Indonesia’s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions
A report on the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD)
Stephen Sherlock
Centre for Democratic Institutions
July 2005
About the Author ...... 3
About the Centre for Democratic Institutions ...... 3
Introduction ...... 4
What is the DPD?...... 6 Constitutional role and powers...... 6 An advisory body not an upper house ...... 8 An assembly for the regions...... 10 Structure of the DPD ...... 10 Leadership of the DPD...... 11 Ad‐Hoc Committees...... 12 Steering Committee ...... 12 Legislation Committee ...... 13 House Affairs Committee ...... 14 Committee for Inter‐institutional Cooperation ...... 14 Ethics Council...... 14 Secretariat of the DPD...... 15 Who are the Members of the DPD?...... 16 Paths to power...... 19 Social and Occupational Backgrounds of DPD Members...... 20 The DPD electoral system: how representative?...... 24 Representation and “politics”...... 27 Representation in the SNTV electoral system ...... 29 Work in progress?: The first year of the DPD...... 31 Making a non‐party assembly work ...... 36
Conclusion...... 39
Appendix: DPD Members, Provinces & Votes ...... 44
2 About the Author Stephen Sherlock is an Associate at the Centre for Democratic Institutions and a political analyst and development consultant, specialising in Indonesia and South and Southeast Asia. He worked for eleven years as an analyst and policy adviser on Indonesia and East Timor in the Australian Parliament and now divides his time between Indonesia and Australia, as a consultant on governance and political change. Email: [email protected]
About the Centre for Democratic Institutions CDI was established in 1998 to assist in the development and strengthening of democratic institutions in developing countries.
Its mission is to harness Australian and international best practice in support of developing countries’ needs for democratic governance.
CDI’s work combines technical assistance and capacity building programs, networking, and interpersonal and knowledge exchange, including the dissemination of CDI’s original research on democracy and its institutions.
Its focus countries comprise Indonesia and Timor‐Leste in South East Asia and Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in Melanesia.
Centre for Democratic Institutions Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200 Australia Phone: 61 2 6125 3197 Fax: 61 2 6125 9726 Email: [email protected] Website: www.cdi.anu.edu.au
3 Introduction
The Indonesian state has been in a process of transformation since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. The first wave of reform under the unelected Habibie government of 1998‐99 saw the removal of restrictions on civil rights such as freedom of speech, association and assembly, the creation of a range of new political parties and organisations and the country’s first democratic election in over 40 years in June 1999. The movement of the parliament (DPR1) back into the centre stage of political life and the subsequent election of a new President then led to a series of constitutional reforms that were completed in 2003. The constitutional reforms strengthened the powers of the parliament and eliminated most of the powers of the previously powerful quasi‐legislative body, the MPR.2 The power to elect the President was removed from the MPR and was placed in the hands of the people through direct election. In addition, a new assembly, the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD) or Regional Representative Assembly/Council was created with the intention of increasing the role of the regions in making laws.
As a new representative assembly with some quite unusual features, the DPD has not yet been analysed in any detail. This study provides an introduction to the structure and operation of the DPD and examines some of the key issues that have emerged in discussion and debate about the DPD in its early formative period. The study considers certain questions about whether the DPD is as representative of the regions as its proponents would claim, whether it has provided a new entry point for regional aspirations into political and policy debate and what problems the DPD faces in attempting to define a role for itself in the future of Indonesian politics.
The DPD grew out of the view that Indonesia’s regions should have a greater role in policy‐making at the national level and that that role should be played by a second chamber of the central parliament. The argument developed in this paper, however, is that the DPD has not yet shown that it can actually provide significant input into the national legislative process or act as voice of the regions. The major problem is that the DPD is only an advisory body and its areas of responsibility are quite limited and, as yet, ill‐defined. Efforts by DPD Members to increase their powers have become a major preoccupation for the assembly and have arguably diverted its attention from the more immediate task
1 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) – People’s Representative Assembly. 2 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) – People’s Consultative Council.
4 of demonstrating that it can effectively use the powers it already has. Critical issues such as the definition and extent of the DPD’s powers and how the assembly should interact with the legislative deliberations of the DPR have not been seriously considered and have been dealt with on an ad‐hoc basis. The result is that the DPD’s only notable achievement to date is being what its leaders have called an “ombudsman” or a “post office”, gathering grievances and petitions amongst governmental and private institutions and individuals in the regions. The structure of the DPD is modelled on the DPR, but it is questionable whether the internal organisational arrangements that are appropriate for the DPR are actually the best for a very different body like the DPD.
DPD Members are elected as individuals and are not permitted to be sponsored by political parties. Despite concerns that political parties would attempt to take over and control the DPD through indirect means, it appears that there has not been any major organised forays into the assembly by the parties. A possible exception is that of Golkar, whose members and ex‐members are prominent in the DPD. This does not seem, however, to be the result of a concerted effort by the party, but instead is a reflection of the fact that the majority of people with governmental and political experience in Indonesia have had some connections with Golkar in the past. The DPD has become an alternative path through which former political operators from the New Order have been able to recreate themselves in the democratic environment and protect themselves from challenges to their influential status.
Apart from people with a background in the New Order, the DPD is also composed of other identifiable kinds of individuals. The large number of businesspeople elected to the DPD suggests that the assembly has become a means by which independently wealthy people can win a national office without depending on the support of political party. There is also a clearly identifiable pattern for local figures with traditional sources of status and influence to win a place in the DPD. Regions with strong localised support for religious organisations like NU, Muhammadiyah or the churches have tended to elect individuals with these backgrounds to the DPD. The election results also show that it is a major advantage to be known in certain localities as being part of an aristocratic or well‐connected family. Finally, the minority of individuals in the DPD with a background of involvement in academia, the law, media and community organisations indicates that it is also possible to be elected to the DPD with a profile built around professional standing and social activism.
5 The electoral system created for the DPD has given rise to some major issues about the powers, legitimacy and representativeness of the assembly. Faced with the reality of their limited powers, most DPD Members take comfort in the view that their chamber is more legitimate and representative than the DPR because it is composed of non‐party representatives. This is seen as justification for the campaign to further reform the constitution in order to increase the powers of the DPD. In fact, however, the unusual features of the DPD’s electoral system create serious doubts that claims for greater legitimacy and representativeness can be sustained. Moreover, the absence of the discipline, predictability and organisational direction provided by political parties can be seen as part of the reason why the DPD has so far failed to develop policy priorities or a plan of action beyond lobbying for increased powers. The first year of the DPD has been marked by drift and a lack of discernable progress.
What is the DPD?
The DPD is an elected assembly designed to increase the participation of the regions in the process of law‐making and the oversight of executive government. It has 128 Members, with 4 representatives from each of Indonesia’s 32 provinces. The DPD is the product of two parallel processes of political change occurring in Indonesia since 1998: firstly, popular and elite pressure for reform of the state to widen participation in decision‐making and accountability and, secondly, the devolution of powers from the capital, Jakarta, to the provincial and district (kabupaten) levels of government in the regions.
Constitutional role and powers
The legal basis for the DPD is Articles 22C and 22D of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which were inserted into the document as part of the constitutional amendments. The Constitution states that the DPD is elected from the provinces and has the following powers:
1) Propose Bills to the DPR related to regional autonomy, central and regional relations, formation, enlargement and merger of regions, management of natural resources and other economic resources and Bills related to the financial balance between the centre and regions.
6
2) Participate in the discussion of Bills related to the matters in paragraph 1 above, as well as provide advice to the DPR on Bills on the State Budget and Bills related to taxation, education and religion.
3) Oversee the implementation of laws related to the matters in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, as well as submit the results of such oversight to the DPR in the form of material for its further consideration.3
The constitutional reforms also changed the composition of the MPR, eliminating the previously unelected regional representatives and replacing them with the Members of the DPD. Article 2 (1) of the Constitution states that “the MPR shall consist of the Members of the DPR and the Members of the DPD. The remaining roles of the MPR are now to amend the Constitution, to swear in the President and to be the final decision‐maker in what would be quite lengthy proceedings to dismiss the President. Some leading Members of the DPD were part of the regional representatives grouping in the MPR and they tend to look upon the DPD as in some ways a successor institution to the MPR. The MPR is now composed of the Members of the DPR and the Members of the DPD and two of the four Speaker and Deputy Speaker position in the MPR are held by DPD Members.
It is important to note that the Constitution does not explicitly state that the DPD is a legislative body. The Constitution states that the DPR “holds the power to make laws,” with the qualification that the DPR must reach “joint approval” with the President (articles 20 (1) and (2)).4 The DPD is not mentioned at all in the context of law‐making powers.
