WELFARE CHAUVINISM IN FLANDERS AND FRENCH SPEAKING BELGIUM

Measuring the effects of citizenship views on (sub)national identification

Author: Corline Meulmeester | SNR: 2016304

Supervisor: Dr. K. Abts (Tilburg University) Words of thanks Second reader: Prof. Dr. P.H.J. Achterberg (Tilburg University) Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands ABSTRACT 13th of December 2018

ABSTRACT This paper analyses welfare chauvinism in Belgium. It investigates to what extent structural characteristics, economic factors, political ideology and (sub)national identity are able to explain welfare chauvinism in Flanders and French speaking Belgium1 in Belgium. Since previous studies indicate a relationship between (sub)national identification and welfare chauvinism, this study elaborates even more on this topic, by examining how citizenship views -either ethnic or civic- influence this relationship, by focusing on the self-interest, ethnic competition and social identity theory. Data from the Belgian National Election Study 2014 (BNES) is used. It is found that a strong sub-national identification with the region of Flanders leads to more welfare chauvinistic preferences, while this relationship cannot be confirmed in French speaking Belgium. This research also shows that citizenship views form an important mechanism to explain welfare chauvinism, whereas a mediating effect of citizenship views is found in Flanders. Moreover, the results show that both forms of citizenship views are associated with welfare chauvinism. At the end of the paper, the results are discussed in accordance with the theories, providing an elaboration of the expectations and findings.

KEYWORDS welfare chauvinism • citizenship views • structural characteristics • economic factors • political ideology • (sub)national identity

1 In this study, French speaking Belgium refers to all Walloon provinces including Brussels, also known as the French community of Belgium. Source: https://www.belgium.be/nl/over_belgie/overheid/federale_staat/structuur.

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INTRODUCTION

Currently, most Western-European countries are facing one of the most challenging tasks since the foundation of the European Union sixty years ago and the opening of the borders roughly 30 years ago2. As a result of far-reaching changes as the worldwide economic crisis of 2008 and the refugee crisis of 2015, social policymakers in Europe have to deal with new political and societal circumstances (Keskinen, Norocel, & Jørgensen, 2016; Vandoninck, Meeusen, & Dejaeghere, 2018). European societies are transforming, from traditional and familiar to multicultural and diverse, leading the public to experience greater feelings of insecurity, uncertainty and discontent (Abts, 2012). These feelings directly and indirectly influence the public opinion regarding social policies and welfare redistribution towards minority groups, since these opinions seem to be hardening (Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 1). Previous studies show that indeed a more sceptic view on immigration and the entitlement of these immigrant groups to receive welfare benefits is present in European countries (Bansak, Hainmueller, & Hangartner, 2016). The public considers these immigrant groups as less entitled to receive any form of welfare benefits when compared to other natives who are in need (van Oorschot, 2006; Waal, Achterberg, & van Oorschot, 2011). Since Andersen and Bjørklund (1990) first mentioned the concept of welfare chauvinism, the topic has been a widely studied topic in the scientific world (Crepaz & Damron, 2009; van der Waal, Achterberg, Houtman, de Koster, & Manevska, 2010). While the public opinion is hardening, social policy makers are also struggling on how to deal with this new large influx of immigrants, having to take these shifts in public opinion into account (Heizmann, Jedinger, & Perry, 2018). Moreover, previous research shows that the immigration of asylum seekers and refugees has become highly unwanted by parts of the native European population. These preferences and ideologies can be detected among all layers in society, crossing traditional social classes and groups in ideas about how the welfare state should deal with immigrants (Bansak et al., 2016; Crepaz & Damron, 2009). These changes in public opinion has led scholars to develop new lines of research about the topic of welfare chauvinism. Whereas literature on the topic of welfare chauvinism was first focused on the relationship between nationalism and perceptions towards immigrants (Lecours, 2000; Maddens, Billiet, & Beerten, 2000; Miller, 1996; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002), later the focus shifted towards the way national identity prevails itself in relation to groups of immigrants and their rights in a welfare system (Janmaat, 2006; Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009). For example, Keskinen et al. (2016) analysed the importance of how social groups are formed and structured in European societies. As argued by Scandinavian scholars, welfare state

2 On the 14th of July 1985, European Countries signed the Schengen Agreement which ensured the free movement of persons among European member states. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and- visas/schengen_en.

iv redistribution can also be defined in terms of citizenship status (Korpi & Palme, 1998). In this research, the authors suggest that welfare state redistribution is not automatically extended to any other individual living within the territorial lines and therefore suggest that there is a distinction between those who are ‘in’ -have legal citizenship- and those who are ‘out’ -do not have legal citizenship. From a sociological perspective, the creation of ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups are based on shared identities and boundaries, which may not always be consistent with the legal boundaries. On top of this, several studies show the relevance of (sub)national identity in explaining welfare chauvinism (Maddens et al., 2000), while other authors show the relevance of citizenship views (Vandoninck et al., 2018). The question however remains whether these citizenship views influence the role of (sub)national identity on welfare chauvinism and to what extent these citizenship views are able to explain welfare chauvinism. Accordingly, research shows that two broad variants of these citizenship views can be detected. The first variant assumes that only ethnic ties and heritage are strong enough to create a sense of mutual solidarity and fellowship. Contrarily, on the other end of the spectrum, civic nationalism can be found, indicating that shared political interests are sufficient to lead to feelings of communality and solidarity (Wright & Reeskens, 2013). As Miller (1996) acknowledges, the conception one has of the national ‘we’ or ‘in-group’ can easily lead to the exclusion of immigrants, especially when this conception is based on ethnic criteria. Civic nationalism on the other hand, is seen as more inclusive by definition. However, this form of nationalism also represents barriers with the native public that immigrants have to overcome, making both forms of nationalism exclusionary in the basis (Brubaker, 1990). Especially in multi-national states, the way the nation or sub-nation is viewed by ‘natives’ seems to play a significant role in explaining levels of anti-immigrant attitudes (Billiet, Maddens, & Beerten, 2003). In multinational states, citizens can identify with either the national state or with one of the multiple sub-national entities present within a country. As Maddens et al. (2000) show, identification with sub-national entities often results in more outspoken feelings towards immigrants, varying from strong negative to strong positive attitudes, while identification with the national state is often connected to more moderate feelings towards immigrants. The goal of mentioned studies is to examine the role of different structural, economic or political factors on welfare chauvinism. Whereas their focus is mainly on examining anti-immigrant preferences in general, the studies lack a specific focus on welfare chauvinism. Thereby, several studies are focussed on the relationship between (sub)national identity and welfare chauvinism without taking the possible effect of citizenship views into account, while the findings of the recent study of Vandoninck et al. (2018) show that both ethnic and civic typologies of national citizenship are able to account for welfare chauvinistic feelings. Besides these findings, the authors also show that the relations of these citizenship typologies on welfare chauvinism are almost completely indirect of nature, since these attitudes are strongly associated with negative views on immigrants. The authors test the mediating effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on sympathy for welfare recipients but they do not

v investigate the possible mediating effect of citizenship views on identification with the different regions in Belgium, while the results suggest that this effect could in fact be present. In this study, the focus will therefore lie on exploring the role of citizenship views on the relationship between (sub)national identity and welfare chauvinism. Is there a direct strong link between different structural characteristics and (sub)national identity and welfare chauvinism? Or is this relationship based on the way (sub)national citizenship is viewed by natives? The latter seems possible since results of previous studies show that there is indeed some form of association between national citizenship preferences and welfare chauvinism (Vandoninck et al., 2018). In order to close this gap in the existing literature, the direct relationship between structural characteristics (1), economic factors (2), (sub)national identity (3), political ideology (4) and the mediating role of ethnic and civic citizenship views (5) will be examined in order to explain levels of welfare chauvinism. Therefore, the following research questions are addressed: i. What is the association between structural characteristics (1), economic factors (2), political ideology (3) and (sub)national identity (4) on welfare chauvinism? ii. Can the relationships between the structural characteristics (1), economic factors (2), political ideology (3) and (sub)national identity (4) be explained by citizenship views (5)?

The remaining parts of this thesis are organized as follows. First of all, a theoretical framework is provided where the different factors underlying welfare chauvinism are discussed. An elaboration of the hypotheses that are derived from these theories will be provided. Secondly, the design of the study is discussed, using the dataset of the 2014 Belgian National Election Studies, as collected by the Institute for Social and Political Opinion research (ISPO) of the KU Leuven. Thirdly, the results are presented that follow from the stepwise regression analysis. This study ends with a conclusion and discussion in which the most important findings are presented together with the limitations of the study and implications for future research.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Structural characteristics on welfare redistribution attitudes This study starts with the assumption that welfare chauvinistic ideas are not distributed equally across the population but that these ideas are structurally and ideologically stratified. These ideas are influenced by two forms of individual indicators, roughly divided in interests and ideas (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Svallfors, 2004). The ‘interest’ factor relates to the self-interest individuals have in the redistribution of welfare state benefits, based on individual structural characteristics (Van Oorschot, Reeskens, & Meuleman, 2012).The self-interest theory assumes that people who are recipients of

