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Comparison of Radical Right-Wing Parties in Bulgaria and Romania: the National Movement of Ataka and the Great Romania Party

Comparison of Radical Right-Wing Parties in Bulgaria and Romania: the National Movement of Ataka and the Great Romania Party

Středoevropsképolitickéstudie RočníkXI,Číslo1,s.4865 CentralEuropeanPoliticalStudiesReview VolumeXI,Part1,pp.4865 MezinárodnípolitologickýústavMasarykovyuniverzity ISSN12127817

Comparison of -Wing Parties in Bulgaria and Romania: The National Movement of Ataka and the Great Romania Party

MarkétaSmrčková 1 Abstract: Thispaperfocusesonacomparisonoftworadicalrightwingparties,AtakaandtheGreatRomaniaParty,theirpositionsin thenationalpartysystem,andtheirrelationshipswiththegoverningpartiesaswellaswithothernationalrightwingparties.In this essay the party programmes, electorate, attitude to minorities, and degree of will be compared. Another importantpartofthispaperiscomparisonoftheelectionresultsofthesepartiesandtheirchancesofremaininginthenational parliaments(andthusbecomingacrucialpartofpartysystem).Allthedetailsmentionedabovewillbeanalyzedagainstthe backgroundoftheoriesofradicalrightwingparties. Keywords: Bulgaria,Minorities,Nationalism,Partysystems,,Radicalrightwingparties,Romania, Introduction ThereweremanyeconomicandpoliticalchangesinCentral and Eastern Europe after 1989,andthetopicofrisingethnicnationalismwas(re)opened.InBalkancountrieslikeBulgaria andRomania,theeliteshaveartificiallyprovokednationalisttendenciesinordertoacquirepublic support. The defence of national interests and populist slogans were claimed in the 90’s in Romania by the radical parties 2 as well as the government parties. Conversely, nationalist proclamations by the parties in Bulgaria could be found exclusively on the periphery of the politicalspectrum. Theaimofthispaperistoanalyzetworadicalrightwingpartiesthatwererepresentedin thenationalparliamentsinthetimeofentrytotheEuropeanUnion–theBulgarianNational Movement of Ataka (Ataka, Natsionalen S ǎyuz Ataka ), and the Great Romania Party (PRM, PartidulRomaniaMare )inRomania.Thegoalofthepresentstudyistocomparetheseparties,their programmes,electorate,electoralresults,andtheirpositiononthepoliticalplayingfieldofthese countries in the period starting after the last elections before accession to the EU (2004 for Romaniaand2005forBulgaria)upuntilspring2009.Thisarticleprovidesanoverviewofthe PRM’ssituationinRomaniainthe90’stobetterunderstanditscurrentposition.

1Contact:DepartmentofPoliticalScience,FacultyofSocialStudies,MasarykUniversity,Joštova10,60200Brno;e mail:[email protected] . 2Thetermsradicalandextremerightwingpartieswillbeexplainedinthefirstchapter.

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The work has been divided thematically into three parts. After an introduction of the theoreticalframework,thediscussionmovestotheanalysisofthepartyprogrammes.Iexamine thepartyprogrammesofPRMandAtakaaccordingtothesecriteria:nationaldoctrine,economic andforeignpolicies,andattitudestowardsminorities.Buttogetamorecomplexideaofparty programmes,anotherpointofcomparisonisadded–electorate.Inthefinalpartofthepaper IanalysethepositionofPRMandAtakainthepoliticalspectrum. Whyisitappropriatetoclassifythesepartiesasradicalright?Whatarethesimilaritiesin theirprogrammes?Howdotheyinfluencethebehaviourofotherparliamentarypartiesinthese countries?Iwilltrytofindanswerstothesequestionsinthisarticle. 1 Theoretical framework of radical right-wing parties in the post-communist area Many authors deal with theories of radicalism, extremism and populism of rightwing parties(Backes,Jesse2005;Betz1998;Ramet1999;Mudde2000)thatproduceaveryextensive listoftheoreticaldefinitionoftheright.Iwillmentiononlyafewofthem,andtrytoapplythem toPRMandAtaka. First,before Imovetotypologiesofradicalright, I have to differentiate between the terms of radicalism, extremism, and populism. Richard Stöss has identified the essential characteristicsofextremeright:nationalism,rejectionofequalrights,andrejectionofdemocratic rulesandhumanisticideology(Stöss,quotedaccordingtoRamet1999:6).StössaswellasMareš describethemainsignofextremism:anantidemocraticcharacter,whichstandsinoppositionto aconstitutionalsystem(Mareš2003:21).Extremismisonepoleofthecontinuumdemocracy– extremism. Radicalism stands between democracy and extremism but still belongs to the constitutionalsystem.Ithasbeenacceptedthatradicalrightpartiesarecompletelydissatisfied with plural democracy and protection of rights, and very critical of the democratic form of governance (Mareš 2003: 34). 3 Radical parties criticise democratic rules and demand deep changes,butatthesametimetheyacceptthestate’smonopolyonpoliticalviolence(Mareš2000: 34). Populismisanothertermnecessarytoexplain.Incontrasttoextremismandradicalism, populismindicatesmethodsandwaysusedtogainthepublicsupportandpoliticalpower.The rightwingpopulistsdemagogicallypitcurrentmoodandprejudiceagainsttherulingclass.They

3 Radical rightwing parties are antimodern, antiwestern, antiEuropean. They fight against individual values (freedom, selfdetermination), democracy and political parties, against anything foreign, and against immigrants (Mareš2003:35).