3 Article 22D, 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. (Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945). Author’s translation. 4 It might be noted here that these two clauses could be interpreted as contradictory. If the DPR has the power to make laws, it should not be necessary for it to obtain joint approval from the President. Before the constitutional amendments, the power to make laws resided with the President alone. Removing the power from the President and explicitly stating that it resided with the DPR was seen as an important step for democratisation. In practice, however, the new formulation is ambiguous and gives executive government an effective power of veto at all stages of deliberations on a Bill. There are a growing number of Bills that have become frozen in the process because the government has refused to agree to the DPR’s draft Bill. See Stephen Sherlock, The Indonesian Parliament after Five Years of Reformasi, United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, Jakarta, 2004 , pp. 29-30. But, in any case, the DPD cannot pass or agree to a Bill, it can only provide advice.
7 The constitutional amendments were embodied in Law 22/2003 on the structure and composition of legislative bodies (commonly known as the Susduk law, an acronym of its Indonesian title). The Susduk law provides a little more detail on how the powers of the DPD are put into effect, particularly by providing some guidance on its interaction with the DPR. The law states that:
• the DPR invites the DPD to discuss the DPD’s proposed Bills, in accordance with procedures determined by the DPR. • discussion with the DPD takes place before the DPR begins discussion on the Bill with the government.5 • advice from the DPD on matters within its purview is to be regarded as material for the DPR to take up for further consideration, including in its discussions with the government. • the DPD gives advice to the DPR on the appointment of Members of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK).
An advisory body not an upper house
The first thing that is most evident from a reading of the Constitution and the Susduk law is that the DPD is only an advisory body. It has a role in the legislative process in that it has the power to draft laws on regional issues, to participate in the discussion on the State Budget and Bills in certain other issues and to oversee the implementation of certain laws. But the DPR is under no obligation to pass or even to consider seriously laws drafted by the DPD or to accept its advice. As mentioned, the Constitution gives the power to make laws to the DPR and the Susduk law makes it clear that input from the DPD is taken at the discretion of the DPR.
The DPD is sometimes referred to in media reports as Indonesia’s “Senate” and many DPD Members appear keen to be called “Senators”, probably in an attempt to boost perceptions of the chamber’s importance. This usage is, however, highly misleading because the DPD is in no way comparable to the US Senate or to upper houses in the bicameral parliaments that exist in both the Westminster tradition and in many presidential systems of government. In the US Congress, the UK Parliament and in many other parliaments, all legislation must pass through an upper house in order to be passed and, in many cases (such as the
5 The Constitution provides that all Bills must be discussed jointly by the DPR and government counterparts and that “joint agreement” between the two sides is required for a Bill to pass into law.
8 Australian Parliament) the upper house has veto powers. Even to talk of the new Indonesian system as “bicameral” is questionable because it suggests that all legislation passes through two houses (Patterson & Mughan 1999). But the DPD does not pass legislation, it can only introduce or give advice on a certain range of Bills in the DPR. Even the more generic term of “second chamber” that is often used in comparative literature is appropriate only in a strict literal sense when discussing the DPD (Baldwin & Shell 2001). The fact that the DPD is an advisory body and is limited in even the areas where it can advise make it difficult to accord it even nominal or ceremonial equal status with the DPR.
The DPD is thus a quite unusual example of a second chamber because it represents the odd combination of limited powers and high legitimacy. Its role in law‐making is limited to certain areas of policy, its powers are only advisory and no Bill is actually required to pass through it in order to be passed, yet at the same time it has the strong legitimacy that comes from being a fully elected chamber. This combination does not seem to be replicated anywhere else in the world. There are second chambers that combine strong powers with the strong legitimacy of popular election, such as the US Senate and the Australian Senate, and these chambers have often played a prominent role in their countries’ political scene. On the other hand, there are countries, such as Canada, whose second chambers have strong powers but lack legitimacy because they are appointed by executive government. The Canadian Senate has a range of powers that sound impressive but which have historically been rarely exercised because the Canadian electorate and the Senators themselves do not regard a body composed of government appointees to have the popular authority to impose its will on the lower house (Franks 1999).
There is a rich variety of forms of second chambers, but the norm is generally for their powers to be considerably or somewhat less than their “lower house”, particularly with regard to financial bills, and for their system of selection to be in some way indirect (either inheritance, appointment or election by other legislatures or institutions) and thus conferring a lesser legitimacy than direct popular election (Patterson & Mughan 2001). Thus political theory and actual practice in most democratic countries has tended to come to regard lesser powers for a second chamber to be a natural accompaniment to indirect election and vice versa. The design of the DPD, however, has created expectations amongst its Members and supporters that its voice should be listened to. Indeed, as shall be discussed below, many DPD Members consider that the method of election for the DPD has actually conferred a greater legitimacy on the DPD than on the DPR. But its powers are such that it does not have the capacity to force the “other
9 chamber” (the DPR) or the government to accept its position on any legislative or policy question.
An assembly for the regions
The DPD could be seen as akin to the second chambers of a number of countries in that its framers aimed to increase representation of the regions. Internationally, such representation is sought to be achieved in a variety of ways. In some countries, regional representation is based on the system of popular election. The US and Australian Senates are both popularly elected, but the electoral district is the state (province), with each state having an equal number of representatives, regardless of population. Other second chambers, such as the German Bundesrat and the South African Council of Provinces, aim for regional representation by having their Members elected from or by the provincial legislatures or provincial executive government. The Canadian Senate is composed of Members who nominally represent the provinces (with numbers varying according to provincial populations), but the appointments are made by the Prime Minister of the Confederation.
The DPD is said to be an assembly for the regions because its constituencies are the provinces and because its Members are elected as individual non‐party candidates. In addition, to ensure that large provinces do not dominate the assembly each province has equal representation, even though Indonesia’s provinces range in population from under 1 million to nearly 40 million. The voting system is by single non‐transferable vote (SNTV), which means that the candidates with the four highest numbers of votes are elected. Candidates for DPD election are not permitted to campaign as members of political parties or on the behalf of parties. They may, however, be members of political parties but may not be current office‐holders in a party. The first election for the DPD was held in April 2004, in conjunction with elections for the DPR and the assemblies at provincial and district level (DPRD‐I and DPRD‐II). The first DPD was sworn in in October 2004.
Structure of the DPD
The internal structure of the DPD is closely modelled on the example of the DPR, with certain important differences created by the absence of political parties. The philosophical approach to decision‐making and their embodiment in a number
10 of organisational principles are clearly influenced by those found in the DPR (Sherlock 2003). These include the direction of the assembly’s business by a strong collective leadership, collective decision‐making by consensus rather than an organised majority‐minority division and the concentration of decision‐ making power in specialised committees, with plenary sessions reserved for largely ceremonial endorsement of decisions made in ancillary bodies within the DPD.
Leadership of the DPD
The operation of the DPD is overseen by the Leadership of the House (Pimpinan DPD), which is composed of a Speaker (Ketua) and two Deputy Speakers (Wakil Ketua), whose duty is not only to preside over sessions but to organise and lead the DPD. The Leadership is characterised in the Rules of Procedure as being a ‘united collective leadership’.6 The philosophy underlying this description is indicative of the particular role of the Speaker(s) of the Indonesian parliament which has been transferred from the DPR to the DPD. In most democratic legislatures it is usually considered that the presiding officers should be impartial and ‘above’ partisanship, or should at least give strong consideration to the rights of opposition parties. The Leadership of the DPD, on the other hand, is seen as representing a collective consensus of the various Members of the assembly. The Leadership is considered non‐partisan not in the sense of being apart from party divisions but in the sense of articulating, or even embodying, a collective expression of all the main views in the DPD. It could be seen as significant that the terminology to describe the office implies that it is one that ‘leads’ rather than ‘presides’.
The Leadership is elected to be broadly representative of the regions. For the purposes of electing the Leadership the country is divided into three zones and one Member of the Leadership must come from each zone. The zones are the Western Zone compromising the 10 provinces of the island of Sumatra, the Central Zone compromising the 11 provinces of Java, Bali and Kalimantan and the Eastern Zone compromising the 11 provinces on the islands of Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua. The Speaker is Ginandjar Kartasasmita from West Java and the two Deputy Speakers are Irman Gusman from West Sumatra and Laode Ide from Southeast Sulawesi.7
6 “satu kesatuan pimpinan yang bersifat kolektif” Peraturan Tata Tertib DPD, Article 18. 7 The actual election of the first DPD Leadership in September 2004 is described in some detail in “Dari Daerah untuk Bangsa”, Legislatif, 1-15 November 2004, pp. 25-29.
11 Ad‐Hoc Committees
Just as the main working and decision‐making bodies of the DPR are the Commissions and Special Committees, the real work of the DPD is centred on four Ad‐Hoc Committees (Panitia Ad‐Hoc (PAH)) which, despite their name, are standing committees. Their role is to discuss Bills emanating from the DPR or initiated by the DPD and to execute the DPD’s powers in the area of the oversight of executive government. The structure and allocation of functions of the PAH reflects the powers and authority of the DPD.
