Officials bdieved that the creation of a British Atomic Energy Act was -essential.to smooth relations -with.theUnited States -inthe realm of atomic energy. The Minister of Supply noted that "it is particulariy important that we demonstrate-tathe.U- S. at. an earlystage-thatwe intend to. secure.effective.contro1-over atomic developments in this country, including control of information conceming the plant for atomic energypoduction,since. we are -hophg-to secure -from-ourcollaboration with the.Ainencans.importantinfomiationconceming. the.technicd aspectsof the. - production of atomic energy" (CAB 130/3 [GEN 75/33]). - paid to any person . . .shall be defrayed out of monies provided by Parliament. . 9 1

However, apart from the disclosure to Parliament that Britain would be

undertaking the development of atomic energy, the general policy was one of secrecy. As

early as October 1945-the.GEN 75 Committee decided that while the Prime Minister and-

Minister of Supply might answer questions in Parliament regarding the developrnent of

atornic energy, "it might in some cases be desirable on security grounds to have these

removed~fiom-theOrder. Paper.'- In October - 1.94SAttleeapproached -the Speaker .of the

House;who agreed ta -"do his best-to see that-: . .Questions inPadiamenton the subject -

of raw materials for atomic energy .. . are kept off the pa~er.'*~

In-addition-to keeping difficult questions-out-ofParlf ament; the-Governmentcodd- also prevent certain information from appearing in the press:

Relations with the press relied upon the D-notice system, which existed before the Second Worlct War, lapsed during the war, was revived thereafter and still exists. In effect it was a system of self-denying ordiilances operated by the press itseIf; a press Committee composed of press representatives and Service Departments, issued D-notices asking the press not to refer to certain subjects affecthg national security. The press were free to accept, reject or ask for arnendrnents of any proposal. The notices had no legal force but were very widely re~pected.~~

The-first D-notice-in relation to-atomic-energywas-issued:by: the Ministry of Supply in - - -

. --

'' The Public-General Acts, pp. 1-1-12- 11 13 :

" CAB 130/2 [GEN 75/3rd meeting].

93 CAB 1 O4/285.

94 Gowing, Independence and Deterreme, Volume 2, pp. 134-5. 1946, '30 cover information that was not caught by either of the [Atomic Energy or

Ofncial-Secrets1:Acts; :onimports, exports-and.intemal movements -ofuranium ore ... ."95

John Wilmot's January 1947memorandum- requesting a decision with regards to

the manufacture of atomic weapons suggested that weapons should be made 'iinder

special arrangements conducive to the utrnost secrecy." It went on to recornmend:

If, for national or international reasons, the special arrangements referred to . . . above are thought desirable, we are at present well placed to make them. The Chief Supe~tendentof Armament Research (Dr. Penney) has been intirnately concerned in the recent Arnerican trials and knows more than any other British scientist about the secrets of the Amencan bomb. He has facilities for the necessary development which could be 'camouflaged' as 'Basic High ExpIosive Research' (a subject for which he is actually responsible but on which no work is in fact being-done). His responsibilities are at present to the Anny side of the Ministry of Supply, but by specid arrangements with the head of that Department he could be made responsible also to me for this particular work and 1would arrange the necessary-contacts -with-my-organization-insuch a way as to secure the maximumsecrecy. Only about f~~eor sixsenior ~~ials.outsidemy own- organization need know of tbis arrangement . . -1have already discussed this matter with the Chiefs of Staffwho authorised me to Say that they are in agreement with me in strongly recornmending the special arrangement outlined . . . above. If these were adopted, the Chiefs of Staffwould see to it that security was not prejudiced by enquiries fiom the Service Departments . . . 96

Al1 copies and waxes of Wilmot's mernorandurn were destroyed within two days of the

GEN 163 meeting?' The decision that the British atomic project should be completely secret was formulated with the United States in min& Tlie memoranduin by the Mister of Supply recomrnending the develop-nt of atomic weapons suggested that the United

9S Ibid, p.135.

" CAI3 130/16 [GEN 163/1].

'' CAB 104/285. One copy of the minutes of the 8 January meeting was kept in the Confidentid Library: Kingdom develop the atomic bomb secretly for if, on the other hand, the atomic bomb

was developed

by means of the ordinary agencies in the Minisûy of Supply and the Service Departrnents . . . it would certainiy not be long before the Amencan authorîties heard that we were developing the weapon 'through the normal channels' and this might well seem to them another reason for-reticenceover technical matters, not only in the field of military uses of atomic energy but also in the generai 'know- how' of the production of fissile matenaLg8

The GEN - 163 - Cornmittee disbanded &er its first -meeting.and was replaced by a

Ministerial Committee on Atomic Energy, created '20 deal with questions of policy in the

fiel3of atomic energy which require consicleration by ~nisters.'"~The Cornmittee met

five tirnes through 1947"' to address with the various elements of atomic energy,

particularly Britain's atomic relationship with the United States. It was in the hopes of renewing collaboration with-the United States that-Britain chose not .to-pursue atomic

collaboration with the Dominions or other European nations. The Chiefs of Stàffdecided on-24October l-947that-collaboration.with-the -Dominions should-be-postponed

In the first place the Chiefs of Staff believe that, even if we were to explain that it was our intention first to ensure that the Dominions introduce adequate security restzfctions-satisfactory- to -ourselvesand-the -Americak,- therek a real- risk-that a - declared-intention.to embark-ona Commonwealth-plmnow-would. have an - wifavourable eXect on the prospects of our own collaboration with the Americans . . . the Chiefs -ofStaff-feel that it.would be-a-mistake-to put- fonvard a plan which. in their view wouid certainly complicate matters and perhaps frighten the

CAB 130/16 [GEN 163/1].

99 CAB 2 l/2476.

'O0 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.22. Americans off for a long time.""

It is unlikely that the secrecy of the British project prompted the American administration to resume coilaboration. When American officials sought the revivai of

U.S .-UK-Canadian atornic collaboration at the end of 1947 they were likely inspired both by the heightening of the cold war and the dwinding of American uranium

supplie^.'^' Both British and Arnerican officials realized that Britain had the advantage in the realm of raw materials. After South Afiica made it clear, in November 1947, that it would be-willing to continue--seiiing-uraniumto -Bntain, a memorandum stressing the importance of continuation of these arrangements was circulated. Its main emphasis was as follows:

Mt is clearly desirable that we do our utmost to keep control of the negotiations with South Afiica, not only to ensure adequate uranium supplies to this country, but also to strengthen our hand in any future negotiations with the United States in

'O1 DEFE 4/8 [COS (4) 13 1st meeting]. rom the end of the war to the end of 1947 - we see a descent fkom the joint wartirne project with Canada to close, but loose, collaboration with her; no CO-ordinatedplans, except in raw material &airs, with the rest of the Commonwealth; the rupture of the wartirne atomic bonds that existed between the British and the Canadians on one hand-and-theFrench on the other; and fmally a reluctance to embark on any other schemes of technical CO-operationwith Europe, even in the case of Belgium where there was a debf in writing and in honour, to be paid pecause vast quantities of high quality uranium were supplied fkom the Belgian Congo] . . . This denial wasprtly due to security . . .but the ovewhehingly -importantreasons why Britain dragged her feet even in such limited areas of atomic collaboration with the Commonwealth and Europe were . . . her perpetual hope that renewed Anglo-American- Canadian atomic CO-operationwas round the next corner, and her anxiety to do nothing to fiighten it away. Her eyes were firmiy fixed across the Atlantic . . ." (Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, pp. 158-9).

'O' Baker, The British Be~een,p.77. atomic energy matters.lo3

In early December Britain received word fiom the State Department that the United States

was "anxious to hold an early meeting of the Combined Policy Committee to institute

discussions on . . . the allocation of raw materials . . . They also recognise that we should

wish to discuss the exchange of information and they would be prepared to take part in

such discu~sion."'~The United States, Britain and Canada took part in negotiations

between 1 1 and 19 December 1947 to formulate a working relationshïp--or modus

vivendi--in the realm of atomic energy. Britain needed technicd information if its atomic program were to progress and the United States "wanted to draw closer to Britain and

Canada in defense as the international outlook darkened and as their anxiety about raw materials for their atornic weapons programme increased.lo5From the December

negotiations the "Modus Vivendi " agreement was established and wsts formalized at a

Combined Policy Committee meeting on 7 January 1948.Io6The Modus Vivendi

'O3 CAB-134/21 [AEW (47) 161. The-BelgianCongo, which supplied both the- United Kingdom-and- the United States with uranium, had become a-less-reliable source for domestic~political-reasons.

Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.245. "[Iln these negotiations the Americans had for the first time been completely fitank, producing detailed figures about their programme, their stocks of raw material, their future needs and the purpose to which they were related. The British had done the same and had found that the Arnencans no longer questioned the existence of a British production programme and the location in Britain of plants and stocks of matenal" as they had in the sprïng of 1946 (Independence and Deterrence, VoIume 1, p.248).

'O6 Edmonds, Setîing-theMould,.p.89. Modus Vivendi,. like al1other atomic - agreements-(except- for. the Washington Declaration) was kept-secret t?om -US.- Congress - - essentidy rendered void al1 previous atomic agreements among the three countries and

estabfished -a new basis-of CO-operation.The- United States gained access to .more uranium: - -

In 1948 and 1949 all supplies available &om the Belgian Congo will be allocated to the United States . . . In 1948 and 1949, if supplies additional to those which will flow fiom existing sources are required to maintain the United States minimum programme, they will be provided . . . fkom the unprocessed and presently unallocated supplies now in the United Kingdom. . . 'O7

In return, Britain gained access to previously restricted technical information on atomic

energy. -Althou& this facilitated amexchange of information-useM to the -Britishproject,

the agreement did not explicitly state that collaboration shodd occur in the area of

weapms. developrnent butratha generai scientific.developrnent- Because-Of the. -

limitations irnposed by the McMahon Act, %e agreement itself of set purpose ornitted al1

direct mention of atomic weap~ns."'~'Britain gained access to certain information but

some-high pionty material ("thefundamental properties -ofreactor materials") remained

restricted.IogBritish officiais attempted to extend the types of information which could be

exchanged, but their requests were met with silence. A 1949 report by the Official

Cornmittee for Atomic. EheFj statedr .

But while the agreement has been relatively satisfactory up to date, die requests we have made in accordance with its terms for enlargement of the areas in which

and British Parliament.

'O7 The 'LM~d~sVivendi" agreement is in CAB 134/22-[l948 mernos].

'O8 Gowing, Independence andDeterreme, Volume- 1, p.254. See -dso Edmonds; Sefting the Mould, p. 9 1.

'O9 Edmonds, Setting the Mould, p.90. For the full list of information to which the British sought access, see Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.247. infiiation is.exchanged are held iip;.the-requestwhich -ws-made.by the Minister- of Defence to the United States Defence Secretary for the exchange of both strategic and technical information on atomic weapons remains unanswered . . .''O

Gowing suggests-thatthe c'promiseof technicd collaboration . .. arnounted to very.

little.""' British officiais recognized this: "On the information side, it was noted that at the moment we tended to get more help fiom the Americms on aspects in which we ourselves were well advanced than in those in which we were behind.""' Moreover, by rendering al1 previous agreements null, Modus Vivendi eradicated Britain's right

(established by eeQuebec Agr-ent ) to be consulted on, or veto, the use of the atomic bomb. '13

Meanwhile, absolute secrecy continued to shroud the British atornic project. In

Iate 1947 the Minister of Supply suggested that general information regarding atomic

" ' Gowing,LbBritai~Amerïcaand the Bomb?,p. 133-c-cDespite.carefitL atternptsto. minimise the nurnber of items classified, the interdependence of technicai information had. mui tiplied restrictions,and in ear-y-1 950 mostfeatures-O£ allreactors- were stiL secrety'(Gowing, Independence and Detemence, Volume 2, p. 124).

"'CAB -13422 [AE(M) (49) 2nd meeting]. ''This British right was surrendered shortly before the British government agreed, at the theof the Berlin airlift in 1948, that United States' bombers potentially armed with atomic bombs rnight be stationed in the United Kingdom. Britain now seemed to nsk annihilating retaliation without even being first informed or consulted . . . this danger seemed acute when -theKorean Wax -brokeout- in- 1-950-and .the Americans - - - . considered the use of the atomic bornb in the Far East" (GowÏng, "Britain, Amerka and the Bomb", p.1-33). Peter Weiler suggests that the British were willing to give up their right to consultation and consent because they were "so eager to show that Britain was a worthy atornic partner"(Ernest Bevin, p. 174). energy should -bedeelassified; as'had-been.done-in.theUnifedfS tates:' l4Headvised that only information regardhg the military applications of atomic energy and the existence, size and locations-ofUnited-kgdom production.plants-should be classified. ' l5 \Nilmot went on to. argue in March -1.948that.

[Slpecial arrangements were approved with the object of concealing not only the technical details of the weapon and the organisation and methods by which it was to be produced, but also that work was being done on it at ail . . -1now wish to bring to the notice of my colleagues that after a year we have reached a stage when this arrangement is becoming: (a) increasingly ineffective; (b) an impediment to progress; and (c) a possible source of embarrassment, or even of danger.' l6

The Minister of Supply argued that the project was becoming too large to maintain the sarne-levelof secrecy without-impeding-progress;It was becoming-impossible-to keep - officers ignorant of the purposes of the work they were conducting. Moreover,

[tlhe increasing number of peopk who are either told about the pyoject, or who are able to make intelligent guesses because they become aware of the interest of the Atomic Energy Department in so-called "high explosives research", involves the risk that sooner or later some journalists may become aware of the comection . . . It is not now possible to prevent this by trying to arrange for the issue of a "D"

Il4 In the United States the Atomic Energy Commission, "faced with public interest much keener than in Bntain, not only made its statutory period reports but voluntarily released a gsgat amount of iiformation to the press, thereby discourag&g - unofficial speculationyy-(Gowing; Independence and.Deterrence, Volume-2, pp:4 27-8):

1'5 CAB 134/21. The memorandurn went on to suggest: "Publicity in regard to atomic energy has been discouraged largelybecause it was thought that the Arnericans rnight regard any disclosures as evidence of inadequate security arrangements, and might found upon this an-excuse for withholding- technical-information: Ithm been ascertained. fiom out Embassy in Washington that there is unlikely to be any q-tion of the Arnericans objecting if we adopt a policy which is exactly similar to their own . . ."

CAB 104/285. notice, because that would involve disclosing the facts, in confidence to the AdzlIiralty;-War Office, PJr Ministry-and-PressGommitttee, Inchchg-the-- jounialist members of the Committee; and any mention at al1 of the subject is at present forbidden. . . '"

In addition, -the Atamic Energy -Act-stated thatthe Ministry-of Supply was responsible to

Parliament -andmut keep the House of Cornmons informed of the progress of the atomic

programme. On 11 October 1946 John Wilrnot had assured the House of Commons that

this .would.occur :

1 am sure we al1 appreciate the necessity for the mostactive Parliarnentary control in this most important matter, and 1 myself am very alive to it. The Minister wilI be required to give the House-ot:Commons fiequent and full information about what -he is doing with the vast powers entnisted-to him and in accordance with the duties which are Iaid upon hirn in this Bill. . .' l8

As the Minister believed that absolute secrecy was hindering die atomic weapons programme and violated the spirit of the Atomic Energy Act, he suggested that:

we should make a suitable opportunity of letting it be known that His Majesty's Government, as a part of its general duty of ensuring the defence of this country, is developing dl-typesof modern weapons, including atomic weapons .-. . l9

' " Ibid.

