Qewriva και Στωικη Aρετή MAXIMILIAN FORSCHNER Aυτή η ανακοίνωση έχει διπλό στόχο: η πρωταρχική της πρόθεση είναι να υποστηρίξει ότι η στωική αντίληψη της αρετής δεν ήταν, αρχικά, κυριαρικά ηθική· αποδεικνύοντας αυτό, η ανακοίνωση έχει την πρόθεση επίσης να σκιαγραφήσει τους λόγους που έκαναν τον Kικέρωνα να αναλάβει μια τέτοιου είδους ηθικοποίησης (moralisation). Όσον αφορά τον πρώτο στόχο, η ανακοίνωση καθοδηγείται από την υπόθεση ότι ούτε το κεντρικό δόγμα της Στωικής φιλοσοφίας, δηλαδή η ταύτιση της αρετής με την ευδαιμονία, ούτε η ιδιοτυπία των δογμάτων τους για τα πάθη (emotions) μπορούν να γίνουν κατανοητά χωρίς να λάβει κανείς υπόψη τον κεντρικό ρόλο που η qewriva πρέπει να είχε διαδραματίσει στην αντίληψή τους για την τέλεια ανθρώπινη ζωή. Όσον αφορά το δεύτερο στόχο, η ανακοίνωση καθοδηγείται από την ιδέα, ότι αυτός ο (αναγκαστικά “δογματικός”) ρόλος της qewriva" δεν εναρμονίζονταν με τη μορφή του ακαδημαϊκού σκεπτικισμού του Kικέρωνα. Έτεινε, επομένως, ο Kικέρωνας, για να μην πούμε ότι ήταν αναγκασμένος, να τον τροποποιήσει και να τον υποβαθμίσει. O ηγετικός ρόλος που πρώτιστα διαδραματίζονταν από τη qewriva εντός της στωικής αντίληψης της αρετής είναι ακόμη ευδιάκριτος στο Kικέρωνα, οποτεδήποτε εκθέτει απλώς στωικά δόγματα ή όπου επιχειρηματολογεί υπέρ μιας στωικής θέσης χρησιμοποιώντας το σκεπτικό του λόγο και τη μέθοδο της αντιλογίας (counter-speech method). Όπως η ανακοίνωση προσπαθεί να δείξει, κάπως λεπτομερεικά, ακριβώς αυτό αποδεικνύεται με παραδειγματικό τρόπο στο έργο Tusculanae (Disputationes). Theoria and Stoic Virtue Zeno's Legacy in Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes V MAXIMILIAN FORSCHNER Nec tamen istas quaestiones physicorum exterminandas puto. est enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum consideratio contemplatioque naturae: erigimur, altiores fieri videmur, humana despicimus cogitantesque supera atque caelestia haec nostra ut exigua et minima contemnimus. indagatio ipsa rerum cum maximarum tum etiam occultissimarum habet oblectationem; si vero aliquid occurrit, quod verisimile videatur, humanissima completur animus voluptate. quaeret igitur haec et vester sapiens et hic noster, sed vester, ut adsentiatur credat adfirmet, noster, ut vereatur temere opinari praeclareque agi secum putet, si in eius modi rebus, veri simile quod sit invenerit. Cicero, Acad. libr. Lucullus 127/8. Cicero owes his philosophical chattels partly to the legacy of Zeno. As he puts it himself quite clearly, he worked with the heritage of Greek philosophy "according to his own judgement and discretion"1 and he has passed it on in a considerably altered form. 1 Cf. De off. I, 6: Sequimur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos, non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus (italics M. F.). Cf. De fin. I, 6. 262 Maximilian Forschner Among the stock of traditional doctrines which bear his stamp is a predominantly moral reading of the Stoic concept of virtue,2 a concept developed in exemplary manner in De officiis, the very work which has ensured the lasting influence of this idea even until the present day. This paper3 pursues a twofold goal: its primary intention is to argue that the Stoic conception of virtue was not, originally, a predominantly moral one; in demonstrating this the paper is also intended to sketch the reasons for Cicero’s undertaking of such moralisation. As far as the first goal is concerned, I am guided by the assumption that neither the central dogma of the Stoics' philosophy, i. e. the identification of virtue with happiness, nor the peculiarity of their doctrine of the emotions, can be understood without consideration of the central role theoria must have played in their idea of the perfect human life. With regard to the second goal, I am guided by the idea that this (necessarily "dogmatic") role of theoria did not fit in with Cicero's form of academic scepticism. He was, therefore, inclined if not forced to modify and downgrade it . It seems to me that the leading role originally played by theoria within the Stoic concept of virtue is still detectable in Cicero, 2 Originally it was Ariston of Chios, the cynic-sceptic disciple of Zeno, who in a self-willed way moralized the Stoic concept of virtue. It probably makes good sense when in the doxographic context of Tusc. V, beside Zeno, the founder and head of the Stoic school, only Ariston of Chios is mentioned (V, 21; V, 33). After all, we know Ariston wanted philosophy to be restricted to ethics; logic and physics seemed to him of no use for the ars vivendi nor for ethics, because we cannot reach exact and certain knowledge as far as the genuine objects of physics are concerned (cf. SVF I, 351 - 355; 378; Steinmetz 1994, 560). The "heresy" of Ariston’s position presumably touched the essential role theoria has played within the frame of the "orthodox" Zenonian concept of virtue. And this could explain why Ariston, representing a cynic-sceptic variant of Stoic philosophy, was of some lasting importance for Cicero, as is manifest also in De finibus (III, 11; 12; 50) . 