71 70 THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA PALESTINE WAR Palestine. Egypt insisted that the Arab armies which entered Palestine and their airfields were far from the combat areas. Egypt alone had should remain there only long enough to liberate the country and then a navy of any dimensions, and even this was a tiny one. The Palestine tum it over to the Palestine Arabs to run as they wished. But King Arabs themselves proved to be of limited military value once the Pales­ Abdullah of Transjordan (son of Sharif Hussein) did not intend to make tine War broke out. Lacking competent military and political leadership a merely temporary entry into Palestine; he wished to achieve his long­ and adequate military equipment, overwhelmed by Jewish successes, and standing dream of ruling a "Greater Syria," composed of Transjordan, fearful of a repetition of the April Deir Yaseen massacre at the hands of Syria, Palestine, and at least part of Lebanon. the Jewish extremists, the Palestine Arabs--especially those who be­ 3 Jewish leaders in Palestine sought to exploit these inter-Arab differ­ came refugees-were at times more of a military liability than an asset. ences in order to avoid having to face all the Arab armies at the same Although initially the Arabs were better armed than the Israelis, time. Believing that they had a better chance of making a deal with Arab stocks of military equipment, especially ammunition, had never King Abdullah than with any other Arab leader, the Jewish authorities been adequate for war. In the past, Britain had refrained from providing sent a secret mission headed by Mrs. Golda Myerson (later to become the Egyptian, Iraqi, and Transjordanian forces with substantial amounts Golda Meir) to see him shortly before the mandate came to an end in of spare parts and ammunition for the British-made military weapons an effort to keep at least Jordan's highly regarded Arab Legion out of they held, to prevent their possible use against herself and to keep those the impending battle. Even though King Abdullah apparently preferred governments that much more dependent upon British good will. Starting a political to a military solution for Palestine as long as he could make in February, 1948, Britain ceased accepting any more new orders for significant territorial gains there, popular pressures throughout the whole Arab munitions, and shortly after the Palestine War began, she joined Arab world against any agreements with the Jews were too strong for other UN members in an arms embargo aimed at the Arab states and him to ignore; so the secret peace mission failed. 2 Israel. Lacking an adequate stock of ammunition for their largely Brit­ ish-style weapons, the main Arab armies were ill prepared for any pro­ INITIAL ARAB AND JEWISH FORCES tracted war. Besides, much of the available military equipment was On May 15, 1948, the five Arab states most directly involved in the obsolete, and some of it proved defective. In the absence of adequate Palestine crisis maintained a total of some 70,000 to 80,000 troops of roads between the various Arab armies and the different war fronts, it varying qualities. Partly because there was a need to keep some soldiers became difficult to assure sufficient military liaison between them and to within their own borders to maintain internal peace and order and shift troops from one front to another as needed. The Arab supply lines partly because the Arab governments had gravely underestimated Jew­ were frequently long, and the Arabs' maintenance and supply services ish strength and determination while grossly overestimating their own were inefficient.4 military capabilities, the Arab states dispatched only about 20,000 to The Jewish Agency had ordered a partial mobilization of Jewish 25,000 troops to help the "Arab Liberation Army" and the armed manpower as early as November, 1947, and a complete mobilization on Palestine Arabs. These included approximately 8,000 to 10,DOO Egyp­ May 2, 1948. On May 15, the Haganah, made up of 60,000 to 70,000 tians, 2,000 to 4,000 Iraqis, 4,000 to 5,000 Jordanians, 3,000 to 4,000 trained members, became the backbone of the Israeli army. Some 20,000 Syrians, 1,000 to 2,000 Lebanese, and token units from Saudi Arabia to 25,000 had served in various Western military forces during World and Yemen. Except for Transjordan's Arab Legion, most of the Arab War II and had thus gained invaluable experience in modern warfare. troops were poorly trained and led, inexperienced in modem warfare, Extensive women's auxiliary services had been organized to save as and fighting far from home. The Arab armies lacked the technicians many able-bodied men as possible for combat. The extremist Irgun and and specialists so greatly needed in modem warfare. Furthermore, be­ Stern Gang maintained several thousand armed fighters