Nitobe, Shidehara, Shirasu and the Hollowing out of the Japanese Peace Constitution

East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 DOI 10.1007/s12140-009-9093-0

Realpolitik Versus Principled Politics: Nitobe, Shidehara, Shirasu and the Hollowing out of the Japanese Peace Constitution

Patrick Hein

Received: 28 June 2009 /Accepted: 30 September 2009 / Published online: 21 October 2009 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract It is argued that the current debate surrounding the revision of article 9 of the Japanese peace constitution has shifted from a debate on non-violent ideals and principles rooted in the pacifism of Shidehara, spiritual father of article 9, to a more pragmatic logic of military action and Realpolitik which lacks intellectual depth, foresight and historical awareness. The article questions the inherent logic that tries to give a purpose to the military and gain international reputation by reinterpreting article 9 indiscriminately. Since 2004, the overseas dispatch of SDF forces into the Iraq combat zone has split the nation more than ever and a national consensus on what article 9 should stand for is further threatened by Government attempts to extend the application of article 9 to military activities outside Japan under the banner of collective defense. Ahead of the 2009 general election for the Lower House opposition and ruling parties have apparently agreed that time has come to review the text of article 9 for the first time after the war based on the premises of Realpolitik. Article 9 in its current wording still represents a very cherished core principle to the nation as a whole despite the military buildup and despite the tacit acceptance of the SDF and of the right to limited self-defense. The current popular mood against collective self-defense, against the overseas deployment of SDF, against the unequitable US-Japan Security Treaty and against nuclear weapons- termed “negative pacifism”- differs from the voluntarist security policies in the election platforms of the LDP and DPJ. Ordinary citizens in and outside Japan have challenged the political elite by teaming up to preach the peaceful spirit of article 9 to the world. It is asserted that the intended revision of article 9 has caused lasting changes in civic political grass-root culture.

Keywords Article 9 . Japan . Pacifist principles . Realpolitik . Revision

P. Hein (*) Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected] 286 East Asia (2009) 26:285–304

Introduction

Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan has stirred controversy since the constitution went into effect in 1947. The provision can be interpreted as prohibiting Japan from using armed force even in self-defense, but over time Japan has developed a military force that has expanded in both strength and reach. This expansion has sparked intense debate about whether or not Japan is in violation of article 9. Studies of the nature of article 9 from the theoretical perspective of principled politics are less common than they ought to be, and there is still much to be learned about the dynamics that have led to the factual reinterpretation of article 9 over the last 50 years. It will be recaptured how much the political reality that has led to the factual revision of article 9 contrasts with the original principle and the constitutional ideal. To substantiate the idea that article 9 has been gradually revised to serve the end of political pragmatism, the study begins by analyzing the theoretical nature of principles meant to ideally underscore political action and retraces then recent developments towards revision and resistance against it. There have been serious attempts to revise article 9 formally, but no amendments have been made so far. For some time however the two largest political parties, the LDP and the DPJ have been intensifying their discussions on constitutional reform including article 9. Amendments will be submitted to the Diet by earliest in 2010 and, assuming consensus is reached, put to a national referendum. A summary conclusion will seek to assess how the intended changes might likely affect public opinion and how article 9 could help to enhance Japan’s overall image in the world.

Theoretical Considerations

Standard dictionaries define the word principle as a yardstick or standard especially of good, ethical behavior. A person of principle is commonly thought to be the one who remains faithful to his moral ideals whatever the changing circumstances and avoids expediency and compromise. Wellknown universal common political principles are justice, peace, equality, hope, dignity, sustainability and human rights. No one knows what it concretely means. Therefore principles are also called ideals and this encompasses that they will never be actually achievable otherwise they would not be ideals. The three basic principles of the Japanese constitution are popular sovereignty, the guarantee of fundamental human rights and pacifism as expressed in article 9. Not everything that looks like a principle is one: for example the current Japanese legislative educational aim of ‘love of the country’, is not a principle in a strict sense. By being an end in itself it is concrete and specific instead of being an unchievable, unattainable ideal; furthermore it serves the end of action or expediency, and does not comply with the political requirement of democratic plurality [1]. Other negative examples of misleading, constraining non-principles are ‘classless society’ (Marxism), ‘race purity’(Nazi ideology) or the concept of the pre- war Japanese ‘divine emperorship’, which put all the sovereignty in the hands of a theocratic ruler acting as commander in chief of the army and head priest of the nationalist state Shinto religion. According to Arendt any requirement of unity- which is the opposite to plurality-with regard to principles proves impossible except under the condition of tyranny or dictatorship. East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 287

Decline of Principles

The ongoing debate on the meaning of the constitutional principle of war renunciation and peace brings out the real motivations of those on all sides of the debate. When Jiro Shirasu, a former top aid to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, wrote his best selling book “Japan, a nation without principles” [16], he could not find a good enough English translation for the term ‘principle’ and just stuck to the katakana transcription reserved to foreign words and the book title read as ‘Purinshipuru no nai Nippon’. In it Shirasu critizes politicians in Japan for not being principled anymore. According to him Japanese politicians have been failing to explain to voters and the public what motivates their actions and decisions. The absence of principles in politics has been causing misunderstandings and frustrations when negotiating bilateral treaties or formulating national policies. Using article 9 as one example in his book he maintains that article 9 may be considered to be the “masterpiece” (Japanese original “akkan” ,[16], p. 226) of the new constitution, regardless – and this is the crucial point- whoever proposed it former Prime Minister Shidehara or General MacArthur. The principle he maintains is good in itself and that is what matters. The stance taken by the LDP after the war that the whole constitution was imposed on Japan against its will and therefore article 9 must be revised is according to Shirasu unprincipled because it is insincere to suggest something is bad simply because it was presumably imposed. He calls it arrogant not to rely on principles in politics and hide one’s true intentions. Shirasu was later made head of the government’s trade ministry and then played a key role in establishing the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and thus helped set the course for Japan’s postwar economic development. Shirasu has been recently lauded for his defiance to the Allies and MacArthur in particular in the Japanese media. His adherence to the peace principle of article 9 seems to have reportedly weakened when the rearmament issue caused a domestic debate within Japan. According to meeting records taken by Robert A. Fearey, an East Asian affairs specialist, who helped John Foster Dulles, then a special representative of President Harry S. Truman, to negotiate the Japanese Peace Treaty in the early 1950s, Shirasu is quoted to have agreed to an amendment of article 9: “Article 9 should and can without great difficulty be amended at an early date to permit rearmament” ([10], p. 204/205). In retrospect it may be questioned if he as a representative of the elite really shared the political intentions of the Allies at that time: that article 9 had to reflect nolens volens the will of the people if it were to survive not only in legal terms but also continue to exist as legitimate principle in the eyes of the entire Japanese nation.

