[Working Title: Chinese Muslim Students at Al-Azhar University]

Chinese Students of Al-Azhar and their impact on Sino-Egyptian Relations

Maurice Gajan

Abstract

China‟s Muslims, a diverse minority of approximately 23 million people, have played an influential role in Chinese foreign policy throughout the past century. Successive Chinese governments have employed the transnational ties of the Muslim minority, as a diplomatic tool to establish and strengthen its ties with Islamic countries As one aspect of this Islamic diplomacy, China has sponsored the scholarship of Chinese Muslims at Cairo‟s renowned Al-

Azhar University This paper assesses the influence of Chinese Al-Azhar students on Sino-

Egyptian relations since the 1930s, focusing on the students‟ individual agency.

In the 1930s, the Guomindang first sponsored the education of Hui Muslim scholars at Al-Azhar.

Chinese Azharites of that time became influential in shaping Sino-Egyptian relations, often engaging in informal „citizen diplomacy‟. After the Chinese revolution in 1949, the Communist government terminated the scholarship program to Al-Azhar. Yet, it continued to exploit Chinese

Muslims‟ transnational ties to establish relations with Islamic countries. The economic and political opening of China since the late 1970s saw the re-establishment of state-sponsored scholarships to Al-Azhar. Since then, the number of Chinese Al-Azhar students has been on the rise; the vast majority of them, however, arrive without scholarships.

China‟s increasing economic and political power, as well as the all-encompassing nation state, have rendered Islamic diplomacy continuously less important. Thus, the current generation of

Chinese Azharites does not wield nearly the same influence, as the scholars of the 1930s. The once crucial transnational ties, seem to have lost their importance for Beijing‟s atheist and increasingly powerful government.

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 3

Literature Review and Methodology ...... 4

History of Chinese Muslims at Al-Azhar ...... 5

Chinese Islam throughout the Centuries ...... 7

Islamic Diplomacy during the Republic of China (1912-1949) ...... 9

Islam in Anti-Imperialist diplomacy under Mao Zedong...... 15

Towards Economic Cooperation ...... 17

Chinese Students at Al-Azhar Today ...... 19

Chinese Azharites: A Tool of Foreign Policy or Individual Agency? ...... 22

A Tool of Foreign Policy? ...... 22

Azharite Agency ...... 24

Contemporary Developments ...... 26

Egyptian Revolution ...... 26

Potential Islamist backlash ...... 26

Conclusion ...... 28

References ...... 30

Introduction

The emergence of China as an increasingly assertive and vocal global player has led to the strengthening of Chinese relations with almost all states spanning around the globe. Particularly within the Egypt, the most populous country in the Middle East, Beijing has increased its economic and political activity over the last 30 years, but historical relations reach back far earlier.

China itself is home to a Muslim minority of approximately 20 million people and has in the past, as well as the present, employed Islam as a link between the Near and the Far East. As early as the 1930s, the Republic of China began to sponsor the scholarship of Chinese Muslims at

Cairo‟s prestigious Al-Azhar University – the oldest and most renowned institution of Islamic learning. As a consequence, the Chinese students of Al-Azhar became an influential driving force in shaping Chinese Islam, as well as the wider relations between China and the Muslim and

Arab world.

While intra-religious Islamic dialogue ceased to exist during the height of Chinese communism from the 1950s to the 1970s, ties have been re-established with Beijing‟s economic and political opening since the 1980s. Since then, the number of Chinese students at Al-Azhar and in Egypt in general has continuously risen. Once again, the atheist government in Beijing seems to employ

Islam as a diplomatic tool to improve economic and political relations with the Middle East and the wider Islamic world.

This research paper will look at the role of Chinese Muslim students at Al-Azhar in the relations between Chinese and the Egyptian state. After introducing Chinese Islam, this paper provides a profound historical background, which guides the reader through the changing situation,

influence and role of Chinese Azharites in the 20th century relations between China and Egypt.

Prior to defining the contemporary influence of Al-Azhar students, an overview of their current situation will be given. Finally, the paper will determine, if Chinese Azharites have merely become a tool of Chinese foreign policy soft power or if they shape the relations between their home country and the Middle East actively themselves. Additionally, contemporary issues, such as the impact of the Egyptian revolution and the rise of global Islamism will be highlighted in relation to Chinese Azharites‟ influence on Sino-Egyptian ties.

Literature Review and Methodology

The subject of Chinese Muslims at Al-Azhar has appeared in the focus of Western scholarship only relatively recently. In particular, the historical dimension of Chinese Azharites has been extensively researched. It is important to mention Zvi Ben-Dor Benite‟s article “"Nine years in

Egypt": Al-Azhar University and the Arabization of Chinese Islam” (2008), as well as John T.

Chen‟s “Re-Orientation: The Chinese Azharites between Umma and Third World” (2014), which both provide a historical perspective of the first Chinese students in Cairo.

In addition to these predominantly historical studies, several other publications concerning

Chinese Muslims in Egypt have appeared during the past decade. However, most of these works are not of a political nature and do not emphasise the aspect of international relations.

Nevertheless, these publications are of tremendous importance for this research paper.

Particularly Dru Gladney‟s book Dislocating China (2004), which deals with Chinese-Islamic identity and power relations provides an insight into the re-emergence of Chinese students at Al-

Azhar University. Additionally, Wang Jie‟s linguistic publication “Sojourner‟s Tongues –

Language Practices among the Chinese of Cairo” (2015) offers an insight into Cairo‟s diverse

Chinese community.

On the issue of Sino-Islamic relations, Frauke Drewes‟ article “Chinese Muslims Going

Global?” (2013) provides a profound overview of the role of Islam in current Sino-Arab relations. The paper touches upon the issue of religious education in international relations, yet it does not detail the impact of Chinese Muslim students at Al-Azhar on Sino-Egyptian relations.

Thus, it is to say that despite the fact that studies on similar issues do exist, this topic has never been analysed independently to this extent.

