United Nations Oral History Project

Shabtai Rosenne 12 June 1990 (OJ.~' -"\" ) ~~ .~ ~6t3j YUN INTERVIEW (Ox) .- SHABTAI ROSENNE NOV 4 19~ ..., .....--_._------.. JUNEYUN INTERVIEW12, 1990 .~, R6t3r :- .. .: (..... 1;:-:-: -": «1 TING N l,', \.. l\V __ I\ SHABTAI ROSENNE 19~ .-1IlIIIIII----·------.. NOV /l JUNE 12. 1990 (~O'· INTERVIEWER, JEAN KRASNO 1(."~ I.~~ ~ I , ,.'.~ •...' UN" ...... , ""- ;I!L-I.,L:,~ r :', ..:(..... I~!' .. : «' .~. Tl NG N ,I. '. '- I l \ V ...., __ , \ CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA

INTERVIEWER,TABLE OF CONTENTSJEAN KRASNO FOUNOINGOF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The Jewish Agency TABLE OF ••••CONTENTS1,2,4,6,10,12,15,17,35 FOUNDINGOisplaced OFPers THEons STATE(OP) OF•••.. ISRAEL __ •.3,4,10-12

TheBritish JewishBring AgencyPalestine Issue to «UN , .. , • 1,2,4,6,10,12,15,17,353,8,9

TheDisplacedWhite PersonsPapers •••••...•••.CDP) •••..•••.3,4,10-124,5,7 TheBritish"Black BringSabbath" Palestine•••_•••.••6 Issue to UN .. 3,8,9

The WhiteBritish PapersRole •••••.•• , .••..••4,5,76,7,13,16,23,25

The Royal"BlackCommissionSabbath" •of •1937 • • •• • • . •• ..8 6

TheIndepeendence British Role••••• • • • .6,7,13,16,23,259,10,15,20,21,22,26,33

UNThe SpecialRoyal CommissionSession on ofPalestine 1937 • . • • .810,11

GAIndepeendenceResolution: • Partition • • • • •...... •• 9,10,15,20,21,22,26,3312-14,16,22,24,25,30,33

UNJerusalem Special ••••••••..•..•.Session on Palestine . • 12,15,23,25,4110,11 GAThe Resolution:Fighting •••••••...... Partition •...... •12-14,16,22,24,25,30,3314,15,33,34,37-41 JerusalemBalfour Declaration .••••••••••• , ....•. .17-1912,15,23,25,41

TheDeclaration Fightingof •••••••..•....Independence . • •• 14,15,33,34,37-4120,21,26,31,32,34

BalfourLaw and AdministrationDeclaration • • Ordinance • • .....17-1921 DeclarationTruce •• ..... of Independence. . . . •. • , • 20,21,26,31,32,3423,38,39,41 UNLaw Secondand AdministrationSpecial Session Ordinance•...... • 2126,29

Truce.US Recognition . . . .of .Israel . . . .•..•..... 23,38,39,4127 UN Second Special Session • • • 26,29 1 US Recognition of Israel •..•....27

1 _ l' UN Mediation. • ••••..••••29,30 Jewish Support for Statehood ••••34-37 ArabUN MediationIntentions • ••••••...... • •••• 3629,30 ONTSOJewish ••••Support-. for• Statehood. . . ••••• •••4034-37 Arab Intentions • • 36 THEUNTSOARMISTICE • • • .'.NEGOTIATIONS • . . .AT .RHODES, . . • • 1949 • 40 British Mandate Ends •••••..•..43 RecognitionTHE ARMISTICEof NEGOTIATIONSState of Israel AT RHODES, 1949.43 TheBritishFighting Mandate•••••••• Ends . . . .• • • • .43 TheRecognitionTruce ••••••••...... of State of Israel .4344,45 The UNFightingCharter • ••.••••..••••...... 4346,47,51 The TruceBernadotte• • •Plan • ••. • ••. • ...... •.. . . 46-4944,45 JerusalemThe UN Charter••••••• ••.••••..•••••. . .•. 47,7046,47,51 TheBunche Bernadotteas Meditator Plan ••• •••.••• 49,51,52,57,58,6146-49 TheJerusalemPeople • at • Rhodes • • • ••••••••••49,50,53,55,5647,70

PalestineBunche as MeditatorConciliation • Commission 49,51,52,57,58,6152,67

The NegotiationsPeople at Rhodes •••••••••••••. • 49,50,53,55,5657-70,74 ThePalestineGaza Strip Conciliation-. •••• Commission...... 60,61 ... 52,67

The NegotiationsIraqi Army ••• •. ....65.57-70,74 TheRole Gazaof the StripUN ••••••••••.•.••60,6166,72,73

The IraqiDemilitarized Army • Zones •..••..•.6570,71

UNTSORole of••••••••••••the UN • • . . . .•• . . . . • .66,72,7372 MixedThe DemilitarizedArmistice Commission Zones • . . •.• .7270,71 UNTSOThe Cold . .War. .•••••••...... •• 773,742 Mixed Armistice Commission . • ••72

The Cold War • • • • • • • • ..•73,74

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THE SUEZ CRISIS Freedom of Passage •• • 76-78,80-85,88 THELaw ofSUEZthe CRISISSea • • 78,80,81,88 TheFreedomGaza ofStrip Passage.• .. ..• • . • . . • 79,87,89,9076-78,80-85,88 TheLaw Fedayeenof the Sea.• • • • •• • •••· 78,80,81,8880,81,84,86 The UNEFGaza Strip••• ..••••••••••••. ... . • 79,87,89,9081,87,89,90,91 AgreementThe Fedayeenat Sevres• • • • • • • • . . .82,8380,81,84,86 The AttackUNEF •••••••••••••••• .85-8781,87,89,90,91 TheAgreementArmistice at SevresWas Over • • •••• • • • •• • .82,8387 UnitingThe Attackfor Peace••••••••..•.•.Resolution . • 85-8788,89 HungarianThe ArmisticeCrisisWas ••Over • • • • • • • .• 8789 UnitingCamp David for ••••Peace Resolution...... • 88,8991,93 HungarianThe Iran-Iraq CrisisWar • • • • • •• . ..••.•• 8991,92 CampThe YomDavid.Kipur • War • • •• • • .. • • .••. •• .9291,93 ThePeace-keeping Iran-Iraq War. ••...... • ••91,9294,95 TheRole Yomof Kipurthe UN War••••••..•••• ••••••••.••9296,97 Peace-keepingEnd of the Cold •••••••.•...•War ••••••...•94,9598-100 Role of the UN ••••••..•••• 96,97 End of the Cold War ••••••...•98-100

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JK: For the record, Mr. Rosenne, could you explain the role that you played around the time of the establishment of JK: Forthe thestate record,of Israel Mr. Rosenne,and I think couldwe youwill explainhave to thestart rolea thatfew yearsyou playedback. around the time of the establishment of Rosenne: theYes, stateyou're of quiteIsrael right.and I thinkl was we demobilizedwill have tofrom startthe a

fewRoyal yearsAir back.Force -- l remember the date very weIl -- on Rosenne: Yes,the firstyou'reof quiteApril right.1946. OnI whichwas demobilizeddate l went frominto thethe RoyalPolitical Air DepartmentForce -- I ofrememberthe London the dateoffice veryof wellthe Jewish-- on theAgency firstfor of Palestine.April 1946. ThatOn whichwas datean agencyI went thatinto thewas Politicalestablished Departmentin 1929 ofunder the specifieLondon officeprovisions of the ofJewishthe AgencyPalestine forMandate Palestine.and represented That wasthe an Jewishagencypeople that aswasa establishedwhole vis-a-vis in 1929both underthe specificBritish provisionsgovernment, of the mandatory,Palestine Mandateand the andLeague representedof Nations the asJewishthe supervisingpeople as a

wholeauthority vis-a-visof those bothdays. the BritishIts main government,office was thein

mandatory,Jerusalem. andIts thesecond Leaguemain of officeNationswas as intheLondon. supervisingAnd authorityits third mainof thoseoffice days.which existedIts mainright officethroughout was thein Jerusalem.whole period Itswas secondin Geneva. main Actuallyoffice wasour inGeneva London.mission And itstoday thirdis mainour oldestoffice whichdiplomatie existedmission right throughoutabroad except the

wholeperhaps periodLondon. was inBut Geneva.it also Actuallyhad offices our Genevain l missionsuppose

todayWashington. is our Ioldestforget diplomaticnow where missioni t was abroadin the exceptunited perhapsstates. London.As I sayButit itwas alsorepresentative had offices vis-a-visin I supposethe

Washington.British government I forgetand thenow Leaguewhere ofitNations. was in theThe unitedLeague states.of Nations Aswas I saydissolved it was laterrepresentativein 1946 and vis-a-visreplaced theby Britishthe United governmentNations andand thethe LeagueBritish of Nations.maintained The Leaguetheir ofposition Nationsas wasmandatory dissolveduntil, laterof course,in 1946 1948.and replacedThe office by thein LondonUnited carriedNationsthe andburden the Britishof direct maintainedrepresentation their position as mandatory until, of course, 1948. The office 1 in London carried the burden of direct representation

1 with the.British government as opposed to the Jerusalem office which was related to the Palestine government.

withAnd, the.Britishof course, thegovernmenttwo were as distinct.opposed to Thethe JerusalemPolitical officeDepartment whichcarried was relatedthe burden to theof Palestinethe work ofgovernment.relations And,both ofwith course,the Britishthe twogovernment were distinct.which wasThe Politicalprimarily Departmenteither the Colonialcarried theOffice burdenin thoseof thedays workor ofthe relationsForeign

bothOffice witdependingh the Britishreally whichgovernmentlevel whichwas being was discussed.primarily

Andeitherif itthewas Colonialsort of Officedetailed in Palestinianthose days orlevel the itForeignwould Officeprobably dependingbe the Colonialreally whichOffice. level wasIf itbeingwas discussed.a broader Andpolitical if it waslevel sortit ofwould detailedhave Palestinianbeen the Foreign level itOffice. would probablyIt dealt bealso thewith ColonialParliament. Office. It Ifalso it didwas thea broaderpublic politicarelationsl leveljob itin wouldconnection have beenwith the bothForeignHouses Office.of ItParliament, dealt alsothe withHouse Parliament.of Commons andIt alsothe Housedid theof publicLords, relationsand with thejob pressin connectionon the major withPalestinian both Housesissues, of Parliament,issues related the toHousePalestine's of Commonsevents. and the House of Lords, and withl had theactually press onworked the beforemaj or Palestinianthe War even issues,in a voluntaryissues relatedcapacity to Palestine'swhen l was events.a student. l went into theirI employashad actuallyl say immediatelyworked beforeafter thedemobilization War even in ina voluntaryApril, 1946. capacityl plunged when intoI wasa alife student.of crises I wentwhich intohas theircontinued employvirtually as I saywithout immediatelyend sinceafter thatdemobilizationdate. in JK: April,When the 1946.UN metI plungedin England into ina life1946 ofwas crisesthe whichPalestine has

continuedissue brought virtuallyup? without end since that date. JKRosenne:: WhenNo, thethePalestine UN met inissue Englandwas notin brought1946 wasup thein Palestinethe UN at thatissue stage.brought up?It was brought up at San Francisco Rosenne: No,indirectly the Palestineand article issue 80wasof notthe broughtCharter upreflects in the UNit atto thatsome extent.stage. . ItIt waswas broughtbrought up inat GenevaSan Franciscoat the indirectly and article 80 of the Charter reflects it to 2 some extent. It was brought up in Geneva at the

2 ~ !i r 1" "'r

dissolution of the League of Nations in March/April, 1946. Then the UN was out of it. Other aspects of the

dissolutionJewish problem of ofthethose Leaguedays ofwere Nationsraised inin March/April,the initial

meetings1946. Then'in theLondon UN wasespecially out of it. whatotherwas aspectscalled of the Jewish"Displaced problemPersons", of thosethe daysDPs, werewhich raisedwas ainmajor the probleminitial meetingin the immediates 'in Londonturmoil especiallyof Europe whatat the wasend calledof the War.the That"Displacewas dhandledPersons",by theECOSOC DPs, towhichsome wasextent a majorand problemby a provisionalin the immediateIRO which turmoilsubsequently of Europe atbecame the endthe ofIRO theitself War.

Thatwhich waitsnowhandledbeing dissolved.by ECOSOC toThat somewas theextentInternational and by a

provisionalRefugee Organization. IRO which subsequentlyThe Allied Forcesbecame hadthe aIRObig itselfunit whichoperating it nowfor beingaIl thedissolved.DPs not Thatonly wasJewish the DPs.Internationall think Refugeethere were Organization.millions andThemillions Allied Forcesof people had a wanderingbig unit operatinaround Europeg for allat thatthe DPstime. not onlyWe had Jewishto handle DPs. thatI thinkas thereweIl. were millions and millions of people wandering JK: Asaroundwe approachEurope at1947 thatthe time.British We stillhad tohad handlea mandate that toas well.govern Palestine. What was the situation at the time

JK: Asthat wethey approachbrought 1947the theissue Britishto the stillUN? had a mandate to Rosenne: WeIl,governthe Palestine.situation Whatgot very was bad.the situationRelations atbetween the timethe thatBritish theyand broughtthe Jewish the issuepopulation to theand UN? the Jewish Agency Rosenne: Well,had become the situationextremely gotbad. very lbad.wouldn't Relationssay therebetweenwas thea Britishterribly andstrong the demandJewish forpopulationthe end andof thethe mandateJewish Agencyor for

hadindependence become extremelyas such, albad.though I iwouldn't t certainly sayexisted. there wasThe a terriblythought had strongbeen demandplanted forby thethe endRoyal of Commissionthe mandateof or1937 for independenceand was endorsed as such,by althoughthe League it certainlyof Nations existed.with someThe thoughtdifficulty. had beenAnd plantedit had beenby theendorsed Royal Commissionby the so ofcalled 1937 andBiltmore was endorsedConference byin the1942, Leaguel think of itNationswas, inwithNew Yorksome difficulty. And it had been endorsed by the so called 3 Biltmore Conference in 1942, I think it was, in New York

3 , s-.-. T 't'

with the American Jewish and the American Zionist bodies. But l wouldn't say there was a terribly overriding demand

withto an theend Americanto the BritishJewish andmandate the Americanper se. zionistThe demand bodies.was Butfor I immigrationwouldn't say becausethere wasof a terriblythe DP overridingproblem indemandthe toaftermath an end toof theWWII Britishand the mandateHolocaust. per see The demand was JK: forCan l immigrationask where youbecausewere atofthat thetime? DP problem in the Rosenne: aftermathIn London. of WWII and the Holocaust. JK:JK: CanCould I askyou wheremention yousomething were at thatabout time?the White Papers? Rosenne:Rosenne: InYes, London.sure. The White Paper was published in 1940 and it JK: Couldprohibited you mentionJewish somethingimmigration aboutafter thea Whitefive yearPapers?period Rosenne: Yes,unless sure.there The wasWhiteArab Paperconsent was publishedto it. in 1940Of andcourse it prohibitedtremendous Jewishbitterness immigrationwas caused afterby thata fivebecause year periodof the unlessHolocaust. thereThe wasBritish Arabmay consenthave relaxed to it.it veryOf slightlycourse tremendousbut negligibly bitternessin light wasof causedthe proportions by that becauseof the problemof the Holocaust.as we found Theit asBritishthe War maycame haveto relaxedan end itin very1945. slightlyThere butwere negligiblyPalestinian in unitslight ofin thethe proportionsBritish army ofat thethat problemtime aswho wewere foundwandering it as thearound War cameEurope to seeingan end reallyin 1945.what Therethe weresituation Palestinianwas. Ofunitscourse in thethe Britishstories armywere atappalling. that time who wereThe wanderingimmediate arounddemand Europewas for seeingthe removal really whatof these the

situationWhite Paper was.restrictions, Of course twothe instoriesparticular. were appalling.One was on immigrationThe immediateand the demandother was wason forland thesales removalwhich, of bythesethe Whiteway, partly Paper restrictions,affects the configuration two in particular.today ofOnethe wasstate on immigrationof Israel and and istherelated other wasto onthe landwhole salesproblem which, ofby the way,"green partlyline" affectsand thethe configurationcontemporary todayproblem of theof statethe offrontiers Israel ofandIsrael. is relatedThe toorigin the canwholebe problemtraced backof theto "greenthat White line"Paper andof the1940. contemporary problem of the frontiers of Israel. The origin can be traced back to 4 that White Paper of 1940.

4 The Brtitsh tried throughout 1946 to see if they could reach some sort of agreement directly with us and with theThe Arabs.BrtitshThey triedthemsel throughoutves were 1946exhausted to see afterif theythe couldWar and reachtheir someheart sort wasn'tof agreementin what directlythey werewith usdoing. and withThat's thefor Arabs.sure. TheyWe themselvesknow that, werein theexhaustedarmed forces.after the

WarThe Royaland theirNavy, heartfor instance,wasn't inwas whatblockading they werePalestine doing.

That'sitself forin sure.the interestWe know ofthat,what in thewas armedcalled forces.illegal Theimmigration. Royal Navy,The· forarmy instance,tried to wasput downblockadingthe tensions Palestineand itselfthe disturbances in the interestthat were of happeningwhat was aIlcalledaround illegalthe immigration.country. The wholeThe· armysituation tried towas putmucky down andthe difficulttensions andand theunpleasant. disturbances that were happening all around the country.The British Thetried whole tosituationresolve wasit muckyin several and difficultways which and unpleasant.were s omet imes contradictory. The Palestine Theadministration British triedwould to sometimesresolve itgo offin severalon one tackwaysand whichthe werepeople insometimesLondon wouldcontradictory.go off on another. TheFor Palestineinstance, administrationabout towards thewouldend sometimesof June, go 1946,off onwhat one tackwe calI and thethe people"Black inSabbath Londonll , wouldthey goarrested off on aIlanother.the leadersFor instance,of the aboutJewish towardsAgency inthePalestine end of June,and put 1946,them whatin a weprison call campthe

"Blackin a place Sabbath",called Latrunthey arrestedwhich is allin thethe middleleadersof ofIsrael the

Jewishtoday. AgencyWe tried in toPalestinecarry on andnegotiations put them inin a Londonprison firstcamp inof aaIl placeto calledget this Latrunbrought whichto isan inend the andmiddlethen ofto Israeldeal today.with the Wesituation tried to carryas a whole.on negotiationsBevin was in notLondonaIl firstthat ofhelpful all tol mustget thissay. broughtAttlee toas anPrime end Ministerand then wasto dealin a withway a thesecond situationranker. as Hea whole.got that Bevinposition was notas aallkind thatof helpfulcompromise I mustbetween say.various Attleestrong as Primecandidates Ministerin thewas Laborin a wayParty a seconditself. ranker.The Labor He Partygot thatwe alwayspositionfelt as renegeda kind ofon compromise between various strong candidates in the Labor 5 Party itself. The Labor Party we always felt reneged on

5 ~-.,.- :c

~i ..i'. j- ri'­ its own position which it had proclaimed not only in its electoral campaign messages or program in the elections itsof 1945own positionbut also whichits traditional it had proclaimedposition. not Itonlybecame in itsas electoralhardened ascampaignanybody messagesand Bevin or wasprograma very in toughthe electionsnut. JK: ofWhat 1945were but alsothe itsBri traditionaltish objections position.to Itthe becameJewish as hardenedimmigration? as anybody and Bevin was a very tough nut. JK:Rosenne: WhatFear ofwerethe Arabs.the BriDon'ttish forgetobjectionsat that totime thethe BritishJewish immigration?Empire was still fairly intact. Their major problem at Rosenne: Fearthat oftime thewas Arabs.India. Don'tThey forgethad agreed at thaton timethe independence the British Empireof India. was still1 don't fairlythink intact.they wantedTheir themajorpartition problem atof thatIndia timewhich wascame India.under Theyvery hadbloody agreedcircumstances on the independenceas you ofknow India.in '46-'47. I don't Therethink wastheyuncertainty wanted the howpartitionthey were of Indiagoing whichto get cameout underof India very andbloodywhat circumstanceswas going to as takeyou knowtheir inplace. '46-'47.There Therewas wason theuncertaintyhorizon howeven theythen werethe goingproblem toof getAfrica out whichof Indiaburst andout whatmuch waslater goingin theto take'60s theirbut was place.on the Therehorizon wasthen. on theThe horizonwhole question even thenof thethe problemimperial oflines Africaof communicationwhich burst outwas muchuncertain. later in Therethe '60swas butalso wasthe onSuez the Canalhorizonrunning then. throughThe wholeEgypt questionwhich ofwas theat imperialthat time lineswas theirof communicationmajor line ofwascommunication uncertain. Thereboth wasfor alsothe Farthe EastSuez andCanalfor runningEast Africa. through So,Egyptthey whichwere wasin ata thatposition time ofwasuncertainty. their major lineAnd of1 communicationam not sure that boththey for theknew Farhow Eastweak andthey forhad Eastbecome Africa.after So,WW theyII. wereAfter inaIla positionthey had anof enormousuncertainty.army stillAnd Iand am didn'tnot suredemobilize that theyit knewas quickly how weakas thetheyAmericans had becomehad afterdemobilized WW II. theirAfterarmy. all theyThey hadhad anarmed enormousforces armythat stillwere andfirst didn'trate. demobilizeThere is itno asquestion quicklyabout as thethat. AmericansBut they haddidn't demobilizedknow how theirweak army.they They had armed forces that were first rate. There is no 6 question about that. But they didn't know how weak they

6 ':: ~ ~.i.\ .. ;;

't

had become or if they did know they didn't want to show it. It came out later. hadThey becomeconceived or ifof theyan idea did whichknow theyhad beendidn'tstarted want toin show1939 it.but hadIt beencame unsuccessfulout later. and had led to the White Paper Theyof 1940 conceivedwhich lof mentioned.an idea whichThat had wasbeena startednew tripartite in 1939 butagreement had beenbetween unsuccessfulus, the andBritish, had ledand tothe theArabs. White PaperWhat ofArabs 1940l don'twhich know.I mentioned.It was onThatthe wasfuture a newof tripartitePalestine. agreemenFor thattpurposebetween theyus, theconvened British,conferences and the Arabs.again inWhatst. ArabsJames's I don'tpalace know.in the Itwinter was onof the1946-47, future thatof Palestine.terrible , Forwinter. that purposel attended theythose convenedconferences conferencesin a againvery injunior st. James'sposition.. palacel was in takingthe winterthe ofnotes. 1946-47,One thathas toterriblestart , winter.somewh~re I andattendedl started thoseby conferencestaking notes inat a conferences.very junior position.These conferences . I was takingwere theextremely notes. difficult.One has to startThe

somewh~rdelegationse andwere I startedtalking byat takingcross purposes.notes at conferences.The British Thesedelegation conferenceshad at leastwere twoextremelyparts to difficult.it. One was Thethe delegationsForeign Office werepart talkingand one at wascrossthe purposes.Colonial OfficeThe Britishpart. delegationThey were sometimes had at leastat loggerheads two partsacross to it.the Onetable waseven. the ForeignThe thing Officebroke partup inandcomplete one was thedisunity. Colonial Office part. They wereBevin sometimesused what at loggerheadshe thought wasacrossa threatthe tablethat even.he Thewould thingtransfer brokethe up wholein completeproblem disunity.of Palestine to the UN. This Bevinwas already used whataround he Februarythought wasof '47a threatthat this thatcame he wouldup. We transfermade our theown wholeanalysis problemof whatof Palestinethat would to theentail. UN. ThisIt would was alreadyhave gone aroundto the FebruaryUN anyhow of '47under thatthe thisCharter came up.through We madethe transferour own analysisof the mandate of whatinto thatsomething would entail.else, Iteither woulda trusteeshiphave gone toagreement the UN oranyhowindependence, under thewhatever. Charter throughSo, we weren't the transferterribly of putthe mandateoff by the intothreat. somethingIt waselse,an either a trusteeship agreement or independence, whatever. 7 So, we weren't terribly put off by the threat. It was an

7 .. •­ empty threat to transfer the thing to the UN. The question was a different one. The question was what wouldempty wethreataim attoif transferit went theto the thingUN. to the UN. The questionTo diverge was a fordifferenta minute, one.you haveThe questionto understand was whatthat wouldthe partition we aim atproposaI if it wentof theto theRoyal UN. Commission of 1937 had createdTo divergea tremendousfor a minute,controversy you have toin understandJewish ranks. that Thethe partitionidea of a proposalJewish state, of theapart Royal fromCommissionthe non-Jewish of 1937 hadreaction createdto ita whichtremendouswas aiso controversyextremely inmixed Jewishand ranks.on the wholeThe ideanegative, of a Jewishl would state,say for apartmany fromdeep thereason non-Jewishwhich l don'treactionneed toto itgo whichinto, wasin alsoJewish extremelyranks too mixedit had andcreated on the wholequite negative,a deai of Ialmost would consternation.say for many deepThere reasonwas whichby no I meansdon't needunanimity to go ininto,the inJewish Jewishworld, rankseven too init hadthe createdZionist worldquite a updealuntil of almostthe veryconsternation.proclamation Thereof wasIsrael's by no meansindependence, unanimityon inthe thedesireabiiity Jewish world,or eventhe feasibilityin the Zionistof worldcomplete up independence.until the veryThey proclamationwere thinking ofin termsIsrael'sof maybeindependence,a dominion on thein the desireabliltyBritish Empire or theat feasibilitythe most. But of completewhen Bevin independence.started using Theythis werethreat thinkingto go into termsthe ofUN maybethat's a whendominionl think in opinionthe Britishgelled. EmpireIn atthat thecase most.we wereBut whenqoing Bevinall out startedfor full usingindependence, this threatby tothe goway toover the theUN that'swhole countrywhen I thinknot over opinionany gelled.partitioned In thatarea. case we were JK: goingWas his allthreat out foraimed fullat independence,the Arabs? Wasby theit wayaffective over theas wholefar as countrytheir interestsnot over anywere partitionedconcerned? area. JKRosenne:: WasYes, histhey threatdidn't aimedworry at atthe aIlArabs?about Wasit. it Don'affectivet forget as farthere aswere theirfive interestsindependent were Arabconcerned?states those days in the Rosenne: Yes,UN. Theythey didn'tdidn'thave worrythe atpoiiticai all aboutweight it. thatDon'theyt forgethave theretoday wereor the fivepolitical independentpower Arabthat statesthey thosehave daystoday inbut, the UN. They didn't have the political weight that they have 8 today or the political power that they have today but,

8 they were by no means insignificant. There had been the famous meeting of Roosevelt with King Ibnn Saoud in Cairo theyin '43 wereor by'44, no hismeanslast insignificant.visit to the MiddleThere hadEast, beenwhich the famouschanged meetingthe whole of pictureRooseveltof withArab/American King Ibnn Saoudrelations. in cairoUp untilin '43 thenor '44,they'd his lastsort visitof been to theAramco Middlesemi-colonial East, which changedrelations. the wholeAlI of picturea sudden of theyArab/Americanover night relations.changed into Up untila much thenmore they'dindependent sort of statusbeen Aramcowith semi-colonialArabism and relations.Panarabism. AllThey ofwere a suddenfar less theyworried over nightabout changedthe UN thaninto aour muchpeople morewere, independentbut our calculation status withwas quiteArabisma coldand Panarabism.clinical one Theythat wereif we farhandled less worriedthings properlyabout thewe UNwould than ourget atpeopleany ratewere,enough but ourof partitioned calculationPalestine was quiteto aenable cold clinicalthe OP problem one thatto ifbe wesolved. handled thingsThere wasproperlythis terriblewe would getconnection at any rateaIl theenoughtime ofof partitionedthe OP problem Palestinewith this.to enableIf theyou DPgo probleminto the torecords, be solved.for instance,There was ofthisUNSCOP terribleyou wouldconnectionsee that all thethere timewas oftremendous the OP problemoposition with inthis.UNSCOP If youand bygo theintoArabs the torecords,UNSCOP forvisiting instance,any OPofcamp. UNSCOPThere you

wouldwas a compromisesee that therereached was ontremendousthat but lopositionhave forgotten in UNSCOPthe anddetails. by theEither Arabs oneto UNSCOPor two visitingmembers wentany OPindividually camp. Thereor wassomething a compromiselike that. reachedThat's on thathow butit Iwas havedone. forgotten the details.The Arabs Eitherand the oneanti-Israeli or two memberselements, went individuallywhoever they or mightsomethinghave likebeen, that.understood That's thishow itconnection was done. of the DPs andThe theArabsPalestine and thequestion anti-Israeliand didelements,everything whoeverto break they mightit. have been, understood this connection of the OPs JK: andIn the thespring Palestineof 1947 questionthere wasand adidspecial everythingsession to atbreakthe United'Nationsit. on the Palestine question. The Jewish JK: AgencyIn the springrepresented of 1947the thereJewish was apeople. special Wassessionthere at anythe United'Nations on the Palestine question. The Jewish 9 Agency represented the Jewish people. Was there any

9 oposition to the Jewish Agency being the representative?

Rosenne: opositionThere may haveto thebeen Jewishin two Agencyareas. beingl amthespeaking representative?now from memory. On the extreme religious right the people who

Rosenne: Thereare today may haveopposed beento in Zionismtwo areas.and Ian amindependent speaking nowIsrael from

memory.particularly, On theespecially extreme religiouswhat are rightcalled the thepeopleSotmor who

areHasidim todaywhich opposedare tonow Zionismquite strongand an inindependentNew York. IsraelThey particularly,were brought overespeciallyfrom Eastern what Europe,are calledwhat wasthe leftSotmorof Hasidimthem. whichThen thereare nowwere quitethe strongextreme in Newassimilationist York. They werecircles broughtin this overcountry from Easternconcentrated Europe,in whatwhat waswas leftcalled of

them.the American Then Councilthere wereof Judaism. the extremeIt stillassimilationistexists. l

circlesdon't think in thisit was countryterribly concentratedeffective becausein what thewas bulkcalledof

the JewishAmericanworld, Councildue ofto Judaism.this connection It stillwith exists.the DPs, I don'twanted thinksome itaction was terriblytaken to effectiveresolve it.because the bulk of JK: theWas Jewishthe position world, ofduethe to Jewishthis connectionAgency at withthat thetime DPs,to wantedpromote somestatehood? action taken to resolve it. JK:Rosenne: WasYeso the position of the Jewish Agency at that time to

JK: promoteWho were statehood?representing the Arabs?

