Qewriva και Στωικη Aρετή
MAXIMILIAN FORSCHNER
Aυτή η ανακοίνωση έχει διπλό στόχο: η πρωταρχική της πρόθεση είναι να υποστηρίξει ότι η στωική αντίληψη της αρετής δεν ήταν, αρχικά, κυριαρικά ηθική· αποδεικνύοντας αυτό, η ανακοίνωση έχει την πρόθεση επίσης να σκιαγραφήσει τους λόγους που έκαναν τον Kικέρωνα να αναλάβει μια τέτοιου είδους ηθικοποίησης (moralisation). Όσον αφορά τον πρώτο στόχο, η ανακοίνωση καθοδηγείται από την υπόθεση ότι ούτε το κεντρικό δόγμα της Στωικής φιλοσοφίας, δηλαδή η ταύτιση της αρετής με την ευδαιμονία, ούτε η ιδιοτυπία των δογμάτων τους για τα πάθη (emotions) μπορούν να γίνουν κατανοητά χωρίς να λάβει κανείς υπόψη τον κεντρικό ρόλο που η qewriva πρέπει να είχε διαδραματίσει στην αντίληψή τους για την τέλεια ανθρώπινη ζωή. Όσον αφορά το δεύτερο στόχο, η ανακοίνωση καθοδηγείται από την ιδέα, ότι αυτός ο (αναγκαστικά “δογματικός”) ρόλος της qewriva" δεν εναρμονίζονταν με τη μορφή του ακαδημαϊκού σκεπτικισμού του Kικέρωνα. Έτεινε, επομένως, ο Kικέρωνας, για να μην πούμε ότι ήταν αναγκασμένος, να τον τροποποιήσει και να τον υποβαθμίσει. O ηγετικός ρόλος που πρώτιστα διαδραματίζονταν από τη qewriva εντός της στωικής αντίληψης της αρετής είναι ακόμη ευδιάκριτος στο Kικέρωνα, οποτεδήποτε εκθέτει απλώς στωικά δόγματα ή όπου επιχειρηματολογεί υπέρ μιας στωικής θέσης χρησιμοποιώντας το σκεπτικό του λόγο και τη μέθοδο της αντιλογίας (counter-speech method). Όπως η ανακοίνωση προσπαθεί να δείξει, κάπως λεπτομερεικά, ακριβώς αυτό αποδεικνύεται με παραδειγματικό τρόπο στο έργο Tusculanae (Disputationes).
Theoria and Stoic Virtue Zeno's Legacy in Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes V
MAXIMILIAN FORSCHNER
Nec tamen istas quaestiones physicorum exterminandas puto. est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae: erigimur, altiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus cogitantesque supera atque caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. indagatio ipsa rerum cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem; si vero aliquid occurrit, quod verisimile videatur, humanissima completur animus voluptate. quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester, ut adsentiatur credat adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus, veri simile quod sit invenerit. Cicero, Acad. libr. Lucullus 127/8.
Cicero owes his philosophical chattels partly to the legacy of Zeno. As he puts it himself quite clearly, he worked with the heritage of Greek philosophy "according to his own judgement and discretion"1 and he has passed it on in a considerably altered form.
1 Cf. De off. I, 6: Sequimur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos, non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus (italics M. F.). Cf. De fin. I, 6. 262 Maximilian Forschner
Among the stock of traditional doctrines which bear his stamp is a predominantly moral reading of the Stoic concept of virtue,2 a concept developed in exemplary manner in De officiis, the very work which has ensured the lasting influence of this idea even until the present day. This paper3 pursues a twofold goal: its primary intention is to argue that the Stoic conception of virtue was not, originally, a predominantly moral one; in demonstrating this the paper is also intended to sketch the reasons for Cicero’s undertaking of such moralisation. As far as the first goal is concerned, I am guided by the assumption that neither the central dogma of the Stoics' philosophy, i. e. the identification of virtue with happiness, nor the peculiarity of their doctrine of the emotions, can be understood without consideration of the central role theoria must have played in their idea of the perfect human life. With regard to the second goal, I am guided by the idea that this (necessarily "dogmatic") role of theoria did not fit in with Cicero's form of academic scepticism. He was, therefore, inclined if not forced to modify and downgrade it . It seems to me that the leading role originally played by theoria within the Stoic concept of virtue is still detectable in Cicero,
2 Originally it was Ariston of Chios, the cynic-sceptic disciple of Zeno, who in a self-willed way moralized the Stoic concept of virtue. It probably makes good sense when in the doxographic context of Tusc. V, beside Zeno, the founder and head of the Stoic school, only Ariston of Chios is mentioned (V, 21; V, 33). After all, we know Ariston wanted philosophy to be restricted to ethics; logic and physics seemed to him of no use for the ars vivendi nor for ethics, because we cannot reach exact and certain knowledge as far as the genuine objects of physics are concerned (cf. SVF I, 351 - 355; 378; Steinmetz 1994, 560). The "heresy" of Ariston’s position presumably touched the essential role theoria has played within the frame of the "orthodox" Zenonian concept of virtue. And this could explain why Ariston, representing a cynic-sceptic variant of Stoic philosophy, was of some lasting importance for Cicero, as is manifest also in De finibus (III, 11; 12; 50) . 3 I am grateful to F. Buddensiek, M. Erler, W. Görler and J. Kulenkampff for their helpful comments on and critique of an earlier draft of this paper, and, above all, to W. Ertl for its English version. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 263 whenever he is simply reporting Stoic doctrine, or where he argues for a Stoic position using his sceptical speech and counter-speech method. As I shall try to show, exactly this is demonstrated in an exemplary manner in the Tusculanae. But even there, the original conception of virtue is overshadowed by Cicero's own view which, notwithstanding the acknowledgement of the outstanding rank of theoretical wisdom,4 in respect of which we are similar to the gods, is primarily concerned with engagement in the societas vitae.5 By nature, man strives for knowledge; exploring, inquiring, and contemplating basic, hidden, difficult, and miraculous things are activities closest to our nature6 and accordingly this striving is "the one most delightful food of the soul".7 But the striving which supports the agitatio mentis and keeps it going finds no rest in this life (because of the earthly state of the human soul)8 and our knowledge (of nature and its underlying order) in fact remains defective and dubious.9 Only after death, when it has left behind its earthly weight, the pressure of desire, its neediness and its vulnerability (if this should ever come to pass), will the most splendid thing be possible for the human soul: namely, the divine and unhindered knowing contemplation of heavenly and earthly things. In virtue of this anthropologically based sceptical position Cicero seems to hold the view that the most important task for man is the political and moral care of society and the concomitant actio vitae.10 In a wholly non-Stoic manner he therefore divides life into the realms of otium and negotium and relates theoria to otium. It is for
4 Cf. De off. I, 13; I, 18. 5 Cf. De off. I, 19; I, 22. 6 De off. I, 18: maxime naturam attingit humanam. 7 Tusc V, 66: unus suavissimus pastus animorum; cf. De off. I, 13. 8 De off. I, 19: ... agitatio mentis, quae numquam adquiescit ... . 9 Cf. W. Burkert, Cicero als Platoniker und Skeptiker, in: Gymnasium 72 (1965), 175 - 200. This article most impressively reveals Cicero’s kind of scepticism concerning the genuine items of physics. 10 The only people who are exempt from the obligation to engage practically in public matters are those who are not fit for it or not capable of it because of their personal circumstances. Cf. De off. I, 71 sq. 264 Maximilian Forschner this reason that he castigates those who, because of their dominating interest in research and study, let down people who ought to be protected.11 He considers it to be a vitium that "some men bestow far too much eagerness on obscure, difficult, but unnecessary things"12, and he even characterises the life of first-rate philosophers as an "escape into leisure".13 It is for this reason that he has theoria reach a perfect state only in the hoped-for beyond.14 For this same reason, too, he passes lightly over the systematically important question of how in the Stoic position the cardinal virtues unite to form the unity of virtue15 and the question of how prudent and just conduct in everyday life results from Stoic wisdom.