Shidehara’s Influence

A more influential though less well known and popular politician embodying principled politics has been former prime minister Kijuro Shidehara, a radical pacifist who is considered to be the spiritual father of article 9 of the after war constitution of Japan. He strongly believed that the aim of political action was to inculcate in the hearts of the citizens a hatred of war and a love for peace which would make it impossible for Japan ever again to embark upon a course of armed 288 East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 aggression against Asia or other nations. Mac Arthur had threatened to submit the Allied draft directly to the Japanese people if the Diet would have refused to accept it. This shows how much the US had tapped into the popular mood of the nation as Whitney remembers: “I had every reason to believe that my gamble would pay off, that the Japanese committee members would not dare to let our statement of principles appear before the public as a draft that they opposed.” ([17], p 250) Despite the controversy that has been spurred about the origin of article 9 it seems safe to say that it was Shidehara himself who proposed the article to MacArthur in their bilateral meeting on 24 January 1946. Looking back it does not really matter if the acceptance not to maintain armed forces had been a trade off to save the then Emperor Hirohito from a pending war crime tribunal or not. What matters is that Shidehara followed nothing but his conscience when he proposed article 9 and according to Schlichtmann, Shidehara acknowledged himself that he had acted under no compulsion from anybody and that it was his earnest desire to “somehow use my office to carry out the will of the people” [14]. This last point is of critical importance as it reflects Shidehara’s thinking that sovereignty expressed through article 9 rests with the people and not with the Emperor or its representatives. Tokyo university professor Horio Teruhisa has been quoted as supporting the view held that Shidehara is the author of article 9: There’s a popular view that Article 9 was imposed on Japan by the U.S. occupation. There was a private conference between MacArthur and then Prime Minister Shidehara, on January 24th 1946, from which no written records remain. There’s no question now that this was the occasion in which the idea for what became Article 9 was floated, but people have debated whether it was brought up by Shidehara or MacArthur. It’s Horio’s view that the idea came from Shidehara, the Japanese Prime Minister. This is backed up by testimony MacArthur later gave in the Senate and later, in the report by the head of the Commission on the Constitution, a group established in Japan to gather documents in order to get the ball rolling for constitutional revision. Takayanagi Kenzo, the Commission head, wrote, "I initially believed that it was MacArthur who proposed the idea for Article 9 first. But having investigated carefully all the materials that I can gather, I have come to the conclusion that it was Shidehara who proposed the idea for Article 9. Horio tried very hard to substantiate this interpretation, but the question arises, why would Shidehara propose such a move? Shidehara wanted to find some way to preserve the emperor system, and disavowing the maintenance of armed forces went hand-in-hand with that desire. Those two principles were tied together in Shidehara’s thinking. (...). (Source: http://celebratingprotest.org/content/view/12/1/1/5/) As Schlichtmann has remarked Shidehara was well aware that the potential enormous destructive threat posed by nuclear weapons made it impossible for conventional armies alone to ensure national security in the future and therefore he pledged for their abolition. In a nuclear arms race a conventional army would simply loose its raison d’etre. Shidehara also demonstrated economical commonsense when he proposed to abolish the military in Japan. According to records by Whitney, former aid to MacArthur, Shidehara pursued economic aims by reducing the burden of military expenditures and revitalizing the economy instead (cited by [14]). East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 289

Schlichtmann gives additional tribute to the international legacy of Shidehara’s pacifism by mentioning that “Article 9 was, in Shidehara’s view, to become a cornerstone of the United Nations system of collective security that would enable all nations to disarm” [14]. Article 9 is viewed as a forerunner to modern concepts of human or collective security [15]. By employing systems of human or collective security, the UN has engaged in dissuading states from acting in a manner likely to threaten peace, thereby avoiding any conflict. The suggestion put forward by Schlichtmann that a transference of national sovereignity to international bodies such as the UN, EU leads automatically to enhanced security and peace must however be cautioned. There is not enough empirical evidence that would support this view. It seems on the contrary that in reality conventional national military operations have survived in modern times but under a different form by being classified as peacekeeping operations or humanitarian interventions with the financial, logistical and military backing of the UN or the EU. One of the very few historical examples of peaceful international dispute settlement is the Aland conflict resolved under the leadership of Japanese diplomat Inazo Nitobe [8]. Nevertheless it has been Shidehara’s great merit to have taken the international lead in convincing other nations that it would be in the mutual interest of collective security to abolish military forces and weapons worldwide. The visionary leadership of Shidehara transgressed national borders and gave in fact inspiration to other foreign nations as well. The ongoing relentless efforts by Japan to secure a permanent seat in the UN Security Council contrast sharply with what Shidehara had in mind. Public opinion in Japan is hostile to one of the main obligations of permanent membership in the Security Council, namely a military contribution to United Nations Peace-keeping Operations (PKO). Many, if not most, Japanese hold that Japan’s constitution (Article 9) prohibits such activities. In a Diet resolution from 1954 any kind of dispatch of the SDF abroad has been prohibited. In 2004 former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made waves when he was quoted in an interview to Japanese journalists that the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution would have to be examined if Japan wants to participate fully in the UN Security Council.