Il8 House of Commons, Volume 427, p.528. This comment had been made in response to a proposed amendment (to the Atomic Energy Act) requiring a published report to be introduced each parliamentary session outlining al1 atomic energy licences authonzed by the Minister of Supply. After Wilmot's assurances that the House would be kept fully-infomed-of dl- atomic- developments, the amendment - was-dropped; -

'19 CAB 1O4/285. Some stegs toward ~xpmding-the atomic-weapons programme - - - and informing a larger number of officiais of the top secret project, had been taken in January 1948 when Sir John Anderson's Advisory Cornmittee had been disbanded and replacedby a-newsystem which-cornprisedof: the Ministerial Cornmitteeon-Atomic -- Energy, a new inter-departmental OEcial Committee on Atomic Energy, and the Atomic Energy Review-ofProducti-on and-Defence-Research Committees(See-CAB 2 1f2476). .. . A carefuily-worded question was directed to the Minister of Defence in the House of

Commons on 12 May 1948 by a Labour backbench M.P.

Mr: George Jeger asked the Minister of Defence whether he is satisfied that adequate progress is being made in the development of the modem types of weapons.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. A.V. Alexander): Yes, Sir. . . research and development-continueto receive the highest-ptiorityinthe defence field, and aH typesof modern weapons, including.atomic weapons, are-being developed.

Mr. Jeger: Can the Minister give any Merinformation on the development of atorriic weapons?

Mr. Alexander: No. 1 do not think it would be in the public interest to do that.'"

This was the f~stmention of atomic weapons in the House of Commons, despite the fact that the decision to-go ahead.with the production. of atomic weapons.had been-made over a year before. The comment was designed to be made in passing and no questions or debate ensued. This was the only Ministerial comment made on the development of the atornic bomb until affer -1952 The previous day, a D-notice25 had been issued which restricted the press fiom publishing information on the development of atomic weapons:

In early 1949-,a£ter-Britaindecided to begin construction of a third-graphitepile, the United States began to take a warmer approach toward collaboration. In February

'" Hansard Parliomentary Debates, 5th Series - House of Commons, Volume 450, Gondon: His Majesty's Stationery Office,1948), p.2 1 17.

12' See appendix 4 for text of D-notice 25. 1949, British officials were informed that the United States would seek to review Anglo-

Amencan atomic energy policy . However, this was not confirmed until August 1949 when U.S. officials suggested that informal talks begin in ~eptember.'" As Gowing points out, this atomic thaw was comected to the re-election of President Truman, dong with a new Democratic majority in both houses of Congress; "those in the Administration who advocated greater atomic CO-operation-withBritain could now expect greater

Congressional ~upport."'~Although Britain was primarily interested, at this point, in building its own bomb, it was quite clear that US. atomic technology was much more advanced and that the British project could still benefit fkom increased collaboration.'"

On 20 September new tripartite negotiations began through meetings of the Combined

Policy Cornmittee.'" The discovery the previous day that the Soviet Union had exploded

'" CAB 134/22 [AE(M) (49) 11. '" Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.273. On 14 July, Truman had explained to Congressional leaders its proposed policy on atomic arrangements with Britain. At this meeting the entire Anglo-Amerïcan atomic relationship was outlined. One of the problems with previous atomic agreements with Britain was that there had always been secured without Congressional approval. At the July meeting Truman promised that any new atomic agreement with Britain would be presented to a Congressional cornmittee. Truman, Acheson, General Eisenhower, and Senator McMahon, al1 supported giving "Britain information about production of fissile material for rnilitary purposes" in order to integrate atomic efforts (Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.277). The argument was that, if Anglo-American atomic projects were fully integrated, than the Atomic Energy Act could be bypassed.

12' ccAmeri~a'~techlogical lead was clearly hcreasing as they built up indusirial factory production of more efficient weapons while Britain was still stniggling to produce one laboratory Nagasaki-type tplutonium] bomb." (Gowing, "Nuclear'Weapons and the 'Special Relationship"', p. 122).

Edmonds, Setting the Mould, p.91. its first bomb created a sense of urgency:

The explosion emphasised the need for the Arnericans to obtain al1 the allies and assistance they could in atomic energy development, but it also emphasised the need for maximum production of atomic weapons at the earliest possible moment. . . This went to the heart of the United States proposais, now at 1stuncovered. The general thesis was that because of Soviet intransige~eit was essentiai 'to maximise the munial defence effort'. The North Atlantic Pact . . .meant that a pattern of CO-operationwas emerging among thé coutries involved; a fundamentai principle of this pattern was to allocate effort in the common defence . . . h atomlc energy affis thïs rneant produchg as many atomic weapons and therefore as much fissilematerial as possible, as soon as possible. "'

The mounting pressure of the cold war was clearly a factor in the United States'

decision to open a discussion on the integration of the Arnerican and British atomic

projects. However, there were other factors involved. The price for the fiill integration of

the Anglo-American atornic programmes was the abandonment of Britain's third pile.

The Amencan representatives at the C.P.C. argued that, for securïiy reasons, atornic

weapons should be built and stored exclusively in the United States. Britain would

contribute by supplying plutonium fiom its first two piles, but would not pursue the

manufachue.of its own atomic ~eapons.'~-Britain was willing to reduce its programme to

two production piles and supply the United States programme with raw uranium and plutonium in return for complete cooperation in the field of atornic development and testing, a supply of U23S and a stockpi-leof atomic weapons to use in-case of a European

'*' Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.282.

"'CAB 13-4/22[AECM) (49) 71. . codict with the Soviet Union.'28As Kenneth Hams has comrnented:

By the end of the year British objectives had changed in a way that made them more acceptible to the Arnencans. Now that the Russians were hown to possess the bomb . . . the British govemrnent's main objective . . . switched to getting a supply of Amencan bombs on British soil, rather than continuing to press for information to hasten the manufacture of her own. To obtain these the British

goyesnweat -wasprepared .toconcede-the independence.of .theh .deterrent and - . - . accept 3ntegration'; with-the Amüricai weapon-project;'"

Negotiations continued into 1950, but the conflicting interests were not reconciled before the arrest of KIaus Fuchs on 2 February 1950. Fuchs was a naturalized British physicist who-,-duringthe warworked.on-the atomic project at-LosAlamos; and now- -- worked at the British Atomic Energy Research Establishment located at Harwell. He was arrested for committing two offences under the British Official Secrets Act, supplying the

Soviet-Unionwith ciassified-atomic informationwhile worhgat- both-los- A-lamos-and

Har~ell.'~~The arrest was made public on 3 February 1950, provoking public and

Congressionalcriticism of British ~ecurit~.'~'As e result-of the arrest of Fuchs

'''CAB -1 34/22 [AE(M) (49)- 91:- See alsa Edmonds; Setting-the Mould, p.9 1; For - - an exhaustive discussion of these negotiations, see Gowing, Independence and Deferrence, Volume 1, pp.279-98.

12' Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p.290.

130 CAB 134/23 [AEW (50) 21.

13' On 7 February 1950, the British Arnbassador in Washington reported to the Foreign Office: "You are probably aware firom newspapers that Americans have been sharply cnticai of United Kingdom securïty authorities . . . [they] are also claiming credit for having uncovered Fuchs's activities, the implication being that United JSingdorn security authorities wodd not have discovered what he was up to but for the F.B. 1. We think that Hoover (Head of F.B.I.) and Groves have been taking this Iine in evidence they have been giving to various congressional committees . . ." (CAB 134/23 [AE(M) (50) 31)- 86

negotiations for integraion of the Anglo-American atomic projects were suspended. On

16 May Acheson finally informed Attlee and Bevin that negotiations codd not realistically be resumed until after Congressional elections and likely not until at least mid- 1951 .13' In response to this news, British atomic energy officials decided to return to a fiiU atomic programme, resuming construction of the third graphite pile and commencing construction of a testing range.'" The 1948's closed without the renewal of close Anglo-Amencan atornic collaboration; both projects continued separately without cooperation. 13'

On 15 Maich-1% 1 the Chiefs of StafTwere given formal approval for their proposd to test the British atomic bomb in October 1952 over the Monte Bello Islands,

13' CAB134/2-3 [AE(M)

133-Ibid.

'" The only other AngIo-Amencan discussion regarding-the atomic bomb before Churchill assumed.office, took.place during the outbreak-of-conflict-inKorea. Truman's announcement on 30 November 1950 that the United States might use the atornic bomb against North Korean forces precipitated a visit fkom Attlee. "In a pnvate session with the President, Attlee elicited a promise fiom Truman that the bomb would not be used without 'prior consultation' with the .United-Kingdom and Canadian Ciovernments; Aithough pressure fiom Acheson prevented such an undertaking being wrinen into the final -communique;which smiply-said-thatthePresident-would-keep the -Prime-Minister- - informed of developments-which- might lead to the-use of the-atomÏcbomb; the-British - - believed that they had received an undertaking in consultation which 'was clear, even though it depended on no written agreement.' While Ministers might have been prepared to accept such an ambiguous understanding, the Chiefs of Staff believed that the President had done littie to allay their anxieties" (Tan Clark and Nicholas Wheeler, The British-Origins. of Nuclear Strate-gy.-1 945-1955 [Oxford:~OdordUniversity- .Press, 1989.1, pp. 139-40). For a detailed discussion of British participation in the Korean conflict, see Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance, chapter 8. 87

off the Coast of ~ustralia.'~~It was decided that the test, called "Operation Hurricane",

would remain secret:

Politicaily, it appears that the requirement is to safeguard the operation to the extent that it shall not become publicly known nor be disclosed to any outside Party. This would be achieved by the grading 'C~nfidential.'"~

However, -earlym -1-95.2-Riim7eMinitierChurchilf in.honnced that atomic tests-would-be

taking place the following 0ctobed3' The British atomic bomb was tested on 3 October

1952, more than seven years after the fist atomic test at Alrnogordo, New Mexico.

Throughout the 1940's and until the first test Bntain's atoniic project remained

completely 3ecret.. There-wasnever the-large-scale-debate-.inatonlic-issues that occurred

in the United States following World War II. The decision to build a British bomb was

not a democratic one. Neither the Labour Party membership, nor the Govenunent, nor

even Attlee's-Cabinet was consulted-Therewas not.one single debatein the House-of

Commons with regard to the British possession of an 'independent nuclear deterrent'. In

fact, although the Minister of Supply was, according to the Atomic Energy Act, responsible for keeping Parliament informed about the costs of the atomic project, this never occurred, even after the 1948 announcement that Britain was building a bomb:

In practice, the estimates for expenditure on atomic energy, as on other defence research and development expenditure, were concealed hmParliament by burying them in the generai sub-heading of the Ministry of Supply vote - a post-

CAB 134/23 [AE(M) (51) 11.

137 The announcement was made fiom 10 Downing Street on the evening of 17 February 1952 (The Times Fondon], 18 February 1952, p.4). war development introduced for security reasons. It was not very happily accepted by the Select Cornmittee on Estimates, which felt that it bore an unduly heavy responsibility when so much of its information was given in strictest confidence and was largely ~nrecorded."~

There was Little public debate about the implication of atomic energy through the 19401s, partly because the general population knew so little about Britain's atomic energy programme until after the first bomb was successfidly te~ted.'~~

The atomic bomb was born in Britain. Margaret Gowing correctly suggests that without the work of the MAUD Cornmittee, the Second World War "rnight well have ended before an atornic bomb was dr~pped.""~Yet, just as Britain became the junior partner in its general relationship with the United States, it also became the junior partner in the Anglo-American atomic relationship. While basic British econornic and rnilitary dependence on the United States hindered an equal Anglo-American relationship, it also inhïbited full cooperation in the field of atomic developrnent. As éarly as 1942 Britain realized that it would not be able to develop and manufacture its own atomic bomb without Amencan assistance and cooperation. This knowledge persisted throughout the

Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.5 1. It was not until 1954 that annual reports on expenditure began to be published. This occurred when the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority was established; ccironically,Parliament received more information after the project passed fiom a Ministry to a public corporation."(Jndependence and.Deterrmcc, Volume-2, pr47).

139 Morgan points out that "Mot until October 1952, when Britain for the first time publicly tested her own atomic weapons, over the Monte Bello Islands . . .did the Attlee government' s decision become general knowledge to the Labour Party and the British public" (Labour in Power, p. 283).

I4O Gowing, Britain and Atornic Energy, p.8 5. 89

19401s, provoking-constant British app-eals for ïncreased collaboration. In order to secure enough cooperation fiom the United States to develop its own atomic project, Britain had to concede the most important right it had gained fiom wartime atomic agreements; the right to veto Akcanuse of atomic weapons."' This pattern of British acquiescence to

American-demands forthe purpose of strengtheniogthe -hglo-Americm-relationp- existed throughout Britain's dealings with the United States in the 1940's.

Yet the atomic relationship in the 1940's was in many ways incongruous with the patterns of the larger 'special relationship' between the United States and Britain. Anglo-

Amaican atomic relations from 1940 to 1950 were completely inconsistent and at thes even antagonistic. Collaboration was always tenuous, and Britain wsts never secure even of maintainhg a junior position in the relationship. As the history of Anglo-Amencan atornic arrangements in the 1940's indicates, atomic relations were often the most distant when the general relationship appeared to be gathering strength. Although Anglo-

American policy toward the Soviet Union began to align by the end of 1946, the

McMahon Act was nonetheless passed and approved by the executive. Similarly, despite joint action in response to the Berlin cnsis and the creation of a formal military alliance through the North Atlantic Treaty, the 1949 negotiations for full atomic integration ended in failure. A "special relationship" between the United States and Britain ceaainly did exist in many spheres, notably in areas of West European recovery and defence and the

14' Britain did not gain back its nght to consent unfil 1952, when it was granted the right to be informed and consulted before atomic weapons were used firom British bases. However this right only extended to bases on U.K. soi1 as opposed to overseas bases. (Gowing, "Britak, knca-and-the- BomW', p. 1.33): containment of Cornmunism. The United States was prepared, in remfor British

cooperation with its fiee-trade econornic vision, to uphold British security and prestige.

However, in the realm of atornic cooperation, Britain was excluded altogether for

extended penods during the post-war era. In the period until 1954, "atomic energy was

something-wholiy-apart,something dedt with-according.to-pniiciplesquite difEerent from those governing the rest of foreign and defense poli~y."'~~

Why-did-American-atomic policy differ so+dely..fkorn its.general policy of accommodating the Labour Govemment after 1945? It was partly because Amencan legislators and officials were unsure of Britain's security in the early cold war period.

British interests needed outside support; Britain was no longer capable of maintaining security'in its sphere of interest. FoT this reason and for reasons of national interest the

United-S tates .clearLy wanted.to keep .atomic-energy exclusiveLy under its control.

