PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PALESTINE, 1948

JUSTUS D. DOENECKE

Deparlrnenl of Hitory. New College of the University of South Florida

Foreign Relalions of the United Staler. 1948, Vol. V: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Part 11. Washington, D.C.: US. Government Printing Office, 1976.

"We have no long-term Palestine policy. We do tial campaign. Israel herself, always the vastly have a short-term, open-ended policy which is outnumbered party, fought against British- set from time to time by White House direc- backed Arab armies to retain her sovereignty, tives" (p. 1222). So wrote a member of the although in so doing she gained additional ter- State Department Policy Planning Staff, Gor- ritory. Fortunately for the United States, she don P. Merriam, in July 1948. In a much- was - from the outset - not only the "sole awaited volume of the Foreign Relations series, democracy" in the Middle East but a militantly the truth of Merriam's observation is driven anti-Communist nation, a country that served home. as a bulwark against Soviet penetration of the According to the conventional wisdom, the Middle East. Palestinian refugees were en- United Nations in effect established the state of couraged by their own leadership to leave; in Israel, doing so when the General Assembly fact they ignored Jewish pleas that they remain voted for the partition of Palestine in in the land of their birth. At no time did Arabs November of 1947. President Truman ardently attempt to establish a state on the area allocated and consistently believed in a Zionist state, and them by partition. Although Israel continually hence was taken aback when Warren R. Austin, sought negotiation, the Arab nations would not American Ambassador to the Security Council, even agree to recognize her existence, much less in March 1948 announced that the United discuss peace. States was abandoning partition and suppor- The real story, of course, is a far more com- ting a UN trusteeship. As Margaret Truman plex one, and the new Foreign Relations writes in her memoirs (Harry S. Truman, 1973), volume sheds indispensable light on this com- the President never formally committed himself plexity. The volume itself begins in January to this plan. Even before the British mandate 1948, in the wake of the partition resolution. ended, Arabs launched massive assaults against On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly Jewish settlements, never once seeking com- had passed Resolution 181, which had recom- promise with the Jewish Agency. Although mended (a) the partition of Palestine into Arab some Palestinian Jews took the offensive, these and Jewish states (b) an economic union be- were terrorists of the Irgun and Stern Gang, not tween the two new states administered by a the recognized Zionist forces known as the joint economic board and (c) an independent Haganah. Jerusalem under UN trusteeship. A UN com- The scenario continues. When Truman mission was to supervise Palestine's. transition recognized the state of Israel in May 1948, do- from British mandate to two Independent nay ing so as soon as David Ben-Gurion announced tions. its formation, he did not do so for political On January 20, 1948, the State Department's reasons but for humanitarian ones. In fact, he Policy Planning Staff, directed by George F. had already written off New York State, where Kennan, found partition unworkable. As its many Jews vote, in the forthcoming presiden- memo noted, increasingly influential Irgun and 344 JUSTUS D . DOENECKE Stern elements within the Zionist movement Other State Department officials were also were committed to far greater boundaries; the skeptical of partition. For example, on January Arabs of Palestine and the Arab states 26, Dean Rusk, chief of the State Department's vehemently opposed partition, much less the UN division, found "serious doubt that there is proposed economic union (although on legal authority for the United Nations to im- November 29, the latter expressed their will- pose a recommendation of the General ingness to accept the principle of a federal state Assembly by force upon the Arab inhabitants in Palestine)."' Given Moslem proclamations of the proposed Jewish state" (p. 558). And of a jihad against the Jews and the irregular early in February, George Wadsworth, military units being organized in Arab states to American Ambassador to Iraq, told Truman fight in Palestine, war was inevitable. The UN that Arab leaders were convinced that partition made no provision for enforcing partition, so betrayed America's own principles of "self- Soviet troops could intervene, causing the determination and majority rule". Over forty United States in turn to do likewise. America per cent of the new Jewish state, he said, would could well be outflanked in the Eastern be Arabs "whose ancestors had owned the land Mediterranean. for many centuries" (p. 597). The consequences of partition, the document State Department anxieties could only be continued, were ominous. The "more moderate confirmed by the report of Robert B. Macatee, and intellectual" Arab leaders might be replac- US Consul General at Jerusalem, dated ed by irresponsible elements; hatred of Zionism February 9. "The Government of Palestine", might extend to include all Westerners; Russia he claimed, "is admittedly in a state of might use the partition precedent to set up pup- disintegration". Vital government services were pet regimes in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and long interrupted, with both Jewish and Arab Macedonia; and Jews could be openly harassed communities refusing to compromise (p. 606). in Moslem countries. Arab regimes could Troops from Iraq and Syria carried out attacks cancel British and American air bases, cease on Jewish settlements, while Jewish armed pipeline construction (and on February 21 the groups took the offensive in Jaffa, Jerusalem, Arab League tentatively agreed to deny and Tireh. "Such activities are designed, accor- American firms pipeline rights until the US ding to the Jews, to force the Arabs into a altered its Palestine policy),[" drastically curb passive state", so reported Macatee. The American trade, and close down United States British, he continued, "cannot get out of schools and missions (pp. 546-554). Palestine too soon" (pp. 609-612). While finding "all of us" to blame for the Soon the State Department sought a UN Palestine imbroglio, Kennan claimed on trusteeship, said trusteeship substituting for January 29 that "the main responsibility will partition and replacing the British mandate un- have to rest with the Jewish leaders and til Jews and Arabs could work out a modus organizations who have pushed so persistently vivendi. If the Policy Planning Staff still hoped for the pursuit of objectives which could scarce- for Arab acquiescence in partition (p. 6211, it ly fail to lead to violent results" (p. 580). On still suggested on February 14 that the United February 24, the diplomat denied that the con- States simply give lip service to the partition flict had "direct relation to our national securi- resolution; it should not press the Security ty", found "past commitments" of "dubious Council for its implementation (p. 629). The wisdom", warned against "domestic National Security Council, in a draft report pressures", and called for "a fairly radical dated February 17, opposed the sending of reversal of the trend of our present policy". American troops to Palestine; partition, so the Otherwise, he argued, the United States alone NSC claimed, should not be enforced "against would be immediately responsible for protec- the objections of the inhabitants of Palestine" ting the Jewish population against the Arabs or (p. 632). The Central Intelligence Agency also wit~.essinga Russian presence in the area (p. denied that partition could be implemented (pp. 657). 