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Rosenne 12 Jun 1990 Transcript United Nations Oral History Project Shabtai Rosenne 12 June 1990 (OJ.~' -"\" ) ~~ .~ ~6t3j YUN INTERVIEW (Ox) .- SHABTAI ROSENNE NOV 4 19~ ..., .....--_._-------.. JUNEYUN INTERVIEW12, 1990 .~, R6t3r :- .. .: (..... 1;:-:-: -": «1 TING N l,', \.. l\V __ I\ SHABTAI ROSENNE 19~ .-1IlIIIIII----·----------.. NOV /l JUNE 12. 1990 (~O'· INTERVIEWER, JEAN KRASNO 1(."~ I.~~ ~ I , ,.'.~ •...' UN" ...... , ""- ;I!L-I.,L:,~ r :', ..:(..... I~!' .. : «' .~. Tl NG N ,I. '. '- I l \ V ...., __ , \ CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA INTERVIEWER,TABLE OF CONTENTSJEAN KRASNO FOUNOINGOF THE STATE OF ISRAEL The Jewish Agency TABLE OF ••••CONTENTS1,2,4,6,10,12,15,17,35 FOUNDINGOisplaced OFPers THEons STATE(OP) OF•••.. ISRAEL __ •.3,4,10-12 TheBritish JewishBring AgencyPalestine Issue to «UN , .., • 1,2,4,6,10,12,15,17,353,8,9 TheDisplacedWhite PersonsPapers •••••...•••.CDP) •••..•••.3,4,10-124,5,7 TheBritish"Black BringSabbath" Palestine•••_•••.••6 Issue to UN .. 3,8,9 The WhiteBritish PapersRole •••••.•• , .••..••4,5,76,7,13,16,23,25 The Royal"BlackCommissionSabbath" •of •1937 • • •• • • . •• ..8 6 TheIndepeendence British Role••••• • • • .6,7,13,16,23,259,10,15,20,21,22,26,33 UNThe SpecialRoyal CommissionSession on ofPalestine 1937 • . • • .810,11 GAIndepeendenceResolution: • Partition• • • • •......•• 9,10,15,20,21,22,26,3312-14,16,22,24,25,30,33 UNJerusalem Special ••••••••..•..•.Session on Palestine . • 12,15,23,25,4110,11 GAThe Resolution:Fighting •••••••....... Partition •......•12-14,16,22,24,25,30,3314,15,33,34,37-41 JerusalemBalfour Declaration .••••••••••• , ....•. .17-1912,15,23,25,41 TheDeclaration Fightingof •••••••..•....Independence . • •• 14,15,33,34,37-4120,21,26,31,32,34 BalfourLaw and AdministrationDeclaration • • Ordinance• • .....17-1921 DeclarationTruce •• ..... of Independence. •. • , • 20,21,26,31,32,3423,38,39,41 UNLaw Secondand AdministrationSpecial Session Ordinance•.. ....• 2126,29 Truce.US Recognition . .of .Israel . .•..•..... 23,38,39,4127 UN Second Special Session • • • 26,29 1 US Recognition of Israel •..•....27 1 _ l' UN Mediation. • ••••..••••29,30 Jewish Support for Statehood ••••34-37 ArabUN MediationIntentions • ••••••.. • •••• 3629,30 ONTSOJewish ••••Support-. for• Statehood. ••••• •••4034-37 Arab Intentions • • 36 THEUNTSOARMISTICE • • • .'.NEGOTIATIONS • . .AT .RHODES, . • • 1949• 40 British Mandate Ends •••••..•..43 RecognitionTHE ARMISTICEof NEGOTIATIONSState of Israel AT RHODES, 1949.43 TheBritishFighting Mandate•••••••• Ends . .• • • • .43 TheRecognitionTruce ••••••••....... of State of Israel .4344,45 The UNFightingCharter • ••.••••..••••. .4346,47,51 The TruceBernadotte• • •Plan • ••. • ••. • . ... •.. 46-4944,45 JerusalemThe UN Charter••••••• ••.••••..•••••. .•. 47,7046,47,51 TheBunche Bernadotteas Meditator Plan ••• •••.••• 49,51,52,57,58,6146-49 TheJerusalemPeople • at• Rhodes• • • ••••••••••49,50,53,55,5647,70 PalestineBunche as MeditatorConciliation • Commission 49,51,52,57,58,6152,67 The NegotiationsPeople at Rhodes •••••••••••••. • 49,50,53,55,5657-70,74 ThePalestineGaza Strip Conciliation-. •••• Commission......60,61 ... 