Besides consulting the limited secondary literature on the issue, this research paper is predominantly based on a number of interviews conducted with Chinese Muslim students and

Chinese living in Cairo, between September and December 2015. It is important to mention that all of the interviewed students were Hui,1 as I was able to communicate with them in Standard

Chinese. Therefore, the reader should be aware of a certain bias towards Hui students at Al-

Azhar, partially neglecting and leaving out the role of Uighurs and other Chinese Muslims.

History of Chinese Muslims at Al-Azhar

China is home to a sizable Muslim population of approximately 23 million people, which are distributed among ten officially recognised ethnic minorities.2 Thus, Chinese Muslims are not a

1 This research paper will use the term Hui Muslim or Hui Chinese to describe this ethno-religious minority in China. This information is of importance, as prior to the introduction of the People‟s Republic of China minority categorization in 1955, all Muslims inside, as well as outside of China were referred to as Hui, Huihui, Huimin or Huizi. While certain scholars thus prefer to use the term Sino-Muslims or Muslim Chinese in order to distinguish the Hui from other Muslim minorities in China during this period, this paper will refer to the group as Hui. In several publications, the Hui are further described as Dungans or Tungans (usually in a Russian or Central Asian context) or Panthays (widely used term for the Huis of Yunnan and Myanmar). 2 Out of the 23 million Chinese Muslims, roughly nine million are Hui. Hui live dispersed over all major Chinese provinces, but are concentrated in Gansu, Qinghai and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in

singular and homogenous entity who share a similar history, culture, or identity. Among these ten minorities, the largest of them, the Hui, which compromise around nine million people, present the most outstanding case. In contrast to other Muslim populations in China, such as

Uighurs, Kazakhs or Tajiks, the Hui do not possess direct ethnic or linguistic ties to Turkic,

Persian or Mongol populations outside of China. Rather than that, the Hui are almost indistinguishable from the Han majority in a physical, linguistic and largely even cultural way.

Only their religion and dietary prescriptions set the Hui apart from the Han. In contrast to the nine other ethnic groups, who are almost exclusively living in Western China,3 Hui can be found all across the country with settlements in almost every larger city.4 This geographic discontinuity and their cultural and linguistic similarity towards the Han Chinese, sets the Hui apart from other

Muslim minorities in China. Due to these characteristics and the relatively friendly relations with the Chinese government, the Hui enjoy many benefits and civil liberties, which are denied to other ethnic minorities, who are deemed as potentially separatist or in other ways threatening to the integrity of the Chinese state (Al Jazeera; Beech).

In order to better understand Sino-Islamic relations, it is important to obtain a greater historical perspective on the issue of Islam in China and its connections to the Muslim world. The following paragraph of this paper will not only give an overview of Muslim history in China, but it also introduces the concept of Islamic diplomacy, a strategy used by Chinese authorities to

Central China. The second largest group of Chinese Muslims are Uighurs, who are predominantly centred in Xinjiang Autonomous Region on China‟s Western boarder to Central Asia. The other eight ethnic minorities, who are Muslims are Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tajik, Uzbek and Tatar in Xinjiang, as well as Salar, Dongxiang and Bonan Muslims in Gansu. 3 Chinese Muslims are predominantly living in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Gansu Province, Qinghai Province and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. 4 Nevertheless, Hui Chinese are predominantly found in Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai, but also in Yunnan and Henan.

employ Chinese Muslims to improve their political and economic ties to Middle Eastern states

(Gladney, “Dislocating China” 235).

Chinese Islam throughout the Centuries

Muslims have been present in China since the early days of Islam, as claimed in the legendary

Huihui Yuanlai (Origins of the Hui), the 17th century founding myth of Chinese Islam (Benite,

“From „Literati‟ to „Ulama‟” 83). It claims that Sa‟d Ibn Abi Waqqas,5 the maternal uncle of

Prophet Muhammed, was sent to China on the order of none other than the prophet himself, thus indicating a “crucial link between Chinese Muslims and the Islamic heartlands” (Benite, “From

„Literati‟ to „Ulama‟” 85). While this event remains disputed among scholars, there exists evidence that Islam arrived to China as early as the 7th century via Arab and Persian traders who established small communities in the coastal towns of Guangzhou, Quanzhou6 and Yangzhou.

During the religiously tolerant and cosmopolitan Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Muslim community grew constantly through the arrival of Persian, Arab and Turkic traders on the Silk

Road (Drewes 64). 7

5 Guangzhou‟s Huaisheng mosque is believed to have been built by Sa‟d Ibn Abi Waqqas in the 650s and supposedly contains his grave (Lipman 25). Although this fact is disputed, the mosque, which dates from the Tang or Song dynasty, is probably the oldest in China, and one of the oldest in the world (Lipman 25). 6 Quanzhou was known for a long time by its Arabic name Zaytoun (Olive), as described by Marco Polo and Ibn Batutta. 7 As the main language of interaction with non-Muslims, as well as for religious purposes, Persian was employed as a lingua franca and remained influential until the revival of Arabic in China in the late 19th century (Green 5).

Islam continued to grow under the Song (960-1279), and especially the Mongol-dominated Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), which often favoured Muslims, 8 as well as other foreigners 9 over the

Chinese population (Jones-Leaning and Pratt 312-313). The flourishing trade along the Silk

Road, following the Mongol conquest, contributed to a vivid exchange between China and the

Islamic heartlands in the Middle East. By the outward-looking early Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the Muslim community in China was well-established and profited from China‟s vivid economic exchange with the Middle East and South Asia.10 Priority given to domestic issues, however led to an increasing isolation of China during the later stages of the Ming dynasty. From this period onwards, China‟s Muslim community lived largely isolated from foreign influences, which led to a further cultural and linguistic assimilation towards the majority population.