PAH I: regional autonomy, relations between the centre and the regions, and the creation, dissolution and amalgamation of regions.8 PAH II: management of natural resources, management of other economic resources, balance of central and regional finances, and taxation. PAH III: education and religion. PAH IV: the state budget, results of the audit of the State Audit Agency (BPK) and advice on the appointment of Members of BPK.
Each PAH is composed of 32 Members, with one Member from each province, each Member being expected to serve on one PAH. The membership of the PAH is selected annually in a plenary meeting of the DPD, so current arrangements will mean that the membership will change each year. The Committees are headed by a Leadership, composed of a Chair and two Deputy Chair which, like the DPD Leadership is meant to be a united collective leadership.
In addition to the PA, there are a range of other permanent bodies (alat kelengkapan) of the DPD which are again modelled on their counterparts in the DPR.
Steering Committee
The Steering Committee (Panitia Musyawarah) is composed of 32 Members (one from each province) whose function is to draw up the agenda for the sessions of the DPD and to determine policies for the operation and management of the assembly and to oversee the work of the various bodies of the DPD. It is headed
8 The word “region” (daerah) is used interchangeably in two senses: to refer in general to the areas of the country outside the capital and to refer collectively to the three levels of sub-national government, the provinces, districts (kabupaten) and sub-districts (kecamatan).
12 by a Leadership with a Chair and two Deputy Chairs, elected by the Members of the Committee at a plenary session chaired by the DPD Leadership.
The Steering Committee’s roles are the same as those for the counterpart body in the DPR, which is a very powerful organ in that chamber. In remains to be seen, however, whether the Steering Committee of the DPD will be as central to the functioning of the DPD as it is in the DPR. This is one of the areas where the absence of political parties will have a crucial effect on how the DPD is able to operate. The Steering Committee in the DPR derives its powers not only from its ability to control what and when is discussed, but also from the fact that it is made up of the Leadership of the DPR, the Leadership of the Commissions and the Leadership of the party caucuses (Fraksi). It is thus composed of the most powerful elements of all the key bodies of the parliament and is the place were the party caucuses are most directly and formally represented (Sherlock 2003).
The composition of the Steering Committee of the DPD, on the other hand, is no different from the composition of all the other bodies of the DPD, including the PAH. The 32 Members of the Committee are selected as individual DPD Members and do not represent established power players from other bodies of the assembly. The absence of party caucuses means that the Committee is not an instrument for the enforcement of party direction and discipline along the lines of its counterpart body in the DPR. It will be important to observe what, if any, conventions come to be developed on the selection of Steering Committee members. Of particular interest will be the question of who, if anyone, is reappointed to the Committee over a number of years and is thus able to build up technical expertise and influence.
Legislation Committee
The Legislation Committee (Panitia Perancang Undang‐Undang) is a committee of 32 DPD Members (one from each province) whose function is to plan and prioritise the agenda of the DPD’s deliberations on Bills and to coordinate the discussion of Bills by the PAH and other DPD bodies. The Committee can hold consultations meetings with the DPR, regional legislatures, central and regional governments and the public and is the point of contact between the DPD and the Legislation Council of the DPR (Baleg) on the deliberation of Bills. The Committee is also responsible for evaluating and developing the Rules of Procedure (Standing Orders) of the DPD and the DPD Members’ Code of Ethics. It is headed by a collective Leadership of a Chair and two Deputy Chairs.
13 The Legislation Committee is modelled on the DPR’s Legislation Council (Baleg), a body that has become increasingly central to the work of the DPR because the Council now oversees the production of all Bills initiated by the DPR, often including the actual drafting of the Bills. The Council has also become an important interface between the DPR and the government. Once again, it will again be interesting to observe if the DPD Legislation Committee takes on as influential role as its counterpart in the DPR.
House Affairs Committee
The House Affairs Committee (Panitia Urusan Rumah Tangga) is responsible for the oversight of the internal affairs of the DPD, including the DPD’s own budget. It is constituted in the same way as the other bodies of the DPD, with a membership of 32 DPD Members, selected annually and with one representative from each province. It is headed by a collective Leadership composed of a Chair and two Deputy Chairs.
Committee for Inter‐institutional Cooperation
The Committee for Inter‐institutional Cooperation (Panitia Kerja Sama Antar‐ Lembaga Perwakilan9) is responsible for managing and developing relations and cooperation between the DPD and other representative legislative institutions, under the guidance of the DPD Leadership. The Committee oversees the dispatching and reception of delegations from other legislative bodies, both bilateral and multilateral, under the direction of the DPD Leadership and the Steering Committee. The Committee is composed of 32 Members (one from each province) selected annually and headed by a collective Leadership with a Chair and two Deputy Chairs.
Ethics Council
The Ethics Council (Badan Kehormatan) is charged with the responsibility of investigating complaints made against DPD Members regarding their continued fitness for office or allegations of violation of their oath or the DPD Code of Ethics. The Council can call witness and gather other evidence, can reach conclusions about its investigations and recommend sanctions such as termination of a Member from a leadership position in the DPD or as a Member of the DPD. But it must refer conclusions and recommendations to a plenary
9 This translates literally as “Inter-Representative Institution Cooperation Committee”.
14 session of the DPD for final decision. The Council is constituted in the same way as DPD Committees, with 32 Members (one from each province) and a Leadership of a Chair and two Deputy Chairs.
Secretariat of the DPD
A major problem confronting the DPD is the fact that the financial and human resources at its disposal to support its work are completely insufficient, particularly for an assembly that is still in the formative stages of its development. The resources available to support the DPR are meagre and those it does have are poorly organised and managed, but the DPR at least has the benefit of a complement of staff and physical resources inherited from its earlier years of existence as a rubber‐stamp chamber during the New Order. But the DPD is not even able to call on upon such accumulated sources of support.
As an interim measure, the immediate administrative and specialist needs of the DPD have been met by the Secretariat of the MPR. With the great reduction in the powers and role of the MPR, and particularly since the end of the work of the MPR committee on constitutional reform, this was a logical short‐term move. But the MPR Secretariat was not designed for a chamber that meets on a continuous basis like the DPD. The MPR Secretariat does have the advantage that it is relatively flexible compared to the DPR Secretariat and it was reportedly able to redirect staff existing staff to new tasks. But the DPD is urgently in need of a Secretariat that is structured around its own institutional needs. Current plans are that a DPD Secretariat will be established by the end of 2005, but outside observers are sceptical that this objective will be met. A Presidential Decree will be required to establish the DPD Secretariat, but this has not yet been issued.10
The MPR Secretariat has a staff of around 300 personnel, with the great majority of these being administrative and security staff.11 There are around 15 staff with the qualifications to provide the kind of intellectual support necessary for a modern legislature. These include 5 legal drafters who had been brought into the MPR Secretariat to work on the constitutional amendment process. There are a number of staff with law and politics backgrounds, but none with high level qualifications in disciplines such as economics and education. These latter areas
10 Interviews with MPR Secretariat staff and staff of international agencies. Jakarta, May 2005. 11 The DPD building is located inside the DPR/MPR compound, but the MPR Secretariat is responsible for the security of the DPD building as well as the MPR Secretariat building. The DPR Secretariat is responsible for the perimeter security of the compound and for DPR facilities.
15 are, of course, a major focus for the work of the DPD and the absence of staff with such expertise is a glaring weakness that reflects the fact that the MPR Secretariat was not designed for the purposes of supporting the DPD. DPD Members are provided with an allowance for one member of staff each. Most of these staff are not well qualified and tend to be regarded by Members as an opportunity to dispense patronage or to employ relatives.
Who are the Members of the DPD?
An important element of the discussion and debate that led to the formation of the DPD was the idea that it should be made up of people different from those that tend to fill the ranks of the DPR. It was intended that the DPD should not be dominated by the professional party politicians in Jakarta, but should contain people from a diversity of backgrounds who are strongly connected with a base in the regions.
The first clear trend is the strong presence of Members with Golkar connections, with one estimate putting it at 24, or 19 per cent of the assembly. These range from former national leaders such as the Suharto‐era Ministers Ginandjar Kartasasmita (now the DPD Speaker) and Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, to provincial party functionaries such as the Aceh representative, Helmi Mahera Al Mujahid, to the North Sumatra representative, Raja Inal Siregar, a former Governor of that province and retired military officer, who described himself as an “adviser” to Golkar.12 One of the Deputy Speakers of DPD, La Ode Ida, also worked as an adviser to the Golkar Faction in the DPR from 1997 to 1999.13 A large proportion of those with a relationship with Golkar appear to be from the “green” or Islamic elements of the party, with a number having been involved in ICMI and Muhammadiyah.
