POPULISM 3 (2020) 13–28 brill.com/popu The Dangerous Myth of Populism as a Thin Ideology Ralph Schroeder Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford [email protected] Abstract The idea that populism is a ‘thin ideology’—unlike other full-bodied ‘thick’ ideolo- gies like conservatism or socialism—has come close to being an orthodoxy among populism scholars. This paper challenges that view and argues that it is at best an open question whether populism meets the criteria of a thick ideology, which should be whether it offers a comprehensive program of political change and whether it has stay- ing power. This argument will be made by reference to three countries, the United States, Sweden and India, all of which have recently seen a populist turn. The paper first summarizes debates about populism, ideology and social change. Then it provides a brief account of populism in the three country cases and argues that their populist turns may be a coherent and lasting new departure. The paper concludes with reflec- tions about the broader ramifications of populism as ‘thick’ versus ‘thin’. Keywords ideology – political beliefs – populism – United States – India – Sweden 1 A ‘Thin’ Ideology? The idea that populism is a ‘thin ideology’ has become commonly accepted among scholars; indeed, it has become something of an orthodoxy.1 There is still considerable debate over the definition of populism, but many scholars now follow Mudde who sees populism as pitting a homogeneous virtuous 1 Stanley, B. “The Thin Ideology of Populism”, Journal of Political Ideologies, 13(1) (2008), 95–110. © Ralph Schroeder, 2020 | doi:10.1163/25888072-02021042 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0Downloaded license. from Brill.com10/01/2021 06:23:24PM via free access 14 Schroeder people against a corrupt or self-interested elite, combined with the idea that politics should allow greater scope for expression of the ‘general will’ of the people.2 There are three core elements to Mudde’s definition; elites, ‘the peo- ple’, and who should be included and excluded in ‘the people’. It is on the last point where different left and right-wing versions of populism can be distin- guished: Right-wing versions often seek to exclude immigrants, for example, whereas left-wing versions seek to defend against the globalizing economic threats that undercut workers’ rights. Mudde and others also make the left/ right distinction, but they also argue that populism is a ‘thin’ ideology because, apart from the Manichean opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, pop- ulism has little by way of its own political program to offer, and so it is reliant on or piggybacks onto other more substantive political ideologies. Since Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, research on populism has exploded, though there had already been a sizable body of research on the topic that goes back several decades.3 Going further into the definitional de- bates will be left to one side here; suffice it to say that the standard definition used by Mudde and others will be adhered to in what follows. The paper will also adopt the baseline definition of the highly contested term ‘ideology’ sup- plied by Freeden, who is responsible for the notion of ‘thin’: He says that a ‘political ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions and values that 1. exhibit a recurring pattern, 2. are held by significant groups, 3. compete over provid- ing and controlling plans for public policy, 4. do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community’.4 Where this paper departs from recent scholarship is in the widespread view that populism is a ‘thin ideology’, which entails that ‘it is unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology: it lacks the capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent programme for the solution of crucial political questions’.5 But whereas the definition of populism has been widely discussed, the notion of a ‘thin ideology’ is perhaps less familiar, so it is worth going into the background of this idea in more detail. ‘Thin ideology’ is a term coined by Freeden in his conceptual analysis of ideologies. He applies the term to ideologies like ‘feminism’ and ‘nationalism’.6 2 Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C.R. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 3 Ionescu, G., and Gellner, E. (eds.) Populism. Its Meanings and National Characteristics. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1969). 4 Freeden, M., Ideology: A very short introduction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 32. 5 Stanley, “Thin Ideology”, op. cit. p. 95. 