vi welfare benefits themselves or find themselves at risk of becoming dependent of the welfare provisions are more likely to support welfare state policies compared to those who do not face this risk. From this perspective, one would then expect that individuals in these so-called ‘transfer’ classes such as the elderly, disabled and unemployed are supportive of welfare redistribution (Jaeger, 2006). Based on this principle, welfare chauvinism is often related to competition over scarce resources between different social groups. The ethnic competition theory of Blumer (1958) argues that competition over scarce resources like low-skilled jobs and welfare benefits leads to the possible exclusion of groups by other groups (Olzak, 2005). According to Van der Waal et al. (2011), there are two main explanations why this theory is able to certify for differentiating levels of welfare chauvinism in Western-European countries. Firstly, welfare benefits can be considered as scarce resources which have the purpose to lessen the economic deprivation of those who are in a weak socio-economic position. Since both natives from a lower socio-economic class as well as immigrants find themselves in this weaker socio-economic position, both groups count on governmental support -read welfare benefits. This creates a field of tension over welfare provisions, since the welfare state has a limit attached to its ability to redistribute (F. Castles, 2002). One’s socio-economic position in society is strongly determined by one’s obtained educational level. In most Western-European countries, economies are knowledge-based, which demands employees to have a certain educational level. Due to globalization and the opening of the European borders, more immigrants from as well inside as outside Europe, found their way to Europe. Labor market competition has become fiercer and since education has the ability to create better employment opportunities, higher educated are in general more optimistic about their employment opportunities than those who have a lower education (Dustmann, Fabbri, & Preston, 2005). For this reason, well-educated are labelled as the winners of globalization –or the ones who can cope with the societal changes that large scale immigration brings along (Ervasti & Hjerm, 2012; Mewes & Mau, 2013). On the contrary, the losers of globalization -or lower educated- own a less abundant skillset, making it harder for this group to compete on the labor market where the situation has become tenser (read: more candidates for a limited amount of low skilled jobs). Therefore, in line with the results of Mewes and Mau (2013) it is expected that those with a low(er) educational level are more welfare chauvinistic than those who have a higher obtained educational level (h1a). Moreover, based on ethnic competition theory of Blumer (1958), it is also expected that those who find themselves in a lower social class are more inclined to restrict welfare provisions for their own interests (h1b). Another related explanation for welfare chauvinism to the latter can be found in the backlog that immigrants already have when they decide to settle permanently in a Western-European country. From the moment immigrants receive official citizenship, immigrants are entitled to receive some form of welfare benefits from the government of the chosen country. However, immigrants are often having a hard time coping with the changes in language, traditions and lifestyle they are experiencing in their new ‘home’ country. These barriers in for example language difficulties lead immigrants to often stay

vii unemployed, making them more dependent on welfare benefits than their native co-nationals in most Western-European countries (Boeri, Conde-Ruiz, & Galasso, 2006). So, in the eyes of the ‘native majority’, welfare benefits now have to be shared with a greater amount of people, causing feelings of tension and conflicts (Manevska & Achterberg, 2013). As a result, feelings of competition arise among natives because they strongly hold the idea that they have to share their scarce resources -read low- skilled jobs and welfare benefits- with immigrant groups. The idea of self-interest seems to prevail itself strongly here, since natives are mostly concerned about protecting their own status, irrespective of whether or not immigrants are in fact deserving of welfare provisions (Kymlicka, 2015). Regarding the self-interest principle, research shows that individuals who are recipients of welfare provisions themselves and in fact financially dependent on the welfare state, are more strongly in favor to restrict welfare benefits from immigrants (Jaeger, 2006). Hence, from this perspective it is expected that welfare recipients are more supportive of the idea to restrict welfare provisions from immigrants than individuals who do not receive any welfare provision (h1c). Besides these socio-economic indicators, authors stress the importance of social demographics in explaining welfare chauvinism. The importance of age is for example addressed by Svallfors (1997), who implies that changing societal factors, such as higher immigration levels, initiate older natives to become more hostile towards groups of others, simply because the elderly are unable to fully comprehend these fast multicultural changes in society. Gender seems to play an important role as well. As Ervasti and Hjerm (2012) show, differences between males and females and their feelings towards outgroups are caused by the occupational status they find themselves in. Because males are often employed in traditional occupations such as construction work or manual labor, they are believed to feel more threatened by immigrant groups, since immigrant groups often are targeting on getting a job in these same sectors as well. On the other hand, evidence of earlier studies shows exactly the opposite, indicating that females are more likely to hold welfare chauvinistic preferences, due to their economic vulnerability which is created by working part-time -or low killed jobs (Ervasti & Hjerm, 2012). In this study, age and gender function as control variables, so no hypothesis is formulated about the effect of age or gender on welfare chauvinism.

Economic factors and political ideology One of the major theoretical approaches to explain welfare chauvinism is pointed towards economic explanations (Kriesi et al., 2008). As Mewes and Mau (2012) suggest, perceived material risk plays an important role in the creation of welfare chauvinistic preferences. The effect of growing economic competition, due to deprived economic circumstances, is most likely moderated by the social class people find themselves in. Evidence shows that in particular members of the working class are inclined to draw ethnically based boundaries when related to welfare state redistributions, indicating that they prefer to limit the welfare state solidarity to ‘the ethnical national majority’ (e.g.Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). This relationship is especially prevalent in countries with a relatively weak economic

viii performance (based on the country’s GDP) (Mewes & Mau, 2012). Empirical evidence shows that individuals who live in a less affluent country are more likely to hold welfare chauvinistic preferences. When the economy is at risk of stagnating and economic risks such as unemployment are expected to rise, findings show that anti-immigrant attitudes become stronger among natives (Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009). In addition to these findings, Heizmann et al. (2018) include the individual-level aspect of current and prospective economic deprivation in their study. As they argue, economic hardship and issues with labor market integration are important indicators of negative feelings towards immigrants. Besides the everyday struggles that follow from economic deprivation, it also shapes how individuals think about economic -and social arrangements. This process prevailed itself particularly strong after the worldwide economic crisis of 2008 (Heizmann et al., 2018). At this time, higher levels of economic deprivation were present in most Western-European countries, leading to especially hard feelings towards immigrants, since they were seen as a great economic burden on top of the already existing economic malaise. In line with the findings of (Heizmann et al., 2018), it is therefore assumed that a negative view on the future economy will lead to stronger welfare chauvinistic preferences (h2a) and that a great perceived impact of the economic crisis of 2008 is related to stronger welfare chauvinistic preferences (h2b). As mentioned, concerns about the economic future of the welfare state have grown since the economic crisis of 2008 and the refugee crisis of 2015. Nowadays, governmental policies are more focused on ‘economic competitiveness’, with a central question revolving around how to afford the high costs of the welfare state (Mouffe, 2005). While many Western-European countries have had strict immigration policies since the start of the era of ‘mass immigration’, a shift in European politics took place in the more economically deprived times that followed after the crisis. More right-wing and populist orientated parties entered the political stage where they were successful to implement more strict economic rules and regulations for immigrants in some European countries (Keskinen, 2016). Research shows that electoral support for such parties is primarily rooted in discontents about immigration and growing ethnic diversity within society (Ivarsflaten, 2008). While these parties are often labeled as ‘anti-immigration parties’, the electorate of these parties also seem to be driven by certain feelings of political discontent (Rydgren, 2007). Besides these conflicts about immigration and political discontent, economic issues and issues regarding the welfare state also stay important for political parties such as new-rightist populist parties. Although these new-rightist populist parties are often placed at the right-end of the political spectrum, new-rightist parties do not particularly adopt traditional rightist ideas about economic redistribution and the welfare state (De Koster, Achterberg, & Van der Waal, 2013). As argued by Inglehart (1990), a ‘new political culture’ has emerged in Western countries, based on the idea that personal values such as individual liberty and self-attainment are becoming more important. In relation to this idea, some authors strongly support the idea that there are in fact ‘two lefts’

ix and ‘two rights’, claiming that the old right is still defined by an anti-egalitarian stance on the welfare state, while the new right is characterized by an authoritarian outlook on cultural issues (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). These new rightist parties stand out for their combination of economic egalitarianism with the preference to restrict welfare provisions to the native population. In fact, this combination of a strong preference for welfare state redistribution with restrictions of these services to immigrants is the exactly what welfare chauvinism is about (van der Waal et al., 2010). Despite the emergence of these new types of political parties, ‘mainstream’ parties still dominate the political stage. In general, mainstream parties on the left are associated with universal thoughts and their desire for inclusive social policies. Right-wing parties are in turn associated with nationalism, monoculturalism and a light skepticism on immigration policies (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016). Based on the division between left -and right-wing political parties -whether from the ‘old’ or the ‘new’ division-, it is expected that a more right-wing political orientated ideology is associated with stronger welfare chauvinistic preferences (h2c). Taking left-wing orientated political parties in to account, these parties in general strongly hold on to the idea that it is the responsibility of the state to ensure a basic minimum living to its citizens Traditionally speaking, left-wing political parties are seen as defenders of the individuals who are strongly at risk of being exposed to social risks such as unemployment (Svallfors, 1997). Neo-liberal orientated views on the state on the other hand suggest that the state should interfere ass less as possible, in line with ideas of right-wing political parties. As argued by left-wing political parties, the government of a welfare state has the responsibility to promote general welfare for every individual by supporting welfare schemes and providing state support when necessary (Swank & Betz, 2003). On the clear distinction between left -and right-wing political parties, it is argued in this study that a stronger preference for state interference, as left-wing parties imply, is related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism. The preference to leave the ‘market’ as it is and to advocate for hardly any or no state interference at all can be linked to right-wing orientated parties, who are in their turn also found to be more inclined to restrict welfare provisions from immigrants (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016). Based on these structural differences between left -and right-wing parties, the following hypothesis can be added: A stronger preference for the state to take responsibility in the redistribution of welfare is related to lower levels of welfare chauvinism (h2d). Despite the structural differences between left -and right-wing orientated political parties, egalitarian principles are by a large part of society seen as the basis of the welfare state, creating a strong counter-movement against welfare chauvinists (Keskinen, 2016). Previous studies show that leftist politics focus on egalitarian and ‘fair’ redistribution of welfare provisions for every individual within the state, implying that these parties have no intention to exclude immigrants from these policies. New- right wing populist parties and to a lesser extent traditional right-wing parties, are rather related to ‘real egalitarianism’, pointing to what they claim to be ‘fair redistribution’ of welfare (Derks, 2006). This fair redistribution of welfare is in its turn according to these parties only fair when it is redistributed

x among native inhabitants or members of the true in-group (De Koster et al., 2013). True economic egalitarian views can therefore be considered as views that imply an equal redistribution of welfare provisions for all citizens, regardless of their heritage, nationality or decent. Based on this principle, the following hypothesis is formulated: economic egalitarian views and welfare chauvinism are negatively associated (h2e). To give a better understanding of the expected relationships, the hypotheses are presented in an overview with a conceptual diagram:

Hypothesis 1a: A low(er) educational level and welfare chauvinism are positively associated.

