Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics Hamid Akın ÜNVER* Abstract Introduction

Third parties have grown increasingly Since the onset of the Syrian Civil War relevant in European politics in recent years, and the subsequent emergence of the with the rise of status-quo changing parties such as Podemos in Spain, in , refugee crisis, many European countries UKIP in Britain and the Front National have been witnessing electoral gains for in . This article aims to bridge the far-right and/or populist parties. These gap in the comparative politics literature by introducing two new types of third parties in parties have either been newcomers to European politics through their bargaining and politics (or their leaders- such as Syriza mediation, crisis behavior and electoral appeal. in Greece, or Podemos in Spain), or In doing so, this study proposes that leadership have been stagnant parties that were cult, localization of support and rigidness of ideology varies across third parties, due to the unable to increase their votes despite existence of two types of third parties; conveyor existing within their respective political coalitions and corrective parties. The article spectrums for a long time (such as the uses the case studies of Syriza and Podemos as ‘conveyor coalitions’ and of the Front National Front National in France). In Austria and UKIP as ‘corrective parties’. By introducing for example, the far-right Freedom these two new concepts, the article attempts Party had to wait for more than half a to bestow future scholarly studies with better century to break the political consensus tools for predicting and studying rapidly rising populist parties. away from far- right parties, which had prevailed in the country since Key Words Since the onset of the Syrian Civil War and the subsequent Party Politics, Third Parties, European Politics, Electoral Behavior, Corrective Parties, Conveyor emergence of the refugee crisis, Coalitions. many European countries have been witnessing electoral gains * Asst. Prof. Dr., Kadir Has University, Department of International Relations, Kadir for far-right and/or populist Has Caddesi, Cibali, 34083, İstanbul, Turkey. parties. E-mail: [email protected]

1 PERCEPTIONS, Summer 2016, Volume XXI, Number 2, pp. 1-28. Hamid Akın Ünver

the end of World War II. This owed backlash against neoliberalism and a largely to growing anti-immigration growing aloofness of the European sentiments after the Syrian civil war elites towards the Greek and Spanish and their subsequent appeal for the financial crises, both parties built rapid far-right – a momentum that has been support through their Eurosceptic brewing since the EU Enlargement agendas. in 2004 and 2007, and intensifying This article aims to conduct an since 2011 with the refugees arriving inquiry into the nature of the newly in Europe from the Syrian civil war. emerging and/or rising parties in In the Greek Cypriot Administration, Europe. These parties either assume Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the third position in their political Greece, Hungary, , Netherlands, systems for an extended period of Sweden, and Switzerland too, time, or rise into prominence after anti-immigration parties have made serving brief periods as third parties. substantial electoral gains, much to the While mainstream political science is dismay of the proponents of the post- mostly concerned with party systems World War II European order. or governmental coalitions, patterns, changes and shifts of the first two parties Essentially a backlash against in political systems, a literature gap exists in terms of how these processes neoliberalism and a growing work outside of the first two parties. aloofness of the European elites This has been an analytical oversight, towards the Greek and Spanish as lack of interest in third parties has financial crises, both parties obscured our ability to forecast the built rapid support through emergence of the rising populist and their Eurosceptic agendas. revisionist parties in Europe and detect political grievances they best respond to. Within the limited attention they However, not all rising parties in have received in the literature, third Europe are far-right, or assert an parties have been conceptualized based anti-immigration agenda. Spanish on how their rise can be explained Podemos and Greek Syriza for theoretically; through increasing voter example, are left-wing populist parties independence,1 spatial voting theory,2 that address inequality, unemployment within strong majoritarian systems3 and economic stagnation from a and within median-voter theorem.4 In perspective of renegotiating austerity addition, more practical case studies measures with the EU. Essentially a have been applied with regard to third 2 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

parties (or lack thereof) in the United when the sum of second and third States,5 appeal and mobilization in party votes are equal to, or greater than Britain,6 competition and resilience in the first party (numerical significance). Germany7 and regional versus national Alternatively, third parties can also be voter patterns in France.8 However, significant in parliamentary voting a conceptualization of third parties sessions that require consensus larger as a theoretical and cross-country than the seats won by the first party, such phenomenon has been unforthcoming. as constitutional changes, declaration This is what this article intends to do. of war, or ratification of international treaties. In such cases, third parties become disproportionately significant, This study is based on the assumption mainly for first parties that need to that there is a gap in the literature on bypass the main opposition party, or comparative politics, which has largely muster a bigger parliamentary majority shied away from focusing on party to pass key policies. Still however, patterns outside of the first two parties. third parties must have enough seats In turn, the study is also structured in the parliament to make contextual upon the view that it is this disregard alliances work. If the first two parties that has prevented a proper agenda have an overwhelming dominance and ideological counter-discourse in a parliament, then third parties to emerge in Europe to mitigate the that have a politically or contextually effects of anti-immigration politics, as insignificant number of seats will not be well as the appeal towards far-right useful in either context. Furthermore, parties. Therefore, the article aims to if the first and second parties agree to address this gap and focuses exclusively form a majority coalition government, on third parties in European politics. third parties grow even more important Here, the article proposes two ways as the main opposition party, provided- of defining a ‘third party’. The first again- that they have enough seats definition is that of the party that gets in the parliament to make minority the third largest share of the votes in an opposition work. Third parties that election, significant enough to render have a tiny fraction of seats are not it as a balancer in coalition talks or significant in any context. parliamentary bargaining sessions. In that, a politically significant third party The second type of third party, as per ought to be ready to form a coalition the focus of this article, is a parliamentary with the second party so as to sideline, group, which is composed of two or or balance against the first party. To that more parties that can form frequent end, third parties become important and standing alliances that manifest 3 Hamid Akın Ünver

