PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PALESTINE, 1948 JUSTUS D. DOENECKE Deparlrnenl of Hitory. New College of the University of South Florida Foreign Relalions of the United Staler. 1948, Vol. V: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Part 11. Washington, D.C.: US. Government Printing Office, 1976. "We have no long-term Palestine policy. We do tial campaign. Israel herself, always the vastly have a short-term, open-ended policy which is outnumbered party, fought against British- set from time to time by White House direc- backed Arab armies to retain her sovereignty, tives" (p. 1222). So wrote a member of the although in so doing she gained additional ter- State Department Policy Planning Staff, Gor- ritory. Fortunately for the United States, she don P. Merriam, in July 1948. In a much- was - from the outset - not only the "sole awaited volume of the Foreign Relations series, democracy" in the Middle East but a militantly the truth of Merriam's observation is driven anti-Communist nation, a country that served home. as a bulwark against Soviet penetration of the According to the conventional wisdom, the Middle East. Palestinian refugees were en- United Nations in effect established the state of couraged by their own leadership to leave; in Israel, doing so when the General Assembly fact they ignored Jewish pleas that they remain voted for the partition of Palestine in in the land of their birth. At no time did Arabs November of 1947. President Truman ardently attempt to establish a state on the area allocated and consistently believed in a Zionist state, and them by partition. Although Israel continually hence was taken aback when Warren R. Austin, sought negotiation, the Arab nations would not American Ambassador to the Security Council, even agree to recognize her existence, much less in March 1948 announced that the United discuss peace. States was abandoning partition and suppor- The real story, of course, is a far more com- ting a UN trusteeship. As Margaret Truman plex one, and the new Foreign Relations writes in her memoirs (Harry S. Truman, 1973), volume sheds indispensable light on this com- the President never formally committed himself plexity. The volume itself begins in January to this plan. Even before the British mandate 1948, in the wake of the partition resolution. ended, Arabs launched massive assaults against On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly Jewish settlements, never once seeking com- had passed Resolution 181, which had recom- promise with the Jewish Agency. Although mended (a) the partition of Palestine into Arab some Palestinian Jews took the offensive, these and Jewish states (b) an economic union be- were terrorists of the Irgun and Stern Gang, not tween the two new states administered by a the recognized Zionist forces known as the joint economic board and (c) an independent Haganah. Jerusalem under UN trusteeship. A UN com- The scenario continues. When Truman mission was to supervise Palestine's. transition recognized the state of Israel in May 1948, do- from British mandate to two Independent nay ing so as soon as David Ben-Gurion announced tions. its formation, he did not do so for political On January 20, 1948, the State Department's reasons but for humanitarian ones. In fact, he Policy Planning Staff, directed by George F. had already written off New York State, where Kennan, found partition unworkable. As its many Jews vote, in the forthcoming presiden- memo noted, increasingly influential Irgun and 344 JUSTUS D . DOENECKE Stern elements within the Zionist movement Other State Department officials were also were committed to far greater boundaries; the skeptical of partition. For example, on January Arabs of Palestine and the Arab states 26, Dean Rusk, chief of the State Department's vehemently opposed partition, much less the UN division, found "serious doubt that there is proposed economic union (although on legal authority for the United Nations to im- November 29, the latter expressed their will- pose a recommendation of the General ingness to accept the principle of a federal state Assembly by force upon the Arab inhabitants in Palestine)."' Given Moslem proclamations of the proposed Jewish state" (p. 558). And of a jihad against the Jews and the irregular early in February, George Wadsworth, military units being organized in Arab states to American Ambassador to Iraq, told Truman fight in Palestine, war was inevitable. The UN that Arab leaders were convinced that partition made no provision for enforcing partition, so betrayed America's own principles of "self- Soviet troops could intervene, causing the determination and majority rule". Over forty United States in turn to do likewise. America per cent of the new Jewish state, he said, would could well be outflanked in the Eastern be Arabs "whose ancestors had owned the land Mediterranean. for many centuries" (p. 597). The consequences of partition, the document State Department anxieties could only be continued, were ominous. The "more moderate confirmed by the