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Capital on the Moral Continuum ERIKSSON Accepted21aug2020 Epublished 2020 GOLD King’s Research Portal DOI: 10.24357/igjr.6.2.828 Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Eriksson, M., Gunnarsson, Å., & Mumford, A. (2020). Capital on the moral continuum: The UK, Sweden, and the taxation of inherited wealth. Intergenerational Justice Review, 6(2), 40-51. https://doi.org/10.24357/igjr.6.2.828 Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. 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Download date: 01. Oct. 2021 Capital on the moral continuum: the UK, Sweden, and the taxation of inherited wealth by Martin Eriksson, Asa Gunnarsson and Ann Mumford bstract: In this comparative analysis of the UK and Swe­ of the taxation of inherited wealth in the UK, and Sweden, are den, we consider, if inherited wealth is most deserving of identified, considered and compared. The criterion for choosing A redistributive taxation, then what lessons, if any, may be these moments is the question: did this moment lead, in our view, learned from the difficult paths faced by this tax in these countries. to the tax surviving (UK) or not (Sweden)? If yes, then we explain We conclude that the political momentum behind the Swedish family our reasons for believing this, and consider the point of difference business was distinct, and, possibly, capable of travel to the UK. between the two countries. Keywords: Tax; Inheritance; Intergenerational justice Why a comparative review, and why the UK and Sweden? Comparative analysis of histories in both the UK and Sweden Introduction reveals that different, figurative taxpayers have emerged as key fo- The morality of inheritance is difficult, and there are long-stand- cal points for debate during moments of change; and, we argue, ing disagreements as to whether inheritance should be taxed. this demonstrates that it is important not only to talk about the Piketty,1 Beckert,2 Halliday, White and others have considered value of the tax, but also who will be seen to be paying the tax. the nuances of this question, whilst international organisations Put simply, the identity of the figurative taxpayer is an important have taken a step further and emphasised connections between part of the story of inheritance taxes, in both the UK and Sweden. inherited wealth and persistent intergenerational inequality.3 Is it possible to devise a tax on inherited wealth that would be ac- The particular significance of the comparative approach cepted on a “global” scale? Inheritance taxation has developed adopted in this paper is that it considers one jurisdic­ in quite distinct ways in different jurisdictions, with significant tion which currently has a tax on inherited wealth (the legal differences (Beckert 2008).4 The rate and extent to which United Kingdom) and one which does not (Sweden). inheritance taxation plays a meaningful role in the redistribution of wealth in different jurisdictions, naturally, varies. The evolu- The particular significance of the approach adopted in this paper tion of, and indeed tolerance for, inheritance taxation in different is that it considers one jurisdiction which currently has a tax on countries is deeply culturally specific. inherited wealth (the United Kingdom) and one which does not The fact of difference is a starting point for this article. The project (Sweden). Despite this stark point of difference, there are many comparatively will consider inheritance taxation in two jurisdic- points of historical similarity between these countries. Thus, mo- tions, with the aim of identifying insights as to ways in which ments of convergence within these joint histories are identified countries organise tax systems to respond to inherited wealth. within this article. The question we seek to answer is: given that This analytical approach acknowledges a debt to the tradition of Sweden and the UK are similar in a number of important ways, Beckert, who constructed a similar, yet much more ambitious, and yet different in others, what then is it possible to learn about expansive, and historical analysis of France, Germany and the the manner in which countries may organise taxes to respond to United States (2008). Overall, this article provides a brief review persistent inequalities in wealth? of important, historical moments in the United Kingdom, and This question is important, and a comparative approach is rele- Sweden. This permits us to consider whether, if we accept the vant, because of the significant role that Piketty has played in the premise that, out of all other forms of wealth, inherited wealth emergence of an active, global discourse. His famous book Capital is most deserving of redistributive taxation, the time has come to contains a great deal of engagement with both the history and consider what lessons, if any, may be learned from the difficult economic thought behind inheritance taxation in the UK (2017). paths faced by this tax in different countries around the world. Simply, he considers this deeply specific British history to be glob- This article is in three parts. Following a review of the scholarly ally relevant; and, as the OECD’s proposal7 indicates, his analyses debate, inheritance taxation in the UK is introduced, largely with are having a pragmatic impact. an eye cast towards historically significant moments of contro- The methodological approach adopted in this paper aims to versy.5 Next, a review of Swedish inheritance taxation is con- challenge assumptions about the legal histories of the UK and ducted. Finally, points of convergence between the two systems Sweden. Legal narrative is well known for enabling (often, auto- are considered, largely for insights into the normative underpin- biographical) analyses of injustice (Culp 1997: 480), sometimes nings of inheritance taxation.6 controversially so (Farber/Sherry 1993, 1995). The controversy This paper aims to continue Piketty’s project of identifying “be- largely occurred in the 1990s, as part of the resistance in some lief systems” (2017). The methodology involves legal narrative, forms of legal scholarship to the “radical critique” of law, which or storytelling. Key moments in the political and legal histories argued that the very foundations of law – including legal schol- 40 Intergenerational Justice Review 2/2020 arship – were insufficiently inclusive of the experiences of “differ- ble enemy’ in those who find themselves deprived of monopolies ent voices” (ibid.: 807). This dissension in the 1990s could trace they ought never to have possessed, and the privileges which enrich its roots to the work of Cover in the 1980s, and, in particular, them at the expense of their poorer fellows” (ibid.). his famous proposition that “[n]o set of legal institutions or pre- During this period, widows, in particular, were presented as hav- scriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give ing a moral entitlement to inheritance (id.: 227). And yet, despite it meaning” (1983: 4). The essence of the legal narrative, or legal concern over their welfare, death duties, collectively, continued to storytelling, movement inspired by Cover, however, was a broad increase in importance during this period as a source of revenue church, extending to examinations of rhetoric (Sherwin 1988), for the government (Lee 2007: 681).10 Lee explained that in fact as well as the consideration of issues of legitimacy and indeter- it was the emerging clout of the “new money” class during the minacy in law (Winter 1989: 2226), among other issues. Here, Victorian era that smoothed the way for the introduction of a tax legal narrative is employed simply to provide social, political and which would ensure that “old money” classes bore a more equal economic accounts of one tax, in two different jurisdictions, at share of the tax burden (ibid.). Thus, the Estate Duty was viewed significant points in their historical “stories.” as a tax which achieved “that elusive principle of taxing according to ‘ability to pay’”, given its foundation upon on a principle of Inheritance taxation in the United Kingdom proportionality (Sandford 1968: 11). Estate duty A significant proportion of the British history with which Piketty Probate, account and temporary estate duties were engages occurs within the (long-lasting) timeframe of the UK’s replaced with a single duty, which was then targeted estate duty, and, thus, this tax serves as the starting point for this at the aggregated value of all property left by the dece­ analysis. Inheritance taxation in the UK, however, far pre-dates dent. The opposition argued that it was unfair to assess the estate tax. Indeed it is perhaps an understatement to suggest a tax solely by reference to the estate of the deceased, that the United Kingdom has a long history with taxation of in- with no consideration for the circumstances of the living persons who acquired the property.
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