Stepwise Hollowing Out

Regardless of Shidehara’s strong personal convictions it seems rather astonishing that a military commander of the sort of MacArthur whose job it had always been to fight wars approved Shidehara’s pacifist principle of military disengagement and Shidehara seems to have been surprised as well by his attitude as Schlichtmann mentions [14]. MacArthur did not follow the footsteps of Shidehara in one critical point though. According to Finn MacArthur had made it clear in an initial note that Japan should not resort to war “even for preserving its own security” ([7], p.96). The explicit prohibition of self-defense was however dropped, a crucial change as it turned out later. Based on recent research it seems that MacArthur’s switch from pacifism to granting the right to self defense was induced by internal political developments in the US. Clifford [4] has suggested “that a major reason for MacArthur’s changes in opinion in regards to the military situation in Japan was his interest in positioning himself as a strong Cold War figure for the 1952 (US 290 East Asia (2009) 26:285–304

Presidential, PH) election”. Acccording to Clifford it was Dulles who persuaded MacArthur in 1950 to change his stance and instruct Japan to rearm. Ironically the Communists, currently staunch supporters of article 9, had joined the chorus of opposition to the new constitution in the parliamentary debate back in 1946 by arguing that war for self defense was justifiable. Even though then Prime Minister Yoshida refuted their argument by telling them that nations often used the defense argument as an excuse to justify wars of any sort, the so called Ashida/ Kanamori amendment by the Diet was approved by the US authorities. As Finn [7] comments “When Ashida proposed it (the amendment, PH) to Kades, he approved it although he realized it meant Japan could use its forces for self-defense and for purposes other than settling international disputes” ([7], p 116). As a matter of fact the amendment was an act of Realpolitik that set a precedent for displacing the radically pacifist principles of Shidehara. The change of prime minister to Shigeru Yoshida and death of Shidehara in 1951 preceeded by the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 brought new dramatic circumstances that completely set new challenges to the US-Japan military cooperation according to John Dower, the author of ‘Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II’ who captured the US policy changes and the dilemma Japan has been facing accurately in an interview transcript: In 1950, the Korean War broke out, and the Americans have been after the Japanese ever since. They were actually pushing them before the Korean War, ‘Change that Constitution. You have to have a military’. And the pressure from the US for Japan to take part in these things has been enormous ever since then. It was incredible. The time of the Korean War, John Foster Dulles and the Americans came in and said to the Japanese, ‘You got to have a military. We want you to have a military of 300,000, 350,000 men’. The rest of the world is looking on, said, ‘You want to rebuild their military now, five years later, after that horrid war?’ And it split the Japanese people. The conservatives said, ‘Well, we can’t quite do it, but we’ll work toward it’. And other people said, ‘This is outrageous. We cherish those ideals because, you know, it reflected what we felt’. So what you have in Japan today is a real complex situation in which Americans are pushing on Japan saying, ‘Rearm. We want you to, you know, take more active role in peacekeeping’(...). (Source: http://www.booknotes.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1558)

The Legacy of Shidehara

Article 9 of the constitution renounces war as a means of settling international disputes and prohibits the maintenance of armed forces and other war potential. It is not just a provision of national law; it also acts as an international peace mechanism towards reductions in military spending, promotion of nuclear weapon free zones, ending violence against women, supporting conflict prevention, and mitigating the negative environmental impact of the military [2]. With its Preamble and Article 9, the Japanese constitution proclaims pacifism as one of the nation’s fundamental principles. Article 9 not only renounces war and the East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 291 threat or use of force as a sovereign right for itself; it also demands that all wars be made illegal and armed forces be abolished. Japan’s constitution provides the right to live in peace – a basic human right not only for the Japanese people, but also for the people of the whole world. The preamble reads as follows: “We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.” The full text of article 9 reads as follows: Paragraph 1: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. Paragraph 2: In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. Article 9 has acted as a restraint on the militarization of Japan, which has maintained what it calls an “exclusively defense-oriented policy” and limited Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) capability to the “minimum necessary level.” In addition, Article 9 prohibits dispatching SDF to foreign territories to engage or participate in military combat overseas. Japan has also interpreted Article 9 as prohibiting the country from exporting arms, thus preventing the resurgence of Japan’s pre-war military industry complex. Furthermore, Article 9 prevents development of an arms race and nuclear proliferation in East Asia. Article 9 was born out of the direct experience of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. The devastation and immense suffering that followed these attacks led Japan to commit to the three non-nuclear principles which prohibit the country from possessing, producing, or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into its territory. The spirit of Article 9 rejects dependence on nuclear weapons in security policies and promotes nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide–an idea long advocated by the victims of the atomic bombings. It also demands that nuclear weapons be outlawed. The three non-nuclear principles had been formally adopted in a parliamentary resolution in 1967 stating that Japan shall neither possess, nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their presence on Japanese territory. Governments have continuously stuck to the nuclear weapons taboo even though port calls by U.S. vessels believed to carry nuclear weapons have sparked controversy. Former SDF air force chief Toshio Tamogami, who was sacked in 2008 for a newspaper article claiming that it was China who had coerced Japan into the war, has been publicly advocating the nuclear rearmament of Japan. The LDP right wing politician Shingo Nishimura was forced to resign in 1999 as a deputy defense minister after calling for a nuclear debate. Article 9 prohibits the threat or use of force as a way of settling international disputes. As such, Japan cannot pose a threat to the security of other countries. This principle has played an important role in establishing trust relationships between Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, and has contributed to keeping the peace for more than 60 years. Article 9 is of paramount importance for the prevention of conflict. In 292 East Asia (2009) 26:285–304

July 2005, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict’s Action Agenda declared that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has been the foundation for collective security for the entire Asia Pacific region. The move towards revision of Article 9 has partly come from the U.S. demand for Japan’s full-fledged military support and participation in its war on international terror. Washington has consistently used the Asian-Pacific region as a hub for launching attacks against Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, the U.S. needs logistical support from its bases in the region to dispatch and sustain any deployment in the Middle East. The United Nations has been calling for a decrease in military spending, and reallocation of limited resources to solve global problems such as poverty, hunger, epidemics, disasters, and to protect human rights. Japan’s article 9 supplements the UN Charter Article 26’s call for regulating armaments and minimizing the world’s resources used on military expenses, and promotes disarmament for development. In November 2008 the NGO Peaceboat who has been very active in mobilizing the public opinion to save the wording and spirit of article 9 submitted a letter to the UN security council requesting it to revitalize article 26 of the UN Charter stipulating that: In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