During the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), China‟s isolationist course continued and the relation between the Chinese state and its Muslim inhabitants deteriorated, resulting in several violent uprisings.11 The 18th century Qing conquest in Central Asia brought large numbers of Turkic

Muslims, such as Uighurs and Kazakhs, under the control of Beijing. Due to the geographic distance and the isolationist policies, Chinese Muslims lived closed off from or with only marginal contact to the Islamic heartlands for centuries. Cultural and linguistic assimilation

8 The Mongol rulers of the Yuan dynasty encouraged migration and facilitated the breakup of a homogenous Chinese society by introducing a distinct taxation system favourable to Muslims (Jones- Leaning and Pratt 312). 9 Such as the Venetian merchant Marco Polo. 10 During the early years of the Ming, China‟s arguably most well-known Muslim, Admiral Zheng He (1371-1433), led several imperial naval expeditions in the Indian Ocean, voyaging with his fleet as far as South Asia, Persia, Arabia and East Africa (Jones-Leaning and Pratt 313). 11 Particularly the late 19th century is characterised by Muslim revolts against the Qing, such as the Dungan Revolt (1862-1877) in Xinjiang and the Panthay Rebellion (1856-1873) in Yunnan (Jones- Leaning and Pratt 316).

continued, while particular traditions and rituals of a distinctly Sinicised Islam developed simultaneously, among what would later be known as the Hui people.

Only in the age of global industrialisation in the 19th century, a reconnection to the Middle East was made possible through the introduction of modern transportation facilities, such as railroads and steamship. Accounts of individual Chinese Muslims travelling to the Middle East for pilgrimage and scholarship can be found from the 19th century onwards. The renowned Chinese

Islamic scholar „Yusuf‟ Ma Dexin (1794-1874),12 for example, spent several years studying at

Al-Azhar and travelling the Middle East in the 1840s (Cieciura). Cases like these however remained the exception rather than the norm until the establishment of the Republic of China after the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Muslim intellectuals from all over China, who hoped to overcome the anti-Muslim discrimination during the Qing dynasty and sought to improve the social position of Muslims, supported the new republic (Mao, “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese

Nation” 376). Sun Zhongshan‟s ideals of a „Republic of Five Nationalities‟ (Wu zu gonghe), which granted equal rights to Han, Manchu, Mongols, Tibetans and Muslims,13 appealed to many Hui, as they recognised a chance for their own social and political advancement.

12 Ma Dexin is credited with providing the first translation of the Holy Qur‟an in Chinese. Upon his return to China, Ma played an influential role in shaping Islam in his native Yunnan province during the Panthay Rebellion (1856-1873). Ma Dexin‟s legacy of progressive teachings is often quoted as the reason why many influential and reforming Muslim figures, such as Ma Jian and Na Zhong, came Yunnan. Additionally, the ties he established to Al-Azhar University made it possible for Muslims from Yunnan to travel to Cairo to study, more than 50 years after his death (Cieciura). 13 The concept of the „Republic of the Five Nationalities‟ made no distinction between different groups or ethnicities of Islamic faith in China and classified them as a whole as Hui.

Islamic Diplomacy during the Republic of China (1912-1949)

The Republic of China faced immense difficulties during its early years, as it was internally weak and fractioned in a series of warlord-controlled territories, while the sovereignty of the state was severely threatened by Western and Japanese imperialist ambitions from outside. Thus, the desire to establish diplomatic ties with the Middle East, a region which suffered similarly from Western colonial domination and which was home to strong nationalist and anti-imperialist movements, seemed logical (Mao, “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 391). Influential

Guomindang leaders, such as the revolutionary leader Sun Zhongshan recognised the „Islamic potential‟, beneficial for building the new Chinese nation. In 1912, he stated in a speech addressing Muslim clerics in Beijing, that

“[w]ithout the participation of the Muslim nationality (huizu), the Chinese national movement will not achieve its final success; without the union of all the world‟s Muslims (huizu zhi zhengge jiehe), the work of eliminating [global] imperialism cannot be completed” (Sun Zhongshan, quoted in Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 378).

Under these circumstances, Chinese Muslims began to embrace an identity as both Chinese citizens and Islamic believers, which previously had not been the case due to Qing repression and persecution (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 378). Additionally, the Han majority‟s perception of the Hui shifted from the image of the „fierce and brutal‟ Muslim to the potential saviour of the Chinese nation in its weak state (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese

Nation” 377). 14 The alleged transnationalism of the Hui and their potential links to the Umma,

14 The Hui‟s martial tradition and their religious transnational ties were no longer understood as a threat to national integrity, but as a potential to defend the homeland and form an alliance with Islamic countries in similar positions as China (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 377).

the global Muslim community, became a tool to help China bridge the gap between the Near and

Far East (Mao, “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 376).

Efforts were engineered to ensure the establishment of closer ties between China and the Islamic nations, and by the early 1930s diplomatic relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia were introduced. The Chinese leadership had realised that in order “to take advantage of [Chinese

Muslim‟s] religious connections, efforts to improve Chinese-Egyptian relations should start with religious exchanges and the exchange of students” (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese

Nation” 389). Following the rise of power of the Guomindang after overcoming the chaotic warlord era of the 1920s, Chinese Muslim leaders initiated a first student delegation to Al-Azhar in 1931 (Cieciura). Supported by the government of Jiang Jieshi, four Chinese Muslim scholars from Yunnan15/16 province left Hong Kong and travelled by steamship via Singapore, Ceylon and Aden to Cairo (Cieciura, Harris 178). As they were the first group of Chinese students to enrol at Al-Azhar, the local media resonance was considerable, as many Egyptians were previously unaware of the existence of Islam in China (Harris 180). The delegation was received by King Fu‟ad of Egypt, who “promised to do his best to aid Chinese Muslims in their plans of

15 The first Chinese Muslim delegation to the Al-Azhar was organised by the Islamic Progressive Association of Yunnan, which had links to the university due to the previous contacts of Yunnanese students, such as Ma Dexin (Cieciura) 16 „Muhammed‟ Ma Jian (1906-1978) and Na Zhong (1909-2007), both natives of Yunnan, are the two most well-known participants of the first Al-Azhar mission. Both engaged in extensive translation and publication activities, such as Ma Jian‟s translation of the Holy Qur‟an. Both Ma and Na are known for propagating their reformist and modernist thought, often making use of state resources. Upon their return to China after several years of studying at Al-Azhar, Ma Jian and Na Zhong became professors of Arabic at several high-profile universities in China and wielded a tremendous influence within the Hui community. Due to their close ties to the Chinese state and the Communist Party in particular, both are remembered as outstanding Chinese patriots who contributed to the advance of Sino-Middle Eastern relations as informal diplomats (Cieciura; Mao “Na Zhong”).

development” (Harris 181). This event was the first diplomatic interaction between a Middle

Eastern head of state and Chinese Muslims, a connection whose potential was soon to be further exploited by the Chinese state.