However, there was another major factor that contributed to United States' uncertain

approach-to- Anglo-+herican- atomic-relations The-American- poli tical - structure-allowed- for the influence of many different and often opposing interests on the formulation of atomic policy.. In a -1949 report by the Official-Committee. on Atomic Energy, Arnerican. atomic policy was analyzed:

An effort had been made to formulate a unified United States policy, but this had not been cornpIeteIy achieved, partiy owing to the number of interests involved on theUnited States side and the special relationship which exists between the various branches of the Executive concemed and the Congress. Divergent views are probably held in the A.E.C. P.S. Atomic Energy Commission] itself on the right attitude to collaboration with the United Kingdom and other countries . . . A

142 Gowing, Britain and Atornic Energy, p. 13 5. See also Gowing, “Wuclear Weapons and the 'SpeciaI Relationship"', p. 123. further cornplicating factor is the uneasy relationship between the Departments of State andDefence. . . '"3

Nonetheless, achieving an AngIo-American atornic partnership remained the

cornerstone of British.atornic poIicy through the 1940's and into the 1950's. No atomic

decisions were made without serious consideration of how they would affect relations

with the United States. When Wînston Churchill resurned office at the end of 1951, he

hoped to realign the Anglo-Amencan atomic relationship. However he too failed to

secure even semi-partnership. British requests to use American testing ranges for the

testing of its bomb were denied,'" and by the time Britain tested its first atomic device,

the United States had already developed its fist thenno-nuclear de~ice.'~~It was not until

after Bntain had developed its own bomb independently that the United States seemed

willing to resurne atomic collaboràtion. In 1954 the McMahon Act was partially

arnended to allow for bilateral agreements on the exchange of atomic energy for military

143 CAB 134/22 [AE(M) (49) 73. Edrnonds has Mercommented that "because the few.who took atomic or atom-related decisions in Britain cauld do so - as they themselves saw it - on the merits of the case and with little or no heed paid to parliarnentary, still less public, opinion in their own country, they did not, with few exceptions, find it easy to understand the different parameters within which corresponding decisions were reached in the United States." (Setting the Mould, p.84).

144 Even as late as 195 1, the resumption of Anglo-American atomic collaboration was at the forefiont of Britain's atomic policy. At a meeting of the Ministerial Cornmittee on Atornic Energy in 1951 "it was felt that, if we made it clear to them [the Americans] that we had the firmintentiorx-of carrying-outthe -Monte-Belo tests, this might not ody Iead them to grant us the use of one of their ranges instead, but rnight also induce them to adopt a more forthcoming attitude over the generd question of atomic energy co- operation"(CAE3- LW23 [AE(M) (5 l) 1l).

14' 14' The first Amencan thermo-nuclear bomb was tested in November 1952, the month after the British atomic test. 92 uses:146Fhally in-1958it was repealed altogetherd the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States signed an agreement "for the Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic

Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes," which allowed "'each Party [to] communicate to and exchange wîth the other Party information, and transfer materials and equipment to the other- Party." This-agreement.was- fürther- amended-to dow Britain.to -purchaseparts- of nuclear weapon systems and eventually entire delivery sy~tems!~'However, before

1958; the collaboration BrÏtain so coveted as an finnation of its privileged relationship with the United States and its status as a great nation was never achieved.

------

'46 FO 93/8/298.

"'Gowingy 'Wuclear Weapons and the 'Special Relationship"' ,p. 124. Chapter 3: The Atomic Bomb and the Labour Left

The Labour party has long been associated with the cause of nuclear disarmament.

In the 1950's the issue caused a major split in the party that lasted for decades. IFrorn 1957

until the end of the cold war the issue of nuclear disarmament had a defining qiriality; it

identified where Labour members stood on the left-right spectrurn of the party. Those

who rejected unilateral disarmament were understood to be on the right of the party while

those who embraced it were considered Ieft-leaning. Indeed, as recently as 198'5, when

the left wing of the party domuiated defence issues, unilateral nuclear disarrnannent was a

key election platform.' While the Labour party maintained a policy of mulàlatd

disarmament throughout the 19S01s, it was not until 1960 that Labour adopted ai. policy of

unilateral nuclear disarmament. This position was reversed only a year later, which is

indicative of the struggle that was occ~gin the pariy around the nuclear iss-e.

By 1955, a connection between the Labour lefi and the anti-nuclear mowement

had been estabIished. This relationship became increasingly intimate in the following

years. However, by contrast, in the late 1940's and early 19501s,the nuclear question had

not provided such a rallying point for the Labour left. During this period, the Labour left

never rallied, in an organized way, to the cause of British nuciear disarmament-

The present chapter seeks to understand this lack of response to the nuckear

question in the context of Labour party culture. There was certainly immediate criticism

' In both the 1983 and 1987 campaigns Labour had a %lateralist th rus^ to its defence policy," supporting the maintenance of conventional forces as opposed rto nuclear weapons. (David Butler and Demis Kavanaugh, The British GeneruZ Election 0x1987 Fondon: MacMillan Press Ltd., 19881, pp.54-5,69. See also Denis Healey, The- Theof My Lzye ww York: W.W. Norton & Company, 19901, pp.500- 1, 535-6). 94 of the new Labour governmenf responsible for the British development of the atomic bomb, fiom the ranks of the Labour lefi, There were numerous issues on which the left - inside and outside Parliament - could attack the govemment for its lack of socialist principles. However, British possession of atomic energy was not a key issue during this period. Even the May 1948 announcement that Britain was developing its own atomic bomb sparked surprisingly Little dialogue about the implications of such a decision among the ranks of the Labour left, It was not until 1955 that the cccurioushiatus of serious public thought or political activity about nuclear weapons which had lasted for almost a decade . . . . [came] to an end.'"

This chapter examines the development of the Campaign for Nuclear

Disarmament (CND) of the late 1950's and the Labour lefi's contribution to this mass political movement. It then turns to an analysis of the Labour left's influence on foreign policy in the Labour government of 1945-195 1 and hally, its curious non-role in the development of British atomic policy £iom 1945-1952.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was officially established on 17

February 1958. The biah of this national campaign was stimulated partly in response to the 1957 Conservative Defence White Paper, which made explicit reference to British dependence on nuclear weapons for its defence3, and the testing in May that year of the

'A.J.R. Groom, British Thinking AboufNuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter Ltd., 1974), p. 108.

Richard Taylor, Against the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.19. British hydrogen bomb at Christmas Island in the Pacific! After the British tests the

Cornmittee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests, founded by the Go1derysGreen

Women's Cooperative Guild, joined with various other cornmittees against nuclear testing to fom one national cornmittee, the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear

Weapons Tests (NCANWT). It then joined with a newly formed disarmament group inspired by the publication of J.B. Priestley's article c'Britain and the Nuclear Bomb" in the New Statesman in November 1957: The NCANWT agreed to broaden its scope to include opposition to nuclear weapons in themselves and not just the testing of such devices. At a meeting on 16 January 1958 these two groups officially merged and the

The Conservative government had announced its intention to manufacture thermo-nuclear weapons in its 1955 White Paper on Defence. The decision had been made shortly after the United States announced, in February 1954, that it planned to manufacture thermo-nuclear weapons (Pierre, Nuclear PoZitics, p.90).

In his article Priestley called for British nuclear disarrnament, arguing that: "Britain nins the risk by just mumbling and muddling dong, never speaking out, avoiding any decisive creative act. For a world in which our deliberate 'insecuri~'would prove to be our uridoing is not a world in which real security can be found. As the game gets faster, the cornpetition keener, the unthinkable will turn into the inevitable, the weapons will take command, and the deterrents will not deter. Our bargainhg power is slight; the force of our example might be great. The catastrophic antics of our thehave behind them men hag-ridden by fear . . . if we openly challenge this fear then we might break with the wicked spell that al1 but a few uncertified lunatics desperately wish to see broken, we could begin to restore the world to sanity and lift this nation f?om its recent ignominy to its former grandeur"(J.B. PriestIey, "Britain and Nuclear Bombs" reprinted in David Boulton (ed.), VoicesfFom the Crowd (London: Peter Owen Ltd., 1964), pp. 38- 45). Another factor that motivated the nuclear disannament movement was the lecture series ccRussia,the Atom, and the West", delivered by George Kennan, former US. Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Keman's lectures expounded upon the dangers of a nuclear amis race (Christopher Driver, The Disarmers pondon: Hodder and Stoughton, 19641, p.38).

Peggy DUE, Lef Lefl, Le# (London: Allison and Busby, 197l), pp. 118-1 20. 96

CND was formed with an unequivocal cornmitment to unilateral disarmament.

The CND had important components; not least among these was the involvement of the Labour le4 which had been attempting to persuade the party to adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament since 1955. In the summer of 1957, thirty Labour M.P.s had

'Toined a new Labour H-Bomb Campaign Cornmittee, and in September 1957 this group rallied 4,000 people in Trafalgar Square to oppose British manufacture of the Bomb."'

The Labour H-Bomb Campaign was ready to join a coordinated national effort after its motion for unilateral disarmament was defeated at the Labour Conference in the autumn of 19~7.~

Although CND's strategy was to mobilize mass support through public rallies and marches, its leadership "always regarded the Labour Party as the natural vehicle for

' John Minnion and Phiiip Bolsover (eds.), The CND Story (London: Allison and Busby Ltd., 1983), p. 13.

A motion was presented which declared: " . . . the next Labour govemment will take the lead by itself refbsing to continue to test, manufacture or use nuclear weapons, and that it will appeal to the peoples of other countries to follow their lead."( F.W.S. Craig (ed.), Consemative and Labour Party Confirence Decisions, 1945-1 981, [Chichester: Parliamentary Research Services, 19821, p. 137). At this Conference, the party adopted a policy of multilateral disarmament but rejected unilateralism by 5,836,000 to 781,000 (The British Labour Party, Report of the 56th Annual Conference, [London: Transport House, 19571, pp. 163-183). During the 1957 Brighton Conference, the acknowledged leader of the Labour lefi, Aneurin Bevan, opposed unilateral British disarmament, making the farnous statement that giving up nuclear weapons would "send a British Foreign Secretary, whoever he may be, naked into the conference table" (Quoted in Pierre, NucIear Poliîics, p. 103). For a discussion of the seemingly drastic evolution of Bevan's thinking regarding the bomb, see Duff, Left, Lep, Lep, pp.69-74 and chapter eleven of Mark Jenkins, Bevanism (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1 979). bringing CND policy into effect.'" The CND Bulletin argued in 1959:

Only through the election of a Labour government and the political pressure which we may exert afierward can we succeed. A renewed mandate for a Tory Government, which has show itself adamantly opposed to any concession in the direction of nuclear disannament, would be a serious and possibly fatal, set-back to our campaign. 10

In addition to the CNDyspublic events, such as the hugely successful marches fiom

London to Aldermaston (site of an atomic research facility) each year at Easter," one of the CNDYsgreatest tasks was to mobilize support for disarmament within the Labour party. Kingsley Martin, a founding mernber of CND, wote in the New Sratesman:

1 know of no other way of obtaining a non-nuclear Britain except by converting the Labour Party. Unless they work through the Labour movement' nuclear disanners are simply marching about to satisfy their own consciences and expressing their sense of the sin and horror of nuclear wad2

9 Taylor, Against the Bomb,p.275. It must be noted that there was disagreement within the movement about the efficacy of relying on the Labour party to institute British nuclear disarmament. Disillusionment with Labour's contribution to the campaign led certain sectors (the Direct Action Cornmirtee and Cornmittee of 100) to encourage "extra- parliamentary, direct action politics"(p. 191). There were many, ofien conflicting, interests involved in the CND, which clearly contributed to major problems within the carnpaign. For a full discussion, see Against the Bomb, chapters 3,4, and 5 and Duff, Le#, Lep, Lefi, pp. 165-84.

'O Excerpts f?om "A Policy for Hermits" by Michael Foot in the CND Bulletin, quoted in Duff, Lep, Lep, Lep, p.166.

" Other efforts included the mass lobby of Parliament held in May, and a Women's' Conference on "Women and the Bomb" in June, 1958. By the end of 1958, over 200 regional CND groups existed and 250 major public meetings had been held. Between 5,000-10,000 people attended the 1958 Aldermaston March; between 20,000- 25,000 people atîended the 1959 March (Taylor, Against the Bomb,pp. 29-3 1,49-50 and Driver, The Disarmers, pp.54-6).

l2 Quoted in Driver, The Disarmers, p.66. 98

Through 1958-9 unilateralism gained momentum in the Labour Party. At the 1958

Conference several motions condernning British possession of nuclear weapons were presented. One called for the next Labour govemment, CCwithinone year of taking office to invite dL powers to join in an organisation designed to eluninate by agreement and inspection the testing, manufacture and use of nuclear weapons and without waiting for agreement by d powers to implement this policy." Another called for the next Labour govemment to "cease unilaterally to manufacture and test nuciear weapons and . . . prohibit the use of nuclear weapons fiom British temt~ry."'~These motions were al1 defeated, but were indicative of growing support for unilateralism within the Labour movement. On 4 June 1959, the Municipal and General Workers' Union - one of the more right-wing trade unions - passed a unilaterd resolution at its a~ualconference.I4

By the end of July 1959 more than one third of al1 resolutions submitted for the Annual

Labour Party Conference advocated unilateral disarmament.15

When Labour seered its third consecutive defeat in the autumn of 1959 it was forced to review its policies and leadership. Labour's leader, Hugh Gaitskell, had marginalized defence issues during the carnpaign and Labour defence policy was little different fiom the Conservative goveniment's policies, yet the Conservatives had still managed to increase their majority. "The defeat of the Labour Party obviously called for a re-thinking of its position . . . With the possibility of power no longer a binding force,

13 See Conference Decisions, pp. 137-8.

l4 DDuff, Lef LeftJ Lefr, pp. 185-6.

l5 Taylor, Against the Bornb, p.288.

i 99 disunity on the defence issue soon re-emerged. . .The fight over unilateralism in the Party was concerned not only with defence but also with the Party's füture, and its future leader~hip."'~

Defeat in the general election and the cancellation of the Blue Streak project (the independent British missile deiivery system) in ApriI 1960 fmally pushed the Labour party to adopt unilateralism. The cancellation of Blue Streak meant that Britain would no longer possess the capability independently to deliver nuclear weapons even if it owned them. Some have argued that the Labour party's change of policy "stemmed more fkom

[the] impracticality [of an independent British deterrent] than fiom a political or ethical de~ision."'~However, by June 1959, aimost one year before the cancellation of Blue

Streak, the Union of Shop, Distributive, and AIlied Workers, the National Unions of

Railwaymen and Mineworkers, the Transport and General Workers' Union, and the

Arnalgarnated Engineering Union had passed unilateralist resolutions .18 The shifi in the trade union position was crucial, for by 1959-60 '"the six iargest trade unions between them controlled a majority of the total vote at the Labour party c~nference."'~Finally at the Annuai Labour Party Conference at Scarborough in 1960 the pam adopted a policy of

l6 Groom, British Thinking, pp.421 -2.

" Duff, Lep, Lef Lep, pp. 18 7-8.

l8 Taylor, Against the Bomb, p.292.

l9 lbid., p.286. 1O0 unilateral nuclear di~armament?~Aithough the camceliation of Blue Streak was a factor in

Labods adoption of unilateralism, more significant was increasing pressure f?om below.

The snuggle for nuclear disarmament was engaged in an organized way by the

Labour left fiom 1955. Unilateralism became the ]hallmark of the left- From 1958-1960 it was an issue on which the left triurnphed; left wing pressure was able to change and radicalize party policy.

Looking back to left-wing criticism of the govemment in the 1940fs,one notices the absence of discussion of nuclear issues in the press and among left Labour M.P.s.

When the left did, on rare occasions, consider atonnic issues, it remained vague and inconsistent. If the composition of the Labour left remained roughly the same fiom the late 1940's to the late 19501s, why did the nuclear issue only captivate the left afier 1955 rather than before? What were the factors that conixibuted to Labour's Malsilence on nuclear issues during the Attlee administration?