Rosenne: Yes.The Palestinian Arabs had a committee. l don't recall

JK: Whoexactly werehow representingtheir relations the Arabs?went. They were represented Rosenne: Theby five PalestinianArab states Arabsof whichhad a thecommittee.most important I don'twas recallEgypt exactlywhich had howits theirown majorrelationsconflict went.with Theythe wereUK atrepresentedthat time byover fivethe ArabBritish statesbases of whichand thethe mostSuez importantCanal and wasso Egypton,

whichgetting hadout itsof ownits majorvassel conflictstatus withit hadthe beenUK atin thatbetween time overthe twothe warsSritishand basesindependence. and the Suez Canal Thereand sowas on,a gettingresolution out inof theits UNvasselauthorizing status itthe hadappearance been in betweenof the

the two wars and independence. There was a 10 resolution in the UN authorizing the appearance of the

10 Jewish Agency for Palestine which created quite a row. The next day there was a parallel resolution for the Arab

JewishHigh Committee. Agency forl don'tPalestinerecall whichnow whethercreated theyquiteappeared a row. Theor notenext dayIt wouldthere wasbe ina parallelthe records. resolutionThey werefor theto Arabsome

Highextent committee.in a tainted I don'tposition. recall nowl whetheruse the theyword appearedquite oradvisedly not. Itbecause would betheir in theleader records.Hajj AminThey elwereHusseini, to some

extentwho is relatedin a taintedto the position.Husseini whoI useis nowtheprominent word quitein advisedlyPalestine andbecausewho istheira relative leader moderate,Hajj Amin wasel muftiHusseini,which whois tois relatedsay a chiefto thereligious Husseini wholeader, is nowput prominentin by thein PalestineBritish. andHe whowas isan a extremistrelative moderate,and he had washad mufticontacts which

wiis thtoHitler say duringa chiefthe religiousWar. There leader,are actual put picturesin by theof British.him in Berlin. He was Thatan extremistdid not anddo thehe hadPalestinian had contactsArab withcause HianytIergood duringin those the War.days Therewhen theare UNactualwas verypicturesmuch ofan himanti-Nazi in Berlin.organization. That did not do the Palestinian Arab JK: causeThen aanyspecial good in commithosettee dayswas whenappointed the UN wasand verythey much hadan anti-Nazirecommended organization.partition. Was the Jewish Agency supportive JK: Thenof that a specialrecommendation? committee was appointed and they had

Rosenne: recommendedYes, l think partition.it is fair Wasto saythe thatJewishit Agencywas support supportiveive of

ofthat thatrecommendation recommendation?if it had been implemented in its Rosenne: Yes,entirety. I thinkThat it isrecommendation fair to say thathad itthree was supportiveparts to it.of thatOne was recommendationthe establishment if it ofhadthe beenJewish implementedstate. Onein itswas entirety.the establishment That recommendationof the Arab state.had threeThe partsthird towas it.a

Oneseparate was thestatus establishmentfor Jerusalem. of the JewishThere was,state.of Onecourse, was o thestronq establishmentobjection inof Jewishthe Arabcircles state.to Thehaving thirda Jewishwas a separatestate without statusJerusalem, for Jerusalem.without Thereany part was,of ofJerusalem course, o stronqbeing a objectionpart of i t.in ButJewishi t wascirclesaccepted to havingon the conditiona Jewish state without Jerusalem, without any part of Jerusalem 11 being a part of it. But it was accepted on the condition

11 that the whole thing in its entirety was put into effect because it offered the opportunity to solve this DP thatproblem. the whole thing in its entirety was put into effect JK: becauseLater on itin Novemberoffered theof 1947opportunitythe General to Assembysolve thisadopted DP problem.that resolution. JK:Rosenne: Laterwith aonmajor in Novembermodification of 1947to theour Generaladvantage, Assembywhich adoptedwas thatmost resolution.of the Negev in the Jewish state which we certainly Rosenne: Withwanted a becausemajor modificationthat was the toarea ourwe advantage,saw as the settlementwhich was

mostarea offor thethe NegevDPs. in the Jewish state which we certainly JK: wantedWhat happened becausewith thatthat was therecommendation? area we saw asWhy thewas settlementit never

areaimplemented? for the DPs. JK:Rosenne: Whatl would happenedsay that withit thatwas recommendation?never implemented Whypartly was itbecause never implemented?of Arab refusaI to accept it. That was certainly the Rosenne: Iprime wouldreason. say thatArab it wasrefusaI neverto implementedaccept and thepartlyArab becauseuse of offorceto Arab refusalbuttress to accepttheir refusaIit. Thatto wasaccept certainlyi t. theThe primeBritish reason.refused Arabto refusalaccept toi t,accepttoo. and Onethe Arabmust usenever of forceoverlook to that.buttressl amtheirnot quiterefusalsure to howacceptfar theit. US Theand Britishthe USSR refusedreally backedto acceptit. Theyit, too.both votedOne formustit neverbut, overlooki t is one that.thing I toam votenot quitein the sureUN howand fari t theis USal waysand theanother USSR thingreallyto backedgive it it.political They bothbacking. voted lforhave it neverbut, itbeen issure one inthingmy ownto votemind inthat thethe UN twoandof itthem is alwaysreally anotherbacked it.thingThe to Americansgive it politicalopenly withdrewbacking. fromI haveit nevera few beenmonths surelater in formy owntemporary mind thatreasons. the twoThe of Coldthem Warreallywas backedbeginning it. toTheshape Americansup then openlyand, ofwithdrewcourse, fromit wasit aacute few monthsin the laterMiddle forEast. temporaryPeople reasons.overlook Thethat. ColdThe Warfirst was beginningcrisis to tobe shapedealt upwith then byand,the of Securitycourse, itCouncil was acutewas in the Middle East. People overlook that. The first 12 crisis to be dealt with by the Security council was

12 " , ..

AzerbaijanAzerbaijan in the Middle East. Nothing in Europe or any other part of the world, it was there. That was where the three powers met, the British were in the process of disappearing. They were still a force to be reckoned with. French interests were worse at that time and the French were completely knocked out.

JK: What were some of the fears of the recommendation for partition? Rosenne: Well, I think even at that time there was beginning to be a fear of oil. There may have been others. You see the Arab world, nevertheless, does occupy a strategic posipositiontion right across all the lines of communication from

the West to the Far East. Even today most airlines go through Cairo from Europe to the Far East.

JK: Was the security situation in Palestine deteriorating? Rosenne: Very much so. It became virtual war within two or three weeks of "the partition resolution of November, 1947.

JK: Why was that? Was that in reaction to the resolution? Rosenne: On the Arab side it was certainly in reaction to the

resolution. On the Jewish side it was partly self­ defense, well, mainly self-defense. I arrived in

Palestine in December and already Jerusalem was under siege. We couldn't get to the airport in Tel Aviv even.

We had to fly. It was not possible to go by road. It

was 15 or 20 miles. Technically that period is often referred to as a civil war. I find it difficult to see

13 how a war could be a civil war and simply by the stroke of a pen on the 14th of May, 1948, become an howinternational a war couldwar. be aFor civilthose warwho andwere simplyinvol byved thein strokei t the dateof a madepenno ondifference. the 14th Itofwas May,still 1948,the samebecomekind ofan war.internationalIt became war.in theForfirst thosephase who werea war involvedfor the inlines it theof datecommunication. made no difference.The main oneItbeing was stillthe road the fromsame TelkindAviv of war.to Jerusalem. It became inThe thesecond first onephasebeing a warthe forroad the fromlinesTel of

Avivcommunication.to Haifa. TheThe mainthird oneone beingbeing thethe roadroad fromfrom TelHaifa Aviv toacross Jerusalem.to Tiberias The intosecondGalilee. one being the road from Tel Aviv to Haifa. The thirdThe oneArabs beingvirtually the roadsucceeded from Haifain acrosscutting tooff TiberiasJerusalem. into ThatGalilee.was their maj or success. It was an enormous effort toThekeep Arabsit virtuallyopen. l thinksucceededthe twoin cuttingsides exhautsted off Jerusalem.themselves That wasin thattheir sixmajormonths success.periode It wasIn anthat enormoussense effortthe Securityto keep itCouncil's open. I thinkfirst thetruce two sidesresolution exhautstedwas fairly themselvesweIl timed. in that six months period.

In thatl want senseto thesay somethingSecurity council'sabout that firstperiod truceaIl resolutiontogether. lwaswas fairlytransfered well timed.from the London office to the

JerusalemI wantoffice to ofsaythe somethingJewish Agency aboutin thatDecember periodof '47.all together.l was immediately I was transferedput to work fromin thethe Londonnewly officeformed tolegal the

Jerusalemsection of officethe Political of the JewishDepartment Agencyof inthe DecemberJewish ofAgency \ 47.

Ifor wasPalestine immediatelyin Jerusalem. put to workOur inofficial the newlydut formedY was notlegalto

sectionhandle theof thedetailed Politicallegal Departmentcontrol system of the ofJewishthe BritishAgency forwhich Palestinewas going in Jerusalem.on every dayOurabout officialthis dutyrule wasand notthat to handlerule, aboutthe detailedthis case legaland controlthat case systemhaving of theto Britishdo with whichimmigration was goingand onland everysales day andaboutso thisforth. rule Thatand thatwas rule,handled aboutby otherthis casepeople. and thatOur caseimmediate having taskto dowas withto immigration and land sales and so forth. That was 14 handled by other people. Our immediate task was to

14 ... "

.. " prepare a kind of commission which was established

immediately after the partition resolution to prepare for

preparethe independenee a kind of thecommissionJewish state.which was established

immediately after the partitionThere resolutionare many tostories prepareabout for

thewhat independencehappened in thatof theperiod Jewishand state.probably aIl of them are true. There was a great dealThereof areconfusion many storiesas you aboutcan whatimagine.. happenedAnd thein thatfact periodthat Jerusalem and probablywas allfor ofaIl themintents are true.and purposes There eutwas offa greatwithin dealtwo ofor confusionthree weeks as addedyou canto

theimagine.confusion. And theMany fact peoplethat Jerusalemsay that wasthey fordid allthis intentsand

andthey purposesdid that cutand offthey withinprobably two ordid. threeNow weeksthe addedBritish to theannounced confusion.that theyManywere peoplegoing sayto thatleave theyPalestine did thison andthe

theyfifteenth did thatof May, and 1948.they probablyThat was did.not Nowthe thedate Britishin the announcedpartition thatresolution. they were goingThe todate leavein Palestinethe partition on the fifteenthresolution ofwas May,later. 1948.It Thatwas August.was not Butthe theydate decidedin the partitionunilaterally resolution.that they wereThe dategoing into theleave partitionon the

resolutionfifteenth of wasMay, later.1948. ItI wasdon't August.know why Butthat theyparticular decided

unilaterallydate was chosen. that I theycan tellwereyou goingthis tothat leaveas soon on astheI

fifteentharrived in ofJerusalem May, 1948.I wasI don'tcalled knowaside Why thatand particularI was told

datethis: wasthe chosen.British Ihave can announcedtell you thisthat thatthey asare soongoing as toI

arrivedleave Palestine in Jerusalemon the I fifteenthwas calledof asideMay, 1948.and I wasWe don'ttold

this:know whetherthe Britishto believe have announcedthem or not thatto believethey arethem. going Bento leaveGurion Palestinehas decided on thatthe fifteenthcome what ofmay May,the 1948.Jewish Westate don'tis

knowgoing whetherto be proelaimed to believe onthemthe orfifteenth not to believeof May, them.1948. BenTo

Gurionbe more hasaccurate decidedon thatthe comenight whatof maythe thefourteenth Jewish stateof May is

goingbecause to thatbe proclaimedwas the Sabbath. on the fifteenth of May, 1948. To

JK: beWhat morewas accurateBen Gurion's on theposition night ofat thethat fourteenthtime? of May because that was the Sabbath. 15 JK: What was Ben Gurion's position at that time?

15 · .

· . Rosenne: Ben Gurion at that time was very much like Shamir is today. He was the bete noir of the British. In fact

Rosenne: whenBen Gurionthe people at thatwere timeattacked was veryand muchput inlikeLatrun Shamir-- ishe today.happened Heto wasbe outthe ofbetethe noircountry of the-­ weBritish.wouldn't Inlet facthim whencome theinto peopleEnqland were becauseattackedwe andthought put in heLatrunwould -- hebe happenedarrested. to Webe keptout ofhim thein countryParis when-- wehe wouldn'twas in letEurope. him comeHe was intotechnically England thebecauseChairman we ofthoughtthe Executive he wouldof thebe arrested.Jewish Aqency We keptfor himPalestine. in Paris whenHe was, he wasin infact, Europe.the Hecommander-in-chief was technically ofthethe ChairmanHagana, ofthe theunderground Executive forces.of the JewishHe was Agencythe strong for Palestine.man of theHe countrywas, inand fact,a verythe commander-in-chiefdetermined person of andthe Hagana,a great the undergroundleader and forces.quite Hecharismatic, was the too,strongon mantop ofof everythingthe countryelse. andThere a veryhad determinedbeen a tremendous personrivalry and betweena greathim leaderand Weizman and atquitethe charismatic,time for this too,leadership on top position.of everythingAnd Weizmanelse. Therewas qui hadte beena different a tremendouscharacter rivalryall betweentogether. him and Weizman at the JK: timeCould foryou thisjust leadershipsay something position.about Weizman'sAnd Weizmanposition was quiteon adeclarinq differentthe characterstate of allIsrael. together. JKRosenne:: CouldNo one youreally just knowssay somethingwhat Weizman's about Weizman'sposition positionreally was. on declaringThey used theto statesay that of Israel.he was the first president, a Rosenne: Noposition one reallythat knowshe didn't what want,Weizman'sof astate positionthat reallyhe didn't was. Theywant usedto see. to sayBut thatl thinkhe was thatthe firstis going president,too far, a positionpersonally. that 1hethink didn'tthat want,he wasof avery statemuch thatwedded he didn't••• wantin the tonature see. of thingsBut I hethinkwas athatold manis andgoinghe wastoo sick.far, personally.He had an attachment I think tothatthe heBritish. was very Hemuchhad, weddedof course, • • • indone thethis naturetremendous of thingsthing he waswith a oldthe manBalfour and heDeclaration was sick.

Hein hadWorld an Warattachment1. He tohad thelived British.in Britian He had,all ofhis course,life. done this tremendous thing with the Balfour Declaration 16 in World War I. He had lived in Britian all his life.

16 A • Many of the Russian Jewish intelligencia of the pre­ revolutionalry period were very much attracted to Great ManyBritain of forthe manyRussianreasons. JewishThey intelligenciawere influenced of theby pre­the qreatrevolutionalryBritish philosophers period were whomverythey muchread attractedand, of tocourse, Great Britainit was the forbastion many reasons.of democracy They inwereEurope. influencedAlI ofbythat the greatin those Britishdays philosopherswas new to them.whom theyl don'tread and,think of hecourse,ever itlost wasthat the attractionbastion of democracyfor Britain in Europe.and things All British.of that Whereasin those Bendays Gurionwas newhad to them.a different I don'tbackground think he everaIl losttogether. that attractionHe was not forfrom Britainthe intelligencia, and things notBritish.from Whereasthe Russian Ben JewishGurionintelligencia. had a differentl don't backgroundeven know allif together.Ben Gurion spokeHe wasRussian. not from Whereasthe intelligencia,Weizman and hisnot wifefrom thewould Russiannormally Jewishspeak intelligencia.in Russian between I don'tthemselves even knowand if Bentheir Gurioncorrespondence spoke Russian.was oftenWhereasin WeizmanRussian. and Hehiswas wifea wouldChemist normallyof world speakrenown. in RussianWhereas betweenBen Gurion themselvescame fromand theirthe Jewish correspondencemasses of wasEastern oftenEurope. in Russian.He hadHe a wasvery a Chemistthorough ofJewish worldeducation renown. butWhereasthat didn'Ben Guriont make himcameof fromthe theintelligencia. Jewish massesHe ofwas Easternself tàught. Europe. He Hetaught had himselfa very thoroughGreek which Jewishhe educationwrote quite but weIlthat didn'tand read makewithout him of anythe difficulty.intelligencia.French, He wasl was selfat taught.a meeting Heonce taughtwith himselfsome UN

Greekpeople whichand he hecorrected wrote quitethe interpreter,well and readcorrectly. without Hisany difficulty.accent was very French,bad but,I washe atknew a meetingthe language once withweIl. someHis UN peopleEnglish andwas hepretty correctedgood. theHe interpreter,was a self taughtcorrectly.man. His politicsaccent waswere veryself bad but,taught he inknewthe thehard languageschool well.of laborHis Englishpolitics waswhich prettyis hardgood.everyhwere. He was a self taught man. His JK: politicsWas Weizman werecapitulating self taughtto inthe theBritish? hard school of labor Rosenne: politicsYes, much whichmore isthan hardBen everyhwere.Gurion. And Ben Gurion was in JK: Was Weizman capitulating to the British? 17 Rosenne: Yes, much more than Ben Gurion. And Ben Gurion was in

17 ·. ·. the country and Weizman wasn't. He was either living in London or in the united states which also made a big difference.the country andBut WeizmanWeizman wasn't.was the Heuncrowned was eitherking. livingDon't in misunderstandLondon or in whatthe unitedl am saying. states Peoplewhich alsonever madeforgot a bigthe difference.Balfour Declaration But Weizmanand his waspart the inuncrownedit and heking.was reallyDon't misunderstandthe uncrowned whatking. I am saying. People never forgotIf l themay divertBalfourfor Declarationand minute andand hisput partit onin theit andrecord, he wasl'Il reallytell

youthe anuncrownedextraordinary king. story. Our first embassy toIfUruguay I may wasdivertaround for and1949. minuteOur andAmbassador, put it on thewho record,just died I'lla tellfew weeksyou an ago,extraordinarywas from story.a very distinguishedOur first embassyJewish to Uruguayfamily wasfrom aroundVilna and1949.from OurJerusalem. Ambassador,When whohe payedjust dieda courtesy a few weekscalI toago,the wasBritish from aAmbassador, very distinguishedthe British JewishAmbassador family fromstarted Vilnahumming and fromto Jerusalem.him Ha-tigva, Whenour he nationalpayed a courtesyanthem. Ourcallman to wasthe veryBritishsurprised Ambassador,and asked the Britishwhat was Ambassadorgoing on. Hestartedsaid, humming"weIl ltowant him toHa-tigva,tell you. our nationall was the anthem.third Oursecretary man wasin verythe Consulatesurprised Generaland askedin whatOdessa wasin going1918 on.and

Heafter said,the "wellBalfour I declarationwant to tellaIl you.the JewishI wasmasses the thirdcame secretaryto the Consulate in the Consulateand that' Generals what inthey Odessasang in and1918 l and've afterremembered the Balfourthat tune declarationever since." all the Jewish masses came toSo, thel wasConsulatetold please and that'sprepare whatthe theynecessary sang documentsand I've

rememberedthat had been thatrequired. tune ever WeIl,since."these are not documents So,you learnI was abouttold pleasein law prepareschools. theAnd necessaryl was told documentsnot to

thattell hadanybody been thatrequired.l was Well,doing thesethis. areThese not documentswere the youtransitional learn aboutdocuments. in law schools.l couldn't Anddo I itwasby toldmyself. not toIt tellwas tooanybodymuch. thatl think I wasthere doingwas this.a group Theseof four wereor fivethe transitionalof us who worked documents.on thisI couldn'talmost donon-stop, it by myself.January, It was too much. I think there was a group of four or five 18 of us who worked on this almost non-stop, January,

18 • • February, March, April. We had difficulty getting the

stuff down to Tel Aviv because of the siege of Jerusalem. AsFebruary,a matter March,of fact April.we wereWe hadnearly difficultyunable togettingget early the

draftsstuff downdown. to TelAnd Avivthese becauseconsisted of theof thesiegethree of Jerusalem.documents whichAs a matterwere ofissued. fact we wereOne nearlywas theunableDeclaration to get earlyof draftsIndependence down. itself.And theseHere consistedl was ofvery theirreverent three documentsand l whichsaid towereBen Gurion,issued. "I amOnegoing was tothehave Declarationa look at theof

Independencelegal part of itself.it." (That's Here aIlI wasthe verypart irreverentthat comes andafter I said"for theseto Benreasons") Gurion, "I"But amthe goingBelles to haveLettres a lookyou canat theput legalin." part of it." (That's all the partSo, bythatcurious comes afterfluke someone"for thesehad reasons")sent me"Buta thenew Bellesedition Lettresof Jefferson'syou can put in."Parliamentary Manual which came outSo, aroundby curiousthat fluketime. Howsomeoneit got hadinto sentJerusalem me a lnewhaven't editionthe ofslightest Jefferson'sidea. TheyParliamentaryhad more Manualimportant which camethings outto aroundbring thatin time.than HowJefferson's it got intoParliamentary Jerusalem IManual haven'tand thel sayslightestthis now idea.in Theythe state had ofmoreVirginia. importantWhen thingsl read it,to notbringfor thein firstthan

Jefferson'stime in my life, Parliamentarybut from aManualdifferent and perspectiveI say this now-­ thein

theAmerican state Declarationof Virginia.of WhenIndependence I read it,was notthere for the-­ firstl saw timethat inthere my life,were certainbut fromstructures a differentof perspectiveit that certainly -- the Americancould be Declarationused. To oftell Independencethe truth wasif thereyou look -- I verysaw thatcarefully thereat wereour certainDeclaration structuresof Independence of it thatyou certainlywill see couldthat itbedoes used.follow To thetellstructure, the truthnot ifthe youwording, look veryfar

carefullyfrom it. atCUriously our Declarationenough, ofit Independencedoes not have you anwillanti­ see

thatBritish it doespassage followin itthelike structure,the US Declarationnot the wording,hase farBen fromGurion it.eut CUriouslyit out. Itenough,was initone doesof notthe haveearly andrafts, anti­ Britishsomething passagelike that. in it Butlikehe thewouldn't US Declarationallow it has.to go Benin. Gurion cut it out. It was in one of the early drafts, 19 something like that. But he wouldn't allow it to go in.

19 He also did something which l think Jefferson wanted to do and couldn't get away with it. He cut out aIl the He"whereases". also did something which I think Jefferson wanted to JK: doTo simplifyand couldn'tthe language.get away with it. He cut out all the Rosenne: "whereases"And make it. more beautiful. l certainly prepared the JK: Tofirst simplifydrafts theof languagethese three. documents. l won't say the Rosenne: Andonly makefirst it draftsmore beautiful.but, l certainly I certainlyprepared preparedthe first the firstdrafts. draftsThe ofDeclaration these threeof documents.Independence, I won'tand there say thewas onlythe curiousfirst draftsproclamation but, I certainlywhich l've preparedseen thesigns firstof drafts.amazement Theabout Declarationit in the ofliterature Independence,at home andand thereeven wasin thethe courts.curious proclamationIt was a proclamation which I've whichseen thesignsstate of amazementCouncil, theaboutpeople it in thewho literatureadopted theat homeDeclaration and even inof theIndependence, courts. Itadopted was a withproclamationit. It whichempowered the statethe Council,government theto peoplework by whodecree adoptedindefinitely the Declarationwithout anyof Independence,parliamentary responsibility.adopted with it.The reasonIt empoweredfor it was theour governmentanticipation to thatwork theby decreeArab armiesindefinitelywould withoutsucceed anyin parliamentarycutting the stateresponsibility.into two Theor reasonthree forparts. it wasThisour anticipationproclamationwould that allowthe Arabthe armyarmiescommanders would ofsucceedeach area in cuttingto take fullthe control.state intoFortunately two or threethat didn'tparts.happen. This proclamation would allow the army commanders of each area to takeThere fullwas control.a third Fortunatelydocument which thatbecame didn'tthe happen.basic law still in force called the Law and Administration

OrdinanceThereof was1948 a thirdwhich documentlaid down whichthe basic becamestructure the basicof lawthe transferstill in offorcevarious calledauthorities the Law andfrom Administrationthe mandatory Ordinancesystem to ofthe 1948independence which laid downsystem the basiccoupled structurewith the of theabolition transferof twoof variousdiscriminatory authoritieslaws fromwhich thewe mandatorywould not system to the independence system coupled with the 20 abolition of two discriminatory laws which we would not

20 i ..

i. ­ allow in our statute book for one minute. It was the British immigration law and the land transfer law. l

wouldallow sayin ourthe statutetwo White bookPaper for laws,one minute.addressing It wasboth theof Britishthose. immigration law and the land transfer law.Now, I

wouldwe had sayin Jerusalem,the two Whiteas it Paperhappened, laws, anaddressingembryonic bothforeign of those.office. It was not in Tel Aviv. It was in Jerusalem.Now, weThey hadwere in Jerusalem,caught in theas itsiege. happened,We worked an embryonicon establishing foreign office.the Foreign It wasOffice not andin Telplanning Aviv. it.It wasl wasin Jerusalem.frequently Theyasked wereto givecaughtopinions in the siege.on various We workedlegal questionson establishingwhich thearose Foreignnearly Officeevery andday. planningAnd lit.think I wasthat frequentlythis is askedinteresting to givefrom opinionsthe point on variousof view legalof this questionsoral history. which arosel would nearlysay until everyafter day. whatAndwe I callthinkthe thatsecond thistruce is

whichinterestingwas in fromJuly theof point1948 ofmy viewbasic of instructionthis oral history.was to Iremain wouldwithin say untilthe frameworkafter whatof wethe callpartition the secondresolution. truce whichThis iswasprobably in Julynotwidely of 1948 myknown basicbut, instructionall the initialwas to remainplanning withinof thethe frameworkpreparatory of thecommission partitionwhich resolution.l have Thismentioned, is probablyboth onnotits widelylegal knownside but,and onall thethe economicinitial planningside and otherof thesides, preparatorywas within commissionthe framework which Iof havethe

mentioned,rather detailed both onpartition its legalresolution side andof on1947. the economicIt was sideonly afterand otherthat, sides,that thatwas instructionwithin the wasframeworkremoved. of theThe 'reasonrather detailedfor the removalpartitionof resolutionthat instruction of 1947.was, Itapart was onlyfrom afterthe non-acceptance that, that thatby instructionthe Arabs of wasthat removed.part of Thethe 'reasonpartition, for the removalbreakdown of ofthatthe instructionUN in doing was,anything apart fromabout thethe non-acceptancesiege of Jerusalem. by theWhen Arabsthings of thatquietened part ofdown the partition,after the thesecond breakdowntruce ofin theJuly, UN in1948, doingthe anythingJewish aboutpopulation the siegeof Jerusalem, of Jerusalem.which Whenwhen thingsall was quietenedsaid and downdone after the second truce in July, 1948, the Jewish 21 popUlation of Jerusalem, which when all was said and done

21 . at that time was about 25 thousand if not more, were down to one loaf of bread and one sardine a day. The total . Jewishat that populationtime was aboutof Palestine25 thousandwas ifabout not more,600 thousand.were down toThere onewas loafa foodof breadline andtoward one thesardineend. a day. The total JewishThey populationcould notof Palestineunderstand waswhy aboutthey 600were thousand.being

Thereexcluded was froma foodthe lineJewish towardstate. the end.Under the partition resolutionThey couldthey were. not understandThere was a whyvery theystrong weredemand beingto excludedput an end fromto that.the JewishBen Gurionstate. hesitatedUnder thea littlepartitionbit resolutionbut towards theythe were.end of JulyThereyou'll was a veryfind strongsomewhere demandin the to putlaw anbooks end tothat that.extraordinary Ben Gurion hesitatedproclamation a littleby thebit butProvisional towards theGovernment end of Julyof Israel you'llmaking find JewishsomewhereJerusalem in the partlaw booksof the Jewishthat extraordinarystate. Let meproclamationsay that legislation by the wasProvisionalpassed. GovernmentThat signified of Israel themakingend Jewishto any Jerusalemclose partattachment of theto Jewishthe partition state. Letresolution. me say that legislation JK: wasl would passed.like to Thatjust backsignifiedup a fewthemonths end beforeto anyJuly closeof attachment'48 just toto coverthe partitionsome things resolution.that happened earlier JK: Ibefore wouldthe likemandate to justhad backexpired. up a fewThe monthsSecurity beforeCouncil Julyhad of called'48 justfor toa trucecover insomeApril thingsbecause thatof thehappenedfighting earlierthat beforehad been the goingmandateon. had expired.That truce Thewas Securitynot particularly Council had calledeffective. for a truce in April because of the fighting that Rosenne: hadNo, nonebeen ·ofgoingthem on.were. ThatFirst truceof aIl,was therenot particularlywas nothing . effective.to back them up. The full story of the British Rosenne: No,involvement none ·of themin that were.phase Firstof the of warall,of thereindependence was nothinghas . toreally backnot themyet up.been written.The full l storythink ofthat thethe Britishwidely heldinvolvementassumption in thatthat phasethey ofadopted the waron ofthe independencewhole an anti­ has reallyJewish positionnot yet beenmay notwritten.be fully I justified.think that lthethink widelythe held assumption that they adopted on the whole an anti­ 22 Jewish position may not be fUlly justified. I think the

22 · ~. Arabs also have a gripe at them. But they were certainly a factor partly because they had to extracate themselves. ArabsIf they alsowere havegoing a gripeto leave at them.on the Butfifteenth they wereof certainlyMay they ahad factorto have partlytheir becauseown theylines hadof to communicationextracate themselves.open to IfHaifa, they toweretheir goingport. to leaveThey onhad the problemsfifteenthof oftheir May theyown hadprotection. to have theirThey ownwere linesa offactor communicationwhich interfered open to

Haifa,certainly to withtheirplanning. port. They had problems of their own

protection.The general Theystaff wereof aHagana factorhad whicha general interferedbasic certainlydirective withwhich planning.was ammended in about March of 1948. This Theqeneral generaldirective staff ofwas Haganato maintain had a generalthe lines basicof directivecommunication whichopen, was toammendeddefend aIlin aboutthe area Marchallocated of 1948.to Thisthe Jewish generalstate directiveunder the waspartition to maintainresolution, the linesbut notof

communicationto qet involved open,with tothe defendBritish, all thenot areato interfere allocatedwith to thethem Jewishexcept statefor underself-defense, the partitionof resolution,course. That but notwas toammended get involvedaround withabout thethis British,time. notl really to interferecan't recall with themthe exact exceptammendment, for self-defense,but there wasof a course.very important That bookwas ammendedin Hebrew aroundthat cameaboutout thisthree time.or fourI reallyyears can'tago recallon the thewar exactof independence. ammendment, butIts therename iswastaken a veryfrom importantthe Psalms, book

in"We Hebrewwere thatas dreamers",came out threeedited or fourby Professoryears ago onYehuda the warWallach, of independence.a military historian Its nameat isTel takenAviv fromUniversity. the Psalms,It "Weconsisted were ofas aboutdreamers",ten oreditedeleven byessays Professoron different Yehuda Wallach,aspects a ofmilitarythat historianperiod atwritten Tel Avivby University.people whoIt

consistedparticipated. of aboutThere tenis anor essayelevenby essaysmyself onon Israeldifferentand aspectsthe UN in ofthat thatperiode periodl haven't writtengot a bycopy peopleof it here.who participated.l have a copy ofThereit at ishome. an essayl could by myselfsend youon Israelone if andyou wantedthe UN init thatfor your period.records. I haven'tIt has gotnever a copybeen oftranslated it here. I have a copy of it at home. I could send you one if you 23 wanted it for your records. It has never been translated