The prominence of former Golkar figures is not surprising because it was by far the official party during the Suharto regime and membership was critically important to the acquisition of any kind of position of public office or influence. Golkar was the only party permitted to organise at the regional level and it was a parallel but integral part of local administrative structures. In many regions Golkar leaders make up a major proportion of the individuals with political and administrative experience and with a high public profile in their local
12 Profiles of Members of the Regional Representative Council 2004-2009, MPR RI Secretariat General & International IDEA, Jakarta, 2004. 13 Ibid., p. 287.
16 communities and provinces. The situation is reminiscent of the hold on public life still held by figures from the Stalinist parties of the former Soviet bloc. There was never anything like a “purge” of New Order figures after the fall of Suharto, so many appear to have used their longstanding networks and profile as a launching pad for election to the DPD. Three other Members declare themselves to have had associations with other parties, two from parties that existed under the New Order, PPP and PDI/PDIP and only one from a party launched since 1998, the Islamic PBB.
Possibly the most striking feature of the composition of the DPD is the prominence of business people. About 50 Members describe themselves as being “entrepreneurs”, in “private business” and so on, which makes them the largest single group in the DPD. There are some who have had previous experience in public office, but the DPD is notable in that it seems to have attracted a large number of individuals with a purely business background that have had little previous overt involvement in public politics.
A large number of religious leaders or individuals with connections to an Islamic or Christian organisation were elected to the DPD. Around 30 DPD Members, or 23 per cent of the assembly, have such connections as a major part of their profile. These include prominent leaders of the Islamic modernist organisation Muhammadiyah, such as Irman Gusman from West Sumatra, as well as a number of figures who are well known in their provinces for their role in the Islamic traditionalist organisation, Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) and in Islamic schools (pesantren) run by NU. In the large provinces of West, Central and East Java, where NU is especially influential, 5 of the 12 DPD Members have a prominent background in NU pesantren.14 There are 8 DPD Members with links to Christian organisations, mainly from eastern Indonesia where Christians are concentrated. In many cases, however, they could not necessarily be described as “religious leaders” because their religious affiliations are just one part of their profile.
Along with religious leaders from organisations with a strong local identity, there is a group of individuals who are prominent in their province or region because their families have traditional local aristocratic or adat connections. The clearest example is probably Gusti Kanjeng Ratu Hemas, the wife of the highly influential Sultan of Yogyakarta. Two of the four Balinese Members are scions of the aristocratic families of Bali. Representing North Maluku are Nita Budhi Susanti, the wife of the Sultan of Ternate and Djafarsyah, the Sultan of Tidore,
14 Profiles of Members, op. cit., pp. 125-179.
17 while Arief Natadiningrat and Ratu Cicih Kurniasih come from traditional ruling families in West Java and Banten respectively. One of the Central Sulewesi representatives, Nurmawati Bantilan, has a family name famous in the province for its long history of occupying prominent professional and public positions.
Many of the DPD Members have had a background in regional government and administration, either as civil servants, members of regional assemblies such as DPRDs,15 or as leading officials such as provincial Governors and district heads (Bupati). Nine Members have held local government office under the Suharto regime or since 1998, 5 have been Members of provincial or district legislatures and 6 were Members of the MPR as regional representatives, meaning that they were appointed by local assemblies. Many individuals with such a background have had careers in the civil service and this is reflected in the background of many DPD Members. The heavy involvement of the military in local administration under the Suharto regime has, however, not lead to high military or police numbers in the DPD. The presence of 5 former uniformed officers in the DPD from the police and military would be considered quite unusual in most democratic countries, but it could be seen as relatively small in the context of Indonesian history.
The final category of DPD Member which can be identified are those with a background in academia or the professions, particularly the media and law. The Deputy Speaker of the DPD, Laode Ide, best exemplifies this strand in the DPD membership, with a professional background in higher education combined with a public profile built around public commentary in the media and work for non‐ government organisations (NGOs), as well as a short period as an adviser to the Golkar faction in the DPR. There are 20 Members who give their occupation as lecturer or academic, as well as 4 Members with legal qualifications and 11 with a background in the media.
Female representation in the DPD is perhaps higher than many people expected, with 27 women being elected. This is 21 per cent of the assembly, a figure which compares favourably with the 11 per cent representation of women in the DPR (Bessell 2004). A couple of the women could be seen as continuing in the tradition of Megawati, Benazir Bhutto or Indira Gandhi and being elected because of their relationships with male figures. A most notable example, as mentioned above, is the wife of the Sultan of Yogyakarta who is a very popular
15 DPRD = Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People’s Representative Assembly. These exist at the provincial level, where they are known as DPRD-I and at district (kabupaten) level, where they are known as DPRD-II.
18 figure in his province and the only member of one of the former aristocratic families who has a national profile. Sultana Hemas’ election demonstrated the great local popularity of the Sultan in Yogyakarta because she actually received the highest individual vote (in percentage terms) of any candidate for the DPD. With 43.31 per cent of the vote in her province, she far exceeded the vote of any other DPD Member, most of whom received from 5 to 20 per cent. Interestingly, the candidate with the second highest vote was another “wife”, Aida Ismet, the wife of the Governor of Riau Islands, who won 35.78 per cent. Further surveys would be required to identify the extent to which voters who supported women candidates did so because of the candidates’ gender.
Paths to power
There are a number of clear patterns to the kind of people who have been elected to the DPD. Their backgrounds could be put into five categories: business, government and the bureaucracy, religion, aristocratic/traditional and professional/social activist. It is important to be clear, however, that these are not watertight categories into which each Member can be neatly placed. On the contrary, there is a large overlap between them and many Members could be identified in more than one way. The Deputy Speaker, Irman Gusman, for example, has prominent Islamic modernist connections, having been involved in both Muhammadiyah and ICMI, but he clearly identifies himself as a businessman with “a modern management approach” to politics, rejecting associations with “sectarianism”.16 In a similar way, most of those with an aristocratic background identify themselves as businesspeople or professionals.
With these reservations in mind, the following tabulation produced by the international development organisation, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Systems (IDEA) presents a view of the composition of the DPD which gives a good impression of the relative strengths of different kinds of DPD Members.
16 Interview with Irman Gusman, Jakarta, May 2005.
19 Social and Occupational Backgrounds of DPD Members Source: International IDEA
No Category Total
1. Golkar background 26
2. Other party backgrounds (PDIP, PPP) 2 (1‐1)
3. MPR (Regional delegates, Social group delegates) 9 (6‐3)
4. DPR 2
5. Regional parliaments (DPRD I/II) 8
6. Business people 50
7. National Executive (Ministers) 2
8. Regional Executive (Governors, District Heads, other) 6 (3‐1‐2)
9. NGO/activist 8
10. Academia 20
11. Islamic Traditionalist 19
12. Islam Modernist 21
13. Non Islamic religious organisations 6
14. Military (TNI/Polri) 5
15. Media 11
16. Law 4
The usefulness of these categorisations is that they give an insight into the sources of prominence, influence and resources on which DPD Members drew in order to win election. They provide a broad picture of the paths to power for DPD candidates. Without the organisational and financial resources of political parties behind them, candidates for the DPD mobilised political and/or financial capital behind them in a number of ways.
Some drew upon their standing as leaders of religious organisations or as members of families with high traditional status and were able to translate the respect of local people into electoral support. In the case of the religious leaders, this had both local and national dimensions, in that NU, Muhammadiyah and the Catholic and Protestant churches are notionally Indonesia‐wide bodies but
20 actually have a strongly regional character to their patterns of adherence. Hence the DPD figures most clearly associated with NU come from East and Central Java, while those with Muhammadiyah connections are strongly represented amongst the Members from Sumatra and most of the Christian Members are from eastern Indonesia. In the case of aristocratic and adat figures, local allegiances were clearly paramount. Thus one path to the DPD was to draw upon highly localised religious and other traditional identities or allegiances, frequently referred to in Indonesian political discourse as “primordial”, a term that often has disparaging connotations.
Other DPD candidates were able to mobilise electoral support out of their background as powerful political figures during the New Order, whether as ministers, governors, district heads or prominent officials in the regional bureaucracy. Recent research has shown that there is marked trend for some new provincial legislatures and positions of district heads and mayors to be taken over by “politicos” from the previous regime who have been highly successful in surviving the transition and thriving in new positions of power that are, in theory at least, now democratically accountable (Robison & Hadiz 2004, Malley 2003). According to Hadiz (2003: p.5), it is an indication “of the success that Soeharto‐era local elites have had in reconstituting their power in a more democratic environment dominated by parties and parliaments”. The evidence from the DPD suggests that this new assembly has also become one of the ways in which this is being achieved.