Due to the initial success of the first delegation of Chinese students at Al-Azhar and its wide publicity within the Hui community through periodicals, such as Yuehua, further missions were sent to Egypt throughout the 1930s. Until the outbreak of the Second World War, four more delegations 17 were organised by the influential Muslim Schools of Beijing and Shanghai

(Cieciura). 18 While the first three delegations were sponsored by the Chinese state, the last and also largest group of 16 Chinese Muslims was financed through a scholarship by King Farouk I of Egypt (Cieciura). A total of 35 Chinese Muslim scholars, out of which only two were not of the Hui nationality, departed to Cairo during the 1930s (Cieciura).

Often out of their own initiative, Chinese Muslims engaged in informal “citizen” diplomacy to advance the standing of China internationally and consequently improve the conditions for the

Hui domestically (Mao, “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 381-382). The 1932 meeting

17 One group arrived in Cairo in 1932, which was followed by two more delegations in 1934. Accompanied by high dignitaries of China‟s Muslim community, such as Ma Songting (1895-1992), these delegations were repeatedly received by the Egyptian King Fu‟ad. In 1936 Fu‟ad‟s son King Farouk agreed to sponsor the scholarship of 16 Chinese Muslims, who arrived to study at Al-Azhar in 1938, at a time when the Second Sino-Japanese War had already broken out. Due to the ongoing global conflict, the 1938 delegation remained the last, albeit the largest group of Chinese students sent to Cairo during the Republic of China (Cieciura). 18 Beijing‟s Chengda Normal School (established in 1925) and Shanghai‟s Islam Normal School (established in 1928) „formed the central axis of Sino-Muslim modernization efforts‟ (Cieciura). The schools maintained close ties to Yunnan‟s modernist Muslim elite and the Islamic Progressive Association. Founded by Ma Songting and Da Pusheng – known as being part of the “Four Great Ahongs” – the schools developed into the centre of progressive Islamic discourse in China under the patronage of Ningxia warlord Ma Fuxiang (Aubin).

of the Chinese delegation, led by Ahong Ma Songting, with King Fu‟ad I of Egypt resulted in the monarch‟s sponsoring the foundation of the Islamic King Fu’ad Library at Chengda Normal

School in Beijing. Diplomatic efforts were often undertaken not in the name of the Chinese state, but in the name and to the benefit of Chinese Muslims. Hui Azharites, such as Na Zhong engaged in a distinctly individual diplomacy, when speaking on behalf of the “50 million

Muslims of China” at the Conference of the World Congress of Arab and Islamic Countries for the Defence of Palestine in 1938 (Mao “Na Zhong”). 19 This, however, does not mean that

Chinese Muslims acted purely as independent agents, disregarding Chinese interests. It is rather the case that many of these young Chinese Azharites were deeply patriotic and sought to promote their Chinese homeland, as well as their Muslim faith.

With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, international support became crucial for the Republic of China. In order to improve diplomatic ties to Middle Eastern countries and also out of the fear of Japanese ambitions to co-opt Chinese Muslims for their pan-Asianist cause,20 Jiang Jieshi‟s government thought to employ Islamic transnational ties by sending the state-sponsored Chinese Muslim Near-East Goodwill Mission to a number of Middle Eastern states in 1938 (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 384). On their journey throughout the Middle East, which included a pilgrimage to the holy city of Makkah, Chinese

Muslim representatives 21 advocated for support of the Chinese cause by stressing China‟s

19 During the first half of the 20th century, the number of Muslims in China was widely assumed to be around 50 million people. 20 Japanese plans to create a Huihui Guo puppet state for the Muslim population of China‟s Northwest, similar to the Manchu (Empire of Manzhouguo) and Mongol (Menjiang) puppet regimes recently erected in China, eventually failed due to overwhelming Hui support for the Chinese Republic. 21 The most well-known participants of the Chinese Muslim Near-East Goodwill Mission were Isa Yusuf Alptekin (1901-1995), who should later become a fervent advocate for Uighur independence and Ma

commitment to anti-imperialist struggle, highlighting the favourable situation of Islam in China and respectively condemning Japanese atrocities against Muslims (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 386). As a response to the Goodwill Mission, the Japanese-controlled puppet government of Beiping22 initiated the Northern China Hajj Delegation to Makkah to assure the well-being of Chinese Muslims under Japanese rule. As patriotic Chinese students at

Al-Azhar received the news of a Japanese-sponsored pilgrimage, they immediately organised a

„counter-hajj‟ to confront and persuade the North China Hajj Delegation in Makkah and thus diminish their impact. This illustrates how contested the perceived transnational, religious identities and connections of Chinese Muslims were and how both the Chinese and the Japanese state attempted to exploit and appropriate them for their own political benefit (Chen “When

Islam was an Ally”).

By financing high-profile religious education and pilgrimages abroad, the Guomindang government hoped to achieve international support from Middle Eastern countries, through employing this kind of Islamic diplomacy (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 389).

Yet at the same time, the state-sponsored Al-Azhar delegations provided Chinese Muslims with the opportunity to reconcile religious and transnational ties, while simultaneously allowing them to be nationalistic and patriotic (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 390). Thus, the

Chinese Muslim students, despite being sponsored by the Guomindang government, often showed their own agency and interests in shaping diplomatic relations. The opportunity to study abroad, as well as the Hajj missions were used by the Hui students to actively participate in

Fuliang, a prominent Hui Muslim leader (Lin 90). The Goodwill Mission visited Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, India and Saudi Arabia (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 382). 22 Between 1928 and 1949, Beijing (meaning “Northern Capital”) was officially called Beiping (meaning “Northern Peace”) by the Guomindang government of Jiang Jieshi.