666 -675). On February 21, the State Depart- PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PALESTINE, 1948 345 ment claimed that the UN Charter did not em- If the Arab states did not accept partition, he power the Security Council to enforce partition continued, they should be branded aggressors. (p. 639), and Austin spoke to this effect before Oil diplomacy, said Clifford, would not be a the Security Council (p. 653). factor. "The fact of the matter is that the Arab On March 5, George C. Marshall told Austin states must have oil royalties or go broke", he to seek a trusteeship in the UN, one lasting until wrote, claiming that they could only get the "the people of Palestine are ready for self- dollars they needed from the United States. For government". Although the United States, said example, he maintained, ninety per cent of the Secretary of State, should not "go on Saudi revenues derived from American oil record as voting against partition", it should royalties. Arab states would automatically request "the Secretary-General to convoke im- spurn Soviet overtures, he went on, acting in mediately a special session of the General the realization that Russian influence Assembly to consider the Palestine question automatically threatened "their social and further" (p. 681). Marshall hoped to embarrass economic structure". On the other hand, col- the Soviets, strong supporters of partition, lapse of UN authority in Jewish Palestine might declaring that they should be made to show result in unilateral Russian intervention. Hence how partition could be carried out peacefully the United States should abandon "the when Jews, Arabs and Great Britain were all ridiculous role of trembling before threats of a taking irreconcilable positions (p. 702). The few nomadic desert tribes". AIL such advice, he Soviet representative to the UN, Andrei added, was "completely uninfluenced" by the Gromyko, professed ignorance on the topic, forthcoming presidential elections (pp. but still did not want the plan modified (p. 690 -696). 734). Further protests came from Moshe Shertok Within the White House, however, opposi- (later Sharett), head of the Political Depart- tion to a trusteeship was already developing. ment of the Jewish Agency, who told Under Early in February, Truman had referred to Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett on "the fanaticism of our New York Jews" (p. February 21 that an imposed trusteeship would 593), and on February 19 he assured Marshall merely create Arab violence and fortify Jewish that "we could disregard all political factors" extremists, while turning all Palestine into a (p. 633). However, Clark Clifford, Special united Arab state. The Jews, Shertok said, Counsel to the President, adamantly stood for would be a minority, left to the mercy of the continuing the partition policy. In a memo to Arab majority (p. 646). On March 13, Shertok the President dated March 8, he claimed that claimed that Palestinian Jews were ready to "the American people" opposed "acts of ap- sign "any paper guarantee" that would assure peasement toward the Arabs" and listed Arab rights in the new state; however, "they various resolutions endorsing a Jewish preferred trust in their good faith and self in- homeland. (In quoting from the Balfour terest". With so many "Jewish hostages Declaration, he overlooked portions that pro- throughout the world", Jews in Palestine vided continuance of "civil and religious rights would be "living in a glass house . . .under the of the existing non-Jewish communities in severe light of world opinion" (p. 716). Palestine".) Clifford endorsed US cooperation Arab alternatives suddenly became visible. with an international security force, one that On March 14, some Arab delegates to the UN, would draw upon American volunteers; Rus- including those from Syria, Lebanon, and sian troops, he said, would comprise no more Egypt, claimed that their own states, and the than one-tenth of the total unit. Calling for the Arab Higher Committee, would agree to either lifting of the American arms embargo, he a unitary or federalized state, or to trusteeship. claimed that such action would give "the Under the first two schemes, the state would be Jewish militia and Haganah, which are striving ruled by a bicameral legislature, with Jews to implement the UN decision, equal oppor- equally represented in the Senate; up to 100,000 tunity with the Arabs to arm for self-defense". Jews could enter the new nation each year for JUSTUS D. DOENECKE from two to three years, with a lesser number same number from Great Britain. In addition, admitted each year thereafter (p. 724). it would necessitate early implementation of Four days later, the United States, France, selective service, over-extend U.S. armed forces and China called for a frusteeship (p. 740), and overseas, and create additional expense (p. Willard L. Thorp, Acting Secretary of State, 800). On April 19, Secretary of Defense James cabled Austin, telling him that the US would A. Forrestal reported that any such troop only support enforcement measures connected allocation would leave no forces available for with such a policy (p. 742). On the following other areas (pp. 832- 833). On the same day, day, Austin addressed the UN. Coming out for Rusk told the General Assembly that the United trusteeship, he denied that partition could be States lacked the military capability to fight a enforced peacefully. (On February 16, the UN war in Palestine (p. 833). However, Marshall Palestine Commission had predicted that unen- warned the British ten days later that if Arab forced partition would result in "uncontrolled, nations invaded Palestine, UN forces would widespread strife and bloodshed" .