1
The 5th and final conversation of the Tusculanae disputationes deals with the central and most controversial dogma of Stoic ethics, according to which virtue is sufficient for a happy life.17 It is a dogma the acceptance of which indicates decisively membership or otherwise of the School, and a dogma which - from the very beginning - has clearly marked the frontier between competing philosophical positions.18 This doctrine of the self-sufficiency of virtue must seem to be paradoxical, if not absurd, against the background of a modern conception of ethics, be this conception Kantian or utilitarian. In fact, this impression of paradox was appreciated in antiquity as well. People then were also acquainted with the fickleness of fate, with the
11 Cf. De off. I, 29: discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt. 12 De off. I, 19. 13 Cf. De off. I, 69. 14 Cf. Tusc. I, 42 - 47. 15 Cf. De off. I, 15. 16 Cf. Tusc. V, 72. 17 Tusc. V, 1: virtutem ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam. 18 Cf. Tusc. V, 32 - 33. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 265 endangerment of institutions, and with the fragility and proneness to suffering of human life. Right at the beginning of the conversation, Cicero's scepticism readily adds its voice to the vox populi: "It is to be feared that as regards our hope for a happy life we may not base our confidence on virtue, but we must rather, it seems, resort to prayers".19 And he does indeed formulate a prayer in the prooimion, but the addressee is not one of the great divine figures which popular faith believed to be benevolent, but an elitist, completely rational institution, i. e. philosophy. Nor does the prayer contain any petitions. It contains, rather, grateful and hymnic praise of an authority to which the guidance of life, the search for virtue and the expulsion of faults has been given over.20 In De finibus Cicero had put forward the crucial objection against the Stoic identification of happiness with virtue. Man is not a free-floating pure spirit; the highest good, in which all human striving is completed and satisfied, could only be based exclusively on virtue if man was a being which consisted solely of a spiritual substance in full control of itself.21 But even in passages of his oeuvre in which his critique of Stoic doctrines is most intense and in which his own position seems to be rather close to Academic and Peripatetic points of view, points of view which commit the whole man to wisdom's care,22 he still puts his money on the development of virtues and conjures up the greatness of soul that comes along with them: by means of this greatness of soul "one could easily resist ... fate, because the most important things lie in the hands of the wise."23
19 V, 2: vereor ne non tam virtutis fiducia nitendum nobis ad spem beate vivendi quam vota facienda videantur. 20 V, 5: O vitae philosophia dux, o virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum. 21 De fin. IV, 28: uno autem modo in virtute sola summum bonum recte poneretur, si quod esset animal, quod totum ex mente constaret, id ipsum tamen sic, ut ea mens nihil haberet in se, quod esset secundum naturam, ut valetudo est. Cf. De fin. IV, 41. 22 Cf. De fin. IV, 17. 23 De fin IV, 17: Atque ab his initiis profecti omnium virtutum et originem et 266 Maximilian Forschner
The Tusculanae, written after De finibus, contain the most determined pleading for the Stoic doctrine. The prayerful hymn in the prooimion of book 5 reveals an extraordinarily broad conception of philosophy. It refers to it as the foundation of political order as well as the source of guidance in morals and science. The old title of wisdom referred to "the knowledge of divine and human things and to the insight into the origins and causes of all appearances".24 Presumably, Cicero quotes this formula here, because the Stoics had integrated it into their well- known definition of philosophy.25 His general conception of philosophy in his later works is indebted to the tradition of Socratics and of the sceptical Academy, and he wants to see discussions carried out in the style of Carneades.26 His own theoretical interest is focused on topics which are directly connected to human practical affairs. Accordingly, Socrates, insofar as he turned his back on the study of nature and shifted his attention to enquiry into human matters, is Cicero's great philosophical model (also) in the Tusculanae.27 For Cicero, the primacy of practical philosophy, most unequivocally put forward in De officiis, seems to follow from the obvious primacy of moral praxis which is related to the community and the common good.28 Man is not a lone wolf, but essentially a social being, dependent
progressionem persecuti sunt. ex quo magnitudo quoque animi existebat, qua facile posset repugnari obsistique fortunae, quod maximae res essent in potestate sapientis. 24 Tusc. V, 7: quae divinarum humanarumque rerum, tum initiorum causarumque cuiusque rei cognitione hoc pulcherrimum nomen apud antiquos adsequebatur. 25 Cf. Aetii Placita I. Prooem. 2 = SVF II, 35: OÜ m°n oÂn Stwëkoã t¬n m°n sofàan eênai qeàwn te kaã ¶nqrwpànwn ùpistømhn, t¬n d° filosofàan ©skhsin ùpithdeàou tûcnhj. Cf. Sextus adv. math. IX, 13 = SVF II, 36; Seneca Ep. VIII, 6. 26 Cf. Tusc. V, 11 and 83 sqq. 27 Tusc. V, 10; cf. Acad. I, 15. 28 De off. I, 153: Placet igitur aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex communitate, quam ea, quae ex cognitione ducantur. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 267 for his survival and flourishing upon the respect, help, appreciation and affection of his fellow beings. The course of life devoted to philosophical theory, praised by Aristotle for the excellent few, does not, therefore, seem to have much plausibility for him:29 "If a life fell to a wise man's share in which he could in the midst of abundance of all things reflect upon and contemplate everything worthy of knowledge, he would nevertheless pass away if he were so lonely that he could see no human being."30 Living, keeping, and promoting consociatio hominum atque communitas 31 is prima facie the superior goal in life for Cicero. As far as the fitting and excellent in the community is concerned, human nature in an unperverted community has institutions to hand which can provide the good man32 (vir bonus) with a reasonably secure orientation even without philosophical instruction and reflection (sine ulla doctrina). And a philosophy which did not use the practical potential of virtue for human community would contain only unconnected and unfruitful knowledge.33 It is precisely the judgement and behaviour of the best which make it clear that in cases of conflict the interests of theoretical knowledge rank below the claims of practical help: "For who would be so desirous of the complete understanding of the nature of things that he, although dealing with and contemplating phenomena most worthy to be investigated, when told about a dangerous threat to his country in respect of which he could intervene in a helpful way, would not abandon everything and leave it standing, even if he thought he could count the stars and measure the size of the world? He would do the same if his father or his friend