23 H •

To• into Enqlish. We could put it on the record here for the purpose of research and l'Il send one of the off prints inintoHebrew. English. YouWe couldcan put put itit inon theyour recordfile. hereCA revisedfor the Enqlishpurpose versionof researchis being and I'llincluded send onein a ofcollection the off printsof my essaysin Hebrew.to be publishedYou can putlater it inin1992 youror file.early (A1993 revisedby my publishers,English versionNijhoff is beingof Dordrecht, included Rolland.)in a collection of my essays to be published laterThis ammendment,in 1992 or earlyif l1993remember by my publishers,riqhtly, was Nijhoffno longer of Dordrecht,limited toHolland.)defending the area allocated to the JewishThis stateammendment,under ifthe I partitionremember rightly,resolution. was Itno waslongerjust limitedto defend to indefendinggeneral. thel thinkarea thatallocatedwas the tomajor the ammendment.Jewish stateThe underrest wasthe technical.partition JK: Wereresolution.the British It wasat thatjust timeto defendattempting in general.to maintain I thinklaw thatand order? was the major ammendment. The rest was technical. JKRasenne:: WereNot really.the BritishThey at evacuatedthat time attemptingthe Tel Avi tov maintainarea fairly law quicklyand order?and handed it over. Jerusalem was completely Rosenne: Notdivided really.with Theybiq barbedevacuatedwire thepartitions. Tel Aviv areaThey fairlyhad dividedquickly itandfor handedsome ittime. over.In JerusalemJerusalem theywas completelyhad two or dividedthree Britishwith bigzones barbedof wiretheir partitions.own in whichThey theyhad dividedconcentrated it fortheir some troopstime. andIn JerusalemBritish personnel. they had twoThese or threezones alsoBritishdivided zonesJewish of Jersalemtheir ownfrom inArab whichJerusalem. they concentratedl don't know theirwhether troopsyou andhave Britishbeen personnel.there or Theseknow Jerusalem.zones also dividedRiqht inJewishthe centerJersalemof fromJerusalem Arab Jerusalem.there has alwaysI don'tbeen knowthe whetherRussian compoundyou havegoing beenback thereto just or afterknow Jerusalem.the Crimean War.Right Wein usedthe centerto calI ofthem JerusalemBevingrads therenamed has alwaysafter Bevin. been theThe Russian"grad" compoundfrom stalingrad, going backof tocourse. just afterThe mainthe Crimeanone was War.there We whereused tothe callRussian them compoundBevingradsis, namedthe after Bevin. The "grad" from Stalingrad, of course. The 24 main one was there where the Russian compound is, the

24 .. ~.• •

• Central Post Office and other public buildings. When they left it there was a tremendous battle between us and theCentralArabs Postto seeOfficewho wouldand otherget holdpublicof itbuildings.because itWhenwas atheystrategic left it therecenter, wasright a tremendousin the centerbattle betweenof Jerusalem. us and Fortunately,the Arabs to seewe gotwho holdwouldof getit. hold of it because it was a strategicThe rest center,of therightcountry, in the centeras long of Jerusalem.as their Fortunately,communication welines got toholdHaifa of it.were kept open they did not have veryThe muchrest tooffear. the Theycountry,knew theyas werelong leavingas theirand communicationit was pointless linesfor tothem Haifato getwereinvolved kept openand theyto losedid notmen haveas they verywould much have.to fear. They knew they were leaving and

JK: Thereit was waspointlessa second for specialthem to sessionget involvedset up andat tothe loseUN menin April.as they would have. JK:Rosenne: ThereThat waswas aa secondus initiative. special sessionThat wasset upto atabolish the UN thein April.partition resolution and to replace it with a US Rosenne: Thatsuggestion was a forus ainitiative.kind of trusteeship. That was Theyto abolishsaw the theway partitionthings were resolutiongoing. It failed,and to ofreplacecourse. itThe withUS brought a us suggestionquite strong forpressure a kind onof ustrusteeship.not to declare Theyindependence. saw the way thingsAnd, in werefact, going.Shertok, It failed,as his nameof course.was then, TheSharett US broughtwhen quitehe hebraized strong pressureit, was inonWashington us not to declarea few days independence.before the And,Declaration in fact,of Shertok,Independence as hisand namehe wasmet then,with theSharettSecretarywhen heof hebraizedState at theit, wastime inand Washingtonhad a very a fewdifficult days beforemeeting the withDeclarationhim. ofHe Independencecame back andwith he thismet withvery thepessimistic Secretary ofreaction. State at Butthe timegiven andthe hadstructure a very difficultof the Americanmeeting withadministration him. He thecameState backDepartment with thisis veryone thing pessimisticand the reaction.Congress is anotherBut giventhing theand structurethe White ofHouse the isAmericananother administrationthing as you know.the Statel Departmentam not familiar is one thingwith aIland thethe Congress is another thing and the White House is another 25 thing as you know. I am not familiar with all the

25 • • details because l was not aIl that involved on the

American side of i t. Obviously l was locked up in

detailsJerusalem. becausePeople I whowas werenot concernedall that wereinvolvedable throughon the AmericaTruman ton sideqet this of quiit.te unexpected,Obviously Iquick was USlockedrecognition up in Jerusalem.which even tookPeoplethe whoUS delegationwere concernedin the wereUN ableby surprise. through

TrumanYou see toi tgetin thisthe. quiterecords unexpected,even though quickthe US recordsrecognitionare whichvery cautious even tookon thethis. US delegationFor instance, in thea manUN bylike surprise.Jessup

withYou seewhom itl in~as the.quite recordsfriendly evenand thoughDean theRusk recordsand people are

veryof that cautiouscaliber on werethis.taken For completelyinstance, aby mansurprise. like JessupIn withfact, whoml think I ~astheyquiteeven friendlyheard aboutand Deanit off Ruskthe andradio. people JK: ofWere thatthe caliberUS fears werethat takenthe completelyJews would bynot surprise.be able toIn

defendfact, I themselves?think they even heard about it off the radio. JKRosenne:: Werel don't thequite US fearsknow. thatl can't the answerJews wouldthat question.not be ableThere to defendwas a feelingthemselves?at that stage that US Middle East policy Rosenne: hadI don'tyet quitereached know.its I levelcan't ofanswerindependence that question.that itTherehas wastoday. a feelingThey were at stillthat stageclosely thatinfluenced US Middleby Eastthe Britishpolicy hadForeign yet Office.reached Theits USlevelhad notof independencebeen a Middle thatEast itpower, has

today.really. TheyIt werehad stillinterests, closely influencedAramco especially, by the Britishand

missionaryForeign Office.interests The USin hadPalestine not beenespecially. a Middle EastBut power,it had really.no presence Itin hadthe Middleinterests,East. AramcoThere especially,was no American and missionarypresence in intereststhe Middle in East.PalestineThe especially.presence was ButBritish. it had noThe presencenavy was inBritish. the MiddleThe armyEast.was ThereBritish. was noMost Americanof the presenceAmericans inhad theliaison Middle dutiesEast. inTheCairo presenceor wherever, was British.the TheRussians, navy wastoo. British.But, thereThe armywas no waspresence British.as Mostsuch. ofThis the

Americansonly came hadlater. liaison duties in Cairo or wherever, the

JK: Russians,Who were thetoo.spokespersons But, there wasat theno presenceUN in New asYork such.for Thisthe only came later. 26 JK: Who were the spokespersons at the UN in New York for the

26 Jewish Aqency? Rosenne: A Rabbi named Abba Hillel silver from Cleveland, if l Jewishremember Agency?riqhtly, Abba Eban, Eliahu Elath was Ambassador Rosenne: Ato RabbiWahinqton named(he's Abbastill Hillelalive), SilverSharett from came,Cleveland,of course, if I rememberfrom time rightly,to time. Abbal was Eban,qoing Eliahuto tell Elathyou wasfor Ambassadoryour oral historyto Wahingtonthere (he'sare twostillpeople alive),in SharettIsrael youcame,ought of course,to qet

afromhold timeof toif time.you canI wason thisgoingperiode to tell youOne foris Abbayour oralEban historyhimself. thereHe is areoften two inpeoplethe states.in IsraelThe youother oughtis toa getman whoa holdlives of ifin Jerusalemyou can onnamed this period.Gideon Rafael.One is AbbaHis otherEban

himself.name before Hehe isHebraized often in itthewas states.Ruffer. Thel otherthink ishe ais manin whoJerusalem. lives inThere Jerusalemshould namedbe no Gideondifficulty Rafael.in qettingHis otherhis nameaddress. beforeWe he areHebraizedquite itclose was Ruffer.friends Ibecause think hehe iswas in Jerusalem.number one whenTherel shouldwas number be notwo difficultyin New York in gettingduring histhe address.six Day WarWeperiode are quiteHe was closevery friendsmuch involved becausein heaIl wasof numberthis in onethe whenUN. I Hewas isnumberone oftwothe in realNew Yorkexperts duringon the Sixinner Dayworkinqs War period.of the HeUN wasduring very muchthat involvedperiod, veryin allmuch of thissO. l'Ilin thebe UN.home inHe isabout onea ofmonth's the realtime. expertsSo, if onyou'd the innerlike toworkingssend me ofa theletter UN duringfor him thatl will period,send veryit off muchto

him.so. I'llIt wouldbe homebe inno aboutproblem a month'sat aIl. time. So, if you'd JK: likeGood, tol havesend beenme a tryingletter toforreach him Ihim. will send it off to Rosenne: him.In some It wouldrespects be nohe problemwould beat all.even better than Eban JK: Good,because I havehe, l beenthink tryinglike toaIl reachgood him.diplomats, interested Rosenne: Inhimself some inrespectsthe inner he workingswould beof eventhe thing.better thanSo did EbanI. becausel mean ifhe, l I wantedthink likea transcript all good ofdiplomats,a Security interestedCouncil himselfrecord fivein theminutes inner afterworkingsit wasof the·spoken thing.l could So didget I.it Ibecause mean ifl Iknew wantedwhere a transcriptto go in ofwhat a Securitythey called Councilthe record five minutes after it was ·spoken I could get it 27 because I knew where to go in what they called the

27 kitchen of the UN. You have to know these things. Whereas l don't think that Eban even knows that the

kitchenrecords exist.of the HeUN.was Youat ahavehigher to levelknow aIlthesetogether. things.

JK: WhereasDuring thisI don'tspecial thinksession that atEbanthe evenUN a knowsUN mediator that thewas recordsappointed exist.for the HePalestine was at a issue,higherCount levelBernadotte. all together.How

JK: Duringeffective thiswas specialhe and sessionwas he consideredat the UN aimpartial UN mediatorby bothwas

appointedparties? for the Palestine issue, count Bernadotte. How

Rosenne: WeIl,effectivel can't was hespeak and wasfor heanybody consideredelse impartialbut, he wasby bothnot

parties?considered impartial in Israel. In fact, if Israel had Rosenne: Well,had any I politicalcan't speakclout for atanybodythat time,else but,which heit wasdidn't not consideredhave, l'm not impartialsure that in weIsrael.would haveIn fact,agreed if toIsraelhim. hadIt

hadis trueany politicalthat he had cloutplayed at thata very time,significant which it roledidn'tin

have,negotiating I'm notthe surefinal thatstages we wouldof havethe waragreedin Europe.to him. ItIt

wasis trueon that thatbasis he hadactually played thata veryhe wassignificantchosen. rolel think in negotiatingit was only theafter finalHitler's stagesdeath of thein warthat inlast Europe.few daysIt

waswhen onthey thathad basisto negotiate actuallythe thatuncondi he wastional chosen.surrender I thinkof Germany.it was onlyFor afterthe WestHitler'sit was deathBernadotte in thatas lastpresident few daysof

whenthe Swedishthey hadRed to negotiateCross who thewas unconditionalable to do that. surrender of

Germany.He wasFornot thea Westgood itmediator was Bernadottein this ascase. presidentWe felt of

thethat Swedishhe was prettyRed Crossmuch whounder was theablecontrol to do that.of the British

who retainedHe was nottheir a goodopposition mediatorto inthe thisJewish case.State We untilfelt

thatearly he1949. was prettyThere muchwas aunderterrible the controlincident of inthethe BritishNegev whowhere retainedwe shot theirdown opposition5 RAF planes towhich the Jewishwas no Statesmall untilfeat. earlyWe were 1949.aIl RAFTheretrained, was a too.terribleIt wasincidentno fun indoing the Negevthat.

whereThat reallywe shotbrought down 5 themRAF planesup with whicha start was noand smallmade feat.them

Wechange were theirall RAFminds. trained,l think too. thatIt wasone noof funthe doingreasons that.for That really brought them up with a start and made them 28 change their minds. I think that one of the reasons for

28 ..

•

his assassination was that he was not regarded as impartial. He was regarded as hostile. And he proposed

hisamendments assassinationto the partitionwas that planhe wasand lnotdon't regardedknow what as impartial.led him to doHe itwaseither. regarded as Whereashostile. thereAnd hewas proposeda great amendmentsdeal of confidence to the partitionin Bunche. planBunche and I wasdon'tknown knowin whatour ledaffairs him toway doback it either.to San Francisco.Whereasl promisedthere was Lawrencea great dealFinkelstein of confidencethat l wouldin Bunche.try and Bunchetrack thiswas knowndown, inbut ourso affairsfar l have way notbacksucceeded. to San Francisco.l think thatI promisedBunche Lawrencewas the Finkelsteinauthor of Article that I 80wouldof thetry Charterand trackbut thisl have down,not butbeen so farable I tohavetrack notit succeeded.down. A coupleI thinkof thatyears Buncheage there was thewas authora seminar of Articleon Bunche 80 ofin theNew CharterYork at butthe I haveRalph notBunche been ableInstitute. to trackThere it down.was anA articlecouple ofby yearsmyself agoon thereBunche wasin athat seminarbook, onan extremelyBunche in intimate,New Yorkpersonal at the articleRalph Bunchewhich Institute.brings out sidesThereof wasBunche an articlethat had by notmyselfbeen onbrought Bunche outin thatbefore. book,It an isextremelynot a dry intimate,diplomatie personalhistory articleeither, whicha

bringssort of outdrinking sides ofa Buncheglass thatof beer had notaround beenthe broughtbilliard out before.table. It is not a dry diplomatic history either, a sort Buncheof drinkinghad a a farglassbetter of beerreputation around asthefar billiardas our table.affairs were concerned. Yet he had a remarkable reputationBunche forhadfairness a far betteranyhow, reputationat that period as farand asin ourmy affairsopinion rightwere throughconcerned.til theYetend. he hadBut nota remarkableeverybody reputationshares that. forl fairnessthink that anyhow,the factat thatthat periodyou are andopposed in my opinionsometimes rightdoesn't throughmean tilto saythe thatend. theButman notis everybodynot being sharesfair. that.Whereas I peoplethink thatare inclinedthe fact tothatequate you areopposition opposed sometimeswith unfairness. doesn't meanl never to sayhad thatthat thefeeling man iswith notBunche. being fair.l don't Whereasthink that peopleBernadotte are inclinedcould haveto equatedone whatoppositionBunche with unfairness. I never had that feeling with Bunche. 29 I don't think that Bernadotte could have done what Bunche

29 did, somehow or ether. l don't think he had the physical stamina te start with. l don't think he had the down to

did,earth somehowpersonality or other.that BuncheI don'thad. thinkThe he hadteam thespirit physicalthat

staminaBunche creatednot to start with.only amongstI don't histhinkown hestaff had thebut downamongst to

earthothers. personalityHe was really that Bunchequite remarkable.had. The team spirit that

JK: BuncheWhat do createdyou think not onlywould amongsthave happenedhis own staffif the butJews amongsthad

others.taken no Heaction was reallywhen the quitemandate remarkable.expired? JK:Rosenne: Whatl think do probablyyou thinkwe wouldwould havehave happenedaIl been ifslaughtered, the Jews hadto

takentell theno actiontruth. whenThe theArabs mandatewere inexpired?that kind of a mood. Rosenne: IAnd thinkl don't probablythink wethe wouldoutside haveworld all beenwould slaughtered,have done very to

tellmuch theabout truth.it. The Arabs were in that kind of a mood.

JK: AndWhat I diddon'tthe thinkdeclaration the outsideof statehood world wouldimply havein doneterms veryof

muchthe UN aboutCharter? it. JK:Rosenne: Whatl don't did thinkthe declarationwe payed too of muchstatehoodattention implyto init termsat that of thetime. UN ThereCharter?is a reference to the UN in the Declaration

Rosenne: Iof don'tIndependence. think we payedThe concepttoo muchof attentionself-determination to it at thatand

time.independence There isas athey referencedeveloped to thelater UN inin thethe UNDeclarationcertainly

ofdidn't Independence.exist in thoseThe conceptdays. ofWe self-determinationare talking about andthe

independenceimmediate aftermath as they ofdevelopedthe War. laterAnd inin thea way UN onecertainlyhas to

didn'tlook at existthe Declaration in those days.of Independence We are talkingand what abouthappened the

immediatein the Middle aftermathEast ofas thereally War.a Andpart inof a theway concludingone has to lookphases at oftheWorld DeclarationWar II ofas Independenceopposed to the anddecolonization what happened

inoperations the Middlewhich Eaststarted as reallyin the a latepart 1950sof theand concluding1960s in

phasesthe UN of whereWorld Warthe II Charteras opposedprovisions to the decolonizationfor self­

operationsdeterminatien whichassumed startedquite in athenew latesignificance. 1950s and 1960sWhereas in

thea man UNlike whereBunche thewho Charterhas been provisionscredited as forone ofselthef- determination assumed quite a new significance. Whereas 30 a man like Bunche who has been credited as one of the

30 • •

• • fathers of that part of the Charter may have dreamt about it in World War II, it was certainly not seen then as a matterfathers ofof practicalthat part politics.of the Charter may have dreamt about it inThe WorldDeclaration War II, itof wasIndependence certainlyis notmuch seenmore, thento asput a matterin these of terms,practicala consummationpolitics. of the mandate of the LeagueTheof DeclarationNations rather of Independencethan of the isUN muchand more,the unitedto put Nationsin thesewas' terms,still aworking consummationwith League of theof Nationsmandateconcepts of the Leagueat that oftime Nationsrather ratherthat thethanquite of thenew UNconcept and theof unitedself­ Nationsdetermination was' stilland workinghuman rights with Leaguewhich ofhas Nationsemerged conceptsin the UNat thatsince. time rather that the quite new concept of self­ JK: determinationDid the declaration and humanof rightsstatehood which hasaffect emergedaggression in the UNtowards since.the new state? JK:Rosenne: VeryDid themuch declarationso. You had of nostatehooddefinitions affectand anyhowaggressionaIl towardsdefinitions the arenew dangerousstate? and not effective. l would put Rosenne: Veryit this muchway. so. TheYouadmittance had no definitionsof Israel into and theanyhowUN gaveall definitionsa certain international are dangerousstanding and not effective.to its de factoI would put bordersit this way.at that Thedate admittancethrough Articleof Israel2, intoparagraph the UN4. gaveIf youa certaintake internationalthe, subsequent standingevents toat itsthe de factoUN, various bordersresolutions at thaton reaffirming date throughprinciples Article 2,of paragraphthe Charter 4. andIf youso on,when take the,you sUbsequentget to Article events2, paragraphat the 4,UN, therevariousare resolutionsfrequent references on reaffirmingto "boundary principleslines of theor Charterthe word and so"lines." on,whenThey you wereget todesigned Articleto 2,refer paragraphto these 4, therekinds areof frequentarmistice referenceslines, or whatever to "boundaryyou might linescalI them,or theboth wordin "lines."Israel or inTheyother wereparts designedof the to worldrefer whereto theseaIl kindssorts of armisticeprovisional lines,lines orcame whateverinto existence you mightin callconjunction them, bothwith in Israelsome sort or inof otherUN action. parts of the world where all sorts of provisional lines came into existence in conjunction with 31 some sort of UN action.

31 JK: Was it anticipated that the declaration of statehood would in some ways bring in the UN in terms of protection

JK: Wasagainst it anticipatedaggression? that the declaration of statehood Rosenne: wouldYes, quitein somedefinitely ways bringbecause in the UNsimultaneously in terms of protectionwith the againstindependence aggression?there application for membership in the UN, Rosenne: Yes,as provided quite definitelyfor in the Partitionbecause simultaneouslyResolution, by withthe way.the independenceIn fact, the Arabsthere todayapplicationmake use forof membershipthat telegram in theas UN,an asargument providedthat for wein theshould Partitionbe pu shedResolution,back, notby theto way.the Inarmistice fact, thedemarcation Arabs todaylines makeeven, use ofbut thatto telegramthe partition as an argumentlines of that1947. we shouldThey say,be pushed"weIl, back,that' snotwhat to youthe undertook."armistice demarcationThey forget linesthat even,it butwas toa thepart partitionof the linesacceptance of 1947.of the totalityThey say,of the"well,partition that'splan. what you

JK: undertook.Was the declaration II They forgetof statehood that italso wasimportant a part ofto the Jewsacceptancein Israel of thethat totalitywere fighting? of the partition plan. JK:Rosenne: WasVery themuch declarationso. Overnight of statehoodi t turned undergroundalso importantforces to whothe Jewshad onlyin Israelbeen partlythat werewell fighting?disciplined into a national Rosenne: Veryfighting much force,so. Overnighta national it turnedarmy whichundergroundcould forcesunite whothe hadpeople. only Herebeen BenpartlyGurion wellwas disciplinedvery far intosighted a nationalwhen he fightingdisbanded force,forceably a nationalwhat was armythe whichelite couldforce unitein the people.underground, Herethe BenPalmah, Gurion becausewas veryit farwas sightedtoo left- whenwing he disbandedfor him. Heforceablywas a socialistwhat was himselfthe elitebut middleforce inof the underground,road. Ultimately the Palmah,the rightbecausewing, it wastoo, toothe left-Altalenawing forincident, him. withHe wasBegin a socialistand Shamir himselfand so buton, middlehe disbanded of the road.them both.UltimatelyHe insisted the righton a singlewing, nationaltoo, thearmy. AltalenaAlI incident,that was onlywith Beginpossible and becauseShamir andof sothe on,Declaration he disbandedof themIndependence. both. He insistedIt was the on supremacya single nationalof the government,army. All that was only possible because of the Declaration of 32 Independence. It was the supremacy of the government,

32 .1 I ;

the supremacy of the parliament, and the control, such as it might be, of the government by the Knesset, by the

parliament. It is actually based on the British sytem

and not on the American system, which means that the

control is actually rather weak. But 'it is there, I

would say. All that was only possible after the

Declaration of Independence.

It also had another effect on the war by creating a much more unified fighting force. The professional

soldiers -­-- there must have been 30 or 40 thousand of

them in the country at that time or more -­-- those who had

fought in the allied forces during the War were now

brought fully into it. To tell the truth the

underground, the Palmah especially, looked with a certain

disdain on the professional soldiers who knew how to salute and polish their boots and so on. They thought

all that was unnecessary. But, of course, it isn't. It

is part of a properly run army.

JK: Initially before the announcement of independence, how

was that decision arrived at by the Jews? Was there full

support initially?

Rosenne: Do you mean the Jews of Palestine or the outside world as

well?

JK: Was there a difference?

Rosenne: Yes, the Jews of Palestine had quite a well developed

system of autonomy which had been created wiwithinthin the

33 ..

~ t_ • It framework of the mandate going down to quite a low level in local qovernment and their own representation vis a

visframeworkthe Jewish of theAgency, mandateby goingthe way.down toThey quitehad a thelownormal level

democraticin local governmentprocesses andof discussiontheir own representationand decision makingvis a

visthrough the Jewishvarious Agency,executives by theand way.various Theycommittees. had the normalAs democraticfar as the processesoutside worldof discussionis concerned and decisionthere wasmakingno throughquestion variouswith executivesEuropean Jewry,and variousi t wascommittees.completely As disorganized.far as the outsideThere worldwas none is atconcernedthat time. thereThe wasonly no Jewishquestioncommunities with Europeanof any significanceJewry, it werewas incompletelythe UK and

1 disorganized.the USA and perhaps Thereplaces was nonelike atAustralia, that time.too Thefar onlyaway

Jewishto be communitiesof any real ofsignificance. any significanceThe wereBritish in the JewishUK and

I thecommunity USA andwas perhapsvirtually placesat likethat Australia,time 100% toobehind far awaythe

toidea. be ofThe anyAmerican real significance.Jewish community The Britishwas certainly Jewish communitydivided, butwasit virtuallythrew its atweight that behindtime 100%the behindidea. theThe Jewishidea. communityThe Americanwas 5 orJewish6 million communitypeople wasalready certainlythen. divided,Although itbutwas it probablythrew itsmore weighthomogeneous behind thethen idea.than itTheis

Jewishtoday. communityIt was much wasmore 5 or concentrated6 million peoplein the alreadyEast. then.That Althoughwas before it itwasstarted probablyspreading more homogeneousout. then than it is today.The ItformaI was muchorganization more concentratedbacked it. in theThere East.was quiteThat

wasa lot beforeof volunteer it startedmanpower spreadingthat out.came and, of course,

money.The Forformalinstance, organizationthere backedwas a manit. whoThereonly wasdied quitea ayear lot oroftwo volunteerago. l manpowerhad met thathim incameof and,aIl places,of course,Las money.Vegas. HeForliterally instance,stole therefrom was thea manAmerican who onlyair diedforce. a yearHe was oran twoair ago.force I pilothad metfor thehim USin airof allforce. places,He stole Las Vegas.I think threeHe literallybig bombers. stole fromHow hethegot Americanthem l don'air tforce.know. HeHe wasgot anthem airto forceIsrael. pilot Heforwas the veryUS airseverely force. punished.He stole I think three big bombers. How he got them I don't know. 34 He got them to Israel. He was very severely punished.

34 · ..

l've forgotten what the punishment was. He got some sort of severe punishment and l think i t was Johnson who

I'verehabilitated forgotten him.what theThen punishmenthe became was.king He ofgotLas someVegas. sort Hankof severeGreenspan puniShmentl think andhis I namethinkwas. it Youwas couldn'tJohnson whofly rehabilitatedaircraft unless him.they Thenbelonged he becameto astateking of Lasunder Vegas.the Hankordinary Greenspanlaw of I aviation.think his Andnameyou was.were Youin couldn'ttrouble withfly

aircraftships at unlesssea unless theythey belongedflew atoflag a stateof a recognizedunder the ordinarystate. There law ofis aviation.a famous caseAnd youof awereship inin troublethe English with shipslaw reports at seain unless1948 called they theflewAsya a flagwho wasof apicked recognizedup by thestate.Royal ThereNavy. is Shea famoushad struck case theof aZionist ship incolors. the EnglishThey knewlaw reportsthat this in was1948a calledunrecognized the Asyastate. who wasSo, pickedthere upwere by thecertainly Royal Navy.practical She implicationshad struck theof Zioniststatehood colors.apart Theyfrom

theknewemotional that this ones.was a unrecognized state. So, there were JK: certainlyDid the declaration practical implicationsof statehood ofaffect statehoodArab intentionsapart from thein any emotionalway? And ones.what were the Arab intentions? JK:Rosenne: TheDid theArab declarationintentions of werestatehoodcertainly affect toArabprevent intentionsthe inindependence any way? Andof Israel.what wereThey thewould Arab haveintentions?slaughtered us Rosenne: Theall. ArabThey intentionsmade no bones wereabout certainlyit. They to wantedpreventus theall out.independencel don't ofthink Israel.the declaration They wouldof havestatehood slaughteredterribly us

all.affected Theythis madeunderlying no bones aspirationabout it. ofTheytheirs. wanted usIt mayall

haveout. intensifiedI don't thinkit. the declaration of statehood terribly

JK: affectedDid they thisever underlyingoffer any aspirationefforts oftoward theirs.a peacefulIt may havesolution? intensified it. JK:Rosenne: DidNo. theyNot toeverthe bestofferof anymy knowledge.efforts towardl must a makepeacefulthat solution?reservation to be fair to them. Rosenne:JK: No.From Notyour toposition the bestin ofJerusalem my knowledge.l'm not I suremust youmake wouldthat reservation to be fair to them. 35 JK: From your position in Jerusalem I'm not sure you would

35 • • ..

• • .. have any personal experience with this but, in your view

was the Secretary-General involved in the Palestine

haveissue? any personal experience with this but, in your view Rosenne: wasTrygve theLie, Secretary-Generalyes. involved in the Palestine JK: Wasissuehe? supportive of the Jewish state? Rosenne: Trygve1 believe Lie,so, yesyeso. He was very supportive of Bunche, as

JK: Wasfar ashe 1supportiveknow, too. ofWeIl, the Jewishthere isstateno ?question about it. Rosenne: You'veI believeonly so,qot yes.to Heread washis verybook. supportiveHis letters of Bunche,to theas

Permanentfar as I know,Members too. ofWell,the thereSecuri isty noCouncil questionof about15 May, it.