49 Středoevropsképolitickéstudie RočníkXI,Číslo1,s.4865 CentralEuropeanPoliticalStudiesReview VolumeXI,Part1,pp.4865 MezinárodnípolitologickýústavMasarykovyuniverzity ISSN12127817 offerseeminglysimplesolutionstoeverysignificantproblem–everythingwillbesolvedafterwe solvethequestionofasylumseekers,immigrantsandminorities(Mareš2003:35). HansGeorgBetzhasdefinedradicalrightwingpartieswithsomecriteriathatarevalid foralldemocracies:afundamentalrejectionofthedemocraticruleofthegame,ofindividual liberty,andoftheprincipleofindividualequalityandequalrights,andtheirreplacementbyan authoritarian system are based on race, ethnicity or religion (Betz, Immerfall 1998: 3). 4 This typology is suitable for understanding radical rightwing parties and their categorization. Nevertheless,thetypologyofCasseMuddeseemstobethemostappropriateforapplyingtothe radical rightwing parties in Romania and Bulgaria, and that is why I use this theory for the classificationofPRMandAtaka. C.Muddehassetforthcriteriadefiningtheradicalrightaswellastypesofrightwing parties.Hedefinestheradicalrightintermsoffourcharacteristics:nationalism,xenophobia,law and order, and a programme of (Mudde 2000: 177). Parties promoting anationalistic doctrine call for political and cultural unity to produce a monocultural society dominated by the state. They speak out against internal enemies (homosexuals) and external enemies(supranationalorganisations).Thesocioeconomicprogrammeisbasedonthedichotomy “us”and“them“,whichdefinesagroupofone’sownpeopletowhomthesocialbenefitsare addressed(Mudde2000:177). Whenwetalkaboutradical“rightwing”parties,wehavetoconsiderthespecificmeaning the term has in the two countries. The basic description of PRM and Ataka (antiSemitism, nationalism,xenophobia,lawandorder,antidemocracy)correspondswithallthetheoriesofthe radicalrightmentionedabove.Theemphasisonthestrongroleofstateinthewelfareareashows itssimilaritywiththeleftwingparties.IfweproceedfromMudde’stheorythatthisisoneofthe basiccharacteristicsoftheradicalrightwingparties,wecanthenconcludethatPRMandAtaka arebothradicalrightwingparties,astheyfulfilallofMudde’scriteria.Ifwelookatthespectrum democracy–radicalright–extremeright,itispossibletoconcludethatAtakaandPRMbelong ontheradicalrightalsofromthispointofview.Theyparticipateindemocraticmechanismsand recognizethelegitimacyofthestate’smonopolyonphysicalviolence.Theydonottrytodestroy thedemocraticformofgovernmentbutfocusonitsradicalchange.

4 He distinguishes two ideal types – national populist and neoliberal populist parties. But he adds that these categoriesareonlyidealtypes,andmanyoftherightwingpartieshavethesignsofbothtypes(Betz1994:108).If wetrytoapplythistheorytoPRMandAtaka,wecanconcludethatbothareamongthenationalpopulistparties.

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Inanalysingtheradicalrightwingpartieswemustconsidertheterritorial,culturaland historical differences between areas, specifically differences between countries in Central and EasternEurope.Forthisarea,someparticularcategoriesofradicalrightwingpartieshavebeen set.SabrinaRamethasdefinedfivecategories,thebordersofwhichareporous:ultranationalist, fascist,clerical,ultraconservativeandradicalpopulist(Ramet1999:6).PRMandAtakaalsouse populiststrategiestogainmoreattentionforthemselvesandtogainvotersupport.Accordingto the criteria for these groups, we can in my opinion rank PRM and Ataka as radical populist parties.Muddehasalsodividedradicalrightwingpartiesinthepostcommunistareaintoseveral groups.PRMisamongtheextremerightwingcommunistpartiesthatconnectnationalisticideas withnostalgiaforthecommunistregime.Atakadoesnotadvocatethereturnof,so itcanbeplacedintothecategoryofpostcommunistextremerightwingpartiesthatarenewly establishedandfocusoncurrentpoliticalproblems(Mudde,quotedaccordingtoMareš2003: 52). 2 Comparison of party programmes and electorate Party programmes are analysed in this chapter according to these criteria: national doctrine, economic and foreign policies, and attitudes toward minorities. Some of them are similar to Mudde’s criteria for the radical rightwing parties: nationalism (national doctrine), xenophobia (attitudes to minorities), and welfare chauvinism (economic policy). I will also comparetheelectorateofPRMandAtakatogetmorecomplexinformationaboutbothparties. 2.1 Programmes 2.1.1 NationalDoctrine ThebasisofthePRMpartyprogrammeistheNationalDoctrineproclaimedin1993with thegoalofaprosperousstatecoveringthesovereign,independent,andintegralterritoryofthe Romanian nation (National Doctrine 2008)5. Emphasis is placed on national values and traditions,defenceofnationalinterests,andcultureandreligion.TheRomanianstateisobligated toprotectallcitizens,andcitizensareconverselyobligatedtoprotectRomaniannationalinterests (NationalDoctrine2008).TheprogrammeoftheNationalMovementofAtakaspeaksinthe same way. Bulgaria is, according to the programme, a state of one nationality, based on acommonreligion,culture,andethnicity.Atakaadvocatesanofficialreligion,participationby

5 National Doctrine is a longterm party programme; the main ideas established in 1993, still valid for the last electionsinNovember2008.