Chinese nation building efforts and advance their social and political standing domestically – often successfully (Mao “A Muslim Vision for the Chinese Nation” 390). Upon their return to

China, many former Azharites became influential figures in the intellectual, political and religious life of both the Republic of China, as well as the People‟s Republic after 1949 (Chen

“Re-Orientation” 39; Mao “Na Zhong”).

Islam in Anti-Imperialist diplomacy under Mao Zedong

The age of imperialism and the weak position of the newly established Chinese nation allowed the Hui to possess transnational and national identities simultaneously. Being able to identify as pious Muslim and at the same time as patriotic Chinese, made Chinese Azharites a valuable diplomatic tool, but also allowed them to influence China‟s international, as well as domestic politics. The rise of decolonisation and the idealisation of nationalism and the state brought an end to the importance pan-Islamic trans-nationalist ties (Chen “Re-Orientation” 49). The manifestation of the nation state in China after 1949, as well as in other parts of the Third World diminished Chinese Muslim opportunities to influence politics by their own agenda. John T.

Chen claims that “the Chinese Azharites‟ legacy of transnational exchange was stripped down and pressed into the service of the nation state” (“Re-Orientation” 49). Since the 1950s, the

People‟s Republic has employed the strategy of playing the “Islamic Card”, as it has been called by Dru Gladney (“Dislocating China” 235). According to this concept, China has been

“promoting its Muslims, and positive policies towards its Muslim minorities, to gain favour among many Muslim Middle Eastern countries” (Gladney “Dislocating China” 235). Under the communist government, Islam was reduced to a tool of promoting international relations, and not, as it has been previously, a religious ideology (Gladney “Dislocating China” 235).

Mao Zedong had the desire to keep close relations in the Middle East and the Third World in general, as he thought to establish China‟s leading role in the anti-imperialist struggle. Generally, the wider Muslim world was seen by the Chinese government as a potential ally against the imperialist West and the Republican government on Taiwan (Chen “When Islam was an Ally”).

An example of China‟s success in establishing ties with Muslim countries is especially seen during the Bandung Conference in 1954, the founding conference of the non-aligned movement.

The Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai, one of the most important participants of this anti- imperialist meeting, was accompanied by the influential Hui Imam Da Pusheng. Zhou attempted to present the treatment of China‟s Muslims in a positive light to garner support from Muslim countries in general, and from Egyptian president Gamal Abd El-Nasser in particular, who was seen as the leader of the Arab world (Chen “Re-Orientation” 47). Whether it was for China‟s

Islamic diplomacy or the country‟s harsh anti-imperialist stance - Beijing‟s strategy of rapprochement did not remain without success. In 1956 Nasser‟s Egypt became the first Arab and African state to recognise Mao‟s China. During the following five years, several Arab and

Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, Syria and Iraq followed Egypt‟s example and cut their diplomatic ties with the Taiwan-based Guomindang, in order to recognise Mao‟s People‟s

Republic as the only legitimate Chinese state.

Domestically, Chinese Muslim elites were able to retain their high social positions within the state. Hui Muslims were recognised as one of China‟s 56 ethnic groups in 1955; however, this

23 Particularly in the early years of its existence, the People‟s Republic of China was eager to gain support from recently independent Third World countries, as it needed international legitimacy against Jiang Jieshi‟s government on Taiwan. Until 1971, the People‟s Republic was not recognised as the legitimate Chinese government by the United Nations and only then gained its seat in the UN Security Council from the Republic of China.

categorisation classified them as an ethnic and not a religious minority (Chen “When Islam was an Ally”). The communist government was not interested in granting Chinese Muslims religious rights, such as the pilgrimage or state support for Islamic education, unless it deemed these aspects useful for political goals. Particularly during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) religious persecution was at its height, as Islamic worship was outlawed and many mosques were closed down. Simultaneously, China became increasingly internationally isolated and its anti- colonial cooperation with other Third World countries decreased.

For several decades after 1949, under the Communist Chinese government, scholarships for

Chinese Muslim students to study at Al-Azhar ceased to exist and no delegations were sent to

Egypt anymore. Only with the economic and political opening of China in the post-Mao era, transnational Islamic ties of China‟s Muslim community were once again deemed useful and the praxis of sponsoring Chinese students of Al-Azhar resumed. This time, however, economic instead of revolutionary and anti-imperialist objectives were dominant in establishing diplomatic and particularly trade links to the Middle East, as China gradually entered an era of global capitalism.

Towards Economic Cooperation

Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China entered a phase of gradual economic reform and an opening-up to the world‟s economic and political spheres. Since the late 1970s, Beijing‟s realignment to major powers was followed by a drop in anti-colonial Third World solidarity alliances and its relations to Middle Eastern states became predominantly economically motivated, especially in the field of energy security. Once again the option of Islamic Diplomacy seemed promising to China‟s leaders, as Sino-Middle Eastern cooperation intensified.

Encouraging friendly relations between Chinese Muslims and Islamic countries included cultural

exchange visits, as well as attracting Islamic and Arabic investments (Drewes 63). Since the

1980s, Chinese Muslims have repeatedly been employed as translators and „cultural experts‟ in

Chinese construction and investment projects in Arabic-speaking and Islamic countries (Drewes

72). Examples of Chinese state-sponsored construction projects in Egypt during this period include the Nile Corniche Highway, the International Conference Centre in Heliopolis, as well as the Cairo stadium (Gladney “Dislocating China” 236).

In 1981, the first state-sponsored group of Chinese Muslims24 since the 1940s arrived to study at

Al-Azhar. It consisted of ten Chinese Muslim students and was organised by the Islamic

Association of China (Wang). Even though this remained the only group of state-funded Chinese

Azharites for over a decade, China‟s course of political and societal opening, meant that the number of privately-funded individual Chinese Muslims travelling to Egypt for their studies would increase gradually from the late 1980s onwards (Drewes 73; Gladney “Dislocating China”

234).