You've1948, tellinq only gotthem toif readthey hisdon't book.do somethingHis lettersthe UNto willthe

havePermanentturned Membersinto the of footstepsthe Securityof theCouncilLeague. of 15l thinkMay, that1948, wastellingthe firstthem iftime theythat don'tletter do somethingwas published. the UN wilItl

washave inturnedhis book.into thel thinkfootstepsit is ofcalled the League.In the CauseI thinofk

thatPeace. wasHe thewas firsta hard timeheaded that Norwegian.letter was published.l think he hadIt wasbeen inforeiqn his book.minister I thinkat one ittime. is calledHe was In athefairly Causehard of

headedPeace. politicianHe was a hardand headedhe saw Norwegian.in the Palestine I thinkissue he hada

beentest foreigncase for ministerthe UN, atto oneprevent time. itHefrom was qoinga fairlythe harwayd

headedthe League politicianwent. and he saw in the Palestine issue a JK: testImmediately case forafter the theUN, mandateto preventhad expiredit from andgoingIsrael the wahady theannounced Leaque itswentstatehood. then very heavy fighting broke

JK: Immediatelyout. after the mandate had expired and Israel had Rosenne: That'sannouncedwhen itsthe statehoodArab armies thenentered very heavythe scene. fightingActually broke outthe. Jordanian army entered about a week before. Rosenne: That'sBasically whenthat the wasArabwhen armiesthe enteredEgyptian thearmy scene.which Actuallwas they mainthe armyJordanianentered. armyAlthough enteredthe aboutJordanian a weekarmy beforewas the. Basicallybest. There thatis wasno questionwhen theabout Egyptianthat. armyBut whichthe Egyptianwas the main army entered. Although the Jordanian army was the 36 best. There is no question about that. But the Egyptian

36 was the biggest. What is not realized is that the Iraqi

army managed certainly to get a contingent as far as

wasJerusalem the biggest.and burried What isaway notin realizedthe Jordanian is that thearmistice Iraqi

armyagreement managedis acertainlyclause about to getIraq. a contingentThey wouldn't as farenter as

Jerusaleminto an armistice and burriedagreement away directly.in the JordanianIt was limitedarmisticeto agreementthe immediate is astates. clause aboutNasser Iraq.was inTheythat wouldn'tinvading enterforce

intoin the an partarmisticethat wasagreementcut off, directly.the Arab Itunits was limitedthat were to

thecut immediateoff at a placestates.called NasserFaluja. was in ~herethat invadingwas a special force

inagreement the partabout that themwas cutin theoff, armisticethe Arab unitsnegotiations that wereto

cutallow offthem at ato placemarch calledout in Faluja.military Xhereorder. was Nassera specialwas agreementthere and that'sabout themwhere inour thepeople armisticegot tonegotiationsknow him. toHe

allowwasn't themunknown to marchto us outas ina militaryperson. order.l think Nasserhe was wasa

therecapta inandat that'sthe time. where our people got to know him. He

JK: wasn'The firstt unknowncalls tofor usa cease-fireas a person.by theI Securitythink heCouncil was a

captainwere ineffective. at the time.How was the truce finally accepted and

JK: Theput firstinto fullcallseffect? for a cease-fire by the Security council Rosenne: wereMy own ineffective.feeling was Howthat was itthewas truceexhaustion. finally acceptedThey kept and

putcoming intowith fullthese effect?calls. They were half hearted. They

Rosenne: Mydidn't own feelinghave any was backupthat itmachinery was exhaustion.which wasThey worthkept

cominganything. withThey thesehad calls.the Consular They wereCommission half hearted.in Jerusalem They

didn'tbut, i t washavecompletely any backupcut off.machineryIt couldn' whicht dowasanything. worth anything.The Red Cross Theywas hadalso the beingConsularfairly Commissionineffective in Jerusalemat that but,time. it Thewas presidentcompletelywas cutRuessen off. It couldn't do anything. Thefrom Redswitzerland. Cross was alsoBut lbeingthink fairlythat theineffectivemain truce atwhich that

wastime.on TheJune presidentlOth was wasrather Ruessenbetter timed from the point

offromview switzerland.of the Securi But Ity thinkCouncil. that theThey mainhad trucea clwhichoser was on June 10th was rather better timed from the point 37 of view of the Security council. They had a closer

37 l·1.• • •

• # appreciation for the realities of the situation and there

really was complete exhaustion. Certainly on our side.

appreciationWe had nothing, for literallythe realitiesnothing. of thel situationremember oneand therenight

reallyl had been was givencompletea rifle exhaustion.and given certainlya bullet onand ourtold side.the

Webullet had nothing,didn't fit literallythe rifle. nothing. I remember one night

JK: IThe hadcease-fire been givenwas a riflein effect and givenfor a awhile. bullet and told the

Rosenne: bulletFour weeks. didn't Thatfit thewas rifle.its prescribed time. JK:JK: TheWhy cease-firedid the fighting was inbreak effectout foraga a in?while.

Rosenne: FourIt broke weeks.out againThat wasbecause its prescribedthe Arabs wantedtime. it to. If l JK: Whyremember did therightly, fightingsubject breakto outcorrection, again? it was actually

Rosenne: Itfor brokea four outweek againperiod. becauseThe theArabs Arabsbroke wantedabout it to.a dayIfor I

remembertwo before rightly,the end subjectof that to fourcorrection,week period. it was actuallyThat was

forone ofa fourthe biggestweek period.military Themistakes Arabs brokethat theyabouthave a daymade. or

twoWe hadbeforemanaged the toendget of ourselvesthat four betterweek period.organized. That was JK: oneThen ofwhat the isbiggestknown militaryas the Ten mistakesDay Offensive that theytook haveplace. made. Rosenne: WeYes, hadit managedgave us tohalf get theourselvesNegev. better organized.

JK: ThenThe final what truceis knownwent asinto the effectTen Dayon OffensiveJuly 18th. tookThat place.was

Rosenne: Yes,when itwe gavewere usreally half theable Negev.to set about organizing the

JK: Thestate. final Althoughtruce wentthere into waseffectsporadic on Julyfighting 18th. Thatit was

whenisolated we wereafter reallythat. ableThere to wasset aaboutlittle organizingfighting thein

state.Jerusalem Althoughand there therehad been wasanother sporadicoutbreak fightingin Galilee.it was Theisolatedmain frontafter wasthat.still ThereEgypt wasand athe littleNegev fightingwhere there in Jerusalemwas continuous and theremilitary had beenaction anotheron outbreaka relatively in Galilee.small

Thescale mainbut frontit was wasthere stillnevertheless. Egypt and the Negev where there wasIt wascontinuousthe outbreaks military thereaction whichon a ledrelativelyto the smalltwo

scaleresolutions but itof wasNovember, there nevertheless.4th and 16th of 1948 which laid It was the outbreaks there which led to the two 38 resolutions of November, 4th and 16th of 1948 which laid

38 • ..

• .. the basis for the armistice negotiations. JK: Why was the July 18th truce able to be put into effect? Werethe basisthe Arabs for thewilling armisticeat that negotiations.point?

Rosenne:JK: WhyYes, waseverybody the Julywas 18thexhausted truce ableby thatto betime. put intoThe wareffect?had Werebeen theqoinq Arabson forwillingsix months.at that point?The los ses were fairly Rosenne: heavy.Yes, everybodyl think wasour exhaustedlosses inby thethatWar time.of IndependenceThe war had werebeen qreatergoing onthan forthe sixlosses months.in aIlTheour lossesother werewars. fairlyThey wereheavy.very I heavy.think ourIt waslossescomplete in theexhaustion. War of IndependenceThere was wereno real greateradministration. than the lossesIt inwas allsort our ofotherhand wars.to mouthThey werefrom veryone dayheavy.to theIt wasnext. completeAiso theexhaustion.UN in the Theremeantime was hadno realmanaqed administration.to in an empiric Itway wasput sorttogether of handwhat to becamemouth thefrombeginninqs one day toof thethe next.UNTSO whichAlso theis stillUN in intheexistence. meantime hadThey managedhad already to in byan empiricthe second way truceput togetherthe capability what becamenot theof preventinq beginningsoutbreaks of the UNTSO-- They whichdidn' is tstillhave inthat existence.and they Theywere hadnever alreadyintended by theto havesecondthati trucethe thebig capabilitypowers would not ofnever preventinghave agreed outbreaksunder --theTheyCharter didn' titself have thatbut, and theythey werehad theneverability intendedto observe to haveand that;report. the bigIt powersis from wouldthen neveronwards havethat agreedyou getundermuch themore Charterobjective itselfand militarilybut, they hadaccurate the abilityreporting to observethan we andwere report.having beforehand.It is from then JK: onwardsThe UN could that haveyou geta presence much morethere objectiveand could andobserve militarilywhat accuratewas actually reportingqoing on.thanThere we werewas havingcontinued beforehand.fighting even JK: Thethough UN couldit would havebreak a presenceout periodically. there and could observe what Rosenne: wasThe actuallywhole situation going on.was Thereextremely was continuedunstable. fightingThe Security even thoughCouncil itsimply wouldsaid breakthat outsuch periodically.and such a time on such and Rosenne: Thesuch wholea date situationthe fighting was extremelywill finish. unstable.WeIl, Theit securitydidn't Councilwork that simplyway. saidThe thatlines suchwere andonly suchreally a timestraightened on such and such a date the fighting will finish. Well, it didn't 39 work that way. The lines were only really straightened

39 < a .. '. •

< a • 'a • out in the armistice negotiations. You would have lines

mixed. The forward lines would be mixed. Let's say that

outthe inforward the armisticeline of one negotiations.side would beYoubehind wouldthe haveforward lines

mixed.line of Thethe otherforwardside linesand wouldall sorts be mixed.of things Let'slike saythat. that

the forward line of one side would be behind the forward JK: lineSo, even of thethe otherdemarcation side andlines all weresortsnot of absolutelythings likeclear. that. Rosenne: They weren't demarcated in the fronts. The fronts were

JK: So,not evenstable. the demarcationYou weren't linesin a werestable notmilitary absolutelysituation clear.

Rosenne: Theyat aIl. weren'tThe demarcatedSecurity Council in the simplyfronts.said Theat frontsX hours wereon

notsuch stable.and such Youa weren'tdate thein afighting stable militarywill stop. situationThe

atdemarcation all. The linesSecurityhad Councilto be established simply saidafter at Xthat. hours on JK: Thensuch wereand theysuch established?a date the fighting will stop. The Rosenne: demarcationThey were partly lines establishedhad to be establishedafter that byafternegotiations that.

JK: Thenwith wereUN assistance they established?especially the lines in Jerusalem.

Rosenne: TheyThe lineswere partlyin Jerusalem establishedwere basically after thatestablished by negotiationsthen.

withIn the UN northassistancethey especiallywere not establthe linesished. in Jerusalem.They were

Theestablished lines inat JerusalemRhodes. were basically established then.

In theThere northwas theya major wereoutbreak not established.of fighting inTheythe Negevwere

establishedbecause of the at crisscrossingRhodes. of the roads and the use of

the roads.There wasThere a majorwere veryoutbreakfew roadsof fightingat that intime. the NegevThe

becauseroad system of thewas crisscrossingvery poor and ofvery the roadscentral andthrough the usethe of

wholethe roads.thing. ThereVery weredificult very fewarrangements roads at thathad totime.be madeThe

roadto let systemthe Egyptian was veryconvoys poor andin toverysupply centraltheir throughtroops theand

wholeto let thing.our convoys Very indificultto supply arrangementsour people hadand tothat's be madehow

tothe letwhole the thingEgyptianwas convoysvery unstable. in to supply their troops and

to letA ourgreat convoysdeal ofin creditto supplyhere ourgoes peopleto Generaland that'sRiley, how

the whole thing was very unstable. 40 A great deal of credit here goes to General Riley,

40 111 • ­ .. .6

111 • .. .­• Bunche's number two, of the US Marine Corps. who handeled this with qreat skill in my opinion. A Marine General

Bunche'sdoesn't standnumberfor two,any ofnonsense. the US MarineHis Corps.yes is whoyes handeledand his thisno is withno. greatHe can skilltwist inyour my opinion.arm and twistA Marineyour Generalarm and doesn'tso on. stand for any nonsense. His yes is yes and his JK: noWas isit no.this Heparticular can twist yourincident arm andwhich twistbrought your aboutarm anda soqreater on. concern for establishing peace negotiations?

JK:Rosenne: WasYes, itthe thisNeqev, particularl would incidentsay so.which broughtThere were abouttwo a

greaterresolutions. concernThey for wereestablishinglocal incidents, peace negotiations?but they were Rosenne: Yes,quite theserious. Negev,There I wouldwere twosayresolutions so. Therein theweresouth. two resolutions.There was only Theyone werefor thelocalother incidents,fronts whichbut theymade werethe quitearmistice serious.neqotiations There wereeasier. two resolutionsl won't go ininto the aIlsouth.the Theredetails wasbecause only onein thisfor thearticle otherof frontsmine on whichBunche madein the armisticeBunche book negotiationsl qo into that.easier. I won't go into all the JK: detailsThis part becauseof the ininterview this articlewill ofdeal minewith on theBuncheArmistice in the Buncheneqotiations book I thatgo intotook that.place in January and February of JK: This1949. partJust of tothe fillinterviewin a willlittle dealbit withof backgroundthe Armisticeon negotiationsthis, the British that tookmandate placehad inexpired Januaryin andMay Februaryof 1948. of Rosenne: 1949.When youJustsay toexpired fill inl woulda littlesay bitterminated. of backgroundIt wason this,basically the Britisha unilateral mandatetermination. had expired inIt Maywas ofan 1948.Act of Rosenne: WhenParliament. you say expired I would say terminated. It was JK: basicallyUpon which athe unilateralJewish people termination.announced Itthe wasestablishment an Act of Parliament.of the state of Israel which was immediately recognized JK: Uponby the whichUS throuqhthe Jewishthe peoplesupport announcedof President the establishmentTruman. Rosenne: ofYes, theit statewas alsoof Israelimmediately which wasrecognized immediatelyby therecognizedSoviet byUnion. the USl throughthink the the SovietsupportUnion of Presidentwas in first Truman.because Rosenne: Yes, it was also immediately recognized by the Soviet 41 union. I think the Soviet union was in first because

41 they didn't and still don't recognize the difference between recognition de jure and recognition de facto and

theythe US didn'twas de andfacto stillonly. don'tA subtlerecognizetechnicality the differenceto it betweenbut, technically, recognitionthey de jurewere andfirst. recognition de facto and JK: Thenthe USimmediately was de factofollowing only. thatA subtleday fightningtechnicalitybroke toout it betweenbut, technically,the Arabs andtheythe wereJews. first. JK:Rosenne: ThenBetween immediatelythe Arab statesfollowingbecause that theday Paletinianfightning Arabsbroke hadout betweenstarted thefighting Arabs immediatelyand the Jews.on the 30th of November, Rosenne: 1947.BetweenIt thebroke Arabout statesin Jerusalem because thefirst. PaletinianThe fighting Arabs hadhad beenstartedgoing fightingon since immediatelythe beginning on the of30thDecember. of November,The armies1947. Itinvaded broke onoutthe in 15thJerusalemof May. first.They Thenotified fightingthe hadUN beenthat theygoingwere on doingsince it.the beginning of December. The JK: Asarmiesyou hadinvadedmentioned on the it15thwas ofthe May.Egyptian They notifiedarmies at thethat UN point.that they were doing it. Rosenne:JK: TheyAs youwere had thementionedmain most it wasserious the Egyptianone, the armiesbiggest at one.that

Thepoint.Jordanian army was also quite serious. JK:Rosenne: TheySeveral weretruces the mainhad mostbeen seriouscalled one,for theby thebiggestSecurity one.

TheCouncil Jordanianbut, it armywasn't was untilalso quiteJuly 18thserious.of 1948 that the JK: truceSeveralwas trucesfinally hadput beeninto calledeffect. for by the Security Rosenne: Ifcouncill can but,clarify it wasn'tthat for untila minute. July 18thThese of 1948appeals thatfrom the thetruceSecurity was finallyCouncil putwere intograduated. effect. That is to say that Rosenne: theyIf I canstarted clarifyby thatasking for afor minute.a cease-fire These appealsand theyfrom developedthe Securityfrom Councilcease-fire were graduated.to truce which Thatled isto tothe sayfirst that andthey secondstartedtruces by askingof the forsummer a cease-fireof 1948. andBut theythe inherentdevelopedinstability from cease-fireled to tofurther truce whichoutbreaks led toespecially the first inandthe secondsouth. trucesFrom oftruce thethey summeradvanced of 1948.to armistice, But thea inherent instability led to further outbreaks especially 42 in the south. From truce they advanced to armistice, a

42 , ·.

general armistice they called it. In fact, I think the preamble to the armistice agreements talk about transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine.

JK: It became clear that the truce itself was not going to be enough and that there needed to be an armistice negotiation which was face-to-face. In your book on the armistice which you publishedpUblished shortly after that in 1951, you spent some pages actually discussing the difference between a cease-fire, a truce, and an armistice. Is there an important difference in these in terms of their effectiveness or how the securitySecurity Council can use them? Rosenne: Yes, I think there is but, don't forget that at that time we were still very much under the influence of what is called traditional classic law which was legitimate and recognized and governed by The Hague Convention of 1907 and under the impact of the armistices of 1944-45. And we were rather inclined to think in those terms. I doubt

that the UN had any clear idea of what they meant. I think that they were political gradations, I think is the best word. But once it ceased to be a matter inside the territory of Palestine alone, that was when they used the expression cease-fire. It was rather irreverently translated into Yidish in the words shiss fire which means "shoot". As the independence grew stronger so this vocabulary of the Security Councilcouncil advanced from cease-

43 ..• T

T

fire, which a policeman can do if he sees a brawl in the street almost, to truce which is traditionally something fire,arranged whichby a milipolicemantary commanders, can do if henot seeson a brawlgovernmental in the streetlevel. almost,Certainly to trucewith whichgovernmental is traditionallyconsent but, somethingit is

arrangednot at the by governmentalmilitary commanders,level. Whereasnot on armisticegovernmentalis

level.already atCertainlygovernmental with governmentallevel. It was consentrelated but,to another it is notqui teat technicalthe governmentalaspect. level.In those Whereasdays armisticethe Securi isty alreadyCouncil atwas governmentalmuch more technical level. Itthan wasi trelatedhas become to anothersince, quiteand wisely technicalso. Theaspect.question In wasthosein daysthose thedays: securityunder whatCouncilarticle was muchof morethe technicalCharter was thanthe it hasSecuri becomety Councilsince,

andacting? wisely Behindso. Thethat questionquestion was isin athosesecond days:question under whatnamely, articleunder ofwhat the chapterCharter ofwasthe theCharter Securitywere Councilthey acting? AndBehindbehind thatthat questionquestion isis athe secondmain politicalquestion namely,issue. Ifunderit iswhatunder chapterChapter of VI,the thatCharteris headedwere they"the acting?pacifie settlementAnd behind ofthatdisputes," question theis theresolutions main politicalof the Securityissue. IfCouncil it is underare technically Chapter VI, recommendations.that is headed "theIf pacificthey are settlementacting under of disputes,"Chapter VII, thethey resolutionsare technically of the

Securitymandatory, councilsubject areto technicallytheir terms. recommendations.Now we had Ifa theypolitical are actingaspiration under Chapterin 1948 VII,to theymove arethe technicallyPalestine mandatory,question, assubjit wasect calledto theiron theterms.agenda ofNowthe weSecurit had ay

politicalCouncil, fromaspirationChapter VIin into1948 Chapterto moveVII thebecause Palestineas we

question,saw it, it aswas itthe wasArabs calledthat on werethe agendacausing of thethe breakdownSecurity Council,of peace fromall theChaptertime. VI intoIn fact,Chapterafter VII thebecauseArab asmove we whichsaw it,brought it was the Arabsfirst thattruce wereto causingan end, thethe breakdownsecurity ofCouncil peacedid allmove the intotime.Chapter In fact,VII andafterthe thesecond Arab trucemove

whichwas actually brought theordered firstby trucethe toSecurity an end, Councilthe Securityunder Council did move into Chapter VII and the second truce 44 was actually ordered by the Security Council under

44 , .r

Chapter VII. There is a significant difference.

JK: In going over some of the background leading up to the armistice negotiations the UN mediator, Count Bernadotte,

had been assassinated in September.

Rosenne: September 17th, I believe it was.

JK: What were the circumstances of his death and can you

elaborate on what the Bernadotte plan was that had been

recommended?

Rosenne: The Bernadotte plan ---­ I'm speaking from memory -­-- was called a progress report to the General Assembly and I

think he signed it the night before he was killed, as

late as that. Basically it involved a very major

redistribution of the land territory of Palestine to our

disadvantage. This goes back to an earlier part of our

conversation when we 'talkedtalked about the importance of the

Negev. The change which the General Assembly in 1947

made on the UNSCOP plan basically related to the Negev

which was put into the Jewish state. His plan involved

taking it out of the Jewish state. It also involved

putting Jerusalem into Arab hands as opposed to the

internationalization of it with some elements of

autonomy, of course, for the non-Muslim populations of

Jerusalem. The Jewish population was the maj ority of the

city. The two together made it absolutely impossible to

even look at the so called Bernadotte plan. It was

doomed before"before' it started. What the relationship between

45 ·~­

·~­ that and his assassination is, quite honestly, l don't

know. It is something that l never got to. l, quite

thathonestly, and hisdon't assassinationknow. l had is, toquitedraw honestly,up the documents I don't

know.which wereIt issent somethingto the UNthatand I whichnever weregot sentto. toI, Swedenquite

honestly,about that. don'tl drafted know. whatI hadwas togiven drawto upme theand documentsl was not whichallowed wereto sentgo behind to thethose UN anddocuments. which were sent to Sweden JK: aboutBut, inthat.general, I draftedas we whathad wastalked givenabout to meearlier, and I washe notwas allowednot considered to go behindimpartial. those documents.

JK:Rosenne: But,No, heinwas general,never consideredas we had talkedimpartial. about learlier,think that he washad

notwe had consideredany real impartial.say in his appointment l doubt very much

Rosenne: No,if wehe wouldwas neverhave consideredagreed to impartial.it. He wasn'I thinkt an thatunknown had wepersonality had any reallike, sayfor in example,his appointmentAmbassador I doubtJarring veryaftermuch ifthe wesix wouldDay Warhavewho agreedwas relativelyto it. Heunknown. wasn' t an unknown

JK: personalityIn terms of like,playing forthe example,role asAmbassadora mediator Jarringhe was afternot

theeffective six Dayin Warthat whocapacity. was relatively unknown.

JK:Rosenne: InNo. termsThere of wasplayingalso theanother role confusion.as a mediatorYou he see,was notthe effectiveGeneral Assembly in thatuses capacity.these words and no one really knows

Rosenne: No.what itTheremeans wasby alsothem. anotherGoing confusion.back to the Youbeginning see, theof Generalthe century Assemblyand theuses Haguethese Conventionwords and noof one1907 reallyaIl knowsthese

whatthings itlike meansmediation by them.and Going"good backoffices" to theare beginningaIl spelled of

theout incenturyconsiderable and the detail.Hague ConventionOne of the ofproblems 1907 allwas thesewhen

thingsthe General like mediationAssembly used and "goodthe word offices""mediator", are allcalI spelledin a out"mediator", in considerablewas it thinkingdetail. inOnethese of thelegalistic problems wasterms whenor thedid Generalit have Assemblysomething usedelse thein wordmind. "mediator",We had continuouscall in a disputes"mediator",with was Bernadotteit thinkingreally in theseover legalistichis powers. terms orIn

didother it havewords, somethingdid heelsehave in mind.power We onlyhad continuousto make disputes with Bernadotte really over his powers. In 46 other words, did he have power only to make

46 ·...

·... recommendations and if so, to whom? Or did he have any other powers? This was a source of bitter discussions withrecommendationshim. Those andof usif whoso, wereto whom?old enoughOr didto heknow, have andany otherl don't powers?include Thismyself wasat a thatsourcetime, of bitterthe one discussionsman in our withforeiqn him.service Those ofwho ushad who actuallywere old workedenough tothrough know, theand ILeague don'tof includeNations myselfand his atthinking that time,was theclosely one maninfluenced in our byforeignLeague serviceof Nations' who hadprocedures actually andworkedpractices through[Jacob the

Robinson].Leaque of Nationsl'm quite and hissure thinkingthat had wasthe closelyLeague influencedof Nations byused Leaquethe word of "mediator"Nations' proceduresin any particular and practicessituation, [Jacobit Robinson].would have meantI'm quitein thatsure thattechnical had thesense Leagueof ofthe NationsHague

usedConvention. the word l'm"mediator"pretty incertain any particularthat is whatsituation,it would it wouldhave meant.have meantThe in thatUN wastechnicalitself sensegoing of throughthe Haguea Convention.transitional phase.I'm prettylt certainused these thatwords is whatand itl woulddon' t havethink meant.anybody couldThe beUN surewas whatitselfwas meantgoingby throughthem. Wea transitionalhad the same problemphase. inItRhodes used overthesethe wordsword "armistice."and I don' t thinklt was anybodyvery interesting could be sureand lwhatdiscussed was meantthat byin them.my essay We

hadon Bunchethe samein problemthe Bunche in Rhodesbook. over50, thel needn't word "armistice."spend time

Iton wasit here.very interestingThe whole issueand I isdiscusseddiscussed thatthere. in my essay JK: onDid Bunchethe death in theof BuncheCount Bernadottebook. So, helpI needn'tthe negotiationspend time onprocess? it here. The whole issue is discussed there.

JK:Rosenne: Did1 think the death50, yeso of CountFirst Bernadotteof aIl, Bunchehelp thewas negotiationmuch more process?enerqetic. Bunche was much more nimble minded and very

Rosenne: Iquick thinkat so,exploiting yes. Firstthe slightest of all, opening.Bunche wasl'm muchnot moresure energetic.that Bernadotte Bunchehad wasthat muchcapacity. more nimble minded and very JK: quickThen Ralphat exploitingBunche was thenamed slightestthe acting opening.mediator. I'm not sure Rosenne: thatHe was BernadotteBernadotte's had thatnumber capacity.two at the time. He JK: Then Ralph Bunche was named the acting mediator. 47 Rosenne: He was Bernadotte's number two at the time. He

47 ·'".

· '". automatically took over. There was enough difficulty

over appointing Bernadotte. Bernadotte was technically

automaticallyappointed by a tookcommittee over. ofTherethe General was enoughAssembly. difficultyThat

overcommittee appointingof the Bernadotte.General Assembly Bernadotteconsisted was technicallyof the five appointedPermanent Membersby a committeeof the Securityof the GeneralCouncil. Assembly.The Cold ThatWar

committeein 1948 had of notthe reachedGeneral theAssemblylevel consistedit reached ofeven the laterfive

Permanenton in 1948, Memberslet alone of thewhat Securityhappened Council.later on.The Coldl doubt War

inthat 1948those had notfive reachedPermanent the levelMembers it couldreachedhave even agreedlater

onquickly in 1948,at anylet ratealone onwhata personhappenedto latertake on.Bernadotte's I doubt

thatplace. thoseSo, itfiveaIl Permanentautomatically Membersfell oncouldBunche haveas agreednumber quicklytwo. That at anybrought rate inon Generala personRiley to takeof the Bernadotte'sUS Marine place.Corps asSo,his itchief all automaticallymilitary advisor fellin onplace Buncheof asa Swedish number

two.General Thatwho broughthad been inBernadotte's General Rileymilitary of theadvisor. US MarineAs

Corpsa result as hisof that chiefthe militarywhole of advisorthe mediation in placeeffort of a Swedishwas in

GeneralUS hands, whoat hadany beenrate, Bernadotte'stechnically. militaryRiley wasadvisor.a serving As

aofficer result secondedof that theto wholethe UN. of theBunche mediationby that efforttime was inno

USlonger hands,in atthe anyAmerican rate, technically.service. He wasRileynot wasseconded a servingto

officerthe UN. secondedHe was atoreal the internationalUN. Bunche bycivil that servant.time was no

longerHe inhad thethree Americanor four service.people. He Onewas wasnot Stavropoulosseconded to

thewho UN.became Helegal was aadvisor real internationalto the UN. He civilwas Greekservant.and had

been Hea memberhad threeof theor fourGreek people.government One inwasexile. stavropoulosHe had

whoquite becamean important legal advisorrole toto playthe UN.in aIlHe wasthis. GreekThere and hadwas

beena Frenchman a membernamed of theHenri GreekVigier government(he died in withinexile. theHe lasthad quite15 years) an importantwho had been rolein tothe playlegal in alland this.security Theresection was

aof Frenchmanthe League namedof HenriNations Vigieralready. (he diedl 'withinve come theacross last

15League years)of whoNations had beenfiles ingoing the legalback toandthe security1920s withsectionhis of the League of Nations already. I've come across 48 League of Nations files going back to the 1920s with his

48 ·.,­

·.,­ initials on them. I had done some research in their archives in Geneva. There was another very curious

characterinitials onnamed them.Paul I hadMohn. doneHe somewrote researcha pamphlet in theirin "Internationalarchives in Geneva.Conciliation," There wasa very anotherimportant very pamphletcurious aroundcharacterabout namedthat Paultime. Mohn.He wasHeBunche's wrote arepresentative pamphlet in in"InternationalTel Aviv between Conciliation,"September anda veryJanuary importantor even pamphletlater, aroundI suppose. about thatHe istime.one Heof wasthese Bunche'squiet, representativeunassuming, extremelyin Tel Avivcompetent, between Septembercapable diplomats.and January Heor wasevencapable later, ofI suppose.doing rough He workis oneand doingof theseit weIl.quiet, Heunassuming,wrote an extremelyimportant competent,pamphlet incapablethat diplomats.wonderfuI seriesHe was capableof the ofCarnegie doing Endowmentrough workat andone doingtime itcalled well. "InternationalHe wrote an Conciliation."important pamphlet1 recommend in thatthat wonderfulyou take seriesa look ofat theit. CarnegieI think it Endowmentwas on the atmediation one timeeffort. called l've"Internationallost track

Conciliation."of him completely. I recommendI don't thatknow youwhether take a helookis atstill it. Ialive thinkalthough it was ona Swedishthe mediationfriend effort.of mine recentlyI've losttold trackme ofthat himhe completely.is. It might I bedon'tinteresting know whetherif you hecould is stillfind

alivehim. although a Swedish friend of mine recently told me JK: thatAroundthe he is. sameIt mighttime bethat interestingRalph Bunche if youwas couldappointed find him.acting mediator the UN recommended the establishment of JK: Aroundarmistice thenegotiations. same time that Ralph Bunche was appointed Rosenne: actingIt more mediatorthan recommended, the UN recommendedit called thefor establishmentthem. By this of armisticetime the Security negotiations.Council was acting under Chapter VII of Rosenne: Itthe moreCharter than recommended,and its resolutions it called forwere them.essentiallyBy this timemandat theory Securitysubject Councilto the wasactual actingtext, underof Chaptercourse. VIIHere of thethe SecurityCharter Counciland itswent resolutionsbeyond recommending. were essentiallyWhat the mandatoryactual words subjectwere toI thedon't actualrecall. text, Itof maycourse.have Herebeen the Security Council went beyond recommending. What the 49 actual words were I don't recall. It may have been

49 ...... "called ·for" or "invited the parties to enter" or

something like that. The essential thing was not that

verb."calledThe ·for"essential or " invitedthing was thethe partiesnegotiations. to enter"We have or neversomethingmoved likefrom that.this The position.essential thingWe waswant notdirect that verb.negotiations The essentialwith each thingone wasof thethe negotiations.Arab states andWe havenot

neveranything movedthroughintermediaries. from this position. HereWe thewantSecurity direct

negotiationsCouncil picked withus upeachon thatone ofand therightly Arab so.statesBunche and knewnot

anythingthat and knewthroughhow tointermediaries.exploit it. It wasHereheavily the undercutSecurity councilby the Palestinepicked us Conciliationup on that andCommission rightly so.which Bunchewas alsoknew

thatpart andof knewBernadotte's how to exploitrecommendations. it. It was heavilyThe undercutPCC was

byestablished the Palestineby the ConciliationGeneral Assembly Commissionin November/December which was also partof 1948. of Bernadotte'sThere was considerable recommendations.rivalry betweenThe PCCBunche was

establishedand the UN itself by theand Generalthis PCC,Assemblywhich inwas November/Decembercomposed of the

ofrepresentatives 1948. There ofwasthe considerableunited states, rivalryFrance, betweenand Turkey, Bunche anda very the curiousUN itselfmixture. and thisThe pcc,French which werewas composedsupposed ofto thebe

representativesthe pro-Israeli sideof theof unitedthings, states,Turkey France,the pro-Arab and Turkey,side, aand verythe curiousUS a kind mixture.of impartial, The Frenchnuetral were supposedchairman. to beIt

thedidn't pro-Israelireally work sidethat of things,way. It Turkeywas quite the pro-Arabunsuccessful. side,

andIt convenedthe US a twokindmaj ofor impartial,conferences. nuetralThe chairman.f irst was Itin didn'tLausanne reallyin the worksummer that way.of 1949,It wasimmediately quite unsuccessful.after the

Itarmistice convenednegotiations two maj or finished.conferences.The mainThe conferencefirst was wasin

Lausannein Paris inin 1952.the summerIt was of a 1949,complete immediatelyfailure becauseafter theit

armisticenever brought negotiationsthe parties finished.together. The Itmainalways conferencekept them was inapart Parisand intransmitted 1952. It messageswas a completefrom one failureto the becauseother, not it neveralways broughtin the theform partiesin which together.it was givenIt alwaysbut in keptthe themform apartthat itandthought transmittedwas most messageslikely fromto oneproduce to theresults. other, not always in the form in which it was given but in the form 50 that it thought was most likely to produce results.