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Bulgarian Orthodox Church in legislation, and the establishment of compulsory religious teachingatbasicschool.Atakaalsodemandsthefullprohibitionofandclearlydefinedsanctions againstethnicpartiesandseparatistorganisations(20PrinciplesofAtakaParty2009;Programme Scheme2009)6. We can find similarities in their programmes, and in their thinking about the political developmentafter1989;bothpartiesregardtheeconomicsituationafterthefallofcommunism ascompletelyunacceptable,andcallforradicalchange. PRM describes the fall ofCeauescu’s regimeasaninternationalconspiracyofUSA,USSRandHungary(Gallagher2003:12);therefore it calls for punishing the perpetrators of economic and social disaster after 1989 (National Doctrine2008).LikePRM,AtakabrandsmostBulgarianpoliticiansandactivistsforhumanand minorityrightsasnationaltraitors,andcallsforsanctionsagainstthosewhovilifyBulgaria(20 PrinciplesofAtakaParty2009).Wefinddifferingopinionsabouttheformercommunistregimes. PRMglorifiesN.Ceauescu 7asnationalherowhofoughtforindependenceofRomania(Shafir 1999:214).WedonotfindasimilarpositionintheprogrammeofAtaka,althoughitseconomic demandsareclosetotheeconomicsystemofthepreviousregime(seechapterEconomicpolicy). ThecommunistregimeinBulgaria,despiteitspaternalism,didnothavethesameexperienceas thatofRomania. 2.1.2 Economicpolicy Theeconomicpartsoftheirprogrammesarealmostidentical.Bothpartiespromotefull nationalizationofindustry,criticisetheeffectsofglobalisationonnationaleconomies,andvoice theirfearoftheopenmarketafterthejoiningtheEU.Theimportantpartoftheprogrammes dealswiththegenerouswelfaresystem.PRMpromotesabalancedwagepolicy,parityintaxes and income between social classes, the return of Romanian property from foreigners, etc. (NationalDoctrine2008).Atakaalsodemandsrenationalizationofstrategicfactoriesaswellas astrongwelfarestate(ProgrammeScheme2009).Atakarejectstheprinciplesofcooperationwith theIMFbecauseincomeandtaxesshouldappropriatetotheneedsofBulgariaandnottheIMF (Ganev2006:87).

6 20 Principles of Ataka Party is a longterm party programme; the Programme Scheme includes more current demands;botharevalidforthenextelectionsinJune2009. 7AswellasgeneralI.AntonescuwhoruledinthecountryduringWWII.

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2.1.3 Foreignpolicy AttitudestowardsjoiningtheEUareclearlydefinedintheprogrammesofbothparties. PRM’sopiniononEuropeanintegrationisgenerallylessnegativethanAtaka’s.Atakapresents clear opposition to the EU. PRM, on the other hand, does not disapprove of Romanian membership, but places emphasis on protecting national interests (National Doctrine 2008). Today Ataka does not demand that Bulgaria leave the EU; nevertheless they call for revising some of the documents that endanger the national interests of Bulgaria (shutting down the nuclearpowerstationinKozloduj,forexample)(ProgrammeScheme2009). Wecanobservemarkeddistinctionsintheparties’positiontowardstheNorthAtlantic TreatyOrganisation.WhilePRMconsiderNATOtheonly possible instrument to protect the strategic interests of Romania, Ataka rejects Bulgaria’s membership in NATO and calls for revision of the treaty, nonparticipation in military action, full neutrality, and the absence of foreign military bases inBulgaria (20 Principles of Ataka Party 2009). On the contrary, PRM demandsaverystrongmilitarystate,thinksthatRomaniashouldplayamediator’srolebetween NATOandRussia,whichis(accordingtothePRMprogramme) a very important partner of Romania(NationalDoctrine2008). 2.1.4 Minoritiesandterritorialrequirements The problem of ethnic minorities is widespread in the Balkan countries. Romania is aquitehomogenousstate,with89%Romanianpopulation,and11%consistingofHungarians (Harghita,CovasnaandMure),theRoma,adecliningGermanpopulation(inTimi,Sibiu,and Braov), plus Jews (7–9 thousand) located mostly in the capital, and others. 8 In Bulgaria the minoritypopulationisalmost17%,whichrepresentsagreaterpotentialforethnictensions.The Turks(9.4%)andtheRoma(4.7%)arethelargestminorities(Volgyi2007:4). OnlyPRMmakesterritorialdemands(becauseofthesituationinRomania).Therewere increasedRomaniandemandstorestorethehistoricalterritoryofRomaniainfirstfewyearsafter

8Otherminorities:smallnumbersofPolesinBucovina(Austria–HungaryattractedPolishminers,whosettledthere from the Krakow region in Poland in the 19th century), Serbs, Croats, Slovaks and Banat Bulgarians (in Banat), Ukrainians(inMaramureandBukovina),Greeks(Brăila,ConstanŃa),TurksandTatars(inConstanŃa),Armenians, Great Russians (Lippovans, in Tulcea). Some minorities have one seat set aside for them in the Parliament to representtheminthepoliticalstructureofRomania(Serafim1999:3).

53 Středoevropsképolitickéstudie RočníkXI,Číslo1,s.4865 CentralEuropeanPoliticalStudiesReview VolumeXI,Part1,pp.4865 MezinárodnípolitologickýústavMasarykovyuniverzity ISSN12127817 thefallofCeauescu’sregime. 9PRMwantstoprotectthepeopleofRomaniannationalitywho straggledintomanycountries(olahi,vlahi,blahi,rumeri,moldoveni,nistreni)andspeaksofthe MoldaviansasethnicRomanians 10 (NationalDoctrine2008).Becauseofthesituationwiththe RomanianHungarians,PRMhasbecomelessoutspokenonthistopic.PRMhasfearedthatthese demands could justify counterdemands by the Romanian Hungarians in Transylvania (Hollis 1999:283). Bothcountrieshaveavoidedviolentethnicconflicts,withtheexceptionoftheearly90’s whenethnicconflictbetweenRomanianandHungarianbrokeoutinTransylvania.Interethnic relationsinRomaniabecameanimportantissueatthebeginningofthenewdemocraticregime (Carey1997:149).Bulgaria,unlikeRomania,hasbeenabletoavoidthethreatofethnicconflict. The nationalist parties were weak and were unable to institutionalize their political demands. Althoughthesepartieshadastrongpotentialbecauseofthepresenceofethnicminorities,their opportunities have been narrowing, and they find themselves at the margin of the political spectrum(Beichelt,Minkenberg2003:17).TheTurkishminorityhasestablisheditsownparty, The Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPF, Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi ) has occupied the political centre, and has made territorial demands like the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania (UDMR, Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România ) that represents the Hungarian minorityinRomanianTransylvania.ThenationalisticpartiesinBulgariawereweaklyfinanced, and their protest was not only about ethnic issues but mainly the economic situation (Volgyi 2007:3435). PRMandAtakahavesimilarattitudestowardminorities.Theyhavefoughtagainstthe integrationoftheseminoritiesintothepublicsphere,andbothareracistandantiSemitic.PRM glorifiestheideologyoftheIronGuard 11 ,isdeterminedfightagainstnationalenemies,callsfor theprohibitionoftheUDMR,andsomeofitsrepresentativesdenytheHolocaust,etc.(Carey