In the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Uprising, the People‟s Republic of China found itself isolated by a Western-dominated, post-Cold War global community. As a response to that, China sought support from non-West states, which resulted in a new intensification of Sino-Arab relations after Tian‟anmen 1989 (Drewes 65; Gladney “Dislocating China” 236). A Sino-

Egyptian bilateral cultural exchange agreement in 1993 further deepened the relationship between the Chinese state and Al-Azhar University, as it was agreed that annually 25 Chinese

Muslim students would receive scholarships to study Arabic or Islamic sciences (Wang). Since

24 The 1981 group consisted of ten Chinese Muslim students, including six Hui, three Uighur and one Kazakh (Wang).

then, the number of Chinese Al-Azhar students has increased, yet the vast majority of them arrive on their own costs.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of self-financed Chinese students at Al-Azhar were

Uighurs, as they tended to receive financial and organisational support from relatives living abroad in Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Central Asia for their study at Al-Azhar (Gladney

“Dislocating China” 234). In 1992, out of a total number of thirty-four Chinese students at Al-

Azhar, twenty-eight were Uighurs and only six Hui (Gladney “Constructing a contemporary

Uighur national identity” 177). Hui students, who lacked sufficient international connections and financial means at that time often had no opportunity to travel to Egypt to receive education without government support (Gladney “Dislocating China” 234). It is due to the drastic rise in

Chinese real wages and living standards that the number of Hui studying at Al-Azhar has increased exponentially.

Chinese Students at Al-Azhar Today

Currently the number of Chinese students at Al-Azhar ranges between 1000 and 2000 (Jin). At this point it should be mentioned that it is difficult to provide concrete statistics, as the student population is constantly shifting and official statistics are difficult to access. Even though the current estimate of Chinese Azharites has risen extraordinarily over the past ten to fifteen years, they still form a considerably small minority within Al-Azhar‟s foreign student population of

39,69425 in the academic year of 2014-2015 (Cairo Post).

25 “The majority of students come from Asia at 16,487, while 9,488 are from Arab countries, 6,525 are from the African Sub-Sahara, 3,754 from Europe, 2,883 from Russia and the Commonwealth and only 830 from the Americas and Australia” (Cairo Post).

The majority of Cairo‟s Muslim Chinese students are living in the vicinity of Al-Azhar

University, particularly in the Cairene districts of Abbasiya and Nasr City. Forming a relatively closed community, most of the students are sharing apartments with fellow Chinese, often even from the same hometown (Jin). During an interview, a Chinese student from Yunnan told me that most of the Yunnan students are living around Ahmed Saeed Street in Abbasiya, while particularly Uighurs and other groups from Xinjiang preferred to stay in the 7th and 8th district of

Nasr City (Jin). Hui people from the Northwest Chinese provinces of Ningxia, Gansu and

Qinghai, who form the majority of Chinese students at Al-Azhar, live in both Abbasiya and Nasr

City, due to their large numbers (Jin). The rise of the student population has led to the establishment of several Chinese Muslim restaurants serving halal food from Northwest China, but also from the Yunnan province. These restaurants, which are usually set up by current or former students of Al-Azhar, serve as meeting points of the community. While contact with

Egyptians and other foreigners exists, it remains relatively scarce, mainly perpetuated by the language barrier. Most Chinese Azharites have a command of Fusha, which they study at the university, but lack sufficient skills of the Egyptian dialect to fully communicate with the local population. The majority of Egyptians, whom they are socializing with, are Chinese language students of Ain Shams University, which is located close to Abbasiya. Thus, Standard Chinese26 and regional Chinese dialects 27 remain the most-spoken language within the Hui student community.

26 Standard Chinese or Putonghua is in the West often referred to as Mandarin. It is the official standardised language of the People‟s Republic of China. 27 Such as the North-West Lan-Yin Mandarin (Lanyin Guanhua), which is spoken in Gansu, Ningxia and Northern Xinjiang – areas with significant Hui Muslim populations.

Nowadays, the vast majority of Al-Azhar University‟s Chinese students are privately funded.

Numbers are difficult to access, yet a Chinese student estimated that more than 90 per cent of the

Chinese students are arriving in Egypt on their own money (Ma). If we assume that the Chinese government is still sending 25 students annually, as mentioned in the 1993 agreement, and take into considerations that most students will spend between five to eight years in Egypt, this number seems fairly accurate. In the past, students have repeatedly complained privately that the number of public scholarships given to Al-Azhar students by the Chinese government is low compared to those provided to Chinese students of other, secular institutions, such as Ain Shams

University or Cairo University (Gladney “Constructing a contemporary Uighur national identity”

177; Ma). Many attribute this reluctance of financing religious education to the government‟s atheist outlook. Despite the fact that most students are financing their studies in Egypt on their own, many of them quote that studying in Cairo is cheaper or only slightly more expensive than in China. In contrast to Chinese universities, Al-Azhar does not charge tuition fees and the living costs in Cairo are below those in China, especially as real income continues to rise for many people in China. One student from Yunnan told me that he can live on 1000 Egyptian pounds per month in Cairo (Jin). Some Chinese students have opened restaurants or work as translators in order to support themselves financially during their stay in Cairo.

In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, when the majority of the modest number of Chinese at Al-

Azhar was predominantly Uighur, the Hui now form the majority of Muslim Chinese in Cairo. In an interview, a Chinese Azhar student estimated that between 70 and 80 per cent of the students of Al-Azhar are Hui, while only 10 to 15 per cent are Uighur (Jin). Not only the improved economic situation of the Hui, but also government restrictions placed on Uighur travel abroad, particularly in the case of religious education, are a reason for this development. Additionally to

Uighur and Hui students, a small number of Chinese Muslims of other ethnicities, such as

Kazakhs are currently enrolled at Al-Azhar (Jin).

In regard to the education level of the students, one interviewee commented that those coming to study at Al-Azhar are not the best students who graduate from Chinese high schools and might not have the chance to enter a good university in China (Lai). Therefore, studying abroad at Al-

Azhar provides them with an opportunity of enormous prestige. Al-Azhar, as the oldest and most renowned institution of Islamic learning enjoys an excellent reputation even in China, particularly among its Muslim population (Jin). Thus, job prospects as imams or religious teachers for those returning to China after their studies are comparatively good. It is important to acknowledge that it is dangerous to generalise about the reasons why Chinese students to study in Cairo, yet it is likely that the motivations of some might not only be religious.