29 Except those who are unfit for the life of politics and especially suited for agitatio mentis because of their personal nature. Cf. De off. I, 107 sqq. 30 De off. I, 153. 31 De off, I, 157. 32 De fin. III, 11: quos bonos viros, fortes, iustos, moderatos aut audivimus in re publica fuisse aut ipsi vidimus, qui sine ulla doctrina naturam ipsam secuti multa laudabilia fecerunt ... 33 De off. I, 157: Itaque, nisi ea virtus, quae constat ex hominibus tuendis, id est ex societate generis humani, attingat cognitionem rerum, solivaga cognitio et ieuna videatur. 268 Maximilian Forschner were in danger".34 As far as these conflicts are concerned there is no doubt about the fact that the obligations of solidarity and justice prevail over the interests and tasks of speculative science.35 But in spite of this seemingly unequivocal pleading for the primacy of social and political praxis it still remains uncontroversial for Cicero, even in De officiis,36 that prudence has to be distinguished from wisdom (sapientia, sophia) and that wisdom occupies the top rank and takes the guiding role (princeps) among all virtues. And in the argument which is supposed to show why this is so he seems to follow the Stoic conception of virtue even as far as the wording is concerned: Insofar as wisdom is knowledge of divine and human things it contains knowledge of the community of gods and men and of men themselves. Thus it supports prudence and provides it with an ultimate foundation and measure, for prudence amounts to knowledge of what has to be pursued and fled from practically in the world of things and events.37 The idea that if wisdom is understood as knowledge and contemplation of human and divine things, without leading to prudence which cares for the well-being of human beings in a practical way (utilitas, commoda), it is defective, fledgling and not yet developed,38 remains untouched by this thought. Serious problems as to how Cicero should be interpreted39 arise for the following reason: Sometimes Cicero speaks of sapientia in the sense of the unique virtue of the Socratics, the Platonists and the
34 De off. I, 154. 35 Cf. De off. I, 155. 36 Cf. De off. I, 153. 37 De off. I, 153: princepsque omnium virtutum illa sapientia, quam sofivan Graeci vocant, prudentiam enim, quam Graeci fr’nhsin dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus, quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia; illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos. As to the details of the argument of this passage cf. Dyck 1996, 340 sqq. 38 De off. I, 153: Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. 39 As pointed out by Dyck (1996) e. g., who cannot resolve them because of his orientation to Aristotle's ideas in NE. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 269
Stoics, sometimes sapientia means a "partial" (but fundamental and guiding) virtue beside prudentia and other virtues, and sometimes he distinguishes scientia (understood as theoretical comprehensio rerum) from sapientia (understood as ars vivendi).40 But he nowhere clarifies the overall structure of virtue, nor does he explain how sapientia and prudentia, which are conceived of in terms of knowledge alone, can become practical, and how prudentia can contain the "benefit of the citizen".41 Considering Cicero's superior intelligence, which can be detected everywhere in his oeuvre, it does seem doubtful that the lack of terminological precision and consistency of his texts should have come about contrary to his intention.
2
The radicality and range of the question of the self-sufficiency of virtue cause Cicero to turn his attention to a conception of philosophy and a concept of wisdom which "are worthy of Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato".42 According to Cicero, Zeno, the founder of the school, may have been a newcomer and a simple craftsman of words (advena quidam et ignobilis verborum opifex), who as all evidence shows sneaked into the old philosophy (insinuasse se in antiquam philosophiam videtur), but the weight and dignity of his thesis that the wise man will always be happy is covered by the authority of Plato.43 Cicero (presumably following Antiochus of Askalon) obviously wants to see the peculiarity of Stoic philosophy being linked up with a tradition and with names that to his mind stand for heroic
40 Cf. Academici libri. Lucullus 23. 41 Tusc. V, 72. 42 Tusc. V, 30. Here Cicero seems to be under the influence of Antiochus of Askalon; cf. W. Görler (1990). 43 In antiquity numerous, mostly anecdotal, reports on the intellectual origins 270 Maximilian Forschner philosophical greatness above all narrow-minded doubt and disrespectful critique. Whether he is right in his genealogy cannot be decided definitively any more. But in fact there are some aspects which indicate that the picture he is drawing is not completely arbitrary and wrong. The sympathy he displays in connection with a simile supposed to have been created and used by Pythagoras is unmistakable. Pythagoras compared life to the games in Olympia. Some with well- trained bodies compete for fame and honour; others strive for earnings and profit; and finally a very small group, the most refined of all, simply come for the sake of watching. Exactly the same was true in life: "There are some rare men who do not care about anything else but attentively contemplating the nature of things. They call themselves lovers of wisdom, i. e. philosophers. And exactly as watching without striving for anything is the most refined thing to do in Olympia, the contemplation and knowledge of things rises high above anything else in life as a whole.” 44 Presumably in order to meet the objection that a political community cannot live merely by contemplation on the part of the best, a concluding sentence follows which is supposed to sound convincing especially to a Roman audience: Pythagoras, having come to Italy, "privately and in public decorated the region which is called Great Greece with splendid institutions and arts."45 Pythagoras and his adherents did not only live for theoria: they were active in politics. The wise man also develops prudence; he renders the well-being of the community a good service; in any case his theoria is not without effects for the community. But according to Stoic philosophy the immediate practical
of Stoicism were in circulation. All the evidence indicates that Zeno was extraordinarily studious and tried to get into contact with the great philosophical figures of Athens. Cf. Hahm (1977) Appendix I, 219 sqq. 44 Tusc. V, 9. 45 Tusc. V, 10. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 271 consequences of theoria seem to concern the personal and not the political sphere of life. Virtue, as the Stoics famously put it, gives us tranquility of life and frees us from the terror of death.46 Virtue disposes its owner to regard as nothing all that which the common multitude would regard as goods and evils: Strength, good health, beauty, wealth, honour, power on the one hand, poverty, lowliness, humiliation, loneliness, loss of one's family, severe bodily pain, lost health, invalidity, blindness, the fall of one's country, exile, slavery on the other hand.47 By means of an (emotive, not practical) disdain for these things, man disengages himself from the confused movements and agitated leaps of the soul, from the passions whose wretchedness is due to the fact that in one’s judgement and desire one takes something to be absolutely good or bad which actually is not so.48 This distance and disdain is made possible - this is the crucial argument which is sound for the Stoic as well as for the Academic - solely by the contemplation of the divine (in nature) which elevates the human mind: erigimus, altiores fieri videmus, humana despicimus, cogitantesque supera atque caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. 49 The Stoic doctrine of the nature (and of the overcoming) of pain and of the passions of the soul in the books 2 to 4 in the Tusculanae is supported by the framing books 1 and 5, in which the thought of identity with the divine in theoria plays a crucial role.