into a unified voting bloc in the – may be characterized as third parties. parliament. Although such parties may have competing interests, agendas and Characteristics of Third ideologies, the need to balance the First Parties in Europe Party or exert political weight in key policy issues may force smaller parties into a third party voting bloc. However, A historical survey of third parties this is not the only way smaller parties in Europe yields several patterns that (whether Third or Fourth) make can be observed through multiple an impact in legislatures; they may political systems. First, the strength engage in issue alliances with the first and weakness (including the rise two parties as well (such as first and and demise) of third parties reflect confidence in the existing political fourth party block versus second and system. When either the hegemonic third party block). In that sense, if the party, or the competition between the vote difference between third, fourth first two parties has a high level of (or even fifth) parties is marginal and legitimacy and large popular support, their competition is tight, then any of third parties tend to be less relevant and such competing parties may be studied lose support. In Britain for example, as a ‘third party’. The best example is there has long been a two-party Germany, where the dominance of the competition between the Conservatives Free Democratic Party (FDP) has been and Labour. Up until the early 1900s, challenged by since 1983, when the Liberal Party (originally and the Greens replaced the FDP as founded in 1859) began to rise, the the third party from 1994-2005. In this two-party dominance continued. The context, both the FDP and the Greens emergence of the Liberal Party is owed can be evaluated as third parties as to a fundamentally structural question their competition remained strong over in British politics: how to manage the an extended period of time and each powers of the Crown and expand the party managed to replace the other political significance of the Parliament.9 more than once. While our first-type The Liberal have slowly, conceptualization of third parties is but consistently gained ground since an arithmetic measurement, where the 1955, reaching their highest vote third party is numerically a third party, percentage in 1983 when they won our second-type conceptualization 25.4 % of the vote. Seyd10 argues that denotes a political influence, where it was the ’ reform oriented numerical third, fourth or even fifth agenda that led to their increasing parties – if they have tight competition public support, whereas Gauja argues 4 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

that it was charismatic leadership by the rise of the Alternative for and resultant voter engagement that Germany party (AfD) after 2013.15 In brought the Liberals success.11 Barnes that regard, the rise and demise of third on the other hand, points to candidate parties are closely connected either to selection methods as a way of gaining the popularity of the hegemonic party, popularity in British third party or to hegemonic competition between politics.12 However, as of late 2012, the two dominant parties. The AfD has UK Independence Party (UKIP) began indeed formulated its rhetoric within to emerge as the third party, largely at anti-immigration, rising in relevance the expense of Labour. Furthermore, mainly due to the inability of the first in 2014, the Scottish National Party two parties to address what the nation’s (SNP) made a rapid rise, becoming the dissidents felt as a failure to ‘protect 16 third party in the May 2015 general Germany against outsiders’. A similar elections, increasing its parliamentary trend can be observed in Hungary seats from 6 to 56. The rise of any third ( ), France (Front National), party can be interpreted as the failure Greece (Golden ) and Slovakia of the first two parties. The Scottish (People’s Party), as their respective National Party as well, is a product of systems grew unable to cope with a the Labour and Conservative failures serious, common challenge. in Scotland, which rendered the SNP a 13 very viable alternative. With austerity The emergence of the Liberal policies, healthcare funding, and Party is owed to a fundamentally serious military budget cuts on the line, structural question in British the failure of the first two parties to address such systemic crises have led to politics: how to manage the the emergence of the SNP as the third powers of the Crown and party. In Germany too, the structural expand the political significance nature of the competition between the of the Parliament. Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/ Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) Second, certain third parties might rendered the prospects of the SPD as be regional parties, with localized a third party relatively obscure.14 It was support. This localization can be ethnic, only after 2005 that the SPD’s inability religious, or connected to a particular to balance against the CDU/CSU political agenda. In the UK, localization briefly led to the rise of the FDP as a of the Liberal Democrats (and the third party, though it was soon replaced Scottish National Party in 2015) in the 5 Hamid Akın Ünver

north is a case in point. According to in recent cantonal elections, the Front Walt (et. al.)17 this trend owes largely National (FN) has risen rapidly, from to the Conservatives’ inability to reach 4.5% in 2008 to 15% in 2011, and in a political settlement with Scotland the 2012 presidential elections, they and their subsequent fall from grace scored their highest ever (17.9%) vote regionally. German politics have long share. In the 2014 municipal elections, had a strong two-party competition the FN won in 12 cities, which was between Christian Democratic Union a historic triumph. The rise of Front of Germany (CDU) and the Social National in France, which has a Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) strong leftist tradition, was explained in the north and a persistent Christian in Hollifield, Martin and Orrenius21 Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), as revealing resistance against refugee whereby the third party, the Free and immigration policy, whereas Democratic Party (FDP), did not have Hainsworth and Mitchell22 forecast significant weight up until the 2009 the Front National’s rise based on the federal elections. Even then, the FDP’s popularity of anti-egalitarian policies credential as a third party was already in immigrant-dominated provinces of challenged by The Greens and the France. To that end, the FN is indeed Left, before the FDP took a big fall in a regional party, with and 2013.18 The far-right AfD made a rapid in the north and Marseille and entry into German politics after its dominating in the south. Similar foundation in 2013, becoming the third examples can be mentioned in party in November 2015 elections, and securing 10.5% of the votes. The AfD’s (New Flemish Alliance – Regional), vote dominance is also regionalized, Finland (Finns Party- Ethnic), Sweden with the majority of its support coming ( - Ethnic) and Italy from Saxony, Thuringia and Baden- ( – Padanian separatist). The Württemberg.19 In France on the degree to which such regional parties other hand, there is not a structured become more or less relevant depends two-party political system, although on how disenfranchised their main voter behavior has clustered around ideology becomes within the larger either the on the left, national political system. If the degree or Les Républicains on the right. In the of disenfranchisement is high, then 1960s and 1970s, L’Union Centriste regional parties become more popular; was a dominant third party, largely if accommodation within the political dominating the agenda on education, system is achieved, then regional party healthcare and social services.20 However, voters choose more mainstream parties. 6 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