Most of the Chinese students, whom I interviewed, stated that they planned to return to China at one point in their life. Most of the students spend between five and eight years studying at Al-

Azhar before returning home. As mentioned above, some Chinese students aspire to become imams or religious teachers back in China, where they are highly regarded as graduates of the prestigious Al-Azhar University. Others, however, plan to pursue a worldlier career path, often working as translators of Arabic and Chinese or accept a job in a Chinese company operating in the Middle East. Some former graduates have opened businesses in Egypt or in other Middle

Eastern countries, yet those seem to remain the minority (Su, Krahl 2; Wei). Some plan to continue their further studies in different places, such as Saudi Arabia or Malaysia.

As an officially atheist state, which is controlling religious practice domestically, it seemed odd that no restrictions were placed on Muslim students to obtain a religious education abroad and outside of the reach of the Chinese government. Yet, during my interviews with Hui students, I

was assured that no restrictions exist to come and study at Al-Azhar for most of them. This, however, only seems to be the case for Chinese Hui Muslims and not for Uighurs. During my interviews, I have heard of restrictions on Uighurs to travel abroad to study at Al-Azhar. Even though, I do not have concrete evidence to support this claim, it seems likely considering

Chinese policies against separatism in Xinjiang. It is probable that Uighurs who plan to study abroad face difficulties obtaining travel documents and might have to undergo background checks, as the Chinese government fears that they will come into contact with radical religious or separatist ideologies.

Chinese Azharites: A Tool of Foreign Policy or Individual Agency?

A Tool of Foreign Policy?

Over the past thirty years, as the economic and political power and influence of China has continuously increased, it seems that the strategy of Islamic diplomacy is rendered less and less relevant. During the time of the early delegations to Al-Azhar in the 1930s and also throughout the communist period up to the 1990s, when China was still a weak state with limited international influence, playing the „Islamic Card‟ might have been crucial for the Chinese state in order to establish relations with Middle Eastern countries. Particularly under the communist government, Chinese Muslims were clearly used as a tool to influence foreign relations, as their own agency was diminished by an overly assertive nation state (Chen “When Islam was an

Ally”).

Within the last decade, China has become the largest trading partner of several Middle Eastern states, including Egypt. Bilateral trade between the two countries has grown more than ten-fold in only 10 years from a mere 1.089 billion US-$ in 2003 to nearly 11.5 billion US-$ in 2014

(ICT Trade Map). Additionally, China and Egypt declared a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2014, cementing Egypt‟s increasingly important role in the development of

China‟s “Silk Road Economic Belt” (Tiezzi). During the same period of time, Chinese investment in Egypt experienced a similar surge, rising from an annual sum of 940 million US-$ in 2006 up to 4.31 billion US-$ in 2015 – amassing to the total sum of 13.19 billion US-$ being invested over the last decade (China Global Investment Tracker).

This development renders the soft power tool of Chinese Muslims increasingly less crucial for

Chinese foreign policy. As Cairo‟s largest trading partner, Beijing is wielding tremendous economic power – especially since the trade balance between the two countries is highly unbalanced in favour of China,28 offering Beijing a number of ways to shape and influence bilateral relations, other than the dependence on potentially unreliable Islamic diplomacy.

Despite – or maybe because of this recent surge in Sino-Islamic economic and political cooperation, Chinese Muslims do not play the role they used to anymore in international relations. Yet the potential of Chinese Islam to foster closer relations to Muslim majority countries still exist and might be further exploited in the future, for example to attract Arab investment and businesses to China (Drewes 70; Sun, Zoubir 14)

Azharite Agency

During the first half of the 20th century, when the Chinese state remained weak, it needed to rely on individual agents, such as Chinese Al-Azhar students in order to maintain international relations. Chinese Muslims actively used this situation, seeking to improve their position in

28 Out of the total bilateral trade volume of almost 11 billion US-$ between Egypt and China in 2013, 8.38 billion US-$ consisted of Chinese exports to Egypt (ITC Trade Map). These mainly manufactured goods, such as textiles, machinery and electronics. Egyptian exports to China consisted predominantly of raw materials, such as crude oil, petroleum, gas and cotton (ITC Trade Map).

China by promoting China and Chinese Islam abroad. Regarding this history of Chinese Muslim students at Al-Azhar and particularly focusing on their individual agency and influence during the 1930s as „free-lance diplomats‟, it is surprising to see that not much remains of this legacy today. Contemporary individual influence of Chinese Al-Azhar students on international relations has been diminished drastically in comparison to the situation of the 1930s. Three main reasons for this development can be pointed out. These are the formation of a strong and unified nation state in China following 1949, Beijing‟s growing global economic and political influence, as well as the nature of individual students.

Firstly, we have to take into consideration that it was only due to China‟s weakness at the time that the Chinese Azharites of the 1930s were able to project great influence on Sino-Egyptian relations. Due to global imperialism and a similarly precarious situation of the Chinese, as well as the Egyptian state, the transnational Islamic ties of Chinese Muslims became a powerful tool for them to shape global South-South relations. After the establishment of the People‟s Republic, and the consequent manifestation and centralisation of the Chinese state, religious exchange ceased to be the priority of a now officially atheist state. Even though Chinese Muslims were still employed in efforts of Islamic diplomacy by the Communist government, their individual agency in shaping international relations came increasingly under scrutiny by an ever more powerful nation state (Chen 49). Secondly, the tremendous Chinese influence in economic terms has limited the influence of Chinese students, as Beijing nowadays possesses a variety of ways to impact bilateral ties.

Additionally, contemporary Chinese Azharites are, unlike the participants in the 1930s Al-Azhar delegations, no high-profile Islamic scholars prior to their arrival. Rather, they are Muslim

Chinese high school graduates, who potentially just took the opportunity to study at a prestigious

university abroad (Lai). As Su and Krahl note, Chinese Muslims in Egypt still tend to end up at the lower end of Chinese society abroad. Within the Oversea Chinese Community in Egypt,

Chinese Muslims lack socio-economic power, financial opportunities and political connections, which results in an almost complete lack of diplomatic and political influence (Lai). However, many young Chinese Muslims see their stay abroad in the Middle East as a chance to participate in the Chinese economic miracle (Su, Krahl 2).