Not only is the DPD being seen as a new path to power in itself, but the assembly is also being used as a stepping stone to power in the regions. At the time of writing, direct popular elections for the positions of governor, district heads and mayors are being held for the first time. Around ten DPD Members are candidates for these elections, a fact that was greeted with acclamation by the majority of Members when it was announced by Speaker Ginandjar at the May 2005 plenary session of the DPD.17 That such a large number of Members would stand for a new office so soon after taking on the responsibilities of a position in the DPD does not suggest that they took their seat in the DPD very seriously. Should most of those Members be successful in their bid for new offices and leave the DPD, it could have a highly disruptive effect on a chamber that has only just begun to function as a representative assembly and which, as discussed below, still has very few achievements to its name. Of equal concern is the fact that the majority of Members do not appear to view this development with any
17 Observation by the author, May 2005.
21 concern or opprobrium. Many Members consider that standing for other offices while still a DPD Member is justified by the fact that they could achieve a great deal more in the powerful positions of governor, district head or mayor, as compared to working in the relatively powerless DPD.18
The relative prominence of DPD Members with a background in academia, the law, media and community organisations suggests that a further way of mobilising support for a DPD is through professional standing and involvement in professional and other organisations, activism or advocacy. This is a very diverse group and further observation and research is required here to gather insight into the manner in which such people gathered support amongst the electorate. It seems, however, that there were very few Members explicitly sponsored or supported by NGOs. The most notable exception is Muspani from Bengkulu, a lawyer by profession who has been a leading figure in human rights and environmental organisations and whose candidacy for the DPD was championed by a number of NGOs in his province. Notwithstanding the prominent role accorded NGOs and civil society organisations in international development and democratisation literature, the sector remains very weak in Indonesia and is dominated by the urban middle class, professionals and students. There capacity to mobilise electoral support has been shown to be weak in other national and regional elections.
It appears that a combination of factors is often required for people with a professional or activist profile to be elected. Laode Ide, for example, is known for his media profile and advocacy work, but he has lived most of professional life in Jakarta, far from his “home” province of Southeast Sulawesi. In this province, however, he was able to boost his support through the strong recognition of his family name which denotes that he comes from a local aristocratic family. One might also mention the example of Ferdinanda Ibo Yatipay from Papua who is a retired civil servant, but who campaigned on a platform of supporting the establishment of the Papuan People’s Council.
The final, and perhaps most common, path to a seat in the DPD is through a business background. The largest single grouping that one can identify in the DPD is business people and entrepreneurs. As previously noted, it is a longstanding characteristic of Indonesian politics that politicians acquire
18 The reaction of many DPD Members at the plenary session indicated that they fully approved of the candidacy of their colleagues in the regional heads elections and saw no negative implications for the functioning and status of the DPD. A number of Members told the author that they fully understood and supported their colleagues’ actions, but one or two expressed surprise and disappointment.
22 business interests during (and as a result of) their involvement in politics. But the interesting feature of the DPD is that there is a large number of Members who identify themselves as businesspeople and do not appear to have a history of previous involvement in politics, at least in the sense of being office‐holding politicians.
The most likely explanation for this is that in the absence of the patronage and financial support of political parties, business people are much more likely to have their own personal resources to mobilise. It is well known that wealthy individuals can obtain a favourable place on a party ticket for election to the DPR or a regional legislature by giving generously to a party. But this route to office, of course, means involving oneself in the internal machinations of the party and possibly being subordinated to a patron and the power‐brokers within the party machine. The DPD, on the other hand, may seem attractive as an independent path to personal political influence, free of party entanglements, for a person with sufficient means to pay the substantial costs of an electoral campaign. Election campaigns usually involve considerable expenditure, not only on printing, advertising etc, but also for the distribution of gifts of clothing, food packages and so on to voters and for the payment of transport and attendance money to those attending rallies. An ambitious individual without large resources must enter the political game through a party, but the DPD allows a businessman with funds and time on his/her hands the luxury of a “non‐ political” entry into politics and a free hand to play the game as he/she pleases.
An important observation on the composition of the DPD and the paths its Members have taken to a seat is that there really does not seem to have been a concerted effort by the political parties to move into the DPD and to control it indirectly by placing their supporters in the assembly. As previously noted, there is a substantial proportion of the DPD who are members of Golkar, have Golkar connections or a history of involvement with Golkar. But research to date does not suggest that this was an organised effort by the party. Rather, it is a reflection of the fact that Golkar allegiances were essential for a political or bureaucratic career under the New Order and, to repeat a point made earlier, the politicos or apparatchiks of the New Order are continuing to play a prominent role in post‐ Suharto political life, including within non‐Golkar parties (Hadiz 2003, 2004). And, of course, some Golkar or ex‐Golkar figures are widely regarded to have stood for election to the DPD precisely because they had lost influence in the party. Both Golkar and non‐Golkar Members of the DPD insist that those with links to Golkar do not work as a political bloc within the assembly. As elaborated below, however, some Members have observed that the influence of New Order
23 modes of thinking and organisation are clearly evident amongst those with a Suharto‐era past. Only 3 DPD Members appear to have connections with other parties, a fact which reinforces the impression that there has not been a major attempt by the parties to win a presence in the DPD.
Of course, were the DPD a more powerful body there would certainly be a great deal more interest from the political parties. If, as so many Members of the DPD wish, the powers of the DPD are enhanced, successive elections may see a large number of candidates being covertly or indirectly supported by the parties. It should not be forgotten that the law does not prevent party members from standing in DPD elections, nor is the nature of party support for a candidate clearly defined. So far, however, the parties have overtly respected the goal of keeping the DPD free of control by political organisations. Future research on the conduct of DPD elections and the functioning of the chamber will probably uncover an interesting web of connections between DPD Members and political parties. It seems very likely that the first party that might attempt to exercise some organised influenced over the DPD would be Golkar since its members or ex‐members are both most prominent and the most experienced in the assembly.
The DPD electoral system: how representative?
As previously mentioned, the DPD was designed to be a regional house with non‐party representatives. Therefore a particular electoral system was introduced with these objectives in mind: all provinces have the same number of representatives, candidates can only stand as individuals and the voting system is single non‐transferable vote (SNTV). The election of individual non‐party candidates has, for many partisans of the DPD, become the single most important distinguishing feature of the assembly. They have argued strongly that DPD Members are “representatives of the people”, in contrast to DPR Members who merely “represent political parties”.
Predictably, many DPD Members support this position, with some seeing the DPD as a “balance” to the party loyalties of the DPR and many going to the extent of claiming to have greater legitimacy than the DPR because the DPD is a more true reflection of the electorate’s aspirations. Amongst those who make such claims are leading Members such as the Speaker Ginandjar Kartasasmita.19 Following on from the prominent public debate that lead to the creation of a
19 Interview with the author, Jakarta, May 2005.
24 system of direct election of the President in 2004, partisans of the DPD have begun to inject new and specific meanings into the phrase “direct election”. In this discourse, a vote for an individual candidate is presented as the only vote worthy of the title “direct” and a vote for a party candidate is portrayed as a lesser and somehow less genuinely democratic choice.20 Of course, much of this language, especially its more extreme formulations, is part of the arguments mustered to support the campaign for increased powers for the DPD in relation to the DPR, as well as to increase the size of the assembly from its current status of one‐third of the DPR.
Rhetoric aside, what has been the effect in practice of the special features of the DPD electoral system and how well have the ideals of representativeness been realised? In particular, how well do the claims for a special higher quality of representativeness stand up to closer scrutiny? Studies of systems of election for representative chambers have repeatedly shown that the particular methods and procedures for creating parliaments and governments can have important effects on election results . Moreover, different systems can be used to achieve different objectives. Proportional representation systems, for example, are usually employed when the most important goal is to make the assembly as close as possible a reflection of the electorate’s opinions, while majoritarian systems such as single member electorates (in Indonesia called the “district system”), usually emphasise the importance of stability of government and of reaching decisions (McLain 1991). As McLain emphasises, however, “’representation’ is one of the slippery core concepts of political theory” and the various objectives implicit in the different views are not always compatible (McLain 1991: 172). Particular systems may not only fail to achieve the expected results, they can also produce outcomes that were completely unintended by their creators.
The most obvious effect of the electoral system for the DPD is that vastly greater representation is given to smaller provinces than larger ones: the small provinces of around 1 million have one representative per 250,000 people while provinces with over 30 million people have one representative for over 7 million people (Datta: 8). The provinces of eastern Indonesia and Sumatra have many more representatives than those on Java. Java contains 60 per cent of Indonesia’s population but has only 19 per cent of seats in the DPD because it has just 6 provinces and therefore 24 DPD Members. The three largest provinces, East, Central and West Java contain around half the population of Indonesia but have less than 10 per cent of the seats. At the other extreme, the 16 provinces of eastern
20 See Profiles of Members, op. cit., eg. pp.21, 40, 58, 61, 93, 104.
25 Indonesia (including Bali), which together have just 20 per cent of the country’s population, received exactly half of the seats in the DPD. The 10 provinces of Sumatra, with the remaining 20 per cent of the population, have 40 of the 128 seats (31 per cent).