52,67 The NegotiationsIraqi Army ••• •. ....65.57-70,74 TheRole Gazaof the StripUN ••••••••••.•.••60,6166,72,73 The IraqiDemilitarized Army • Zones •..••..•.6570,71 UNTSORole of••••••••••••the UN • • . .•• . • .66,72,7372 MixedThe DemilitarizedArmistice Commission Zones • . •.• .7270,71 UNTSOThe Cold . .War. .•••••••. .•• 773,742 Mixed Armistice Commission . • ••72 The Cold War • • • • • • • • ..•73,74 2 2 ' ..... ':l. ~... :r ~ THE SUEZ CRISIS Freedom of Passage •• • 76-78,80-85,88 THELaw ofSUEZthe CRISISSea • • 78,80,81,88 TheFreedomGaza ofStrip Passage.• .. ..• • .• . • 79,87,89,9076-78,80-85,88 TheLaw Fedayeenof the Sea.• • • • •• • •••· 78,80,81,8880,81,84,86 The UNEFGaza Strip••• ..••••••••••••. ... • 79,87,89,9081,87,89,90,91 AgreementThe Fedayeenat Sevres• • • • • • • • . .82,8380,81,84,86 The AttackUNEF •••••••••••••••• .85-8781,87,89,90,91 TheAgreementArmistice at SevresWas Over • • ••••• • • •• • .82,8387 UnitingThe Attackfor Peace••••••••..•.•.Resolution . • 85-8788,89 HungarianThe ArmisticeCrisisWas ••Over • • • • • • • .• 8789 UnitingCamp David for ••••Peace Resolution. .. .....• 88,8991,93 HungarianThe Iran-Iraq CrisisWar • • • • • •• . ..••.•• 8991,92 CampThe YomDavid.Kipur • War• • ••• • ..• • .••. •• .9291,93 ThePeace-keeping Iran-Iraq War. ••... ...• ••91,9294,95 TheRole Yomof Kipurthe UN War••••••..•••• ••••••••.••9296,97 Peace-keepingEnd of the Cold •••••••.•...•War ••••••...•94,9598-100 Role of the UN ••••••..•••• 96,97 End of the Cold War ••••••...•98-100 3 3 "-.'r" :~è-,i{' ~-: :r? .~ '" :~'i" - J'? JK: For the record, Mr. Rosenne, could you explain the role that you played around the time of the establishment of JK: Forthe thestate record,of Israel Mr. Rosenne,and I think couldwe youwill explainhave to thestart rolea thatfew yearsyou playedback. around the time of the establishment of Rosenne: theYes, stateyou're of quiteIsrael right.and I thinkl was we demobilizedwill have tofrom startthe a fewRoyal yearsAir back.Force -- l remember the date very weIl -- on Rosenne: Yes,the firstyou'reof quiteApril right.1946. OnI whichwas demobilizeddate l went frominto thethe RoyalPolitical Air DepartmentForce -- I ofrememberthe London the dateoffice veryof wellthe Jewish-- on theAgency firstfor of Palestine.April 1946. ThatOn whichwas datean agencyI went thatinto thewas Politicalestablished Departmentin 1929 ofunder the specifieLondon officeprovisions of the ofJewishthe AgencyPalestine forMandate Palestine.and represented That wasthe an Jewishagencypeople that aswasa establishedwhole vis-a-vis in 1929both underthe specificBritish provisionsgovernment, of the mandatory,Palestine Mandateand the andLeague representedof Nations the asJewishthe supervisingpeople as a wholeauthority vis-a-visof those bothdays. the BritishIts main government,office was thein mandatory,Jerusalem. andIts thesecond Leaguemain of officeNationswas as intheLondon. supervisingAnd authorityits third mainof thoseoffice days.which existedIts mainright officethroughout was thein Jerusalem.whole period Itswas secondin Geneva. main Actuallyoffice wasour inGeneva London.mission And itstoday thirdis mainour oldestoffice whichdiplomatie existedmission right throughoutabroad except the wholeperhaps periodLondon. was inBut Geneva.it also Actuallyhad offices our Genevain