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The Single-‐Issue Party Thesis and the Sweden Democrats1

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The Single-‐Issue Party Thesis and the Sweden Democrats1 The Single-Issue Party Thesis and the Sweden Democrats1 Gissur Erlingsson, Kåre Vernby and Richard Öhrvall Abstract When commenting on the European radical right, the term ‘single-issue party’ is frequently bandied about. We survey the various conceptualizations of the term and then apply them to the Sweden Democrats (SD), a party with roots in extremist subcultures that gained parliamentary representation in the 2010 elections. In the empirical analysis, we draw primarily on a unique survey of all parliamentary candidates to study: (1) the SD candidates’ positions on a large number of diverse issues, (2) what issues they prioritize, and (3) the degree of ideological cohesion among their candidates. Secondarily, certain voter characteristics associated with the single-issue party concept are surveyed. Here, we use a large-scale exit poll to study: (1) SD voters’ demographic characteristics and (2) what issues they prioritize. Throughout, the other main Swedish parties serve as points of comparison. Against what is commonly claimed, we find that the single-issue party label fits the SD poorly. Keywords: Parties, voters, ideology, radical right-wing parties 1 We wish to thank participants in seminars at the EPSA annual meeting and the Network on Nordic Populism, and Ryan Bakker for comments. We also wish to thank Helena Bengtsson and SVT/SR, SOM institute, Swedish National Data Service (SND), Statistics Sweden and the Riksdag for providing data. This research was financially supported by the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation. 1 Introduction In the Swedish national elections in 2010, the Sweden Democrats (SD) gained parliamentary representation. After emerging from neo-fascist and neo-Nazi subcultures in the late 1980s, the party has gradually moderated to broaden its appeal. This development is characterized by, among other things, the banning of uniforms at party gatherings, the changing of the party symbol from a fist and a flame to a blue anemone, and the renunciation of fascism and Nazism around the turn of the last century. Support for the party has grown steadily and in 2010 it received 5.7 percent of the vote in the national election and thereby gained seats in the parliament for the first time. When commenting on new entrants to the sphere of European radical right- wing parties, both scholars and competing politicians have been quick to brand the Sweden Democrats a ‘single-issue party’. This term is notoriously vague, however. In this paper, we survey how it and related terms, such as ‘niche party’, have been conceptualized. Based on the literature, we conclude that the term “single-issue party” denotes a set of closely related concepts in the research on party types whose connotations partly overlap (cf. Mudde 1999). Some of these views emphasize the characteristics of the parties themselves, in other words, the ‘supply-side,’ in the parlance of party research (Ignazi 2002; Mitra 1988; Mudde 1999; Meguid 2005, 2008; Wagner 2011). Finally, there are scholars who focus on those who vote for the radical right, in other words, the characteristics of the ‘demand side’ (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Mudde 1999). Our literature review shows that these respective views have a number of observable implications regarding the party in question and, in some cases, the characteristics of its voters. This list is similar to that found in Mudde (1999). We argue that the conceptualizations focusing on the supply-side are best evaluated using data capturing the policy positions of party elites and the priority these elites accord to various types of issues. Conceptualizations focusing on the demand-side, by contrast, are best evaluated on the basis of data on voters’ economic and demographic characteristics, as well as the 2 motives underlying their choice in the ballot booth. We apply these insights to the question of whether or not the SD should be considered a single-issue party. For the supply-side, which, following the previous literature, is our primary focus, we draw on a new and unique survey data set that contains a rich body of information on the 2010 parliamentary candidates. Most importantly, the data include stated policy positions on a broad range of issues, as well as information on the issues they prioritize. As a secondary source of information, we use an election-day exit poll that contains information on voters’ socio-demographic characteristics and stated motivations. The paper proceeds as follows. First, a brief history of the SD is presented. Second, we discuss the previous literature on the subject of whether or not radical right-wing parties should be considered single-issue parties. Third, we describe our data and measures. In the fourth part, we present our results. The final section presents our main conclusions. A Brief History of the Swedish Case Until recently – with the exception of the populist party New Democracy (ND) which was