Hypothesis 1b: A lower social class and welfare chauvinism are positively associated.

Hypothesis 1c: Welfare recipiency and welfare chauvinism are positively associated.

Hypothesis 2a: A negative view on the future economy and welfare chauvinism are positively associated.

Hypothesis 2b: A great impact of the economic crisis of 2008 and welfare chauvinism are positively associated.

Hypothesis 2c: A right-wing political ideology and welfare chauvinism are positively associated.

Hypothesis 2d: A stronger preference for the state to take responsibility in the redistribution of welfare and welfare chauvinism are negatively associated.

Hypothesis 2e: Economic egalitarian views and welfare chauvinism are negatively associated.

Conceptual diagram:

Social structures Age Gender Education Income Social class Welfare Welfare benefits chauvinism

Economic factors Effect econ. crisis Economic develop.

Political ideology Egalitarianism Left-right wing voting State responsibility

Figure 1. Conceptual model displaying the hypotheses 1a to h2e. Source: BNES 2014 *prepared by author

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Diversity and (sub)national identity Several authors found evidence to support the idea that ethnic diversity unfirms social solidarity, social trust and support for the welfare state (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Waal et al., 2011). A striking example of such a transition is the development of the American welfare state. As argued by authors, ethnic boundaries restrain social solidarity, which is the most important aspect of justifying welfare redistribution to those in need. (Waal et al., 2011). The differences between natives and ethnic minorities -in the United States formed by the group of ‘Afro-Americans’, in Europe formed by ‘non- western immigrants’- induce the idea of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and inevitably lead to cracks in social solidarity. The otherness of these ethnic minority groups leads natives to having a hard time in creating mutual feelings of belongingness and commitment with these other groups (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). Taking the American example in to consideration, many scholars expect that the situation in European welfare states will follow the latter, due to the rising influx of non-Western immigrants. Consequently, the support for welfare redistribution will be subverted in the future. Kymlicka and Banting (2006) consider the United States as the main example of a state in which heterogeneity or ethnic diversity has led to reduced support for welfare redistribution. The same scholars labelled this mechanism the ethnic diversity theory, while it has emerged as a one of the main theories in welfare chauvinism research. So, if this theory is correct, a stronger support for economic redistribution can be found in countries where recipients are considered as ‘one of our own’. In societies where individuals of other ethnicities can become the potential recipients of welfare provisions, the support for redistribution will eventually decline, as argued by Waal et al. (2011). Therefore, scholars as Eger (2010) refer to the idea that varying levels of ethnic diversity are able to explain varying levels of welfare chauvinism among European countries, just as varying levels of ethnic diversity are claimed to cause varying levels of support for welfare redistribution in different states of America (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). Proponents of the ethnic diversity theory therefore expect that higher levels of ethnic diversity will make European welfare states follow the American example (Freeman, 1986). Despite the logic reasoning behind the ethnic diversity theory, several authors seem to disagree with the idea that European welfare states will follow the American example. Authors claim that the American experience is unique and unable to explain the situation in Europe (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). While many authors (Soroka, Johnston, & Banting, 2007) examined the role of ethnic diversity, little empirical evidence is available to confirm the ethnic diversity theory. Only Mau and Burkhardt (2009) found significant evidence to show that in countries where the society is very ethnically diverse, natives are indeed less inclined to grant immigrant the same welfare provisions as other needing natives. However, the authors emphasize that this relationship is not very strong (Mau & Burkhardt, 2009, p. 225). Due to this gap in empirical evidence, scholars started to search for other additional explanations for varying levels of welfare chauvinism. One of these explanations is related to the concept of (sub)national identity.

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(Sub)national identity When searching for explanations for welfare chauvinism, authors started to focus their research on the role of (sub)national identity (Lecours, 2000). A widely mentioned theory that is related to this topic is known as the social identity theory (Pehrson et al., 2009). As Tajfel and Turner (1979) describe it, people have the fundamental drive or feeling to belong to a social group of some kind, with the idea that the membership of this group is a fundamental aspect of their self-identity. Especially when natives have the feeling that their traditional identities are fading or blurring -due to higher levels of cultural diversity-, they become keener on protecting their ‘own’ identity (Kinnvall, 2004). This self-identity is created by placing themselves and similar others into social groups based on basic norms, fundamental values and other ethnic indicators. The individual is now able to compare others, who are considered as outsiders of this group, to some sort of reference group, the so-called ‘in-group’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This process of identifying social groups, leads to positive views towards the own in-group while the ‘others’ or the out-group are seen as inferior. Group formation is thus considered as an essential step in the formation of feelings of threat, uncertainty and insecurity, influenced by the idea that others can form threats to one’s identity (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Especially in a multicultural and multidimensional society, individuals might experience the feeling that their environment is changing constantly. To maintain a grip on the world, societies try to create structure and order and by labelling other groups -read immigrants-. By doing so, societies try to cope with these feelings of insecurity, resentment and powerlessness (Abts, 2012, p. 407). In fact, national identity is commonly claimed for creating feelings of solidarity within society (Curtis, 2014). National identity can be understood as “the attachment to a social group super-ordinate to ethnic and other particularistic identities” (Wright & Reeskens, 2013, p. 1443). Theorists such as Marshall (1950) for example argue that welfare state expansion is only possible when there are feelings of belonginess, commonality and solidarity felt towards other groups within society. In this present ‘Age of Migration’, individuals more often perceive others to be different than the same, undermining a required pillar for welfare state expansion, i.e. public legitimacy (S. Castles, 2003). The idea that shared identification to the state functions as a glue to support welfare redistribution is widely studied from a variety of perspectives. Miller (1996) implies that nations are ‘ethical communities’ and that a shared national identity helps to ensure the idea that making sacrifices for others -who you might not even know or will ever meet- is necessary, which is a critical aspect of redistribution in the welfare state. Without these ties of nationality between individuals there is less incentive for people to provide in welfare redistributions to others (Kymlicka, 2001). And these ties of nationality are exactly what is missing when social groups are created. A lack of shared nationality based on ethnic heritage of descent, leads individuals to have lesser empathy for others, making them less likely to engage in helping behavior (Wright & Reeskens, 2013). To conclude, national identity helps to generate solidarity among citizens which in turn helps to facilitate the vertical redistribution of welfare state provisions. When a shared national identity is missing, due to different ethnical backgrounds and descents, the solidarity of

xiii citizens is believed to fade out, creating preferences to exclude groups of ‘others’ (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). Additionally, several theorists examined the role of national identity in multinational states because the effect of national identity is expected to be different here. Because Belgium is a multinational state which consists out of two large regions, Flanders and French speaking Belgium, Belgians can also relate to one of these regions instead of the national state. Previous studies show that most Belgians identify with both the national state as one of the sub-national regions, however a stronger identification with one of the sub-national regions seems to lead to a weaker form of identification with the national state and vice versa (Billiet et al., 2003). In their research, these authors also show that identification with Flanders leads to stronger welfare chauvinistic preferences while identification with French speaking Belgium shows no evidence for preferences to restrict benefits from immigrants (Meeus et al., 2010). In this study, the findings of these studies are followed. Based on this, it is expected that identification with the Flanders region is positively associated with welfare chauvinism (H3a) while identification with the French speaking Belgium region is negatively associated with welfare chauvinism (H3b).

Deservingness Although no direct hypotheses are derived from the criteria of deservingness, these aspects do form important indicators for explaining levels of welfare chauvinism in societies. In one of the most fundamental studies on this topic, van Oorschot (2006) examined the role of deservingness perceptions among European natives. Traditionally, European natives are considered as positively minded about the redistribution of welfare benefits to others. Yet, it seems to be the case that this does not apply to the redistribution of welfare benefits to immigrants. In general, those who are sick or disabled are seen as most deserving, followed by those who are unemployed. This is partly caused by a persistent stigma that lies on the idea of being unemployed. Whereas Europeans see the unemployed as less deserving as those who are sick or disabled, the entitlement of benefits to immigrants even has to be placed at the lower end of the deservingness spectrum. van Oorschot (2006) claims that this gap is caused by the systematic development most Western-European welfare states have been through. In most welfare states, the government first implemented the benefits that were most crucial, such as benefits for the sick, elderly and disabled. Later, the benefits for the unemployed or low-skilled workers were implemented, leading to a possible systematic gap in the willingness to see others as entitled to receive welfare benefits (Pampel & Williamson, 1989). In later research, Van Oorschot (2008) manages to create five leading principles of deservingness, also known as CARIN: Control, Attitude, Reciprocity, Identity and Need (Meuleman, Roosma, & Abts, 2018). In relation to the topic of this study, especially the principles of identity and reciprocity play a role. As mentioned by Tajfel and Turner (1979), individuals always seem to be

xiv looking for similar characteristics in others. For obvious reasons, natives will never be able to fully identify themselves with immigrants, due to different backgrounds, heritages and descents. This lack of shared identity will cause a lower degree of solidarity towards these groups of ‘others’, making immigrants less entitled to receive welfare provisions in the eyes of the ‘paying majority’. As Van Oorschot (2008) describes it, another important mechanism related to deservingness is the principle of reciprocity. Deservingness of welfare provisions shows to be strongly rooted in the idea that one has to contribute to the welfare state first before receiving any ‘state assistance’. Immigrants have a hard time to meet up to these expectations, simply because they did not have a proper chance to contribute to the welfare state significantly yet (Reeskens & van der Meer, 2018).