The Power of Justice

Despite outside pressures to share more military financial and manpower responsibility, changed security circumstances in the world and the global rise in terrorism and armed conflicts the judiciary has proven to be a very effective and powerful force in outlawing some of the actions of the Government-at least symbolically. The role of the courts in providing a constitutional check and balance on the executive has been enhanced in an unprecedented landmark ruling in April 2008 when the high court in Nagoya ruled that the dispatch of air self-defense forces personnel to Iraq had been unconstitutional. It was not for the first time that a court had touched the constitutionality issue openly in public and in favour of the civilian plaintiffs. In 1959 the Tokyo district court held the Security Treaty unconstitutional. In a 1973 ruling by the Sapporo district court the SDF had been held unconstitutional. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed both decisions. The 2008 ruling acknowledged that “The ASDF airlift activities (to and from Iraq) run counter to Article 9 of the Constitution” and the special law established in 2003 to allow the Self-Defense Forces to provide humanitarian support for Iraqi reconstruction efforts. “The ASDF mission to airlift armed troops from multinational forces to Baghdad plays a part in the use of force by other countries,” thus it can be construed that Japan itself is using force, which is banned by the Constitution says the verdict. In modern warfare, the transport of personnel and supplies constitutes a key part East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 293 of combat, the judge said (Source: Asahi Shimbun, 18 April 2008 English edition, p 23). The verdict is unequivocal in that it ruled the dispatch of 3000 soldiers overseas as an illegal act and contrary to the prohibition of using force as means of settling international disputes.

Official Interpretations by the Government

In January 2007 the newly upgraded Ministry of Defense was launched and in the tradition of the Ashida/Kanamori amendment of 1946 the right to self-defense and to maintaining an army has become a de facto inalienable prerogative justified by changed international circumstances and alleged new geopolitical threats. On its webpage the Ministry of Defense reflects the government’s interpretation of article 9 in detail. It is the most extensive official interpretation of the enhanced meaning given to article 9 in an ever evolving international environment . The most important points are as follows: It is reiterated that the self-defense capability to be possessed and maintained by Japan under the Constitution is “limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense”. It is also reconfirmed that it is “unconstitutional to possess what is referred to as offensive weapons that, from their performance, are to be used exclusively for total destruction of other countries, since it immediately exceeds the minimum level necessary for self-defense. For instance, the SDF is not allowed to possess ICBMs, long-range strategic bombers or offensive aircraft carriers.” The right to engage in self-defense is conditioned by three scenarios: “(i) there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; (ii) there is no appropriate means to repel this aggression other than the use of the right of self-defense; and (iii) the use of armed strength is confined to the minimum level necessary for repelling.” Although the geographical area of operations is not specified overseas missions are excluded: “It is, however, not permissible constitutionally to dispatch armed troops to foreign territorial land, sea and airspace for the purpose of using military power, as a so-called overseas deployment of troops, since it generally exceeds the minimum level necessary for self-defense.” By referring to article 51 of the UN Charter the right to collective defense is reacknowledged with precautions though: “Under international law, there is recognition that a state has the right of collective self-defense, that is, the right to use armed strength to stop armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, although the state is not under direct attack. It is beyond doubt that as a sovereign state, Japan has the right of collective self- defense under international law. It is, however, not permissible to use the right, that is, to stop armed attack on another country with armed strength, although Japan is not under direct attack, since it exceeds the limit of use of armed strength as permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution. (Source: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp01.html)

The Pitfalls of Collective Self-Defense

It should be noted that the ministry text spawns a new international concept of a conventional military force that can be used not only for defense of the nation’ s 294 East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 inside territory but also outside Japan by adding the unspecified geographical scope clause which extends the right to self-defense beyond national borders. The non-use of offensive or destructive weapons is reiterated which includes tacitly also the nuclear weapons arsenal. The right of collective defense measures trespassing pure self-defense purposes goes back to the Defense Guidelines issued in 1997. Under the guidelines, Japan was to provide rear-area support to U.S. forces on the high seas and in international airspace surrounding Japan, in addition to Japanese territory. According to a news report by Kyodo from 4 August 2009 a panel submitted updated recommendations to the government that would allow Japan to take a more offensive approach: “The experts called on the government to revise its current exclusively defense-oriented posture to enable Japanese forces to intercept ballistic missiles targeted at the United States and protect American vessels on the high seas. The recommendations by the nine experts are expected to serve as a basis for the updated National Defense Program Guidelines that will define the country’s basic security policy between fiscal 2010 and 2014. The government is scheduled to adopt the new defense guidelines by the year-end.” Since 2001 the duty to collective self-defense has become a key argument in supporting the war on terror. The once formulated prohibition to resort to war “even for preserving its own security” (Mac Arthur) has been turned to its opposite as collective self-defense means in reality nothing else but the participation in war like combat measures as a means of settling international disputes including the war on terror. Due to the growing international expansion in military cooperation matters the Japanese government has started to rely more and more on the UN charter to justify its right to maintain armaments and engage in military actions allegedly restricted to self or collective defensive purposes. Article 51 of the UN charter stipulates in this respect that Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Craig cautions that even if permissible under international law (article 51 of the UN Charter) the political implications of collective self-defense could be far reaching in terms of military involvement: “It should be clear, therefore, that any amendment of Article 9 to explicitly authorize Japan to exercise a right of collective self-defense, would be to thereby give the government the power to use force anywhere in the world upon its own determination that there had been an armed attack against another state. Given the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan could be called upon to defend the U.S. anywhere in the world.“ The question remains, if collective self-defense is a worthwhile de-escalating approach to tackle international disputes as Craig notes: “There is no duty under international law to engage in collective self-defense, nor is it consistent with the spirit of the renunciation of war and the use of force for purposes of resolving international disputes that is articulated East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 295 in Article 9. Nor is it clear that it would be in the long-term interests of Japan, given the likely response of neighboring countries to such a policy shift.” (Source: http:// search.japantimes.co.jp/print/eo20070830a3.html) According to Hori the hollowing out of article 9 has been made possible without amending its contents. He asserts that “the strategy that the LDP has adopted is, rather than changing the actual Article of the Constitution - to change reality, in other words - to generate interpretations of the Constitution to fit the transformed reality. Hence, the process is called interpretive revision of the Constitution, which has taken place over the last several decades.” (Source: http://celebratingprotest.org/content/view/12/1/1/5/) In 2007 the government of then Prime Minister Abe took another important step towards revising the pacifist constitution by having a bill approved in both houses to hold a referendum on the issue as early as 2010. The newly enacted referendum law puts a freeze until 2010 on any proposal for changing the Constitution being submitted to the Diet, but the LDP was hoping preliminary discussions could start in the Diet panels as soon as possible. Article 96 of the Constitution says any revision must be approved by a two third majority of all the members of both houses of the Diet and then be endorsed by a simple majority of casted votes in a national referendum. Some fear that the latter may lead to a victory to fervent supporters to change and criticized the government for not establishing a minimum turnout in the referendum.