9ThepossibilityofindependenceofMoldaviain1990wasbasedontheassumptionthatRomaniaandMoldavia couldandshouldunify.Romaniawantsreunificationofitshistoricalterritory;Romanianeliteshaveseemedtobein favourofunifying,buttheRomanianpublichadmuchmoreambivalentattitudes(Roper2002:106). 10 ForexampleinFebruary2008C.V.TudorwrotealettertothechairmanoftheEPinwhichheinformedthem abouttheexistenceofanindependentMoldavia,andstressedthatBessarabiandNorthBukovinawereintegralparts ofRomania(TheLetterofC.V.TudortoChairmanofEP). 11 TheIronGuardwasafascistorganisationthatpursuedpogromsonJewishpeopleininterwarperiod.Themain representative was professor Cuza. After its prohibition it was reorganized into Everything for Homeland ( Totul pentruTara )andbecameamassorganisation.Itsintellectualcoreconsistedofteachers,doctors,journalistsandalso students.Itcalledforsocialharmony,expulsionoftheJews,anddissolutionofpoliticalparties(Tejchman1997:48).

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1997:164165).AtakaaccusestheRomasandTurksofcausingthebadeconomicsituationin Bulgaria,labelstheDPFasanantisystemicethnicparty,andcallsforitsprohibition.Atakacalls fortheuseofmassivepoliceinterventionandthecreationoflocalmilitia(Ganev2006:87).It alsoadvocatesrequiringTurksandMacedonianstotakeBulgariannamesbecause“Bulgariais onlyforBulgarians”(Tavanier2005:2).BothpartiescouldbecharacterizedasantiSemitic,but usuallytheyhighlightantiTurkishorantiHungarianattitudes. 2.2 Electorate PRM attracts mostly young people with higher education. The electorate of PRM is composedofcitizensinbigcitieswhoarefrustratedofpostcommunistdevelopments,whofeel left behind (old people yearning for the return of the old regime, or young people who are frustrated on the labour market) (Gallagher 2003: 13). The problem of the Hungarians in Transylvaniahasnothadabigimpactinotherplaces;thusPRMhasconcentratedtacticallyon prejudicesagainstRomasandJews(Hollis1999:282).Itsmembershipbasehasgrownrapidlyas theresultofitsparticipationinthedistributionofgovernmentbenefitsafter1992(moreonthis inthenextchapter). TheelectorateofAtakaismadeupoftraditionalsupportersoftheBulgarianSocialistParty (BSP, Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partyia ) who consider its behaviour insufficiently radical. More than30%ofitsvotersarepeoplewhohadvotedfor the National Movement of Simeon II. (NDSV, NatsionalnoDvizhenieSimeonYtori )(Tavanier2005:2).ThePartyhasgainedthevotesof protestvoterswhoweredissatisfiedwiththeeconomicsituationandthehighlevelofcorruption. Both parties are associated with many people who participated in the old communist regime;e.g.thechairmanofPRMC.V.Tudorandmanyotherswhobelongedtocommunist apparatus(Hollis1999:282).SomemembersofAtakaareformermembersoftheCommunist SecurityService(Ganev2006:87;Tavanier2005:2).Thetruthisthattherearepeopleamongthe founderswhoarestillconnectedtoRussia(Pettifer2005:4). Ataka and PRM publish their own magazines, Ataka and Romania Mare, where chauvinisticopinionsarebroughtout,aswellasopinionsoneconomicsituationofpeoplewho donotsharetheirideologicalpointofview(Gallagher2003:21).Atakahasalsosatellitechannel Skat.Bothmediabroadcasttheirdisagreementwiththepoliticalelites,andcontributedtotheir parties’successintheelectionsof2005(Savkova2005:10).

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3 The position of PRM and Ataka on the political scene and in party system This chapter will analyse the position of both parties on the political scene of each country. First, the situation in the 90’s will be described (election results, participating on government),whichwasverydifferentinthetwocountries.Thesecondpartofthischapterwill focusonthe“best”electionresultsthatthepartieshaveachieved,in2000theRomanianparty, and2005inBulgaria.Then,IwilltrytoanalysewhyPRMlostsupportsoquickly,andwhether AtakawillstayonthesceneorwillfollowPRM.Finally,amoredetailedanalysisofthepolitical spectrumwillbeadded. 3.1 Theradicalrightinthe90’s ThePartyofGreatRomaniawasestablished20June1991asapoliticalwingofthewider extreme nationalistic Movement for Great Romania 12 . In the 1992 elections PRM won almost 4% of the vote 13 (table no. 1, The results of parliamentary elections 1992). PRM joined the coalitiontosupportthegovernmentoftheSocialDemocraticPartyofRomania(PDSR, Partidul DemosratáeidinRomania )alongwithanotherpartyoftheradicalright,andonesocialistandone agrarian party.14 This coalition split up, and PRM benefited the most from this. Its electoral results improved in 1996, and its chairman C. V. Tudor came in fifth in the presidential elections15 (The results of parliamentary elections 1996; The results of presidential elections 1996). IncontrasttoRomania,therewasnorelevantrightwingpartyinBulgaria,whichmeant thatnopartygainedmorethan3%ofthevoteorgotintotheParliamentasarepresentativeof