Even though, socio-economic and political influence of these Chinese students is decreasing, one should not forget that Chinese Muslims still benefit from the current situation on a personal level. Improving Sino-Egyptian relations and the chance of an affordable and prestigious higher education at Al-Azhar provide Chinese Muslims with the opportunity to obtain a religious education - in a form, which is impossible in China. Thus, most Chinese Muslims are satisfied with the status quo and do not anticipate further direct influence on Sino-Egyptian relations.

Contemporary Developments

Egyptian Revolution Throughout the past five years, political and economic relations between Beijing and Cairo have continued to improve – despite political unrest in Egypt (Krahl 50). This is particularly grounded in China‟s enormously pragmatic foreign policy, which allowed Beijing to uphold good relations with all Egyptian governments of the past five years. It is symbolic for China‟s significance for

Egypt that both Muhammed Morsi and his successor Abd ElFatah As-Sisi made their first official state visits to the People‟s Republic respectively.

As the revolution in 2011 was taking place, however, international commentators were particularly keen to point towards a potential spill-over to China (Mu, Pollack). The short-lived

and largely ineffective Jasmine civil rights movement 29 was seen as a direct result of the revolutions in the Arab World. Particularly, the Islamic character of the Arab Spring was worrying for Beijing, as tightened security in Xinjiang at that time illustrates (Horesh 171).

It is, however, difficult to determine in how far Chinese students studying in Egypt at that time have been influenced by the events of the revolution. Certainly, Chinese Muslims in Egypt experienced the revolution a lot differently than their counterparts in China and might bring home ideas of protest, revolution and political Islam (Wen). So far there has been no evidence for this development.

Potential Islamist backlash Discussing China‟s concept Islamic diplomacy, observers often point out the possibility of backlash of an Islamist nature (Drewes 77; Greenfield). As the Chinese government is allowing and funding Islamic education domestically and abroad, the fear persists of a potential radicalisation of Chinese Muslims to the disadvantage of the Chinese state. Particularly looking at Islamist activity in China itself, this might be a worrying thought.

Islamists in China are predominantly Uighur fighters, who link their religious ideology to national separatism of „East Turkestan‟.30 In the ongoing conflict in Xinjiang, radical Islamist organisations, such as the Turkestan Islamic Party31 have played a central role, as the Chinese

29 Inspired by the Arab Spring in the Middle East, the short-lived and small-scale pro-democracy Jasmine civil rights movement took place in China in 2011. The movement was unable to gain popular support and remained largely ineffective, yet it prompted a considerable government response. The movement‟s name is derived from Tunisia‟s Jasmine Revolution, which brought down President Ben Ali in January 2011. 30 Uighur separatists refer to the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region as “East Turkestan”. 31 Turkestan Islamic Party or East Turkestan Islamic Party has been formerly known as East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Traditionally, TIP is said to have strong links to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as other radical Islamist movements across Central Asia.

government claims. It is however not the case that members of the organisation have an affiliation with Al-Azhar University. Rather, most of them have been trained across the border of

Xinjiang in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Furthermore, Egypt could be potentially used by Chinese radical Islamists as a stepping stone to join Daesh in Syria or Iraq. As there are currently more than 300 Chinese nationals fighting for

Daesh, these fears do not seem ungrounded (Spencer). Most of these fighters, the vast majority of whom is Uighur, have however entered Syria through Turkey, where there already exists a large Uighur exile community (Spencer). Potentially also out of these fears, the numbers of

Uighur students are disproportionally low at Al-Azhar, as restrictions are placed on them to travel abroad to pursue religious education.

While the concerns of an Islamist backlash certainly exist, the Chinese government seems to put hope into the economic integration of Chinese Muslims, which might lower ethnic tensions within China (Su, Krahl 1). Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the use of Islam and

Chinese Muslims as a diplomatic tool remains a mixed blessing for Beijing (Drewes 77).

Conclusion

In conclusion, we can see how the role of Chinese students at Al-Azhar has been fundamentally altered by the rise of China as a global economic superpower. Already in its early years, Jiang

Jieshi‟s government sponsored delegations of Chinese Muslim students to study at Cairo‟s Al-

Azhar University in order to improve relations with the Middle East by employing the alleged transnational religious ties of China‟s Muslim community.

Chinese Muslims, who studied in Cairo, had been influential in shaping the early relations between the newly founded Chinese Republic in the 1930s and 1940s. Albeit their small

numbers, they actively engaged in „freelance diplomacy‟ to strengthen the Chinese nation, as well as the position of Chinese Muslims within it. The global age of imperialism and China‟s weak international standing made the transnational Islamic connections of Chinese Muslims crucial to establish Sino-Middle-Eastern relations, simultaneously allowing Al-Azhar students to identify as both, pious believers and patriotic citizens.

This unique case of Azharite agency, however, ceased to exist with the emergence of the powerful nation state in the form of the People‟s Republic of China in 1949. The new communist government allowed no room for transnational connections, if they were not deemed useful and thus the support for religious education abroad was cut. While Islamic diplomacy continued to be practiced under the rule of Mao Zedong to foster international anti-imperialist alliances, Chinese

Muslims were denied their agency within the process.

With the economic opening in the late 1970s, the Chinese government once again began to support the scholarship of Chinese students at Al-Azhar – this time to improve economic relations with the Middle East. Nowadays, more than thousand Chinese Muslims are studying at

Cairo‟s Al-Azhar University, most of them however on their own expenses. As the economic rise of China over the last three decades has permeated Sino-Egyptian relations to an unprecedented degree, Islamic diplomacy has increasingly lost its importance. Contemporary China possesses a plethora of ways to shape and influence bilateral relations with Cairo, making them independent from potentially unreliable Azharites.

Developments in recent years, such as the Arab Spring, the insurgency in Xinjiang and the increase of radicalised political Islam in Iraq and Syria, contribute to China‟s perception of

Islamic diplomacy as a mixed blessing. Yet, the importance of Chinese Islam and Chinese

Azharites for soft power and cultural diplomacy should not be underestimated in the future.

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