50 · ..

Whereas with Bunche, the secret of the armistice

negotiations was the fact that the Security Council had

calledWhereasfor negotiationswith Bunche, andthe thissecretwas of interpretedthe armisticeby negotiationsBunche as meaning was thethat fact"you thatboys thesit Securityin the same Councilroom hadand calledyou're goingfor negotiationsto damn weIl sitand therethis untilwas interpretedyou've reached by

Bunchean agreement... as meaningThe thatUN "youhad boysremarkable sit in controlthe sameover room thisand

you'rein Rhodes goingbecause to damnthe wellisland sit wastherevirtually until you'veinaccessible reached

anat agreement...that time. TheTheUN UNhad hadone remarkableplane, the controlDakota, overand thisone

inday Rhodesit went becauseto Cairo the andislandone wasday virtuallyit went toinaccessibleTel Aviv. atYou thatcould time.only Theget UNoff hadthe oneisland plane,if theyou Dakota,could getand cnteone

daythatplane. it went toTo getCairocnte andthat one planeday ityou wentneeded to anTelOK Aviv.from

Youthe couldUN. Itonlywas getcalled off thethe island"milk run".if you could get onto JK: thatWhat planewas your• Toposition get onto inthatRhodes? plane you needed an OK from

Rosenne: thel was UN.legal It wasadvisor calledfor thethe "milkIsraeli run".delegation for the JK: Whattwo setswas yourof talks positionin Rhodes. in Rhodes?In the north, in Lebanon

Rosenne: Iand wasSyria, legalwe advisorhad a muchfor thesmaller Israelidelegation delegationthere. for theThe

twoarmy setsman wasof talksthe head in Rhodes.of those twoIn thedelegations. north, in Lebanonl think

andhe was Syria,a colonel we hadthen, a muchMakleff. smallerHe' delegations dead now. there.He laterThe

armybecame manChief was theof Staff. head ofWe thosehad onetwo Arabdelegations.expert and I myselfthink

hefrom wasthe a colonelForeign then,Ministry. Makleff.Those He'snegotiations dead now. Hein laterthe

becamenorth are Chiefquite of Staff.heavily Wedocumented had one Arabin an expertunexpected and myselfway.

Whatfrom thehappened Foreignis Ministry.this. TheThosedelegation negotiationsin New in Yorkthe northcomplained are quiteonce heavilythat idocumented t did not inhave an unexpectedenough direct way.

Whatreporting happenedfrom Rhodesis this.to knowThewhat delegationwas going inon, Newto Yorkknow complainedwhat the atmosphere once thatwas itlike didand notso on.have Itenoughonly gotdirectdry

reportingofficial reports. from Rhodesl was to onknowvery whatclose waspersonal going on,relations to know what the atmosphere was like and so on. It only got dry 51 official reports. I was on very close personal relations

51 ..... • • •

• with a man who was the legal advisor of the delegation in New York, Jacob Robinson (no longer alive). He was the

manwith whoa manItold who wasyou thehad legal had advisora great ofdeal the ofdelegationexperience in Newwith York,the LeagueJacob Robinsonof Nations (noin longerthe minorities alive). Hequestion. was the manHe hadwhoat I onetoldtime you beenhad hadlegal a advisorgreat dealto theof experiencegovernment withof Lithuania. the LeagueLithuania of Nationshad ina majorthe minoritiesdispute with question.Poland Heover hadVilna, at one whichtime beenran legalright advisorthrough to thethe governmentLeague of

ofNations. Lithuania.He hadLithuaniahandled hadquite a majora lot disputeof that withdispute. Poland

overThat wasVilna,where whichhe gotran hisrightexperience through atthemul Leaguetilateral of Nations.diplomacy Hewhich had washandledin those quite daysa lotin ofits thatbeginnings. dispute. That iswashow wherewe were he gotable histo handleexperiencethe UNatquite multilateralearly in diplomacyour existence whichwith wasa greatin thosedeal daysof professionalism.in its beginnings.He Thatwas inis howNew weYork. were ablel got to handleinto thethe habitUN quiteof earlywriting in ourpersonal existenceletters withto a himgreaton deala first of professionalism.name basis. He was inFor Newsome York.reason I whichgot intohas madethe mehabitvery ofangry writingthe

personalState Archives lettersat tohome himhave on a includedfirst namethem basis.in a volume of diplomatieFor somedocuments reason whichrelating has tomadethe meRhodes very angryarmistice the

Stateagreements. ArchivesThese at homeare havenot diplomatieincluded themdocuments in a volumeat aIl. of diplomaticIf anything documentsthey are relatingundiplomatic to thedocuments. Rhodes armisticeIn one agreements.letter l say Thesethat theare notinstructions diplomaticgiven documentsto us atby all.Ben

GurionIf anythingare complete they arerubbish undiplomaticand thank documents.God we've notIn beenone letterable to I carrysay thatthem theout andinstructionscan now dispose given toof them.us by BenNow Gurionyou don't areput completethat kind rubbishof stuff and thankin diplomatie God we'vedocuments. not been

ableIt is toone carrything themfor out aandstudent can nowto disposepick themof them.up goingNow youthrough don'tthe put. archives.that kind of lstuffdon' tin thinkdiplomaticthey documents.should be Itbanned is oneor thinganything for buta studentas a toresult pick nearlythem upaIl goingmy through the .archives. I don' t think they should be 52 banned or anything but as a result nearly all my

52 correspondence to the delegation in New York on the neqotiations in the north have been described in full evendowncorrespondenceto what to wethehad delegationfor lunch andin withNew Yorkwhom andon howthe wenegotiationscrawled through in themine northfields. have been described in full even downFrom Rhodesto whatthere we hadwas fora certainlunch andamount withbecause whom andEytan how wewho crawledwas the throughhead of minethe delegationfields. in Rhodes was a good correspondentFrom Rhodesand therewrites waswith a certaina facile amountpen. becauseHe used Eytanto writewho washome thequite head ofa lot,the delegationor telelgraph in Rhodeshome quite was a goodlot. Acorrespondentlot of his stuff and writesis in thewitharchives a facilebut, pen.there He usedis very to writelittle homeabout quitethe a lot,negotiations or telelgraphwith homeJordan. quite aPartly lot. Abecause lot of theyhis stuffdidn 'is t takein theplace archivesin Rhodes. but, thereThey is verytook placelittle privately.about the Eytannegotiationscan tell withyou Jordan.about that.PartlyHe becauseconducted theythem. didn'tThe takefirst placenegotiations in Rhodes.were withThey Egypttook placein Rhodes. privately. Eytan can tell you about that. He JK: Whoconductedwere somethem.of Thethe firstmajor negotiationsactors who were wereinvolved with Egyptin thein Rhodes.neqotiations in Rhodes? JKRosenne:: WhoBunche, wereRiley, some ofVigier, the majorstavropoulos, actors whothose werefour. involvedOn thein Egyptianthe negotiationsside apart in Rhodes?from the official delegation which Rosenne: wasBunche,headed Riley,by Vigier,a colonel stavropoulos,in the Egyptian those four.army Onnamed the EgyptianShareen whosidewas apartsomehow from relatedthe officialto King delegationFarouk. whichThe wasEgyptians headed hadby aa colonelfirst class,in the highlyEgyptian professionalarmy named Shareambassadoren whowho waswas somehownot a relatedmember toof Kingthe delegationFarouk. Thein Rhodes.Egyptians Hehadwas aprobably first theclass,main highlyEgyptian professionalcivilianin thatambassadordeleqation. who was notTheir a memberdelegations of thewere delegationmuch more in militaryRhodes. thanHe wasours. probablyOurs thewere mainevenly Egyptianbalanced. civilianinWe thatattached delegation.as much importanceTheir delegationsto the political were muchside moreof military than ours. Ours were evenly balanced. We 53 attached as much importance to the political side of

53 these negotiations as to the military side. In fact, l don't think the civilian side paid too much attention to

thethesemilitary negotiationsside. as toThey the wentmilitaryof side.into aInmilitary fact, I subcommitteedon't think theand civilianwe were veryside happypaid tooto muchlet General attentionRiley to andthe themilitaryofficers side.work itTheyout themselveswent of withinto thea militarylines or whateversubcommitteethey andwanted we wereto do.very happyWe were to interestedlet Generalin Rileythe politicaland the officersside of workit. it out themselves with the lines or JK: Whowhateverelse representedthey wanted theto do.Israeli We wereside? interested in the Rosenne: Therepoliticawasl asideman ofnamed it. Shilouh (no longer alive) who was

JK: anWho extremelyelse representedskillful theand Israeliexperienced side? diplomat and who Rosenne: hadThereconducted was a mana namedgreat Shilouhdeal of (noour longerrelations alive)wi whoth thewas Britishan extremelymilitary skillfulthroughout and experiencedthe War in Cairo.diplomatl andsuppose who

hehad wasconductedabout thea greatmost dealoutstanding. of our relationsThe rest withmiddle the rankingBritish armymilitaryofficers throughoutand intelligence the War in unitscairo.and I Foreignsuppose Ministryhe was aboutpeople. the Frommostthe outstanding.army we had RabinThe (laterrest middleChief ofrankingStaff armyand PrimeofficersMinister and intelligenceof Israel) thereunits partand Foreignof the timeMinistrywith people.Egypt. HeFromwas thecommander army we hadof theRabinsouthern (later frontChief

atof Staffone time. and PrimeYigael MinisterAlon (laterof Israel)Foreign thereMinister) part of wasthe theretime withsome Egypt.of the Hetime. was commanderBut above ofaIl thethere southernwas Yigael front Yadinat one (nottime.alive) Yigaelwho Alonwas deputy(later chiefForeignof Minister)staff in thewas

Warthereof someIndependence. of the time.He becameBut abovechief allof therestaff waslater. YigaelHe

wasYadinthe (notson alive)of anwhoarcheologist was deputy chiefwho hadof staffa worldwide in the reputationWar of Independence.(Prof. Sukenik). He becameYadin chiefhimself of staffhas alater.worlwide He reputationwas the sonas ofan anarcheologist. archeologist withwho hishad knowledgea worldwideof archeologyreputation (Prof.and of SUkenik).the history Yadinof himselfthe country has a worlwideand his personalityreputation ashe anbecame archeologist.a very good withchief hisof knowledgestaff. Heof archeology and of the history of the country and his 54 personality he became a very good chief of staff. He

54 knew enough about the Roman occupation of the country and

the Crusaders and where the roads went and so on. Walter knewEytan enoughwas the abouthead theof Romanthe delegation. occupation ofAbba the Ebancountrywas andin

theNew CrusadersYork. This andman whereShilouh the whomroadsl wentmentioned and sowas on. theWalterhead

Eytanof the wasdelegation the head withof theJordan. delegation.The realAbba negotiationsEban was in

Newwith York.Jordan Thisdid mannot Shilouhtake place whom atI mentionedRhodes. was the head

JK: ofNot theuntil delegationlater? with Jordan. The real negotiations Rosenne: withNo, theyJordanwere didgoing not takeon at placethe sameat Rhodes.time. In fact, the

JK: Notagreement'was until later?telegraphed to Rhodes after it had been

Rosenne: No,reached they andwere itgoingwas onincorporated at the same time.into theIn fact,armistice the agreement·wasagreement. We telegrapheddon't know howto Rhodesmuch Bunche afterknew it hadof this.been reachedMy suspicion and isit thatwas Buncheincorporateddid know intoand playedthe armisticethe game

agreement.extremely loyally.We don'tl knowhave howheard muchthat Bunchehe didn't knew ofknow this.and

Mywas suspiciontaken by issurprise that Bunchewhen didhe gotknowthis and telegramplayed thesaying game

extremelythat this loyally.was the contentsI have heardof thethatagreement he didn't thatknow andthe wasnegotiations taken by surprisehad gotten whenbogged he gotdown thisin telegramRhodes. sayingThey

thatweren't thisbogged was down.the contentsThey were of simplythe agreementnot taking thatplace. the negotiationsThe Jordanian haddelegation gotten boggedin Rhodes down didin Rhodes.not have Theyfull

weren'tpower. Thatboggeddid down.not matterThey werevery simplymuch. notIt wastakingonly place.a two

Thehour Jordanianflight to delegationAmman and a intwo Rhodeshour flightdid notto haveCairo. full

power.We Thathad todidbring not matterour own verycommunications. much. It was Weonlybrought a two

hourcommunications flight to Ammanfrom the andarmy. a two lhourthink flightthe Egyptiansto Cairo. did the same,We hadprobably. to bring our own communications. We brought communicationsThere were fromtwo thegreat army.things I thinkthat theBunche Egyptiansdid. didOne

thewas whensame, heprobably.greeted us on arrivaI saying that there were

no victorsThere andwereno twovanquished great thingshere. thatEverybody Bunche isdid.here Oneon • was when he greeted us on arrival saying that there were 55 no victors and no vanquished here. Everybody is here on •

55 a footing of equality. The second was the socializing which he forced on us mainly through the billiard table. Wea footingwere really of equality.all ex-army, The onesecondarmy wasor thethe socializingother, from thewhichWar. he forcedMost ofon usus couldmainlyplay throughbilliards the billiardor snooker table.or Wepool wereor reallywhatever allyou ex-army,do around one aarmybilliard or thetable other,with froma glassthe War.of beer.Most ofBunche us couldused playthat billiardsto very greator snookereffect, or

verypool successfullyor whatever youto turndo aroundthem intoa billiardhuman beingstable withand toa glassrealize ofthat beer.the Buncheothers usedwere thathuman tobeings, very greatalso. effect,

JK: very50, the successfullyEgyptians toand turnthe themlsraelis intoplayed human beingstogether. and to Rosenne: Werealizeplayed thatthree thesided otherssnooker, were humanor whatever beings, youalso.calI your JK: pool,So, thewith Egyptiansthe UN. and Andthe l'veIsraelisgot playeda guess together.that the UN Rosenne: Wewould playedarrange three whensided thesnooker,UN wouldor whateverwin and you whencall yourthey

wouldn't.pool, with That'sthe UN.a guessAnd I'veon my gotpart. a guessBut thatit was thevery UN

wouldeffective. arrangeIt iswhenthe thehuman UNside wouldof diplomacywin and whichwhen makesthey

wouldn't.it tick. That's a guess on my part. But it was very JK: effective.You mentioned Itthat is thethere humanwere sideboth ofmilitary diplomacyand whichpolitical makes itaspects tick. to the negotiations. How was that undertaken and

JK: Youhow mentioneddid the subcommittees that there wereoperate? both military and political

Rosenne: aspectsIt was undertaken to the negotiations.at home by theHowgood was integrationthat undertakenbetween and howBen didGurion the andsubcommittees5harett. Benoperate?Gurion was Prime Minister

Rosenne: Itand wasMinister undertakenof atDefense. home by theHe goodtook integrationthis double betweenjob Benfollowing Gurion theand ChurchillSharett. precedentBen Gurionin wasthe PrimeUK during Ministerthe andwar. Minister5harett wasof aDefense.very loyal HeForeign took Ministerthis doublealthough job hefollowingquarreled the veryChurchillbitterly precedentwith Ben in Gurionthe UK afterwards.during the war.They wereSharetta clash was a ofverypersonalities loyal Foreignas Ministermuch as althoughanything heelse. quarreledThey hadverythe bitterlycoordination with Benat Gurionthe highest afterwards.level. They were a clash of personalities as much as anything 56 else. They had the coordination at the highest level.

56 • • •

• • • The two parts of the delegation, of course, had

differences of opinion obviously, but i t basically worked weIl.The twWeo didn'tparts payof toothe muchdelegation,attention ofto course,the military had detailsdifferencesunless of opinionwe were obviously,asked for the butcivilian it basicallyside workedof it. well.l can't Wsaye didn'tthe same pay toofor muchthe military attentionpeople. to the militaryThey did trydetailsto lay unlessdown wethe werelaw askedabout forthe thetechnical civilianlegal side parts.of it. lI wascan'tactually say thetold sameby forYadin, the militaryand l was people.angry withTheyhim, did thattry toeverybody lay downknows the lawthat aboutthe breadththe technicalfor territorial legal parts.sea isI wasthree actuallymiles. toldTherefore, by Yadin,we canand sayI wasterritorial angry withsea him,in thethat everybodyagreements. knows lthatsaid the breadthl didn't for knowterritorialthat thesea territorialis three miles.sea Therefore,was three mileswe can andsay territorialtherefore, ifseayou in

wantthe threeagreements.miles you'veI saidgot toI writedidn'tthree knowmiles. that Butthe thatterritorialis the differencesea was threebetween milesthe andarmy therefore,approach andif youthe civilianwant threeapproach. miles you've got to write three miles. But JK: that[This isis thethe differencefifth side betweenof the tapedthe armyinterview.] approach Weandwere the talkingcivilianabout approach.the armistice negotiations that were going

JK: on[Thisin Januaryis the fifthand Februaryside of theof 1949.taped interview.]We were focusing We wereon

thetalkingnegotiations about the goingarmisticeon innegotiationsRhodes between that wereEgypt goingand Israelon in Januaryand we wereand Februarytalking aboutof 1949.the differencesWe were focusingbetween on the negotiationsmilitary and goingthe on politicalin Rhodes betweenaspects Egyptof theand negotiations.Israel and we wereWhat talkingwere the aboutobjectives the differencesof the military between aspectsthe militaryand didandthey the differpoliticalor coincideaspects withof the politicalnegotiations.issues? What were the objectives of the military Rosenne: Byaspectsin largeand didin thosethey differdays there or coincidewas fairly withclose the coincidence.political issues?With Egypt there were two major objectives. Rosenne: OneBy wasin largeto make init thosepossible daysfor thereus to getwas tofairlythe Gulf closeof

coincidence. With Egypt there were two maj or objectives. 57 One was to make it possible for us to get to the Gulf of

57 l' • •

.. • • Aqaba on the Red Sea. It ended up with Taba arbitration

a couple of years age because the Egyptians controlled Aqabathat parton theof Redit. Sea.It wasIt endeda kind upof withno-man's Taba arbitrationland. The

aJordanians couple ofweren't years agoin itbecauseyet. Theythe Egyptianswere in Aqaba controlleditself thatwhich partis onof theit. eastIt wasside a ofkindthe ofGulf no-man'sbut not land.in Taba.The JordaniansThe other was weren'tto get inthe itEgyptians yet. Theyout wereof inBeersheba. Aqaba itselfThe whichEgyptians is onhad thea eastgovernment side ofof thesome Gulfsort butat notBeersheba. in Taba. TheThey otherwere wasas farto getnorth theas Egyptiansthat. We outwanted of Beersheba.them out fromThe Egyptiansbehind the hadEgytian a governmentfrontier altogether.of some sortWe atdidn't Beersheba.quite

Theysucceed werein asthat far andnorthit's as regrettablethat. We wantedin retrospect them out thatfrom behindthat didn't the Egytianhappen frontierbecause thataltogether.was how Wethe didn'tGaza stripquite wassucceedformed. in thatThe andGaza it'sstrip regrettablewas a sma11in retrospectarea, a verythat thatsmall didn'tarea happeneven today,because whichthat wasunder how thethe GazaArmistice strip wasAgreement formed.remained The Gazain Egyptian Strip washands a smalland that area,is aat verythe smallroot of areaall thatevenhas today,happened whichsince. underApart thefrom Armisticethat we Agreementsucceeded remainedin getting inthem Egyptiana) right hands behindand thatthe isprevious at the rootfrontier, of all thethat has1906 happenedfrontier since.and Apartb) fromwith thatother we succeededarrangements in whichgettingwere themof aa) mi1itaryright behindcharacter the previousthe way

wasfrontier,left opentheto us,1906if frontierwe wanted to,and tob)get withto Taba, otherto arrangementsthe Red Sea. whichThose werewere ofour a mainmilitaryobjectives. characterThere the wasway

wasnot leftmuch opendifference to us, thereif we wantedbetween to,the topo1tica1 get to Taba,and theto militarythe Red Sea.objectives Those wereapart ourfrom mainthe objectives.technicalities Thereof thewas notmilitary. much difference there between the poltical and the JK: militaryWhat about objectivesvillages thatapartwere fromprimarily the technicalitiesArab or primarily of the military.Jewish and how they would be fit into the various JK: Whatdemarcations? about villages that were primarily Arab or primarily

Jewish and how they would be fit into the various 58 demarcations?

58 Rosenne: Most of that area was desert• The problem was not

villages but nomadic tribes which continued for quite a

Rosenne: Mostlong whileof thatafterwards, area wasthe desert.problem ofThethe problemBedouin wasnomads. not villagesThe real butarea nomadicwas the tribesGaza strip. which continuedThat was howfor thequiteGaza a longstrip whilecame afterwards,into existence. the problemThat ofwas thenot Bedouinso elsewhere. nomads. TheIn the realJordanian area wasfront the Gazathere strip.are divided That wasvillages how thebut Gazanot

Stripanywhere came elseinto existence.as l recall. That wasThey not soare elsewhere.settled Inpragmatically the Jordanianand frontthe thereless theare centraldivided governmentsvillages butknow not

anywhereabout it theelsebetter, as toI tellrecall.the truth.They are settled pragmaticallyl don't knowand thewhether less theyou centralknow this governmentsbut, the know49th aboutparallel it thefrontier better,with to Canadatell theis truth.not always along the 49th parallelI don't knowprecisely whetherfor youthat knowreason. this Somebut, oftheit 49thgoes parallelnorth of itfrontierand some withgoes Canadasouth ofis itnotto alwaysavoid cuttingalong theup 49thIndian parallelreservations precisely andfor thatvillages. reason. SomeIt ofis it goesdone northpragmatically. of it and some goes south of it to avoid cutting up

JK: IndianYou mentioned reservationsthat Ralph and Bunchevillages.set a certainIt iskind doneof pragmatically.mood at Rhodes by making i t .clear that there was no

JK: Youvictor mentionedand no thatvanquished Ralph Bunchein the setnegotiations a certain andkindalso of

moodthat heat hadRhodeseveryone by makingworking it·clearface-to-face that therein the wassame no victorroom. Didand itno startvanquishedout that in waythe initially?negotiations and also Rosenne: thatYes, almosthe had fromeveryonethe first workingday heface-to-faceconvened a face-to-facein the same meeting.room. DidBy itno startmeans outwere thataIl wayof theinitially?negotioations face­ Rosenne: Yes,to-face. almostDon't from misunderstandthe first day heme convenedon that. a Firstface-to-faceof aIl, meeting.it is not Bypossible no meansin wereany alldiplomatie of the negotioationsnegotiations. face­We to-face.aIl ate inDon'tthe misunderstandsame diningroom me onat that.the sameFirsttime, of all,at

itdifferent is not tables,possiblethat's in anytrue, diplomaticbut the negotiations.Hotel des Roses We all ate in the same diningroom at the same time, at 59 different tables, that's true, but the Hotel des Roses

59 , .. " ..

had only one diningroom. It was wartime conditions even

though it was as late as 1949. The area had been in hadltalian onlyhands one diningroom.and had been Ittransfered was wartimeto Greececonditionsunder eventhe

thoughpeace treatyit was whichas latehad asonly 1949.entered The intoarea forcehad beenfairly in

Italianrecently. handslt andwasn't had inbeenvery transferedgood shape. to GreeceThe dinner under thewas

peaceserved treatyat 1:00 whichand everybody had only ateenteredat 1:00. into Ifforceyou jostledfairly

recently.at the doorway It wasn'twith inan veryEgyptian good shape.going in,Theyou dinnerjostled was

withservedan atEgyptian. 1:00 and everybodyThe delegations ate at 1:00.were onIfthree you jostledfloors withat thethe doorwayUN in between.with an EgyptianOne was ongoingthe firstin, youfloor, jostledthe withUN was an onEgyptian.the second The floor,delegationsand thewereother on threewas onfloorsthe

withthird thefloor. UN in between.That keptOne wasthem on apartthe firstto floor,avoid theany

UNfisticuffs was on theor anything second floor,like that andwhich the othercould waseasily on havethe

thirdhappened. floor.But, atThatthe keptsame timethemthey apartwere toaIl avoidtogether. any fisticuffs or anything like that which could easily have

happened.Quite But,a lot atof theprivate same timemeetings they werewent allon especiallytogether. on the civilian side in the hotel at Rhodes. And you

couldn'tQuiteget a lotoff ofthe privateisland, meetingsas l said, wentwithout on especiallythe UN

onhelping the civilianyou off. sideFace-to-face in the hotelmeetings at Rhodes.took place Andquite you

couldn'toften without get offrecords, the island,to discuss as I limitedsaid, withoutpoints theeither UN

helpingheads of youdelegations off. Face-to-faceor number meetingsone or tooknumber placetwo quiteor oftenwhoever withouthe wanted. records,For to instance,discuss limitedl think pointssome eitherof the headstechnical of delegationslegal discussions or numberwere participatedone or numberin twoby theor

whoeverEgyptians he andwanted.stavropoulos. For instance,The EgyptiansI think somehad aoflegal the

technicaladvisor but legalthey discussionsdidn't seem wereto give participatedhim much authority.in by the

Egyptiansl don't know andwhat stavropoulos.he did but, Thel've Egyptianslost touch hadwith a legalhim.

advisorl've not butseen theyhim didn'tsince. seem to give him much authority. I don't know What he did but, I've lost touch with him. 60 I've not seen him since.

60 Then every now and then there would be formaI meetings with records. There weren't many of these formaIThenmeetings every withnow recordsand thenwith therethe Egyptians.would be formalThere meetingswerew about withfour records.or five, that'sThere weren'taIl. But manythat ofwas thesewhen thingsformal meetingshad already withbeen recordsmore withor theless Egyptians.agreed, the Thereway werewthings aboutare usually four or done.five, that's all. But that was when JK: Howthingsmuch hadauthority alreadyor beenautonomy more didor lessyour delegationagreed, thehave? way things are usually done.