Silent Grass-Root Resistance Increases

Resistance and social protest against the conclusion of the US-Japan security treaty, revision of the fundamental law of education, the legalization of flag and anthem, official Yasukuni shrine visits, history textbooks revisions, the treatment of comfort women, militarism and rearmament is not new. The leftwing ‘All-Japan Teachers’ Union, for instance, - by inculcating for decades pacifism in public schools- has been strictly opposing any moves to restore symbols linked to Japan’s Imperial system and past militarism. In 1999 the Obuchi Government submitted a bill to officially grant legal status to the country’s defacto national flag and national anthem that was enacted by the Diet. In Japan’s schools, the use of the Rising Sun flag and the singing of the Kimigayo, which calls for “the reign of the Emperor to continue for 1,000 generations,” has been and continues to be a source of sharp conflict between school administrations and the ‘All-Japan Teachers Union’. Whereas the Teachers Union has been traditionally linked with socialist or communist political parties it is noteworthy that many concerned ordinary citizens have been taking actively part in politically non-affiliated, financially independent social movements and NPOs to mobilize public opinion for preserving article 9. They are aware that the only way to bloc any hypothetical amendment approved by the Diet would be to gain a simple majority of votes in the subsequent referendum. The number and intensity of advocacy networks has gradually increased over the past years. The first major grass-root movement to stop the article 9 revision was formed in 1999. The “No to Constitutional Revision Citizen’s Network” is a NPO formed by 100 different group members (http://www.annie.ne.jp/~kenpou/index. html). In November 2002 the scholarly “Japan Institute of Constitutional Law” was established. It is a private non-profit organization dedicated to research and public 296 East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 education on the pacifist principles of the Constitution. Another influential lobby network is the “Article 9 Association” (http://www.9-jo.jp/index.html) in which writers and critiques including Nobel Prize winner Kenzaburo Oe take part. The “Article 9 Association” has more than 6000 branches nationwide. “Peace Not War Japan” (PNWJ), an offshoot of the UK-based organization formed in 2002 to protest the intervention in Afghanistan, is a Tokyo-based volunteer group, working to raise awareness of issues relating to peace, war and non-violent solutions to conflict through cultural activities. Started in 2004 PNWJ brings together musicians, artists and other Japanese groups or organisations that work for peace and social justice, and is intended to benefit the grassroots peace movement. Finally, the Japanese international NPO “Peace Boat” is working to protect article 9 through education, lobbying and campaigns. The voyage of a chartered peace boat around the world is a key event. The well-established non-governmental and non-profit organization with its headquarters in Tokyo maintains 8 offices throughout Japan and a branch association in Geneva.

Pacifism in the Past and Now- Variations of a Theme

Since 1985 more than 4 billion Yen of taxpayer’s money has been annually spent for military purposes. In the current defense program budgetary spending includes the modification of Aegis equipped escort ships and improvement of Patriot missile capabilities in order to respond to a ballistic missile attack, the building of warning and control radars and the establishment of a midair fueling and transport unit. For Seigel it seems clear that the military expenditures have risen in the last decades despite the existence of article 9: “In fact, Article 9 has not provided a restraint on Japanese military expenditure and development and therefore it does not make sense to argue that Japan needs to change Article 9 in order to build up its defence capability. Depending on how military spending and defence capability are measured, it can be argued that Japan currently has the second largest defence capability in the world” ([12], p 8). Most people would argue that spending so much money on the military can impossibly be a manifestation of hardcore pacifism. What is meant when Japanese speak about “pacifism” today? There is no doubt that article 9 has formally met the wishes of the ordinary Japanese citizens. In a recent opinion poll from the Asahi newspaper from April 2009 that asked the question: “Do you think Article 9 should or should not be amended?” 64% of the respondents said “should not be amended” and 26% answered “should be amended”. (Source: http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/ polls/2009/poll-09-11.htm). What matters however is if the acceptance of article 9 is rooted in the same radical, principled pacifism Shidehara had in mind in 1946 or if it is a new form of pragmatic, convenient - maybe even naïve- anti-militarism. Maybe it is fair to assume that the public sentiment of today tacitly supports the constitutionality of the SDF as long as it is a non-conscription corps, stays small in numbers, involved in civilian relief or disaster rescue activities, does not engage in missions abroad and refrains from keeping nuclear or offensive, destructive weapons. The same goes for the tacit acceptance of the US-Japan security treaty that has allowed Japan to prosper East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 297 economically and delegate national defensive protection to the US nuclear umbrella and the 50,000 US forces stationed in Japan. Since the end of the Cold War, the Treaty has extended in character from national security issues limited to protecting the territory of Japan to regional and global conflicts. Japan has been heavily critizised for its checkbook diplomacy during the Gulf Wars leaving the bulk of the work on the ground to the US Allies. That is the main reason why the conservatives have pushed for amending the Constitution and speeding up collective self-defense. The tacit acceptance of the SDF, the right to self-defense and the US Security Treaty differs from the once radical pacifism of Shidehara calling for unarmed neutrality, disarmament and collective security. The term “negative pacifism” has been coined by Ikegami-Andersson [9] to define Japan’s contemporary pacifism. According to her “negative pacifism” has a negative connotation with a paralyzing effect: constructive discussions on security issues, warfare and military are considered to be taboo. This results in a failure to produce alternative security concepts. Negative pacifism is also the result of “dual victimization” [3] the Japanese feel they have been submitted to. Among those who are active in the article 9 preservation movement are many elderly Japanese who have a negative sentiment of having been victimized in the past by both the Japanese military and the US military attack. Furthermore there exists a kind of strange love-hate relationship between Japan and its strongest ally the US. Many citizens have voiced their concerns that Japan should become more independent from US “patronizing” without providing details or a specific roadmap. Contrary to the Germans who never experienced the atomic bombing the Japanese believe that they have been victims rather then perpetrators. Their negative pacifism seems to be concerned with their past war memories and individual suffering failing to make a bridge by applying lessons from the past to shaping alternative security policies. A statement by the ‘Teacher’s Union’, who has raged a battle with the LDP over the revision of the fundamental education law, reflects this negative pacifism as well: “During the war, teachers had told their children to die for the state. When the war ended, they pledged not to send their children to battlefields again, which is the origin of the JTU movement” (Source: http://www.jtu-net.or.jp/ english/about_jtu.html). Who would not agree with the ‘Teacher’s Union’ that war is a bad thing? Of course there also younger activists who have not experienced war directly by themselves but nevertheless support article 9 as it stands. How do the two major political parties in the Diet that seek a Government majority by luring potential coalition partners address the issue?