3 I am grateful to F. Buddensiek, M. Erler, W. Görler and J. Kulenkampff for their helpful comments on and critique of an earlier draft of this paper, and, above all, to W. Ertl for its English version. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 263 whenever he is simply reporting Stoic doctrine, or where he argues for a Stoic position using his sceptical speech and counter-speech method. As I shall try to show, exactly this is demonstrated in an exemplary manner in the Tusculanae. But even there, the original conception of virtue is overshadowed by Cicero's own view which, notwithstanding the acknowledgement of the outstanding rank of theoretical wisdom,4 in respect of which we are similar to the gods, is primarily concerned with engagement in the societas vitae.5 By nature, man strives for knowledge; exploring, inquiring, and contemplating basic, hidden, difficult, and miraculous things are activities closest to our nature6 and accordingly this striving is "the one most delightful food of the soul".7 But the striving which supports the agitatio mentis and keeps it going finds no rest in this life (because of the earthly state of the human soul)8 and our knowledge (of nature and its underlying order) in fact remains defective and dubious.9 Only after death, when it has left behind its earthly weight, the pressure of desire, its neediness and its vulnerability (if this should ever come to pass), will the most splendid thing be possible for the human soul: namely, the divine and unhindered knowing contemplation of heavenly and earthly things. In virtue of this anthropologically based sceptical position Cicero seems to hold the view that the most important task for man is the political and moral care of society and the concomitant actio vitae.10 In a wholly non-Stoic manner he therefore divides life into the realms of otium and negotium and relates theoria to otium. It is for 4 Cf. De off. I, 13; I, 18. 5 Cf. De off. I, 19; I, 22. 6 De off. I, 18: maxime naturam attingit humanam. 7 Tusc V, 66: unus suavissimus pastus animorum; cf. De off. I, 13. 8 De off. I, 19: ... agitatio mentis, quae numquam adquiescit ... 9 Cf. W. Burkert, Cicero als Platoniker und Skeptiker, in: Gymnasium 72 (1965), 175 - 200. This article most impressively reveals Cicero’s kind of scepticism concerning the genuine items of physics. 10 The only people who are exempt from the obligation to engage practically in public matters are those who are not fit for it or not capable of it because of their personal circumstances. Cf. De off. I, 71 sq. 264 Maximilian Forschner this reason that he castigates those who, because of their dominating interest in research and study, let down people who ought to be protected.11 He considers it to be a vitium that "some men bestow far too much eagerness on obscure, difficult, but unnecessary things"12, and he even characterises the life of first-rate philosophers as an "escape into leisure".13 It is for this reason that he has theoria reach a perfect state only in the hoped-for beyond.14 For this same reason, too, he passes lightly over the systematically important question of how in the Stoic position the cardinal virtues unite to form the unity of virtue15 and the question of how prudent and just conduct in everyday life results from Stoic wisdom. 1 The 5th and final conversation of the Tusculanae disputationes deals with the central and most controversial dogma of Stoic ethics, according to which virtue is sufficient for a happy life.17 It is a dogma the acceptance of which indicates decisively membership or otherwise of the School, and a dogma which - from the very beginning - has clearly marked the frontier between competing philosophical positions.18 This doctrine of the self-sufficiency of virtue must seem to be paradoxical, if not absurd, against the background of a modern conception of ethics, be this conception Kantian or utilitarian. In fact, this impression of paradox was appreciated in antiquity as well. People then were also acquainted with the fickleness of fate, with the 11 Cf. De off. I, 29: discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt. 12 De off. I, 19. 13 Cf. De off. I, 69. 14 Cf. Tusc. I, 42 - 47. 15 Cf. De off. I, 15. 16 Cf. Tusc. V, 72. 17 Tusc. V, 1: virtutem ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam. 18 Cf. Tusc. V, 32 - 33. Theoria and Stoic Virtue 265 endangerment of institutions, and with the fragility and proneness to suffering of human life. Right at the beginning of the conversation, Cicero's scepticism readily adds its voice to the vox populi: "It is to be feared that as regards our hope for a happy life we may not base our confidence on virtue, but we must rather, it seems, resort to prayers".19 And he does indeed formulate a prayer in the prooimion, but the addressee is not one of the great divine figures which popular faith believed to be benevolent, but an elitist, completely rational institution, i.