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Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 22 July 2017

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Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 22 July 2017 Weekly Iraq .Xplored report 22 July 2017 Prepared by Risk Analysis Team, Iraq garda.com/ips Confidential and proprietary © GardaWorld Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 22 July 2017 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................................... 2 ACTIVITY MAP .................................................................................................................................................... 3 OUTLOOK ............................................................................................................................................................. 4 Short term outlook ............................................................................................................................................. 4 Medium to long term outlook ............................................................................................................................ 4 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ...................................................................................................................................... 5 ISF to launch offensive soon to retake Tal Afar .............................................................................................. 5 THREAT MATRIX ................................................................................................................................................ 5 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ............................................................................................................................... 5 Security ............................................................................................................................................................... 5 Political ................................................................................................................................................................ 6 Foreign Affairs .................................................................................................................................................... 7 Economy ............................................................................................................................................................. 7 WEEKLY OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT .................................................................................................... 9 Countrywide Military/Security Situation .......................................................................................................... 9 ACRONYM LIST ................................................................................................................................................ 15 GARDAWORLD INFORMATION SERVICES .............................................................................................. 16 GARDAWORLD.................................................................................................................................................. 16 This report is an abridged version of GardaWorld Weekly Iraq .Xplored July 22, 2017. To subscribe to the full versions of the daily/weekly Iraq .Xplored reports, or for enquires relating to other GardaWorld services, please contact [email protected] Disclaimer: The information and opinions expressed in this Report are the views of GardaWorld and constitute a judgment as at the date of the Report and are subject to change without notice. The information and opinions expressed in this Report have been formed in good faith on the basis of the best information and intelligence available at the time of writing, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to its accuracy, completeness or correctness. GardaWorld accepts no liability arising out of or in connection with the comments made or the information set out in this Report and the reader is advised that any decision taken to act or not to act in reliance on this Report is taken solely at the reader’s own risk. In particular, the comments in this Report should not be construed as advice, legal or otherwise. Confidential and proprietary © GardaWorld [2] garda.com/ips Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 22 July 2017 ACTIVITY MAP Confidential and proprietary © GardaWorld [3] garda.com/ips Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 22 July 2017 OUTLOOK Short term outlook . With victory in Mosul announced across Iraqi media, there is an elevated likelihood of coordinated reprisal attacks into population centres across the north, west and centre of Iraq, though these will likely be constrained by resources and the security footprint, particularly in Baghdad. IS may also attempt to increase their attack tempo in eastern Anbar, with the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah likely to be key targets for high- profile attacks. Two SVBIED attacks in Basra province on May 19, and SVIED attacks in Karbala and Babel on June 9 exhibit IS retains intent and capability for attacks in the southern provinces. The region remains assessed as non- permissive for IS to significantly escalate operations due to demographics, with the few Sunni militant sympathizers in the region remaining isolated. The security footprint and other local factors in the central and southern regions, particularly in Baghdad, will severely constrain IS ability to mount sustained complex attacks of the type reported in the north and the west of the country. The threat from low-level IED and SAF attacks remains. There may be an increased level of ISF deliberate actions to disrupt and deter insurgent and criminal activity during the Mosul operation, especially in the northern areas of Baghdad province. Medium to long term outlook . In the absence of concerted engagement with the Sunni population in areas currently under IS control, it is possible that the post-IS security environment will be characterized by sectarian flash points between radical Sunni tribes and Shia militia groups especially in Nineveh province and western Kirkuk. Limited reporting has already indicated displaced Sunni families being advised or directed to leave Kirkuk. It is almost certain that in areas retaken by ISF, an insurgency will be established by Sunni insurgents including remaining IS affiliates. Low-level incidents related to criminality, personal disputes and tribal tensions are likely to continue in Basra and the southern provinces in general. This is assessed to be facilitated by large segments of the security forces currently being involved in operations to retake IS-held areas of the country. In the long-term, there will be tensions driven by the return of Shia militia factions, who will expect material and social rewards for the contribution in the national campaign against IS. While the Mosul operation has refocused attention away from Abadi’s reform program, the risk of politically motivated demonstrations against corruption in front of government institutions remains extant. Confidential and proprietary © GardaWorld [4] garda.com/ips Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 22 July 2017 SIGNIFICANT EVENTS ISF to launch offensive soon to retake Tal Afar Top Iraqi military commander, Lt-Gen Abdul Amir Yarallah stated on July 15 that Iraqi forces will soon launch a new offensive to recapture Tal Afar from IS. Yarallah stated that the fourth stage of the 'We Are Coming, Nineveh' operations will be launched soon to liberate Tal Afar city and the other districts in Nineveh province still under IS control (see Security section). THREAT MATRIX Region Political Terrorism Militancy Crime K&R KRG* Moderate Low Low Low Low North** Moderate High-Extreme High High High Baghdad Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Anbar Moderate High High High High South*** Moderate Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Threat Scale Minimal Low Moderate High Extreme * KRG – Dohuk, Erbil & Sulaymaniyah ** North – Nineveh, Salah ad-Din & Diyala *** South – Babil, Wasit, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Maysan & Basra LATEST DEVELOPMENTS Security ISF to launch offensive soon to retake Tal Afar Top Iraqi military commander, Lt-Gen Abdul Amir Yarallah stated on July 15 that Iraqi forces will soon launch a new offensive to recapture Tal Afar from IS. Yarallah stated that the fourth stage of the 'We Are Coming, Nineveh' operations will be launched soon to liberate Tal Afar city and the other districts in Nineveh province still under IS control. While Yarallah did not mention a timeframe for the commencement of operations against Tal Afar, a number of analysts and commentators have said that it will likely take several weeks for Iraqi forces to realign and refit prior to operations against Tal Afar. Further speculation over the fate of al-Baghdadi In a further twist over the fate of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a senior Iraqi intelligence officer said in a statement on July 16 that al-Baghdadi was still alive and hiding in Syria in an area outside the northern Syrian province of al-Raqqah. The statement was attributed to Abu Ali al-Basri, the head of the intelligence and anti- terrorism department at the Iraqi Interior Ministry. On July 21, the US Secretary of Defence Jim Mattis also said that he believed that al-Baghdadi, was still and that he would only believe otherwise when ‘we know for sure we have killed him.’ Confidential and proprietary © GardaWorld [5] garda.com/ips Weekly Iraq .Xplored Report 22 July 2017 IS highlights its ‘operations’ south of Mosul IS has published an infographic on its operation targeting Imam Gharbi village 70km south of Mosul, saying it was in its twelfth day. The group
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