report of Robert B. Macatee, and intellectual" Arab leaders might be replac- US Consul General at Jerusalem, dated ed by irresponsible elements; hatred of Zionism February 9. "The Government of Palestine", might extend to include all Westerners; Russia he claimed, "is admittedly in a state of might use the partition precedent to set up pup- disintegration". Vital government services were pet regimes in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and long interrupted, with both Jewish and Arab Macedonia; and Jews could be openly harassed communities refusing to compromise (p. 606). in Moslem countries. Arab regimes could Troops from Iraq and Syria carried out attacks cancel British and American air bases, cease on Jewish settlements, while Jewish armed pipeline construction (and on February 21 the groups took the offensive in Jaffa, Jerusalem, Arab League tentatively agreed to deny and Tireh. "Such activities are designed, accor- American firms pipeline rights until the US ding to the Jews, to force the Arabs into a altered its Palestine policy),[" drastically curb passive state", so reported Macatee. The American trade, and close down United States British, he continued, "cannot get out of schools and missions (pp. 546-554). Palestine too soon" (pp. 609-612). While finding "all of us" to blame for the Soon the State Department sought a UN Palestine imbroglio, Kennan claimed on trusteeship, said trusteeship substituting for January 29 that "the main responsibility will partition and replacing the British mandate un- have to rest with the Jewish leaders and til Jews and Arabs could work out a modus organizations who have pushed so persistently vivendi. If the Policy Planning Staff still hoped for the pursuit of objectives which could scarce- for Arab acquiescence in partition (p. 6211, it ly fail to lead to violent results" (p. 580). On still suggested on February 14 that the United February 24, the diplomat denied that the con- States simply give lip service to the partition flict had "direct relation to our national securi- resolution; it should not press the Security ty", found "past commitments" of "dubious Council for its implementation (p. 629). The wisdom", warned against "domestic National Security Council, in a draft report pressures", and called for "a fairly radical dated February 17, opposed the sending of reversal of the trend of our present policy". American troops to Palestine; partition, so the Otherwise, he argued, the United States alone NSC claimed, should not be enforced "against would be immediately responsible for protec- the objections of the inhabitants of Palestine" ting the Jewish population against the Arabs or (p. 632). The Central Intelligence Agency also wit~.essinga Russian presence in the area (p. denied that partition could be implemented (pp. 657). 666 -675). On February 21, the State Depart- PRINCIPLE AND EXPEDIENCY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PALESTINE, 1948 345 ment claimed that the UN Charter did not em- If the Arab states did not accept partition, he power the Security Council to enforce partition continued, they should be branded aggressors. (p. 639), and Austin spoke to this effect before Oil diplomacy, said Clifford, would not be a the Security Council (p. 653). factor. "The fact of the matter is that the Arab On March 5, George C. Marshall told Austin states must have oil royalties or go broke", he to seek a trusteeship in the UN, one lasting until wrote, claiming that they could only get the "the people of Palestine are ready for self- dollars they needed from the United States. For government". Although the United States, said example, he maintained, ninety per cent of the Secretary of State, should not "go on Saudi revenues derived from American oil record as voting against partition", it should royalties. Arab states would automatically request "the Secretary-General to convoke im- spurn Soviet overtures, he went on, acting in mediately a special session of the General the realization that Russian influence Assembly to consider the Palestine question automatically threatened "their social and further" (p. 681). Marshall hoped to embarrass economic structure". On the other hand, col- the Soviets, strong supporters of partition, lapse of UN authority in Jewish Palestine might declaring that they should be made to show result in unilateral Russian intervention. Hence how partition could be carried out peacefully the United States should abandon "the when Jews, Arabs and Great Britain were all ridiculous role of trembling before threats of a taking irreconcilable positions (p. 702). The few nomadic desert tribes". AIL such advice, he Soviet representative to the UN, Andrei added, was "completely uninfluenced" by the Gromyko, professed ignorance on the topic, forthcoming presidential elections (pp. but still did not want the plan modified (p. 690 -696). 734). Further protests came from Moshe Shertok Within the White House, however, opposi- (later Sharett), head of the Political Depart- tion to a trusteeship was already developing.