The clirnate of the late 1940's would seem tohave been ideal for the flourishing of the Labour left. The Labour government of 1945 was not only committed to democratic

The two motions that called for unilaterd disarmament at the 1960 Scarborough Conference were presented by thw AEU and the TGWU. They passed by 3,303,000 to 2,896,000 and 3,282,000 to 3,239,000 respectively, For debate see The British Labour Party, Report of the 59th Annual Conference (London: Transport House, 1960), pp. 176- 202. socialism but, bolstered by a large parliamentary majority, it lifted the restrictive standing

orders of party discipline in the Common~.~'A lively lefi-wing press interacted with the

Parliamentary left.

Let us fist examine the nature of the Parliamentary left. The left in Parliament

was not unified; it was made up of various ideologically distinct factions. The mainstream

Parliamentary left was for the most part fairly moderate. Comrnunists and pacifists in the

House of Commons were figegroups that did not hold much purchase with the

mainstream leRn who were largely journalists, writers and lecturers. Prominent in this

group of lefi-wing M.P.s were R.H.S. Crossman, Michael Foot, Ian Mikardo, Geofiey

Bing, Benn Levy, J.P. W. Mallalieu, Jennie Lee, Barbara Castle, Francis Bowles, Maurice

" The standing orders, although allowing M.P.s to abstain fkom voting on matters of conscience, did not allow M.P.s to vote against the party. For the text of the standing orders see Robert MacKenzie, British Political Parties condon: Mercury Books, 1963), appendix C, p.688.

22 Some pacifists in the House of Commons included Rhys Davies, Reginald Sorensen and Victor Yates. However, pacifism was largely destroyed by World War II. Although pacifism was the official Labour party policy fiom the end of World War 1, in 1937 the Labour party abstained on the government's SeMce Estimates, instead of voting against them as was traditional, and that same year adopted at its Annual Conference an "uncomprornising opposition to appeasement and fh suppoa for rearmament"@en Pimlott, Kugh Dalton bondon: MacMillan Press Ltd., 19851, p.242). Pacifisrn was not a widely credible politicai ideology in Bntain in the immediate post-war period. In 1945, "Labour had a large majority and the pacifists' votes did not really matter much." (Eugene Meehan, The British Left Wing and Foreign Policy [New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 19601, p.30). In addition, the moderate Labour Ieft made efforts to not be associated with fellow travelling Comrnunists, such as William Warbey, Konni Zilliacus, John Platts-Mills, Leslie SolIey and Lester Hutchinson, so that its loyalty to the Labour governrnent codd not be questioned. They were "usually anxious not to be cast in the roles of fellow-travellers or crypto-Comm~sts.Equally they were concerned not to repeat the pacifist errors of the years of appeasement in the thirties"(Morgan, Labour in Power,p.67). Edelman, R.G.W. MacKay and Leslie Halemu

Some of these M.P.s were intimately involved in the lefi-wing British press. The two major lefi-wing journals in 1945 were the Nau Stutesman and rib bu ne.'^ The New

Statesman was the "chief vehicle for lefi-wing opinion in Britain throughout the period

1945-5 1."= Its editor was Kingsley Martin, and its assistant editor was R-H.S. Crossman, who had been elected to the Houe of Commons in July 1945. Aithough appealing '?O independent leftists associated with the Cornmon Wealth, the ILP or even, in 1945, the

Communist Party," the New Statesman accepted most of its contributions from Labour left M.P.s such as Maurice Edelrnan, Stephen Swingler and Woodrow Wyatt. 26 Tribune was even more closely associated with the Labour party. Its editorial board in 1945 was comprised of Jennie Lee, Paûicia Strauss, Michael Foot, Ian Mikardo, and John

Kimche."

Y Meehan, The British Lefr Wing, p.29.

'4 The New Statesman and Tribune were the most important jodsbut there were others, such as the Glasgow Fonvard and the ReynoldNews. These two were less influentid and less widely circulated. Moreover, the Reynold News was often sornewhat non-political. Therefore the following pages will concentrate on the New Statesman and Tribune as the main expression of lefi wing sentiment.

2s Meehan, The British Lefi Wing, p.23.

26 Jonathan Schneer, Labour's Conscience (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988)' p.32.

" Meehan, The British Lefr Wing, p.24. Tribune was established in 1937 by the Socialist League, which had formed in 1932 to "push for the adoption by the Party of a socialist programme' '(David Coates, The Labour Party and the Shuggle for Socialism London: Cambridge University Press, 19751, p. 186) Founding members were Aneurin Bevan, Stafford Cripps and George Strauss. Strauss and Cripps had severed their connection to the paper before World War II; Bevan's involvement was limited because he was a member of the new government. As David Howell has pointed out, Bevan's For them, Tribune was a means by which parliamentary debate could be continued in the wider context of the entire Labour movement in Britain, and without the repressive influence of the Speaker of the House of Commons . . . 28

There were, of course, many other left-wing organizations in Britain in 1945; however,

apart fiom the commentary fiom lefi-wing joumals, most "lefi wing activity within the

po st-war Party was restricted almost exclusively to ParLiamentary manoeu~ring."'~

When the Labour party was elected to power in My 1945, it prornised to change

the basis of British foreign policy, which had for years been dominated by the

Consemative pw.The Labour election manifesta, "Let Us Face the Future", promised

to apply a "Sociaiist analysis to the world situation." It even went a step further,

committing a Labour government to maintainhg fi-iendly relations with the Soviet Union

and suggesting that a Consemative government would be unable to achieve this:

We must consolidate in peace the great war-time association of the British Commonwealth with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Let it not be forgotten that in the years leading up to the war the Tories were so scared of Russia that they rnissed the chance to establish a partnership which might have prevented the warS3O

Many newly elected Labour M.P.s believed that a Labour government would be

"appointment as Minister of Health could be seen as a stroke of imagination, or perhaps as a caging of the Govemment's most effective potential criticX@avid Howell, Brish Social Dernocracy London: Croom Helrn, 1976), p.1361. However Bevan's wife (Jennie Lee) and Strauss's wife (Patrïcia Strauss) remained actively involved with the journal.

28 Meehan, The British Le$ WNlg, p.25.

29 Coates, The Labour Party, p.190.

'O "Let Us Face the Future" (1 945) in F. W.S. Craig (ed.), British General Election Manifestos, 1900-I974(London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1975), p. 130. guided by party policy in the sphere of foreign aEairs. Denis Hedey, who becarne the secretary of the party's International Department, had decIared at the 1945 Labour Party

Annual Conference that:

The crucial principle of our own foreign policy shodd be to protect, assist, encourage and aid in every way that Socidist revolution, wherever it appears. . . there is a very great danger udess we are carefid, that we shall fïnd ourselves running with the Red Flag in fiont of the armoured cars of Tory imperialism and counter-revolution . . . 3 1

During the campaign of 1945 Harold Laski, the Chairman of the Labour Party National

Executive Council, comrnented that the Labour party wanted to break fiom traditional foreign policy:

1 want to emphasize that the Labour Party is at no point committed to the doctrine of continuity of foreign policy. We do not propose to accept the Tory doctrine of the continuity of foreign policy because we have no interest in the continuity of Conservative poli~y?~

Jonathan Schneer points out that although Attlee quickly repudiated Laski's comment, the

Labour membership had no real reason to assume that a Labour government wouId not pursue a socialist foreign policy. At the end of the campaign Attlee even seemed to endorse Laski's view by commenthg that:

It is obvious that a Labour Govemment will follow a policy in accordance with the principles in which it believes . . . The fact that in the late Govemment members of dl parties were in accord on the main lines in our foreign policy does not alter the fact that the complexion of the new House of Cornmons will decide

' British Labour Party, Report of the 44th Annual Confieence condon: Transport House, 1945), p. 114.

32 Quoted in Peter Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), chapter 6, endnote 1, p. 355. the course of fbture poli~y?~

For many Labour M.P.s a "socialist foreign policy" rneant closer Anglo-Soviet relations and more distant Anglo-American relations, There existed a genuine distnist of

American ~a~italisrn?~However, as discussed in chapter 1, the new Labour govenunent immediately began to initiate closer relations with the United States, and soon after began distancing itself fi0111 the Soviet Union. The appointment of Ernest Bevin as Foreign

Secretary was a major factor in this continuity in foreign affairs. He came to the foreign office with "a strong anti-Sovietism, sharpened by years of stniggle with Communists inside the British and international trade union rnovernent~.'"~As John Saville points out:

"Bevin's rnind was already closed to new idem by the time he reached the Foreign Office at the end of July 1945. His views on international relations had been confumed during his years in the War Cabinet and the major premises of his political reasoning were not thereafter to be altered in any fundamental ~ay."~~

Left-leaning Labour MP.s soon realized that Britain was failing to pursue the ccsociaIistforeign policyyythat it had promised in 1945. At a Parliarnentary Labour Party meeting on 10 October 1945 M.P. Barbara Castle moved 7hat in order to preserve the unity of the Party, the PLP be consulted before policies are announced by Members of the

" Quoted in Schneer, Labour S Conscience, p. 19.

" Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p. 189.

35 Weiler, Ernest Bevin, p. 146.

36 John Saville, The Politics of Continuity (London: Verso, 1993), p.93 . Govemment which mod* or ignore decisions of the AnnuaI c on fer en ce.'^' This request was clearly ignored. As cold war tensions intensified and Anglo-American collaboration increased, Labour left dissatisfaction with the govemment grew. Bevin asserted in March

1946 that Britain was '?he 1st bastion of social democracy . . . [an alternative to] the red tooth and claw of Arnerican capitalism and the Communist dictatorship of Soviet

~ussia."'~However, to many lefi-leaning Labour M.P.s this was mere lip-service. The

Govemment's denunciation of communist insurgency in Eastern Europe and the

Mediterranean, its support for Amencan policy in the ~acific," lack of aid to dernocratic forces in Franco's Spain and quiet satisfaction about Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech al1 seemed to stray fiom ''socialist foreign p~licy."~As David Coates has pointed out: "The expenence of Governrnent Office had left the Labour Party in 1945 with a leadership that was ever willing to temper its policies to the requirements of 'sound reason and national interest' - entities which, as MO~SO~[leader of the House of Commons] made clear to

" Quoted in Schneer, Labour '.Y Conscience, p.53. According to the Labour party constitution of 1918, the annual conferences were to be the "instrument of policy makingy7(Morgan,Labour in Power,p.73). However, as Robert MacKenzie has pointed out: '?he PLP [Parliarnentary Labour Party] is autonomous and the anoual conference has no control whatever over the actions of a Labour Governrnent. The Pwconstitution states that 'the work of the Party shall be under the direction and control of the Party Conference' but this can ody mean 'the work of the Party outside Parliament"' (British Politcd Parties, p.48 5).

"Mach 1946, quoted in G. Warner, ''The Anglo-American Special Relationship", Diplornatic History Fall 1989, 13(4): p.48 1.

39 As early as October 1945, the New Statesman declared: "ln the Pacific zone General MacArthur is the unchallenged dictator, who makes and unmakes puppet governments at will" (New Statesman, 13 October 1945, 30 (764): p.239).

40 See Schneer, Labour's Conscience, pp.53-4. the Labour party conference in 1946, had nothing in common with the 'Lefi' of the

Party.'"'

By autumn of 1946, lefi-leaning M.P.s and publications had begun to criticize

Bevin's foreign policy. Between 3 1 August and 28 September the New Statesman published a series of four articles denouncing Emest Bevin's increasingly cold war foreign policies? On 29 September twenty-one M2.s circdated a letter to Attlee which declared:

The Government gives too often the impression of being infected by the Anti-Red virus which is cultivated in the United States . . . Gross imperfections in . . . States such as Greece, Spain and even the United States itself tend to evoke but a fiaction of the criticism directed Ea~tward?~

The architects of the letter were carefid not to include the narnes of fellow travellers.

M.P.s such as Solley, Platts-Mills, Warbey and Zilliacus, were sympathetic to the letter's aims> but were considered by the mainstream party to be left-wing extremists. The signatories of the letter wanted to assure the govermnent that it was legitimate group of

41 Coates, The Labour Parry, p.63.

42 See Meehan, The British Lefr Wing, pp.96-9. The very kst attempt at shifting Labour's foreign policy had occurred almost one year before eariy as October 1945, when 5 8 M.P .'s signed a motion condemning Bntain' s policy in Indo-China and Indonesia (Morgan, Labour in Power, p.63).

43 Quoted in Schneer, Labour's Conscience, p.56.

44 They were members of the Foreign Affairs policy group, and used their membership 70denounce Bevin on such issues as Greece, Spain, Indonesia, and relations with the Soviet Union" (Morgan, Labour in Power, p.60). loyal members who opposed the goveniment's foreign policy."

On 1 November 1946 Tribune printed the explanation of one of the signatories of the letter to Attlee. Lyall Wilkes wrote:

We are victims of a coalition on foreign afFairs - . , which exacts its sacrifice now of Socialism abroad but which will almost certainly in time exact its sacrifice of Socialism at home.46

Soon after, the Labour left, led by Crossman, organized an amendment to the Address fiom the Throne be moved in the House of Comrnons. The Amendment expressed

the urgent hope that His Majesty's Govemment will so review and recast its conduct of international &airs as to afford the utmost encouragement to, and collaboration with al1 nations and groups striving to secure full Sociaiist planning and control of the world's resources, and thus provide a democratic and constructive Socialist alternative to the othenvise inevitable conflict between American capitalism and Soviet Communism in which al1 hope of world govemment wodd be destroyed?'

These endeavours embraced the 'third force' ideology. Most of the moderate

Labour lefi believed that Britain - as a democratic socialist nation - represented the middle ground between Amencan and Soviet political and economic systerns. They believed that a socialist Britain was the only positive alternative to these two ideological extremes, and should bridge the gap between the two superpowers. They were not sympathetic to either the Soviet Union or the United States, but rather were dedicated to a

45 Schneer, Labour's Conscience, p.57.

46 Ibid., pp.57-8.

"Hansard Parliarnentary Debates, 5th series - House of Comrnons, Volume 430, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947), 18 November 1946, p.525. No one voted in favour of the amendment but there were 130 abstentions. democratically socialist Britain.

in early 1947, during the coal crisis, a group of Labour lefi M.P.s started to meet

regularly to discuss how they codd push the govemment to adopt more socialist policies.

They caIled themselves the "Keep Left" group. While the United States Congress was

contemplating rniiitary aid to Turkey and Greece (under the auspices of the Truman

Doctrine), "Keep Left" produced a pamphlet by the sarne name, which was published by

the New Sratesman. The authors of Keep Lep were Crossman, Foot, and Milcardo, though

another twelve M.P.s signed their names to the pamphlet.48Keep Le# presented many

criticisms of the Labour govemment and dedicated half its contents to a discussion of

foreign policy. It declared: " So far we have learnt ody what a Socialist foreign policy

shozrld not be . . . However attractive it may be at first sight, 'collective security against

Communism' is a betrayal of socialist prin~i~les."~The "Keep Leeygroup explicitly

espoused the notion of Britain as a %ird force":

The task of British Socialism must be, wherever possible, to Save the smaller nations fiom this futile ideological warfare and to heal the breach between the U.S.A. and the US.SIR- But we cannot do this if we oursefves have taken sides either in a Communist bloc or in an anti-Bolshevik axis. It would be a betrayal of British and European Socialism if we meekly accepted Communist leadership. But it would be equally fatal to accept American leadership in exchange for dollars

48 They were: G. Bing, D. Bruce, H. Davies, L. Hale, F. Lee, B. Levy, R-W-G. MacKay, J.P.W. Mallalieu, E. Millington, S Swingler, G. Wigg, and W. Wyatt. (See Keep Lefr (London: New Statesman and Nation, 1947). Seven of the 'Keep Left' members were joumalists (Morgan, Labour in Power, p.64).