3
Modern interpretations of the Stoic conception of virtue tend to
46 Tusc. V, 6. 47 Tusc. V, 29 - 30. 48 Tusc. V, 15 f., 43. 49 Acad. libr. Lucullus 127; cf. Seneca, De brevitate vitae XIX; Ep. moral. 41, 1; 65, 16. 272 Maximilian Forschner play down or ignore the aspect of theoria and the theological dimension of the Stoic arete, especially when they try to approach it via the doctrine of oikeiosis:50 this is probably due to the fact that attempts to make ancient ethics relevant today no longer have any idea of what to make of this dimension. Modern interpreters draw their justification from a dogma which has been deeply rooted since the European Enlightenment, and according to which it was Hellenistic philosophy which originally put forward the primacy of practical life and practical philosophy which has become so familiar and obvious in modern times. Cicero sees himself forced into the role of the crucial source of this conviction. The guiding, but often tacit assumption behind this is the following: in De finibus III Cicero offers an account of Stoic ethics which can do without any reference to physics and theology.51 The determination of the highest good is carried out solely by way of a psychological and anthropological clarification of the goals, and the hierarchy of the goals, of natural, unperverted human inclinations. In virtue of the fact that the texts being handed down to us in this book contain the most authentic depiction of Stoic ethics, this assumption, if correct, is of special importance. It is, however, false.
50 Cf. for example Inwood 1985. In his book Inwood focuses his attention on the analysis of the practical side of the Stoic conception of reason and of rational appetite. In his introduction he interprets important references of the Stoic account of the relation of theory and practice (DL VII, 130; Cicero, Nat. deor. II, 37; De fin. III, 73; II, 34; Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1033 C-D; Epictetus, Diatr. III. 3. 2-4) in such a way that they support a functional reading of theoria: "the most important reason for contemplating the world was to facilitate the living of life according to nature", p. 3. There is no further discussion of this by him. 51 To give an example: "The Stoics did indeed regard theology as the foundation of ethics, since the end for man could be defined as living virtuously and as living in conformity with nature, in which the divine reason was everywhere immanent. However, Cicero could expound Stoic ethics in De Finibus III without the least allusion to the Stoic doctrines on physics of which theology was a part (italics M. F.) though in his Stoicising account of the divine natural law in De Legibus he too had asserted that nature was the basis of justice and all the social virtues, as well as of pious worship of the gods, which he calls pure religion (I. 43. 60). Brunt, 182. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 273
At the end of De finibus III52 Cicero makes it perfectly clear what fundamental role physics and theology play in the Stoic conception of virtue. This conception may basically seem strange to us, and presumably it can hardly be made relevant now. According to this conception, the shape and force of the wise man's being good and his virtus are due to the (theoretical) direction of his thought and his (theoretical) closeness to the divine. His actions, which meet the criterion of the predicate honestum, originate in a disposition and consist in deeds which we would hardly consider to be essentially virtuous according to our contemporary conception of virtue. The Stoics according to Marcus Cato (or Cicero) consider dialectic and physics to be virtues, the former "because it prevents our ever giving our assent to anything false, prevents our being deceived by an insidious plausibility, and enables us to keep a tight and lasting hold on what we have learned about good and evil ... But physics, too, has been awarded this honour. The reason for this is that he who wants to live in accordance with nature must start from the whole world and its government. In fact, nobody can judge properly about good and evil without knowledge of the laws underlying the order of nature and of life including the lives of the gods. Only then can man know whether human nature is in accordance with nature as a whole or not. And as for all the old directives of the wise which call for obedience to time and following the god and know thyself and nothing in excess, without physics nobody can understand what meaning they have, and they are utterly meaningful."53
52 The question is of course, whether not only the final passage De fin. III, 72 sq., which explicitly speaks against Brunt’s remarks, but also the central section De fin. III, 21 implicitly speaks against it, or whether the homologia which is dealt with here is to be understood in a primarily practical way. Presumably the key concept of homologia in III, 21 already implies the "consonance" with the divine world order realised via theoria. Furthermore,the oikeiosis-passage in De fin. III, 16 does not start with a psychological nor with an anthropological clarification of the inclinationes naturales and their goals, but obviously points to all animals (simulatque natum sit animal ...). 53 De fin. III, 72 sq.; cf. Plutarch, Stoic. rep. 1035 B - D. According to Plutarch Chrysippus started each treatise on ethics with a foreword on Zeus, on fate and 274 Maximilian Forschner
Now this passage may indicate a rather functional conception of physics and theology, according to which these disciplines are in the service of ethics;54 and indeed there is no doubt that the Hellenistic schools, as far as the ordering of the disciplines was concerned, sometimes gave ethics the preeminent position and made it the goal of their curriculum, to which all the rest of philosophical instruction referred.55 But for Stoicism, theoria is an activity which has value in itself; it even stands in the centre of what virtue enables and that to which virtue predisposes. An additional side-effect of this activity, taken for granted, is the wise man's being good in a moral and practical fashion. It is this which could be illustrated by a closer look at book V of the Tusculanae, of which Cicero says in the catalogue of his writings in De divinatione II. 1. that it deals with a theme which of all things most illuminates the whole of philosophy.56
4
In book V of the Tusculanae the Stoic school is represented by its founder, Zeno (together with his unorthodox disciple Ariston of Chios). According to the hardly flattering characterisation of the