Tacit Political Consensus Among Major Parties to Revise Article 9?

Every political analyst would expect that the ruling and opposition parties would engage in fierce controversial parliamentary deliberations over addressing the revision of article 9. This has not been the case in Japan. A draft of the proposed new constitution was released by an internal LDP committee headed by former Prime Minister Mori on November 2005 as part of the 50th anniversary of the party’s founding. The proposed changes included among others that the first paragraph of Article 9, renouncing war, was to be retained. The second paragraph, 298 East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 forbidding the maintenance of “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential” was replaced by Article 9-2 which permits a “defense force”, under control of the Prime Minister, which defends the nation and may participate in international activities. This new section uses the term “army”, which has been avoided under the current constitution (see also 11, 18). Ahead of the 2009 Lower House elections the LDP provided additional explanations. Prime Minister Aso reiterated that his party would seek debate on reinterpreting Japan’s pacifist constitution in a way that would allow its armed forces to take part in military operations alongside its ally the United States. The LDP has stressed its international contribution to fighting terrorism, including through a naval refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. When it comes to implementing policies the executive seeks to choose the most convenient way of getting things done. Several times the LDP has succeeded to circumvent the Diet, the highest legislative organ, when issuing new defense guidelines or sending military abroad. As it stands now, only with prior parliamentary approval of each mission may small numbers of SDF members join in monitoring an achieved ceasefire; any breakdown of a ceasefire triggers an immediate return to Japan. In its campaign pledges the ruling party said it would seek a law to enable the government to dispatch troops overseas, doing away with rules that require parliament to pass a temporary law for each mission. Regarding the Constitution, the LDP has presented a concrete amendment draft [11] while the DPJ has been eager to follow the footsteps of the LDP by clarifying the right to maintain an army and engage in self-defense. In its basic policy statement on security issued in 1999 the DPJ stated: “(...) That is, firstly, Japan has not renounced the exercise of its right to individual self-defense if Japan is subject to an unlawful attack from abroad, and secondly, the existence of the current Self- Defense Force (SDF) is not unconstitutional.” (Source: Basic policies DPJ, English edition, 1999). Whilst the LDP has clearly stated its constitutional revision intentions in written language in 2005, the DPJ has remained ambiguous and equivocal since it issued its proposal listing the four constitutional security pillars, namely: “pacifism”, “civilian control”, “UN PKO participation” and “restricted right to self-defense” [6]. The 2009 DPJ election manifest does not directly refer to the revision or not of article 9 and this makes it difficult for any ordinary citizen to find out where the DPJ exactly stands and more importantly if and how it intends to reconcile the declared right to self-defense and recognition of the SDF with the current clause 2 of article 9. For instance the election manifest of the DPJ [5] approves participation in UN peacekeeping operations as well as the anti-piracy SDF operations in Somalia, whereas Hatoyama commented that the SDF refuel mission in the Indian Ocean should not be extended after it runs out in 2010. North Korean suspicious cargo vessels should be inspected. The US-Japan security treaty should be revised and realigned without providing specifics. The 2009 manifest does not mention if article 9 should stand as it is, but deals with the question of constitutional reform in an indirect way by asking for vigorous discussions with citizens to reach a national consensus. In a personal e-mail communication to the author dating from 5 August 2009 the DPJ has partially clarified its stance with regard to article 9: “The Democratic Party of Japan is opposed to a Constitution that would effectively permit the use of force that exceeds East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 299 the bounds of self-defence, and the use of force overseas that is not based on a United Nations resolution. On the other hand, however much one may try to uphold Article 9, what amount to de facto changes in the interpretation of the Constitution have been proceeding at the whim of various Cabinets. The need is growing for the Japanese nation to put a halt to this by including clear statements in the Constitution regarding the exercise of the right to self-defense and the international cooperation that may be carried out by the government. If undertaken from the perspective of making clear what the Japanese Self Defense Forces "cannot do", changing the provisions of the Constitution may be preferable.” The minimum necessary use of force for strict self-defense purposes under the constitutional boundaries is reiterated. At the same time however an inclusion of additional explanatory “clear statements” in the Constitution is sought based on the need to stop Governments from interpreting article 9 at their own discretion and goodwill. The DPJ seems to be indirectly opposed to collective defense: By requiring UN approval for overseas missions it seems that the DPJ seeks to exclude collective acts of self- defense as no prior endorsement by the UN would be needed in such a case. The ruling LDP coalition partner Komei party by respecting the will of its strong peaceloving Buddhist lay support groups such as Soka Gakkai, contends in principle that both paragraph 1 and 2 should be fully retained but has been ready to compromise on this point in order to join the Government camp. Opposition parties have a reputation for abandoning their principles when politically convenient to do so. This happened to the former Japan Socialist Party, a longtime supporter of Article 9, which accepted the constitutionality of the SDF and the legitimacy of the US security treaty to ally with the LDP in 1995. Likewise, the New Komeito Party has put aside the issue of pacifism to engage in a coalition. The LDP, with help from its coalition partner Komei, has been seeking enactment of the rules of the Deliberative Councils on the Constitution so that it can start examining drafts of a new constitution. With the National Referendum Law coming into force in May 2010, the LDP intends to lay out a roadmap for a new constitution. The creation of the Constitution Research Council in 2000 in both houses of the Diet has paved the way for discussion on constitutional revision in the Diet. Regarding clause 2 of article 9 the report on constitutional reform issued by a commission of the Lower House in April 2005 stated that a majority of commission members did not deny taking measures to reflect the right to self-defense and recognize the SDF. A network promoting constitutional revision composed of pro- revision lawmakers from the LDP, DPJ, the Komei Party, and People’s New Party along with ex-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who acts as an advisor to the league, is closely in consultation to work on a new constitution. Does the underlying consensus among opposition and ruling parties on the revision of article 9 mean that the prevailing public opinion in Japan today rejects the postwar pacifism of the past and holds that the use of force is necessary and desirable for the resolution of conflicts in today’s international society? In past opinion polls conducted up to 2005 a majority of respondents used to indicate that they favoured the amendment of Article 9. The option the majority favoured was to preserve paragraph 1 while skipping paragraph 2. A more recent public opinion poll conducted by the conservative newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun revealed that a majority of people oppose a revision of the 300 East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 constitution. Enthusiasm has been fading in Japan for rewriting the post-World War II pacifist constitution, with more people opposing the idea than supporting it for the first time in 15 years, a poll showed in April 2008. The result indicates that 42.5% of those who responded said that the Constitution should be revised, while 43.1% favoured the Constitution unchanged. Questioned about the Article 9, Clause 1, 12.5% responded that they want to change it, while 81.6% believed there is no need to change it. Regarding the Clause 2 of the Article 9, 36.8% wanted to change it, while 54.5% saw no need to change it. Thus, the poll shows that most people who responded not to change the Constitution including the Article 9’s Clause 2, which has been the focus of the debate about whether to change the Constitution or prefer the status quo and this also means that pacifist norms are still strongly and widely rooted among the public. The Yomiuri, which has taken surveys on the issue since 1981, said it was the first time since 1993 that a majority of Japanese supported the pacifist constitution. In 2004, as many as 65 percent said the constitution needed to be revised. That was the year that then prime minister Junichiro Koizumi sent troops to Iraq on a landmark mission, Japan’s first military deployment since 1945 to a country where fighting was under way. The Yomiuri opinion poll taken in 2008 offers support for a deep national division over Mr Koizumi’s decision to send troops to Iraq. The 2004 dispatch became the trigger for protests but if taking into account previous policy changes it turns out that preparations for sidestepping and dismantling article 9 had been already undertaken since the early 90’s. Already in September 1990 with his plan to send a UN peace cooperation team to Saudi Arabia and then in 1991 Prime Minister Kaifu had succeeded to secure the tremendous sum of 1.3 billion USD of financial support for the first Gulf war. Thereafter he had tried to push the dispatch of five SDF airplanes for airlifts to Iraq through parliament, but without avail. He succeeded however in dispatching minesweepers from the SDF to the Persian Gulf without seeking or getting the required approval from parliament. The most important step towards the factual revision of article 9 was doubtlessly the dramatic passage of the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill in 1992 recaptured in the history annals of the LDP:

The LDP’s weakened position in the Upper House had made it necessary for it to pursue the passage of the bill through cooperation with the Komei Party and Democratic Socialist Parties (DSP) that later disbanded. These 3-way negotiations eventually resulted in the formulation of five prerequisite conditions for Japan’s participation in PKO operations that were then incorporated into the legislation. They were the following - (1) parties involved in the conflict must have agreed to a cease-fire; (2) parties involved in the conflict must have consented to the introduction of peacekeeping personnel; (3) the neutrality of peacekeeping forces must be strictly observed; (4) Japanese personnel must be withdrawn in the event that the above conditions are not fully met; (5) the use of small arms is authorized only in the event that such action is deemed absolutely necessary to protect the lives of peacekeeping forces. The Komei Party decided to support the bill. However, the Democratic Socialist Party, citing the need to maintain "civilian control" of the military, insisted that the participation of Japanese forces in UN peacekeeping forces be made subject to Diet approval. Although the bill had already passed through the Lower House during an extraordinary session of the East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 301

Diet debate in the Upper House continued. Efforts to reach a compromise on the PKO cooperation bill among the LDP, Komei Party, and Democratic Socialist Parties extended into the regular session of the Diet convened on January 24, 1992. It was not until late May that an agreement was finally reached on the bill. Sections included in the compromise bill such as “a freeze on participation in UN peacekeeping forces,”“a mandatory prior Diet approval,” and “a review after three years” can be considered as concessions made by the government and the LDP to the other parties. (Source: http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/history/chap15.html)

The bill became law on the evening of 15 June 1992 with a vote of 329 to 17 in its favour with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) boycotting it and only the Communist Party voting against it. Backed by the new law Japan became enabled to send peacekeeping troops to Cambodia and Mozambique and participate in refugee relief efforts in Rwanda later on. The PKO Law was revised twice (in 1998 and 2001) in order to loosen the strict conditions under which SDF units operating abroad may use weapons. Sending SDF forces overseas into war zones may be regarded as a violation of article 9. Even if no shots were fired and no casualty was suffered in Irak it can be argued that the dispatch of military forces overseas is neither an act of self-defense nor an activity that contains violence in the strict sense of article 9. The ongoing Afghanistan conflict demonstrates the obvious blurring of boundaries between war and reactive self- defense measures. Defensive troops deployed to ensure human security centered civilian reconstruction are more and more involved in war like combat scenes and become targets because they are foreigners wearing uniforms and weapons. The definition of what constitutes war and war zones has become more fuzzy then ever.