[p. 6311.) have to intercede. And if these Arab troops in- The editors of the State Department volume, cluded contingents from Transjordan, a British drawing upon both Department memos and ally, the United States would hold the United professional historians, imply that Truman had Kingdom responsible (p. 865). Foreign full knowledge of the trusteeship proposal and delegates to the UN refused to commit gave it his approval (pp. 744 -750). themselves to a trusteeship until America ex- On April 1, the Security Council endorsed pressed its willingness to send troops (p. 845). resolutions calling for both a truce and a special Things were obviously in limbo. Chaim session of the General Assembly, its task being Weizmann, president of the World Zionist to consider the future government of Palestine Organization and soon to be Israel's first presi- (p. 777). On the following day, the State dent, wrote Truman on April 9. There was, he Department drafted its own trusteeship plan, said, no assurance that "a trustee is available, one that would assure "the territorial integrity that Arabs or Jews will cooperate, that the of Palestine" (p. 779) and use a plebiscite to General Assembly will approve an agreement or ascertain the view of "the majority of the that any effective measures can be improvised registered members of both the Arab and by May 15th", the latter being the date that the Jewish communities of Palestine". Both com- British mandate was due to expire. The Jewish munities would have to approve any plan sub- people, he claimed, faced the choice of mitted to the UN (p. 796). To the State Depart- "Statehood" or "extermination" (pp. ment, at any rate, partition was dead, although 808 -809). Truman publicly declared on March 25 that he The Zionists obviously planned to go ahead still favored partition for the future (p. 760). with statehood. On April 15, Weizmann told Enforcement factors soon played their role. American delegates to the UN that, if there Loy W. Henderson, Director of the State were no two-thirds majority in the General Department's Office of Near Eastern and Assembly for trusteeship, the Jews of Palestine African Affairs, warned Marshall that enforc- had the legal right to establish their own nation. ing a trusteeship might require "the shedding of The Arabs, he said, were too weak to resist, and American blood in Palestine" (p. 756). To economic needs left them unable to cut off oil reduce such dangers, Henderson continued, the sales to the United States. Touching on a dif- United States must avoid "Zionist pressures", ferent point, Weizmann claimed that, since the cooperate with the British, defuse the Palestine 1920s, there was no possibility of the Jewish issue in the forthcoming presidential election, state going Bolshevik (p. 423). When Marshall end illegal arms smuggling into Palestine, and told an off-the-record press conference on bring Jews and Arabs together (p. 757). The April 28 that an armistice had virtually been Joint Chiefs, in a memo dated April 4, reached, Shertok told the Secretary thenext day predicted that American military involvement that the Jewish Agency opposed the proposed would require 46,000 US. troops as well as the UN truce. It would defer statehood and thereby PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PALESTINE, 1948 347 prejudice "our rights and position" (p. 875). United States" and convince them to "prevail The famous Deir Yassin incident was now upon the Jews in Palestine to adopt a reported. On April 13, the American consul at reasonable and conciliatory attitude". The Jerusalem cabled Marshall, informing the Secretary should also tell Arab representatives Secretary that Irgun and Sternist forces attack- that mass fighting in Palestine would create ed Deir Yassin, an Arab village several miles "political and economic disaster" in the Arab west of Jerusalem. "Attacks killed 250 persons, world (pp. 841 -842). of whom half, by thdr [Zionist forces] own ad- One of the more interesting documents in the mission to American correspondents, were State Department collection concerns women and children", his bulletin said (p. 817). Marshall's conversation on May 4 with Dr. (Historian Howard M. Sachar calls Deir Yassin Judah Magnes, president of the Hebrew "the most savage" of Zionist "reprisal University in Jerusalem. Magnes, who had long actions", as "more than two hundred Arab sought a binational state in Palestine, asked the men, women, and children were slain, their United States to impose economic sanctions on bodies afterward mutilated and thrown into a both sides. Calling the Jewish community there well".)131 "an artificial development", he predicted that Then, on May 3, Consul Thomas C. Wasson sanctions could halt "the Jewish war machine" reported from Jerusalem that Arab armies had (P gw. not yet invaded Palestine; however, thousands But the White House was slowly shifting, of individual Arabs were fleeing the country. moving eventually in the direction of recogniz- The recent battle at Jaffa, Wasson claimed, was ing the new Jewish state that Weizmann an- started by the Irgun, with the Haganah "taking nounced would be created on May IS. On May over in the midst of battle". (Sachar writes that 11, Rusk claimed that rejection of a truce by when Zionists captured Jaffa on May 14, the both parties "cuts the heart out of trusteeship" local Arab population of 70,000 fled in (p. 966). At a meeting with various government terror.)['' Referring to both Deir Yassin and advisers held on May 12, Clifford called for im- Jaffa, Wasson reported: "Until recently Irgun mediate recognition of the Jewish state, a sug- started such operations; if successful were con- gestion that Lovett termed "a very transparent tinued by Haganah; if not were repudiated by effort to win the Jewish vote". The United responsible Jewish quarters" (p. 890). States, said the Under Secretary, would be On the next day, Robert M. McClintock, recognizing a nation while the General special assistant to Rusk, drafted a memoran- Assembly was still considering the further dum (unsent) to Lovett. The refusal of the government of the whole Palestine area. Mar- Jewish Agency to accept on-the-spot truce shall warned that if Truman followed negotiations, said McClintock, clearly revealed Clifford's advice, he - the Secretary - would its intent "to go steadily ahead with the Jewish "vote against the President". Truman, acting separate state by force of arms". If the Jewish over Clifford's objection, endorsed a State Agency, which had military responsibility, Department resolution to the General Assembly sought to round out the state after May 15, calling for a truce and a UN Commission (pp. "the Jews" would be "the actual aggressor" 975 -976), whose major task would include against "the Arabs" (p. 894). promoting "agreement on the future govern- Meanwhile, on April 20, Austin called for a ment of Palestine" (p. 979). Truman claimed to trusteeship in the UN (p. 836), but Henderson be well aware of "the political risks involved remained anxious. .Two days later, Henderson which he, himself, would run" (p. 976). Far told Lovett that the Palestine problem should from being a consistent and enthusiastic cham- "no longer. . . be treated as a football of pion of the Jewish state, Truman was obviously domestic politics, but as a matter seriously in- wavering. volving the security of the United States". Mar- Nothing, however, had yet been resolved. shall, he said, should meet with "the outstan- Although the State Department draft resolution ding leaders of the Jewish Community in the indicated that America no longer saw partition 348 JUSTUS D. DOENECKE as workable (p. 979), Weizmann pointed to the feared that the whole U.S. delegation might November General Assembly resolution as resign en mane (p. 993). On May 19, Austin legitimizing the creation of his new nation (p. declared that recognition had "deeply under- 982), and on May 12 the United States dropped mined the confidence of other delegations in support of the trusteeship plan. Clifford soon our integrity". The "feeling" prevailed, he began making arrangements with Eliahu Eps- continued, that "the Jews . . . violatedspirit of tein (later Eliahu Elath), director of the Jewish truce effort, and prevented conclusion of for- Agency's