l missionsuppose todayWashington. is our Ioldestforget diplomaticnow where missioni t was abroadin the exceptunited perhapsstates. London.As I sayButit itwas alsorepresentative had offices vis-a-visin I supposethe Washington.British government I forgetand thenow Leaguewhere ofitNations. was in theThe unitedLeague states.of Nations Aswas I saydissolved it was laterrepresentativein 1946 and vis-a-visreplaced theby Britishthe United governmentNations andand thethe LeagueBritish of Nations.maintained The Leaguetheir ofposition Nationsas wasmandatory dissolveduntil, laterof course,in 1946 1948.and replacedThe office by thein LondonUnited carriedNationsthe andburden the Britishof direct maintainedrepresentation their position as mandatory until, of course, 1948. The office 1 in London carried the burden of direct representation 1 with the.British government as opposed to the Jerusalem office which was related to the Palestine government. withAnd, the.Britishof course, thegovernmenttwo were as distinct.opposed to Thethe JerusalemPolitical officeDepartment whichcarried was relatedthe burden to theof Palestinethe work ofgovernment.relations And,both ofwith course,the Britishthe twogovernment were distinct.which wasThe Politicalprimarily Departmenteither the Colonialcarried theOffice burdenin thoseof thedays workor ofthe relationsForeign bothOffice witdependingh the Britishreally whichgovernmentlevel whichwas being was discussed.primarily Andeitherif itthewas Colonialsort of Officedetailed in Palestinianthose days orlevel the itForeignwould Officeprobably dependingbe the Colonialreally whichOffice. level wasIf itbeingwas discussed.a broader Andpolitical if it waslevel sortit ofwould detailedhave Palestinianbeen the Foreign level itOffice. would probablyIt dealt bealso thewith ColonialParliament. Office. It Ifalso it didwas thea broaderpublic politicarelationsl leveljob itin wouldconnection have beenwith the bothForeignHouses Office.of ItParliament, dealt alsothe withHouse Parliament.of Commons andIt alsothe Housedid theof publicLords, relationsand with thejob pressin connectionon the major withPalestinian both Housesissues, of Parliament,issues related the toHousePalestine's of Commonsevents. and the House of Lords, and withl had theactually press onworked the beforemaj or Palestinianthe War even issues,in a voluntaryissues relatedcapacity to Palestine'swhen l was events.a student. l went into theirI employashad actuallyl say immediatelyworked beforeafter thedemobilization War even in ina voluntaryApril, 1946. capacityl plunged when intoI wasa alife student.of crises I wentwhich intohas theircontinued employvirtually as I saywithout immediatelyend sinceafter thatdemobilizationdate. in JK: April,When the 1946.UN metI plungedin England into ina life1946 ofwas crisesthe whichPalestine has continuedissue brought virtuallyup? without end since that date. JKRosenne:: WhenNo, thethePalestine UN met inissue Englandwas notin brought1946 wasup thein Palestinethe UN at thatissue stage.brought up?It was brought up at San Francisco Rosenne: No,indirectly the Palestineand article issue 80wasof notthe broughtCharter upreflects in the UNit atto thatsome extent.stage.
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