would be , which defines If the degree of a broad range of political, economic disenfranchisement is high, then and social priorities introduced by regional parties become more between 1975 and popular; if accommodation 1990, which left a mark in British within the political system is politics transcending beyond the achieved, then regional party , Tony Blair and governments. It is important voters choose more mainstream to underline that Thatcherism is parties. not a third party ideology; rather its influence became systemic and Third, certain third parties revolve became a first-party ideology.25 In around a leadership cult; either alive today’s European politics, a return to or dead. Membership to and support leadership cult (or at least symbolism) of such parties then become closely can be observed. While linked to leadership personality and has been the longest lasting of such ideology, whereby candidacy and leaders, it is hard to talk about a ‘cult’ in promotions are often linked to personal her case, given the political culture in 26 or professional connections to the Germany. Also, mere length of office leader in question. in France is not a sufficient mark of cult on its is one example, although exact party own, given how long Tarja Halonen in Finland, Bertie Ahern in Ireland, affiliation usually transcends existing Gören Persson in Sweden and Franz ideological entrenchments. From Vranitzky in Austria have ruled, but 1947- 1958, Gaullism was shouldered have failed (or have been unwilling) by the RPF- Rassemblement du Peuple to establish personality cults. It is also Français, and from 1958-1976, it was hard to argue for a leadership cult in the the UNR - Union pour la nouvelle Scottish National Party as a regional république and the Union pour la défense third party, but the Front National’s de la République or UDR. After 1976, Marine Le Pen is a candidate as a case Gaullism was entrenched within the point, largely owing to her relationship Rassemblement pour la République or to longtime FN leader Jean-Marie 23 RPR. In , the Polish Socialist Le Pen.27 Hereditary continuity of Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna) legitimacy and leadership cult in became heavily influenced by the third parties renders membership and personality cult of Józef Piłsudski, promotions to be closely connected to which continued to affect party politics the relationship to the founding family. after his death in 1935.24 Another case Whether similar leadership cults exist, 7 Hamid Akın Ünver

or will take shape in Podemos or Syriza parties to voice concerns and objections is still up for debate. While Pablo about the mainstream political system Iglesias Turrion of Podemos cannot be that have not been, or cannot be (due characterized as a cult-based leader,28 to populist reasons) presented by the Alexis Tsipras of Syriza demonstrates a two dominant parties. This in turn, more up-front leadership as the face of renders third parties disproportionately the party – in what may be defined as a significant in times of breaking two- member of a long tradition of ‘rock star party deadlocks, both in political 29 party leaders’. discourse and in parliamentary voting sessions. Two dominant parties in turn, may rely on the vote support of the Mere length of office is not a third parties to pass a certain legislation sufficient mark of cult on its or reach the required number of own, given how long Tarja majority for a particular parliamentary Halonen in Finland, Bertie decision. In major political deadlocks, Ahern in Ireland, Gören Persson the disagreement between first and in Sweden and Franz Vranitzky second parties therefore, are often resolved by third parties, according, in Austria have ruled, but have or close to the ideological stance of failed (or have been unwilling) the third party. This is perhaps the to establish personality cults. most significant role of third parties. Inelastic demand for most of the third parties render them immune to vote Fourth, certain third parties or third loss as a result of politically incorrect, party ideologies are chronic, in the sense or unfavored statements. Depending on that they remain third for extended their ideology, third parties may either periods. The Liberals in Britain or the use this unique position in politics to FDP in Germany have been structural steer a political system away from crisis, third parties, retaining their third- or generate such crises. In Britain for ranking popularity status across a example, the current deadlock between long streak of elections. This chronic the Labor and the Conservatives over status renders similar third parties Brexit – whether Britain should leave comfortable in the sense that they both the EU or not – is being corrected by the know that it is unlikely for them to be Scottish National Party.30 In the words the first party, and also for them to lose of SNP member Alyn Smith, ‘A Brexit substantial votes and lose their third would reopen the question of Scottish party status. This comfort allows third independence’,31 which effectively 8 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

means that the party would correct the successfully voice popular discontent deadlock between the first two parties over these crises, may substantially over Brexit, in favor of staying within increase their popularity. If the existing the union. Similarly in Germany, the political status quo is risk averse and deadlock over refugee policy between free of such crises, then third parties the CDU/CSU, SPD, Die Linke and retain their existing popularity, without Bündis 90/Die Grünen has persisted, significant impact on their popularity. with the AfD growing increasingly and This has specifically been the case with disproportionately more influential in the AfD, the Front National, Syriza bringing about an anti-immigration and Podemos, as mentioned earlier. The 32 resolution to the deadlock. Angela Greek and Spanish third parties; Syriza Merkel’s attempts to bridge this gap and Podemos, can be analyzed in close by spearheading a refugee return and relevance, due to similar contexts repatriation deal with Turkey is a direct that brought about their rise. Both result of the growing AfD influence. In Greece and Spain have been two-party France, it is the Front National’s third dominant systems. The Panhellenic party pressure that has also corrected Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the deadlock over immigration and (ND) competition forced the French government to back 33 dominated in Greece, whereas the the refugee deal with Turkey. Social-Democratic, Social Liberals (PSOE) and Liberal – Christian- democratic – Conservatives (PP) Third parties become more rivalry dominated in Spain. In Greece, relevant in times of crises – be following sustained disenfranchisement it security, financial or social – within the systemic two-party rule and and depending on the extent the two dominant parties’ inability to to which they can successfully tackle the growing economic crisis, voters tried a new formula: supporting voice popular discontent over 34 these crises, may substantially a formerly obscure party – Syriza. increase their popularity. Although Syriza has been active in Greek politics since 2004, it was not until the 2012 elections that it made its mark by increasing its vote share Finally, third parties become more substantially to 27%, which laid the relevant in times of crises – be it security, ground for its emergence as a first financial or social – and depending party in the January 2015 elections. The on the extent to which they can feeling of abandonment and neglect, 9 Hamid Akın Ünver