political office in Washington, to ex- mal truce", with the United States tacitly en- pedite American recognition (p. 989), and dorsing such violations and thereby harming Truman recognized the Provisional Govern- the UN effectiveness (p. 1014). ment of Israel hours after its birth (p. 992). The British were furious. Foreign Secretary The State Department, of course, was resting Ernest Bevin told American ambassador Lewis uneasy all this time. Wasson reported on May W. Douglas on May 22 that American recogni- 13 that, with the exception of the Irgun attack tion "had cut the ground from under the ef- on Jaffa and Haganah occupation of certain forts which we were making, not entirely unsuc- areas on the Jerusalem -Tel Aviv road, Palesti- cessfully, with the Arabs on the bases of these nian Jews had strictly observed the partition United States proposals" (p. 1034- 1035). Two boundaries. He noted, however, that David days later, Bevin denied that Transjordan's Ben-Gurion, chairman of the provisional Arab Legion entered "any part of the area Zionist Council of State, "had always said that recommended for the Jewish state by the the main aim of Jews was to get all of Assembly". Furthermore, Legion attacks on Palestine", that Haifa was under Jewish parts of Jerusalem resulted from "the breaking domination and the former Arab city at Jaffa of cease-fire by the Jews" (p. 1038). now deserted, and that "most representative Kennan wrote another one of his analytical Arabs have fled to neighboring countries" (p. memos, this one expressing "deepest apprehen- 985). On the same day, Marshall told varied sion over the trend of U.S. policy". He diplomatic offices that internal weaknesses repeated the warnings of the Policy Planning made Arab activity in Palestine most difficult. Staff that the United States should undertake Iraq, he said, had recently suffered from no major responsibility "for the maintenance strikes, neither Lebanon nor Syria had any real and security of a Jewish state in Palestine". army, the Saudis could barely keep their own Current American actions, he said, "threaten tribes in order, and Transjordan depended on not only to place in jeopardy some of our most British officers (p. 983). vital interests in the Middle East and the It was, however, Truman's recognition that Mediterranean but also disrupt the unity of the caused the real consternation. Clifford pointed western world and to undermine our entire to "unbearable pressure" to "recognize the policy toward the Soviet Union" (p. 1021). Jewish state promptly" (p. 1005). while Lovett Lovett, in forwarding Kennan's recommenda- feared that the President's action might lose tion to Marshall, concurred (p. 1022). "the effects of many years of hard work in the Israel wasted little time in seeking U.S. Middle East with the Arabs" (p. 1006). A assistance. On May 25, ten days after Arab General Assembly resolution of May 14, forces attacked Palestine, Weizmann sought authorizing a UN mediator for Palestine, had American lifting of the arms embargo, declar- involved no recognition of either Israel or parti- ing that the new nation-state of Israel needed tion (pp. 994-995). Henderson stressed that "anti-tank weapons; anti-aircraft weapons; recognition was de facto; it did not necessarily planes; and heavy artillery" (p. 1042). In addi- involve US. commitment to the partition tion, he desired a loan from the Export-im- boundaries (p. 1002). port bank (p. 1043). The Division of Near When the news of Truman's actions reached Eastern Affairs declared that Arabs would the UN, the American delegation saw its labors perceive the lifting of the embargo as "an for truce and mediation undercut. Marshall American declaration of war", a move that PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PALESTINE, 1948 349 would "immediately evoke hostile and violent June 28, 1948, by UN mediator Count Folke mob reaction against the United States" (p. Bernadotte at Rhodes. Bernadotte differed in 1060). that he recommended the inclusion of The new nation also wanted "the right kind" Jerusalem into Arab territory (with municipal of diplomatic envoy. On May 26, Weizmann autonomy for the Jewish community), further sought full exchange of diplomatic represen- consideration of Jaffa's status, a free port at tatives (p. 1051), and Shertok wanted the Haifa, and a free air terminal at Lydda (p. United States to send someone of ministerial 1154). He also called for the rights of refugees rank (p. 1074). Clifford opposed sending a to return home without restriction, review of career diplomat, preferring, he said, "a big immigration at the end of two years, and com- calibre man of large reputation". When mon defense and economic cooperation with Truman chose James G. McDonald, a strong Jordan (p. 1153). Zionist proponent, as Special Representative to Both parties rejected Bernadotte's proposals, Israel, Lovett immediately protested. The with the Arabs still holding out for a united Under Secretary was soon informed by Clifford state (p. 1192) and Israel particularly fearful of that the President would brook no opposition immigration restrictions (p. 1191). On July 9, (p. 1311). Arab officials formally rejected a truce that Now that the Zionist state was recognized, lasted almost a month, and Zionist forces soon the State Department sought modification of its took the offensive, gaining territory in Galilee, boundaries. On June 23, McClintock drafted a the Negev, and northern Gaza. Israel was "Top Secret" memorandum calling for a new no "David" fighting an Arab "Goliath", as drawing of boundaries, one that followed the its committed troops - so a CIA estimate noted Peel Report of 1937. McClintock asserted that - outnumbered the Arabs over two to one. Israel's jagged borders ("a portrait by Picasso", "The Jews", said the CIA, "may now be he noted) were "fantastic" in the absence of strong enough to launch a full-scale offensive economic union with an Arab state. He sug- and drive the Arab forces out of Palestine" (p. gested Israeli control of the coastal area from 1244). Tel Aviv to Haifa, with a considerable portion In general, Bernadotte was pessimistic. Early of western Galilee included. In turn, Transjor- in August, he noted that Israel demanded all dan would receive areas of the Negev allocated Galilee by right of conquest, a corridor from to Israel by partition. Such "freezing" of Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, and the return of the Israel's boundaries, McClintock asserted, Negev, awarded it under the partition provi- would guard "the Arab states against the wider sions. In addition, he learned that Israel would pretensions of the Jewish revisionists and such not negotiate on boundaries as a condition of fanatics as those of the Irgun who have preten- the peace settlement (p. 1316). sions to the conquest of Transjordan". Mc- Jerusalem was a particularly sticky point. On Clintock also called for Jerusalem's interna- August 4, Consul General John J. Macdonald tionalization under UN auspices: "to allow reported that Arab leaders in Jerusalem Jerusalem to be a Jewish capital", he wrote, favored demilitarization of the city while the "would incite reciprocal emotion in the Arabs" military governor of Jewish Jerusalem was (pp. 1134 - 1138). Acting U.S. representative to obstinate in his refusal (p. 1277). The Israeli the UN, Philip Jessup, concurred in such government argued in part that Christian indif- recommendations, to which he added official ference to the city justified its control (p. 1286). international recognition of Israel's de fac- Israel, Bernadotte suspected, was merely using to control of Jaffa (p. 1166). By September 1, delaying tactics pending the time it could "de- Marshall had approved the bulk of these mand Jerusalem be included in Jewish state" recommendations (p. 1368). (p. 1287). Pessimistic concerning Jewish inten- State Department recommendations concern- tions in Jerusalem, Macdonald recommended ing the Negev and western Galilee were that Israeli intransigence be criticized publicly somewhat similar to those proposals offered on by both the UN and the US (p. 1302). 