JK:Rosenne: WeIl,How muchon authoritythis we had or toautonomycheck quitedid yourfrequently delegationwith have?the government. We had brought directives, of course, but we Rosenne: Well,would oncheck thisnearly we hadeveryday, to check nearlyquite frequentlyevery word. withThey the government.relied on us Wequite had abroughtlot. directives,Don't forget ofthat course,the seniorbut we wouldstaff checkof the nearlyForeign everyday,Ministry nearlywas in everyRhodes. word. ItTheywas reliedalready onsecond us quiterank. a lot. l Don'tam not forgetsaying that thatthe seniorin a disparagingstaff of thesence. ForeignThey Ministrywere verywas goodin Rhodes.people bothIt wasin TelalreadyAviv, secondas it wasrank.then, I andam innotNew sayingYork. Butthatthe intop a disparagingrank of the Foreignsence. Ministry,They werethe veryDirector good peopleGeneral, bothhe adin Telof the Aviv,Arab asdepartment, it was then,and andthe inlegal New advisorYork. Butwere theaIl topin Rhodes.rank of theSo, Foreignthere wasMinistry,not much thethat Directorcould General,be done headfrom homeof theon Arabany department,detail. On andbroad the lineslegal advisorit was aweredifferent all in Rhodes.story. BothSo, Sharettthere wasand notBen muchGurion thatwouldn't could beagree donequite from homea lot. on anyWe woulddetail.ask Onand broadreport linesand itthey waswould a differentsay we don'tstory. agreeBoth withSharettwhat andyou've Ben Guriondone, wouldn'tundo it. agreeJust quiteundo ait. lot.It's Wenot wouldthe askend andof the reportworld. and they would say we JK: don'tDo you agreerecall withwho elsewhat wasyou'vethere done,from undothe Unitedit. JustNations? undo Rosenne: Asit. IIt'ssa idnot, theit endwas of Bunche,the world.Riley, Vigier, and JK: Do you recall who else was there from the united Nations? 61 Rosenne: As I said, it was Bunche, Riley, Vigier, and

61 ,,- .. •

Stavrapoulos. One of the secretaries was killed with

Hammarskjold~ a French girl. We used French quite a lot Stavrapoulos.in these negotiations. One of theThere secretarieswas a man wascalled killedGrant withor HammarskjoldGrand who was~ a Frenchpress relationsgirl. We officerused Frenchbut, quitethose a werelot thein thesefour negotiations.main people. ThereThere waswas onea manother callednamed GrantPablo or GrandAzcarate. who wasHe wasa pressa Spaniard, relationsl thinkofficera Republican.but, those wereHe

thehad fourbeen mainprominent people.in Therethe minori was oneties othersection namedin Pablothe Azcarate.League of HeNations was a secretariatSpaniard, I thinkat one a Republican.time. He gotHe

hadinvolved been andprominentl remember in himtheone minoritiesday crying sectionthat Jerusalem in the Leaguein the heightof Nationsof the secretariatsiege reminded at himone oftime.the siegeHe gotof Madrid.involved andEytan I rememberknows a himlot oneabout day Ascarate.crying that TheyJerusalemwere quitein the close.height of the siege reminded him of the siege of JK: Madrid.As we discussed Eytan knowsthere werea lotseparate about Ascarate.discussions Theygoing wereon quitewith Egypt, close.with Jordan, and Syria and so forth. Why was

JK: Asit wehandled discussedin this thereway? were separate discussions going on Rosenne: withFirst Egypt,of aIl, withwe Jordan,would andnot Syriahave andgone so intoforth.any Whyjoint was negotiations.it handled in thisThat way?is for sure. Secondly, for a purely Rosenne: Firstmaterial of pointall, ofwe view,would thenot issueshave gonewere quiteinto anydifferent joint negotiations.in each case. ThatThe mainis forissue sure.in syriaSecondly,was actuallyfor a purelythe

materialwater line. pointIt ofhad view,nothing the issuesto do withwere thequitefighting differentat inaIl. eachThere case.our Theobjective main issuewhich in wesyriaobtained was actuallywas to getthe

waterthe whole line.of oneIt hadof thenothingsources to doof withthe Jordan,the fightingthe Dan, at all.the RiverThereJordan our objectiveitself, thewhichSea we ofobtainedGalilee, wasand to theget thelower wholeJordan of entirelyone of thein sourcesIsrael. ofAnd thethat Jordan,we succeeded. the Dan, theIt had Riverbeen Jordanentirely itself,in Palestine. the Sea ofThrough Galilee,that andwe werethe lowerable to Jordanconstruct entirelythe Nationalin Israel.Water And Carrierthat we tosucceeded.take the It had been entirely in Palestine. Through that we were 62 able to construct the National Water Carrier to take the

62 ••

•• water from the north down to the south. Incidently, this year there is a drought in the north instead of the south waterand they fromare theturning north downit around to the andsouth.sending Incidently,it the otherthis yearway. thereIt isis verya droughtcurious. in theThe northsyrians insteadwanted of theat southaIl andcosts theyto areprevent turningthat it andaroundon thatand sendingthey failed. it the otherWith way.Lebanon Itthere is verywas curious.no real problem.The syrianswith wantedJordan at allthe costsproblem towas preventJerusalem that andandwhat on thatis now theythe failed.West Bank. With JK: LebanonDuring thetherefighting was nowere realthere problem.other nationswith Jordaninvolved? the Rosenne: problemIraq mainly, was Jerusalemthe rest wasand purelywhat isnominal. now the ThereWest Bank.may have JK: Duringbeen a theplatoon fightingor a werebattalion there orotherso. nations involved? Rosenne:JK: IraqHow was mainly,that thehandled rest wasin the purelynegotiations? nominal. There may have Rosenne: beenThey awithdrew platoon afteror a battalionthe negotiations or so. started. Iraq was JK: Howthe wasonly thatone handledthat was inany theproblem. negotiations?They were discussed Rosenne: Theyat the withdrewSunneh afterpart ofthethe negotiationsJordanian agreement.started. IraqJordan was thetook onlyresponsibility one that wasfor anytheir problem.actions. They wereActually discussedthey atwithdrew. the SunnehThe partattack of wethemade Jordanianon Deis agreement.Yasseen which Jordanled tookto this responsibilityterrible business for theirafterwards actions. wasActuallycompletely they withdrew.justified fromThe aattackmilitary we madepoint onof Deisview Yasseenbecause whichthe Iraqi led toarmy thiswas there.terribleThey businessare not afterwardsto be underestimated, was completelythe justifiedIraqi army. fromThey a militarydid get pointas far of viewas Jerusalem because thewhich Iraqiis armyquite wasa distancethere. Theyfrom areBagdad. not to be underestimated, the JI<: IraqiIn the army.agreements They didwas getthere as farany asacknowledgement Jerusalem whichthat is quiteother aforces distancehad frombeen Bagdad.involved? JK:Rosenne: InNo, theonly agreementsthe Jordanian was one.there Thereany acknowledgementwere no independent that otherArab statesforces hadat beenthat involved?time, don "t forget. AlI the Rosenne: No,mediterranean only the Jordanianstates one.were Therestill wereunder no independentEuropean Arab states at that time, don't forget. All the 63 mediterranean states were still under European

63 T • occupation. The only independent state was Saudi Arabia at that time. They had a nominal unit. WeIl, Iraq was occupation.also independent. The only independent state was Saudi Arabia JK: atIn thatyourbook time. youTheymentioned had a nominalthat unit.each agreementWell, Iraqhad wasa alsopreamble independent.each of which stated that the negotiations were JK: Inentered your intobookat youthe mentionedrequest of thatthe Securieach agreementty Council. hadWas a preamblethere a specifieeach of whichpolitical statedreason that forthe negotiationsincluding that? were Rosanne: enteredYes, the intoUN inat thosethe requestdays was of thenot Securitywhat it isCouncil.today. WasIt therewas far a morespecificpotent politicaleven then. reasonIt hadfor notincludingbeen destroyed that? Rosanne: Yes,by the theCo UNId inWar thoseat thatdays wasstage. not whatThe Securiit is tytoday.Council It wasmeant farsomething. more potentFrom evenIsrael's then. Itpoint had notof viewbeen destroyedwe wanted byto getthe admissionCold War intoat thatthe UN,stage.as weIl.The SecurityIn fact, councila great meantdeal something.of the armisticeFrom Israel'snegotiations point of viewwere we wantedpartly topolitically get admissionmotivated into bytheour UN,application as well. Infor fact,admission a greatto dealthe UN.of Iftheyou armisticelook at thenegotiationsdates you willwere seepartlythe politicallyconnection between motivatedthem. by ourMembership applicationwas forMay admission15th, 1949. to theIt was UN.before If youthe Syrianlook atagreement the dateswas youfinished will but,see the connectionother three betweenwere finished. them. MembershipThere was wasa Mayspecial 15th,cease­1949. Itfire wasarrangement before the thatSyrianwas agreementmade with wasSyria finishedthat but,could thebe otherreported threebefore were thefinished.date ofTherethe wascrucial a specialvote incease­the fireGeneral arrangementAssembly. that Therewas madewas witha definiSyria tethatconnection could be reportedbetween ourbeforeposition the datein the of armisticethe crucialnegotiations vote in theand Generalour admission Assembly.into theThereUN. wasIt a alsodefinitehappens connectionto be a betweenhistorie ourfact. positionThe inUN thehad armisticean interest negotiationsin i t, too.and ourBunche admissionand Trygve intoLie theboth UN. hadIta UNalsointerest happensin toit. be a JK: historicAlso in thefact.preamble The itUN mentionshad an interestthat these inagreementsit, too. Bunche and Trygve Lie both had a UN interest in it. 64 JK: Also in the preamble it mentions that these agreements

64 ...;

~ .• were established to facilitate a transition to a more

permanent peace. so, were these negotiations considered

weretemporary? established to facilitate a transition to a more

Rosenne: permanentYes, we considered peace. So,them weretemporary. these negotiationsAs a matter consideredof fact

temporary?it produced quite curious incidents in the negotiations.

Rosenne: AsYes,l wementioned consideredin themthe articletemporary.on BuncheAs a matterl raised of factthe

itquestion producedof quitethe durationcurious incidentsof the armisticein the negotiations.agreements

Asthemselves. I mentionedWe wantedin the toarticlefollow onthe BuncheHague ConventionI raised theof question1907 and haveof thean unlimitedduration durationof the armisticeto be renewed agreementsin one year.themselves.The UN Wesaid wantedunder tono followcircumstances the Haguewould Conventionthey have of

1907anything and haveto doan unlimitedwith an agreementduration towhich be renewedallowed in onethe

year.resumption The UNof saidthe underuse of noforce. circumstancesIt is quite woulda theypowerful have

anythingargument. toThey do gotwiththeir an wayagreementon that. whichThe allowedother was thea

veryresumptioncurious of incidentthe use ofin force.the Syrian It isnegotiations quite a powerfulwith argument.this very complexThey gotarrangement their way ofon athat.demilitarized The otherzone was ina verythe north curiouswhich incidentwas an ininhabited the Syrianarea negotiationsnot a desert witharea

thislike verythe onecomplexin the arrangementsouth. The of Syriansa demilitarizedwanted itzoneto inbe

thein forcenorth untilwhich replacedwas an inhabitedby the agreements area not a todesertbe worked area

likeout attheLausanne one in theunder south.the PCC.The SyriansWhereas wantedwe by thatit totime be

hadin forcebecome untilsophisticated replaced enoughby the toagreementsknow that toLausanne be workedwas outgoing atto Lausanneget no underwhere. theAnd PCC.we opposedWhereas thatwe bywording that timeand hadwe gotbecomeour sophisticatedway on that enoughon the toground know thatthat Lausanneit was wastoo goingindefinite. to get no where. And we opposed that wording and

we gotl neverour wayunderstood on that whaton thelay groundbehind thatthat itdemand was tooby

theindefinite.Syrians. It was to me illogical. But the Syrians

were I veryneverillogical. understood whatNegotiations lay behindwith that themdemandwere by the Syrians. It was to me illogical. But the Syrians 65 were very illogical. Negotiations with them were

65 •...

•... extremely difficult. One day we got to the clause about

the release of prisoners of war. The Syrian legal advisor,extremelywithdifficult.whom l Onebecame day personallywe got to thefriendly clause aboutright throughthe releasethe wholeof prisonersperiod and ofwho war.ended Theup beingSyriana legaljudge

onadvisor,the International with whom ICourt, becamesaid personally"weIl, we friendlycan't agree rightto that."through lthesaid, whole"what perioddo youand meanwho endedyou can't up beingagree a tojUdgethe

onrelease the Internationalof a prisoner Court,of war?"said "well,He said, we can't"surely agreeMr. to

Rosennethat." Iknowssaid, about"what thedo youNapoleonic mean you divisioncan't agreeof powersto the

whichreleasewe ofhave a inprisonerour country." of war?"The Heprisoner said, "surelywas one Mr.who

Rosennehad had someknowsdisciplinary about the Napoleonicaction taken divisionagainst ofhim. powers50,

whichl said, we"what have thein ourhell country."does that Thehave prisonerto do with was it?"one whoHe

hadsaid, had"it someis disciplinaryin the hands actionof the takenjudiciary." against 50,him. l So,did

Isomething said, "whatvery therude. helll doessimply thatpulled have outto doa bigwithnewspaper it?" He

andsaid,put "iitt isin infront the ofhandsme andof startedthe jUdiciary."to read. So,l said I didto

Vigier,somethin"wheng verythis rude.fellow I simplyhas learnedpulled outhis alaw biglet newspaperme know and put1'11 iputt inmy frontnewspaper of me andback." startedThat towas read.a dirty I saidtrick. to

Viqier,But we remained"when thisvery fellowgood hasfriends. learnedWe hisused lawto letbump me knowinto

andeach I'llother putin mythe newspaperstreets back."around ThatNew York.was a dirty trick.

JK: ButIn the we agreementsremained veryseldom goodwere friends.the actualWe usedcountries to bumpnamed into

eachuntil otherthe end in theof thestreetsdocument. around New York.

JKRosenne:: Inl don't the agreementsrecollect seldomthat there were wasthe anyactualspecial countriesreason namedfor

untilthat. thel don't end ofthink the anydocument.issue was made out of it. There Rosenne: wasI don'ta different recollect issue.that thereIt arosewas anywith specialthe syriansreason forin that.particular. I don'tIt thinkwas anyfirst issueof wasaIl madethe outexchange of it.of Therefull

waspowers a differentat the governmental issue. It levelarose notwith atthethe syriansmilitary in

particular.level. An armisticeIt was firstis essentially of all thea militaryexchange documentof full powers at the governmental level not at the military 66 level. An armistice is essentially a military document

66 . •..

. •. ,. but, we insisted on full powers eminating from the government, that they should be signed in the names of but,the qovernments we insistedof theon countriesfull powersrather eminatingthan in thefromnames the government,of any particular that theyunit shouldor in thebe signednames ofin thethe armiesnames orof theanything governmentslike that. of the Thatcountrieswas an ratherissue thanmainly in thewith namesthe ofSyrians. any particularYou're right unit thator init theis anameslittle of bitthe surprisingarmies or anythingto find the likenames that.of theThatcountries was an issueonly mentionedmainly withat the Syrians.end but, 1You'redoubt rightif we thatmade itan isissue a littleout of bitit. surprisingl don't torecollect find themaking names anof issuethe countriesout of it. onlyl mentionedthink we wereat thea endlittle but,bit I doubtsensitive if weto madeArab ansuseptibilities issue out of it.about I don'tthat. JK: recollectThey still makingdid not anwant issueto outrecognize of it. IsraelI thinkas weastate. were a Rosenne: WeIl,littlethey're bit sensitivenamed once. to ArabThey suseptibilitiesare not completely aboutblank. that. JK: TheyEytan stillmay knowdid notmore wantabout to that.recognizel'm Israelsure he aswould a state.have Rosenne: Well,consulted they'reme ifnamedthe once.question Theyhad are arisennot completelyin any serious blank. Eytanforme may1 believeknow morewe aboutdidn't that.pay tooI'mmuch sureattention he would tohaveit consultednor did our me peopleif the questionat home either.had arisenSharett in any andseriousBen form.Gurion Iwould believehave webeen didn'tvery paysensitive too muchto attentionanything tolike it northat. did1 thinkour peoplethey saw at onlyhomethe either.importance Sharettthat theand nameBen Gurionof the wouldcountries haveshould been verymade sensitivesomewhere toin anythingthe document. like that. I think they saw only the importance that the name JK: ofWere thethere countriesdemilitarized should madezones somewhereset up duringin the thedocument.talks? Rosenne: Yeso JK:JK: WereHow weretherethey demilitarizedset up in termszones ofsetwho up wouldduringmaintain the talks?law Rosenne: Yes.and order, etc.? JK:Rosenne: HowThis wereissue theydidn't set reallyup in termsarise ofin whothe wouldEgyptian maintainagreement law andbecause order,it etc.?was in the middle of the desert. It was an Rosenne: This issue didn't really arise in the Egyptian agreement 67 because it was in the middle of the desert. It was an

67 • • t

area which Yadin happened to know from his knowledge of histery and archeology that the Romans had used and the areaCrus adwhichers hadYadinused happenedand we tohad knowused fromi thisto knowledgeget to theof historySinai. andIt archeologywas uninhabi thatted theexcept Romansfor hadthese used andNomadic the Crusadertribes. sTherehad usedwas simplyand weno hadproblem used aboutit to thatget atto aIl.the

Sinai.And it wasIt awassmall uninhabiarea.ted Theexceptreal forproblem these aroseNomadicin

tribes.Jarusalem, Therea heavily was simplypopulated no problemurban aboutarea thatwhere at thereall. Andwere itdemilitarized was a smallareas area.only Thea fewrealyards problemwide fromarosetime in Jarusalem,to time and a placeheavilyto place.populatedMore urbanseriously area whereit was therethe werenorth. demilitarizedThe Syrians areashad gotten only aacross few yardsthe Jordanwide fromnorth timeof tothe timeSea ofandGalilee place atto aplace.place calledMore seriouslyMahanagim itwhich was owesthe north.its place The toSyrianshistory had asgottenthe acrosssite where the JordanJacob northhad his of thedream. Sea ofTheGalileeSyrians at a gotplaceacross calledthe MahanagimJordan whichthere owesand wantedits plactee toretain historytheir as hold.the siteThat wherewas Jacobpart hadof thishis dream.debate overThe theSyrianswater gotline. acrossUltimately the Jordanthey thereagreed andto wantedwithdraw tofromretainthis theirarea on hold.the conditionThat wasthat partthe ofIsraeli this debatearmy didn't over theadvance. water line.So, theUltimatelyarmy became they policemen.agreed to

withdrawThat's how fromit thiswas done.area onThe thearea conditionas fixed thatwas thebasically Israeli armyalong didn'tthe lines, advance.maybe tidiedSo, theup armya little becamebit, policemen.of where That'sthe front how actuallyit was done.was atThethe areatime. as fixed was basically

JK: alongSo, the theIsraelislines, maybefunctioned tidiedas uppolice. a little bit, of where Rosenne: thePolice fronweret actuallyallowed. was Thisat theis time.quite common. It is done JK: So,everywhere the Israelisin the functionedworld in demilitarized as police. zones which are Rosenne: Policeinhabited. were Youallowed.can't haveThis inhabitedis quite common.demilitarized It is zonesdone everywherewithout seme inkind the worldof enforcement. in demilitarizedThere zoneswere birthswhich areand deathsinhabited.and marriagesYou can't haveand thingsinhabitedlike demilitarizedthat which no zonesone without some kind of enforcement. There were births and 68 deaths and marriages and things like that which no one

68 knew quite how to handle. Bunche said, "don't get bogged down with that kind of stuff. Just deal with it as it knewarises." quiteIn howaddition to handle.to thatBunchearea said,which "don'twas more getor boggedless downdemarcated with thatby the kindactual of stuff.front, Justsome dealmore withwas thrownit as itin arises."as a kind In ofadditiongift toto thatthe areaSyrians whichbecause was morepart or lessof demarcatedPalestine liesby theon actualthe east front,bank someof the moreSea wasof thrownGalilee. in Theas afoothills kind ofof giftthe Golanto theHeights, Syrianssome becauseparts of partthe Seaof Palestineof Galilee lieswere onalways the eastin Palestine. bank of theThat Seaarea of Galilee.was also Thedemilitarized foothills ofbecause the Golanthe Heights,Syrians hadsomesucceeded parts of thein Seathe ofsouthern Galileepart wereof alwaysthe Sea inof Palestine.Galilee itselfThat areain getting was alsoto thedemilitarizedwater in Palestine.because the SyriansOne of theirhad succeededconditions in thefor withdrawingsouthern partfrom of thethere Seawas of Galileethat the itselfwhole inof gettingthat side to theshould waterbe demilitarized.in Palestine. TheOne frontierof theirof conditionsthat area wasfor withdrawingfixed. It fromwas therethe oldwas Palestinianthat the wholefrontier. of that sideThe shouldinclusion be demilitarized.of it in the demilitarizedThe frontier ofzone thatwas areapurely was arbitrary.fixed. It was the old Palestinian frontier. The JK: Howinclusionwas the ofarmistice it in theagreement demilitarizedto be implemented?zone was purely Rosenne: arbitrary.By quite an elaborate machinery in which the UN was very JK: Howheavi1y was theinvolved armisticethrough agreementwhat was toalready be implemented?in place, the Rosenne: UNTSO,By quitebut anunder elaboratea different machineryhat. in Theywhichwere the technicallyUN was very heavi1ythe supervisory involved organthroughof whatthe wasparties alreadyto thein place,armistice the UNTSO,negotiations but underand anot differentoperating hat.as theTheyUNTSO. were technicallyUnder each theagreement supervisorythere wasorgana separate of the MixedpartiesArmistice to the Commissionarmistice negotiationscomposed of anandequal not operatingnumber of asrepresentatives the UNTSO. Underof each agreementside with athereUN chairman. was a separateThe Egyptian Mixed Armisticeagreement Commissionwent one composedfurther and of hadan equala kind numberof appeal of representativescommission that ofwas eachnot side with a UN chairman. The Egyptian agreement went one 69 further and had a kind of appeal commission that was not

69 followed in the other agreements. This appeal commission was used once or twice. It dealt with some pretty tough

followedissues including in the otherthe Suezagreements.Canal. ThatThis wentappealthrough commissionthat wasmachinery used onceand orso twice.did Aqaba, It dealtfor that withmatter. some pretty tough

issuesThey inclUdingwere very the Suezpatchy Canal.and itThatis wentin herethroughthat thatmy machinerycriticism andof theso didUN Aqaba,really forbegan thatdeveloping. matter. Because they Theyturned wereinto verykind patchyof scoreboards. and it is inHow heremany thattimes my werecriticismyou foundof theresponsible UN really forbeganbeing developing.guilty? HowBecausemany theytimes turnedwas country into kindx found of scoreboards.guilty? How manyHow manytimes timeswas werecountry youy foundfound responsibleguilty? This forwas beingwithout guilty?attempting How manyto timesfind outwas whatcountrywere x foundthe underlyingguilty? Howcauses many fortimesthese was countryoutbreaks. y foundSome guilty?of them Thiswere waspurely withoutlocal. attemptingA soldier to mightfind outhave whatgotten weredrunk the andunderlyingrun across causesthe forl ines theseand outbreaks.someone fired Somea shot of themat him. wereBut purelythey local.were aIl Areported soldier mightnumerically. have gottenl was drunkone ofandthose run andacrossa few theothers I ines thatand someonefound that firedthe a shotUN insteadat him. ofButoperating they were toall takereportedthe numerically.language of theI waspreamble one ofas thosea transition and a few tootherspermanent that

foundpeace werethat actuallythe UN ratherinsteadinclined of operatingto keep tothe takeparties the languageat arms oflength the preambleand to asreport a transitionevery soto permanentoften to peaceheadquarters were actuallyin New ratherYork. inclinedParty x tohas keepbeen thecondemned parties atnine armstimes lengthor y has andbeen tocondemned report teneverytimes. so oftenThis went to headquarterson with Egypt inthrough New York.1956 andPartywas onex hasof thebeenreasons condemnedwhy nineBen Guriontimes orrefused y has tobeenallow condemnedthe agreement ten times.to beThisrevived went onafter withthe EgyptSuez throughWar of 19561956. and Becausewas one ofit thewas reasonsjust plain why

Benridiculous. Gurion refusedThe other to allowagreements the agreementwent on tountil be revived1967. afterHammarskjold the Suez Warrealized of 1956.that, Becausesubject it towasthe justSecurity plain ridiculous. The other agreements went on until 1967. 70 Hammarskjold realized that, SUbject to the Security

70 •..

•.. Council, the armistice regime was teetering. He regarded the Egyptian part as the most important. l think he was

Council,right on thethat. armisticeHe made regimehis visit was teetering.to the Middle He regardedEast in

the1956 Egyptianwhen he parttried as totheshore most itimportant.up. But I itthinkwas healways was

rightkeeping onthe that.parties He madeat arms his lengthvisit towith thethe MiddleUN as Easta kind in 1956of football when heumpire tried intothe shoremiddle it insteadup. Butof itreally was alwaystrying keepingto bring thethem partiestogether at inarmsorder lengthto discusswith theissues UN as anda kindsee

ofwhat footballcould béumpireresolved. in the Itmiddlewas aboutinsteadthat of reallytime that tryingthe

toCold bringWar themcame togetheralong and in orderyou can't to discussseparate issuesthe andMiddle see

whatEast couldfrom thebe resolved.Cold War. ItThe wasCold aboutWar thatbecame timeserious that thein Coldthe earlyWar camefifties. along andAs earlyyou can'tas 1954 separatewhen thethe SovietsMiddle Eaststarted fromvery theheavily Cold War.arming Thethe Colddifferent War becameArab seriouscountries in

themainly earlyEgypt. fifties.The Iraqi-BritishAs early as agreement1954 whenbroke the Sovietsdown in

started1953. Whatvery happenedheavily armingafter thethat differentis an integral Arab countriespart of

mainlythe Cold Egypt.War. TheThe Iraqi-BritishMiddle East agreementwas not an brokeindependent down in 1953.factor inWhatworld happenedaffairs afterat aIl.that Itis wasan integralone of the partflash of thepoints Coldof War.AmeriCan-Russian The Middle tensions.East was not an independent

JK: factorThe agreement in world hadaffairsno atexpiration all. It wasdate. one ofWere the flashthere

pointsprovisions of American-Russianwithin the agreement tensions.to conduct further peace

JK: Thetalks? agreement had no expiration date. Were there

Rosenne: provisionsYes, there withinwere no thespecifie agreementprovisions to conductin furtherthe Armistice peace talks?Agreement to conduct political negotiations. We would Rosenne: Yes,have thereliked itwerebut, no lspecificdon't think provisionswe would inhave the gottenArmisticeit. AgreementThe Arabs certainlyto conductwouldn't politicalhave negotiations.agreed to that Webecause would

havethey likedregarded it but,the I Armisticedon't thinkAgreements we would haveas agottenmilitary it.

Thephase Arabsas thecertainlytraditional wouldn'tconcept have agreedof an toarmistice that becauseas a they regarded the Armistice Agreements as a military 71 phase as the traditional concept of an armistice as a

71 military phase. In the Jordanian agreement there is a special clause calling for further talks to work out

detailsmilitaryespecially phase. Inas theregards Jordanianto Jerusalem. agreement thereJerusalem is a wasspeciala special clauseissue. callingpopulations for furtherwere talksintermingled. to work outA lotdetailsneeded especiallyironing outas inregardsJerusalem. to Jerusalem.We tried toJerusalemoperate wasit anda specialthe Jordaniansissue. Populationsrefused. wereIt intermingled.was a special A committeelot needed ironingof some outsort in Jerusalem.that was We supposedtried to operateto be establishedit and theunder Jordaniansthis agreement. refused. We broughtIt was thisa specialbefore thecommitteeSecurity ofCouncil, some thesortrefusaI that ofwasJordan supposedto honor tothis be part.establishedAnd theunderSecurity this agreement.Council didWe broughtnothing thisabout beforeit. theBut Securityby this Council,time, 1953, the refusalthe Security of JordanCouncil to honorwas thisso heavilypart. Anddistorted the Securityby the ColdcouncilWar didthat nothingit really aboutbecame it. Buta useless by thisoperation. time, 1953,Around thethat Securitytime there Councilwas onewasyear so heavilywhen the distortedSecurity byCouncil the Coldhad Warno meetingthat it atreallyaIl onbecamethe Middlea uselesEast,s operation.one year Aroundin its thathistory. time thereThat waswas one1963, yearl whenthink. the Security Council had no meeting at all on the JK: MiddleAre there East,any oneother year pointsin its you'dhistory.like Thatto bringwas 1963,up inI think.regards to the armistice? JKRosenne:: AreThis therewas the anyfirst othertime pointsthat you'dan armistice like toof bringthis upscale in regardshad been toorqanized the armistice?through an international organization.

Rosenne: ThisThere waswas thea tremendousfirst time thatamount an ofarmisticeexperimentation of this scalethat hadwent beenon. organizedIt was througha matter anof internationalpersonal pride organization.that when Therethey qot wasinvolved a tremendousin the amountarmistice of negotiationsexperimentationin Koreathat wentboth on.sides Itasked was fora mattercopies ofof personalmy book. prideAbout thatthe whensame theyday lgotqot involvedthe requests in thefrom armisticeboth Moscow negotiationsand Washington. in Korea bothl met sidessome ofaskedthe forpeople copieswho ofwere my involvedbook. Aboutin the theKorean same day I got the requests from both Moscow and Washington. 72 I met some of the people who were involved in the Korean

72 ~ f' ... .

~-... negotiations and they told me that they read that book

from cover to cover. 50, if it helped on that, it was

negotiationssomething. and they told me that they read that book

JK: fromThank coveryou. toWe cover.have anotherSo, if sessionit helpedto ondo that,but, weit wascan

something.take a break. JK: Thank you. We have another session to do but, we can take a break.

JK: This portion of the interview will deal with the Suez War

in 1956. Mr. Rosenne, what was your role in Israel at

JK: Thisthis portionparticular of thetime interviewduring the willSuez dealcrisis? with the Suez War Rosenne: inAt 1956.that timeMr. l Rosenne,was still whatlegal was advisoryour rolefor inthe IsraelForeign at thisOffice particularin the Foreign time duringMinistry thein SuezJerusalem. crisis? l'Il put it Rosenne: Atthis thatway, timethere I wasis astillcontinuum legal fromadvisorreally forthe thebeginning Foreign Officeright throughin the Foreignto Camp MinistryDavid about in Jerusalem.freedom of I'llnavigation put it thisthrough way,both therethe isSuez a continuumCanal and fromthe Straitreally oftheTiran. beginningThe righttwo were throughlinked. to CampWe Davidhad thought about freedomat Rhodes of duringnavigationthe througharmistice bothin theone Suezof our Canallater and conversationsthe Strait of withTiran.BuncheThe twothat werethe problemlinked. ofWeSuez had wasthoughtresolved at Rhodesby the duringArmistice the armisticeAgreement. inThe oneproblem of our oflaterTiran conversationshad not yet witharisen. BuncheWe thatknew theof theproblemexistence of Suezof thewas strait,resolvedof bycourse, the Armisticebut, it Agreement.was used very Thelittle problemat thatof Tirantime. hadOne notof yetour arisen.objectives We knewthere ofwas theto existenceget this land,of theonly strait,a few ofmiles, course,on but,the Redit wasSea usedin ordervery littleto give at thatus this time.outlet One ofto ourAfrica. objectivesIn thereBunche's was reportto get tothisthe land,Security only Councila few miles,of August, on the1948, Red Seawhen inwe orderhad tocompleted give us thethis lastoutletof tothe Africa.armistice In Bunche'snegotiations reportwith to Syriathe Securitythere was Councila half of sentenceAugust, 1948,which when we had completed the last of the armistice 73 negotiations with Syria there was a half sentence which

73 •..

•.. we didn'~ like very much. It was not really what we

thouqht we were going to get. l don't remember the exact

wewording didn'but,~ likeit verysaid somethingmuch. Itlike was "andnot allreallyvestiges what weof

thoughtwar (or wewar wereconditions) going to willget. beI removed,"don't remembersomething the exactlike

wordingwords to but,that iteffect. said somethingThat was likeintended "and allas vestigesfar as ofwe warwere (oreoneerned war conditions)(Eytan could will tellbe removed,"you more somethingabout this) liketo wordsdeal withto thatthe freedomeffect. ofThatpassage was throughintendedthe as Suezfar asCanal we werewhieh concernedhad come (Eytanup through could thetellarmistice you more proceduresabout this) andto dealthrough withthe the Seeurityfreedom ofCouneil, passage throughthe Security the SuezCouncil Canal

whichresolution had comeof september up through1, the1951. armistice procedures and throughThis thewas Securitymy first Council,appearance the attendingSecurity securitycouncil

resolutionCoune!l meetings. of septemberMy colleague, 1, 1951. Robinson, was in Israel and weThishad wasto swapmy firstpositions. appearancel was attendingin New York Securityat that Counciltime. meetings.That was whenMy colleague,l got myRobinson,introduction was in toIsraelthe andSeeurity we hadCouneil. to swap positions.l had been I inwasthe in GeneralNew YorkAssembly at that time.before that.That lwasdidn' whent present. I got myEban introductiondid the speaking to thein

Securitythe Seeurity Council.Council, I hadbut beenl was inthe the legalGeneraladvisor. Assemblyl beforeknew quite that.a bitI didn'aboutt present.the Suez EbanCanal. did theIn fact,speakingl had in thelived Securitythere during Council,the butwar Iand wasknew the itlegalphysically advisor.quite I

knewweIl. quiteSo did a bitEban. aboutl'm thenot Suezsure Canal.that we Indidn't fact,know I hadit

livedbetter therethan duringsome of thethe warEgyptians and knewbecause it physicallyit is not quitean

well.area frequentedSo did Eban.much I'mby Egyptians,not sure thatat weany didn'trate southknow itof betterIsmailia than.. some of the Egyptians because it is not an area frequentedThe Tiran issue much beganby Egyptians,coming to atthe anyfore ratearound southlate of Ismailia.1949 and early 1950, as far back as that. There was an exehangeThe Tiranof eorrespondence issue began comingthrough to thethe foreUS aroundEmbassy latein

1949 and early 1950, as far back as that. There was an 74 exchange of correspondence through the US Embassy in

74 ~...