on providence. He used to say that there was no other or no more suitable way to the theory of good and bad or virtue or happiness than the one starting from universal nature and the divine government of the world. 54 This is B. Inwood's interpretation of the role of physics and dialectic in Stoic philosophy, (1985) 3. 55 Cf. Schofield, (1986), 48. That such a functional reading of the role of physics for ethics does not hold for the Stoics, not even for the late Stoicism of Imperial Rome, is indicated by a short glimpse on Seneca's Naturales Quaestiones. Here virtus is sometimes quite obviously referred to theoria, in turn, in a functional manner : virtus enim ... animum laxat et praeparat ad cognitionem caelestium, Lib. I pr. 6. The Quaestiones Naturales exclusively deal with cosmological knowledge of the divine, the essence of which turns out to be perfect rationality, thus functioning as a paradigm for the formation of an equally perfect human soul; cf. Stahl, (1975), 274. 56 totam philosophiam maxime illustrat; cf. Schofield (1986), 47. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 275 genesis of his teaching, Zeno sneaked into the old philosophy.57 In fact, he himself hardly ever claimed to be original;58 the overall anecdotal information about his intellectual origin points in the direction of an immense studiousness and towards the effort to consult the ancients and to put together thoughts from different philosophical movements to create a new synthesis;59 it is certain that he was influenced by Socratics, by the Cynics, the Megarians and by Academics; it is not unlikely that he borrowed from Heraclitus. Later, Antiochus of Askalon was strongly interested in claiming a close link between Zeno and Polemo in order to regard Stoicism (up to his time) as the genuine heir of Platonic teachings.60 No doubt, this does have effects on the picture Cicero draws of Zeno. Pythagorean influences can hardly be denied.61 It is possible that Zeno studied with a Pythagorean (Xenophilos of Chalkidike); a book by Zeno on Pythagoreanism is authenticated at any rate.62 In addition to this a hint in Stobaios suggests that he was familiar with Aristotle's Protreptikos via Krates.63 His conception of theoria could be best illustrated by his elaborate natural philosophy. His work Peri tou holou 64 contained an account of the coming-to-be and passing-away of the cosmos,65 the explanation of special natural phenomena66 and perhaps the
57 Tusc. V, 34; cf. to this point also De fin. 3, 5. 15: Zeno not so much the inventor of new thoughts but of new words; cf. Acad. libr. Lucullus 15; De fin. IV, 56; DL VII, 25. 58 Cf. DL VII, 2; VII, 25; SVF I, 235. 59 Cf. above all Hahm, (1977), Appendix I: Influences on Stoicism According to the Biographical Tradition. 60 Cf. Hahm, (1997) 221; Görler, 938 - 967, above all 949, 955. 61 On the influence of contemporary musical theory on Stoic philosophy cf. A. A. Long, The harmonics of Stoic virtue, in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Suppl. vol. (1991), 97 - 116. 62 SVF 1, 41 = DL VII, 4: cf. Hahm 225 sq. 63 SVF 1, 273; cf. Hahm 226. 64 SVF I, 41. 65 SVF 1, 102. 66 SVF 1, 117 and 119. 276 Maximilian Forschner doctrine of principles, for which two further separate works, Peri ousias 67 and Peri physeos 68 are attested. Whether Zeno only sketched the Stoic cosmological system and left its elaboration to his successors cannot now be decided with certainty. At any rate, Kleanthes wrote a work of commentary and explication On Zeno's Natural Philosophy.69 Zeno's name is no longer mentioned in the titles of Chrysippus' numerous works on natural philosophy. Two telos formulae of Zeno have come down to us. According to the dominant opinion in literature homologoumenos zen 70 is believed to have been the original one, because in its exclusive focus on psychological consistency and harmony71 "it corresponds to the origin of Stoic philosophy in Socratic philosophy".72 Now apparently Zeno's Peri anthropou physeos also contained the second telos formula homologoumenos te physei zen.73 If we take into account the following two facts, it is anything but clear why the one telos formula should be more original or more Socratic than the other. First, Zeno knew Xenophon's Memorabilia,74 so that he was familiar with Socrates the natural philosopher and teleologist (in contrast to Plato's early work), and he could adopt his view that our body was made up of the four cosmic elements earth, water, air, and fire, and that in a similar way our mind (nous) came from cosmic reason.75 Secondly, Zeno, together with almost all the later Stoics, considered ether to be divine, to be equipped with mind and to
67 SVF 1, 85. 68 SVF 1, 176. 69 SVF 1, 481 = DL VII, 174: Perã t≈j [tou] Zønwnoj fusiologàaj d›o. 70 SVF I, 179; Stob. Ecl. II, 75, 11 Wa. 71 Stob. loc. cit.: touto' d' †sti kaq' üna l’gon kaã s›mfwnon z≈n, Èj tÒn macomûnwj zÎntwn kakodaimono›ntwn. 72 von Fritz (1972), 113. 73 SVF 1, 179; DL VII, 1. 87. 74 Cf. DL VII, 2 - 3; 31 - 32. 75 Xenophon, Mem. I, 4. 8 - 9: Socrates to Aristodemos: "But elsewhere, you think, there is nothing capable of reason (o‹d°n fr’nimon), although you know that in your body you possess only a small amount of earthly matter, Theoria and Stoic Virtue 277 govern everything.76 The connection of natural philosophy and ethics, along the lines of the instruction to seek the perfection of life in the accordance of human with cosmic reason, almost certainly stands at the beginning of Stoic philosophy. According to Cicero, Zeno’s claim that only the "morally" good77 was good is backed by the authority of Plato.78 In support he quotes the dialogues Gorgias 470d - 471a and Menexenos 247 e - 248 a.79 Both paragraphs are considered to be loci classici of Platonic ethics in the Hellenistic age.80 Presumably, they were already known by Zeno who, unlike any other philosopher of his time, refers to his predecessors and the ancients.81 Now, both dialogues do in fact come very close to the Stoic doctrine of telos, and accord well with the terminology of the paragraph in Xenophon mentioned above. It is true that in Plato's texts we do not find the explicit claim that the natural goods and the gifts of fate are completely irrelevant to human happiness; rather, the final myth of Gorgias indicates that Plato (or Socrates) was still inclined to the view of a certain distance between virtue and happiness, and non- virtue and unhappiness, in this life. Nevertheless, especially in the Archelaos scene of the Gorgias, we already find the crucial thought
which is around in abundance. The same is true of the humid, which is met with frequently, just as in general your body is composed of small amounts of the other substances which exist in great quantity. Only intellect (noun' ) you think you got hold of by good fortune, because it does not exist elsewhere; and [you think] this [entity which is] exceedingly big and unlimited in quantity behaves in a well-ordered way because of something irrational (di' ¶fros›nhn tinß ... e‹tßktwj †cein)"? This passage played an important role for Stoic natural philosophy and theology, cf. Cicero, De nat. deor. II, 13 - 22, Sextus Emp. Adv. Math. IX, 92 - 101; Dragona-Monachou, (1976), 50; Boyancé, (1962). 76 Cf. Cicero, Acad. libr. Lucullus 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur summus deus, mente praeditus qua omnia regantur. Cleanthes ... solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. 77 Tusc. V, 33: bonum esse solum quod honestum esset. 78 loc. cit. V, 34. 79 loc. cit. V, 34 - 36. 80 Excerpts of it can be found in Stob. Ecl. 4. 40, 25 resp. 4. 