350 JUSTUS D. DOENECKE The United States, however, continued to however, its application would "convince resist major responsibilities for Palestine, refus- Arabs that real intention of Jews is to dispossess ing Bernadotte's request for American marines refugee Arabs of property and enterprises in in Jerusalem (p. 1235). On August 19, Forrestal Israel in order to provide space and economic told the National Security Council that troop opportunities for Jewish immigrants" (p. deployment to Palestine would jeopardize con- 1155). Bevin called for international efforts to nections to other parts of the world "vital to settle Jewish refugees elsewhere, so as to United States security" (p. 1322). Both Israel "remove feeling that world is trying to solve and Arab forces, so the State Department sug- problem, which Arabs had no part in creating, gested, should contribute "small well- at expense of Arabs alone" (p. 1249). disciplined military units . . . .to assist in George C. Marshall was also disturbed. The demilitarization and to control possible ex- Secretary of State called for gradual Israeli ab- tremist outbreaks" (p. 1305). also adding that sorption of Arab refugees, declaring that other- "Palestinian Arabs should . . . have right of wise Israel would be giving the impression that expressing their views in some manner" (p. assimilation of Jewish immigrants was taking 1305). place at the expense of the former Arab in- At this point the refugee issue started coming habitants. Failure to partially repatriate the to the fore. As Professor Sachar notes, there refugees "might create difficulties", wrote the were various reasons for the flight, an exodus Secretary of State, "for 265,000 Jews per- that reached nearly 175,000 during the last manently residing in Arab states" (p. 1311). weeks of the mandate. Despite Zionist claims, Israel, however, remained intransigent on the Sachar finds no evidence for the charge that the issue. Early in August, Shertok told Bernadotte Arab governments themselves called for that Arab refugees would constitute a fifth col- evacuation. On the contrary, he notes, the Arab umn. According to the American Charge in League told Palestinians to stay put. Once on Cairo, Shertok said that "Economically PGI the offensive, Israel "encouraged" about [Provisional Government of Israel] had no 100,000 Arab inhabitants of Lydda, Ramle, room for Arabs since their space was needed and surrounding villages to flee, often doing so for Jewish immigrants", to which Bernadotte by spreading tough warnings ahead of them. By replied that it seemed anomalous for Zionists to July 9, the number of Arab refugees reached demand the migration to Palestine of Jewish 300,000, proof - writes Sachar - that "the displaced persons when they refused to Jewish republic" was "capable of waging recognize the refugee problem "they had ruthless and brutal warfare on its own"."] created" (p. 1295). Bernadotte himself had The State Department received similar witnessed the seizure of Arab property by Jews reports. Aubrey E. Lippincott, Consul at (p. 1295). Haifa, noted on June 23 that Arabs returning State Department concern continued. Noting to Haifa were considered aliens. Since they had the Arab refugees who fled from Haifa on to obtain identity cards and swear allegiance to April 21 -22, and from Jaffa on Apdl25, and the Israeli state, the remaining Arabs determin- recalling Jewish promises of safeguards for ed to leave (p. 1138). Four days later, American Arab minorities, Marshall accused Israel of Consul General Macdonald cabled that Sher- "callous treatment of this tragic issue" (p. tok, now Israel's Foreign Minister, declared 1367). Rusk too was concerned, claiming that that Arabs could not return until a general "Israel may be using the fate of these unfor- political settlement was made, an attitude that tunate people to enhance its bargaining posi- - so Macdonald predicted - would only in- tion". "A substantial number of refugees", he crease refugee bitterness (p. 1151). Upon hear- contended, could be permitted to return ing that Israel would bar 300,000 refugees, Jef- "without prejudice to the domestic security of ferson Patterson, Charge in Egypt, claimed the state of Israel" (p. 1332). Epstein, now that "such action can no doubt be justified as representative of the Provisional Government necessary security measure for new state"; of Israel, confirmed Rusk's analysis, declaring PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PALESTINE, 1948 351 that "this question would be of importance to gress report to the UN, given on September 16, them [the Israelis] as a bargaining point" in show how he modified his original proposal by negotiations with the Arab states (p. 1347). making concessions to Israel by seeking inter- By the middle of August, Marshall was nationalization of Jerusalem, deleting becoming strongly critical of Israel. On August economic union with Transjordan, and assign- 16, Marshall sent Truman a secret memo in ing all Galilee to Israel. However, his report in- which he questioned Israel's desire to maintain cluded "the right" of Arab refugees to return a current peace. He listed several factors - at the earliest possible date. "The Arab in- military occupation of much of Jerusalem, habitants of Palestine", Bernadotte wrote, systematic violation of the UN truce, continual "are not citizens or subjects of Egypt, Iraq, sniping against Arab positions, reception of Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan, the States arms from France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia which are at present providing them with a - that cast light on Israeli sincerity, noting as refuge and the basic necessities of life" (pp. well Shertok's official proclamation that Israel 1401- 1406). They also cover Bernadotte's would not currently accept those 300,000 assassination (pp. 1414 - 1415) and Marshall's refugees who, said Marshall, "fled from their endorsement of September 21, without White homes and are now destitute in nearby Arab House permission, of the UN mediator's new areas". Russia, so feared the Secretary of State, proposals (p. 1416). would take advantage of the crisis to "foment Neither side liked Bernadotte's final sugges- trouble" in Iran and Iraq, while Israeli tions. Most Arab representatives stressed that hostilities against Transjordan might pit the Haifa, Jaffa, and Galilee recently had a majori- US. against Britain (pp. 1313 - 1315). ty of Arabs (p. 1423). Yet