Citizenship and welfare redistribution As mentioned, the idea of sharing resources with others -even with the principle of reciprocity in place- seems to be strongly related to some sort of a shard identity or group belonging (Vandoninck et al., 2018, p. 159). In ethnography, authors show that in-group solidarity can be used as strong asset to survive (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008). Miller (1996) and Turner et al. (1987) see group identification as an important mean to foster group solidarity, since group identification helps to create feelings of empathy for other group members. In modern time societies, the redistribution of welfare and resources is arranged at nation or state level. As a result of this, all others within the state lines - read fellow citizens- can be considered as the group to identify or relate with (Roche, 1992). However, official state citizenship is not always considered as a sufficient indicator of being a complete member of the national in-group. Additionally, the research of Wright and Reeskens (2013) indicates that the way an individual perceives citizenship is relevant for questions on how to organize welfare redistribution. Citizenship typology was first mentioned in the work of Kohn (1944) who believed that every individual, regardless of his or her religion, background or ethnicity, could join a nation as long as (s)he swore to respect the principles as presented by the state. This type of nationalism especially arose in countries where there was a strong bourgeoisie present in combination with liberalization and decentralization of rules and authority, e.g. Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. Another type of nationalism prevailed itself in states who had feudal economies and strong absolutist rules. This more ethnic form of nationalism resulted in a strongly fixed form of membership of the nation, depending on ethnic descent, language and traditional customs. Especially in Germany and Eastern-Europe, this type of nationalism prevailed itself in the eras to follow (Janmaat, 2006; Kohn, 1944). In later studies, Brubaker (1990) translates these two main embodiments of membership of a nation as ‘ethnic’ versus ‘civic’ citizenship (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). The ethnic tradition of citizenship underlines the importance of shared heritage, common culture and ancestry as the basis of the national community. Contrary, the civic view regards the nation as a rational community where

xv every person who legally lives within the territorial lines is considered as ‘part of the majority’ (Vandoninck et al., 2018). Although the typology of citizenship views is multidimensional, previous research indicates that this theoretical definition can be measured empirically in European countries by using standardized markers (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2010). One of the leading theorists on the topic, Miller (1996), explains why civic and ethnic views play a meaningful role in explaining support for welfare redistribution. Individuals who define citizenship in a civic manner do not consider nationality as something that is ethnic bound and are therefore expected to feel more compassion for other nationals, irrespectively of their cultural heritage or ethnic descent. On the other hand, ethnic nationalists, “consider a section of their co-nationals as not belonging to the ‘real’ national group for which they feel sympathy and could therefore be less inclined to support social welfare schemes and benefits that accrue to everybody holding citizenship in an ethnically diversifying context” (Vandoninck et al., 2018, p. 160). Wright and Reeskens (2013) test the relationship between these ethnic and civic typologies of citizenship and welfare redistribution preferences in several European countries and the findings suggest that ethnic nationalists prefer a more economically equal society with restrictions of welfare -welfare chauvinism- for immigrants. The current welfare systems of most European countries have no policy that excludes or restricts immigrants from receiving welfare benefits on a purely cultural or ethnic basis. So, the structure of current welfare states is not in line with the ideal image that ethnic nationalists hold, in the sense that they prefer equality -economic egalitarianism- but not for immigrants. In contrast to what was expected on theoretical grounds, the findings of Wright and Reeskens (2013) show that civic nationalists can also be linked to welfare chauvinism, however to a limited extent. Regarding the current evidence that is available, the arguments of theorists like Miller (1996) and Wright and Reeskens (2013) are followed up on in this study. Whereas ethnic citizenship attitudes indicate preferences for the in-group with prejudice towards ethnic minority groups, civic citizenship views do not seem to apply to this. Therefore, civic nationalism is not expected to have a strong connection with welfare chauvinism (Vandoninck et al., 2018). This does not automatically mean that individuals with civic citizenship preferences consider immigrants in a more positive way than other co-nationals. As Miller (1996) argues, the entitlement of welfare benefits to ethnic minority groups is for civic nationalists mostly determined by the reciprocal integration of these groups, suggesting that also civic nationalists might show some form of welfare chauvinistic preferences. Because this study is focused on the Belgian state, a further inspection of research regarding the multinational state of Belgian and citizenship views is necessary. Research on this topic shows that in the Dutch-speaking region Flanders, identification with the region is in general considered as ethnic, while the identification with the Belgian national state is considered as civic. On the contrary, the relationship in the French-speaking region French speaking Belgium is found to be exactly reversed

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(Billiet et al., 2003; Meeus et al., 2010). However, one must consider that in both regions, as well ethnic -as civic citizenship attitudes showed to be present (Dejaeghere, 2010). Taking all the studies on citizenship views into consideration, only the study of Vandoninck et al. (2018) examines the mediating effect of citizenship views on sub-national identity in Belgium. This study shows that there is indeed a mediating effect of both ethnic as civic citizenship views found on the relationship between sub-national identity and welfare chauvinism and it seems rather interesting to elaborate further on these results. Because the research of Dejaeghere (2010) shows that both ethnic and civic citizenship are present in Flanders and French speaking Belgium, this assumption is followed in this study. By taking other factors into account such as structural characteristics, economic factors and political ideology, the following hypotheses can be derived: the relationship between sub-national identification with Flanders and welfare chauvinism is mediated by ethnic and civic citizenship views (H4a) and the relationship between sub-national identification with French speaking Belgium and welfare chauvinism is mediated by ethnic and civic citizenship views (H4b). To give a better understanding of the expected relationships, the hypotheses are presented in an overview with a conceptual diagram:

Hypothesis 3a: Sub-national identification with the Flanders region is positively associated with welfare chauvinism.

Hypothesis 3b: Sub-national identification with the French speaking Belgium region and sympathy for welfare redistribution for immigrants are positively associated.

Hypothesis 4a: The relationship between sub-national identification with the Flanders region and welfare chauvinism is mediated by ethnic and civic citizenship views.

Hypothesis 4b: The relationship between sub-national identification with the French speaking Belgium region and sympathy for welfare redistribution for immigrants is mediated by ethnic and civic citizenship views

Conceptual diagram displaying hypotheses 3&4:

Sub -national Citizenship identification views with Flanders

Welfare Sub -national chauvinism identification with French speaking Belgium Citizenship views

Figure 2. Conceptual model displaying hypotheses 3&4. Source: BNES 2014 *prepared by author.

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Also, the conceptual model of all the tested relationships is presented in figure 3:

Figure 3. Conceptual model displaying all hypotheses. Source: BNES 2014 *prepared by author.

Social structures Age Gender Education Income Social class Welfare benefits

Economic factors Effect econ. crisis

Economic develop. Welfare chauvinism

Political ideology

Egalitarianism

Left-right wing voting

State responsibility

Citizenship Sub -national views identification with Flanders

Citizenship Sub-national views identification with

French speaking

Belgium

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DATA AND METHODS

To test the hypotheses as stated above, data from the seventh wave of the Belgian National Election Study (BNES 2014) is used. The BNES is a post-electoral survey that was conducted in Flanders and French speaking Belgium in Belgium. This survey was designed by the Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek Opinieonderzoek (ISPO-KU) from the KU Leuven. The population consists out of Belgian nationals with an age of 18 or above and who were allowed to vote for the Federal Belgium Election of 2014. Respondents were selected with a random probability. The selection took place in two stages: first on municipality level, secondly on individual level. Data was selected face-to-face personal interviews and by conducting computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). In addition, a drop-off questionnaire was designed to be completed by the respondents on their own. The sample size consists out of N=1901 from who N=1403 also sent back a drop-off questionnaire. Overall, the response rate is 47,5% for the main questionnaire and 74% for the drop-off questionnaire. After removing missing values, i.e. respondents that did not fill in the questionnaires completely or have not returned the questionnaires, a total sample size of N=1217 remained. In order to get a sufficient image of the levels of welfare chauvinism, only respondents with Belgian parents were selected, based on the items asking: ‘Is or was your mother/father born in Belgium’ (q27 & q29). This because previous studies show that welfare chauvinism is perceived differently by those who have foreign parents (Alanya, Swyngedouw, Vandezande, & Phalet, 2017). After removing respondents with foreign born parents, a final sample of N=1056 remains. The sample consists a sub-sample consisting out of N=733 for the Flanders region and N=323 for the French speaking Belgium region. In table 1 a total overview of all the included variables is presented.

Strategy of analysis In the remainder of this chapter, the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables is addressed. In order to prepare the raw dataset, IBM SPSS Statistics 24 is used. The analysis is performed by handling the data step by step. The first step is the creation of scales by performing a factor analysis of the variables measuring welfare chauvinism and citizenship views. By doing so, it can be determined which indicators are suitable for the measurement of the chosen factors. The factor loadings have to be at least .4 or higher. If not, the item might not have a relationship with the other items or it can suggest that there is an additional factor present which needs exploration (Costello & Osborne, 2005, p. 4). Indicators that do not reach this level are removed from the scale. This is done stepwise until the model reaches a sufficient fit. To check the reliability of the scales, Cronbach’s Alpha is used. When the result of the Cronbach’s Alpha is .5 or higher, the reliability can be considered as sufficient. When Cronbach’s Alpha is .8 or higher, the reliability can be considered as very good (D. C. Miller & Salkind, 2002). Dummy variables with n categories are included as n-1, where the unincluded category is treated as the reference category (indicated with ref. cat.).