49 Keep Lep, p.35. There was organized and consistent criticism of the govemment's handling of foreign policy through 1946-7. At the Annual Conferences the Ieft expressed this cnticisrn of Bevin's foreign policy. At the 1946 Conference the following motions were put forward :

This Conference, recognising that the only hope of lasting peace lies in the international adoption of Socialism, and regretting the Goverment's apparant continuance of traditional Conservative Party policy of power politics abroad, urges a return tu the Labour Party foreign policy of support of Socialist and anti- Imperidist forces throughout the world . . . This Conference is of the opinion that world peace cm oniy be based on a British foreign policy directed to ensure fimi fiiendship and cooperation with the U.S.S.R."

At the 1947 Conference similar sentiments were expressed:

This Conference recognises the importance of the closest relations with the U.S.A. but. . . feels that it is equally vital to secure the closest CO-operationwith the U.S.S.R. . . It believes that subservience to capitalist America will inevitably draw us into an anticipated slump, and that the only way to avoid this is to CO-operate with al1 countries with Socialist planned economies. . . 5'

Despite clear left-wing discontent in boîh the Parliarnentary and non-

Parliamentary Labour party, with the govemment's traditional approach to foreign flairs and power politics, there was aimost no discussion of the implications of a British atomic

*' British Labour Party, Report of the 45th Annual Conference (London: Transport Houe, 1%6), pp. 151-7,

s2 Conference Decisions, pp. 249-25 1. These 1946-7 motions were defeated. Bevin bad the clear backing of the Trades Union Congress at the Conference. Although certain unions were prepared to condernn Bevin's foreign policy in 1946 (such as the Distributive and Allied Workers), the TUC defeated a resolution presented at its 1946 annual conference that called for a rejection of Bevin's policy in general and in Greece in particular (Schneer, Labour 's Conscience, p. 135). As David HoweIl has pointed out, '%e leadership could rely almost automatically on support fiom a majority of the large trade unions" at the Labour Party Coderence (British Social Democracy, p.141). 111

bomb in the period 19454947. We now tuni to an examination of this phenomenon.

The first and most obvious reason for the lack of criticism regarding the atomic

bomb was that the Labour Party was not informed of the government's intention to use

atomic energy for military purposes. This was kept secret mtil May 1948. Indeed, as The

Manchester Cuardiun comrnented in 1946: "One could wish that the cornmittees set up

by our own govemment had a litde more to Say . . .The silence of our own government

does not encourage people to take this great problem seriously. There is a work of public

uiformation done in the United States which has no counterpart here."*) As Stephen King-

Hili commented, "as soon as the appalling significance of the atomic bomb faded fiom

our minds steeped in horror, apathy resumed its ~wa~.'*~

Even immediately after the bombings there was little criticism of the U-S.-U.K.

development and use of atomic bombs. The New Statesman stated on 2 1 August 1945

that "two bombs, by obviating the need for invasion, may on balance have saved life."ss

Tribune suggested that '?bis most drarnatic of scientific discoveries has been made under

the pressure of communal siwival in war and without any motivation of profit at a11."56

However, in the months that followed, as the world absorbed the implications of atomic

energy, the New Srutesman and Tribune did cail for the international control of atornic energy. The New Statesman condemned Truman's October 1945 announcement that the

-- -- '' Quoted in Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, p.54. " Ibid., p.53.

55 Néw Statesman, 11 August 1945'30 (755): p.85. " Tribune, 10 August 1945, (450): p.1. 112

United States would withhold atomic secrets, suggesting that such an act would ody

prompt the Soviet Union to manufacture its own bomb independently. " MerAttiee

called for tripartite Anglo-Amencan-Canadian talks on the international control of atomic

energy, Tribune declared: "We are proud that the initiative for this plan has corne fiom

Brirain's Labour G~vernment.'"~While both journals expounded the need for

international control of atomic energy, thîs was based on the assurnption that under such

conditions Britain could benefit fiom atomic secrets. The New Statesman cailed for the

distribution '90 the whole family of mankind the fixits of its atomic research . . ."59 It was

not considered that Britain might refiain fiom exploithg this the new form of energy.

Although there was some discussion in 1945, while the bomb was still fiesh in the rnind of the left, commentary in Tribune and the New Stafesman soon dwindled. Mer

1945 there was only sporadic discussion of the implication of atomic weapons. This was, of course, exacerbated by the fact that by August 1946, after the legislation of the US.

Atomic Energy Act, it was clear that the United States was intent on maintainhg its atomic monopoly. As far as most M.P.s and journalists and the public were concerned, this meant that Britain would not manufacture the weapon. Many beIieved that the United

States was solely responsible for atomic energy and the bomb. It is for this reason that pacifist and Labour left groups dike strayed fiom the issue of the bomb and focussed their energies on other, seemingly more pressing, issues. As Lawrence Wittner has

'' New Statesman, 13 October 1945,3 0 (764): p.239. Tribune, 16 November 1945, (464):p.2. " New Statesman, 3 November 1945,30 (767): p.292. pointed out, the Peace Pledge Union and the British FeLlowship of Reconciliation

believed that providing relief to war tom Europe was "'the most important fom of

activity' . . . British pacitists did not place the problem of nuclear weapons at the top of

their agenda.'ym

Thus, neither of the two most important left-wing journals commented when the

British Atomic Energy Act was passed in 1946, despite the fact that the Act earmarked

£30 million for a British programme.6' Sirnilarly there was little cnticisrn of the bill in

Parliament, and it received near-unmimous support fiom both sides of the House. Nor

was there substantial criticisrn of the 1946 Defence White Paper, which stated: "The great

strides made in the realm of science and technology, including the production of atomic

bombs, cannot fail to afXect the make up of our forces . . .""

Despite the Atornic Energy Act and the Defence Paper of 1946, few understood

that Britain had the capability or the intention of mdacturing atomic weapons. On 1

February 1947 the New Stutesman wrote:

It has been repeatedly stated that the concern of British atomic research and development is with the peacetime use of atomic energy and not with the bomb. . .

Wiîtner, One World, p.8 8. '' See Gowing, Independence und Deterrence, Volume 1, p.49, and Volume 2, p.49. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Atomic Energy Act gave the Minister of Supply full control over the development of atornic energy. It also declared that to disclose any atomic information "in the exercise of powers under this Act" was a crime. (See The Public Generul Acts of 1946,pp. 1 11 1-1 113). Certain Labour M.P.s did criticize that such secrecy might hamper the establishement of international control of âtomic energy, but were assured by the Muiister of Supply that this would not occur (The Times, 9 October 1946, p.8).

62 Quoted in Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p.71. This is a realistic policy, since bomb production in these congested and vulnerable islands, dependent on the basic atomic ores from abroad, is militarily ~ntenable.~~

As Groom has accurately pointed out:

The policy of secrecy was doubtless one of the major factors which made for the relative lack of public discussion about the British bomb in the early post-war years . . . Public discussion centred more on general questions, such as international control and relations with the Soviet Union, than on specific issues such as whether and in what circumstances Britain shouid build a bornb?'

The 1947 National Service Act was a contributing factor to the lack of discussion on atomic weapons. When the government introduced a bill in March 1947 that reinstated national service for a period of eighteen months, "the pacifist Rhys Davies tabled an

Amendment calling for a rejection of the Bill. Seventy-seven Labour MT'S signed the

~mendment."~~At the second reading of the bill seventy-two M.P.s voted against it, and twenty abstained publicly. Both the centre and far left and pacifist contingents of the

House of Cornmons disapproved of the lengthy penod of national service.66By the third

" New Statesman, 1 February 1947,33 (832): p.91. Ironicdy, the month before this statement was made, the British made the decision to go ahead with the manufacture of atomic weapons. By the end of 1947 designs had been made to give bombers atomic capability (Groom, British Thinking, p.37).

64 Groom, British Thinking, p.35.

65 Hugh Berrington, Backbench Opinion in the House of Cornmons, 1945-5.5 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973), pp.72-3. As Mark Jenkins has pointed out, '?he conscription revolt was in effect the first initiative of Keep Left . . ." (Bevanism, p.44).

66 The centre lefi opposed the bill because of the labour shortage in Britain at the the, arguhg that manpower could not be spared. The hard left opposed the bill on the grounds that it was offensive to the Soviet Union, and pacifists opposed conscription on moral grounds. (See Robert Jackson, Rebels and Whips [London: MacMillian and Company Ltd., 19681, pp.59-60). 115

reading of the bill the government had agreed to an amendment that reduced the penod of

national service fkom eighteen to twelve months. This appeased most of the lefi and oniy

37 M.P.s opposed the bill in its third reading.

The government's insistence on the continuation of national service during peace

time seemed to signiQ that Britain still relied on traditional military strategy. This

indirectly suggested to the left that no plans for an atomic arsenal were being made. As

soon as the bombs had been used in Japan, the left understood that atomic weapons had

the ability to make conscription ~bsolete.~'

In the domestic sphere alone, [atomic weapons would make ] it necessary, sooner or Iater, to adopt a radically different attitude to the problem of general conscription (which as a nationai policy, will become nonsensical) as well as to the question of army and navy expenditure . . .

The government's commitment to developing a dual defence system based on both

atomic and conventional rnilitary capability, was kept secret. The governrnent seemed to be focussing on traditional methods of defence in the post-war era. Govenunent insistence on mandatory national service was not the only thing that seemed to indicate that Brïtain was not developing atomic weapons; the continued development of conventional weapons also contributed to misconceptions about British skategy.

Comments like the one made by pacifist Labour M.P. Emrys Hughes in March 1948 on the subject of annual Service Estimates provide Merevidence of this widely held

67 Later, in the 195OVs, the Conservatives grasped this . The 1957 Defence White Paper called for a reduction of defence expenditure and the end of national service, suggesting that an nuclear deterrent could replace such conventional military requirernents (Driver, The Disarmers, p.34).

Tribune, 17 August 1945, (45 1): p.1. misconception:

1 maintain that these estimates do not reflect the attitude we should be adopting toward modern warfie, that we cannot afford this money at a time of national crisis, that we are preparing obsolete weapons, that we are throwing away the national money . . . in a tirne of atomic warfare . . . 69

The lack of discussion about the moral implications of atomic energy in 1946-

1947 also stemrned from the left's (and general public's) ignorance of the distinction of atornic weapons fiom other weapons . It was not until the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons that the public was able to make both a moral and practica! distinction between conventiond bombs and atomic bombs. The inability to fùlly comprehend the implications of the atomic era was expressed in the pages of both Tribune and the New

1s the new weapon, like the old, merely to become the servant of competing nationalisms? . . .The problem presented by the atomic bomb . . . is not new. It is the problem of building an international so~iety.~~

And

We have to abandon the national ownership of military power . . . This advance we shall not make until one of the Great Powers leads the way as a pioneer, and dares to propose with all its resources of publicity a clean break with the old order of cornpetitive nationalism."

Aithough Tribune and the New Statesman called for international control of atomic energy in these articles, they viewed the atomic bomb as a part of the old dilemma of

69 House of Commons, Volume 448,4 March 1948, p.574.

'O Tribune, 10 August 1945, (450): p.2.

" New Sratesrnan, 3 November 1945,30 (767): p.292. rnilitansrn and nationalism in international politics. niey did not yet fully appreciate that

the bomb added an entïrely new dimension to the international situation by fundamentaily

changing the nature of warfare. The atomic bomb was uoderstood to be just another

weapon. Although scientists %ere well aware of the hazards of exposwe to high levels of

radiation," the consequences of atomic warfare were believed by the public to be very

similar to the consequences of conventional saturation bombing used in Germany and

Japan in the latter half of the war. It was widely believed that an atom bomb did the same

kind of damage as a larger number of conventional bombs? Not until the 1950's did people outside the scientific community began to grasp the physical dangers of nuclear

energy and that the public began to be concemed with proliferation.

While Tribune and the New Statesman called for international control of atomic energy in 1945 and Keep Lefr called for British rejection of atornic weapons in 1947, atomic disarmament was not one of the main focal points of the "third force" proponents.

"Keep Left" dedicated only one paragraph of its 47 paged pamphlet (nearly 16 pages of which was dedicated to foreign policy and defence issues) to the subject of atomic weapons:

We should . . . renounce the manufacture and use of atomic bombs and to subrnit our armed forces and marnent factories to inspection of U.N.O. , irrespective of whether Russia and America reach an agreement on the subject or not. This involves no sacdice of security for us, since our security depends not on winning

* See J. Samuel Waiker, "History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the Bomb", Diplornatic Hisfo~1995, 19(2): p.326. As U.S. Generai LeMay put it soon after the atomic bombings: "We scorched and boiled and baked to death more people in Tokyo on that night of March 9-1 0 than went up in vapour at Hiroshima . . ." (Quoted in Mark Seldon, "The United States, Japan, and the Atornic Bomb" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 199 1,23 (1): p. 10). the next - atoniic - war, but on preventing it .A United Europe, strong enough to deter an aggressor, but voluntarily renouncing the most deadiy offensive weapon of modem warfare, would be the best guarantor of world peace?

The atornic bomb was a peripheral issue, it did not have the mobilizing effect of numerous other foreign policy questions (such as conscription, policy in the

Mediterranean, or relations with the Soviet Union). The 'Wiird force" movement had a somewhat ambiguous view of atomic energy. This was partly because in 1947 atomic energy was a potential means to relieve the energy crisis in Britain. The New Statesman commented on 1 February 1 947 that was essential that a British atomic energy programme be pursued:

In terms of our national economy, it is a matter of urgency that we push ahead. It is now clear . . . that atornic energy fiom fissionable matenals can, in fact compete with coal as a source of industrial power . . . 74

Moreover, while those who adhered to the 'third force7ctearly thought an Amencan atomic monopoly was disastrous to world peace (and wodd have found a Soviet atornic monopoly just as threatening), it is not clear that they would have been intierently opposed to a British monopoly of atomic energy. The main tenet of the 'third force' ideology was the belief in Britain's intemationd obligation as conciliator between the

United States and the Soviet Union. The 'third force' proponents asserted that Britain should provide the world with mord leadership by choosing the middle way between communism and capitalism. Not only would British possession of atomic weapons be

73 Keep Lefi, p.4 1.

" New Statesman, 1 February 1947,33(832): p.9 1. essentially Less threatening to world peace (because Britah, under a Labour government, would manage them responsibly); more important, a British "independent nuclear deterrent" wodd enable British military independence from the United States- Such independence was crucial to Britain's role as a socialist alternative- Attlee appealed to the

'third force' ideology in 1952 when he justified his government's secret development of an atomic bomb:

1do not believe it is right that this country should be absolutely dependent on the United States of Amenca . . . that is one very good reason for going ahead widi our own work on the atomic b~rnb.~*

Similarly, Labour left leader Aneuri. Bevan, when making his famous speech repudiating unilateral nuclear disarmament in 1957, "harkred] back to the Lefi wing's 'Third Force' concept of a decade earliery'76declaring that:

It is against that deadly, dangerous negative polarkation that we have been fighting for years. We want to have to oppomuiity of interposing between these two giants, a modifjhg, rnoderating and mitigating infl~ence.'~

For Bevan, nuclear weapons gave Bntain the influence it needed to mediate the cold war and provide moral leadership for the world. The 'third force' proponents of the 1940's never explicitly used this rationale for British possession of atornic weapons. However, although Keep Lefi repudiated British possession of the bomb, Tribune and the New

" Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th series - House of Commons, Volume 537, (London:His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), 5 March 1952, p.497.

'' Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 103.

77 Quoted in Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 103. Statesman, the other vehicles for the expression of the 'third force' position, remained virtually silent on nuclear issues through 1947."

1947-1952

Increasïngly through 1947, the Labour government began to take a hard line agaùist lefi-wing cntics. At the 1947 Conference, the govemment circulated a pamphlet created in response to Keep Lefr, promising that Britain would "in no case . . .be drawn into cornmitments which excluded the possibility of sunilar collaboration with Russia.'"

The pamphlet, called Cards on the Tableyvigorously supported Bevin's foreign poli~y.~~

At this same conference, Bevin defended his foreign policy and attacked the left, claiming that they had "stabbed in the back."=' Drawing (as Bevin was apt to do) on bis loyalty to the trade union movement, he declared:

78 The only critical mention of the atomic bomb that 1could find was in the 3 1 May 1947 issue of the New Sraiesman. This article accepted the notion of nuclear deterrence: "The knowledge that we possessed the reserves might be a deterrent to the outbreak of war." However, it condemned atomic weapons based on the realization that in the advent of atomic war, Britain would be annihilated. (See New Statesman,3 1 May 1947,33 (874): pp.387-8).

79 Quoted in Weiler, British Labour and the CoZd War, p.109. Car& on the Table was drafted Denis Healey, the Secretary of the International Department. It was approved by Hugh Dalton and Foreign Office ministers, Hector McNeil and Chirs Mayhew. (See Healey, The The ofMy Life, pp. 105-6). " Because Keep Lefi was published at a crucial moment in Anglo-American relations - while the Truman Doctrine was being debated in Congress - the Labour leadership was concemed that %e Arnencans might conclude that it was the left which spoke for Britain, and decide that an Amerkm presence in Europe was unwelcome. An attempt to deal with this problem was made by the publication before the party conference of a pamphlet entitled Cards on the Table. . ." (Harris, p.307).

British Labour Party, Report ofthe 46th Annual Conference (London: Transport House, 1947), p. 179. If you are to expect loyalty fiom Ministers, the Ministers - however much they may make mistakes - have the right to expect loyalty in retuni. 1grew up in the trade union, you see, and 1have never been used to this sort of thing."

Jonathan Schneer has pointed out that the Margate conference "marked the beginning of the end of Labour lefi organized resistance to BeWiite 'continuity of foreign p~licy.""~

Bevin received the solid support of the trade unions for his foreign policy. The

Conference carried a motion that pronounced:

This Conference . . . puts on record its approval and welcome of the generai policy of the Foreign Secretary and especially of his courageously expressed desire to Mersome system of world organisation for peace, based upon the direct representation of the peoples and workers of the world and not only of their States and govemments."

Two motions, one calling for cooperation with the Soviet Union, and another condemning the backing of a reactionary govemment in Greece, were both defeated!' These motions were so widety rejected by Conference delgates that they did not even receive card votes.s6 As Richard Crossman later cornmented, at the Margate Conference Bevin "did not merely smash his cntics; he pulverised them into applauding him.""

Through 1947 and 1948 international events helped move the left behind Bevin's

Ibid., p.179. For full speech, see pp. 175-182.

83 Schneer, Labour 's Conscience, p.64. " Conference Decisions, p.250.

85 Ibid., p.25 1.

Jenkins, Bevanism, p.47.

" Quoted in Schneer, Labour's Conscience, p.63. 122 foreign policy. Perceived Soviet aggression and continuhg American support to Britain persuaded the left to accept the inevitability of the cold war. The creation of the

Cominform in October 1947, the Prague coup in Febmary 1948, and the Berlin blockade in the spring/summer of 1948 dl seemed to prove that the Soviet Union was intent on extending its totalitarian regime through Europe. These events seriously challenged the assurnptions of the left and fiactured the "Keep LeWYgroup in particular? By 1947,

Tribune was fïrmly anti-Soviet and had essentidly abandoned its ''third force" argument:

Tribune's pro-American position in 1947 was entirely pragmatic. Britain was in debt to the USA, drew half her irnports fiom that source, refied on her for defence and [in Tribune's words], 'could il1 afford to do without the Americans. ' 89

Secretary George Marshall's offer in June 1947 also served to rnobilize support for Bevin's foreign policy. Not only did Marshall aid demonstrate the United States' cornmitment to European recovery, but Soviet rejection of participation in the plan suggested to the left that the Soviet Union was really seeking to divide Europe. Moreover,

Bevin's quick initiative and skillfull manoeuvring (Britain received the bulk of MarshaIl aid) were appreciated by much of the mainstream left since Britain desperately needed aid to ward off economic collapse and continue its commitment to democratic socialism.

Both Michael Foot and Richard Crossman, two key left-wing figures, supported the

Marshall Plan despite its exclusion of the Soviet bloc." "Richard Crossman . . . wrote, '1

88 Morgan, Labour in Power, p.64. " Jenkins, Bevanism, p.66. As Jonathan Schneer points out, this development in Tribune's point of view began as early as 1946 (Labour's Conscience, pp.32-3).

'O Ibid., p.64. have often criticised Bevin. . .Now . . . .he has seized the initiative . . . He can lay the

foundations of a real peace in spite of Mr. ~01otov.'"~~He admitted that the Marshall

Plan made plans for a 'third force' obsolete."

However, it was not ody international circumstances that led to the Labour left's

acceptance, by 1948, of Bevin's foreign policyP3 As Peter Weiler has documented, the

Labour government actively attempted to cmh aIl pro-Soviet elements in the labour

rnovement, through the Information Research Department The IRD,approved by

the Cabinet in January 1948, "poured out a stream of anti-communist [literature] for both

domestic and . . . foreign c~nsum~tion.'"~It provided ministers, the press and the Trades

Union Congress with such propaganda ''to use as they saw fit? This effort, combined

with real Soviet intransigence, provoked an anti-Soviet backlash in Bntain that the left

was unable to counter. In October and November 1948 the TUC produced two circulars

to be distributed to its membership.

91 Schneer, Labour 's Conscience, p.3 8.

92 Jenkins, Bevanism, p.48.

93 At the 1948 Labour party conference, a motion was passed that declared "its loyal support for the Labour Government, and. . . the policy which is being carried out both at home and in the field of foreign affairs . . . " (See British Labour Party, Report of the 47th Annual Conference (London: Transport House, l948), p. 184).

94 See Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, chapter 6.

95 Ibid., p.207. The IRD was originally called the Communist Information Department.

96 Ibid., p.208. AS well, Herbert Tracey, the publicity director of both the Labour party and the TUC, was provided with rnaterial fiom the IRD (British Labour and the Cold War,p.2 16). In these circulars, the General Council called on members to resist communist activities and to consider removing fkom office any co~ll~nunistwho held a position of power in the movement?'

The govemment also conducted a purge of communists fiom the civil service and the Labour party . On 1 5 March 1948 Attlee a~ouncedin the House of Commons that

'?he Government had reached the conclusion that it was necessary 'to ensure that no one, known to be a member of the Communîst Party, was engaged on work the nature of which effected the security of the State.""' When a group of far left M.P.S~~sent a telegram in April 1948, urgÏng support for Pietro Nenni, the leader of the Italian socialists

(who were affiliated with the Italian co~ll~nunists)in the upcoming election, they were publicly denounced by the National Executive Cornmittee."' The signatories of the telegram were requested to make a pledge of loyalty to the govemment and were threatened with expulsion from the Labour party if they were to act sünilarly in the

'' Ibid., p.2 16. Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p.552. "Forty-five M.P.'s signed a motion regretting Attlee's statement but only five voted against the Government" (Ernest Bevin, p.552).

99 John Platts-Mills, Konni Zilliacus, D.N. Pritt, Tom Braddock, William Warbey and GeofEey Bing were the key organizers of the ''Nenni telegram."

'O0 The NEC was easily controlled by the Parliamentary leadership with assistance fi-om the major trade unions. Arthur Deakin, the head of the Transport Workers, Tom Williamson, head of the General and Municipal Workers and Sam Watson, head of the Durham Miners, were key supporters of the Govemrnent on the NEC. The only left- wingers on the NEC after 1948 were Michael Foot, Harold Laski and Anewin Bevan. Bevan, as a member of the government was not in a position to rebel, Laski had moved increashgly to the right by this time, and alone, Foot was unable to sustain any persistent criticism of the leadership at the Executive level. (See Morgan, Labour in Pawer, pp.71- 2)- 125 future.lo1AU those who signed the Nenni telegram were wiilïng to make this pledge, except for John Platts-Mills who, on 28 April 1948, was expelled fiom the party for his beha~iour.'~~

In 1949 three other hard-left Labour M.P.s were expelled fiom the party for their pro-Soviet sympathies. Between May and July 1949, fellow-travellers Zilliacus, Solley and Hutcbson were "expelled on policy grounds, in terms of the views they had expressed and the company they had kept for some past years . . ."'O3 As Schneer has pointed out, the expulsions did not take place because the government perceived the far left to be a threat to Labour's foreign policy. The far lefi had been discredited in the eyes of the public by 1948. The expulsions were a waming to more rnoderate leftists who had persistently criticized government foreign policy:

The red aim of the expulsions . . .was not so much to silence four troublesome backbenchers as to intimidate others who were more influentid. The rigid adherence to protocol of Labour mernbers like Foot, Crossman and the rest of the "Keep Left" group after 1947 provided indirect evidence for this conclusion . . .'O4

Both extemal events and governent pressure helped to dissolve the 'third force' movement. Although five critical arnendrnents were presented by Labour Members in the

House of Comrnons in response to British entry into the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization and one hundred and forty Labour Members did not vote for the bill, oniy

Io' See Jackson, Rebels and Whr;Ds, p.66.

'O2 According to K.O. Morgan, the expulsion was "accepted by the party with little demur and wannly applauded in the pages of Tribune" (Labour in Power, p.68).

'O3 Morgan, Labour in Power, pp.68-9.

1O4 Schneer, Labour's Conscience, p. 13 1. six M.P.s voted aga& it.'" Of the fifieen members of "Keep Lep, seven voted in favour of British involvement in NATO.'" In March 1949 Tribune had expressed support for NATO, suggesting that it was "the answer of the Western Powers to more than three years [of] aggressive diplomacy by the Soviet G~veniment."'~'As Mark Jenkuis has pointed out: "assertions that NATO was purely a security pact could not disguise the fact that Tribune was abandoning the third way."lO' When the "Keep LeRygroup produced its second pamphlet during the election campaign of 1950, entitled Keeping Le#, log again published by the New Statesman, it had clearly accepted the cold war notion of the world being separated into two hostile camps. Moreover, it explicitly acknowledged Soviet aggression and supported Britain's filiation with the American camp.

But the Labour govemment was obviously justified in its decision at the Paris Conference to disregard Russian threats and to collaborate with out neighbours in

'O5 The vote was 333 to 6. Those who voted against it were two Cornrnunist M.P.s, Platts-Mills (who had already been expelled fiom the Labour party) and Zilliacus, Solley and Hutchinson (who were soon to be expelled). (See Jonathan Schneer, "Hopes Deferred or Shattered: The British Labour Left and the Third Force Movement, 1945-1949", Journal of Modern History 56 [June 19841, p.223). Despite the large number of abstentions, it is significant that no moderate left Labour M.P.s voted against NATO. Tt clearly was not as compelling an issue as national service had been in 1947.

'O6 Ibid., p.224.

'O7 Quoted in Schneer, "Hopes Deferred or Shattered", p.221.

'O9 The composition of the "Keep Left" group was slightly different in 1950. The parliamentary Lef3 changed fiom 1945-1950, loosing some Members and gaining others, while generaiIy loosing momentum. Those who signed Keeping Left were Richard Acland, Donald Bruce, Barbara Castle, Richard Crossman, Harold Davies, Leslie Hale, Tom Horabin, Marcus Lipton, Ian Mikardo, Stephen Swingler, George Wigg, Tom Williams. (See Keeping Le$ pondon: New Statesman and Nation, 19501). Europe in organinng Western Union and disûibuting Marshail Aid . . . Later on it was right to resist Russian efforts, through the Cominform, to sabotage Western recovery; it was right to resist the Berlin blockade; and finally it was nght to accept the division of Germany asfait accompli and take part in setting up the Western German Govement. But the fact remaïns that the foreign policy in which we believed in 1945 had to be scrapped. Mead of mediating between the blocs, we have become a member of the Atlantic Pact.'"

The most noticeable change fiom Keep Le$ of 1947 and Keeping Le# was the "tacit abandonment of the third way for the acceptance of the western allian~e."'~'

By 1949 the Labour leadership could count on support fiom its left wing. Soviet belligerence toward, and American support for Britain, were important factors in the left's gradua1 acceptance of Bevinite foreign policy. The Labour government's concerted effort to discredit the extreme Ieft also contributed to this shift. At the 1949 Labour conference Sam Berger, the American Labour Attaché, "reported that there was 'more homogeneity of outlook than ever before'; delegates were 'prepared to follow their leaders wherever they felt it necessary to take them.""" Similar reports had been made by the beginning of 1948. In January 1948, the American Embassy in London sent word to

Washington that "virtually the whole British Labour movement has, step by step, abandoned its sentimental attitude toward the Soviet Union and ranged itself behind

Be~in.""~nùs was a climate unlikely to foster critical thinking about the desirability of a

''O Keeping Lep, p. 19.

IL' Jenkins, Bevanism, p.77.

Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, p.229.

Quoted in Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p.549. British atornic project.

The left's lack of dialogue on atomic matters continued after 1947. While Tribune

and the New Sfatesman did publish articles on atomic energy and the atomic bomb, these

did not discuss the possibility of a British deterrent. When the Minister of Defence

"announced" in the Cornrnons in May 1948 that Britain was developing atomic weapons,

there was no response fiom the ParIiamentary Labour party. A.V. Alexander made it clear

in his announcement that it would compromise national security to discuss the details of

the British bomb; the left seerned content to accept this. Immediately after the

announcement, the House went on to discuss the quality of Danish beef.li4 As discussed

in the previous chapter, those responsible for British atomic decisions were dso

successful in keeping questions regarding British atomic energy off the Order Paper. As

Labour M.P. EmsHughes had commented only two months prior to the atomic announcement:

None of the experts cmtell us very much about the atomic bomb. When we ask questions in this House about it, one would aimost think an atomic bomb had been dropped. When an hon. Member asks the Prime Minister about the atomic bomb, he looks at him as if he asked something inde~ent."~

The government continued to restrain Parliamentary debate &er it announced its intention to manufacture atomic weapons.

Despite these factors, the left's lack of reaction--especially in the press-4s surprising. The D Notice that had been issued the day prior to the announcernent

'14 Home of Comrnons, Vol. 450, 12 May 1948, p.2117.

'lS Hansard Parliarnentary Debaies, 5th series - House of Communs, Volume 448, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1 !Nt%),4 March 1948, p.574. 129 restncted the press fiom discussing certain details of the British atomic programme, such as location of work sites, design or construction of atomic weapons, and names of those

involved in work on the prog~amme."~Yet it did not restrict the press fkom making editorial comments on the news that Britain was manufacturing a nuclear deterrent or engaging in a debate on the moral implications of such a decision. However, despite this fieedom, neither the New Srutesman or Tribune chose to comment on the atomic announcement. Although Tribune had published an article discussing the deadlock at the

United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in ~pril,'l7 it feit no need, after the May

1948 announcement, to discuss how British possession of atornic weapons mi& affect these negotiations. The New Statesman also re-ed from commenting on the news. Its next mention of atomic weapons was in a book review in October 1948.