The advocates of regional weighting along provincial lines would argue that this result was the intended and desirable result of the system and ensures that smaller, remote and poorer provinces are given greater representation to compensate for their disadvantage and location. Closer examination, however, reveals that the system is a rather crude instrument for achieving such objectives and that many anomalies have created unfair results for many provinces and regions and for particular groups within them.
In the case of Java, for example, while it may be true that Java is the home of Indonesia’s great and powerful, the island also contains huge numbers of the country’s poor whose geographical proximity to the centres of power provides little material benefit. In any case, questions could be raised about the rationale for giving four seats to the province of Banten, which shares the putative advantages of being located on Java (and is right next to Jakarta), but has a relatively small population, while the masses of people in a huge province like West Java, with no particular economic advantages, also has four representatives? Equally, the centre of power and privilege, Jakarta, still has four DPD Members even though its population is far below the big provinces of Java. Similar questions might raised about why the citizens of Yogyarkarta, a small and highly influential city, have as many DPD representatives as their vastly more numerous Central Javanese cousins.
Similar anomalies could be pointed to in eastern Indonesia. For example, relatively large provinces such as East and West Nusa Tenggara or South Sulawesi have fewer DPD representatives per head of population than the smaller provinces on Sulawesi and Kalimantan, even though the former share all the remoteness and disadvantage of eastern Indonesia.
Of greater concerns is the possible perverse effect of the system on the dynamics of eastern Indonesian politics. The already very small province of Maluku was divided into the two new provinces as part of conflict resolution in the area, thus doubling its representation in the DPD. Unsympathetic observers in larger neighbouring provinces might ask themselves why an incapacity to live peacefully with one’s fellows should be rewarded with greater representation in Jakarta. Such arrangements could even be seen as creating further incentives to
26 fissiparous tendencies in an already conflict‐prone region. Indeed, a common interpretation of the decision to divide Papua into three provinces, in violation of the Special Autonomy Law, was that certain locally‐based elites saw it as a way of increasing the range of mechanisms for accumulating power and wealth, including seats in local assemblies and governments and in the DPD.
The only region that appears to have DPD representation in rough proportion to its population is Sumatra, although it is slightly under‐represented. But the fact that Sumatra is an exception is, in itself, anomalous. Many regions of Sumatra are arguably no better geographically or economically placed that much of eastern Indonesia, yet they have been allotted far fewer representatives in the DPD. And as in eastern Indonesia, questions could be raised about why, for instance, the small number of citizens of Riau and Riau Islands, who are strategically located near Singapore and whose provinces have good natural resources, have the same number of DPD Members as larger and less well‐located and endowed provinces in the rest of Sumatra. The division of the old province of Riau into two was certainly not caused by a desire for more DPD representation, but the possibility of having double DPD seats might be an extra element of encouragement for other provinces to emulate the Riau example.
Representation and “politics”
The principal of regional representation implies that placing a particular individual in an assembly who is elected by the population of that province means that that individual “represents” the province. The suggestion is that minority groups within those provinces (defined variously on lines of ethnicity, religion, socio‐economic standing and so on) benefit from representation that they would otherwise be deprived of. Yet, at the same time, the inference is also made that these “representatives” would not be bound by sectional identities but would speak for their province as a whole, the unspoken assumption of which is that all the people in the province have common interests. Provincial representation was therefore meant, simultaneously, both to supersede and to speak for minority interests and identities.
Many creators of the DPD were probably aware of the complex reality of the abstract idea of “representation” in practice. But they focused their attention on the issue of the potential for cooption of provincial representation by political parties. Hence the idea of non‐party candidature for DPD election. As mentioned earlier, the objective was to bring a new type of representative of regional
27 opinion to the national legislative process, one of a different breed from the party politicians who congregate in Jakarta. During debate on the Susduk law in the DPR there were differences of opinion about how connected to party affiliations that DPD candidates should be permitted to be, but the common idea was that quarantining the campaign from party candidates would lead to a different and more genuine kind of representation that was free of “politics”. Thus it was decided that candidates could not be funded or sponsored by parties and they could not hold office in a party structure.
It appears, however, that the goal of non‐party representation has proved to be incompatible with the goal of provincial representation. While the provisions on party support and membership were meant to distance all parties from the DPD on an equal basis, the provincial composition of the DPD has actually greatly enhanced the influence of some political traditions in the assembly over others. If all parties were evenly supported throughout the country this would not happen, but the reality is that most Indonesian political parties are quite regional in character, with concentrations of popularity in different areas.
Golkar in particular has benefited from the regional composition of the DPD. We have already noted the strong presence of DPD Members with Golkar connections, either as holders of national or regional administrative office that required Golkar membership during the Suharto era, or as figures in the party structure and party organisations. But if Golkar’s position in the DPD was explicable only in terms of strengths the party inherited from the New Order, it could be expected that Golkar‐connected DPD Members would come from a uniform cross section of Indonesia’s regions. In fact, however, they tend to come from provinces in eastern Indonesia, where the pervasiveness of Golkar within local administrative structures and political life under the New Order was always much greater than in Java. Golkar has been able to hold onto a dominant position in these areas after the collapse of the Suharto regime, a dominance that has enabled its networks to win a large number of DPD seats, even though the candidates were not officially endorsed by the party. In the DPR also, Golkar is particularly strong in eastern Indonesia (Sherlock 2004). Thus because the eastern regions are greatly over‐represented in the DPD, there was an inherent advantage in having a Golkar background. The weighting designed to advantage a particular region has created clear political effects, effects that are arguably an imbalance in political representation.
The opposite effect has, of course, been felt in Java because of its under‐ representation in the DPD. This is especially notable in the case of Members with
28 connections to NU. As mentioned earlier, 5 of the 12, or 42 per cent of DPD Members for East, Central and West Java have strong NU connections. If this figure was replicated in a truly proportional DPD, up to 20 per cent of the DPD might have NU connections and might be sympathetic to the National Awakening Party (PKB). Of course it is not possible to assume that NU or PKB support would be translated in such a mechanical way into a differently constituted DPD. But this calculation does give some indication of the representational disadvantage suffered by a major religious and political current because of the way the DPD is elected.
Representation in the SNTV electoral system
In addition to the anomalies created by equal numbers of DPD Members per province, the SNTV electoral system (also known as “first past the post”) has also produced some notable election results which raise interesting questions regarding the representativeness of the DPD. Internationally, this system has received frequent criticism (Wall 2004) and many countries in the Asia Pacific region have moved away from it as part their processes of political reform (Reilly 2004: 11‐14). The SNTV system in multi‐member constituencies has led to a situation where not one single DPD candidate received an absolute majority of votes in his/her constituency. In fact, all but four DPD Members were elected with less than 20 per cent of the vote and 62 per cent (79 Members out of 128) received less than 10 per cent. The SNTV system in multi‐member constituencies leads to a great scattering of votes across candidates and the winning candidates often receive only a small number of votes above the candidates they defeat (Reilly 2004). In a large province such as West Java, for example, the vote was spread across 42 candidates. Since almost all DPD Members received the support of only 5 to 20 per cent of the people of their province, claims that they represent the province should be treated carefully. (See Appendix for DPD Members’ votes.)
The system produced an extraordinarily high rate of “wasted” votes, that is votes that did not elect any candidate. In over half of the provinces (17 of 32) the combined vote for all four successful candidates ranged from as low as 27 per cent of the total vote in their province to a high of 40 per cent. In other words, from 60 to 73 per cent of the voters in those provinces did not vote for any of their putative representatives in the DPD. In only six provinces did the total vote for the four successful candidates equal an absolute majority.
29
The vastly different sizes of the provinces affected the size of the vote for individual candidates, but not markedly so. The bigger the province, the greater were the chances that a Member would be elected with less than 10 per cent. In the four large provinces on Java, only 2 of the 16 Members just managed to cross the 10 per cent threshold (11.15 and 11.26 per cent). Both of these were candidates with strong NU connections. The very small provinces of Papua, West Irian Jaya and North Maluku returned 4 Members with between 10 and 20 per cent each and gave these 4 candidates more than 50 per cent of the vote in total. But even many relatively small or middle sized provinces did not return very high votes for individual candidates or very high total votes for all successful candidates. In Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau, South Sumatra, Lampung, Bangka Belitung, Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, Central and West Kalimantan and Southeast Sulawesi the total vote for all winning candidates was less than 40 per cent of the electorate and either 3 or 4 candidates in each province failed to receive more than 10 per cent. Standing in a small province gave a candidate a better chance of receiving a relatively higher vote than standing in a large province, but virtually all candidates still failed to receive the support of even a fifth of their constituents.