Fawzi Bey, senior Soviet strategy, as revealed by the Syrian Egyptian delegate to the General Assembly, minister to Moscow Zeineddine to Walter made no objection to the existence of the state Bedell Smith, American ambassador to Russia, of Israel. The Arabs, said Bey, no longer remained constant. Continued support for desired a unitary state in Palestine; indeed Israel, commented the Syrian, would lead to negotiations with Israel could begin once the further Arab setbacks, which in turn would Arab refugees were permitted to return home discredit the "ruling classes" in the eyes of their (pp. 1424- 1426). Israel, too, opposed the people. If the Arabs were given no other choice, plan, with Shertok claiming that Israel needed they would seek aid from the Soviets (pp. an "adequate area in which to live and grow" 1370- 1371). (p. 1453). All of Galilee, he told Marshall on Particularly intriguing is the "Jordanian con- October 5, was needed for defense, while the nection". On March 12, in a conference of Negev was essential for absorbing immigrants Truman and administration officials, it was (p. 1453). learned that Shertok had recently hinted of a Despite Marshall's endorsement, the White "behind the door" deal with Abdullah ibn House warned against accepting the Bernadotte Hussein, King of Transjordan. If Abdullah plan in its entirety. Clifford called Lovett from took over the Arab portion of Palestine, said Truman's campaign train in Tulsa on Shertok, the Jews could establish their September 29, telling the Acting Secretary of sovereign state without any need to make a State that "pressure from the Jewish groups on truce with the Palestinian Arabs (p. 973). On the President was mounting and that it was as January 3, 1949, the State Department con- bad as the time of the trusteeship suggestion" tinued its endorsement of a "Jordanian solu- (p. 1430). In a secret memo dated September tion" (p. 1706). At the same time, Lovett 30, McClintock quoted Lovett to the effect that dismissed what he called the "Arab Palestinian disavowing Marshall "would impugn the in- Govt" which, he said, was established without tegrity of the United States" (p. 1438). On the consulting Arab Palestinians and was same day, McClintock - noting the heavy dominated by the Mufti of Jerusalem (p. 1448). Zionist pressure for the partition boundaries - The documents covering Bernadotte's pro- claimed that the United States would have to - I

JUSTUS D.DOENECKE concede most, if not all, the Jewish settlements "contempt, acrimony and ridicule" in the in the Negev to Israel (p. 1439). General Assembly. Dulles claimed to under- When Lovett attempted to secure Truman's stand the situation, promising to do allhecould approval of the Bernadotte plan, the President to influence the Republicans toward modera- at first endorsed it, doing so on October 10. tion (pp. 1448 - 1449). However, on the following day, White House However, not long after, candidate Dewey advisers vetoed it (p. 1466). The British, who publicly repudiated the Bernadotte plan, doi~g wholeheartedly backed the Bernadotte pro- so on October 23 when he backed the partition posal, soon -found America backsliding, for boundaries (p. 1507). Immediately Clifford - Lovett began hinting at "minor modifications" and Lovett also - urged Truman to reaffirm (p. 1469). On October 15, Lovett - in what his support of the Democratic platform, said was a transparent political move - instructed statement endorsing the partition boundaries the American UN delegation at Paris to "let and claiming that all modifications should be others do the talking" (p. 1471). Three days subject to Israeli (but not Arab) veto (p. 1503). later, the Acting Secretary received a request Truman did so on October 24, stressing that from Truman, personally delivered to his any boundary modification must be "fully ac- Washington home by Clifford, ordering ceptable" to Israel and promising to expedite American UN delegates to avoid any action on loans to Israel as well (pp. 1513- 1514). Clif- Palestine without Truman's personal ford rejoiced in the new campaign moves, say- authorization. UN debate, the President said, ing that Dewey's initiation was "the best thing must be deferred until after the election (p. that has happened to us to date" (p. 1509). 1490). Forrestal soon accused Clifford and During all this time, Israel was gaining ter- David Niles, Administrative Assistant to the ritory in the Negev, going down as far as Beer- President, of using the Palestine issue for sheba (p. 1509). In the maneuver known as "squalid political purposes" (p. 1501). "Operation Ten Plagues", it broke the truce Hence, when Fawzi told Austin on October line of October 14. Israel, in fact, had 17 that Israeli forces, in violation of the current dynamited her own trucks to create the incident truce, took military initiative in the Negev, the needed for her troops to move swiftly. On Oc- State Department merely replied that the tober 23, Lovett acquiesced in Israeli domina- United States would take no unilateral tion of the northern Negev (p. 1508), although measures (p. 1492). Fawzi replied in turn that Marshall found it a "serious mistake" to the situation was rapidly deteriorating, with the publicize America's support. Public exposure, U.S. appearing "to be waiting on SC [Security he said, would threaten General Assembly en- Council] action instead of stirring SC into ac- dorsement of the Bernadotte plan, harden tion". Egypt and Arab societies, he continued, Israeli desires to capture the entire Negev, and were facing severe disruption, with "far- harm relations with Egypt, then losing major reaching repercussions" possibly in the offing strongholds there (p. 1515). Ambassador (p. 1500). Douglas feared that America's new Negev Early in the presidential campaign, it ap- policy would play into Soviet hands, for it peared as if both parties would follow a bi- would destroy any chance for a Palestine settle- partisan approach to the Palestine question. On ment that year (p. 1516). The American October 2, Lovett reported a conversation with delegates to the UN, he said, could not even John Foster Dulles, leading foreign policy ad- mention the Negev without "giving the appear- viser to Republican presidential candidate tance of condoning Israeli military aggression Thomas E. Dewey and member of the U.S. across UN truce lines", and thereby creating delegation to the General Assembly then "cynical reactions" in other countries. The en- meeting in Paris. Lovett warned Dulles against tire Palestine situation, Douglas maintained, Zionist efforts to play off "one party leader- was "probably as dangerous to our national in- ship against the other in the contest for votes", terest as is Berlin" (pp. 1516-1518). as such behavior could only subject America to On October 26, UN mediator Ralph Bunche, PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PALESTINE. 