In the months after the governrnent's announcement Tribune and the New

Statesman did publish a nurnber of articles about atomic weapons. For example, in a piece in its 13 August 1949 edition, the New Sfatesman criticized the Labour government for allowing the United States to use British air bases."* At the tirne of the 1948 Berlin blockade, Bevin had immediately ailowed U.S. bombers with atomic capability to be stationed at British bases. Whiie the article criticized aLlowing US. bombers, potentidly equipped with atomic bombs, to wreak havoc fkom British bases, it did not question British manufacture of the very same

Il6 See Appendix 4.

Il7 Tribune,2 April 1948 (586), p.4.

'18 New Statesman, 13 August 1949,38 (963): p. 171. weapons. In fact in an article on 6 August, in reference to the negotiations for the

integration of Anglo-American atomic projects, the journal argued that Britain should continue with its own atomic programme and not allow British atomic bombs and materiais to be stored in the United States, declaring "we must always remember that the atomic stakes are not ody military but econ~mic."~~~The New Statesman's ambivalence toward the atomic bomb was furtfier expressed later that same month when the journal published a response to the 13 August article:

Indiscriminate massacre is not an absolutely necessary accompaniment to the use of atom bombs. If we are clear headed and humane it will be possible . . . to think out Iimits and restraints that would enable this weapon to be used without civilian massacre- . ."O

There was a similar lack of discussion surroundhg the implications of a British bomb &er September 1949, when the Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb. While both the New Statesman and Tribune renewed their cal1 for international control of atomic energy after the Soviet explosion was detected, they both did so without mentioning the British programme. They suggested that the Soviet Union and the United

States were responsible for the amis race, and failed to hold the Labour govemment accountable for its participation in the race for atomic supremacy. 12' Both journals speculated whether the Soviet explosion would inspire the resumption of Soviet-

''' New Statesman, 6 August 1949,38 (96 1): pp. 139-40.

''O New Siatesman, 27 August 1949,38 (964): p. 219.

121 See New Statesman, 1 October 1949, 38 (968): pp.347-8 and Tribune, 30 September 1949, (664): p.5. 13 1

American negotiations in the United Nations Atornic Energy Commission (UNAEC).

However, the British development of atomic bombs did not factor into th& analysis.

While both journals, and Tribune in particular, were sharply critical of the Soviet Union's

lack of cooperation at the UNAEC, they did not criticize Britain for contnbuting to the

international arms race by attempting to manufacture its own 'independent deterrent.'

In the House of Commons, the news of the Soviet explosion did not provoke any

immediate critïcism of British participation in nuclear proliferation. The clnly comment

made by a Labour M.P. was a question directed at the Prime Muiister by Eric Fletcher:

1s my right hon. Friend aware that the atomic energy establishrnems in this country work only normal Civil Service hours, and is he satisfied that out own research is being pushed fonvard with sufEcient energy, in view ofEthe apparently fevensh development elsewhere?"*

The one comment that came fiom the Labour party accepted the notion ofdeterrence and only criticized the govemment for not proceeding faster with its own progmmme.

The only stin-ings in Parliament occurred in Iate September, when a motion signed by seventy M.P.s, called for the Prime Minister "to take the initiative in proposing a conference between the heads of State, particularly the United States and the U.S.S.R. with a view to solving the existing [atomic] deadlock . . ."lx The motion was presented by Labour M.P. Raymond Blackburn and supported by about forty other Labour

In Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5 th series - House of Commom, Volume 468, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), 27 September 1949, p.3.

lU Ibid., 20 October 1949, p.759. Member~.'~~However, it was easy for Members of the British Parliament to request such

a conference, because Britain had not yet sucessfiilly manufactured a British atomic

bomb. Bntain had only to gain fiom the international control of atomic energy which

would resdt in the dissemination of atomic secrets, because it was the only signifïcant

power that had yet to fully develop it. An end to the U.S.-Soviet atomic monopoly was

surely in Bntain's interest, and was essential to the preservation of its world power status.

While one Labour M.P. chastised the government for its secrecy on the atom ic

issue and called for a full discussion in the House of Comrnons, there was no dissent

when the Minister of Defence dismissed the motion and turned to other business.13

Keepirzg Left did engage in a discussion of British atomic capability. It deciared:

The greatest threat to world peace and to the standard of living on both sides of the Iron Curtain is the armarnents race. The Russian production of atom bombs had completely outdated the Bachproposals for international control of atomic energy; and these islands, like the rest of Western Europe, are now indefensible against attacks by weapons of mass destruction. We should, therefore, in concert with the Brussels Powers, initiate new proposals for the elimination, under international cor,trol and inspection, of weapons of mass destruction (including atomic weapons, bacteriological and chemical warfare, and rockets) and declare our readiness to cease production of them. '26

The general thmst of Keeping Lefr's argument was that main defence against Communist totalitarianism was to mahtain a high standard of Iiving at home. If too much was spent on rearrnarnent than living conditions in Britain and the Commonwealth would

-.- ......

'24 The Times (London), 29 September 1949, p.4.

lx House of Comrnons, Vo1.468,20 October, p.759.

126 Keeping Left, p.44. detenorate and Communism would seem more appealing to the peoples of the world:

The most vital need to-day is that Britain and America should accept the view that the first line of defence is socid and economic, and that anrnaments are the second line. '"

It was this same argument that Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson and John Freeman used when they resigned fiom the government in the spring of 195 1. With the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the govemment, not heeding the advice of the authors of Keeping

Lefr, had announced in September 1950 that it would increase its three year defence programme by El, 100 million, raising it to £3,600 it was increased again in

1951 to £4,700 million owing to American pressure, promise of aid, and the intensification of the Korean conflict. It was understood that this was the "largest rearmament effort . . . Britain could undertake without imposing the drastic restrictions of a wartime econ~m~."'~~However, it was clear that social services in Britain would suffer because of remment. The 1951 Budget "included a proposal for charges on dentures and spectacles" in the National Health SeMce."'

In response to this, on 21 April 195 1 Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Labour,

Harold Wilson, the President of the Board of Trade, and John Freeman, Parliamentary

Secretary at the Ministry of Supply, al1 resigned fiom the government. Harold WiIson

12' 12' Ibid., p.23.

12' hlichael Foof Aneurin Bevan: 19454960,Volume 2 ( London: Davis-Poynter, 1973), p.307.

12' Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p.86.

"O Jackson, Rebels and Whips, p.94. explained his resignation, using similar language as Keeping Lefi: "social se~cesshould have their own pnority; . . . they have a contribution to world peace no less real than an mattainable re-marnent '

Keeping Left did condemn atomic weapons. However its disapproval was only in very general terms - its authors did not make a moral distinction between atomic weapons, chernical weapons or conventionai rockets. Like Bevan, Wilson and Freeman,

Keeping Left emphasized the domestic concems involving rearmament. The principle of remament was not called into question, only the consequences of overspending for

British and Commonwealth standards of living.

The Ministers could have in fact blarned the British atomic programme for the huge defence costs. The Attlee government had maintained conventional defence spending after the war, while developing a new atomic program~ne.'~'The combination of both programmes was extremely expensive.'" Margaret Gowing has calculated that between 1946 and mid-1952, the govemment committed approxirnately £1 17.2 million to its atomic programme without even producing one bomb. In 1950-1 twenty-three percent

13' Harold Wilson's resignation speech, printed in Tribune, 4 May 1951, (73 l), p. 12.

132 When asked in the House of Commons shortly afier the first Soviet test whether the discovery of the atomic bomb made modern amarnents obsolete, Attlee had declared that he had been advised that "'the existence of the atom bomb did not necessarily mean that al1 other weapons were obsolete" (The Times [London], 28 September 1949, p.4).

133 Churchill noted this in 1952 when he declared that "it was 'acurïous comrnentary on British politics' that it should fall on a Conservative govenunent in the face of dire financial stress to have to curtail a military defence programme to which a 'Socialist' government had committed the nation9'(Pierre,Ndear Polifics, p.87). 135 of Ministry of Supply expenditure was dedicated to the atomic programme.'" Yet the

Ministers did not dwell on atomic weapons in particuIar, but rather rearmament in generai.

The Korean war caused major schisms in the Labour party. EIeven motions tabled by the lefi called for cease fire and the withdrawal of British troops, opposed sanctions against China, and attempted to limit the area of codlict in ~orea."' None of the protests in Parliament focussed on the atomic bomb, except on one occasion in November 1950, when President Tnunan announced that atornic bombs might be used in the Korean conflict. On this occasion, one hundred M.P.s sent a letter to the Daily Herald objecting to the use of atomic weapons. The Ietter was not published nor the names of the signatones dis~losed.'~~However, '%th pressure from all sides of the House of

Commons, AttIee flew to Washington on 3 Decemberyyandinsisted that atomic weapons not be used in the confiict. 137 In response ot the Washington visit, the New Satesman mildly wrote:

President Truman, who is not without courage, and common sense, has so far

13' See Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 2, Appendices 16 and 17. '" For an overview of the motions presented by the parliamentary lefi, see Berrington, Backbench Opinion, pp. 89-90.

136 Jackson, RebeZs and Wh@, p.9 1. The Dai& Herald was the official Labour Party organ-

13' Clark and Wheeler, The Origins of British, p. 139. Michael Foot argued that there is a certain degree of mythology surrounding Attlee's visit to Washington- According to him, "Truman claimed that his remarks on the subject had been vastly misrepresented, and clearly Attlee accepted the explanation in advance . . .there was indeed little talk at that meeting of the atom bomb" (Aneuran Bevan, p.309). listened to protests from Amerka's allies (which include Britain and the Commonwealth) and has so far denied MacArthur the miiitary convenience of bombing Mukden or Harbin."'

Tribune wrote: "ML Attlee's visit to Washington achieved a number of considerable

successes. It may be that he axrived there in the nick of time to stop a vast extension of

the war.""' Although the two journals supported Attlee's efforts to dissuade Truman

hmallowing atomic or conventional bombing in the Korean conflict, neither seemed to

ready to comment on the particular significance of atomic warfare. In this sense there had

been little evolution in their views on atomic warfae ssine the bombings of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki. Both jomds were primarily concerned with an extension of the war in

Korea which they believed would result fkom American atomic or conventional

bombing campaigns.

In March 1951 Labour M.P. Harold Davies complained that the United Kingdom

was in a "secondary place vis-a-vis the United States as far as the use of the atornic bomb

is c~ncerned."'~~The Minister of State, Kenneth Younger felt compelled to defend the government against this charge and the extensive criticism kom the Conservatives that

Britaio's programme was not making enough progress:

As regards the atomic weapon itself, as distinct fkom development in other directions of this field, we have advanced Merthan the country has been led to believe by certain statements that have been made. It is incorrect to Say, for

13' New Sratesman, 2 December 1950, XL (1030), p.529.

13' Tribune, 15 December 1950, (72 l), p.3.

14' 14' Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th series - House of Cornrnons, Volume 485, Gondon: EsMajesty 's Stationery Office, 195l), 22 March 1951, p.2667. example, as has been said, that we do not even know how to make the atomic bomb or indeed have made no progress.14'

The lefi-wing, inparliament and the press, did not respond to this comment or cnticize the government's admission that the nation had been kept in the dark about the tme state of the atomic programme.

Except for its support of Attlee's visit to Washington in November 1950, and despite its call for peace in Korea, the New Sratesrnan did not engage in a discussion about the atomic bomb during the Korean conflict. Tribune, on the other hand, did provide some fairly ~~O~OUScomrnentary on the bomb. In July 1950 Tribune published an article that clairned that the Comrnunist "Outlaw the Bomb" campaign was motivated by the fact that the Soviet Union had a massive land army, one that could easily cmsh

British forces. Drawing on the experience of World War II, it dso suggested that the atomic bomb was a more hurnane form of warfare than traditional metl~ods.'~'

Extraordinary as this sounds, as Jenkins comments: "whatever the views of the editors . . .

[this] escaped their censure."143By auturnn 1950 Tribune was considering the idea of threatening the use of atomic bombs.'" On 8 September the journal suggested that atomic war would be better than becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union, arguing that:

So anyone who thinks that war has now become so horrible that anything is

14' Ibid., p.2670.

'42 Tribune, 7 July 1950, (704), pp.3-4.

'43 Jenkins, Bevanism, p.68. '" Ibid., p.68. preferable to it must have the candour to explain exactly what he is choosing. He might also consider that in the ultimate, it matters very Inttle to the person who has been killed, whether he was killed by an atornic explosion . . .or by a firing squad. 14'

Later that month, the journal stated: "More arms are doubtless needed to provide an

effective force against the dangers of Communist aggre~sion."'~~

Finally, when the new Churchill g~vernment'~'announced in February 1952 that

Britain would be testhg its own atomic bornb, there was absolu~elyno criticisrn in or out

of Parliament. There was cornplete silence on the matter. The New Statesman and

Tribune did not mention the announcement at The annomcement generally

"received only passing attention f?om the press, a total of twenty-four lines in The

Tirne~.""~Although the manufacture of the British atomic bomb was not seen as one of

the major foreign policy decisions, it was nonetheless widely approved of:

Asked about the development of the British atornic bomb in early 1952, shortly after it was announced by the government, British respondents expressed approval

14' 14' Tribune, 8 September 1950, (71 3), pp.3-4.

146 Tribune, 19 September 1950, (714), p.4. It should be noted that Tribune underwent a drastic change in opinion through the course of the Korean war. In 1951 it became aligned with the New Statesman and began to reject British military participation and even rearmament (Meehan, The British Left Wing, pp. 160-4).

14' 14' The Labour governxnent was defeated in the autumn of 1951.

14' 14' Tribune published an article on 2 March which condemned the infeasibility of the government's defence budget. However this critique did not extend to the realm of the British atornic bomb or the costs of testing it. See Tribune, 7 Marrch 1952, (753), p.5.

14' Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p.85. of the action by 60 to 22 percent.'"

A pacifist group called Operation Gandhi did stage a protest at Aldermaston after the

1952 announcement, but only thirty people attended." ' Yet withui six years, similar protests at Aldermaston rallied tens of thousands.

-

Is0 Witiner, One World, p.3 1 1.

'" Driver, The Disamers, p.24. Conclusion

By the end of the 1940's BRtain had secured a formal cornmitment fiom the

United States to support the British economy and protect British interests fiom Soviet aggression. While Emest Bevin had been able to secure economic, political and military aid on a piecerneal basis in the immediate post-war era, it was not until 1948-9 that the

United States committed itself to full scale involvement in western European security through the Marshall Plan and later the North Atlantic Treaîy Organization. Achieving this kind of formai alliance was clearly the prirnary goal of British foreign policy in the years following the Second World War.

From the end of 1946 Britain and the United States shared a very special relationship in the realm of foreign policy. The United States consistently proved to be willing to support BritÏsh interests when Britain lacked the resources to maintain them.

Most of the United States' European policies bolstered British interests or relieved Britain of the key responsibilities it was unable to sustain. The loan of 1946, the Truman

Doctrine, the suspension of convertibility, and rnilitary support in the Middle East were ail essentid to British economic stability and influence abroad. The Marshall Plan and the

North Atlantic Treaty were the formal expression of trends in Anglo-Amencan relations since 1946.