39, 24; cf. Gigon, ed. (1992), 562 f. 81 SVF 1, 1 = DL VII, 2; cf. VII, 25 sq. 278 Maximilian Forschner that the entire happiness of man lies in education (paideia) and justice (dikaiosyne) (ùn to›tJ Ω p≠sa e‹daimonàa ùstàn);82 in his translation Cicero speaks of the doctus and vir bonus.83 The crucial question is of course what is meant by paideia here and how it is connected to dikaiosyne. Plato tried to answer it in the Republic.. We know from Zeno's Politeia that he considered the usual education (ùgk›klioj paideàa) to be useless84 and that he exclusively favoured philosophical wisdom and virtue.85 There is no indication, however, that Zeno simply took over Plato's programme of education in the Republic; traditionally it is assumed that in his Politeia Zeno corrected certain teachings of Plato's work.86 But at the end of the Kallikles round Plato's Gorgias does contain hints which presumably contained a programme for Zeno and early Stoicism. Here we find the doctrine that the excellence and goodness of every being are due to an immanent order (taxis) or beauty (kosmos) of its own and that this was also true for the soul, the order and beauty of which consisted in temperance (sophrosyne), which becomes public in doing one's duty towards gods and men. Sophrosyne establishes community (koinonia) and friendship (philia) which in turn constitute the principle which holds together heaven and earth and gods and men, as Socrates points out, referring to the doctrine of "the wise" (possibly Pythagoreans).87 It is true that this section contains no hints at theoria, but it puts the goodness of the soul and of men into a cosmic dimension.88 In connection with the section of De finibus (III, 72 sq.), dealt with above, on the role of the virtue of physics,
82 Gorgias 470 e. 83 V, 35; doctus is a man of theoretical wisdom. 84 SVF 1, 259 = DL VII, 32. 85 Cf. SVF 1, 263; 266. 86 Cf. SVF 1, 260. 87 Gorgias 507 e - 508 a. 88 The educational dimension of the doctrine of being which is obtained by theoria is worked out in the Republic, which is presumably very close to the Gorgias. If we could suppose that Zeno also knew the Timaeus (and adopted Theoria and Stoic Virtue 279 which enables us to know the underlying laws behind the order of nature and life, including the lives of the gods, it gives a clue to plausible assumptions as to how early Stoicism followed Plato. The passage from Xenophon's Memorabilia, which presumably was of importance for Zeno's philosophical development, fits in neatly here, especially as far as terminology is concerned: It is not by reason of something irrational that the cosmos as a whole behaves in a well ordered way ([o‹] di' ¶fros›nhn tinß ... e‹tßktwj †cein).
5
In Tusculanae V, 12 to V, 82 Cicero develops what he takes to be the strongest and bravest doctrine of a happy life,89 i. e. the doctrine of the Stoics. Sections V, 66 to 72 unfold the kernel of this doctrine. It can be expressed in the following formula: what is to be called good they attribute to mind.90 The message, considered to be Socratic, sounds simple: A human being is of the same kind as his mind;91 from an ontological point of view human mind is an offspring and a fruit of the divine mind and cannot be compared to anything else but to this.92 "Virtue" means mind in perfection, perfect reason93 embodied by the wise, who in the sublime freedom and the full self-assurance of their autarky disregard everything that
some ideas of this work), a hypothesis which will be strengthened by Sedley (forthecoming) about The Origins of the Stoic God, the genesis of the role of (doing) astronomy within the Stoic concept of virtue could be seen with more precision, because Antiochus’ picture of the relation between Zeno and Polemo (and the Old Academy) becomes historically more trustworthy. 89 V, 82: Habes, quae fortissime de beata vita dici putem. 90 V, 119: in animo reponunt omnia. 91 V, 47: qualis cuiusque animi adfectus esset, talem esse hominem. 92 V, 38: humanus autem animus decerptus ex mente divina cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso deo, si hoc fas est dictu, comparari potest. 93 V, 39: ... perfecta mens, id est absoluta ratio, quod est idem virtus. 280 Maximilian Forschner can happen to them,94 or may be lost to them, and who live their lives in passionless tranquility and composure. The question is, what are the contents and what is the structure of the Stoic mens perfecta or ratio absoluta. Cicero gives a preliminary answer by introducing the Stoic concept of virtue by means of examples. For him Plato and Archytas of Tarentum are homines docti et plane sapientes (V, 64).95 The elaborate picture of the wretched tyrant Dionysios of Syracuse (V, 67) is contrasted with the positive paradigm of the mathematician Archimedes. Without any comment Cicero adds the names of Democritus, Pythagoras, and Anaxagoras to the story of Archimedes. Now, all the positive examples have one common feature: they were heroes of mind, not the least as far as theory is concerned, and they all succeeded in combining philosophical and scientific erudition (doctrina) with human greatness (humanitas) in their lives (V, 66). After this prelude of examples, which is supposed to raise propaedeutic associations, Cicero directly and in a general way talks about the essential preconditions, motives and factors (the moventia V, 68) which motivate one to the intellectual life, and which constitute this life in the state of perfection. According to Cicero, necessary preconditions are extraordinary gifts (ingenium eximium) and an aroused appetite for enquiry after truth (ad investigandam veritatem studium incitatum). The fruits to be harvested from such a direction of life towards knowledge and insight are three-fold, corresponding to the disciplines of physics, ethics and logic, into which the Stoics divide their doctrine: "One consists in the knowledge of things and the explanation of nature, another consists in the division of things which are to be striven after by all means, and in the understanding of how to live, the third in the judgement of what follows from each thing, what contradicts it, in which all precision of discussion and truth of judgement is to be found."96
94 Cf. V, 41, 42. 95 Et could be read as et epexegeticum, thus indicating the dependency of sapientia on doctrina. (Suggestion by W. Görler). 96 V, 68: ex quo triplex ille animi fetus existit, unus in cognitione rerum positus Theoria and Stoic Virtue 281
The following highly-condensed sections, 69 to 72, explicate the contents and the epistemological and genetic order in which the wise man constitutes and confirms himself.97 The first position is allocated to the investigation of the motions of the spheres, the heaven of the fixed stars and the movements of the planets, i. e. basically to astronomy. Astronomy in turn gives rise to the investigation of principles,98 which occupies second place and deals with the origins and "seeds" (initia tamquam semina) of everything that has come into being, which depicts the cosmic position of the earth and which gives an account of the generically different forms of coming to be, being and passing away on the earth. In third position, it is this intense meditation (haec tractanti animo et noctes et dies cogitanti, V, 70) on the unity and multiplicity of being which gives rise to the self-knowledge of human mind, which realizes that a person is of the same essence as divine mind as far as origin and nature is concerned, and which gains inexhaustible pleasure from this thought.99 Arising from the thought of mind coming from divine mind there is, fourthly, the aspiration, insofar as man is a finite rational being, for imitatio dei in a human being.