along with an insurmountable crisis, by pulling their countries out of forced the Greeks to leave the traditional the EU, but by reconfiguring their two-party entrenchment and try the relationship with the Union. In Syriza’s obscure third party. In Spain, an almost case, distancing from the EU took identical rise of a third party took place, on the form of threatening to ally as Podemos, channeling the Spaniards’ with , although this did not disdain with the main two parties, happen.37 In Podemos’ case on the became the first party. Although the other hand, the party suggested that United Left (IU) has been the integral it might leave the monetary union third party in Spanish politics in recent if austerity measures become too years, the rapid rise of Podemos after 38 February 2014 owed largely to the burdensome on the Spanish people. electorate’s view that the existing main This new push for other alliances also parties, just like in Greece, were too take in the form of distancing both close to big business interests and thus, countries from Germany (for financial could not move in favor of choices that reasons), as well as the would alleviate the Spanish financial (for Common Foreign and Security crisis.35 In other words, both Greek and Policy considerations) citing growing Spanish third parties have emerged as dependence on and steering by external a reaction to the financial crisis, and actors. the inability of the existing status quo to address the looming economic and Conceptualizing Corrective social problems. Parties and Conveyor The emergence of third parties as Coalitions serious contenders and rising into first party status indeed has a transnational dimension, as such parties share One of the central aims of this certain similarities. First, financial article is to introduce two new disillusionment and debt restructuring conceptualizations for the study of unite Syriza and Podemos. With Greek third parties: ‘corrective parties’ and government debt at 180% of its GDP ‘conveyor coalitions’. These two new and Spain’s 100% debt-to-GDP ratio, conceptualizations are aimed at better both parties aim to restructure debt studying parties that are outside the and distance their respective countries first two slots in popularity rankings from international creditors.36 Second, and also predicting which types of third both parties reflect a growing disdain parties benefit from crises and which towards the – not ones thrive during stable periods. 10 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

Third parties that fit into the status to steer the debate on the refugee ‘corrective party’ conceptualization and immigration policy. Certainly the of this study have to fulfill five main FN, AfD and are strong criteria. First, a corrective party has to cases to this point. have a rigid ideology. This ideology can be ethno-nationalist, religious, sectarian or regional, but the main currency of the Concessions or backtracking party is its unbendable commitment politically for populist or to its ideology. Concessions or parliamentary alliance purposes, backtracking politically for populist or that are easier carried out by parliamentary alliance purposes, that first and second parties, are are easier carried out by first and second considered threats to party parties, are considered threats to party identity and raison d’être. identity and raison d’être. To that end, it is much harder for corrective parties to enter into coalition arrangements with first or second parties and quite often, Second, corrective parties tend to such parties may choose to protect have localized support and have a their rigid ideological purity, instead traditional political hinterland; either of becoming a part of the governing ethno-nationalist, or sectarian. When coalition. The term ‘corrective’ however, corrective parties are localized, they comes directly from these parties’ reflect regional disenfranchisement behavior in dealing with competition (geographical concentration of and disagreement between hegemonic discontent – such as in the AfD’s parties. When the first and second case) that is outside the mainstream parties need to form a coalition, either political identity of that nation. for government or legislation purposes, Identity-based parties that pursue the then they turn to smaller parties for agenda of an identity not shared by extra numbers. Corrective parties aim the political mainstream, tend to be to resolve such deadlocks through geographically confined. On the other offering their numbers in exchange hand, if corrective party support is for ideological ‘correction’ of the well-distributed across the nation, it disagreement based on their red lines. reflects disenfranchisement within the This is currently one of the biggest hegemonic identity and usually reflects structural problems in Europe (and the degree and intensity of how that perhaps beyond) that ideologically rigid identity is practiced within the political third parties are using their corrective system. A better case to this is how the 11 Hamid Akın Ünver

FN in France has expanded beyond its party organization inevitably leads to northern and southern strongholds and existential crises between the party became a nation-wide party. core and its grassroots organizations after the death or political demise of the leader in question. If the party If corrective party support is well- cannot craft a new post-leader contract distributed across the nation, between its core and base, it will either it reflects disenfranchisement splinter or dissolve. within the hegemonic identity Fourth, corrective parties are usually and usually reflects the degree comfortable with their chronic third and intensity of how that party status; that is as long as corrective identity is practiced within the parties retain their ‘third most popular’ political system. or ‘close fourth’ status, not coming first or second does not cause a drop in morale, force resignations or Third, corrective parties tend to have cause an ideological reformulation. a strong leadership cult. Corrective As mentioned in the first condition, parties that have such a strong corrective parties rather cling to their leadership cult choose their members, rigid ideological positions, rather appointments and promotions based on than taking populist risks to dilute candidates’ proximity or relationship to their ideology to become first or the leader in question. Relatives, friends second parties. Corrective parties and personal connections of the leader that retain their chronic third party play significant importance in building status prefer to bet on the first party’s the party’s organization and regional inability to muster enough votes to structure, as well as in how these parties gain single-party majority and plan ‘correct’ dominant parties. In contrast, ways in which they can steer coalition those corrective parties that have no or talks into an outcome that best fits weak leadership cults tend to negotiate into the corrective party’s ideological their organization and structure stance. Such ideological corrections of based on candidates’ demonstrated deadlocks, according to corrective party loyalty to the ideology or cause. Some rationality, are more important than corrective parties are also hybrids, being the first party, since first parties where moderate levels of leadership have to pursue a more comprehensive / cause loyalty have similar effects on pragmatism that prevents them from how the party structures and organizes asserting their ideological priorities itself. The introverted nature of such into the system. Such ideological 12 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