However, this American cornmitment to British interests did not occur easily or naturally. The United States had to be convinced that it had common interests with

BBtain. British foreign policy in the imrnediate post-war era was dedicated to persuading the US.executive and State Department that Bntain and the United States did indeed share interests abroad- The success of this British effort was bolstered by the

simultaneous breakdown of Soviet-Amencan relations and Soviet aggression in eastem

Europe.

Britain gained enormously fiom its relationship with the United States; it staved

off economic collapse, achieved "stability" in the Mediterranean, and was able to retain

key interests in the Middle East. However, the British govemment was forced to

compromise to achieve this closeness, by abandonhg the Commonwealth's system of

sterhg trade preference for a system of multilateral trade (fiom which the United States

was able to expand its markets), and by giving up certain imperid interests, such as India

and Palestine. Despite this pattern of Anglo-American compromise, Britain was clearly

the junior partner in the relationship because it was, in so many spheres, essentially

dependent on the United States. In this sense, the relationship was uneven and unequal.

The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization set the precedent for

western European (including West German) rearmament. After this, Britain's strategic

value becarne less important to the United States. The signing of the treaty forrnalized the

United States' cornmitment to al1 Western powers, not just the United Kingdom. Because of this some of the intimacy of the early post-war relationship was lost during the 1950's.

However, between 1946- 1949, Britain clearly enjoyed a 'special relationship' with the

United States. While the relationship may have been uneven, during this period Bntain received massive US.support, particularly in the sphere of foreign policy.

Atomic relations were the exception to this trend. Despite the general alignment in

Anglo-American policy, atomic relations grew increasingly distant in the years following 142

World War II, Akhough the original work that made uranium fission possible had been

conducted in Britain, and despite the fact that the British MAUD Report made the

uranium bomb possible, shortly der the war Britain was shut out of the joint project that

it had begun. The 1946 United States Atomic Energy Act created an Arnerican monopoly

in atomic weapons and ended Anglo-Amerïcan collaboration. Following this, British

atomic policy became directed at securing the resumption of AngIo-American

collaboration and manufacniriog an "independent nuclear deterrent.77Althoughthe first

Anglo-American atomic bomb was manufactured in 1945, Britain was unable

successfully to manufacture its own until 1952. It was not mtil after this that the United

States was willing to resume AngIo-Amencan atomic collaboration. In 1954 the US.

Atomic Energy Act was amended to allow for an increased exchange of previously

restricted information. On 15 June 1955 the United States and Britain formally agreed to

increase collaboration through the exchange of information; however, the United States would not agree to provide the United Kingdom with a supply of atomic weapons until its own production level improved.' It was not until 1958 that the Atomic Energy Act was repealed to allow for Ml collaboration between the United States and Britain. At this point, the United States agreed to the interchange of atomic Somation and the transfer of materials and eqyipment for the Anglo-American "muhial defense purPoses."' Soon after, the British Blue Streak project was cancelled and the Anglo-American projects became integrated. After this, Britain was dependent on the United States to supply 143 delivery systems to use its own atomic weapons. British "independent nuclear deterrence" was abandoned.

Despite the political rhetoric used by the ûpponents of dateralism, that Britain's defence and military requirements should remah independent form the United States, by the mid-1950's Britain had begun the process of abandonhg independent nuclear deterrence. In 1953 Churchill was advised to request that U.S. atomic bombs be supplied for the use of British Royal Air Force bombers mtil Bntain was able to manufacture enough of its own.

It was not until after the process was well undenvay that the left rallied to the cause of British nucIear disarmament. While the Labour party endorsed rnultilateral disarmament through the IWO'S, it rejected unilateral British disanmarnent until the cancellation of Blue Streak and the integration of the Anglo-Arnerican systems. The Ieft did not become preoccupied with nuclear disarmament while Bntain was conimitted to maintaining its own independent nuclear arsenal.

Tribune formulated an anti-British atomic bomb position in 1955, which intensified with the inception of CND. The New Statesman, however, did not support unilateral disarmament until 1957. In November 1954 the New Statesman had declared that, "it may well be that the development of British atomic power would strengthen the already strong will to peace of the British people." It did cd1 for international control of atomic energy, but only because '90 be armed only with weapons which one shrinks fiom using Save in the very last resort is to be left defenceless till the case becomes desperateSm3

New Wesman,27 Novernber 1954,48: pp.68 1-2. As late as 1955 Richard Crossman and George Wigg argued that:

On balance, therefore, we believe that Britain should remain a member of NATO and make one supreme effort . . .to find a basis for peacefùl CO-existence.If this is to be our role, it is difficult to deny Mr. Attlee's contention that Brîtaîn must share in the possession of the ultimate deterrentS4

Although Attlee did present a motion in April 1954 in the House of Cornrnons that called

for a ban on nuclear tests and the establishment of a disannament conference, the Labour

party supported the government's 1955 Defence White Paper that declared the intention

to manufacture thermo-nuclear weapons. Paragraph 19 of the Paper stated that Britain

would meet any aggression with atomic retaiiation, and the Labour party was prepared to

accept this. While sixty-three Labour M.P.s abstained form voting on the bill, several

prominent left-wing Members, including Harold Wilson, Richard Crossman, John

Freeman, Stephen Swingler and Leslie Haie, voted with the party? At the 1955 hual

Conference the motion for the Conference to place "on record its opposition to the

manufacture of the hydrogen bomb and dl nuclear weapons by Great Britain and its

condemation of the Governrnent's policy of using these weapons unconditionally in the

event of war," was defeated.6

It was after this that the Labour party began to rethink its position on nuclear weapons. In the late 1950's the preoccupation with nuclear proliferation captivated not

' Quoted in Berrington, Backbench Opinion, p. 110.

Foot, Aneurin Bevan, pp.464-5. Bevan attacked Attlee for supporting the Defence Paper, because of paragraph 19. The PLP's vote to have Bevan expelled was narrowly defeated at the NEC.

6 Conference Decisions, p. 135- 145 only the Labour left but much of the British public as well. The Campaign for Nuclear

Disarmament became a popular movernent. However in the pre-atomic detonation period, as we have seen, there was no careh1 consideration of the implications of a British

'independent nuclear deterrent.' Although lefi-wing journais fkom time to time advocated the international control of atomic energy in the pre-detonation penod, it is not clear whether this stemmed fiom moral considerations about the effects of atomic energy or whether it was motivated by the desire for Britain to share in the atomic secrets that it helped develop during the war. In addition, while the left considered the implications of

Amencan and Soviet nuclear capability, little thought was ever given to the role Britain played in the cold war arms race.

There are several reasons for this lack of criticism of British atomic policy. The silence surrounding the atomic bomb was partly based on generd public ignorance about the British atomic programme. Although the govenunent admitted in 1948 that it was manufacturing atomic weapons, it certainly discouraged any informed dialogue on the subject. Whereas in the United States a Congressional committee was forrned to discuss the implications of atomic energy and the press was encouraged to discuss the subject, the

British programme was shrouded in secrecy, and was even, as Kenneth Harris has commented, "constitutionally dubious.'" In addition to this, very few outside the scientific community were inforrned of the danger of atomic energy.

Fear of nuclear proliferation in Britain was, in part, provoked by the extensive testing of nuclear weapons that taok place in the late 1950's. Twenty-five British tests

'Harris, Attlee, p.29 1. 146 were conducted in 1956, nfty in 1957 and one hundred in 1958. ' Before 1952 only the

United States and the Soviet Union had conducted atomic tests, and in fact had a monopoly on the weapon. This made it easy for the British public and left wing critics to distance the atomic issue fiom the Attlee government. As Andrew Pierre has correctly noted: Totuntil the arriva1 of tiiermo-nuc1ea.r weapons was the revolutionary nahue of the atomic age fully grasped.'"

Another important reason for the Iack of dialogue on atomic issues after the 1948 announcement was the general alignment of the left with govemment thinking on foreign policy. By 1948 Soviet aggression and Anglo-Arnerican collaboration had largely assured the lefi of the legitimacy of cold war foreign policy. British development of atomic weapons in light of cold war developrnents no doubt seemed tenable to many non- pacifists on the traditional left. Efforts by the govemment to Communism contributed to increasing acceptance of its policies and to the labour movement's notion of the Soviet Union as the enemy of social democracy. Indeed, by 1950, some on the lefi believed that atomic war was preferable to Soviet expansion into western Europe.

Moreover, while there was much criticisrn of the govemment by the Labour left, the period 1945-51 was one of relative unity for the Labour party. As Kenneth Morgan has pohted out :

The Attlee years fiom 1945 to 1951 . . . are something of an exception . More than any other time in the party's stonny history, the dominant mood was one of unity. Until the resignation of Aneurin Bevan and Harold Wilson . . .there was

Minnion and Bolsover, The CND Stow, pp. 15-6.

Pierre, Nuclear PoZitics, p.72 remarkably little overt tension at any level of the administration or the movement. 'O

The fact that Herbert MO~SO~felt able to suspend the party's standing orders in 1946 is an indication of the relative harmony that existed in the PLP during the 1945-51 session.

The ody significant parliamentary revolt was over the issue of conscription, when seventy-seven Labour M.P.s voted against the government. Moreover, widün a year, the decision to reduce the penod of national service fkom eighteen to twelve months was overtumed. In October 1948 national service was ulcreased again to eighteen rnonths.

Only three Labour M-P.s vo ted against membership in NATO and only five against

Gaitskell's controversial budget of 1951 ."

As Robert Mackenzie has pouited out: "Except on the rarest occasions in the history of the party it has been a Centre-Right majority in the PLP which has carries the day against a Lefi min~rity."'~

This trend was broken briefly in 1959-60 with the adoption of unilaterdism. In light of this, it is not so surprishg that British possession of an atomic bomb did not become a divisive issue in the 1940's. Being in Opposition was much more conducive to such divisions, as the 1950's clearly indicate. By the early 1950's the party had fractured into a Bevanite lefi and Gaitskellite right and discord over defence policy emerged. The standing orders were reuistated in 1952, in response to this schism. However there were

'O Morgan, Labour Nt Power,p.45.

" Jackson, Rebels and Wh@, p.96.

l2 Mackenzie, British Political Parties, p.640. no ntch civil wars in the 1945-51 period when the Labour party was in government. The leadership had fim control over its parliamentary ranks. The left also tended to

tone down its critique as elections loomed. For in a sense it had no choice. The prerequisite of any implementation of any part of its programme was the return of a Labour pariy majority, and thus unity on any ternis almost invariably proved preferable to letting the Tories in."

In this sense the left was Iimited in the 1945-51 Parliament in a way that it was not in the I95O's.

Al1 these circurnstaxices contributed to the lack of discussion of the implications of British possession of atomic weapons both before and after May 1948. The Labour left was not opposed to the atomic bomb in principle until 1955; at this point it becarne an all- consurning moral issue that divided the Labour party until the end of the 1980's. However before this, while it was a subject that warranted sporadic discussion, the atomic bomb, responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths in Japan and the intensification of the cold war, was not of paramount importance to the Ieft.

------

l3 Coates, The Labour Party, p.202. Excerpt fiom "An Act to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey", signed by President Truman, 22 May 1947, fiom Statutes at Large, Volume 6 1, part 1 (Washington: United States Govemment Printing Office, 1948), pp. 103-5.

"Be if enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may fiom theto time when he deems it in the interest of the United States fumish assistance to Greece and Turkey . . .(1) by rendering fiinancial aid in the form of loans, credits, grants, or otherwise to those countries; (2) by detailing to assist those couutries any persons in the employ of the Govenunent of the United States . . . (3) by detailing a limited number of members of the military seMces of the United States to assist those countnes, in an advisory capacity oniy; (4) by providing for (A) the transfer to, and the procurement for by manufacture or otherwïse and the transfer to, those countries of any articles, senrices, and information, and (B) the instruction and training of personnel of those coufltries, and (5) b y incurring and defiay ing necessary expenses, inchding administrative expenses and expenses for compensation of personnel, in comection with the carrying out of the provisions of this Act. . . There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President not to exceed $400,000,000 to carry out the provisions of this Act. . . Appendix 2

Excerpt fkom the c'Economic Cooperation Act", ratified by Congress 3 April 1948, signed with the United Kingdom 6 July 1948, Çom Statutes at Large, Volume 62, part 1 (Washington: United States Govenunent P~tingOffice, 1949), pp. 137-59.

(a) Recognizing the intimate economic and other relationships between the United States and the nations of Europe, and recognizing that disruption foIIowing in the wake of war is not contained by national fiontiers, the Congress finds that the existing situation in Europe endangers the establishment of a lasting peace, the generd welfare and national interest of the United States, and the attainment of the objectives of the United Nations. The restoration or maintenance in European countries of principles of individual liberty, fkee institutions, and genuine independence rests Iargely upon the establishment of economic conditions, stable international economic relationships . . .It is declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to sustain and strengthen [economic conditions] through assistance to those countries of Europe which participate in a joint recovery program based on self-help and mutuai cooperation: Provided, That no assistance to the participating countrïes herein contemplated shall senously impair the economic stability of the United States. (b) It is the purpose of this title to effectuate the policy set forth in subsection (a) of this section by fùmishing material and financial assistance to the participating countries . . . by (1) promoting industrial and agricdtural production in the participating countries; (2) furthering the restoration or maintenance of the soundness of European currencies, budgets, and finances; and (3) facilitahg and stimulating the growth of international trade . . . by appropriate measures including reduction of barriers which may hamper such trade - . . . Appendix 3

Excerpt fiom the "North Atiantic Treaty", signed 4 Aprii 1949, in Statutes at Large, Volume 63, part 2 (Washington: Govermnent Printing Office, 1949), pp.224 1-22%.

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with al1 peoples and governments. They are determined to safeguard the fieedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the nile of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1 The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved be peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refiain in their international relations fiom the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2 The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and fnendly international relations by strengthening their fiee institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek ro eliminate conflict in theu internarional economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or dl of them.

Article 3 In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutud aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4 The Parties will consdt together whenever, in the opinion if any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or secuity of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against thern all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. . . . . Article 9

The Parties kereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish irnrnediateiy a defense corruTUttee which shall recommend measures for the bplementation on Articles 3 and 5 . . . Appendix 4

"D Notice No.25 (to Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry and Press Cornmittees)", issued 11 May, 1948 fiom AB 6/466.

It is important in the interests of national security that there be no disclosure of uiformation about or in reference to the following matters relating to the developrnent of atomic weapons: (1) The Location or progress of work in the United Kingdom on the development and production of atomic weapons. (2) The design, methods of construction, weight and size of the atomic weapons which are being developed in the United Kingdom, and the materials which are being used. (3) The place or places where weapons are being stored. (4) The identification of individuals who work on atomic weapons. Notes: (i) The reference to progress of work in subparagraph (1) above refers to the disclosure of factual information about the progress. It is oot intended to prevent the publication of statements imputing lack of progress if in the view of the responsible editor there is such lack of progress in the general sense as demands comment. (ii) This notice is concerned solely with work on atomic weapons. Information about atomic energy research programmes is not affected. Those subjects are sficiently covered by the provisions of the Official Secrets Act and Section Eleven of the Atornic Energy Act. (iii) "D" Notice No. 12 stands. For convenience of reference it reads as follows: - "It is important in the interests of national security that there should no disclosure of information concerning the impoa, export or movement within this country of uranium or thorium . . . Bibliography

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