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After the scales are determined, a regression analysis is performed to explore the direct effects of structural characteristics, economic factors, political ideology and sub-national identity on welfare chauvinism. After this, I will include citizenship views in the model. All analyses are performed on two sub-samples, one sample based on respondents living in Flanders and one based on respondents living in French speaking Belgium. By doing so, the expected differences between Flanders and French speaking Belgium will be visible more clearly.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics Mean SD Min. Max. N Structural characteristics Age 52.21 17.331 18 93 1056 Male (female is ref.cat.) .505 .500 0 1 1056 Education (no/primary education is ref. cat.) Lower secondary .168 .374 0 1 1056 Higher secondary .327 .469 0 1 1056 University level .428 .495 0 1 1056 Social class (workers class is ref. cat.) Lower middle class .379 .485 0 1 1056 Higher middle class .372 .483 0 1 1056 Higher class .009 .097 0 1 1056 Income (sufficient income is ref. cat.) Not sufficient income .147 .355 0 1 1056 Just sufficient income .536 .499 0 1 1056 Welfare benefits (no benefits is ref. cat.) Benefits recipiency .221 .415 0 1 1056

Economic factors Effect of economic crisis (no effect is ref. cat.) Small effect .557 .497 0 1 1056 Strong effect .158 .365 0 1 1056 Economic development (economy worse is ref. cat.) Economy same .361 .481 0 1 1056 Economy better .269 .444 0 1 1056

(Sub)national identity (sub)national identity (only Belgium is ref. cat.) More Belgium .198 .399 0 1 1056 Equally region/Belgium .354 .478 0 1 1056 More region FL*/FREBEL* .215 .411 0 1 1056 Only region FL/FREBEL .054 .226 0 1 1056

Political ideology Egalitarianism 3.75 .717 1.33 5 1056 State responsibility 4.40 2.393 0 10 1056 Left-right voting 5.24 2.140 0 10 1056

Citizenship views Ethnic views 2.73 .685 1 4 1056 Civic views 3.39 .460 1.83 4 1056 Valid N (listwise) 1056 Note: Descriptive statistics displayed by presenting the mean score (mean), standard deviation (SD), minimum score (min) and maximum score (max). The valid observations are presented with the valid N. All values are rounded to three decimals. *FL: Abbreviation used in all tables to indicate Flanders. *FREBEL: Abbreviation used in all tables to indicate French speaking Belgium. Source: BNES 2014, *prepared by author

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The independent variable: Welfare chauvinism Welfare chauvinism is the dependent variable in this study. To measure this, items 122_1 t/m 122_8 of question 122 are used: ‘To what extent do you agree with the following statements?’ This concerns the following statements: • Migrants contribute too little to social security compared to what they receive (q122_1); • Only people whose parents are Belgians are entitled to social services and benefits (q122_2); • Migrants who work and pay premiums here deserve the same social benefits as Belgians (q122_3); • When granting social benefits, people who have born here should get priority over people who have not been born here q122_4); • Migrants should be allowed to enjoy the same social services as Belgians (q122_5); • Someone who doesn’t adapt to the Belgian way of life has no right to social services (q122_6); • Migrants should first have a job before gaining access to social services (q122_7); • Everyone in our country, without exception, should be able to enjoy social security q122_8). Regarding these items, respondents were asked to select an answer ranging from “totally disagree” to “totally agree”, ranging on a five-point Likert scale3. The explanatory factor analysis indicates one factor for ‘welfare chauvinism’. As presented in several studies, a model in which there is a separate “identity” (q122_2 + q122_4 + q122_6) and “contribution” (q122_1 + q122_3 + q122_7) dimension could not be properly identified due to a linear dependency between the two factors (Meuleman et al., 2018). Also, a model with two separate factors shows a low reliability4 as well as various cross-loadings. After the stepwise deletion of q122_3 and q122_85, the scale eventually reached a Cronbach’s Alpha of .8176, which can be considered as good. The results of the factor analysis are presented in annex 1 of the appendix.

The independent variables Variables that can be categorized as structural characteristics are used as the independent variables: educational level, social class, income and benefit recipiency. Educational level – In many studies, the relevance of education in explaining welfare chauvinism is underlined (Mewes & Mau, 2013). In this study, the educational level of respondent is measured by the question asking respondents what their highest obtained education (with diploma) is: What is the highest

3 Items q122_3, q122_5 & q122_8 were recoded so that a score of 5 indicates a score of more welfare chauvinistic preferences. 4 Separate identity scale has a reliability of .671 while a separate contribution scale has a reliability of .366. 5 Q122_3 & q122_8 were removed because the results of the reliability analysis showed that this would create a higher reliability of the scale. 6 Cronbach’s Alpha with all items included: .806.

xxi obtained educational level you have a diploma in?’ (q17). The scores are structured in four categories: (1) no education/primary education (ref.cat.); (2) lower secondary; (3) higher secondary; (4) university level. Social class – Strongly related to one’s educational level is social class, which is in turn shown to be related to politics and opinions regarding the welfare state (Pampel & Williamson, 1989). To measure social class, the following question is used: ‘Which class do you consider yourself to be part of?’ (q25). For the scores of social class four categories can be distinguished: (1) workers class; (2) lower middle class; (3) higher middle class and (4) higher class (ref.cat.). Welfare recipiency – As Jaeger (2006) shows in his study, recipients of welfare provisions are looking after their own interests when regarding redistribution of the state. Since welfare recipients are financially dependent of the state, they generally hold a more exclusionary vision towards immigrants. Welfare recipiency is measured with the question: ‘Did you or any member of your household receive any form of welfare provisions in the last two years, for example unemployment benefits or disability insurance?’ (q26). Two dummy variables are created to measure the welfare benefits recipiency; 0=receiving welfare benefits (ref.cat); 1=not reviving benefits. In addition to the structural characteristics, respondents were asked about how they feel and think about certain economic factors in society. Also, the effects of the economic crisis of 2008 were discussed with the respondents, since the relationship between actual or perceived economic deprivation on welfare chauvinism is underlined in several studies (Heizmann et al., 2018). Effect economic crisis 2008 - The respondents were asked if they feel like the economic crisis had an effect on their daily lives, using the following question: ‘How strong was the effect of the economic crisis on you or one of your household members regarding income or employment?’ (q116). Three answer categories are constructed: (1) no effect (ref.cat.); (2) small effect and (3) strong effect7. Economic development in the future - In addition to the question regarding the economic effects of the past, respondents were asked to provide an answer to the question on how they think the economy will develop in the nearby future: ‘How do you expect that the economy will evolve the coming next 5 years?’ (q117). This question has three answer categories: (1) economy will get worse (ref.cat.); (2) economy will stay the same; (3) economy will get better. In this study, the effect of sub-national identification with the region of Flanders or French speaking Belgium is examined, since previous studies show that there is an effect between this concept and welfare chauvinism (Billiet et al., 2003; Vandoninck et al., 2018). Sub-national identity – Identification with one of the sub-regions is measured by the question asking if the respondent identifies more with the region of Flanders or French speaking Belgium than the Belgian state or vice versa: ‘Which of the following statements applies to you the most?’(q127). Five

7 A very strong effect (4) is combined with a strong effect (3). xxii categories can be distinguished: (1) I feel only FL/FREBEL; (2) I feel more FL/FREBEL than Belgian; (3) I feel equally FL/FFEBEL as Belgian; (4) I feel more Belgian; (5) I feel only Belgian (ref.cat.). Besides the structural and economic factors, the respondents were asked to provide an answer to items regarding their political preferences and believes. Left-right wing political ideology – As Schumacher and Van Kersbergen (2016) show in their study, left-wing preferences are associated with universal thoughts and the preference for inclusive social policies for all, while right-wing parties are in turn associated with sceptic ideas about immigration and welfare, as also expected in this study. In order to measure the respondent’s political preference, the respondents were asked to indicate where they would place themselves on 10-point scale measuring left-right wing political preferences, related to the question: ‘Where would you place yourself on this scale regarding political left -or right-wing ideas?’ (q77). On this scale, a score of 0 indicates more left-wing orientated preferences while a score of 10 indicates more right-wing orientated preferences. State responsibility – As addition to the political orientation, the preference for the state to interfere with welfare redistribution is measured in this study, since state interference and responsibility to distribute welfare has shown to influence ideas and perceptions about immigrants (Derks, 2006). State responsibility is measured with one item asking respondents: ‘Where would you place yourself on this scale regarding the responsibility of the state in providing well-being for every individual?’ (q76). With the scale ranging from 0 to 108, a score of 0 indicates that the respondent prefers every individual to take responsibility in providing for his or her own well-being while score of 10 indicates that the respondent prefers total state interference and sees the government as the responsible actor. Egalitarianism – Economic egalitarianism is measured by three subitems: ‘Class differences should be smaller than they are now (q52_1); The differences between high and low incomes should stay as they are now (q52_2); The government should interfere to decrease the differences between different incomes (q52_3)’. These items were combined in to one scale, with answer categories ranging from: (1) totally disagree; (2) disagree; (3) don’t disagree/don’t agree; (4) agree; (5) totally agree.

Control variables To be certain that the effects in this study are a true reflection of the relationships as discussed, control variables are included in the models. In this study, age, gender and income are used as control variables. Age - Age is measured in the years, based on the item: What is your year of birth? (q1). The respondent was asked to fill in his or her year of birth. Gender - Ervasti and Hjerm (2012) highlight the importance of gender in their study, since the evidence of the effect of gender on welfare chauvinism is mixed. Some evidence supports more welfare chauvinistic preferences among males while other findings point towards more welfare chauvinistic

8 Original scores were reversed, so the item was recoded. xxiii preferences among females. Therefore, the item regarding the gender of the respondent (q2) is used. Two dummy variables are created to measure gender, 0=female (ref.cat.); 1=male. Income – Income is measured by looking at the ability to pay the bills every month with the income the household receives, the question asking respondents: ‘Which of the following statements is most applicable to your current situation, considering the current income you receive?’ (q97). Three categories can be distinguished9: (1) we have not enough to make ends meet (ref.cat.); (2) we have enough to make ends meet; (3) we have enough and have no problems to make ends meet10.