12 ItpromotedRomaniannationalinterests,renewalofterritorialgreatness,reconnectionofterritorieslostinWWII, andrecognizingoffascistdictatorI.Antonescuasnationalhero. 13 InRomaniaelectionsareheldtobothchambersoftheParliamentatthesametime,soonlytheresultstothe ChamberofDeputiesarementionedbecausetheresultstotheSenatearealmostthesame.Theelectoralsystemis proportional,withHare’squota,andtherestofthemandatesdistributedbyD’Hondt.Themandateclausewas3% in1992andincreasedto5%in1996.Inspring2008achangeofelectoralsystemwasmade.Thenewpersonalized systemwasusedintheelectionsheldintheendofNovember(Maršák2006:213). 14 “Red Tetragon” – PDSR, fascist PUNR – Party of Romanian National Unity ( Partidul UnităŃii NaŃionale aRomânilor ),PRMandPSM–SocialistPartyofLabour( PartidulSocialistalMunciiú ).Sometimesitiscalledthered brown coalition or the pentagon – it was also supported by Agrarian Party (PDAR, Partidul Democrat Agrar din România ). 15 Thepresidentialelectionsaredirect,withanabsolutemajoritysystem,thetermis5years.

56 Středoevropsképolitickéstudie RočníkXI,Číslo1,s.4865 CentralEuropeanPoliticalStudiesReview VolumeXI,Part1,pp.4865 MezinárodnípolitologickýústavMasarykovyuniverzity ISSN12127817 thispartofthepoliticalspectrum. 16 Ethnicityandextremismwerenotissuesthatwereableto mobilizepublicsupport(Bell1999:254).IncomparingRomaniaandBulgariaweseethatthey were very different in the 90’s. In Romania, two rightwing parties (PRM, PUNR) were represented there; on the other hand, in Bulgaria there were no rightwing parties in the Parliament despite the fact that ethnic minorities are much more numerous in Bulgaria. The explanationforthesituationinRomaniacouldbetheviolentconflictinTransylvania,andalso thequestionofMoldavia’sreconnectiontoRomania. 3.2 Itsbestelectionresult:coulditberepeated? Attheendofthe90’sthesupportforPRMwasincreasing.PRMgrewstrongerwhen GheorgeFunar,theformerchairmanofPUNR,joinedin1998.Inthe2000electionsPRMwon almost 20 % of the vote, and became the second strongest party in the Parliament; Tudor proceededtothesecondroundofpresidentialelections(Theresultsofparliamentaryelections 2000;Theresultsofpresidentialelections2000).ThisquickjumpinthePRM’ssupportwasthe biggest surprise of these elections. The success was caused by the rising numbers of protest votes,buttherisedidnotcodifythesourcesofpoliticallegitimacyforPRM(Strmiska2001:49). In2001PRMcameoutstronglyagainstthegovernment’splantoguaranteelanguagerightsfor theHungarianminority,andreopenedthecampaigntoprohibitUDMRbecauseofitsalleged betrayalofRomania(Day2002:388).Tudorcalledforestablishmentofanationalallianceforthe restoration of Romanian unity, accused Hungarians of attempting to secede, and proclaimed apolicy of assimilation in “Hungarian territory” (Serafim 1999: 4). This and other similar activitiesreflectedtheincreasingpopularityofPRM. TheNationalMovementofAtaka 17 wasfoundedinMay2005,soitwasmoresurprising that it became the fourth strongest party in the Parliament 18 (table no. 2, The results of

16 Nevertheless,amongthepartiesintheParliamentthereappearsomefactionse.g.inUnionofDemocraticForces (SDS, Sayuz na demokratichnite sili ). the most important radical rightwing parties were the Patriotic Labour Party (OPT, OtechestvenaPartiyanaTrudači ),andBulgarianNationalRadicalParty(BNRP, BalgarskaNatsionalnaRadikalna Partiya )etc. 17 Ataka was founded as a coalition of three parties: National Movement to Protect the Homeland (NDSO, Natsionalno Dvizhenie za Spasenie na Otchestvovo ), Bulgarian National Patriotic Party (BNPP, Bǎlgarska Natsionalna PatriotichnaPartiya )andUnionofPatrioticForces–Defence( SǎyuznaPatriotichniteSiliiVoiniteotZapssa–Zashtita ). ThechairmanwasVolenSiderov,whohadestablishedapartyofthesamenamebeforethefoundingoftheNational MovementofAtaka,butregistrationwaspostponedandthepartydidnotparticipateinelections. 18 Theelectoralsystemisproportional,4%threshold,D’Hondtmethodfordividingofvotesinasinglestatedistrict.

57 Středoevropsképolitickéstudie RočníkXI,Číslo1,s.4865 CentralEuropeanPoliticalStudiesReview VolumeXI,Part1,pp.4865 MezinárodnípolitologickýústavMasarykovyuniverzity ISSN12127817 parliamentary elections 2005). It was caused by voter dissatisfaction, and because of the bad economicsituationinBulgariansociety.Butanewfactor,heretoforealmostunknownfactoralso appeared:thechauvinismoftheextremeright,andantiTurkishsentimentsthathadneverbeen representedintheParliament.TheemergenceofantiTurkishattitudeswasconnectedwithfears by nonprivileged social groups who were afraid of opening the borders with Turkey and apossibleincreaseinthenumberofMuslimsinBulgaria 19 (Pettifer2005:3).Afterthesuccessin the parliamentary field, the party repeated its success in the presidential elections of 2006, in which V. Siderov got to the second round 20 (The results of presidential elections 2006). The successwascrownedforathirdtimeinelectionstotheEPinwhichAtakadoubleditsprevious percentageofvotesinparliamentaryelections(TheresultsofelectionstoEP2007). 21 ThecontinuousgrowthofvoterpreferencesforPRMinthe90’swastheexceptioninthe postcommunist area. The government participation of ethnic parties (UDMR, DPS) in both countrieswascounteredbythegrowthofnationalisticfeelings.Butthisisnottheonlyreasonfor voters’ support in Romania and Bulgaria. People were dissatisfied with postcommunist developments,withpoliticalelites,economicdepression,highinflation,,andthe high degree of corruption. PRM and Ataka took advantage of this situation and got mostly protest votes. The best result for PRM came in 2000 in which the party campaigned on corruption and socioeconomic topics that attract voters who are not identified with its programme in an ideological sense (Gallagher 2003: 24). The same reasons apply to Ataka. People were mostly dissatisfied with the previous government of the National Movement of SimeonII.,andwiththepervasivecorruption;theseledtoaverylowturnout(thelowestsince the1989)(Theresultsofparliamentaryelections2005).SupportforAtakacontinuouslyrose;the successwasrepeatedinthepresidentialelections in2006andEuropeanelectionsin2007,in whichitgot14%ofthevote.