It is interesting to note some particular local results that were heavily influenced by the SNTV system. Because SNTV often has the effect of scattering the vote across a large number of candidates, single communities that otherwise have a strong overall identity may not achieve the level of representation that might have been predicted. This occurred in the case of South Sulawesi, where a province with strongly Islamic modernist character elected only two Islamic candidates, with the other two going to Toraja Christians. This occurred because a large number of candidates were fielded out of the Islamic community because of internal divisions, thus splitting the vote. The Christian community, on the other hand, proved more cohesive, put forward fewer candidates and achieved representation in the DPD well above its numbers in the province.
Of course, in a proportional representation (PR) system such as used for the DPR, the vote for successful individual candidates might also be a small percentage of the electorate, as might be the quota won by, or allotted to other candidates. But the existence of parties melds candidates together into blocs that arguably provide each individual Member with a more credible claim to represent a wider constituency. Moreover the PR system in the DPR has produced a far smaller number of “wasted” votes than the extraordinarily high numbers recorded for
30 the DPD. The great majority of Indonesians did not actually vote for the candidates elected to the DPD.
There is continuing debate about the merits of different electoral systems in the literature on this subject. The debate is probably unresolvable because it involves balancing off different and competing objectives. There are strengths and weaknesses in any electoral system, but the claims for greater legitimacy or representativeness made by proponents of the DPD system are difficult to sustain in the face of close analysis. The combination of three elements, equal numbers of representatives for each province regardless of population, the banning of party candidates and the SNTV voting system, have produced a highly idiosyncratic pattern of representation in the DPD. This may be not be seen as problematic if the particular objectives of special representation for remote and poor regions and minorities was consistently achieved. But, as has been argued above, it is difficult even to make a case that the stated objectives of the DPD system have actually been realised in practice.
Work in progress?: The first year of the DPD
The first DPD was elected in April 2004 and its Members sworn in in October 2004. As has been mentioned, the DPD has limited powers but is surrounded by the legitimacy that comes from direct popular election. This has confronted the Members of the DPD with the challenge of using the political clout of popular legitimacy to bolster the limitations of the powers and authority that has been conferred on it. As an entirely new body, the DPD has embarked on this project while needing to establish a basic institutional framework and set of procedures for internal organisation and for relating to the DPR, the central government, provincial legislatures and provincial governments. What progress has the DPD made in its first year of operation and what does its progress so far suggest about its future role in Indonesian politics?
The principal achievements of the DPD to date have largely been internal institutional ones. Since the DPD is new, it is understandable that it needs to dedicate a considerable part of its first months in establishing its own internal rules, procedures and structures. The DPD has adopted Rules of Procedure or Standing Orders (Peraturan Tata Tertib) and the various bodies of the DPD provided for in those Rules have been constituted (Yudhini 2004). Many of the operating procedures have been put into practice in a range of deliberations. A
31 cycle of sessions has been established which involves a number of weeks of plenary sessions and meetings of Committees and other bodies, interspersed with a number of weeks of recess during which Members are expected to carry out “working visits” in their provinces to “gather aspirations” amongst their constituents.
It is significant to note, however, that virtually all of the work of the drafting of the Rules of Procedure was actually done by officials in the MPR Secretariat during the final session of the MPR Committee which produced the changes in the Constitution. The DPD Members themselves produced only minor amendments to the draft Rules of Procedure they received from the MPR, mainly to introduce the idea of the three regions that should be represented in the DPD Leadership. This principle also became reflected in the composition of the Leaderships of the various Committees.
The drafting of the Rules of Procedure by parties other than the Members themselves appears to have had a significant effect on shaping internal arrangements in the DPD. As noted above, the structure of the DPD was modelled very closely on the DPR, but this is not necessarily desirable when the DPD has such different powers, functions and composition from the DPR. The Steering Committee of the DPR, for example, is a very powerful body because it allows for coordinated management of DPR business by the most influential elements of the House and it brings together the political parties and the working bodies of the DPR. The DPD Steering Committee, on the other hand, is a collection of individual Members selected on a somewhat random basis. With one‐quarter of the assembly sitting in the Committee, there seems to be a danger that the flow of work through the DPD could be impeded if such an unwieldy body finds it difficult to agree. While the Steering Committee of the DPR might have an unfortunate tendency to dictate to ordinary Members of that chamber, it does so because it represents the leaders of the parties. The members of the Steering Committee of the DPD, on the other hand, represent no‐one except themselves and have no authority to back up their decisions.
Of particular concern is that the Rules of Procedure provide very little guidance on the crucial issue of how the DPD should interact with the DPR or the President and central government ministers. The Rules are silent on the nature of the working relationship with regional executives and legislatures. On questions such as how the DPD should relate to executive government, the assumption seems to have been that the DPD could largely imitate the procedures of the DPR. The problem, of course, is that the DPD’s powers of oversight over
32 executive government are far more limited than the DPR’s. The DPR, for example, has the power to summon (panggil) Ministers and government officials to appear before it, but the DPD only has the authority to invite (undang). Critical issues about what this means in practice have not been resolved. For example, if a Minister is invited to appear, is it necessary for the President to agree to the Minister’s attendance and can a DPD Committee and a Minister make an agreement on something without Presidential approval? Are such meetings to be only for exchange of information or can government representatives be made to account for and justify government actions? On whose authority should an invitation to a Minister or official be issued, the DPD Leadership, the Committee or a plenary session?
Because the functions of the DPR are so different from the DPD’s, there is no guidance to be found in the DPR Rules of Procedure on certain issues that are critical to the functioning of the DPD. In particular, because the DPD’s main potential influence over the legislative and policy‐making process is through its input into the decisions made by the DPR, its working relationship with the DPR must be clear and explicit. From the DPD’s point of view, the rules governing the relationship should be organised and scheduled to facilitate its maximum involvement and input. Few of these details have, however, been decided upon. On the matter of the DPD’s input on the State Budget, for instance, no provision has been made to specify at what point in the DPR’s deliberation of the Budget that the DPD should make its recommendations. Technical questions with critical political ramifications, such as when and how the DPD should receive the draft Budget and whether it should come straight from the government or through the DPR, have yet to be worked out. Within the DPD, the question of who should carry out the Budget function has also not be resolved. Should it be the role of PAH IV alone, or should the plenary be required to endorse the decisions of PAH IV, or should the matter be referred to a special task force of some kind?
The fundamental question of how the DPD’s areas of authority are to be defined has not been clarified. What, for example, is an issue of regional autonomy and what is not? And more importantly, who is to make these decisions and who will decide which Bill meets the criteria for DPD involvement and which do not? Will such decisions be made by the DPD or the DPR alone, or will they be made by negotiation between the two institutions. Because basic questions about how the DPD can actually carry out its constitutional mandate in practical terms have not been seriously tackled, at the time of writing (May 2005) many of the working bodies of the DPD have not yet begun to operate in an active sense. Few of the PAH have been able to develop a set of priorities for their work, let alone
33 establish a plan of action for the coming period. Even basic procedural questions such as when and how PAH should report to the plenary have not been dealt with.21
Because many procedural questions have not been ironed out by either the leadership bodies or the Members of the DPD, evidence of the work of the DPD in political and policy terms is hard to find. The Assembly has become the focus of petitions and complaints by large numbers of individuals, organisations and institutions throughout Indonesia. When Members undertake their “working visits” they find no shortage of people in their constituencies who want to come to them with business, employment, financial, family and other problems and disputes, as well as more organised lobbying on the part of foundations, non‐ government organisations, firms and so on. They have also become the target of lobbying by regional legislatures and administrations, particularly at the district and sub‐district level, which appear to see DPD Members as a channel to put pressure on higher levels of government in Jakarta to address local problems and to support new projects. They also report that significant numbers of people look upon their representatives as sources of direct financial assistance (sumber dana).
Some DPD Members have also become involved in what they have called “controlling” the conduct of the elections for the positions of Governors and district heads (bupati), positions which are being directly elected for the first time in 2005. This involves Members going to their respective provinces and observing the actions of local officials. For instance, they have scrutinised the selection process for candidates to see if regulations are being correctly implemented. In cases where irregularities have been found, DPD Members have reported the incidents to the media and raised them with the local office of the Election Commission (KPUD).22
It is notable that most of the DPD’s activities to date have largely involved the Members acting independently in their individual capacities. Tasks that require collective strategic thinking, planning and coordinated action have not been prominent in the work of the assembly. In particular, the DPD’s record of achievement in lawmaking is non‐existent. This is not to suggest that, in the time available to date, the DPD should already have passed Bills through the DPR, or even that it could be expected to have drafted some Bills. But no available evidence indicates that the DPD has directed attention to developing a list of
21 For a detailed discussion of many of the procedural issues that need to be dealt with by the DPD see Yudhini (2004). 22 Interviews with DPD Members, Jakarta, April 2005.