represented in the parliament between 1991 and 1994 – the radical right has been very weak in Sweden. In the 2010 elections, however, the SD gained parliamentary representation following a decade of growing electoral prominence. The party was formed in 1988 and back then it had intimate affiliations to outright racist and Nazi movements in Sweden. Larsson and Ekman’s (2001) mapping of the party’s origins leaves no doubt that those who founded the party in the late 1980s were deeply embedded in neo-Nazi networks. Partly because of its affiliations to hardcore neo-Nazi movements and explicit anti-immigrant profile, the SD was electorally marginalized in the 1990s, gaining less than 0.25 percent of the votes in the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections. In the 2002 local elections, however, the SD received a total of 49 seats in municipal councils, an increase from 8 3 seats in the previous election, cementing its position as the most important political party outside the national parliament (Larsson and Ekman 2001). In 2006, the SD made a breakthrough in local elections. The party obtained a total of 280 seats in 144 out of 290 Swedish municipalities, a substantial increase compared to the 2002 elections, when it obtained representation in only 29 of the municipal councils. In the parliamentary election, the party did not get enough votes to pass the 4 percent threshold necessary to obtain representation. However, with 2.9 percent of the votes, it became entitled to financial support from the state until the upcoming 2010 election. Together with stronger finances, the attention the party subsequently received paved the way for further success, and in the 2009 European parliament election it got 3.3 percent of the votes. It is also worth noting that the SD’s rise has taken place against the background of falling membership on the part of most established political parties. Purportedly, membership rose from 1,802 in January 2006 to 5,846 in October 2011, an increase of over 320 percent (Dagens Nyheter 30.10.2011). Subsequently, the 2010 election proved to be the party’s major electoral breakthrough, winning 612 seats in 246 municipalities, and with 5.7 percent in the parliamentary election, the SD received 20 seats in the national parliament. Since the mid-1990s, the party has purposefully and actively worked to change its original ideological profile by, for example, renouncing Nazism, banning uniforms at party meetings, and changing its party symbol. This process has had organizational consequences. In 2001, some of the more radical members, because the party had become soft on its original profile issues, decided to leave and to form the National Democrats. Under the current party leader, Jimmy Åkesson, elected in 2005, the party has continued its attempts to resemble more successful anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe, such as the Danish Peoples Party (Rydgren and Ruth 2011). Besides excluding members viewed as damaging the party’s profile, new issues have become more prominent in SD rhetoric, for example opposition to the EU and crime. 4 Whether these changes represent a real change in the nature of the party’s ideology is disputed. Some recent analyses of the party’s ideology suggest that it still ought to be labeled “national socialist” (Lindberg 2010), and that, despite current efforts, it has more in common with the German Nazi movement in the 1930s than with the modern European parties it professes to identify with, such as the Danish People’s Party (Wingborg and Lodenius 2009). Previous research argues that the party has evolved ideologically towards a position of ethno-nationalism, combined with a strong dose of social conservatism and a centrist, albeit unemphatic, position on economic issues (Rydgren 2006: 108–116). However, the party’s aspiration to renew its ideological profile has continued. Today, the party’s official ambition is to distance itself from perceptions that it is too “nationalistic.” In fact, in October 2011, the party formally declared that, ideologically, it should be labeled “social conservative” (“Sverigedemokraternas principprogram” 2011; Riksdag och department 2011). The Single-Issue Party In the literature, the term “single-issue party” has been used to denote a set of closely related concepts. Under the same umbrella we will include the term “niche party,” since there is a considerable degree of conceptual overlap between scholars who use this term and those who use the term “single-issue party.” Throughout, we will discuss the implications of the various single- issue party concepts for characterizing the Sweden Democrats. The most direct approach to determining the nature of radical right-wing parties is to look at the parties themselves: the “supply-side”. One prominent view is that parties that possess a distinctive and recognizable ideology cannot be considered single-issue parties (for example, Ignazi 2002; Mudde 1999). The central issue then becomes whether the radical right-wing parties that have emerged in Europe in recent decades possess a distinct and recognizable ideological core.
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