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Ultra Low Latency Connectivity Services for Financial Customers

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Ultra Low Latency Connectivity Services for Financial Customers Ultra-Low Latency Connectivity for Financial & Capital Markets Visit us at www.ctamericas.com Global Financial & Trading Center Connectivity London Frankfurt Moscow Dalian Chicago Tokyo Zhengzhou Shanghai New York Shenzhen Los Angeles Hong Kong Singapore Ultra-Low Latency Route Availability SH - LON SH - CHI SH - FRK TOK - NY London TOK - CHI Moscow Frankfurt SH - HK Chicago HK - LON Beijing HK-MOS Tokyo Shanghai HK - NY Los Angeles New York Shenzhen SH - TOK Hong Kong HK - FRK HK – SGP SH - NY Shenzhen Singapore SZ – HK HK - LA SH - SGP HK - CHI Hong Kong Network Options . Multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) virtual private network (VPN): Get service level agreements with 99.9%- plus availability for secure converged data, voice and, video traffic-all on a single network connection. Private line services: Support your global networking, security, and business continuity requirements with Ethernet Virtual Private Line, Ethernet Private Line, Optical Wavelength Service and International Private Line. Internet bandwidth: Connect your users and bandwidth- intensive business applications, with superior peering and interconnectivity—plus reliability with a network \ recovery time of less than 50 milliseconds. Expected Guaranteed Round Trip Shanghai – Chicago 155ms 158ms Shanghai – New York 171ms 174ms Latencies China-USA Hong Kong – Chicago 172ms 175ms (POP-to-POP) Hong Kong – New York 190ms 193ms June 2018 Hong Kong – Los Angeles 140ms 143ms Tokyo – Chicago 126ms 129ms Japan-USA Tokyo – New York 143ms 146ms Shanghai – Frankfurt (TMP) 155ms 158ms Shanghai – Frankfurt (TSR+) 145ms 147ms Shanghai – London 148ms 151ms • Expected Latency figures are China - Euro Hong Kong – Frankfurt (TMP) 167ms 169ms based on SDH loopback test Hong Kong – Frankfurt (TSR+) 153ms 156ms (Bandwidth: E1, round trip delay) Hong Kong – London 159ms 162ms Hong Kong – Moscow 122ms 125ms • Expected Latency figures are Shenzhen – Hong Kong 1.82ms 2.00ms only obtained from tests between Shanghai – Hong Kong 25ms 26ms the selected POP in each city Shanghai – Singapore 53ms 55ms Inner Asia Shanghai – Tokyo 24ms 26ms Hong Kong – Singapore 30ms 32ms Tokyo – Singapore 65ms 67ms Shanghai – Dalian 35ms 37ms China Shanghai – Zhengzhou 19ms 20ms Mainland Zhengzhou – Dalian 36ms 37ms Shanghai – Chicago Primary Routing Latency: 155ms U.S.A. Hillsboro CLS Chicago TPE China Shanghai Chongming **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shanghai – New York Updated: 03-APR-2015 Primary Routing Latency: 171ms U.S.A. Hillsboro CLS Chicago TPE China New York Shanghai Chongming **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Hong Kong – Chicago Updated: 14-APR-2015 Harbour U.S. Pointe PC-1 Japan Seattle Chicago Tokyo Ajigaura Chikura Primary Routing China Latency:172ms SJC Hong KongChung Hom Kok **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Hong Kong – New York Updated: 03-APR-2015 Harbour U.S. Pointe PC-1 Japan Seattle New York Tokyo Chicago Ajigaura Chikura Primary Routing China Latency:190ms SJC Hong KongChung Hom Kok **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Hong Kong – Los Angeles Updated: 14-APR-2017 Japan U.S.A. China Chikura Los Angeles Unity Hong Kong SJC Chung Hom Kok Primary Routing Latency: 140ms **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Tokyo – Chicago Updated: 14-APR-2015 Primary Routing Latency: 126ms Harbour Pointe U.S.A. CLS Seattle Japan PC-1 Chicago China Tokyo **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Tokyo – New York Updated: 03-APR-2015 Primary Routing Latency: 143ms Harbour Pointe U.S. CLS Seattle Japan PC-1 Chicago China New York Tokyo **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shanghai – Frankfurt (Transit-Mongolia) Updated: 14-APR-2015 Sweden Stockholm Moscow Russia Germany Frankfurt Mongolia Erenhot Primary Routing Beijing Latency: 158ms China Shanghai **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shanghai – Frankfurt (Transit-Kazakhstan) Updated: 07-APR-2016 Russia Frankfurt Kazakhstam Aketobe Urumqi Primary Routing China Latency: 147ms Shanghai **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shanghai – London (Transit-Mongolia) Updated: 14-APR-2015 Sweden Stockholm Moscow U.K. Russia London Mongolia Erenhot Primary Routing Beijing Latency: 148ms China Shanghai **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Hong Kong – Frankfurt (Transit-Mongolia) Updated: 14-APR-2015 Sweden Stockholm Moscow Russia Germany Frankfurt Mongolia Erenhot Primary Routing Beijing Latency: 169ms China Hong Kong **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Hong Kong – Frankfurt (Transit-Kazakhstan) Updated: 07-APR-2016 Russia Germany Frankfurt Kazakhstam Aketobe Urumqi Primary Routing China Latency: 156ms Hong Kong **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Hong Kong – London (Transit-Mongolia) Updated: 14-APR-2015 Sweden Stockholm Moscow U.K. Russia London Mongolia Erenhot Primary Routing Beijing Latency: 159ms China Hong Kong **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Hong Kong – Moscow (Transit-Mongolia) Updated: 08-APR-2016 Moscow Russia Mongolia Erenhot Primary Routing Beijing Latency: 122ms China Hong Kong **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shenzhen – Hong Kong (Terrestrial Cable) Updated: 14-APR-2015 Shenzhen Primary Routing New Territories Latency: 2ms Kowloon Hong Kong Hong Kong Island **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shanghai – Hong Kong Updated: 14-APR-2015 Wuhu Huzhou Anqing Shanghai Primary Routing Hangzhou Latency: Jiujiang 25ms Jinhua Nanchang Jian Nanping Ganzhou Guangzhou Shenzhen Hong Kong **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shanghai – Singapore Updated: 14-APR-2015 China Shanghai Shantou Hong Kong Primary Routing Latency: 53ms APCN-2 Malaysia Singapore **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shanghai – Tokyo Japan Kitaibaraki Tokyo Maruyama Chikura Primary Routing China Latency: 24ms Chongming Shanghai TPE **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Hong Kong – Singapore (Equinix) Updated: 14-APR-2015 China Shantou Hong Kong Primary Routing Latency: 30ms EAC Singapore **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Tokyo - Singapore Japan Kitaibaraki Tokyo China Maruyama Chikura Primary Routing Latency: 65ms APCN-2 Malaysia Singapore **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shanghai – Dalian Updated: 25-SEP-2015 Dalian Primary Routing Latency: 35ms Yantai Qingdao Rizhao Nantong Suzhou Shanghai **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Shanghai – Zhengzhou Updated: 14-APR-2016 Zhengzhou Lianyungang Shangqiu Huaibei Xuzhou Yancheng Primary Routing Nantong Latency: Suzhou 19ms Shanghai **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Zhengzhou-Dalian Updated: 14-APR-2016 Dalian Yantai Zibo Weifang Jinan Qingdao Zhengzhou Jining Zaozhuang Shangqiu Xuzhou Primary Routing Huaibei Latency: 36ms **Resilience options can be provided on individual case basis Failover Options TPE (Primary) Failover due to primary fault Shanghai Tokyo APCN2 (Backup) Automatic Restorative Failover TPE (Primary) Auto-recovery Shanghai Tokyo APCN2 (Backup) Manual Restorative Failover TPE (Primary) Manual-recovery Shanghai Tokyo APCN2 (Backup) Active Recovery After Failover Auto-Recovery Domestic SDH systems (International Usage) Auto-Recovery Overseas SDH systems (ONNET) Manual-Recovery on demand** **Manual-Recovery on demand OFFNET resources OR For OFFNET resources or some submarine cable Submarine cable systems systems which are not controlled by CT, active recovery procedure is as following: – 1. Trouble ticket issued by GCSC upon reception of customer’s requirement – 2. Negotiation with OFFNET vendor or submarine cable NOC to determine maintenance window after primary route fault has been fixed – 3. Switch customer circuit from backup route to primary route during maintenance window Proximity Hosting Transmission POPs Inside Key Securities Exchanges & Financial Data Centers CME Data Center, Aurora HKEx Data Center SGX Data Center Tokyo Chuo Center 1/F 60 Hudson St. **Extra latency will be introduced due to inner city optical fiber transmission Industry-leading APAC Latency Figures Route Latency Route Detail Capacity 189ms Via SJC+PC-1 CT 198ms via TPE CT Hong Kong – New 218ms via AAG Other York 205ms via EAC+UNITY Other 196ms via IA+PC-1 Other Hong Kong – 2ms HK to SZ Direct CT Shenzhen 8-10ms via Guangzhou Other 53ms APCN2 via Shantou CT 58ms via EAC Other Shanghai – Singapore 60ms via IA Other 62ms APCN2 via Hong Kong Other 159ms via Mongolia terrestrial cable CT Hong Kong – London 174ms via Mongolia terrestrial cable Other Key Service Features & Benefits . Competitive SLA pledge SLA commitment on latency, MTTR, Service Delivery Date & more! . Industry-leading Service Availability Managed connectivity into exchanges w/ autofailover redundancy . High Service Security Dedicated circuits based on SDH/SONNET . Scalable Bandwidth Available bandwidths up to 100Gig-E with range of access options . Proximity with Major Financial Exchanges 24 established low – latency routes directly connecting 13 priemer financial markets around the world. Global One-Stop Service Global 24x7 help desk, trouble ticketing portal and dedicated customer project teams. Get Connected and Stay Ahead . Schedule a Meeting Ryan Oklewicz, Deputy Dir. Marketing [email protected] . Visit Us: https://www.ctamericas.com.
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