6 Freeden, Ideology, op. cit., pp. 98–100. DownloadedPOPULISM from 3 Brill.com10/01/2021 (2020) 13–28 06:23:24PM via free access The Dangerous Myth of Populism as a Thin Ideology 15 A ‘thin ideology’ is defined as ‘one that, like mainstream ones, has an identifi- able morphology but, unlike mainstream ones, a restricted one’.7 There are an- alytical and substantive reasons why he makes this distinction: the analytical one is that other approaches to understanding ideology, such as Marxists and post-structuralists, think that there has been ideological fragmentation, so that very many beliefs can count as ideologies apart from mainstream ones that are thick and comprehensive and coherent. In fact, for Freeden, some ‘thin ideolo- gies’ may simply be social movements such as the ideologies of the ‘environ- mental’ and ‘gender’ movements.8 In any case, Marxists and poststructuralists, according to Freeden, see too many ideologies everywhere. The substantive reason for the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ is that restricted ideolo- gies such as ‘nationalism’ assert the primacy of nationalism but ‘little else. It certainly does not produce a scheme for the distribution of scarce and vital goods’,9 which is a key feature of a thick ideology. Now it may be true that nationalism and environmentalism and feminism do not have such schemes, but populism, as we shall see, does: in the case of right-wing populism, it is that scarce and vital resources should be distributed according to the principle that certain people, those within an ethnic group or other criterion of deservingness that excludes others, should be prioritized in allocating resources. In the case of left-wing populism, resources should be re-allocated away from economic elites or companies and foreign workers that benefit from globalization—and towards those who would benefit from stronger borders that protect the rights pertaining to economic distribution. Freeden himself sometimes has an understanding of populism whereby it is focused on single issues like ‘Brexit’ which he understands primarily in terms of nationalism.10 But ideologies morph, and populism outside of the United Kingdom has become far more than exit from the EU, as those who apply the notion of ‘thin ideology’ but define populism in terms quite different from Freeden recognize. (It can be noted as an aside that Brexit may indeed have 7 Freeden, Ideology, op. cit., pp. 98–100. Freeden also develops criteria for the ‘maturity’ of an ideology, which are their uniqueness or distinctiveness, responsiveness to a broad range of issues, and adaptability (“decontestation”), Freeden, M. (1996). Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. pp. 485– 87. These will be useful in assessing ‘thickness’ below. 8 As an aside, it can be mentioned here that in several recent national and regional elec- tions in German-speaking countries, Green parties have gained more support than social- ist (left) parties, perhaps another sign that thick ideologies are declining at the expense of formerly ‘thin’ ones. 9 Freeden, Ideology, op. cit., p. 98. 10 Freeden, M. “After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology.” Journal of Political Ideologies, 22(1), 2017, 1–11. POPULISM 3 (2020) 13–28 Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 06:23:24PM via free access 16 Schroeder been ‘thin’, but it will leave its mark on British politics even if exiting the EU is reversed, for in that case, the distrust of those who voted for Brexit in the refer- endum and continue to push for it will remain entrenched in British politics. If Brexit does take place on the other hand, Britain’s political direction will also have been altered profoundly.) In any event, Freeden could be right to argue that it is not clear if popu- lism will achieve the same strength and coherence as socialism, liberalism and conservatism, which are among his examples of ‘thick’ ideologies. But by des- ignating populism as ‘thin’, and arguing that it is parasitic on other, ‘thicker’ ideologies, Freeden and those who use this designation make two mistakes. The first is to imply that populism is a transient, minor or weak phenomenon on its own. It is true that populism does not yet have as much historical force or tradition as socialism or liberalism.11 But the absence of a long historical tradi- tion was also characteristic of fascism and communism, both of which certain- ly had strong, if relatively brief, efflorescences. Or again, there are few parties that directly invoke populism in their party names, but this is sometimes also true of parties that pursue thick ideologies. Moreover, even if it is still too early to identify the social forces that give rise to a phenomenon which has, in much of the world, gained strength (or been revived) only in recent decades or even years, it would be a mistake not to try do so. A concrete example of where this mistake can lead will be useful before we return to broader issues: Mudde, who is generally regarded as one of the foremost scholars of populism, frequently comments on current events and argues that journalists and academics often cry wolf and exaggerate an alleged crisis of populism in order to seek attention.