19 ItcoincidedwiththeopeningofnegotiationforTurkishmembershipintheEU. 20 Thepresidentiselecteddirectlythroughatworoundabsolutemajoritysystem,thetermis5years. 21 TherepresentativesofAtakaandPRMallowfortheestablishingofapoliticalgroupintheEuropeanParliament withthenameIdentity,tradition,sovereignty(ITS)(membersare:FrenchNationalFront,AustrianFreeDemocratic Partyetc.).Theestablishingofthegroupisconditionalonhavingmembersfrom5countriesatminimum,whichwas reachedwiththeentranceofBulgariaandRomaniatotheEU.ITSwasdissolvedaftertheEuropeanelectionsin Romania2007becauseitlackedenoughmembers.

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3.3 ThefallofPRM:willAtakabenext? Althoughnotwithinthesametimeframe,thepositionofthebothparties,PRMand Ataka,wasverysimilar.DespitethefactthatPRMhashadrelativelysignificantpotential,ithas alwaysbeenafringepartywithalmostnochancetokeepitspositionasthesecondstrongest partyforthelongterm,ortohangontotheroleofthemainoppositionparty(Strmiska2001: 49).AtpresenttheBulgarianAtakaisinasimilarposition.Itspoliticalleverageisgreaterthan PRM’s, but due to the fragmentation of the political spectrum and the character of Ataka’s possibilities,itspotentialforgainingpowerasacoalitionpartnerislimited.AfterAtakagotinto theParliament,alltheotherrelevantpartiesannouncedtheywillnotcooperatewithit.Theact was supported by a letter signed by fifty civic associations directed to the President, the government,andthepoliticalparties,theaimofwhichwastoconvincethepoliticalactorsnotto negotiate with Ataka on the parliamentary field (Tavanier 2005: 3). This process was also accompanied by EU pressure, and a threat to end membership negotiations. Ataka still had relativelyhighpollnumbersatthetime. Bycontrast,PRMhadalreadystartedtoloseitssupporters,andinthenextelectionsin 2004 it gained only 13 % of the vote. Also, Tudor had came in third place position in the presidential election (The results of parliamentary elections 2004; The results of presidential elections2004).In2005TudorlefthispartypositionandwasreplacedbyCorneliuCiontiu.To getthesupportoftheEuropeanPeoplesParty(EPP)intheEuropeanParliament,andtomakeit possibletojointhegroup,PRMchangeditsnametothePeoplePartyofGreatRomania.Butthe EPPrefuseditsmembershipanyway,andthereactionofPRMwastorenamethepartyasthe PartyofGreatRomaniaagain.Theirgradualdeclineinelectoralsupportwasshownduringthe electionstotheEPinNovember2007,whenPRMfailedtogetenoughvotestogetintotheEP (TheresultsofelectionstoEP2007). Todaypublicopinionpollsshowdecliningvoters’supportforAtaka.Atthebeginningof 2008thesupportforAtakawasaround6%(BulgariansTurntoProEuropeanGERBParty). Onereasoncouldbethecreationofanewrightwingconservativeparty,CitizensforEuropean DevelopmentofBulgaria(GERB, GrazhdanizaevropeyskorazvitienaBalgariya ).Accordingtopolls thisisnowthestrongestparty,andasanewactoritisunburdenedbypreviousfailures.Inlight of this fact it could take over part of Ataka’s protest votes. In addition, Ataka has distinct problemswithcoherence–halfofitsmembersofparliamenthavelefttheparliamentaryclub. PRMisinamuchworsesituation.Thepartyhasveryquicklylostanimportantpartofits supporters,mostlythosewhodidnotidentifysomuchwiththePRM’spoliciesbutwhohave

59 Středoevropsképolitickéstudie RočníkXI,Číslo1,s.4865 CentralEuropeanPoliticalStudiesReview VolumeXI,Part1,pp.4865 MezinárodnípolitologickýústavMasarykovyuniverzity ISSN12127817 votedforitasanalternativetotheotherparties.ItsfailureinelectionstotheEP,inwhichthe partyfailedtowinasinglemandate,wasagreatdisillusion. 22 AtthebeginningofNovemberthe supportforPRMwas3%(PSDPCAllianceLeadsinRomania).Thiswasdefinitelyconfirmed duringtheparliamentaryelectionsinNovemberinwhichPRMgainedonly3.15%(Theresults of parliamentary elections 2008). Thus it did not get into the Parliamentand is now a non parliamentaryparty.Thereasonsforthisarenotclear.Itispossiblethattheprotestpotentialof PRMhasdeclinedbecausepeoplehaveadaptedtothepresenceofUDMRinthegovernment;or thattheeconomicsituationhasimprovedaftertheEUentry,andthatallofthishasalsobeen supportedbytheillusionofastrongpresident. Ontheotherhand,Atakahasstillmuchmorepotential.Theproblemswithcorruption haveincreased,andBulgariahasbeennotifiedbytheEUthatfinancialassistancecanbecutoff. AlsotherelativelysignificantTurkishminoritycouldinfluencethevoters’politicalpositions,as thereisarealpossibilityofnegotiationsforTurkishmembershipintheEU.Thesedifferences betweenRomaniaandBulgariamightproducedifferentresultsforAtakainthenextelections. Conclusion WecandescribePRMandAtakaasstronglynationalist,antiSemitic,antiwestern,anti reformandantidemocraticparties.PRMputtheemphasisonthesocialarea,whichleadssome authors such as Ute Gabanyi to label PRM as a national socialist party. Other authors as V.Tismeanucallitanationalisticpopulistparty(Strmiska2001:41).Itseconomicprogrammeis leftist,withemphasisonorganicvaluesbasedonethnicity,whichonthecontrarywouldplace PRMontheradicalright(Gallagher2003:2).Cleardefinitionsarealsoproblematicinthecaseof Ataka. In Bulgaria there are antiwestern and antisystem elements typical of radical leftwing parties.Theparty’sdualidentitiesareobvious–supportforsocialisticeconomy,combinedwith the strong antiSemitic, racist and nationalistic messages. The members of Ataka call it “not aleftist or rightist but a Bulgarian movement” (Asenov 2007). The emphases on the social welfareforone’s“own”peopleareoneofthemaincharacteristicsofradicalrightwingparties accordingtoC.Mudde,whosedefinitionswereusedinthiswork.TheNationalMovementof AtakaandTheGreatRomaniaPartyfulfilalltheseconditions,andarebothclassifiedasradical rightwingparties.Thishasbeenconfirmedbyanalysisoftheprogramme documentsofboth