Citizenship views Citizenship views are measured by items that indicate how important respondents think each of the following statements are in explaining what it means to be a true Belgian, using two items: ‘To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding Belgium and immigration?’ (d16). This question consists out of for items or statements: • One should be born here oneself (d16_1); • One should have ancestors who were born here (d16_2); • One should live here for most of one’s life (d16_3); • One should be able to speak Dutch (d16_4); The second question regarding ‘How important do you think the following things are for a foreigner to become a Belgian citizen with the Belgian nationality?’ (d17). • One has to adjust fully to Western culture and way of life (d17_1); • One should be able to prove that they know the history, customs and traditions of our country (d17_2); • One should contribute to our economy and society (d17_3); • One should be able to stand their own feet financially (d17_4); • One should voluntarily denounce any other nationality (d17_5); • One should have a clean criminal record (d17_6). The items measure the opinions of the respondents on a five-point Likert-scale, ranging from “strongly unimportant” to “strongly important”. Two scales, ethnic citizenship views (d16_1 + d16_2 + d16_3 + d17_5) and civic citizenship views (d16_4 + d17_1 + d17_2 + d17_3 + d17_4) are created as a result of a factor analysis. The scale of ethnic citizenship views has a Cronbach’s Alpha of .755 while the scale of civic citizenship has a Cronbach’s Alpha of .768, so both scales11 can be considered as reliable. An overview of the results of the factor analysis are presented in annex 2 of the appendix.

9 The categories are recoded, so a score of 1 now indicates no sufficient income and a score of 3 indicates a good income. 10 Answer category 4 ‘we have more than enough income, we can save easily’ is combined with category 3. 11 Correlations between ethnic and civic citizenship views is .599. xxiv RESULTS

In this chapter an overview of the results is presented. First, the results of the direct effects are discussed. All results are presented for two separate samples: Flanders and French speaking Belgium. In every model, variables are added stepwise and the results are presented in three tables. Table 2 shows the effect of structural characteristics and economic factors on welfare chauvinism, whereas table 3 shows the effect of structural characteristics, economic factors, (sub)national identity and political ideology on welfare chauvinism. Lastly, table 4 shows the effect of all the predictors together with citizenship views added to the model. In the first model of table 2 one can see the effect of structural characteristics on welfare chauvinism. For the sample group of Flanders, significant effects are found for and gender (B=-.138; p<.01), indicating that one can say that females are more welfare chauvinistic than males. This model also shows a negative effect of having a university level degree (B=-.645; p<.001). Since this effect is significant, one can say that this effect shows that a lower education and welfare chauvinism are positively associated, which confirms hypothesis 1a. That a lower education leads to more welfare chauvinistic preferences could be due to the fact that this group owns a less abundant skillset, making it harder for this group to compete on the labour market with immigrants, creating feelings of chauvinism. In addition, the model also shows that those who do not have a sufficient income to pay the monthly bills with (B=-.232 p<.01) or have just a sufficient income to pay the monthly bills with (B=-.119, p<.05), are also found to be less welfare chauvinistic compared to those who have a sufficient income. Despite these findings, no significant effects are found for social class on welfare chauvinism, causing hypothesis 1b to be rejected. When looking to these results, only partial evidence is found to support the ethnic competition theory for this sample (Mewes & Mau, 2013). For the sample group of French speaking Belgium, significant effects are found university schooled respondents (B=-.550; p<.01). As these effects are significant, one can say that university educated individuals are less welfare chauvinistic than those with no or a primary school education. These findings are consistent with findings from previous studies (Dustmann et al., 2005) and in line with the ethnic competition theory (Blumer, 1958), confirming hypothesis 1a for the French speaking Belgium sample. Regarding social class, the effects of the lower middle class (B=-.2481 p<.01) and higher middle class (-.401, p<.01) differ significantly from the effects of the workers class, showing that compared to individuals in the working class, the lower middle class and higher middle class are less welfare chauvinistic. This suggests that lower classes indeed perceive feelings of threat from immigrants, confirming hypothesis 1b. For both samples, nonsignificant effects were found to confirm hypothesis 1c, suggesting that welfare recipiency and welfare chauvinism are positively associated. In model 2 of table 2, economic factors are added, namely the expectation of the future development of the economy and the impact of the economic crisis of 2008. For the Flanders sample,

xxv the significant effect of gender (B=-.133, p<.01) stays roughly the same, suggesting that the effect from the first model hold. The effects for two out of three educational groups became significant, showing negative significant effects for higher secondary (B=-.221, p<.05) and university level (B=-.633, p<.001) schooled, now strongly indicating the expected positive relationship between a low education and welfare chauvinism (h1a). A great impact of the economic crisis of 2008 seems to play a significant role in determining welfare chauvinistic preferences; those who experienced a great impact of this crisis show to be more welfare chauvinistic (B=.169, p<.05). Additionally, the model shows that a positive expectation of the future economy and welfare chauvinism are negatively associated (B=-.179, p<.05). This suggests that current and prospective economic hardship play an important role in explaining welfare chauvinism. Besides the daily struggles that follow from economic hardship, it also shapes how individuals perceive economic and social arrangements for immigrants (Heizmann et al., 2018). For the Flanders sample, hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b can therefore be confirmed. The R2 of the Flanders sample increased from .200 in model 1 to .216 in model 2. Regarding the French speaking Belgium sample, only the effect of age (B=.051, p<.05) remained significant. The effect of university level education (B=-.546, p<.01) stayed significant as well. In contradiction to the Flanders sample, the effects of a lower middle class (B=-.286, p<.01) and higher middle class (B=-.385, p<.01) remained significant, again indicating that compared to those in a lower social class, i.e. working class, individuals in a higher class are less welfare chauvinistic. The model shows no significant effects for the economic factors, indicating that hypothesis 2a and 2b have to be rejected for the French speaking Belgium sample. The R2 of the French speaking Belgium sample increased from .194 model 1 to .200 model 2. In model 3 of table 3, (sub)national identity is added to the predictors. For the Flanders sample, the effects of identifying only with the Flanders region (B=.389, p<.01), identifying more with Flanders than Belgium (B=.285, p<.01), or equally identifying with Flanders and Belgium (B=.192 p<.05) are positive, which indicates that when one identifies with the region more, the individual will be more welfare chauvinistic. This is in line with hypothesis 3a, which claims that sub-national identification with the Flanders region is positively associated with welfare chauvinism. The R2 of the Flanders sample increased from .216 model 2 to .257 model 3. For French speaking Belgium, no significant effects are found to support hypothesis 3b. This indicates that sub-national identification is only able to significantly explain welfare chauvinism in Flanders. The R2 of the French speaking Belgium sample increased from .200 model 2 to .206 model 3.

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Table 2. Standardized Regression Coefficients of structural characteristics and economic factors with welfare chauvinism as the dependent variable (N= 1056). Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 FL FREBEL FL FREBEL B SE B SE B SE B SE Structural characteristics Age .029 .016 .050 .025 .032 .016 .051* .026 Male (female is ref. cat.) -.138** .046 -.162* .076 -.133** .046 -.150 .077 Education (none/primary is ref. cat.) Lower secondary -.161 .102 -.204 .166 -.183 .102 -.194 .167 Higher secondary -.192 .098 -.211 .178 -.221* .098 -.205 .169 University -.645** .103 -.550** .177 -.633*** .102 -.546** .178 Social class (workers class is ref. cat.) Lower middle class -038 .063 -.281* .108 -.034 .062 -.286** .109 Higher middle class -.040 .074 -.401** .122 -.021 .074 -.385** .123 Higher class .100 .233 -.341 .493 .048 .232 -.270 .497 Income (sufficient income is ref. cat.) Not sufficient income -.232** .080 -.011 .142 -.183* .082 .031 .148 Just sufficient income -.119* .057 .057 .088 -.078 .058 .074 .092 Welfare benefits (no benefits is ref. cat.) Benefits recipiency .-.098 .062 -.118 .087 -.107 .062 -.117 .087

Economic factors Effect of economic crisis (no effect is ref. cat.) Small effect .079 .053 .037 .107 Strong effect .169* .081 .153 .132 Economic development (economy worse is ref. cat.) Economy same -.030 .055 .070 .092 Economy better -.179** .060 -.023 .099 R2 .200 .194 .216 .200 Source: BNES 2014 *prepared by author Notes: Notes: Entries are non-standardized coefficients (B) and standard error (SE), significant levels are presented as *p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