correction reaches its maximum effect the electorate. Successful conveyor in times of crises, which is our fifth coalitions substantially increase condition, such as wars, conflicts or their votes and become first parties ratification of key international treaties. over time. Such parties have all self- Especially if corrective parties are defined as being a political outlet of all already in a coalition government, or unrepresented groups in their initial are negotiating with hegemonic parties formation, successfully carrying these to form a coalition, their power to groups into hegemony. In doing so, amend, steer or influence crisis policies they have usually evolved from a former become optimal and significantly third party. disproportionate to their electoral support. As a third party, conveyor coalitions do not have a rigid ideology; rather, they aim to unite a wide array of It refers to a third party type disenfranchised social and political that unifies most or a substantial groups that do not have a coherent political outlet. Conveyor coalitions portion of disenfranchised are either ‘new’ parties, or emerge ideologies and agendas within out of older parties that substantially its political stance, stretching revamp their organization, ideology its initial ideological position and structure, aiming to make a to reach out to unrepresented greater impact on politics. This is the portions of the electorate. case with Syriza and Podemos. Their novelty usually follows an existing systemic problem, or the inability of the hegemonic parties to represent a The second new conceptualization significant portion of a fragmented this study offers, through an analysis of electorate, providing conveyor coalitions third party patterns in Europe, is that with an opportunity to make substantial of the ‘conveyor coalition’. Conveyor gains. However, conveyor coalitions do coalitions differ from a corrective not aim to ‘correct’ the system, nor do party in almost every criterion. It they seek to resolve political deadlocks refers to a third party type that unifies through the exercise of a particular most or a substantial portion of ideology. Instead, conveyor coalitions disenfranchised ideologies and agendas seek to maximize their popular support within its political stance, stretching by appealing to as many left out groups its initial ideological position to reach that have no political voice, and ‘convey’ out to unrepresented portions of them to hegemonic status. While, the 13 Hamid Akın Ünver

conveyor coalition parties may sound to as many disenfranchised voters as liberal or centrist, that is certainly not possible. To that end, both conveyor the rule, as if a liberal / left-wing system coalitions and corrective parties seek disenfranchises a large segment of the to instrumentalize discontent within conservative / right-wing voting blocs, or without the hegemonic political they may be united by a conservative – identity, but the former will always right-wing conveyor coalition party. seek to bring together these pockets of discontent actively, whereas corrective parties are usually passive in that regard. Conveyor coalitions seek to maximize their popular support Third, leadership cults tend to be by appealing to as many left out less emphasized in conveyor coalitions, groups that have no political compared to corrective parties. Even voice, and ‘convey’ them to when conveyor coalition parties have hegemonic status. a popular and charismatic leader, they cannot afford to structure the party or its regional networks based on Second, successful conveyor proximity to the leader or loyalty to his coalitions tend not to have localized understanding of ideology. Conveyor support. Even if the initial support coalitions are less likely to establish base of a conveyor coalition party is and rely on a leadership cult as a basis local, they will immediately organize for party operation and structuring. to expand beyond this support base, Since conveyor coalitions seek to play aiming to have nation-wide appeal. into political gray areas and maximize What differentiates a conveyor votes, they need to attract both coalition party’s non-local base to that quality and quantity into their party of a corrective party is that conveyor ranks. This means that they need to coalitions will always seek to expand detach promotions, appointments and their support base, whereas corrective parties will settle (and often take great candidate listings both from the leader pride) within their local or identity- and the political ideology, effectively based power base. In other words, steering clear of the establishment corrective parties have no interest in of a leadership cult. This in turn, bending their rigid ideology in favor of forces conveyor coalition parties to be more votes, whereas this is specifically more merit-based, either in terms of what conveyor coalitions do: play into experience and expertise, or with regard ideological gray areas in order to appeal to work rate and performance. 14 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

Fourth, conveyor coalitions do not risk, low-polarization environment, settle for their third party (or close conveyor coalitions can afford to fourth/fifth party) status, as such obscure their ideology and offer a parties bring together ideologically coherent ideological agenda in order diluted ranks with the promise of an to perform their ‘conveyor’ function. electoral victory, whichever way it may In contrast, corrective parties thrive be defined (either winning hegemonic during crisis periods within high-risk, party status, or increasing vote high-polarization environments, where percentages by a particular amount). the political gray area that benefits Not meeting the set criteria in elections conveyor coalitions disappear. In such will cause a significant morale drop in periods, conveyor coalitions only the party and lead to resignations and succeed when the existing discontent restructuring. In more extreme cases, with the hegemonic political discourse conveyor coalitions may also self- is high enough and neither the first disband following failure in elections. two parties, nor a corrective party can For conveyor coalitions, it is more offer a credible counter-hegemonic rational to take big concessions in party discourse. If, however, the hegemonic ideology, often obscuring and blurring party (or parties) have large popular the party’s main ideological line, in support during crisis periods, then favor of gaining more popularity among conveyor coalitions lose support again, voters. In contrast to corrective parties, along with corrective parties. That’s conveyor coalitions do not seek to why the current refugee crisis in Europe leverage their third party status to force significantly empowers corrective an ideological outcome into a political parties, rather than conveyor coalitions. deadlock. Rather, conveyor coalitions However, single-issue parties like the seek to resolve political deadlocks AfD or FN are also dependent on through consensus and ideological the persistence of the structural crisis. backtracking. Conveyor coalitions do Once the refugee problem is resolved, not emphasize this role however, as their impact will be less. their primary goal is always carrying different disenfranchised groups into Corrective Party Case Study: hegemonic status, rather than enjoying their chronic third party status that The Front National and the employs an ideological agenda. UK Independence Party Conveyor coalitions also thrive during stable periods with low-intensity Although the rise of the populist far- crises or absence thereof. In a low- right is a Europe-wide phenomenon, 15 Hamid Akın Ünver