of their own cause of jealousies and rivalries, the Arab leaders could not agree either who operated independently of the Haganah until all Israeli forces were on an effective unified military command or on an over-all military fully integrated in late June. Different authorities have estimated the policy. Each separate army fought on its own front without seriously total number of persons in the Israeli armed services on May 15 as from coordinating military strategy or even exchanging vital military infor­ 35,000 to 80,000." Moreover, Israel added greatly to her manpower in mation with the others. While only Egypt, Iraq, and Syria possessed sig- . two ways: (1) some 30,000 new immigrants, selected carefully with the nificant air power, they assigned too few of their planes to the battle, war effort in mind, entered Israel between May 15 and August 9, 1948; 72 THE A R A B-1 S RAE LID I L E M M A PALESTINE WAR 73 (2) foreign volunteers, especially from among those Jews and non-Jews old men, women, and children performing everything but combat duty, who had military and technical skills most urgently needed by the Israeli almost every Israeli soldier could be employed with maximum effect in armed services, were encouraged to come to Israel. Harry Sacher, a the front lines. Moreover, the Israelis, realizing that the fate of their British writer and Zionist, estimated that these volunteers came from cherished state was gravely threatened and there was little if any room fifty-two different countries and ultimately made up 18 per cent of the for retreat, often fought with great courage and tenacity. They also bene­ Israeli armed forces. The official Israel Digest stated that "these volun­ fited greatly from their able political and military leadership, from a teers formed the nucleus of the Israel Air Force, Navy, Tank Corps and highly effective intelligence system which over the years had provided radar units." 6 Israeli officers with the detailed data and information so essential to suc­ Initially, the principal weakness of the Jewish forces was lack of cessful military planning, and from the vast financial help that poured in arms. Even before World War II, the Jews had begun to acquire weap­ from Jews in the United States and other Western countries. Long before ons, primarily small arms, legally and illegally. During and shortly after May 15, the Israelis had established new settlements at various stra­ the war these activities were intensified, and an extensive arms purchas­ tegically important places and provided these, as well as the older settle­ ing organization with agents in the United States and Europe bought ments, with trained men and some of the scarce military equipment. All much surplus equipment. Because it was too risky for the Jews to smug­ of these factors were eventually to play a decisive role in enabling the gle in this war material while Britain remained in control of Palestine, Israelis to win the Palestine War. the purchased munitions were stored in Europe pending the day when PALESTINE WAR, 1948 they could be shipped safely to Palestine. Shortly before the mandate ended, about thirty shiploads of men, food, and munitions left European Immediately after the mandate ended on May 15, the Arab states and other ports for Israel. On the night of May 14-15, some of these dispatched part of their armed forces into Palestine in order to save the ships entered Israeli ports, and their cargoes were unloaded and rushed country for her Arab inhabitants. One Egyptian column moved up along to the battle fronts. Moreover, by quickly converting ordinary industries the coast to within twenty miles of Tel Aviv, while another advanced via into war industries, the technically proficient Jews were soon able to Beersheba to the southern suburbs of Jerusalem. The Arab Legion en­ manufacture and/or improvise large numbers of armored cars, mortars, tered Palestine from the east to occupy the Old City of Jerusalem, plus and other vitally needed items. (Neither the Palestine Arabs nor the adjacent areas. Iraqi troops were sent in to bolster or take over from other Arabs possessed the facilities or skills to produce any of their own Arab Legion contingents on the central front west and northwest of military equipment in this way.) As a result of all of these endeavors, Jerusalem. Syrian units crossed into northeastern Palestine, while a Israel was quickly able to surmouut her deficiency in weapons, and thus small Lebanese force entered from the north to join the "Arab Libera­ suffered less from the UN-imposed arms embargo than did the Arabs. tion Army" fighting in the Galilee sector. In the beginning, the Arab When the war broke out, Israel was faced with a number of weak­ armies generally assumed the offensive and seemed to be making rea­ nesses other than that involving the lack of arms.