In model 4 of table 3, political ideology is added to the model. For the Flanders sample, left- right wing voting has a small but positive effect (B=.068, p<.001), which proves that a more right-wing political orientation is positively associated with welfare chauvinism, although this effect has to be accounted for as very small. This is in line with the idea that the electorate of right-wing orientated parties are sceptic about immigration, multiculturalism and welfare redistribution (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016). Therefore, hypothesis 2c is confirmed for the Flanders sample. Since the model shows no significant effects for economic egalitarian views and state responsibility, hypothesis 2d and 2e are rejected. The R2 of the Flanders sample increased from .257 model 3 to .296 model 4. For the French speaking Belgium sample, the responsibility of the state shows to have a small but significant effect on welfare chauvinism (B=-.042, p<.05), suggesting that those who prefer less intervention of the state to provide in the welfare of society are indeed to some extent more inclined to restrict welfare provisions from immigrants. This could be explained by the idea that these individuals are not in favour of any state redistribution at all, let it be the redistribution of welfare provisions for immigrants xxvii (Svallfors, 1997). The model also displays that left-right wing voting has a small but positive effect, again indicating that a more right-wing political orientation is positively associated with welfare chauvinism (B=.058, p<.01). Notwithstanding, these results show that hypothesis h2c and h2d can be confirmed. No significant relationship is detected between economic egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism, leading to the rejection of hypothesis h2e. The R2 of the French speaking Belgium sample increased from .206 model 3 to .277 model 4. In model 5 of table 4, citizenship views are added to the model. For the Flanders sample, both ethnic (B=.180, p<.001) as civic citizenship (B=.479, p<.001) views have a positive significant effect, which proves that both forms of citizenship views lead to welfare chauvinism, although civic citizenship shows a stronger effect. After adding citizenship views to the model, the effect of university level education is still stable and significant, suggesting that higher educated form their perceptions towards immigrants perhaps through another line of reasoning than citizenship views. For example, it could be the case that higher educated have a more open view towards immigrants in general because they are more able to cope with the changing societal circumstances that are caused by a more multicultural and heterogeneous society (Ervasti & Hjerm, 2012). Noteworthy, the effect of benefits recipiency (B=-.137, p<.01) has now become significant, showing that those who receive benefits themselves are in fact less likely to hold welfare chauvinistic preferences, contradictory to what was expected based on the ethnic competition theory. The effects of sub-national identification with only the region of Flanders or more the region of Flanders than the Belgian state become weaker, suggesting that the effect of (sub)national identity on welfare chauvinism is mediated by citizenship views, which confirms hypothesis 4a. The R2 of Flanders increases from .296 model 4 to .454 model 5. The model is for the Flanders sample now able to explain 45.5% of the variance compared to 29.6% of the variance without citizenship views included. This indicates that citizenship views are indeed a relevant factor in explaining welfare chauvinism in Flanders. For the French speaking Belgium sample, the effects of sub-national identity have not been significant from the first model on. The model does show that the effect of university educational level is still significant (B=-.363, p<.05), however the effect has become weaker compared to the other models. No significant evidence was found to support the effect of (sub)national identity on welfare chauvinism or a mediating effect on this relationship of citizenship views. Therefore, hypothesis 4b have to be rejected. Noteworthy, the results show that ethnic citizenship views (B=.324, p<.001) and citizenship views (B=.490, p<.001) both have a significantly strong effect, suggesting that both types of citizenship views result in welfare chauvinistic preferences. The R2 of French speaking Belgium increases from .277 model 4 to .529 model 5, indicating that 52.9% of the variance can be explained by all factors. This suggests that this study has identified important factors that explain welfare chauvinism. As the increase in the R2 shows, citizenship views contribute substantially to the model and are therefore found to be important factors in explaining welfare chauvinism.

xxviii Table 3. Standardized Regression Coefficients of structural characteristics, economic factors, (sub)national identity and political ideology with welfare chauvinism as the dependent variable (N=1056). Model 3 Model 3 Model 4 Model 4 FL FREBEL FL FREBEL B SE B SE B SE B SE Structural characteristics Age .028 .016 .053* .026 .024 .016 .061* .026 Male (female is ref. cat.) -.152** .046 -.156* .078 -.159*** .045 -.136 .077 Education (no/primary educ is ref.cat.) Lower secondary -.142 .100 -.157 .169 -.116 .098 -.187 .163 Higher secondary -.184 .096 -.182 .171 -.156 .094 -.201 .165 University -.588*** .101 -.528** .180 -.536*** .099 -.525** .173 Social class (workers class is ref. cat.) Lower middle class -.042 .061 -.298** .110 -.069 .060 -.315** .106 Higher middle class -.045 .072 -.389** .124 -.093 .071 -.463** .121 Higher class .088 .227 -.288 .500 -.053 .223 -.492 .480 Income (sufficient income is ref. cat.) Not sufficient income -.184* .080 .030 .150 -.179* .078 -.005 .146 Just sufficient income -.090 .056 .071 .093 -.104 .055 .038 .090 Welfare benefits (no benefits is ref. cat.) Benefits recipiency -.124* .060 -.124 .088 -.105 .059 -.090 .087

Economic factors Effect of economic crisis on life (no effect is ref. cat.) Small effect .057 .052 .047 .109 .081 .051 .069 .105 Strong effect .171* .080 .182 .136 .152*** .078 .184 .132 Economic development (economy worse is ref.cat.) Economy same -.016 .054 .072 .093 -.040 .053 .034 .089 Economy better -.177** .059 -.022 .100 -.204*** .058 -.080 .097

(Sub)national identity (only Belg. is ref. cat.) More Belg. -.079 .095 .068 .099 -.067 .092 .047 .095 Equally reg./Bel. .192* .084 -.010 .101 .142 .082 -.010 .097 More region FL/FREBEL .285** .088 -.126 .157 .222** .086 -.081 .151 Only region FL/FREBEL .389** .115 .224 .272 .302** .113 .197 .262

Political ideology Egalitarianism -.003 .034 -.085 .056 State responsibility -.013 .010 -.042* .017 Left-right voting .068*** .012 .058** .017 R2 .257 .206 .296 .277 Source: BNES 2014 *prepared by author. Notes: Entries are non-standardized coefficients (B) and standard error (SE), significant levels are presented as *p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

xxix Table 4. Standardized Regression Coefficients of structural characteristics, economic factors, (sub)national identity and political ideology with the mediating effect of citizenship views with welfare chauvinism as the dependent variable (N=1056). Model 5 Model 5 FL FREBEL B SE B SE Structural characteristics Age -.012 .014 .007 .021 Male (female is ref. cat.) -.123** .040 -.105 .061 Education (no/primary education is ref.cat.) Lower secondary -.114 .086 -.139 .132 Higher secondary -.125 .083 -.097 .134 University -.400*** .088 -.363* .141 Social class (workers class is ref. cat.) Lower middle class -.049 .053 -.212* .087 Higher middle class -.073 .063 -.265* .099 Higher class -.093 .197 .083 .393 Income (sufficient income is ref. cat.) Not sufficient income -.163* .069 -.027 .119 Just sufficient income -.104* .049 -.008 .073 Welfare benefits (no benefits is ref. cat.) Benefits recipiency .-.137* .052 -.094 .070

Economic factors Effect of economic crisis on life (no effect is ref. cat.) Small effect .051 .045 .038 .085 Strong effect .093 .069 .169 .106 Economic development (economy worse is ref. cat.) Economy same -.013 .047 .028 .072 Economy better -.104 .052 -.056 .078

(Sub)national identity (only Belg. is. ref. cat.) More Belg. -.025 .082 -.041 .078 Equally reg./Bel. .138 .072 -.008 .079 More region FL/FREBEL .126 .077 -.042 .122 Only region FL/FREBEL .203* .100 .060 .212

Political ideology Egalitarianism -.001 .030 -.048 .045 State responsibility -.006 .008 -.024 .014 Left-right voting (0=left, 10=right) .039*** .011 .033* .014

Citizenship views Ethnic .180*** .038 .324*** .051 Civic .479*** .057 .490*** .079 R2 .454 .529 Source: BNES 2014 *prepared by author. Notes: Entries are non-standardized coefficients (B) and standard error (SE, significant levels are presented as *p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

xxx CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The aim of this study was to answer the following research questions: What is the association between structural characteristics (1), economic factors (2), political ideology (3) and (sub)national identity (4) and welfare chauvinism? Can the relationships between structural characteristics (1), economic factors (2), political ideology (3) and (sub)national identity (4) be explained by citizenship views (5)? To provide an answer to these research questions, data from the Belgian National Elections Study (BNES) from 2014 were used. The first predictors that were added to the model are related to structural characteristics, with the expectation that a lower educational level is positively associated with welfare chauvinism. This mechanism is supported for both sample groups and shows that the level of education has indeed an influence on welfare chauvinistic preferences. The second hypothesis is related to the social class an individual belongs to. This hypothesis was rejected for the Flanders sample but accepted for the French speaking Belgium sample. This indicates that in French speaking Belgium, a lower social class is positively related to welfare chauvinism. In Flanders, this relationship could not be confirmed. For both sample groups, no convincing evidence was found to suggest that there is a positive association between welfare recipiency and welfare chauvinism, while previous research suggested that this relationship is present, based on the theory of self-interest (Jaeger, 2006; Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). Due to only partial conformation of the hypotheses related to structural characteristics, the results only indicate partial evidence to conclude that the self-interest theory or ethnic competition theory is indeed able to explain welfare chauvinistic preferences. This theory therefore may not be the best fit to explain welfare chauvinism. When economic factors were added to the model, together with the structural characteristics, the effect of educational level stayed significantly in place, again providing evidence for a positive association between a lower educational level and welfare chauvinism. For the Flanders sample, the findings imply that current and prospective economic hardship play an important role in explaining welfare chauvinistic preferences. Besides the daily struggles that follow from economic hardship, it also shapes how individuals perceive economic and -social arrangements for immigrants (Heizmann et al., 2018), displaying an important relationship between economic factors and welfare chauvinism. While the hypotheses regarding these economic factors can be accepted for the Flanders sample, the model remarkably shows no significant evidence to suggest the same relationship is present in French speaking Belgium. These findings therefore reveal some interesting differences between the relationship of economic factors and welfare chauvinism in the two regions of Belgium. As previous studies indicated the relevance of examining the association between political factors and welfare chauvinism, variables that measure these political preferences were included in this study. The results show significant effects of one’s right or left-wing political orientation in explaining