this article will now focus on two migration after the intensification of political parties to illustrate the the Syrian Civil War – although anti- case of corrective parties. Both the immigration politics had already been Front National (FN) and the UK on the rise since 2004, following the Independence Party (UKIP) are what EU’s eastern expansion. this study conceptualizes as ‘corrective parties’ due to their ideological rigidness, type of popular appeal, and UKIP – and the Brexit the role of their leadership. referendum it created – on The FN has utilized the divisions the other hand, are not only within the French right and the the results of a few months of lethargy of the left.39 In addition, political campaigning, but the the party sought to create a strong culmination of four decades and sharp political position for the of latent – disenfranchised voters that were Labour never wanted to join growing increasingly alienated towards the common market in 1973 a politically disconnected political elite. and Conservatives also had an Disdain towards political elites both uneasy relationship with the at the national and at the European level has led both parties to grow a union. Eurosceptic character and favor non- intervention in what they call as ‘foreign adventures’, such as Syria.40 UKIP – and The FN existed in French politics for the Brexit referendum it created – on the a long time despite having not assumed other hand, are not only the results of governmental position. In fact, the FN a few months of political campaigning, did not control a substantial portion of but the culmination of four decades of the départements and it was fine with latent Euroscepticism41 – Labour never not doing so – it was a protest party44 – wanted to join the common market in as all corrective parties are. Its strength 1973 and Conservatives also had an was concentrated in the northeast and uneasy relationship with the union.42 coastal southeastern parts of France, UKIP too, is a response to elite politics, where the post-industrial labor market which is seen as synonymous with had generated sustained frictions not the EU and unwanted political and only between the ‘old French’ and the financial burdens.43 These dormant immigrant population, but also within sentiments in the UK, as well as in these immigrant groups as well.45 It France, emerged with the scale of was only after the take-over of Marine 16 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

Le Pen (daughter of FN legend Jean- when it witnessed a drastic increase, Marie Le Pen) as the leader of the marking 12.6% popularity.49 UKIP party in 2011 that the FN expanded is not a far-right party like the FN, its ambitions. Like a typical corrective but its anti-immigration, isolationist party, the FN was revolving around a and Eurosceptic stance brings it leadership cult, in which the proximity closer to the scope of corrective party to the founding/iconic leader served conceptualization, instead of a conveyor 46 as the basis of intra-party legitimacy. coalition. It is a single-issue party – like In order to assume government, the most corrective parties are – namely, FN had to grow out of a corrective to have Britain leave the EU. UKIP party – which was comfortable with thus campaigned extensively, under the its fringe status for the sake of its leadership since 2006 of , ideological purity – and expand its who built popular support in favor of voter base. Marine Le Pen chose to exit from the EU through a number do this through appealing to younger of sub-issues such as immigration, voters who, according to polls, were defense spending and fiscal policy concerned about the future of their jobs, independence.50 In doing so, Farage the ideological purity of la République 47 also rendered UKIP increasingly and secularism (laïcité). Just like a associated with his persona, establishing typical corrective party, the FN thrived a strong leadership cult, which became in a crisis period (migration and intra- synonymous with UKIP’s position. immigrant tensions) and expanded its Farage distanced UKIP from the voter base by capitalizing on ideological detached and aloof elite politics and purity and disenfranchised voters. pursued a policy of re-rooting UKIP The party broke its historic record in as a ‘truly representative party’ – very March 2015 by winning by 25% in similar to what Marine Le Pen did with French local elections. Marine Le Pen the FN after 2011. Like the FN and summarized her strategy as follows: 48 many other corrective parties, UKIP ‘We are growing roots. French roots’ . has risen from obscurity and thrived UKIP on the other hand is a within the crisis of the European relative newcomer to British politics system, as well as increased migration (founded in 1993, compared to the from Syria. As a result, it has capitalized FN, which was founded in 1972). Yet, on voters whose main concerns were its electoral performance was very the protection of ‘Englishness’, being close to that of the FN, as UKIP was ‘left behind’ by the elites, and jobs.51 unable to muster more than 4% of It was indeed a telling lesson for the the votes up until the 2015 elections, designation of corrective parties that 17 Hamid Akın Ünver

UKIP’s popularity map in the 2015 Le Pen’s niece and Jean-Marie Le Pen’s elections converged substantially with grand-daughter, rendering the FN one areas that voted the most in favor of the of the best examples of a cult-based Brexit referendum in June 2016. corrective party, perhaps more so than the Gaullist parties in France.52 Finally, Both the FN and UKIP conform both the FN and UKIP have long been best to this study’s conceptualization happy with their fringe status and never of corrective parties – they have rigid substantially modified their ideological ideologies and are largely single-issue positions in favor of votes, up until enterprises. The FN and UKIP are structural factors produced a context essentially culturally and ethnically within which both parties’ protectionist protectionist movements that aim to messages started resonating with their protect ‘Frenchness’ or ‘Englishness’ disenfranchised voters. against a perceived threat to the purity of identity. Both parties seek to protect Conveyor Coalition Case their respective ideological purity Study: Podemos and Syriza against a perceived cosmopolitan encroachment and are disdainful of the political elites and the existing Although they are substantially status quo as ineffectual, disconnected different from one another, the one and aloof. Both parties have a political similarity between Podemos-Syria hinterland where their votes have on the one hand, and parties like the remained inelastic in the past, and new FN-UKIP on the other, is that they political expansion areas where their all reflect long-accumulated disdain renewed and modified message is being towards Europe and political elites. received well. While the FN support But these parties have different reasons zones are places where intra-communal to be - and elite-skeptic. Syriza tensions between and within immigrant and Podemos express a different type communities are higher, UKIP thrives of anti-establishment politics, which in predominantly ‘English’ areas that is less concerned with immigration are away from cosmopolitan areas. and nationalist purity (like the Both parties have a strong leadership FN and UKIP) and more focused cult as Le Pen in the FN and Farage on the adverse effects of the 2008 in UKIP have created a unity of party, financial crisis on Greece and Spain ideology and leader synonymy. This respectively.53 As Greece and Spain cult effect is stronger in the FN as fell victim to the burden of austerity Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, the party and bailouts, unelected EU oversight deputy from is both Marine over these countries’ financial systems 18 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