et in explicatione naturae, alter in discriptione expetendarum fugiendarumque rerum
The realisation of this wish has various aspects.100 There is in the first place (and to my mind predominantly) a theoretical aspect (sc. the fruit of sapientia in a narrow sense): in his mind man depicts the causal power and structural order of the divine governance of the world in the form of language and thought, and by means of the meditative internalisation of this true depiction he rises above the limitations of his life into the dimension of divine eternity. 101 Furthermore, there is an emotive aspect (sc. the fruit of the Stoic freedom from the passions): Entering this dimension man gains the serenity of divine tranquility as well as distance from and composure towards human affairs;102 he looks down on them (despicere). And finally we have an ethical aspect (sc. the fruit of prudentia): he realises what is the highest good and what is the greatest evil (in the cosmos and) for his nature, what virtue, i. e. the perfection of his disposition towards the actualization of this good, consists in, and where all officia of daily life are to find their object.103 The crucial point of the Stoic conception is the following: out of the (progressive) meditative realisation of universal virtue the kinds and parts of virtues grow and blossom.104 Up to now we have been talking about physics, and about ethics
100 In Acad. libri Lucullus 23 Cicero is talking of two aspects. The virtues according to the Stoic conception contain scientia on the one hand (in the sense of stabilis et immutabilis comprehensio rerum) and sapientia (in the sense of constans ars vivendi). As the stress is on an epistemological argument here, the emotional aspect is left out. 101 V, 70: ipsa enim cogitatio de vi et natura deorum studium incendit illius aeternitatem imitandi neque se in brevitate vitae conlocatam putat, cum rerum causas alias ex aliis aptas et necessitate nexas videt, quibus ab aeterno tempore fluentibus in aeternum ratio tamen mensque moderatur. Although White , (1985) is himself of the opinion (requiring interpretation) that the primary goal of most Stoics was the formulation of an ethics (57), he is entirely right in stressing that the wise man's virtue, the actuality of which is described by the formula homologoumenos zen, primarily means "that one’s soul actually reflects the pattern of nature, in the sense of comprehending it" and that "one’s activities are ordered by that condition of the soul" (67). (the last italics M. F.). 102 V, 71: Haec ille intuens atque suspiciens vel potius omnis partis orasque circumspiciens quanta rursus animi tranquillitate humana et citeriora considerat! 103 V, 71: quo referenda sint officia. 104 V, 71: hinc illa cognitio virtutis existit, efflorescunt genera partesque Theoria and Stoic Virtue 283 only as far as the philosophical knowledge of divine and human affairs is concerned. But section 72 obviously deals also with the question of what follows from this for the practical life of the wise,105 and thus it also deals with prudential aspects of the Stoic conception of virtue. It is explicitly stated that the perfection of the wise man’s understanding of himself lies in his seeing that the benefit of the citizen is included in his prudentia.106 Clearly, this section is divided into two parts, and just as clearly (still within the Stoic division of disciplines) it alludes to the topic of the relation of practical and theoretical activity. In the first half, the third fruit of Stoic wisdom is mentioned, i. e. logic or dialectic, (disserendi ratio et scientia), which, as Cicero metaphorically puts it, pours itself over all parts of wisdom, defining the thing in question, classifying being into kinds and screening things as to their logical and causal connections. On the one hand scientific knowledge and ability pertaining to logic is of the utmost practical use as far as the practical consideration of things is concerned (ad res ponderandas, says the advocate Cicero); on the other hand its exercise offers the most refined pleasure and it is the activity most worthy of wisdom.107 This maxume ingenua delectatio, however, belongs to leisure (sed haec otii); the wise man, though, also concerns himself with the survival and welfare of the res publica, ensures that the political community receives its due, and cultivates friendship. There are several problems as to how section 72 should be understood, and in my opinion these can only be solved, as I have already pointed out in the introduction, by taking into consideration Cicero's basic position of scepticism. On the one hand he indicates that scientific logic or dialectic (disserendi ratio et scientia) follows the steps of physics and ethics (sequitur tertia); and he indicates (in
virtutum (italics M. F.); invenitur, quid sit quod natura spectet extremum in bonis, quid in malis ultimum, quo referenda sint officia, quae degendae aetatis ratio deligenda. 105 Cf. V, 71: quae degendae aetatis ratio deligenda. 106 V, 72: quid eo possit esse praestantius, cum contineri prudentia utilitatem civium cernat. 107 ex qua cum summa utilitas existit ad res ponderandas, tum maxume ingenua delectatio et digna sapientia. 284 Maximilian Forschner what has been said immediately before in section 71) that from the general knowledge of the ultimately valuable, and according to the particular availability of otium and the particular requirements of negotium, a criterion for the rational choice of a philosophy of life emerges (quae degendae aetatis ratio deligendae), i. e. for the general determination of behaviour and the choice between the pleasure of a theoretical [pre]occupation with logic (physics, and ethics) on the one hand, and the practical commitment to the public good of res publica on the other.108 In introducing the "three fruits of mind", however, Cicero also stresses the fact that not only does all the precision of discussion depend on logic, but also all truth of judgement.109 And this obviously means that physics and ethics, and thus knowledge of the ultimately valuable, is not possible without logic: as we have heard, logic pours itself over all areas of wisdom, and logic is essentially included in wisdom. In order to become a wise man, according to the Stoics, a certain amount of freedom from the pressure of negotia seems necessary. For somebody like Cicero, who is and desires to be engaged in political affairs, this raises the question of how much logical education, or indeed general theoretical education, is indispensable to hitting by means of prudence on the right and good with regard to the conduct of life and everyday negotia. The text of the Tusculanae provides no answer to the question of how, according to the Stoics, this kind of practical prudence comes about, nor how it is connected to wisdom.110 Furthermore the question of whether practical and political engagement is an obvious consequence of (perfect) wisdom or whether the wise man is (at least sometimes) simply forced to turn to negotia is left undecided.