1948 353 successor to Bernadotte, ordered all troops After the American people went to the polls, back to the October 14 truce line (p. 1518). The Israel still remained intransigent. Weizmann, British sought a Security Council resolution congratulating the President on his election vic- that would levy sanctions upon any defiant na- tory, claimed that "sheer necessity compels us tion (p. 1525), although Lovett warned that the to cling to the Negev". Furthermore, he accus- U.S. needed specific presidential approval ed the British of using Arab states as "hired before it could cooperate (p. 1523). On October assassins" (pp. 1550-1551). (Denying such 29, Shertok told Marshall that, even if the claims as Weizmann's, Ambassador Douglas Security Council ordered Israeli compliance, maintained that "the meticulous observance by Israel could not leave newly-occupied lands. the British of the arms embargo . . . had reduc- Accusing Eygpt of "wanton aggressive- ed the Arab forces and the Arab Legion to a ness . . . in invading Palestine ter- state of almost complete impotence" [p. ritory" and pleading "self-preservation", he 1537l.Even British military installations at Am- called withdrawal an "act of suicide" (pp. man and Iraq, wrote Douglas on November 12, 1526- 1527). receive no English war materials [p. 15711.) Under such circumstances, fighting could on- At this stage, Truman refused to back Israel ly continue. On November 3, Marine Brigadier totally. On November 10, he told Douglas and General W. E. Riley, chief of the US. truce Lovett that support for partition boundaries by observers, reported to Bunche that both sides no means implied that the United States would were violating the truce, with "this attitude support Israeli claims to Jaffa and western most pronounced in the Jews". Arab forces, Galilee. However, he said, Israel "might well Riley said, generally "have endeavored to com- consider relinquishing part of the Negev to ply with the cease fire"; their violations, he Arab States as quidpro quo for retaining Jaffa continued, consisted of retaliatory action. On and western Galilee" (p. 1565). Yet on the other hand, "willful and premeditated November 28, when Truman wrote Weizmann, violations of the truce by the Jews are now he spoke somewhat differently. In a letter routine". Israeli forces were far superior to all drafted by Niles, the President deplored any at- enemy troops and "could undoubtedly clear all tempt to take the Negev from Israel and pro- of Palestine of Arab forces in a relatively short mised the nation low-term loans. He predicted time" (p. 1541). General Assembly backing for the American On October 29, the Security Council ad- position, which involved opposing "any ter- journed without voting on the Negev. Lovett, ritorial changes in the November 29th [I9471 noting how the American elections affected UN resolution which are not acceptable to the State conduct, wryly wrote, "Am told removal of Israel" (p. 1633). restrictions on normal procedures may be ex- American diplomats were learning how pected next week when silly season terminates" unbending Israel had become. On November (p. 1528). On a more serious note, he told Mar- 10, Lovett met with Epstein and Michael Com- shall that "our past experience with formally ay, Israeli representative to the UN. Comay, approved positions and institutions which are while welcoming any armistice, opposed both subsequently and suddenly altered or revoked is Bunche's suggestion of demilitarized neutral dangerous and intolerable" (p. 1534). His con- zones and the Security Council call for leaving cern was undoubtedly heightened when recently-captured areas. Epstein admitted that Truman ordered the American delegation to the forthcoming Israeli elections made his abstain on any UN vote, indeed to avoid taking government oppose withdrawal. Extremists, any position on Palestine before election day "still an important and dangerous element", (p. 1535). On November 4, the day after might turn to Russia. Lovett saw Israel facing a Truman was re-elected, the Security Council choice: she could either lay claim to western asked the belligerents - with American ap- Galilee and Jaffa, or justify domination of the proval - to return to the truce line of Oc- Negev "on the grounds of right and justice" tober 14 (p. 1546). bestowed in the partition resolution. She could 354 JUSNS D. DOENECKE 1 not do both. Comay replied that he considered Clintock protested, declaring that the paper ig- territory allotted by the partition resolution "as nored almost all of Bernadotte's propqsals and belonging to Israel by right, and considered challenged Truman's desires as expressed on that the territory militarily occupied outside November 10 (p. 1600). On December?, Ben- this area could be a matter for discussion". Gurion told Bunche that despite the Security However, Epstein backed Lovett's position, Council resolution of November 4, whichcalled declaring that Israel wished to abide by UN for a truce and withdrawal from the Negev, he decisions and negotiate directly with the Arabs would not comply until Egypt was prepared to (pp. 1562- 1563). negotiate (p. 1653). The Cold War again entered into the As winter approached, the State Department Palestine controversy. In a conversation be- received hints of Arab bending. On November tween Marshall and Shertok on November 13, 10, Stanton Griffis, American ambassador to the Israeli foreign minister claimed that his Egypt, reported that King Farouk favored government sought to "steer a middle course" direct negotiations with Israel (p. 1561). Then, between the US. and the U.S.S.R. Although a week later, British officials cla~med that "many Israelis" wanted to "go along with the Arabs would back the Bernadotte plan provid- Russians", American support for Israel's posi- ed the UN would assume responsibility for firm tion on negotiations, an armistice, and im- frontiers. The recent Israeli military success, so mediate admission to the UN would counter- British officials feared, worsened prospects for balance such sympathy. (Weizmann pointed to talks, for at the outset of any such eonversa- a "dangerous" Russian influence if Israel was tions, the Arabs would be bargaining "under forced to "surrender" the Negev [pp. duress". Sir Orme G. Sargent, British Perma- 1606- 16071.) Marshall in turn told him that nent Under-Secretary of State for European Israeli arms purchases from Soviet-dominated Affairs, feared "another Munich", with the Czechoslovakia increased Arab fears, and that powers selling "Abdullah down the river for open Israeli flouting of UN resolutions would the sake of specious peace" (p. 1602). affect her membership in that body, US. loans, The British were equally disappointed in and American de jure recognition (pp. American policy. According to Ambassador 1577- 1580). On the following day, Shertok Douglas, Truman's statement of October 24 wrote Marshall, claiming that when such "fun- undercut British -American cooperation con- damental national interests" as the Negev were cerning Israeli boundary changes. Bevin in fact at stake, Israel had "no choice" but to ignore considered Bernadotte's proposals weighted the Security Council (p. 1561). He found against the Arabs, backing them only because himself "deeply alarmed by the apparent deter- Britain had hoped to "stand shoulder to mination to pursue the November 4th line to shoulder" with the United States in pushing a the bitter end" (p. 1582). general solution through the General Assembly. On November 15, the American delegation to The United Kingdom was particularty concern- the UN drafted a resolution on Palestine. It ed about the Negev. Not only did it serve "like called for