led to increased public reaction against of PASOK – which lost more than the European project, generating a left- 150 seats in the parliament within wing backlash. a span of five years.55 Just like a true conveyor coalition, Syriza neither had localized support nor ideologically Although they are substantially confined popularity, and it expanded different from one another, its voter base rapidly across Greece and the one similarity between across competing political ideologies. Syriza had successfully adopted a Podemos-Syria on the one conveyor role, which collected fringe, hand, and parties like the FN- disenfranchised groups and carried UKIP on the other, is that they them into hegemonic status. Although all reflect long-accumulated Syriza had a popular leader – Alexis disdain towards Europe and Tsipras – it was not the kind of political elites. leadership cult enjoyed by the Front National in France, which orbited strongly around the Le Pen family – neither was Tsipras a kind of Farage, Syriza is a text-book case conveyor who had adopted a long-term campaign coalition, with a diverse range of strategy around one leader, one issue membership of atheists, Catholics, and one party.56 In addition, up until Greens and Eurosceptics. Ultimately, his self-ejection, Yannis Varoufakis Syriza – as a left-wing party – ended was also an important face of the party, up assuming a coalition government hinting at the fact that the party is far with the – a right- from revolving around a single leader. wing party. The structural problem Greece faces as a whole, enabled all The rise of Podemos has been equally parties and disenfranchised groups to fast, mainly due to the similar structural come together and establish a political constraints Spain was operating under, alliance. As an ideologically fluid, compared to Greece. Podemos too, vote-getting party, Syriza was the best is a Eurosceptic and anti-austerity suited party among alternatives due movement, one which is a reaction to to its ability to remain disconnected the perceived maltreatment by the EU’s to any ideological baggage, becoming financial institutions. The rapid decline the political outlet that could host in the Spanish education, healthcare these diverse groups within itself.54 and higher education systems revealed Syriza’s rise went hand-in-hand with the EU’s inability to contain and the demise of the establishment party resolve the crisis in Spain, leading to 19 Hamid Akın Ünver

successive protests and disenchantment with the Spanish political elite.57 As a Both parties have popular result, Spain and Greece ended up leaders, but their role is different sharing two of the highest levels of than that of Le Pen or Farage – youth unemployment (24% and 51% instead of creating a unification respectively)58 leading to the emergence of a personality cult with a policy of Partido X – a political group evolved issue and anchor party ideology from a hacktivist enterprise – and around the leader, Syriza and Movimento-15, which became two of Podemos use their leaders as an the youth groups that pioneered the anti-austerity and anti-EU sentiments interface connecting the party in the Spanish society.59 It was on the to the voters. shoulders of these two movements that Podemos emerged and became the main Both Syriza and Podemos are ideal political outlet for their grievances. cases of conveyor coalitions: they are The Madrid Mass March of January unattached to a strong ideological 2015 reflected the conveyor coalition position and their agenda-issue aspect of Podemos – even though designations are fluid and varied. the event was organized by a radical- Syriza and Podemos are ‘bridge’ leftist interest, it attracted most of the movements that aim to bring together Spanish that was disenfranchised voters around a policy, against austerity and advocated greater rather than an ideology. Rather than independence from the EU’s financial protecting an identity (‘Spanish-ness’ institutions. Although Podemos is or ‘Greek-ness’) or immigration or ideologically more committed than cultural-identity concerns, these parties Syriza, its ability to refine its discourse are instead focused on protecting and appeal enabled it to become their countries’ financial and labor a ‘catch-all’ party, expanding way beyond its natural ideological support systems from technocratic and elitist threshold. Having been established in encroachments. These parties do not January 2014, Podemos gained 20.68% have a natural geographic support support in the 2015 Cortes Generales hinterland as they aim to unite as many vote, winning 69 of the Congressional regions and ideologies as possible to seats and 16 of the positions.60 carry them into hegemony. Both parties This rapid rise – like that of Syriza – have popular leaders, but their role is contrasts starkly with corrective parties different than that of Le Pen or Farage that spend long years in the fringe – instead of creating a unification of opposition. a personality cult with a policy issue 20 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

and anchor party ideology around the appeal before, have gradually increased leader, Syriza and Podemos use their their popularity by resisting the influx leaders as an interface connecting the of refugees. A second fundamental party to the voters. Finally, neither disdain that brought about the rise of Podemos, nor Syriza has been happy third parties is the economic decline with their fringe status, as both parties and the inability of the political elites expanded their support base rapidly to find a way out of the European after their establishment, quickly rising recession; this is particularly true with to prominence. Spain and Greece.

This article started with a critique that the general lack of interest in The rise of new third parties in the comparative politics literature Europe is certainly a reaction over the study of parties that are neither government (first party), nor against the failure of the existing the main opposition (second party) political system to address obscured our understanding of third new economic, social and party dynamics in Europe. This in demographic challenges that the turn, prevented our ability to forecast continent faces. the emergence and life cycles of third parties, rendering European political systems unable to address the growing appeal of . In order to address Conclusion this literature gap, this article focused specifically on the political behavior of third parties and contributed to The rise of third parties in Europe the literature by introducing two new reflects growing anti-establishment and concepts: ‘corrective’ and ‘conveyor anti-status quo sentiments. In that, the coalition’ party conceptualizations. rise of new third parties in Europe is Crisis periods and fundamental disdain certainly a reaction against the failure of towards the political system bring the existing political system to address about two different types of responses. new economic, social and demographic ‘Corrective parties’ monopolize a rigid challenges that the continent faces. ideological stance and thrive during Anti-immigration sentiment is perhaps periods when the political middle the most critical of these factors as a ground moves towards that stance. diverse group of third parties, whose Conveyor coalitions, on the other hand, nationalist rhetoric found little electoral do not have a rigid ideological position, 21 Hamid Akın Ünver

and seek to move their ideology towards the establishment, a renewed focus the existing political middle ground. on third parties is necessary in order Corrective parties also tend to be more to understand their respective party localized in their support, whereas conveyor coalitions aim to break that systems and electoral behavior. This in localization and seek greater national turn, will yield important evidence on appeal. Corrective parties in turn, are countries’ decisions and happy to remain as a third party for shifts over the long term. extended periods of time and cling onto their ideology, whereas conveyor coalitions seek popularity that will With the intensifying disdain enable them to gain first party status. towards the establishment, a renewed focus on third parties is Third parties have not attracted the necessary in order to understand scholarly attention they deserve, largely their respective party systems owing to their inability to shake the and electoral behavior. existing status quo. However, now, with the intensifying disdain towards