108 How this is supposed to happen in the way Cicero describes it is far from clear. 109 V, 68: in quo inest omnis cum subtilitas disserendi tum veritas iudicandi. 110 Whether it is provided by De officiis in a satisfying way must be left open here; to my mind it does not seem to be the case. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 285
According to the doxographic evidence,111 the Stoic wise man of course happily and unerringly does what is right in any situation. In the crucial passage Cicero uses the subjunctive mood (transeat idem iste sapiens ad rem publicam tuendam), presumably indicating a certain degree of prescription even for the wise man. This would be rather in the line of Plato's dualisms, which force the philosopher from the vision of ideas back to the cave. And this would certainly be in accordance with sections of book I of the Tusculanae and of Cato maior de senectute which are of a Platonic colouring, and which speak of the (somehow material) nature of the human intellectual soul, of its home in the astral sphere, of its activity in accordance with its nature and of its (difficult) task in its life on earth. [According to them] human mind is of heavenly kind and origin112 scattered into human bodies by the gods "so that there may be beings who take care of the earth, and by contemplating the order of things in heaven imitate it in the manner and constancy of their lives".113 Any soul which can achieve this returns to its natural place after death where, in perfect conditions, it can devote itself to the activity which, when it can free itself from providing for life's needs and from the pressure of everyday business, it already desires to do most during its existence on earth: the investigation and contemplation of things in heaven, their essence, their laws and harmony and the contemplation of the drama (spectaculum) of the earth and the scenes upon it.114 And all this is found in Cicero with a sceptical and ironical twist. (In the Tusculanae Cicero primarily conjures up the heavenly blessedness of the natural philosopher and astronomer, whereas in Cato maior the pleasant anticipation of the community of the virtuous to come stands in the foreground).115
111 Cf. Pohlenz, 153 sqq., (1990), 83 sq. 112 Cf. also De rep. 6, 15 (Somnium Scipionis). 113 Cato maior XXI, 77: sed credo deos immortales sparsisse animos in corpora humana, ut essent qui terras tuerentur, quique caelestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitae modo atque constantia. 114 Cf. Tusc. I, 47. 115 Cf. Cato maior XXIII, 83. 286 Maximilian Forschner
The question is whether and to what extent it is the authentic doctrine of the old Stoics which we have been dealing with in the sections we have examined. Cicero presents it as a typical of the position of Zeno, a position ennobled by the authority of Plato. That fact that theoria played a central and dominant116 role within the Stoic conception of virtue can, of course, be illustrated from cases elsewhere. Human mind, as the doxographers unanimously have it, is a fragment and descendant of the divine mind which pervades and shapes the cosmos. Human mind reaches its perfection when it recognizes the divine structure of the world and knows itself to be in accordance with this structure, and when it expresses and imitates this harmony in its behaviour117 The old Stoics presumably rejected a partition of the forms of life into theoretical and practical types, but favoured a uniform ars vivendi which was called logikos.118 But this does not give us any information about the position of theoria within the one overall virtue. It occupies the top position in important doxographic formulae about the human purpose. According to them the Stoic sage in his theoria primarily depicts the divine world order.119 The fact that Chrysippus came to reject the hedonism of an escapist life of the learned120 (which Plutarch hastened to turn against him by constructing a contradiction between his words and his life) does not speak against this leading role: the Stoic sage does what is appropriate in the situation whether in an investigative and
116 Cf. Plutarch, Stoic rep. 1035 B - D; Cicero, De fin III, 73. 117 Cf. Cicero, De nat. deor. II, 37: ipse autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed est quaedam particula perfecti. Poseidonios's account of the telos according to Clemens of Alexandria frgm. 186 Edelst. - Kidd: tÿ z≈n qewrounta' t¬n tÒn ÷lwn ¶løqeian kaã tßxin kaã sugkataskeußzonta a‹t¬n kat™ tÿ dunat’n. Cf. Epictetus, Diss. I, 6. 19 - 20: tÿn d' ©nqrwpon qeat¬n eásøgagen a‹tou' te kaã tÒn †rgwn tÒn a‹tou,' kaã o‹ m’non qeatøn, ¶ll™ kaã ùxhght¬n a‹tÒn. 118 Cf. DL VII, 130. 119 Cf. Kerferd, (1978), "The truth that is in all things is the Taxis or principle of order, and what the wise man, who alone achieves the goal, is doing is contemplating ... its structure. In so doing he joins in bringing this structure into being (in himself)", 132. 120 Cf. Plutarch, Stoc. rep. 1033 C - D. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 287 contemplative or an active manner: he does not flee praxis where it is required; but for a Stoic sage this is required not nearly as often as commonly thought (today). Seneca's Quaestiones naturales indicate that according to the Stoics theoria is not just an indispensible precondition of a morally perfect way of life, but theoria is exactly what the divine potential of human life is aiming at, and it is what is worthwhile to live for.121 This may have a Platonic colouring (in Cicero in the Tusculanae and Cato maior and in Seneca in the Quaestiones naturales);122 but quite a lot , if not all, the evidence indicates that it was not only in its late phase, but also in its beginnings, that Stoic philosophy oriented itself to a picture of Socrates and to a Plato for whom natural philosophy plays an essential role in their conception of virtue and in the justification of the theory of the unity of virtue and happiness.
6
The (lack of) information on Zeno's life also points in a similar direction. As far as the relation of theory and praxis in his biography is concerned, the latest research in ancient history attests a moderate theoretical interest together with a practical indifference towards political life.123 Among 25 works known at least by their title only two deal (directly) with politics (Politeia, Peri nomou).124 Attempts by the Macedonian King Antigonos Gonatas to gain
121 Haec inspicere, haec discere, his incubare, nonne transilire est mortalitatem suam et in meliorem transcribi sortem? - Quid tibi, inquis, ista proderunt? - Si nil aliud, hoc certe: sciam omnia angusta esse mensus deum. Lib. I, Pr. 17. Nisi ad haec admitterer, non
Zeno’s friendship seem not to have been very successful, or at least unreciprocated;125 he rejected invitations to the king's court in Demetrias.126 His only known contribution to his adopted town Athens was a small financial donation for the refurbishment of a public bath.127 The posthumous honours he received from the city were due solely to the initiative of his admirer Antigonos Gonatas,128 although this would not have been possible without the Athenian citizens’ acknowledging his personal integrity. Like his great successors Kleanthes and Chrysippus, Zeno led a philosophical life, the life of the school, to be precise, which was focused on theoria. His contemporaries in no way saw any contradiction to the ideal of virtue they were pursuing. (Along with Dion Chrysostomos)129 it was only Plutarch who first questioned them, since he believed that the philosopher has an obligation to engage in political praxis, as well: "In relation to the complete body of his work Zeno himself wrote a great deal on constitution, ruling and being ruled, adjudication and speech, and Kleanthes also wrote a great deal on these subjects, but surely most was written by Chrysippus. But in the course of none of their lives no office of strategist, no passing of law, no membership of the council, no defense before the judges, no campaign for the country, no ambassadorship nor extraordinary donation can be traced. It is rather so that they spent not just a short time, but an unlimited period, i. e. all their life away from home, debating, reading and writing books, living in colonnades, and they enjoyed lessons like lotus eaters. Thus it is obvious that they lived in accordance with the works and words of other people rather than with their own."130
125 Cf. DL, VII, 15. 126 Cf. DL VII, 3 = SVF 1, 3. 127 Cf. DL VII, 12 = SVF I, 3. 128 Cf. DL VII, 15 = SVF 1, 4. 129 Cf. Dion Chrysostomos or. 47, 2 = SVF 1, 28. 130 Stoic. rep. 2, 1033 B - C = SVF 1, 27. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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