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Thailand 2011 THE ELECTION IN THAILAND 2011 Thawilwadee Bureekul PhD. King Prajadhipok’s Institute Prepared for: Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES) Plenary Session October 9-11, 2014 At WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany 2011 Thailand Election System • Each representing roughly Constituency 170,000 people. 375 • Each constituency elects System MPs one MP to parliament. 500 • Each party fields up to 125 candidates for the same number of seats. 125 Party-list • Voters get to choose only one party for the party-list system. MPs • Each party ranks candidates System based on their reputation and experience Appropriation of constituency seats per province http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thai_general_election,_2011 Represented Number of Political Parties, 2011 Represented Represented Party's name Parties name number number 1 Pheu Thai Party* 21 Chartthaipattana Party* 2 Chart Pattana Puea Pandin Party* 22 Liberal Party 3 New Democracy Party 23 Chart Samuccee Party 4 Thai Citizen Party 24 Bamrungmueang Party 5 Rak Thailand Party 25 Kasikornthai Party 6 Phalang Chon Party 26 Matubhum Party 7 Prachatham Party 27 Better Life Party 8 Dumrongthai Party 28 Palung Sungkom Thai Party 9 Mass Power Party 29 Thai Party for Thai People 10 Democrat Party* 30 Mahachon Party 11 Thai Por-Pieng Party 31 Prachachon Chow Thai Party 12 Rak Santi Party 32 Rakpandin Party 13 Thaipensuk Party 33 Civil Peace Party 14 Social Action Party* 34 New Aspiration Party* 15 Thai Pen Thai Party 35 Asamatupoom Party 16 Bhumjaithai Party* 36 Sport Party of Thailand 17 Thaen Khun Phaendin Party 37 Parung Chownathai Party 18 For Heaven and Earth Party 38 Thai Sangsun Party 19 The Farmer Network of Thailand Party 39 Puen Kaset Thai Party 20 New Politics Party 40 Maharatpattana Party * Sent 125 candidates for all party-list seats Election Process Voter Polling station Polling station Security Party Agents / registration Administration Committee officer representatives Check the list Announce the • Queue Provide at Any party at least 20 locations at controller least 1 security fielding days least 20 das • Voter list officer for candidates officer every polling may observe • Ballot station voting and officer counting in • Voting each polling booth controller • Ballot box controller (The Asia Foundation, 2007) Election Process Prior to Chairman + committee + security officer election day pick up the ballot boxes, ballots, printed ( 1 day) form, other supplies 7 AM : set up the polling station, open the sealed packets, count the Before the ballots papers and post that total number of ballots in the conspicuous place polling begins 8 AM : Open the ballot boxes and show that they are empty and seal them. Then two voters will be asked to sign the entry as witnesses. Polling Authorized persons can enter the station. The identification process for voters and cast the process ballots. Closing the 3 PM : close the station, seal the slot on the box polling station and count the remaining unused ballots Show the ballot and read out the candidates or parties selected, then The counting record on the counting form. The result will be announced. After that process deliver the ballots boxes to the constituency election commission office. (The Asia Foundation, 2007) Abroad voting & Early voting 1 week before the election June 26, 2011 * 30 days for vote registration 2011 Election Process at the poll station 1. Voters check their names before entering the polling station 2. Showing their ID card to the polling station committee (PSC) 3. The voters sign or fingerprint the entry on the counterfoil of each ballot. 4. Voters receive two ballots 5. Voters mark their ballots by making a cross (x) 6. Put the ballots in the ballots box. 7. Finish the election and leave the station. http://www2.ect.go.th/about.php?Province=kamphaengphet&SiteMenuID=635 Percent Turnout in Thailand, 1933 – 2011 Percent Turnout in Thailand 3 July 2011 Party-list system Constituency system Voters 46,921,682 46,921,777 Voter turnout 5,203,107 75.03% 35,119,885 74.85% Invalid ballots 1,726,051 4.9% 2,039,694 5.79% No-votes 958,052 2.72% 1,419,088 4.03% Number of Votes and seats 3 July 2011 Political party Party-list (number of Party-list Constituency Total number of House votes) (number of House seats) (number of House seats) seats Pheu Thai 15,744,190 61 204 265 49.0% 54.0% 53.0% Democrat Party 11,433,762 44 115 159 35.2% 30.7% 31.8% Bhumjaithai 1,281,577 5 29 34 4.0% 7.7% 6.8% Chat Thai Pattana 906,656 4 15 19 3.2% 4.0% 3.8% Chat Pattana Pheu Pendin 494,894 2 5 7 1.6% 1.3% 1.4% Palang Chon 178,110 1 6 7 0.8% 1.6% 1.4% Rak Prathet Thai 998,603 4 - 4 3.2% 0.8% Mathubhum 251,702 1 1 2 0.8% 0.3% 0.4% Rak Santhi 284,772 1 - 1 0.8% 0.2% Mahachon 133,772 1 - 1 0.8% 0.2% New Democracy 125,784 1 - 1 0.8% 0.2% Total 125 375 500 The result of election, 2011 Source: The Nation, 4 July 2011 Source: Electoral Geography.com Pictures on Election July 3, 2011 The election campaign from Election Commission of Thailand The Campaign Advertisements Democrat Party The Campaign Advertisements Pheu Thai Party The Campaign Advertisements Chart Thai Pattana Pheu Phandin Party The Campaign Advertisements Love Thailand Party The Campaign Advertisements The Campaign Advertisements Election Speech Election Speech Election Speech Early voting on June 26, 2011 Polling Station July3, 2011 Preparing of staff before opening time (8AM) The polling station Board of Voter list, Candidates and the example of Ballot Checking voter name Queue to vote Sign and receive the ballots Cast a ballot Count Votes Count Votes The result of vote counting Bring the ballot box to the center King Prajadhipok’s Institute Survey on the Election July 3, 2014 Data Collection Period Data Period Sample Size The study on Thais view the general election on July 3, 15 July – August 1,500 2011 : survey after the 2011 election occurred Probability sampling Face to face interviews the eligible voters (18 years old and up). Receiving Election Information Source of Information Percent Newspaper/Magazine 2.5 Television 58.4 Political Activities such as political signs 28.2 Election campaigner 0.5 Normal Radio 1.1 Community Radio 0.5 Election Committee 0.1 Community Leaders 2.8 Local Government Officials 0.7 Internet 0.1 Others 0.4 Received no information 2.9 Total 100.0 Comparing percent of turnout 2007 and 2011 Average interests in the July 3rd 2011 election by region Percentage of people able to specify names of candidates and political parties by region Matching Names of Candidates and Parties Percentage of people who were planning to vote for Members of The House of Representatives Political Party names BKK North Northeast Central South Total Democrat Party 25.18 25.44 9.29 21.32 84.13 27.3 Pheu Thai 42.96 32.26 68.38 32.91 4.32 42.01 For the Development of 1.07 2.17 0.49 1.03 Nation Thai Development 2.51 0.2 5.64 1.44 2 Proud Thai 2.51 3.16 1.59 Others 31.86 36.21 16.8 40.13 9.62 26.07 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 The satisfaction on the election, July 3, 2011 King Prajadhipok's Institute The Government Complex Commemorating, Building B. 120 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Road, Thung Song Hong, Laksi District, Bangkok Thailand www.kpi.ac.th .
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