xxxi welfare chauvinistic preferences for both sample groups. These findings are in accordance with the idea that the electorate of right-wing orientated parties are sceptic about immigration, multiculturalism and welfare redistribution (Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016). Moreover, the findings of the French speaking Belgium sample imply that the view individuals have on the responsibility of the state to provide equal well-being for all plays a role in shaping welfare chauvinistic ideas. As earlier studies also indicate, individuals who are not in favour of any state redistribution at all are also more inclined to restrict welfare provisions for immigrants (Svallfors, 1997). Lastly, this study is especially focussed towards examining the role of (sub)national identification with the Belgian state or one of the sub-entities and welfare chauvinism. In this study, assumed is that a strong sub-national identification with the region of Flanders is positively associated with welfare chauvinism while a strong (sub)national identity with the region of French speaking Belgium is negatively associated with welfare chauvinism. Significant effects are found for the Flanders model, suggesting that in the Flanders region, sub-national identification with this region plays an important role in explaining levels of welfare chauvinism. In line with earlier results of other studies, no specific evidence is found to suggest a relationship between sub-national identification with French speaking Belgium and preferences to restrict immigrants from benefits. From this perspective, the social identity theory seems to be a proper theory to explain welfare chauvinism in a multi-national state. When citizenship views were added to the model together with the structural characteristics, economic factors, political ideology and (sub)national identity, the effect of (sub)national identification with Flanders on welfare chauvinism stayed in place, however the effect did become weaker. This implies that indeed a mediating effect of citizenship views on sub-national identification with Flanders and welfare chauvinism is present. Although not significant, citizenship views also show to have a strong influence on the relationship between sub-national identification with French speaking Belgium and welfare chauvinism. The R-square of this last model also implies that a great variance is explained by adding these citizenship views, indicating that also in this region, citizenship views form an important indicator. Last of all, the direct effects of citizenship views on welfare chauvinism show to be in contradiction to what was expected of previous studies and theories, namely that civic citizenship attitudes are not positively related to welfare chauvinism (Kohn, 1944). Since these theories suggest that civic citizenship views are not related to any ethnic form of in-group identification and therefore not specifically imply a negative view towards immigrants, it was assumed that civic citizenship views would not show a positive association with welfare chauvinism. Nevertheless, the results suggest that civic citizenship views are in fact positively related to welfare chauvinism. Pehrson et al. (2009) explain this relationship by reasoning that any endorsement of holding criteria for obtaining national citizenship, even in a weaker or more inclusive form -hence civic citizenship views, contribute to the exclusion of minority groups who do not comply with these expected criteria.

xxxii To conclude, this study provides new insights about the importance of self-interest, competition, shared-identification and ethnic and civic citizenship views in explaining levels of welfare chauvinism in a country. While not all theories are found to be equally important, this study shows that especially the social-identity theory is able to explain why and how welfare chauvinistic preferences are formed by individuals. By doing so, new insights are provided for governments and they could use this information to construct new social policies and programmes for natives as well as immigrants. Based on this, the Belgian state could investigate what their social policies should entail to create higher levels of shared solidarity among natives and immigrants, so that the functioning of the welfare state is guaranteed in the future.

Limitations & future research implications As any study, this study has weaker points that need to be accounted for. Firstly, only data from the BNES 2014 was used, instead of longitudinal data. As a consequence of this, it is not possible to determine how the effects have developed over a longer time span. Also, the data does not present the situation in Belgium after the migrant crisis of 2015. It is likely that the new data based on the elections of 2018 will lead to different results, considering the great societal changes that the migrant crisis brought along. This data is not available yet, so it was not possible to use this dataset for this study. Therefore, future studies should replicate this study with the new dataset of 2018 to see whether or not the same outcomes can be detected or that the migrant crisis shaped the public opinion on welfare redistributions for immigrants even more. Moreover, this study does not examine welfare chauvinism in different countries. It is likely that (sub)national identity and citizenship views have different effects in different countries. For researchers, it can be interesting to examine these effects, in order to find the universal underlying causes for welfare chauvinism (Wright & Reeskens, 2013). In addition to this, there is no moderation effect tested in this study to see if the effects of the different types of citizenship views differ significantly in Flanders and French speaking Belgium. By adding an interaction term to the model, one can investigate what the fundamental differences are between the effects of citizenship views in the different regions. By doing so, one is even more capable of explaining how and when these typologies of citizenship views start to effect one’s perception of redistribution of benefits towards immigrants. Future research should therefore focus on where citizenship views are derived from and where they originate. What psychological, social, economic or national factors are important in shaping these views? Current research has been unable to truly investigate where, how and why an individual adopts a specific representation of citizenship over the other, suggesting that this line of research requires more attention. When the true origins of citizenship views building are found, scholars could examine what can be done to alter the perceptions that individuals in a society hold, in order to produce more harmonious intergroup relations in more heterogeneous societies.

xxxiii Lastly, the dependent variable measuring welfare chauvinism was not separated in to different principles of deservingness which are underlying welfare chauvinism. Based on the principles of Van Oorschot (2006), one could distinguish five underlying principles of welfare chauvinism (CARIN): control, attitude, reciprocity, identity and need. It is possible that when these principles are distinguished separate from each other instead of one variable measuring welfare chauvinism, the results will be different. By distinguishing the principles, it can become clear how the different principles are exactly related to personal, economic and political preferences and how these findings can be used to affect and implement future policies (Meuleman et al., 2018).

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APPENDIX

Annex 1. Factor analysis ‘welfare chauvinism’

To check if two separate scales need to be created for welfare chauvinism, the correlations of the eight items have to be checked. The correlations are presented in table 1.1

Table 1.1 Correlations items welfare chauvinism C P W B S B J C C P .389*** W .040 .261*** B .437*** .517*** .176*** S .416*** .429*** .286*** .467*** B .418*** .316*** -.002 .367*** .326*** J .513*** .418*** .087*** .457*** .436*** .484*** C .253*** .194*** .154*** .188*** .416*** .276*** .332*** *p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

C=Migrants contribute too little to social security compared to what they receive P=Only people whose parents are Belgians are entitled to social services and benefits W=Migrants who work and pay premiums here deserve the same social benefits as Belgians B=When granting social benefits, people who have born here should get priority over people who have not been born here S=Migrants should be allowed to enjoy the same social services as Belgians B=Someone who doesn’t adapt to the Belgian way of life has no right to social services J=Migrants should first have a job before gaining access to social services C=Everyone in our country, without exception, should be able to enjoy social security

Table 1.2 Explanatory factor analysis Initial Eigenvalues Factor Total % of variance Cumulative variance 1 3.390 42.280 42.380 2 1.130 14.120 56.500 3 .896 11.198 67.697 4 .612 7.650 75.348 5 .561 7.015 82.363 6 .508 6.346 88.710 7 .466 5.824 94.534 8 .437 5.466 100.000

Figure 1. Scree plot

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The factor loadings are presented in table 1.3. All items load higher than .4.

Table 1.3 Factor loadings Factor 1 Factor 2 Migrants contribute too little to social security compared to what they .772 receive Only people whose parents are Belgians are entitled to social services and .575 .328 benefits Migrants who work and pay premiums here deserve the same social benefits .902 as Belgians When granting social benefits, people who have born here should get .674 priority over people who have not been born here Migrants should be allowed to enjoy the same social services as Belgians .573 .427 Someone who doesn’t adapt to the Belgian way of life has no right to social .774 services Migrants should first have a job before gaining access to social services .792 Everyone in our country, without exception, should be able to enjoy social .403 security Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization

Although the results of the factor analysis show two factors, the results also show many cross-loadings and an eigenvalue of the second factor of just slightly above 1 (1.130). The scree plot also suggests that one factor is sufficient. Adding to that, the reliabilities of two separate scales for an ‘identity’ and ‘contribution’ factor are not considered as sufficient (see page 21). Therefore, only one scale is created for the variable ‘welfare chauvinism’.

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Annex 2. Factor analysis ‘citizenship views’

To check if two separate scales can be created for citizenship views, as the theory suggests -ethnic and civic- the correlations of the eight items have to be checked. As shown in table 2.1, some items have a strong correlation (=bold printed).

Table 2.1 Correlations items citizenship views B P L D C T C F N C B P .695*** L .462*** .453*** D .262*** .222*** .345*** C .415*** .382*** .305*** .314*** T .346*** .356*** .286*** .306*** .440*** C .310*** .266*** .274*** .299*** .363*** .339*** F .335*** .309*** .289*** .307*** .427*** .347*** .559*** N .378*** .358*** .296*** .164*** .366*** .338*** .273*** .302*** C .320*** .310*** .223*** .279*** .420*** .325*** .340*** .353*** .345*** *p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

B=One should be born here oneself P=One should have ancestors who were born here L=One should live here for most of one’s life D=One should be able to speak Dutch C=One has to adjust fully to Western culture and way of life T=One should be able to prove that they know the history, customs and traditions of our country C=One should contribute to our economy and society F=One should be able to stand their own feet financially N=One should voluntarily denounce any other nationality C=One should have a clean criminal record

Table 2.2 Explanatory factor analysis Initial Eigenvalues Factor Total % of variance Cumulative variance 1 4.114 41.142 41.142 2 1.108 11.080 52.222 3 .886 8.864 61.086 4 .776 7.755 68.841 5 .673 6.733 75.574 6 .659 6.588 82.162 7 .532 5.324 87.485 8 .523 5.234 92.719 9 .429 4.285 97.004 10 .300 2.996 100.000

Figure 2. Scree plot

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The factor loadings are presented in table 2.3. All items load higher than .4 on one factor, therefore no items are removed from the analysis. Factor 1 and 2 have an eigenvalue above 1, so two factors can be distinguished to measure citizenship views. Factor 1: Ethnic Factor 2: Civic

Table 2.3 Factor loadings of citizenship views Factor 1 Factor 2 One should be born here oneself -.874 One should have ancestors who were born here -.904 One should live here for most of one’s life -.649 One should be able to speak Dutch .553 One has to adjust fully to Western culture and way of life .561 One should be able to prove that they know the history, customs and traditions of .483 our country One should contribute to our economy and society .842 One should be able to stand their own feet financially .825 One should voluntarily denounce any other nationality -.440 One should have a clean criminal record .583 Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization

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