22 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

Endnotes

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3 Andrew Blais and Kenneth Carty, “Does Proportional Representation Foster Voter Turnout?”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 18 (1990), pp. 167-181; Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure, Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1984.

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30 Mads Dagnis Jensen and Holly Snaith, “When Politics Prevails: The Political Economy of A Brexit”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 9 (2016), pp. 1-9. 31 “Smith: ‘A Brexit would reopen the question of Scottish independence’”, at http://www. euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/interview/smith-a-brexit-would-reopen-the-question- of-scottish-independence/ (last visited 9 October 2016). 32 Nicole Berbuir, Marcel Lewandowsky and Jasmin Siri, “The AfD and its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?”, German Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2015), pp. 154-178. 33 “A comparison of Germany’s AfD and France’s National Front”, Deutsche Welle, at http://dw.com/p/1IlnY (last visited 9 October 2016). 34 Stavrakakis, and Katsambekis, “Left-wing populism in the European periphery”, pp. 119-142. 35 Cristina Flesher Fominaya, “Spain is different: Podemos and 15-M”, Open Democracy, Vol. 29 (2014). 36 David Roman and Matt Moffett, “Spanish Antiausterity Party Podemos Holds Massive Rally in Madrid”, Wall Street Journal, 31 January 2015. 37 Meike Dülffer, Carsten Luther and Zacharias Zacharakis, “Caught in the Web of the Russian Ideologues”, Die Zeit, 7 February 2015. 38 “Podemos: Spain Anti-austerity Party Banging on Doors of Power”, BBC News, at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35150771 (last visited 9 October 2016). 39 Michael Lowy and Francis Sitel, “The Far Right in France: The Front National in European Perspective”, Socialist Register, Vol. 52, No. 52 (2015), pp. 51-67. 40 John Evans, P. Burrin and C. Schori-Liang, “‘La politique du dehors avec les raisons du dedans’: Foreign and Defence Policy of the French Front National”, Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist , London, Routledge, 2013, p. 125. 41 Karine Tournier-Sol, “Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a Populist Narrative: UKIP’s Winning Formula?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2015), pp. 140-156. 42 Robert Ford, Matthew J. Goodwin and David Cutts, “Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 Elections”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2012), pp. 204-234. 26 Corrective Parties and Conveyor Coalitions: Explaining the Rise of Third Parties in European Politics

43 Andrew Geddes, “The EU, UKIP and the Politics of Immigration in Britain”, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 85, No. 3 (2014), pp. 289-295. 44 Daniel J. Della Posta, “Competitive Threat, Intergroup Contact, or both? Immigration and the Dynamics of Front National Voting in France”, Social Forces, Vol. 92, No. 1 (2013), pp. 249-273. 45 Nonna Mayer, “From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 1 (2013), pp. 160-178. 46 Ibid. 47 James Shields, “Marine Le Pen and the ‘New’ FN: A Change of Style or of Substance?”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 1 (2013), pp. 179-196. 48 James Shields, “Departmental Elections and the Changing Landscape of French Politics”, Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2016), pp. 1-12. 49 Tournier‐Sol, “Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative Traditions into a Populist Narrative”, pp. 140-156. 50 Darren Kelsey, “Hero Mythology and Right-Wing Populism: A Discourse-Mythological Case Study of Nigel Farage in the Mail Online”, Journalism Studies, 25 March 2015, pp. 1-18. 51 David Runciman, “A Win for ‘Proper People’?: Brexit as a Rejection of the Networked World”, Juncture, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2016), pp. 4-7. 52 Alexandre Dézé, “Le changement dans la continuité: l’organisation partisane du Front national”, Pouvoirs, Vol. 2 (2016), pp. 49-62. 53 John Molyneux, “Editorial”, Irish Marxist Review, Vol. 4, No. 13 (2015), pp. 1-4. 54 Yannis Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis, “Left-wing Populism in the European Periphery: The Case of SYRIZA”, Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2014), No. 119-142. 55 Paris Aslanidis and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Dealing with Populists in Government: The SYRIZA-ANEL Coalition in Greece”, Democratization, Vol. 23, No. 6 (2016), pp. 1-17. 56 Gerrasimos Moschonas, “A New Left in Greece: PASOK’s Fall and SYRIZA’s Rise”, Dissent, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2013), pp. 33-37. 57 Dimitri Sotiropoulos, “Southern European Governments and Public Bureaucracies in the Context of Economic Crisis”, European Journal of Social Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2015), pp. 227-245. 27 Hamid Akın Ünver

58 Marine Karanikolos, et al., “Financial Crisis, Austerity, and Health in Europe”, The Lancet, Vol. 381, No. 9874 (2013), pp. 1323-1331. 59 Marta Pérez Escolar, “Imperfect Bipartisanship and Spanish Pluralism: The Keys to Success of Podemos on Twitter”, (R)evolutionizing Political Communication through Social Media, Hershey, PA. Information Science Reference, 2016, p. 94. 60 Luis Ramiro and Raul Gomez, “Radical-Left Populism during the Great Recession: Podemos and Its Competition with the Established Radical Left”, Political Studies, 22 June 2016.

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