22 Accordingtothetheoryofsecondorderelections(Europeanelectionsbelongtothiscategory),itistherulethat oppositionpartiesaswellasprotestpartiesusuallygainmuchmorevotesthanthegovernmentparties.Theelection resultsforAtakaconfirmthistheory,neverthelesstheresultofPRMcontestsit.MoreseeinMarsh1998.

60 Středoevropsképolitickéstudie RočníkXI,Číslo1,s.4865 CentralEuropeanPoliticalStudiesReview VolumeXI,Part1,pp.4865 MezinárodnípolitologickýústavMasarykovyuniverzity ISSN12127817 parties,focusingonfiveaspects:nationalistdoctrine,economicpolicy,foreignpolicy,attitudes towardminorities,andtheelectorate. ThereareseveralreasonsfortheriseinsupportofAtakaandPRM.Thedeclineinliving standards,thelossofhope,andeconomicproblemsarethemostimportantones.Thedistinctive increaseincrimeandcorruptioncreatedthespaceforpopulistpartieswithdemagogicslogans thatweresuccessfulbecauseofthesocialcrisis.Themainculpritsaresaidtobethegovernment elites and the national minorities whose representatives (DPS and UDMR) proclaimed improvementoftheirsocialposition()asthepartofgovernmentcoalition.Thehigh support for these parties in the general elections in 2000 (PRM) and 2005 (Ataka) was also producedbyfearoftheEUandthenongovernmentalhumanandcivicrightsorganizations. Itishardtodeterminewhatthefutureholdsfortheseparties.Since2007Atakahaslost votersupport–butthisdeclinehasnotyetbeenconfirmedbyelections,onlybypublicopinion research.AfterthecuttingoffEUfinancialassistance,thepotentialstrengthofAtakahasbegun toreturn.Evenso,itspollnumbersstillremainaround7%.ProtestagainsttheEU,towhich Bulgariahashadtoreturnfinancialgrants,andwhichwantstoaccepttheTurkeyasamember state, has reemerged. Due to Ataka’s short existenceitisdifficulttosayifitwillmanageto remainonthepoliticalsceneafterthenextelection. InthecaseofPRMthesameconclusionapplies–futuredevelopmentsarestillopen. PRMhaslostmanyofitssupporters,aswasshownintheelectionresultsfromthelastthree elections.AfterthelastparliamentaryelectionsinNovember2008PRMisnolongerrepresented in the Parliament, and its potential strength has declined. Time will tell whether PRM has achancetogetbackintotheParliamentandremainarelevantparty,asthepotentialofPRMis muchlessthanthatofAtaka. Toconcludethecomparisonmadeinthispaper,itisimportanttosaythatvoters’support forthepartiesroseduringdifferentperiodsoftimebutforthesamereasons–thepresencein the government of UDMR and PDF; the problematiceconomic situation; and dissatisfaction withpostcommunistdevelopments.TodayPRMhasstartedtolosesupport,andhasbecomean almostmarginalparty;itisaquestionwhetheritwillevermanagetoreturn.Ataka’sdeclinehas beensomewhatreversed.However,thefutureisstillopenbecausethepartyisnotrootedin society.Onthecontrary,thenationalpartiesarerootedinRomaniansociety,anddespitethis, PRMisnolongerrepresentedintheParliament. For both parties as protest movements, it is probable that if the economic situation improves,thepartieswillhavethesupportonlyofthosevoterswhoareidentifiedwiththem,and