An International Test Case

The conflict with North Korea has become an international test case for extending the application of article 9 to military interventions outside Japan. North Korea test- launched a series of missiles into the sea of Japan on 5 July 2006. In October 2006 it carried out its first nuclear underground test. Then again in April 2009 North Korea, in violation of UN resolutions, launched a long-range ballistic missile. This was followed on 25 May 2009 its second underground nuclear test. On 12 June 2009 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted an additional sanctions resolution against North Korea. The adopted resolution strongly condemns the second nuclear test as a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which was adopted after North Korea’s first nuclear test 2006. The new resolution demands that North Korea not conduct any further nuclear test or ballistic missile launch and announces new additional sanctions against that country, including strengthened inspections of shipping cargo to and from North Korea, an enhanced arms embargo, and prevention of the transfer of financial and other assets that might contribute to nuclear or missile development. The aim of these measures is to stem the flow of funds and materials involved in North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. With regard to the inspection of shipping cargo, which became the focal issue of 302 East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 negotiations, Japan and the United States wanted to make such inspections mandatory for member states of the United Nations, but China refused to budge from its more cautious stance. In the end, therefore, the resolution calls upon member states to implement inspections. However, reflecting on the ineffectiveness of Security Council Resolution 1718 of 2006, which also included various sanctions, the latest resolution provides a mechanism for the thorough execution of the sanctions, including the establishment of a panel of experts to monitor the state of their implementation. The inspection issue could end up in a direct casus belli between Japan and North Korea as North Korea has made clear that it considers any inspection of its ships in international waters as an act of war. In its 12 June 2009 editorial the conservative Sankei Shimbun comments on the need for Japan to react to the escalating conflict by adjusting the current legislation. Regarding the problem of Japan not being able to conduct cargo inspections in international waters under current legislation, it states, “With such unsatisfactory legislation, Japan is going to lose the trust of the international community. This situation should be remedied immediately.”(Source:http://fpcj.jp/modules/news8/ index.php?page=article&storyid=218).

Conclusion

The analysis of the factual revision of article 9 has revealed that a paradigm shift has occurred on the political stage with a shifting focus from reliance on pacifist ideals or anti-militarist thinking to fuzzy military pragmatism and Realpolitik. Shirasu has critized modern politicians for being unprincipled and failing to explain to voters what motivates their actions. The 2009 manifests of the LDP and DPJ fail to reveal clearcut principles behind their security policies and quest for constitutional reform. The LDP wants to pursue “international contributions” and gain “international reputation” under the banner of collective self-defense whilst the DPJ wants to “add clear statements to the Constitution specifying what the SDF is not allowed to do”. Despite the adoption of pacifist principles in the Constitution rejecting the concept that a state can resort to war or that there are any aims that can justify war there has been a tacit popular conditional after-war support for the SDF and the Security Treaty. The factual military normalization went hand in hand with the “generation of interpretations of the Constitution to fit the transformed reality” as Hori has described the path chosen by the political parties. There has been a strong push since 2005 from the political elite to abandon clause 2 of article 9. It has been proposed that the -first ever- overseas dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq has deeply divided the nation and triggered a renaissance of silent, grass-root pacifist activism among ordinary citizens, whereas the mainstream political establishment driven by the willingness to fulfill international obligations has been seeking ways to give a new purpose to the military. This move could be problematic as it threatens the essence of article 9. It is simply unconceivable that the renunciation to military force, state violence and war as an end of politics can be maintained without disarming or renouncing the military means which make war possible. Military acts of potentially offensive nature or dispatch to combat zones outside the geographical boundaries of Japan under the pretext of “collective self- defense”, “war on terror”, “humanitarian intervention” or East Asia (2009) 26:285–304 303

“peace keeping international cooperation” could get Japan into an imbroglio breaking with the after war consensus of renouncing war and pursuing peace at all times. Reflecting on the “collective security” spirit of Shidehara, Seigel suggests that it would be much smarter to convince others to follow the Japanese example then trying to revise article 9 unilaterally: “If Japan, instead of changing its constitution, would put its diplomatic effort into encouraging other countries to adopt similar peace clauses in their constitutions, it would move the world much closer to peace” ([12], p.10). The idea that article 9 can serve as a role model to other nations has found support among ordinary citizens. In his essay on the topic Mita ([13], p.68) concludes that instead of revising article 9 it should be reinforced and revalorized. Article 9 should be preserved in its current form as a universal principle: “What should Japan do? First, it should preserve Article 9 in the current Constitution as a great human heritage. Indeed, there is growing support for the movement of acknowledging the current Japanese Constitution as a world heritage. This can be seen from the increasing number of internet sites and also from the fact that “Let’s Make Article 9 a World Heritage”, a book written by Oota Hikari, a comedian and a popular essayist, and Nakazawa Shin’ichi, an anthropologist at Tama Art University, has sold more than 700,000 copies since its publication in 2006.”

References

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Patrick Hein studied political science at the university of Marburg from 1984 to 1991 graduating with a master degree. Major research interests: Green Parties, parliamentary systems, comparative studies of Germany and Japan, political theory of Hannah Arendt. Studied from 1991 to 1993 as Japanese Government scholarship student at the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Waseda university. Field research done on the National Diet of Japan. Major publication: “How the Japanese became foreign to themselves. Implications of Globalization on the Private and Public Spheres in Japan” published 2009 in Germany. The book applies the political theory of Hannah Arendt to the cultural historical context of Japan. Has published since 1989 numerous newspaper and magazine articles relating to Japanese history, politics, economics, culture and arts. Obtained an additional academic qualification in mental health counseling from Capella University in 2007.