acceptance of Israel as an indepen- a dagger blade dividing the Arab world"; Israel dent state, opposed any new General Assembly would obtain virtually all the arable land in resolution on boundaries, and endorsed UN what had been a predominantly Arab area (p. control of Jerusalem and a UN conciliation 1611). commission. "Arab Palestine standing alone", British anxieties were soon realized. On it continued, "could not constitute a viable in- November 20, Jessup qualified "general" U.S. dependent state". Hence, it should "be agreement with Bernadotte's report by declar- transferred to one or more of the neighboring ing that any modification of partition boun- Arab states through the process of negotiation daries must be acceptable to Israel, and conducted by a UN conciliation commission, needless to say, the British reacted unfavorably. taking into account the wishes of the in- Jessup did declare that the Palestinian refugees habitants of Arab Palestine" (p. 1596). Mc- should "be permitted to return to their homes, PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PALESTINE, 1948 355 with adequate compensation to those who mediate withdrawal of small Israeli units from chose not to return" (p. 1617). the Egyptian side of the frontier (p. 1706). On December 22, Israel again violated the Because the volume ends on the last day of Security Council truce resolution, this time by December, readers might not realize that cease- the Negev move known as "Operation Ayin". fires took place early in 1949, with Israel's Israel acted, claimed Truman's Special boundaries extending well beyond those outlin- Representative McDonald, because of a con- ed in the partition resolution. On January 19, tinued Egyptian threat to its south, financial 1949, the White House announced a hundred strain, and the belief that only by such efforts million dollar loan to Israel, and six days later could she gain "the territory in theNegev allot- the United States extended de jure recognition ted under partition" (p. 1689). Lovett drafted a to Israel. The Palestinian war radicalized cable to McDonald, which was not sent, declar- several Arab regimes, with a military coup in ing that if Israel had indeed violated the truce, Syria in 1949, Abdullah assassinated in 1951, it could not be categorized as a "peace-loving and Farouk overthrown in 1952. state" and the United States would be forced to The volume challenges recent claims made by review support for her UN application (p. Clifford, in material containing little documen- 1690). The British desired American coopera- tation, to the effect that Truman never aban- tion for a Security Council resolution, one that doned support for partition. Concerning the would set a truce and time limit for Israeli May 12 meeting, at which Truman supposedly withdrawal to her position of October 14 (p. backed Marshall and Lovett over Clifford, the 1691). Although the United States abstained in former Special Counsel asserts that the Presi- the voting, doing so along with Russia and the dent "simply did not want to embarrass Ukraine, the British proposal passed eight to General Marshall in front of the others". Clif- nothing (p. 1699). ford further maintains that various experts on During this time "the Jordanian connection" the UN Charter found the Security Council took a new twist. On December 29, Sir Alec S. having the authority to partition Palestine, that Kirkbridge, British minister to Transjordan, the State Department's Office of the Legal Ad- reported that Elias Sassoon, former head of the viser recommended an arms embargo on certain Oriental Section of the Jewish Agency, and Col- Arab states and the arming of a Jewish militia, onel Moshe Dayan, commanding officer of the and that he personally convinced Lovett of the Israeli forces in Jerusalem, met with Adbullah wisdom of recognition before it was announc- el Tel, Transjordanian representative. Accor- ed. ding to Kirkbridge, the two Israelis told Ab- Clifford also finds "a note of anti-Semitismw dullah that Israel was no longer interested in a in efforts of unnamed revisionists who see mere armistice and that Transjordan must recognition as a partisan move, but he offers no choose "either peace or war". Kirkbridge evidence for this charge. (He does deny that the feared that unless Transjordan immediately State Department or Forrestal were anti- agreed to peace negotiations, Israel would at- Semitic.) He cites Arab "violence", though tack Iraq, thereby rendering Transjordan mentioning none by Zionists. He claims that helpless (pp. 1699- 1700). politics played a minor role in T~man's The United States suddenly took a tough recognition, for in May 1948 party strategists position, with McDonald instructed to meet had already "written off" New York. Needless with Ben-Gurion and Shertok. Israel, said to say, he is silent about his own role in the fall Lovett, must withdraw from Egyptian territory campaign."' Thomas Paterson, reviewing the and abandon her "threatening attitude" Foreign Relations volume in the American towards Transjordan or face "a substantial Historical Review, finds Clifford disingenuous, review" of American policy (p. 1704). Israel, and this historian can only conc~r.~' Shertok responded, had no intention of seizing The volume also challenges obse~ations Egyptian territory and sought an armistice with made by Ian Bickerton, particularly Transjordan. McDonald reported the im- Bickerton's claim that Truman's actions 356 JUSTUS D. DOENECKE between May and November, 1948 do not suggest and timely, indeed indispensable to our a course based on political expediency".1@' understanding of the diplomatic process. However, it supports the interpretation made by John Snetsinger, who explains Truman's NOTES moves in light of the "Jewish vote". Snetsinger notes a memo, written in Clifford's own hand- writing, to the effect that on March 8, 1948, 1. Fred J. Khouri, The Arob-Israeli Dilemma (2nd ed.: Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1976), PP. Marshall informed Austin that Truman had ap- 54-56, 76. proved trusteeship. Concerning the controver- 2. Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel (New York: sial May 12 meeting, Snetsinger finds Clifford Knopf, 1976), pp. 301 -302. 3. Ibid., pp. 333 - 334. telling Truman not to pass up the opportunity 4. Ibid., p. 308. to recover his reputation in the Jewish com- 5. Ibid.. 0. 334. munity. Throughout the whole campaign, Snet- 6. bid.; b. 338. 7. Clark Clifford, "Recognizing Israel", and "An EX- singer notes, Clifford was in constant touch clusive Interview with Clark Clifford", American with Israel supporter^.^'^' Heritage, XXVlll (April, 1977), pp. 4- 11. Finally, at long last, we can begin to make 8. American Hisloricol Review. LXXXII (December. 1977), pp. 1356- 1357. our appraisals not on the basis of self-serving 9. Ian J. Bickerton, "President Truman's Recognition of interviews and memoirs, in which selective Israel". American Jewish Hsfortcol Quarterly, LVilI memory is far too often at work, but on the (December, 1968). pp. 173-240. 10. John Snetsineer. Truman. the Jewish Vole, and the basis of primary sources. For this we are in- &earion ofl&&anford, Calif.: Hoover kstilution debted to the Historical Division of the State Press, 1974). Department, for their volume is both thorough