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Literature Printed sources Bell,J.D.(1999):TheRadicalRightinBulgaria,in:S.P.Ramet(ed.): TheRadicalRightinCentralandEasternEurope since1989,Pennsylvania,ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,pp.233254. Betz,H.G.–Immerfall,S.(1998): TheNewPoliticsoftheRight ,NewYork,St.Martin’sPress. Betz,H.G.(1994): RadicalRightWingPopulisminWesternEurope ,NewYork,St.Martin’sPress. Carey,H.F.(1997):PostCommunistRightRadicalisminRomania,in:P.H.Merkl–L.Weinberg(eds):TheRevival ofRightWingExtremismintheNineties ,London,FrankCass. Day,A.J.(2002): PoliticalPartiesoftheWorld ,London,JohnHarperPublishing. Ganev,V.I.(2006):Ballots,BribesandStateBuildinginBulgaria, JournalofDemocracy ,Vol.XVII,No.1,pp.7589. Hollis,W.(1999): DemocraticConsolidationinEasternEurope:TheInfluenceoftheCommunistLegacyinHungary,theCzech RepublicandRomania ,NewYork,EastEuropeanMonographs. Mareš,M.(2003): PravicovýextremismusaradikalismusvČR ,Brno,Barrister&Principal. Maršák,J.(2006): FormovánísystémupolitickýchstranvRumunskuvobdobí1989–2004 ,Politologickýčasopis,Vol.XIII, No.2,pp.200213. Marsh,M.(1998):TestingtheSecondOrderElectionModelafterFourEuropeanElections,BritishJournalofPolitical Science ,Vol.XXVIII,No.4,pp.591607. Mudde,C.(2000): TheIdeologyoftheExtremeRight ,Manchester–NewYork,ManchesterUniversityPress. Pettifer,J.(2005): BulgarianElections2005: ADifficultResultforEUAccession ,Camberley,ConflictStudiesResearch Centre. Ramet,S.P.(1999):DefiningtheRadicalRight,in:S.P.Ramet(ed.): TheRadicalRightinCentralandEasternEurope since1989 ,Pennsylvania,ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,pp.327. Shafir,M.(1999):TheMindofRomania’sRadicalRight,in:S.P.Ramet(ed.): TheRadicalRightinCentralandEastern Europesince1989 ,Pennsylvania,ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,pp.213232. Strmiska,M.(2001):Parties,Poles,AlliancesandRomanianPluralism,1990–2000, Středoevropsképolitickéstudie ,Vol. III,No.2,pp.1027. Tejchman,M.(1997): DějinyRumunska ,Praha,InstituteofWorldHistory. Volgyi,B.B.(2007): EthnoNationalismduringDemocraticTransitioninBulgaria:PoliticalPluralismasenEffectiveRemedyfor EthnicConflict ,YCISSPostCommunistStudiesProgrammeResearchPaperSeries. Internet sources 20PrinciplesofAtakaParty2009 ,AtakaParty,onlinetext.[cit.15.3.2009]

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Asenov, P. (2007): After the Local Elections , SBS Radio, online text .[cit.9.11.2007] Beichelt,T.–Mindenberg, M.(2003): ExplainingtheRadicalRightinTransition:Theories of RightWing Radicalism and OpportunityStructuresinPostSocialistEurope ,FrankfurterInstitutfürTransformationsstudien,No.3/02,on line text .[cit.10.2.2008] Bulgarians Turn to ProEuropean GERB Party , Angus Reid Global Monitor, 19 March 2008, online text .[cit.15. 3.2009] Gallagher, T. (2003): Romania’s Greater Romania Party: Defying Political Categorisation ?, paper presented on ECPR Conference in Marburg, Germany, 19 September 2003, online text .[cit.15.3.2009] National Doctrine 2008 , PRM, online text .[cit.15.3.2009] Programme Scheme 2009 , Ataka Party, online text .[cit.15.3.2009] PSDPC Alliance Leads in Romania , Romania News Watch, 3 November 2008, online text .[cit.30.11.2008] Savkova, L. (2005): Election Briefing No. 21: Europe and the Parliamentary Election in Bulgaria , EPERN, online text .[cit.15.3.2009] Serafim,A.(1999): EthnicPoliciesandRomanianPoliticalParties ,DefenceAcademyoftheUnitedKingdom,onlinetext .[cit.15.3.2009] Tavanier, Y. B. (2005): Massive Attack, Transitions Online , online text .[cit.15.3.2009] The Letter of C. V. Tudor to Chairman of EP , Romania Senat, online text .[cit.4.2.2008] Election results Romania Theresultsofparliamentaryelections1992: . Theresultsofparliamentaryelections1996:. Theresultsofpresidentialelections1996:. Theresultsofparliamentaryelections2000: . Theresultsofpresidentialelections2000: .

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Theresultsofparliamentaryelections2004: . Theresultsofpresidentialelections2004:. TheresultsofelectionstoEP2007:. Theresultsofparliamentaryelections2008: . Bulgaria Theresultsofparliamentaryelections2005 :; . Theresultsofpresidentialelections2006: . TheresultsofelectionstoEP2007: [availableto1.3.2008]; . Unlessotherwiseindicated,theelectionsresultsareavailabletoMarch2009.

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Appendix Table no. 1. Romania–resultsofelectionstotheChamberofDeputiesandtotheEuropeanParliament.1

Candidate Votesin% 1992 1996 2000 2004 2007 2 2008 PDSR–SocialDemocraticPartyofRomania 3 27,72 21,52 36,61 36,8 23,11 33,09 CDR–DemocraticConventionofRomania 4 20,01 30,17 PD–DemocraticParty 5 7,03 28,81 32,36 PNL–NationalLiberalParty 6,89 13,44 18,57 AlliancePNLPD 31,5 UDMR–HungarianDemocraticAllianceofRomania 7,46 6,64 6,8 6,2 5,52 6,7 PRM – The Great Romania Party 5 3,89 4,46 19,48 13 4,15 3,15 Source:madebyauthoraccordingtotheavailabledata. 1ElectionstotheEuropeanParliamentheldin2007. 2Onlymainpoliticalpartiesareshown. 3In1992ranasFSND–DemocraticFrontofNationalSalvation;in2004asNationalUnionPSDPUR;in2007as separatepartyPSD. 4Thecomposition:PNL,PNTCDandothersmallparties;in2000PNLranseparately;in2004withPDasAlliance PNLPD;in2007separatelyagain. 5PD–forelections1992and1996inUSD–SocialDemocraticUnion;in2008asPDLDemocraticLiberalParty.

Table no. 2. Bulgaria–resultsofelectionstotheBulgarianParliamentandEuropeanParliament.1 Votesin% Candidate 2005 2007 BSP–BulgarianSocialistParty 2 31 21.41 NationalMovementSimeonII 19,9 6.27 DPF–MovementforRightsandFreedoms 12,8 20.26 Ataka – National Union Attack 8,1 14.20 GERB–CitizensforEuropeanDevelopmentofBulgaria 3 21.68 Source:madebyauthoraccordingtotheavailabledata. 1ElectionstotheEuropeanParliamentheldin2007. 2ForelectionstoEPranwithsomesmallpartiesasEuropeanSocialistPlatform(ESP). 3Partywasestablishedin2006.

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