". •.. Cairo to the Egyptians. It was a bit obscure. That was when they occupied these islands. They had been Cairounoccupied to theand Egyptians.l think Ittechnically was a bit belongedobscure. toThatSaudi was whenArabia. theyThe occupiedEgyptians theseput a smallislands.army unitTheyon hadit. beenThe unoccupiedstraits are andvery I narrowthink there.technicallyThey belongedare a few tohundred Saudi Arabia.yards wide Theand Egyptianscould be putcontrolled a small armyby oneunitcanon on it.on Thethe

straitsshore. areThe verycanon narrowis probably there. stillThey there.are a fewWe hundredin the yardsForeign wideMinistry and couldalready be controlledas early as bythat onebegan canonthinking on the shore.that there The wascanongoing is probablyto be only stillone there.way toWe getin the ForeignEgyptians Ministryoff those alreadystraits as earlyand that as thatwas by beganforce. thinkingThey thatdidn't thereseem wasto begoingmoving to voluntarily.be only one way to get the

EgyptiansWhen Hammarskjoldoff those straitscame andin the thatsummer was byof force.1956 a goodThey didn'tdeal of seemhis timeto beand movingattention voluntarily.was spent trying to solve what Whenhad already Hammarskjoldat that cametime inbecome the summera twin ofproblem, 1956 a goodthe dealSuez Canalof hisand timeTiran. and attention. There were wasmaj spentor legal tryingdifferences to solve whatbetween hadthe alreadytwo because at thatthe timeSuez becomeCanal a twinwas dealt problem,with theby Suezthe constantinople Canal and TiranConvention.. There wereof major1888 whereas legal differencesthe strait betweenof Tiran thewas twounder becausegeneral the Suezinternational Canal was dealtlaw which with atby thethat Constantinopletime was in a Conventionstate of major of 1888flux whereasbecausse the itstraitwas ofjust Tiranbefore wasthe underfirst generalconference internationalon the law lawof whichthe seaat thatwas convened.time was inThese a statematters of majorare aIl fluxconnected becausse andit youwas willjust beforesee why thein firsta few conferenceminutes. Hammarskjoldon the law ofvery themuch sea wasthought convened.that theThesetwo mattersquestions are ofallfreedom connectedof passageand you willthrough seeSuez why andin afreedom few minutes.of passage Hammarskjoldthrough the veryStrai mucht of thoughtTiran should that thego twoto thequestionsInternational of freedomCourt of passagefor an throughadvisory Suezopinion. and freedomHe thought of passageat onethroughtime thethat StraitIsrael of Tiran shOUld go to the International Court for an 75 advisory opinion. He thought at one time that Israel

75 would lose on the Suez Canal issue and win on the Strait of Tiran issue. That was never my opinion. My opinion wouldwas that losethe on riskthe Suezof losing Canal onissueboth andwas winextremely on the straithigh. JK: Whatof Tiranwere issue.Israel's Thatobjectives? was never my opinion. My opinion Rosenne: wasTrade thatwith theEast riskAfrica. of losing on both was extremely high. JK: What50, theywerewanted Israel'sbasically objectives?freedom of passage. Rosenne: TradeYes, freedomwith Eastof Africa.passage, that's aIl. That's enough. JK: So,That's theywhat wantedaIl thebasicallylaw of thefreedomsea conferencesof passage. are about, Rosenne: moreYes, thanfreedomanything of passage,else. that's all. That's enough. JK: That'sThey didn't what allwant thecontrol. law of the sea conferences are about, Rosenne: moreNo, onlythan freedomanythingof else.passage and overflight. Now, how JK: Theywere didn'tthese connected?want control.l think we managed to pursuade Rosenne: No,Hammarskjold only freedomto ofdrop passagethis andidea overflight.of going Now,to howthe wereInternational these connected?Court. I WeIl,think wewe manageddid pursuade to pursuadehim. HammarskjoldAlthough if youto takedrop Presidentthis ideaEisenhower's of going statementto the afterInternationalthe Suez Court.War in 1957Well,around we March,did pursuadehe does him.talk Althoughabout until if judiciallyyou take Presidentdetermined. Eisenhower'sHe uses words statementto that aftereffect. the Suezl think War thatin 1957John aroundFoster March,Dulles he doeswas talkalso aboutthinkinq untilalonq jUdiciallythose lines. determined. He uses words to that effect.After I thethinkSuez thatWar theJohnmajor Fosterissue Dullesthat arose was whichalso thinkingwe couldn't alongdo thoseanything lines.about was how to withdraw from the GazaAfterStrip the Suezwhere Warthe thepressures major issuewere thatvery arosegreat. whichl wethink couldn'tin retrospect do anythingthey aboutwere wascompletely how to withdrawmisplaced. fromA thebunCh Gazaof striphiqh wherelevel theexperts pressuresand technicians were very great.from theI thinkoffice inof retrospectthe UN High theyCommissioner were completelyfor Refugees misplaced.in Geneva A bunchcame to oflook highat levelthe Gaza expertsStrip andand technicianshelp us while fromwe werethe office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva 76 came to look at the Gaza Strip and help us while we were

76 in occupation of it in that periode They very much thought they could have solved the problem then. They werein occupationready to help.of it Herein thatagain period.the UN intervened.They very muchIt belongedthought theyto the couldUNWRA, havethe solvedspecial the organizationproblem then.to dealThey withwere thereadyPalestinian to help. refugeesHere againand thethey UNwanted intervened.nothing toIt dobelongedwith theto theHigh UNWRA,Commissioner the specialfor organizationRefugees in toGeneva deal wheretherewith the Palestinianwas tremendous refugeesexpertise and theyin wantedthat periodnothingfor to settlingdo with thelarge Highnumbers commissionerof people. forIt Refugeeswas still inpost Genevawar periodewhere thereThey waswere tremendouskicked out expertisewhen we inleft. that Thereperiodwere for verysettlinglong largeand difficult numbers ofnegotiations people. It withwas stillthe Americans post war period.especially Theyand werewith kickedthe UN. out Hammarskjoldwhen we left.was Therea strong were verypersonality. long and difficultHe had his negotiationsown interests. with theThe AmericansAmerican delegationespecially andhandled with thesethe UN.negotiations Hammarskjoldmainly waswith a strongMrs. personality.Meir who was thenHe hadForeign his Minister.own interests.The delegationThe Americanwas delegationheaded by a handledvery prominent these negotiationslawyer named mainlyArthur withDean Mrs.who Meirwas with who thewas firmthen ofForeignSullivan Minister.and Cromwell The delegationwhich was alsowas headedthe firm by ofa veryJohn prominentFoster Dulles. lawyer namedThis Arthuris a linkDean whoup. wasArthur withDean the wasfirmafterwards of Sullivanthe andhead Cromwellof the whichUS delegation was also theto thefirmfirst of andJohnthe Fostersecond Dulles.conferences Thison isthe a lawlinkof up.the

Arthursea in Dean1958 wasand afterwards1960. Here the youhead haveof thea USlink delegationup of a toseries the firstof andcomplicated the secondissues. conferencesWe on satheid lawthis of theto seaHammarskjold in 1958 andand 1960.to the AmericansHere you thathave wea linkfelt thatup ofthe a seriesquestion ofof Tirancomplicatedcould beissues.solved throughWe saidthe conferencethis to Hammarskjoldon the law ofandthe to sea.the AmericansIt would thatbe ridiculouswe felt thatfor thea questiongovernment of toTiranput couldthat kindbe solvedof issue throughto a thecourt conferencewhere it onloses the controllaw of overthe sea.the operationIt would atbea ridiculouscertain point, for aa government to put that kind of issue to a court where it 77 loses control over the operation at a certain point, a

77 major operation of that kind. As far as Suez was concerned we said, "look, the Egyptians simply damn weIl majbetteror operationopen the canal. of thatThat's kind.what Asthe farSecurity as SuezCouncil was concernedresolution wesays." said, "look,But it thedidn't Egyptianshappen simplythat way. damn well betterThe openmajor the objectivescanal. That'sin the whatSuez the WarSecurityas far councilas we wereresolutionconcerned says."l thinkBut itwere didn'ttwo. happenNasser thathad way.started organizingThe majorthe Fedayeenobjectiveswhich in theis what Suezdeveloped War as farinto as thewe werePLO as concernedpart of the I Egyptianthink wereintelligence two. Nasserfrom hadGaza startedstrip. organizingThey were beginningthe Fedayeento whichcause isa nuisance.what developedAt theintosame the PLOtime aswe partwanted of thefreedom Egyptianof intelligencepassage through from GazaTiran strip.to Theydevelop wereour beginningtrade wi toth causethe Far a nuisance.East and EastAt theAfrica. same timeThose wewere wantedthe major freedomobjectives. of passagel think throughwe actually Tiran gotto developboth, to ourtell tradethe truth,with thein Farthe Eastend. andAlthough East Africa.it was Thosedifficul weret. theThere major wasobjectives.a speech I bythinkMrs. we Meiractuallyin gotthe both,General to Assemblytell the ontruth,March in1, the1957. end. ItAlthoughtook severalit was difficult.months to negotiateThere wasthat a speechspeech. by ItMrs.was Meirnegotiated in the Generalprimarily Assemblyin New Yorkon Marchbetween I, her1957.advisors It tookin NewseveralYork monthsand Arthur to Deannegotiateand his thatadvisors speech.and HammarskjIt was oldnegotiatedand his primarilyadvisors. inl Newwas Yorkthe backupbetweenin herJerusalem advisorsas infar Newas Yorkthe andqovernment Arthur Deanwas andconcerned. his advisorsl had andto Hammarskjoldcontinue as andnumber his advisors.two in the I delegationwas the backupfor thein Jerusalemfirst law as offarthe as thesea governmentconference, waswhere concerned.we got theI hadclause to continuethrough aswhich numberis twooften inreqarded the delegationas the Aqaba for clause.the first[The lawreference of theit seato conference,Article 16, whereParagraph we got4 of thethe clause1958 Conventionthrough whichon theis oftenTerritorial regardedSea as andthe theAqabaContiguous clause. [TheZone.] referenceIt partly it to Articlesettled the16, thingParagraphbecause 4 ofthe theUN 1958had anConventionobserver poston theat Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.] It partly 78 settled the thing because the UN had an observer post at

78 ..... e

..... e the strait of Tiran which remained there until Nasser removed it in 1967. This was the UNEF One which was

theestablised strait then.of TiranUNEF whichOne remainedwas a brilliant there untilconception. Nasser removedl strongly it insuspect 1967. i t Thiswas wasBunche' thesand UNEF iOne t waswhichin wasthe establiseddrawers.. l then.think theyUNEF mustOne havewas aforeseen brilliantsomething conception.like Ithis stronglycoming. suspectl'm notit wassure Bunche'if theysandforesaw it wasthe inAnglo­ the drawers..French part I thinkof that theyoperation. must havel foreseendon' t think somethinganybody likedid thisuntil coming.after theI'm nationalizationnot sure if they offoresawthe Suezthe Anglo­Canal

FrenchCompany. partIf ofyou thatlook operation.at the documentation I don' t thinkvery anybodycarefully did untilyou will afterobserve thethat nationalizationIsrael was dead ofsilent the onSuezthat. CanalIt Company.never expressed If you lookitself at onthethat. documentationWe had anveryobserver carefullyat youthe willLondon observeConference that Israelon the wasSuez deadCanal. silentl ondon't that.thinkIt neverhe opened expressedhis mouth itselfand onif hethat.did heWe certainlyhad an observerdidn't sayat

theanything Londonagainst Conferencethe onEgyptians. the Suez Canal.We did I notdon'twant thinkto heinterfere opened hiswith mouththe Egyptianand if he nationaldid he certainlyaspirations. didn'tThey say wereanythingno concern againstof theours Egyptians.as long as weWe coulddid notget wantfreedom to ofinterferepassage. with the Egyptian national aspirations. They JK: wereHow longno concernhad Israel's of oursfreedom as longof aspassage we couldbeen getblocked? freedom Rosenne: ofFrom passage.1946. The first Egyptian legislation was then JK: Howdirected long hadagainst Israel's"Zionist freedomgoods" of passagethrough beenthe Suezblocked?Canal

Rosenne: wasFrom in1946.1946. TheThe firstBritish Egyptiandid nothing legislationabout it.was thenThey

directedcouldn't. againstAfter the"zionistindependence goods" throughin 1948 theit becameSuez Canalmuch waseasier in for1946.the TheEgyptians Britishanyway. did nothingThey hadabouta Prize it. CourtThey whichcouldn't.operated. After the Mostindependenceof its indecisions 1948 it becamehave muchbeen easierpublished. for the Egyptians anyway. They had a Prize Court JK: whichIn the summeroperated.of 1956MostNasser of nationalizedits decisionsthe canalhave whichbeen published. 79 JK: In the summer of 1956 Nasser nationalized the canal which

79 ... ~

the French and the British objected to highly. Can you

tell me something about the agreements at Sevres?

Rosenne: thel know Frenchnothing and theabout Britishthe agreementsobjected toat highly.Sevres atCan aIl.you tellLike meeverybody somethingelse aboutwe werethe agreementsjust presented at Sevres?with certain Rosenne: Ioperational know nothinginstructions. about the agreementsThere atwas Sevresthe at firstall. Likeglimmerings, everybodyapart elsefrom we weremaybe justthe presentedmemoirs of withEban certainwho was operationalinvolved or maybeinstructions.Ben Gurion, ofThereanything wasserious the offirstthe

glimmerings,inner history apartis an fromarticle maybe whichthe memoirswas published of Eban whowithin was theinvolvedlast or maybetwo Benyears Gurion,in ofthe anythingBritish seriousperiodical of the innerInternational history andis anComparative article whichLaw Ouarterlywas publishedby Geoffrey within Marstonthe lastof twoSidney yearsSussex in College,the BritishCambridge. periodicalHe Internationalobviously had accessand comparativeto Foreign LawOffice Ouarterlydocuments. by GeoffreyIt is Marstonquite an ofinteresting Sidney Sussexaccount College,of how the Cambridge.legal people Heof

obviouslythe British hadForeign accessOffice to Foreignwere keptOfficeout documents.of it. My Itguess is quiteis that an theinterestinglegal people accountof theof howIsraeli the legalForeign peopleOffice of thewere Britishalso kept Foreignout ofOfficeit probably were keptfor outthe of sameit. Myreasons. guess isIt thatwas athecase legalwhich peoplegot beyondof the legaliIsraelities. ForeignThe Officelegal

werepeople alsowere keptleft out toof itclean probablyup the for mess,the samewhich reasons.often

Ithappens. was a case which got beyond legalities. The legal JK: peopleThe agreements were leftwere toapparently clean upto thecoordinate mess, whichsome kindoftenof happens.efforts between the British and the French and Israel. JK:Rosenne: TheYes, agreementsas far as werel know. apparentlyl have tonever coordinateactually someseen kindthem. of effortsl don't evenbetweenknow theif Britishthey have andbeen the published.French and Israel.l suppose

Rosenne: Yes,they ashave farbeen. as I know.l am anI haveoperational never actuallyman on seenthe whole.them.

Il've don'tbeen evenverycareful know if theyin haveaIl beenmy writings,pUblished.which I supposeare a theylot, havetoavoid been.dealing I am anwith operationalthe Middle manEast. on thel whole.didn't I've been very careful in all my writings, which are a 80 lot, to avoid dealing with the Middle East. I didn't

80 "

want to cause any embarrasment to any particular

government, Israel or anybody else, for that matter, by

wantwriting toon causethe Middle any East.embarrasmentl have a tocertain any standingparticularin

government,the international Israel community.or anybody else,l've keptfor thatoff matter,the Middle by

writingEast and onhave the notMiddleinterested East. I myselfhave a incertainthe details standingof init

theexcept internationalwhen l have community.had to professionally. I've kept offl don't the Middlerecall Eastever andsaeing havethe notSevres interestedagreement. myself in the details of it JK: exceptWhat ware whenyour I haveinstructions? had to professionally. I don't recall

Rosenne: everMy instructions seeing the wereSevresbasically agreement.to do what l could to get JK: Whatthe freedomwere yourof instructions?navigation through both areas. That was Rosenne: Myour instructionsprime interest. were basicallyThe Foreign to do whatOffice I couldwas to moreget theconcerned freedomwith of thenavigationFedayeen throughand that bothside areas.of it. ThatWe washad ourissues primewith Egyptinterest.which weThethought Foreignhad beenOfficesolved was bymorethe concernedarmistice withbut, theit turnedFedayeenout anddifferently. that side ofDon't it. Weforget had thereissues withwas Egypta revolution which we thoughtin Egypt hadshortly been solvedafter by thethe armisticeArmistice but,Agreement. it turnedl don'tout differently.think it really Don'taffected forget therethings wasaIl thata revolutionmuch. lt affectedin Egyptthe shortlypersonalities, after thethe

ArmisticeKing and theAgreement.corrupt government.I don't thinkThen it Nasserreally tookaffectedover thingswith his allstrong that much.personality It affectedand he thebecame personalities,extremely anti­ the KingIsraali andand theleader corruptof government.a wide anti-lsraeli Then Nassercoalition took byoverno withmeans hislimited strong topersonalitythe Arabs. and heHe becamethe extremelyone who reallyanti­ Israelibrought andwhat leaderis called of a widethe Thirdanti-IsraeliWorld into coalitionit. lt bywas no meansvery curious,limited ontothe thenight Arabs.that heHe diedthe whichone whowas reallyin the

broughtmiddle ofwhata Ganeralis calledAssembly the Thirdwe hadWorldscheduled into it. a Itnormal was verydelegation curious,reception on the nightthat thatnight. he diedSome whichquite wasinnocent in the

middledelegate of froma Generalsome countryAssemblycame we hadup toscheduledus and asaid, normalIl l delegation reception that night. Some quite innocent 81 delegate from some country came up to us and said, II I

81 "'..#

"' ..­ suppose your reception for tonight will be cancelled." l said, "What for?" He said, "weIl, haven't you heard

Nassersuppose hasyourdied?" receptionl foranswered, tonight"we willshould be cancelled."cancel a receptionI said, "Whatbecause for?"Nasser He said,has died?""well, haven'tBut, that's you heardhow thingsNasser gohasat died?"the UN. I Youanswered,don't always "we shouldknow who cancelyou are a talkingreceptionto. because Nasser has died?" But, that's how thingsThere go atwas thea manUN. beforeYou don'tNasser alwayswho wasknow lesswho youhostile are talkingbut less to.effective. His name was Naguib. He had also been involvedThere wasin a theman 1948beforewar. NasserOur peoplewho wasknew lesshim hostilealso. but less effective. His name was Naguib. He had also

JK: beenOn October29, involved in1956, the 1948Israel war.attacked Our peopleEgypt. knew him also. Rosenne: There was a trememdous camouflage operation that went on JK: Onat thatOctobertime. 29, Everybody1956, Israelthought attackedthe tensionEgypt. was between Rosenne: ThereIsrael wasand a Jordan.trememdousIf camouflageyou look atoperationthe press thatcarefully went on you'llat that seetime.that Everybodythe tension thoughtthat thewas tensionspoken wasabout betweenwas betweenIsrael andIsrael Jordan.and Jordan.If you look at the press carefully JK: you'llThis was seeon thatpurpose the totensiondeflect thatattention? was spoken about was

Rosenne: betweenl don't know.Israel l andwas Jordan.in Europe at that time on something.

JK: Thisl don't was recallon purposewhat totook deflectme to attention?Europe but, l know l was

Rosenne: Icalled don't inknow.a hurry I wasabout in Europethat time.at that ltimethought on something.that war wasI don'tgoing recallto break what outtookwith me toJordan. Europe Youbut,see, I knowif war I wasis calledgoing to inbreak a hurryout, aboutthe lastthatthing time. anyI militarythought thatis going war wasto dogoingis tell to breakany civilian out with thatJordan.doesn't You needsee, toif know.war is JK: goingWas there to breaka feeling out, thethat last Egyptthing anywas militarygoing to isattack going toIsrael? do is tellWas anythis civiliana preemption that doesn'tor was needi t toreally know. an JK: Wasattempt thereto gaina feelingsomething? that Egypt was going to attack Israel? Was this a preemption or was it really an 82 attempt to gain something?

82 ~ ·

Rosenne: l think it was really jumping onto the band wagon. l think it was exploiting an opportunity which presented

Rosenne: Iitself think withit wasAnglo-French really jumpinginitiatives onto thevis-a-vis band wagon.Eqypt. I thinkThe issues it waswere exploitingthere anyhow.an opportunityl think whichthe presentedForeign Ministryitself withhad Anglo-Frenchreached a conclusion, initiativesor vis-a-visat any rate Egypt.the Thehigher issuesechelons were oftherethe Foreignanyhow. Ministry,I thinkthat the theForeignonly

Ministryway to get hadfreedom reachedof passagea conclusion,through orTiran at wasany soonerrate theor

higherlater byechelonsthe use of oftheforce. Foreign TheMinistry,Egyptians thatwould the onlynot

wayvoluntarily to get freedomrelinquish of passageany of throughtheir Tiranposition was there.sooner orl laterthink bythat theis usethe ofpoint force.of departureThe Egyptiansfor thewouldwhole not voluntarilythinking. Whatrelinquishl think anyhappened, of theirand positionhere is there.to some I thinkextent thatinformed is thequess pointwork ofon mydeparturepart, is forthat thewhen wholethe thinking.British and Whatthe FrenchI thinkstarted happened,their andinitiative here is toto someuse extentforce againstinformedNasser guess forworkwhatever on my part,purpose is thatthey whenwanted, the

Britishour people, and especiallythe French thestartedMinistry theirof initiativeDefense and to thisuse forceis Shimeon againstPeres Nasser(he was forthe whatevermain contact purposein theythose wanted,days) ,

oursaw anpeople,opportunity especiallyhere theto getMinistrythe strait of Defenseof Tiran. and Thisthis

wasis Shimeonby jumping Perespigqyback. (he was theThe mainFrench contactgave in usthoseone days),thing whichsaw an wasopportunitycardinal herein aIl to this.get the Theystraitgave of usTiran.air coverThis

wasover byTel jumpingAviv whichpiggyback.we didn't The have.French Thatgave wasus onequid thingpro whichquo. Thewas sequencecardinal ofin eventsall this.was moreThey orgaveless us likeair this.cover

Weoverdid Telattack Aviv whichEqypt. we Theredidn'tis have.no question That wasabout quidthat, pro

quo.whether Theit sequencewas provoked, of eventsthe Fedayeen,was more orwhatever. less likeWe this.were

Wethen didpresented attack Egypt.with an Thereultimatum is noby questionthe British aboutand that,the whetherFrench to itcease was provoked,and desist theor Fedayeen,withdraw, whatever.whatever, Wewithin were thena limited presentedperiod withof antime ultimatumor else. by theAnd Britishit was andon the

French to cease and desist or withdraw, whatever, within 83 a limited period of time or else. And it was on the

83 -': .... f

...• I basis of the "or else" that they started their operation.

That is how it was done. But their operation failed

basiscompletely of thebecause "or else"it thatwas sotheybadly startedhandled. their operation.

JK: Thatl think is howthey itasked was thedone.Egyptians But theirand operationthe Israel faileis tod

completelyseparate themselves because itten wasmiles so badlyback handledfrom the. Canal but,

JK: Ithe thinkCanal theywas askedin Egyptian the Egyptiansterritory. and the Israelis to

Rosenne: Right,separatebut themselvesthey also tenmishandled miles backit. fromThey the didn'tCanal havebut,

thetheir Canaltroops was inin place.EgyptianBut territorythey did. give us air cover

Rosenne: Right,over Tel butAviv theywhich alsowe mishandleddidn't have it.at thatTheytime. didn'Ourt havaire

theirforce wasn'ttroops strongin place.enough. But they did give us air cover

JK: overAfter Telthe Avivfighting which brokewe didn'tout havethe UNat calledthat time.for a Ourcease­ air

forcefire andwasn'ta withdrawal strong enoughof forces..

JK:Rosenne: AfterAnd also the putfightingthe UNEF brokeOne outin theplace. UN calledl think forthe a ceaseprime­

fireobjective and a ofwithdrawalUNEF One ofwas forcesto save. face for the British

Rosenne: Andand alsoFrench. put theIt's UNEForiginal One indisposition place. I wasthinkto theseparate prime objectivethe British ofand UNEFthe OneFrench was tofrom savethe faceEgyptians for thevis-a-vis British

andthe French.Port of Said.It's originalFrom there dispositionit expanded was outwardsto separatande

thewas Britishgiven a androle. the FrenchThe armistice from the Egyptiansas far as vis-a-viwe weres

theconcerned Port ofwas Said.dead andFromburied. there itBen expandedGurion outwardsmade a veryand

wassharp givenspeech a inrole.Parliament The armisticeabout it being as fardead asand weburied were

concernedand he said, was"aIl deadthe andmagicians buried. inBenEgypt Gurioncould madenot aput verity

sharptogether speechagain. in ParliamentIl This is abouta quotation it being fromdead theand burieBible.d

andThe heUN said,would "allnot acceptthe magiciansthat, de in jure,Egypt butcouldde notfacto putone it

togetherhas te acceptagain. IIthe Thissituation. is a quotationOf course, from thewhen Biblethe.

TheArmistice UN wouldAgreement not acceptdisappeared, that, de jure,aIl butthe de armisticefacto one

hascommission to acceptand thetheobserver situation.set up disappearedOf course, alongwhen withthe

Armistice Agreement disappeared, all the armistice 84 commission and the observer set up disappeared along with

84 it. Anyhow, it would not have been big enough to observe this much larqer area which now came into play. One of it.the conditionsAnyhow, it forwouldour notwithdrawal have beenfrom big theenoughGaza tostrip observewas thisUN observation much largerposts areaat whichTiran nowwhich cameremained into play.there Oneuntil of the1967. conditionsThere was forfreedom our withdrawalof passage fromthrough the GazaTiran stripduring was UNaIl observationthat periode postsThat atis Tiranthe linkwhichup remainedwhich was theretidied untilup 1967.on the Therelegal sidewas freedomthrough ofthe passagefirst conferencethrough Tiranon theduringlaw allof the thatsea period.in 1958. ThatAgain is theArthur linkDean, up whichthe wassame tidiedman with up onwhom thethe legalterms sideof throughour withdrawal the first wereconferencenegotiated, on the waslaw ofhead theof seathe inUS 1958.delegation. Again ArthurHe knew Dean,exactly the samethe manissues with whomthat werethe termsinvolved of ourand wewithdrawalhad at that werestage negotiated,very strong was headcooperation of the fromus delegation.the British Heand knewthe Frenchexactlywho therealized issues thatthe siqnificancewere involvedof andstraits we hadin atgeneral. that stageThat verybecame stronga cooperationmajor issue infromthe thelast Britishconference and theon Frenchthe law whoof realizedthe sea, thekeeping significancepassage open of straitsand overflight. in general. That became a

JK: majorThe resolution issue in theto lastcalI conferencefor a cease-fire on the lawcame of fromthe sea,the keepingGeneral passageÂssembly. open and overflight. JK:Rosenne: TheWhat resolutionhappened there to callwas thatfor isa cease-firewas the first cameapplicationfrom the Generalof the Assembly.Uniting for Peace Resolution. That was a Rosenne: Whatresolution happenedthat therewas wasadopted that isin was1950 theafter firstthe applicationSecurity ofCouncil the hadUnitingbeen completelyfor Peace stYmiedResolution.by the RussianThat wasvetoa resolutionin the Korean that wasissue. adoptedThat in 1950is when afterthe the AmericansSecurity councildeveloped hadthe beenide acompletelyshifting thestYmiedcenter by ofthegravit Russiany of vetothe UNin forthethe Koreanmaintenance issue. of peaceThat fromis whenthe Security the AmericansCouncil developedto the General the ideaAssembly. shiftingKeep the incentermind ofthat gravitythe General of the UNAssembly for theresolution maintenanceis ofnever peacemore fromthan thea Securityrecommendation. Council to the General Assembly. Keep in mind that the General 85 Assembly resolution is never more than a recommendation.

85 This is quite important in aIl this. Incidently, we were very reserved towards that resolution but, by that time Thiswe couldn't is quite opposeimportantit. in allWe this.did privatelyIncidently,warn we werethe veryAmericans reservedthat towardsit could thatbackfire, resolutionas it but,has doneby thatin atimebad weway. couldn'tOne of opposeour speeches it. Wein thedid UNprivatelyexpressed warncertain the Americansreserves. thatAs theit couldresults backfire,of the vetoas ites hasin donethe Securityin a bad way.Council, OneBritish of ourand speechesFrench invetoes, the UNan expressedemergency sessioncertain reserves.of the General As theAssembly results wasof thecalled. vetoes Toin showthe Securityyou how Council,things are Britishlinked, andthe FrenchWest vetoes,managed anto emergencyget the issue sessionof ofHungary the Generalbefore theAssemblyGeneral wasAssembly called. whereTo showit wasyou alsohow thingsvetoed. areThere linked,was athesecond West emergencymanaged tosession get therunning issue ofin HungaryparaIleI beforeover the theSoviet Generalintervention Assembly wherein Hungary. it was alsoThe vetoed.two ran inThereparallel. was a secondIt was emergencycomplex. sessionYou can' runningt separate in parallelone part ofoverthe theworld Sovietfrom interventionthe situation inin Hungary.another partThe twoof theran world.in parallel.It was Itextremely was complex.complexe You can't separate JK: one[the parttape of thewas worldchanged from forthe situationthe interview] in anotherWe werepart ofdiscussing the world.at Itthe wasend extremelyof the complex.last tape the linkage JK: between[the tapedifferent was changedevents forat thethat interview]time and thatWe werethe discussingresolution forat thea cease-fire end of thehad lastcome tapefrom thethe Generallinkage betweenAssembly differentbecause of eventsthe veto atin thatthe Securitytime andCouncil. that theA resolutioncease-fire didfor takea cease-fireplace and hadUN comeEmergency from theForces Generalwere Assemblyput into place.because Asof youthe mentionedveto in thethey Securitywere first council.at Port A cease-fireSaid to separate did take theplaceFrench and UNand EmergencyBritish Forcesfrom werethe putEgyptians. into place.How Asdid youthis mentionedbegin theyto interactwere firstwi atth Portthe SaidIsraeli to position?separate the French and British from the Rosenne: Egyptians.It opened upHowa possibilitydid this beginof anto agreementinteract with the Israeli position? 86 Rosenne: It opened up a possibility of an agreement with the

86 Egyptians to station the UNEF and included in that would be in the Gaza Strip and along the frontier. In fact, in

Egyptiansthe Taba arbitrationto station theone UNEFof theand issuesincludedwas, in thatwhere wouldwas

betheir in thepost Gazaat Taba.strip andThis alongwas thea question frontier.of Infact fact,not ina

thequestion Taba ofarbitrationlaw. There onewas of a thelong issuesdiscussion was, whereabout wasit.

theirIn the postend theyat Taba.brought Thisthe wasEgyptian a questioncommandant of factof notthat a questionpost to qive of law.evidence Thereas wasto wherea longhis discussionpost was. aboutIn theit. courseIn the endof the theydiscussion brought theon theEgyptianpoints commandantwhere they ofwould that

postbe stationed to qive andevidencepatrol, as itto waswherepossible his postin was.that contextIn the

courseto have of onethe quitediscussiona distance on the pointsaway at whereTiran theyitself. would

beThat's stationedhow it andwas patrol,done. itIn wasretrospect possible init thatwas quitecontexta

toskillfully have oneconceived quite adiplomatie distance operation.away at Tiranl didn't itself.have That'sdirect responsibilityhow it was done.for that.In retrospect it was quite a

JK: skillfully50, at that conceivedpoint you diplomatichad observation. operation. I didn't have Rosenne: directNo, the responsibilityobservation "with for that.Egypt disappeared. It was

JK: So,replaced at thatby UNEF.point you had observation.

