Anglo-Arnerican Relations, 1945- 1949, the Manufacture of Atomic Weapons, and the Labour Governent of 1945 Catharine B. Grant Submitted in partial fulnlment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada December, 1999 O Copyright by Catharine B. Grant, 1999 National Library Bibliothèque nationaIe 1+1 ,,,da du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada Our die Noae dfdrcwe The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National L&fary of Canada to Bibliotbeque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distniute or seil reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/fïh, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la proprieté du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts firom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othewise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son p enmission. autorisation. TabIe of Contents Table of Contents Abstract Acknowledgeme~ts htroducbon Chapter 1 The Anglo-Arnericun "Special ReZutionsh@, '" 1945-1949 10 Chapter II The Anglo-Arnerican Atomic Relations and British A tomic 44 Decision-Making Structures Chapter III neAtomic Bomb and the Labour Left 93 Conclusion Appendices Bibliography The British decision in 1947 to manufacture atomic weapons was greatly inauenced by its changed international status in the post-World War II era. Britain emerged ftom the war near economic collapse and was unable to maintain its strategic interests abroad. As relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, BritaUi increasingly relied on Amencan economic and rnilitary support. British officiais believed that British atomic capability would convince the United States that Britain was a secure political and rnilitary dyand would also allow a certain degree of British strategic independence. hglo-Amencan relations strengthened significantly in the years following the Second World War. However, the development of atomic energy/weapons became an issue of contention in the post-war relationship. Wle the United States was willing to cooperate with Bntain in the realm of basic foreign policy it was unwiiiing to cooperate with Britain in the development of atomic energy despite the fact that Britain has pioneered the project and the two nations had worked jointly on atomic energy during the war. Mer Britain was officiaIly exchded fiom participation in the Amencan atomic project in 1946, it proceeded with the developrnent of its own independent project, hoping that the United States would eventually be persuaded that Britain was worthy of fidl and equd atomic partnership. However, without American cooperation in key fields, Britain was unable to produce its own atornic bomb unnl 1952. It was ody after Bntain had successfidly tested its own bomb that the United States was willing to resume Ml atomic collaboration. The decision to manufacture a British "independent nuclear deterrent" was made by a small group of Labour ministers. The full Cabinet was not consdted and the decision was kept secret fiom Parliament for more then a year. However, when Labour M.P.s found out about the development of a British atomic bomb, there was very Iittle criticism of the govexnment's secret decision. Although the Labour party had strong traditions of socialism and even pacifism, there was littie discussion by the lefi-wing of the Labour party about the moral implications of the atomic decision for a Labour govemment. It was not until the mid-1950fs, after the advent of thenno-nuclear weapons, that the Labour lefi began to grasp the moral consequences of the atornic age and began to push the Labour party to adopt a policy of unilateral British nuclear disarmament. By examining the evolution of Anglo-Arnerican relations after 1945, the development of British atornic policy and the Labour left's reaction to this policy, this study attempts to understand why the Labour government decided to manufacture atomic weapons in 1947 and how this decision impacted the credibility of the govenunent and the Labour party as a whole. '1 would like to thank the following people for their help and support during the writing of this thesis: my supervisor, Dr, Stephen Brooke; the Social Sciences and Humanities reference staff at the Killam Library; Tma Jones and MqWyman at the Dalhousie history department; fellow graduate history students, particuiarly Sara Butler, Ruth McCleiland-Nugent, and Renee LafTerty; and finally Dominic Cardy and William Grant. Introduction In 1947, Britain, under a Labour government, began to develop atomic weapons- The decision to manufacture these weapons was made in complete secrecy by a small group of Labour ministers and was hidden fiom Parliament dl1948. Much of the British public knew nothing of the British bomb until it was successfully tested in 1952- Those responsible for the manufacture of atomic energy thought of the bomb as a British "independent nuclear deterrent." This term was loaded with significance and suggests much about the British position in the post-World War II era. British officiais wanted to achieve independence from the United States and deter Soviet expansion; for them, the development of atomic weapons was essentid to both these goals- There were many reasons why Britain chose to develop its own atornic bomb. This thesis attempts to understand the British atomic decision through three avenues. First, it sets the context for the atomic decision by examining Britain's international position in the years immediately following World War II. Secondly, it examines the decision itself in light of foreign and domestic political considerations by studying the Anglo-American atomic relationship and the atomic decision-making process under the post-wax- Labour government. Finally, it Iooks at the Labour party's particular response to Britain's atomic role by cornparing the left's views on general foreign policy issues with its views on the bomb. In this way, although the thesis focuses on a foreign policy decision, it is not just about British foreign policy. It is also about the political structure of the Labour party and the interactions between the left and the party leadership. The thesis thus places a decision, which has been largely understood as having implications primarily outside Brïtain, within the context of British domestic political culture. British atomic policy cannot fully be understood as only a series of strategic or military decisions. The international political and economic clirnate conûibuted to the Labour governmentyspolicy. The first chapter of the thesis, "The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1945-1949"' addresses international issues. One cannot begin to understand the 1947 decision outside the context of the Britain's international position. Britain had been reduced to a second-class power during the war. Afier the war, it Iacked the resources to maintain its Ulfluence abroad. The main goal of the British Foreign Secretary throughout the 1940's was to gain Amencan suppoa for British policy abroad, which required Arnerican military and economic aid as well as ideological support. Chapter I examines British encouragement of the development of the anti-Soviet Anglo-American alliance. It demonstrates increasing Amencan support of Bntain fier 1946, while emphasizing the unevenness of the relationship and Britain's junior status in relation to the United States. The first chapter establishes the cold war context for the British development of atomic weapons but dso serves to distinguish the larger Anglo-American relationship from the Anglo-American atomic relationship which is discussed in Chapter 2. The foundation of the first chapter is two series of pubrished foreign policy documents: the first senes of R. Bullen and M.E. Pellen's Documents on British PoZicy Overseas (which is still incomplete), and the State Department's series The Foreign Relations of the United States.' Unpublished British Cabinet and Foreign Office documents @eId at the Public Record Office in London) are also essential to understanding of the development of the hglo-American alliance. The histonography of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' is large and, for the most part, uncontroversial. Most historians of this period agree on the dignrnent of AngIo-Amencan policy and the increasing dienation of the western powers fiom the Soviet Union. They also recognize the weakness of Britain's position vis-à-vis the United States. The more important works on the subject are those of Christopher Thome, William Roger Louis, Victor RothweU, Kenneth Morgan, Ritchie Ovendale, Robin Edmonds, Elisabeth Barker, Richard Gardner, Alan Bullock and Peter Weiler.' Sorne are more critical than others, but al1 agree on the basic developments of the Anglo-Amencan ' Other important materials are United Stufes Statures-at-Large and the United States Code Congressional Service, which provide guides to the laws established by the United States Congress. The US.Congressional Record and Hansard' s Parliamentary Debates are also essential sources. ' See Christopher Thome,