Rosenne:JK: No,They thewere observationto occupy the ·withborder? Egypt disappeared. It was

Rosenne: Morereplacedor less.by UNEF.l wouldn't go as far as to say occupy.

JK: TheyDon't wereforqet to occupyhalf of theit border?was desert and still is. They

Rosenne: Morehad these or less.frontier I wouldn'tposts to observego as farwhat as wasto goingsay occupy.on, to

makeDon'tsure forqetthat halfno oneof itcrossed was desertinto the andother stillside. is. They

hadwere thesemore important,frontier postsfrom tothe observeobserving whatpoint was goingof view, on, onto

makethe Gazasure Stripthat nothan one halfcrossedway intodown thethe otherSinai side.which Theywas

wererock moreand important,desert and fromat thisthe observingone post pointat Tiran of view,which on

theoperated Gaza untilStrip itthanwas halfremoved. way downIt"was thethrough Sinai whichthat thatwas

rockit was andpossible desert toandget atthis thisten oneyear postsettlement at Tiran ofwhichthe

operated until it was removed. It· was through that that 87 it was possible to get this ten year settlement of the

87 Tiran part of the problem but not the Suez Canal part of the problem. That was only settled in the peace treaty Tiranat Camp partDavid. of the problem but not the Suez Canal part of JK: theThen problem.the UN operationThat was thatonly tooksettledplace in didthe havepeacedefinite treaty atadvantages Camp David.for Israel over what the situation had been

JK: Thenbefore. the UN operation that took place did have definite Rosenne: advantagesIn one sense, forcertainly, Israel overin anotherwhat thesense situationit went hadfurther been before.than the observers ever went in keeping the parties Rosenne: Inapart. one sense,In that certainly,respect ini another t may have sensebeen it wentone furtherof the thanunderlying the observersfactors whichever ledwentto inthe keepingsix Day theWar. parties JK: Whyapart.would In thatthat leadrespectto furtherit may havefighting been whenone ofit thewas underlyingintended to factorskeep peace? which led to the six Day War. JK:Rosenne: WhyIt wasn't would intendedthat leadto beto afurtherbuffer zone.fightingYou whenare readingit was toointendedmuch tointo keepit. peace?There was no zone at aIl. It was Rosenne: Itessentially wasn't intendeda small tounit be aof buffersoldiers. zone. l Youdon't are rememberreading toohow manymuch thereinto it.were Therebut, theywas wereno zonesmall at companies.all. It wasl essentiallydon't think a theysmall wereunit ofmore soldiers.than that.I don'tThey rememberwere howscattered many theredown atwerevarious but, pointsthey wereby agreementsmall companies.as to where I don'tthey were thinkto be.they Theywerewere morenot thanmuch that.different Theythan werethe

scatteredobservers downexcept at therevariouswere pointsmore byof agreementthem. as to where JK: Werethey werethey toable be.effectively They were tonotstop muchthe differentFedayeen thanraids? the Rosenne: Yes,observersquite exceptweIl. thereThere werethey morewere of quitethem. effective and

JK: Weretheir theypresence able effectivelykept the Strait to stopof Tiranthe Fedayeenopen. Althoughraids? Rosenne: Yes,it wasn't quite terriblywell. Theremuch usedthey werein that quiteperiod effectiveafter andaIl thattheir work.presenceTiran kept gotthe itsStraitimportance of Tiran actuallyopen. Althoughin the Iran-Iraqit wasn't Warterriblywhere themuchJordaian used inport thatof periodAqaba becameafter allone that work. Tiran got its importance actually in the 88 Iran-Iraq War where the Jordaian port of Aqaba became one

88 •

of the main Soviet supply routes to Iraq. As a result of that there was a major Soviet interest in keeping those

ofstraits the mainopen. SovietIt didn'tsupply worryroutesus. to Iraq.The Port As ofa resultAqaba ofis

thatquite therean important was a majorcontact sovietboth interestfor East inAfrica keepingand thosemore

straitsimportantly open.for Itthe didn'tFar East.worry us. The Port of Aqaba is JK: quiteYou've anmentioned importantseveral contacttimes both thatfor Eastkeeping Africathe andparties more importantlyseparated did fornot theaid Farin East.peaceful settlement. In what JK: You'veway did mentionedthat operate severalnegativeIy? times that keeping the parties Rosenne: separatedIt operated didnegatively not aid inin peacefulthe sense settlement.that there wasIn neverwhat

wayany didattempt that operateto get negatively?together and discuss underlying

Rosenne: Itissues. operatedIt negativelywas the US ininitiative the sensewhich that reallythere wasdid neverthat anyafter attemptwhat was toin getone sensetogethera success and discussand in oneunderlyingsense a issues.failure ofIt wasthe theEgyptian us initiativePrime Minister, which reallySadat. did thatHis

aftersuccess whatwas wasin inthe oneYom senseKipur a War,successthe andfirst in fewone dayssenseof a

failureit. His offailure the Egyptianis that hePrimehadn't Minister,planned Sadat.it properly His successand in the wasend in hethenearly Yom Kipurlost War,his wholethe firstcountry. few daysThat's of

it.enough. His ThefailureSyrians is thatwere healso hadn'tthe same.plannedl wasit properlybrought andup inin thea country end he nearlywhich lostsays histhat wholethe country.only battle That'sof enough.importance Theis Syriansthe last wereone. also the same. I was brought

up inl athink countrythat whichSadat goessays intothatthe thecategory only battleof great of

menimportancein the issense the thatlasthe one.realized what had happened and

realizedI thinkthat thatthe Sadatonly waygoesfrom intohis thecountry's category pointof greatof menview into theput sensean endthatto hethis realizedsituation what hadand happenedthat was andto realizedreach some thatsort theof onlyagreement, way fromcreaky his thoughcountry'sit mightpoint be,of

viewwith Israel.to put anWe endare tolucky thisthat situationthere isanda desert.that was l'mto reachnot sure somehe sortcould ofhave agreement,done it creakyif it hadthoughnot itbeen mightfor be,the

with Israel. We are lucky that there is a desert. I'm 89 not sure he could have done it if it had not been for the

89 ..

Sinai desert. That's why the situation with Syria and the other countries is so difficult. But the main issues

betweenSinai desert.Israel andThat'sEgypt whywere thepartly situationsettled withearlier Syria butand werethe otherfinally countriessettled is soin difficult.the peace treaty.But the mainThat issueswas achievedbetween Israelafter andaIl Egyptsorts wereof preliminaries.partly settled earlierIt took buta werelong timefinallywith settleda lot ofin comingsthe peaceand treaty.goings. ThatBarbara was Waltersachievedwas afterinvolved all sortsat one oftime. preliminaries.There are aIlItsorts took ofa curiouslong timeways withthat a diplomacylot of comingsworks, andas whengoings.the EgyptiansBarbara Waltersand the wasIsraelis involvedwere atlocked one time.up at ThereCamp David,are allliterally sorts of curiousphysically wayslocked that diplomacyup in Camp works,David. as whenThey thewere Egyptiansnot let andout untilthe Israelisthey had werereached lockedan upagreement. at Camp David,In other literallywords, physicallyit was a repetition locked upof inthe CampRhodes David.process. They werel would notvery let muchout untillike theyto see had whatreachedhappened an agreement.with Theodore In otherRoosevelt words, itand wasthe a Treatyrepetitionof Plymouth of the Rhodesin 1905, process.if he lockedI wouldup verythe muchJapanese likeand to theseeRussians what happenedsomewhere. with lTheodorehaven't Rooseveltbeen able andto findthe Treatyout yet. of PlymouthIt is on inmy 1905,agenda ifto helook lockedinto up thatthe Japaneseone day andto seethe Russianswhat happened. somewhere.It I washaven'thatt beenkind ableof todiplomacy, find out theyet.strong It isarm on diplomacymy agenda ofto thelook Americans,into that

oneskillful day towith seeskillful what happened.opposite numbersIt was whothatknew kindtheir of diplomacy,national interests the strongand armknew diplomacywhen to ofgive theand Americans,when to skillfulstand firme withThat skillfulgoes foroppositeBegin andnumbersthat goeswho knewfor Sadat.their national interests and knew when to give and when to JK: standIn retrospect firm. Thattoday goes wefortalked Begin andabout thata goeslot forof Sadat.issues involving the Middle East crises and the United Nations.

JK: InIn retrospectretrospect todaywere therewe talkedways aboutthat athe lotUN ofoperated issues involvingeffectively theand Middlewere Eastthere crisesways andin thewhich Unitedthey Nations.could In retrospect were there ways that the UN operated 90 effectively and were there ways in which they could

90 improve? Rosenne: Personally, l think one must be very careful not to

generalize.improve? l think that every international dispute as Rosenne: Personally,far as l canI thinksee onehas mustits beown verycontours, careful itsnot ownto generalize.physiognomy. I Thethinkconcept that everyof the internationalUN peace-keeping disputeforce as whichfar asemerged I canin stagessee hassimply its outownof contours,sheer necessity its ownhas physiognomy.turned out to beThea conceptgood one, of butthe onlyUN peace-keepingup to a point. forceIt whichis a good emergedone inin stagesthe sense simplythat outit ofdoes sheerstop necessityfighting hasor turnedat any outrate toif beit a gooddoesn't one,stop but fightingonly up toaltogether, a point. Itit enablesis a goodit oneto inbe thekept senseunder thatsome itsort doesof stopcontrol fightingand notor atexpand any tooratefar. if itBut doesn'tit has stopnot fightingshown any altogether,capability itof enablesgetting itto togrips be keptwith underunderlying some sortissues. of controlIt needsand nota expandgreat powertoo far.to takeBut itthat has innothand shownand anyit capabilityneeds great of gettingstatesmen to togripsget withinto underlyingthe act. issues.The UN ItCharter needs isa greatmisconceived, power tothe takeCharter that itself.in hand andAnd itit needsis probably great statesmenjust as weIl to thatget itintonever theworked act. becauseThe UNit Charteris based ison misconceived,the false assumption the Charterof the itself.perpetuation And itof isthe probablywartime justalliance as wellwhen thatthere it neverwas workednothing becauseeven toit perpetuais based te.on theBecause falsethey assumptionwere fighting of the perpetuationagainst the ofsame the wartimecountry alliancedoesn't makewhen themtherereal was allies.nothing TheevenUN topeace-keeping perpetuate. Becauseforces fromthey which,were fightingin principle againstat anythe rate,same thecountrybig doesn'tpowers aremakeexcluded them realgenerally allies.unless The byUN agreement,peace-keepingand whichforces onlyfromoperate which, byinagreement principlehas atshown any rate,itself theto bebiga powersmore effectiveare excludedmachinery generallyfor unlessthe by maintenanceagreement, andof whichinternational only operatepeace byafter agreementit has hasbroken showndown, itselfto bringto be ita moreback andeffectivemaintain machineryit. l don't forthink theit hasmaintenanceshown itself of international peace after it has broken down, to bring it 91 back and maintain it. I don't think it has shown itself

91 very effective for the solution of international disputes. But, on the other hand, l'm not sure in this

verymodern effectiveworld that for thethepublic solutiondoesn't of internationalexpect major disputes.international But,disputes on the tootherbe resolvedhand, I'mover not night.sure in Itthisis

modernjust not worldpossible. that Forthe instance,public doesn'tl see noexpectsolution majorat internationalaIl to Ulster disputesand l see tono besolution resolvedat overaIl night.to Gaza, Itfor is

veryjust muchnot possible.the same reasonsFor instance,in both cases.I see noThis solutionis very, at allvery totragic Ulsterin andboth I seecases. no solutionIf Ulster at wereall tonot Gaza,part forof verythe OKmuchthere the wouldsame reasonsalmost incertainly both cases.be a peace-keepingThis is very, veryforce tragicthere. in Thereboth cases.should be,If Ulsterthere reallywere notshould part be.of theThe reasonsUK therewhy wouldneither almostof themcertainlyget resolved be a peace-keepingare similar

forceproblems there.and theyThere goshouldvery be,deep. therel reallythink shouldthat somebe. Theinternational reasons whysituations neither ofare themsuch getthat resolvedthe most are thatsimilarcan problemsbe done byandthe theyinternational go very deep.community I thinkis to thatkeep somethem underinternationalcontrol, situationsnot let them arelead suchto thatmajor theoutbreaks most thatlike can beoccured done byin thethe internationalearly part of communitythis century is toevery keep themtime underthere control,was even nota minorlet themoutbreak lead toin majorthe outbreaksBalkans. likeFor occuredinstance, inwho thewould earlyhave partthought of thisthat centurythe bullet everythat timewas

thereshot inwasSarajevo even a inminor1914 outbreakwould have in ledtheto Balkans.what it did.For

instance,It wouldn't whohave wouldhad havethe thoughtUN been thatin existencethe bulletthen. that was JK: shotDo you in Sarajevothink that in 1914an internationalwould have led organizationto what it did.is Itcapable wouldn'tof peace have hadmaking? the UN been in existence then. JKRosenne:: Dol wouldn'tyou thinkexclude thatit anbut internationalon the whole, organizationno. l think isit capablehas to beof leftpeaceto making?one of the big powers operating with Rosenne: Igeneral wouldn'tconsent. exclude Itit hasbut onto thebe removedwhole, no.from I bigthinkpower it hasrivalry. to be Theleftinternational to one of theorganizations big powers areoperatingtoo open withto general consent. It has to be removed from big power 92 rivalry. The international organizations are too open to

92 , ..

rivalries. The Secretary-General U Thant, for whom l had the hiqhest admiration (1 worked with him quite a lot),

rivalries.said to us Theone Secretary-Generalday, "look, l'm manaqinqU Thant, directorfor whom I ofhada theconcern highestwhich admirationhas 120 share (I workedholders withof whichhim quiteyou havea lot),one

saidshare." to usIn onethat day,sense "look,the UN I'mis managingnot the Leaque. directorIn ofits a concernheyday it whichhad has60 members.120 share Theholdersmost ofit whichhad was you65. haveThat one wasshare."before Inthe thatbiq sensecountries the UNstarted is not withdrawingthe League. fromIn itsit. heydayIt had ittwo had secretaries-general60 members. The mostin itthe had wholewas 65.of Thatits washistory. before Thethe UNbighas countrieshad a secretary-generalstarted withdrawingwith fromnever it. moreIt hadthan twotwo secretaries-generalterms. Every ten years in theit haswholechanged, of itsor history.even more Thefrequently. UN has had aIt secretary-generalgoes in rotation withand nevernot morenecessarily than twoon terms.ability. EveryFor teninstance, years itU Thanthas changed,was chosen or evenafter moreHammarskjold frequently.died. It Theregoes werein rotationtwo very andstrong not necessarilycandidates. onOne ability.was ManfredFor instance,Lacks andU Thantone waswas chosenMonge afterSelim ofHammarskjTunisia.old Theredied. wasTherestrong wereopposition two very tostrongboth candidates.and the biq powersOne wasdecided Manfredthat Lacksthey andwanted one waswhat Mongethey Selimthought of wasTunisia.a weak Thereman. wasWe stronghappened oppositionto know Uto Thantboth andpersonally the bigand powershad actually decided helpedthat theyhim whenwantedhe arrivedwhat theyin thoughtNew York wasas Permanenta weak man.Representative We happenedof toBurma, knowvirtually U Thant

personallyunknown and andunknown had actuallyin New helpedYork. him Wewhenhad he physicallyarrived in

Newhelped Yorkhim as andPermanentbefriended Representativehim and so ofon. Burma,He turnedvirtuallyout unknownto be a andmuch unknownstronger inpersonality New York. thanWe hadthe bigphysicallypowers helpedthought. him That'sand befriendedfor sure. him Waldheimand so on.was Hechosen turnedagain out tobecause be a theymuch wantedstrongera personalityweak man. Andthan i tthewas bigEurope' powerss thought.turne l understandThat's forthat sure.the presentWaldheimSecretary-General was chosen againis

becausealso not theyvery wantedqood. a50 weakmy sourcesman. Andtell itme. was l Europehave noI s turn. I understand that the present Secretary-General is 93 also not very good. So my sources tell me. I have no

93 .. personal opinion. l've had nothing to do with him. l'm told he's weak and indecisive. He was involved in the personallaw of the opinion.sea conference I've hadand nothingthey tosay dohe withdidn't him. leaveI'm toldany mark he's onweakit. andBut indecisive.it was Latin He America'swas involvedturne in Thethe nextlaw ofturn theis seaprobably conferenceAfrica andand theyno sayone heknows didn'twho leaveit is goingany markto be.on it.The Butone itman waswho Latincould America'spossible turn.have thisThe

nextjob belongs turn is toprobablythe wrong Africatribe andin noUganda one knowsand iswhoout it ofis

goingthings toat be.the presentThe one moment.man who could possible have this job belongsThe publicity to the wrongof the tribeUN isin theUgandabain andof isany outtrue of

thingsdiplomacy. at theYou presentsimply moment.cannot do it if every move is public.The l'mpublicitynot saying of theyou UNdon't is reportthe bainwhat ofyou anydo truebut diplomacy.to have every You movesimplyreported, cannot doevery it iftime everyyou movesneeze is public.reported I'mis notnot thesayingway youto don'tconduct reportpublic whataffairs. you do butIt

tosimply havecan't everybe movedone thatreported,way. every time you sneeze JK: reportedIn the past is notin several the wayof tothese conductsituations pUblic affairs.the Security It simplyCouncil can'thad itsbe donearms thattied way.because of the veto. JKRosenne:: InI wouldn'tthe past sayin severalit is because of theseof situationsthe veto. thel think Securitythat Councilis an over had simplification.its arms tied becauseThe veto of theis onlyveto.expressive Rosenne: Iof wouldn'tsomething. say Itit isis anbecauseextremely of theinaccurate veto. Iword thinkto thatuse.

isThere an overis no simplification.such thing as aTheveto. veto isIt onlysimply expressivedoesn't ofexiste something.The Charter It is saysan extremelythat certain inaccurateresolutions word torequire use.

Therea majority. is no suchIf thatthingmajority as a veto.is notIt there,simply it'sdoesn'tnot exist.there. TheThere's Charterno saysresolution. that certainSo, resolutionshow one can requiretalk aabout majority.a veto Ifl don'thatt majorityknow. Ais vetonot herethere,means it's whennot there.something There'shas been no resolution.passed by theSo, Congresshow one but,can talkthe

aboutPresident a vetosays, I don'tno. Thereknow. isA nothingveto herepassed meansby whenthe something has been passed by the Congress but, the 94 President says, no. There is nothing passed by the

94 Security Council. So, it is a different concept. It's

a legal technicality, perhaps, but not entirely. If the

Security CouncilCouncil.is So,hamstrung, it is a itdifferentis hamstrung concept.because It'sof athe legalfundamental technicality,lack ofperhaps,agreement butamong not entirely.the major powersIf the Securitywhich finds Councilexpression is hamstrung,if necessary it is hamstrungthrough becausethe veto. of theBut fundamentalmore often lackthan ofnot agreementit finds amongexpression the majorin powersthat whichmatters findsare expressionnot brought ifbefore necessarythe throughSecurity theCouncil. veto. ButDon' tmoreforget oftenthat thanbefore not ita findsmeeting expressionof the Securiin thatty

mattersCouncil aretakes notplace broughtthere beforehas theto beSecurininety votesCouncil.in Don'tagreement forgetthat thati t shouldbefore takea meetingplace. ofThe theSecretary- Security CouncilGeneral doestakesnot placejust sendthereout hasan invitationto be nineto votesa meeting in agreementat 2:00 tomorrow that itafternoon. should takeThe place.actual Themeeting Secretary-of the GeneralSecurity doesCouncil not justis negotiatedsend out anfirst. invitationThe totitle a meetingof an

atagenda 2:00 itemtomorrowis negotiated. afternoon. ThereThe actualused tomeetingbe enormous of the Securitydebates over councilthe titleis negotiatedof an agenda first.item Thein thetitleSecurity of an agendaCouncil. itemIt iswould negotiated.go on for Theredays. usedNow toit beis enormoussimply a debatesletter tooveravoid the that.title ofBefore an agendait can itembe convenedin the Securityfor its

Council.first meeting It wouldthere gohave on toforbe days.nine votesNow init favoris simplyof it, a letternine countries to avoid agreeingthat. Beforeto it. it can be convened for its JK: firstNow, withmeetingthe theresituation have tochanging be nine votesbetween in favorthe USof it,and

nineSoviet countriesUnion andagreeingthe Cold to it.War waning, how does this JK: Now,affect withthe theMiddle situationEast? DoeschangingIsrael betweenlook favorablythe US andon Sovietthis change Unionin andthe theinternational Cold War waning,environment? how does this Rosenne: affectBasically, the Middlel can't East?speak forDoesIsrael Israelanymore. look favorablyl've been on

thisout ofchangepublic in servicethe internationalnow for over environment?ten years. l should Rosenne: Basically,think that Ione can'twould speakbe inforfavor Israelof anYmore.anything thatI've wouldbeen out of public service now for over ten years. I should 95 think that one would be in favor of anything that would

95 reduce international tensions. We have good memories of joint American-Russian cooperation on the Middle East whichreduce wasinternationalone of the tensions.things which We haveenabled good thememoriesIsraeli of jointindependence American-Russianto go through. cooperationl wrote aonlittle the Middlearticle Easttwo whichor three wasyears one agoof theon Israel'sthings whichinvitation enabledto thethe SecurityIsraeli Councilindependencewhich tol gothink through.was inI July,wrote a1948, littleas articleopposed twoto orthe threeJewish yearsAgency ago onfor Israel'sPalestine. invitationThis towas theengineered Security Councilthrough Whicha representati I think wasve inof July,the Ukraine,1948, as opposedManuelski, to theGromyko, Jewishand AgencyJessup. forThat Palestine.is how thingsThis werewas engineeredworking in throughthose days. a representativeThere is no doubtof thethat Ukraine,Israel isManuelski,going to

Gromyko,come under anda Jessup.very great Thatsqueeze is howover thingsthe werenext workingfew years. in thoseIncidently, days. l Therethink isthat no doubtonly thethatShamir Israelgovernment is going tois comecapable underof areacting very greatto it.squeezel don't overthink the nextPeres fewwould years.be Incidently,capable of reactingI think tothatit. onlyWe arethe inShamirthe situationgovernmentof isa capablewar in ofIsrael. reactingl tothink it. thisI don'tis thinkone ofPeresthe wouldserious be mistakescapable ofthe reactingAmerican togovernment it. We areis inmaking, the situationbacking Peresof a warover inShamir. Israel. I think this is one of the serious mistakesl'm thenot Americanyet fully governmentconvinced thatis making,the Soviet-American backing Peres overrapproachment Shamir. or reduction of tension goes beyond Europe. For instance,I'm not yetthe fullyclassic convincedtraditional that theRussian Soviet-Americandemand for rapproachmentaccess to the orPersian reductionGulf ofis tensionstill there. goes beyondThe tensions Europe.

Forin theinstance,southern thereaches classicof traditionalRussia has Russianreminded demandme veryfor accessmuch of to thethe Persianfirst dispute Gulf is discussedstill there.at theThe tensionsSecurity inCouncil the southernwhich wasreachesover ofAzerbaij Russia an.has remindedl think mei tveryis muchpremature of theto firstrush disputeto conclusions discussedthat at thebecause Securityfar Councilreaching whichevents wasare overhappening Azerbaijin an. EuropeI thinkthat itthey, is premature to rush to conclusions that because far 96 reaching events are happening in Europe that they,

96 -. , 'c.-, •

therefore, extend to other parts of the world. It is by

no means clear that it does. l have often wondered that

therefore,for the two extendbig powers to otherthat partspriority of theshould world.be givenIt is toby

nothe meansMiddle clearEast thator theit does.Far East.I haveThese oftenare wonderedtwo danger that

forspots. the twol'm bigstill powersnot surethat thatprioritythey shouldhave made be givenup their to theminds Middleand there East areor thecertain Far East.signs thatThesethey aremay twobe dangergiven spots.priority I'mto stillthe Far notEast. sure thatThere theywas havea Gorbachev-Korea made up their

mindsmeeting andintherethe Unitedare certainstates signslast thatweek. theyThat may maybe givenbe a

prioritysign that tothey thefeel Far thatEast.the ThereFar Eastwas ais Gorbachev-Koreamore dangerous

meetingthan the inMiddle the UnitedEast. Westatesmust lastnot forgetweek. thatThatthe maySoviet be a

Unionsign thaistitselfthey feela Middle that theEast Farpower. East isIts moreaccess dangerousmay be

thandifficult the Middlebut, itEast.is neverWe mustthe notless forgetthere. thatIt thehas sovietmore

Uniondirect isinterest itself ina Middlethe Middle EastEast power.than Itsthe accessunited mayStates be

difficulhas. ltthasbut,a bigit isfrontier never thein lessthe Muslim there. world.It has 50,morel

directwouldn't interestrush to in anythe Middleconclusions, East thanyet. the Anythingunited statesthat

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97

97 INDEX OF NAMES

Alon, Yigael 56

Attlee, Clement INDEX6 OF NAMES Azcarate,Alon, YiqaelPablo da 6456 Attlee,Begin, MenachemClement 33,89,946 Azcarate,Ben-Gurion, PabloDavid da 16-20,64 23, 33, 54, 58, 63, 70, 73, 83,

Beqin, Menachem 8733,89,94

Ben-Gurion,Bernadotte, CountDavid Folke 16-20,2, 29, 23,31, 46-50,33, 54, 52 58, 63, 70, 73, 83, Bevin, Ernest 875-8, 25 Bernadotte,Bunche, Ralph Count Folke 2, 29,30-32, 31, 37,46-50,42, 5249-52, 55, 57,

Bevin, Ernest 58,5-8, 61,25 64, 67, 71, 76, 81

Bunche,Dean, Arthur Ralph 27,2, 30-32,80, 81, 37,88 42, 49-52, 55, 57, Dulles, John Foster 79,58, 8061, 64, 67, 71, 76, 81 Eban,Dean, ArthurAbba 27,28, 80, 29, 81,56, 77,88 83 Dulles,Eisenhower, John DwightFoster 79,79 80 Eban,Elath, AbbaEliahu 28,28 29, 56, 77, 83 Eisenhower,Eytan, Walter Dwight 755,9 56, 64, 69, 76

Elath,Farouk, EliahuKing 2558

Eytan,Finkelstein, WalterLawrence 55,30 56, 64, 69, 76

Farouk,Gorbachev, KingMichael 51005 Finkelstein,Greenspan, Hank Lawrence 3360 Gorbachev,Gromyko, Andrei Michael 10990 Greenspan,Hammarskjold, HankDag 364,6 73, 78-81, 96 Gromyko,Hitler, AdolfAndrei 911,9 29

Hammarskjold,Husseini, Hajj DaqAmin el 64,11 73, 78-81, 96 Hitler, Adolf 11, 29 98 Husseini, Hajj Amin el 11

98 Jarring, Gunnar 48

Jefferson, Thomas 20 Jessup,Jarring, PhilipGunnar 27,48 99

Jefferson,Lacks, Manfred Thomas 9620

Lie,Jessup,Trygve Philip 37,27, 6799 ManuelskiLacks, Manfred 9996 Marston,Lie, TrygveGeoffrey 8337, 67 Meir,ManuelskiGolda 80,99 81 Marston,Mohn, Paul Geoffrey 8350

Meir,Naguib Golda 80,85 81

Mohn,Nasser, PaulGamal Abdel 5038, 80-82, 84-86 NaguibPeres, Shimon 8586, 99 Nasser,Rabin, YitzhakGamal Abdel 38,56 80-82, 84-86 Rafael,Peres, ShimonGideon 86,28 99 Rabin,Riley, YitzhakWilliam 5642, 50, 55, 56, 64

Rafael,Robinson, GideonJacob 2853, 77

Riley,Roosevelt, WilliamTheodore 42,9, 9350, 55, 56, 64

Robinson,Ruessen Jacob 53,39 77 Roosevelt,Rusk, Dean Theodore 927, 93 RuessenSadat, Anwar 3992, 94

Rusk, Dean 279 / Saoud, King Ibnn Sadat,Selim, AnwarMongi 92,96 94

Saoud, King Ibnn 916, 33, 99 / Shamir, Yitzhak Selim,Shareen, MongiColonel 9655

Shamir,Sl'laret1:, YitzhakMoshe 16,26, 33,28, 9958, 63, 70

Shareen,Shilouh Colonel 5556, 57

Sharet1:, Moshe 26, 28, 58, 63, 70 99 Shilouh 56, 57

99 •

Silver, Rabbi Abba Hillel 27 stavrapoulos, Constantine 64 Truman,Silver, HarryRabbi Abba Hillel 27,27 43 Ustavrapoulos,Thant Constantine 9664 Viqier,Truman, HenriHarry 50,27, 4355, 64, 68 Waldheim,U Thant Kurt 9697 Walters,Viqier, HenriBarbara 9350, 55, 64, 68 weizman,Waldheim, ChaimKurt 9717, 18 Walters,Yadin, Yiqael Barbara 9356, 59, 70 Weizman, Chaim 17, 18 Yadin, Yiqael 56, 59, 70

100

100