34 priorities for legislative action or has even selected one or two of the Bills currently under deliberation in the DPR as appropriate targets for DPD involvement. The DPD Legislation Committee has met on a number of occasions but has not yet been able to draw up any specific proposals for draft Bills to submit to the DPR or for input into Bills already before the DPR. The National Legislation Program for 2005 (Prolegnas), a list of proposed legislation for the coming year, names certain Bills as within the purview of DPD involvement, but the list was drawn up by the government and the DPR together, without any input from the DPD.
The issue that has occupied the greatest amount of time and energy amongst DPD Members has been their campaign to increase the powers of the assembly. As noted previously, the constitutional amendments gave only very limited powers to the DPD and from the very beginning of their terms in office, DPD Members have both argued publicly and lobbied privately to have the constitution further amended to strengthen the authority of the DPD. Their arguments focus on the contention that current arrangements have created “soft bicameralism” which, it is argued, does not reflect the fact that the DPD is a directly elected chamber with as much or even greater legitimacy than the DPR. It is also sometimes argued that “strong bicameralism” is a feature of large federations, with the inference that, as a large diverse country, Indonesia should have similar constitutional arrangements. Such an argument would, however, appear to be counterproductive in a political culture such as Indonesia’s, where talk of federalism is often seen as tantamount to encouraging separatism. The assertion that the DPD would promote fissiparous tendencies and threaten the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia was, in fact, the main thrust of those who opposed the creation of the DPD during the constitutional debates in the MPR (Pahlevi 2004).
But whatever the merits of the arguments in favour of bolstering the powers of the DPD, concentrating efforts on such a campaign at this early stage would seem to be problematic. When the assembly has yet to show any real results from its presence on the political scene, it could be argued that it is a diversion of resources from the immediate task of demonstrating to both the electorate and the policy‐making elite that the DPD can actually provide a representative voice for the regions in the national decision‐making. Indeed, discussions with DPD Members suggest a level of preoccupation with the question of the assembly’s powers that reflects an inability to develop a strategy for using its existing
35 authority effectively.23 Voices both inside and outside the DPD have urged it to develop at least one Bill to present to the DPR as a demonstration of the assembly’s potential. If such a Bill were to be rejected by the DPR, the rejection could be publicised in the media as evidence of the DPR’s obstruction and indifference and used to bolster the case for increased powers for the DPD. While such devices have been verbally accepted, there has been no progress towards realising them.24 Instead, any strategy for achieving the constitutional change has concentrated on backroom lobbying with Members of the DPR and the government. Discussions with leading Members makes it clear that they see the goal of increasing the DPD’s powers not as a long term project but as something to be achieved within the five‐year life of the current DPD.25
The reality of the first months of the work of the DPD is that it has not moved beyond being a body whose Members gather complaints and petitions from members of the public and pass them on the relevant authorities in executive government. The Deputy Speaker, Laode Ide, noted regretfully that the DPD was becoming just a “post office” and had had been given little opportunity by either the DPR or the government to become involved in policy‐making.26 The Speaker, Ginandjar, expressed a similar view, likening the DPD to a large but inefficient and expensive “ombudsman”.27 This result seems to be a combination of the factors external to the DPD, especially the difficulty of getting cooperation from the DPR and the government when the assembly’s powers are so limited, and the internal incapacity of the DPD to organise itself, draw up clear and detailed priorities and develop strategies to implement its plans.
Making a non‐party assembly work
Observation of the operation of the DPD in its less than one year of existence indicates that it has yet to develop ways to expedite decision‐making in an assembly composed of individuals who are not subject to party discipline or fraction or caucus‐based organisation. The most basic unit of organisation on which the DPD has attempted to depend is that of a delegation from each province. Because DPD Members theoretically represent a province, one Member
23 Interviews with DPD Members, Jakarta, April – May 2005. 24 Interviews with academics, commentators and MPR Secretariat officials, Jakarta, April – May 2005. 25 Interviews with DPD Members, April – May 2005. 26 Interview with Laode Ida, Jakarta, April 2005. 27 Interview with Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Jakarta, May 2005.
36 from each province is represented on each PAH and other working body of the DPD and the Speaker routinely calls for one Member from each province to report back from working visits or to speak on a particular matter before a plenary session of the assembly. This appears to be seen as a kind of surrogate for the practice followed in the DPR where each party (or fraction) is represented on the working bodies of the DPR and each party is invited by the Speaker to give its views on decisions being deliberated. Some provincial teams reportedly work more cohesively than others, with the four Members from Bali being observed to cooperate most effectively.28 Beyond generalities, however, there is rarely much commonality of views amongst the four delegates from each province. The Members from South Sulawesi, for example, comprise a Protestant pastor, a former naval officer and two Islamic clerics. Critically, the system has not yet been tested over any seriously controversial issue. Discussions in plenary sessions have yet to make a decision on a divisive question and bodies such as the PAH have so far barely operated as decision‐making entities.
Other attempts to bring the DPD Members into functional groupings have included the creation of regional and subject‐specific caucuses. The Members from the provinces of Sumatra have formed themselves into a Sumatra caucus, as have those from Kalimantan. A caucus of Members from “conflict regions” has also been established, bringing together Members from provinces in eastern Indonesia that have been affected by internal civil conflict, such as Maluku, North Maluku, Papua and West Irian Jaya. There have also been caucuses set up to discuss issues such as the environment and social welfare. At the time of writing, however, such caucuses have not become anything other than discussion groups.
Some Members have observed that although the Golkar and ex‐Golkar Members do not operate in a factional manner, there is a distinct tendency for them to think and act in common ways which are shaped by the legacy of the New Order.29 In particular, they are seen as giving priority to the protection of the perceived common interests and image of the Members of the DPD as a body. Some Members, particularly those from an activist background, are critical of former figures from the New Order who the critics consider are more interested in defending their own positions, wealth and influence than in strengthening the DPD as a representative institution and law‐making body. There are also latent tensions between former operatives from the New Order and younger Members
28 Interviews with observers from international organisations and DPD Members, April – May 2005. 29 Interviews with DPD Members, Jakarta, May 2005.
37 with a activist, professional or business background over ways to achieve political ends. The latter are more inclined to want to take issues into the public realm and use the media to gain public support for their position, while the former want to adhere to the traditional methods of private lobbying and the exercise of personal influence. Whether such differences will manifest themselves in organised factions or even the growth of informal groupings remains to be seen. In particular, it will be insightful to observe the operation of the DPD Leadership because it is composed of a formerly very powerful figure from the New Order, Ginandjar Kartasasmita and two younger men with an academic/activist and business background, Laode Ide and Irman Gusman respectively.
The DPD has so far failed to develop some way to channel the various personal interests and agendas of its Members into workable units. This is a major element of the explanation for the assembly’s failure to become more than an “ombudsman” or a “post office”. Internationally, it is the norm for legislative assemblies to be driven by the interaction between parties, factions or groupings of some kind, whether such interaction is conflictual, competitive or cooperative. Discipline and/or political coherence within those groupings tends to facilitate decision‐making and to provide predictability about how most members will act on any issue. There is a voluminous literature on the role of political parties in parliaments, much of it highly critical of the behaviour of parties, but there is general agreement about the function they perform in making parliaments work. Not only are parties a key element of internal operations, they often play a major part in developing the policy options that are debated.
The DPD, on the other hand, faces the reality of trying to make decisions in an assembly composed of disparate individuals. It is a commonplace of political commentary that chaos and unpredictability are the common results of a proliferation of political parties within parliaments. It may only be a partial exaggeration to say that the DPD is sometimes like an assembly with 128 different parties. All of the Members have come to the DPD with some particular objective in mind, whether personal or political, but there are few mechanisms through which those particular interests can be sorted into priorities for action. One Christian Member, for example, was particularly motivated to be elected to the DPD to promote the idea of interfaith dialogue. But there is little sign that even his Christian colleagues are committed to a similar goal and, in fact, the greater reality is that such ideas are received with hostility by a range of Islamic Members who take every opportunity to argue for the adoption of Islamic sharia. Such a diversity of views is, of course, not unique to the DPD, but other
38 assemblies tend to sift the multiplicity of agendas through the coalition‐building that is inherent both in the very formation of political parties themselves and in their negotiations with other parties.
Conclusion
The creation of the DPD can be seen as one of the final acts in the institutional rebuilding of the Indonesian state since the end of the New Order. A series of constitutional reforms and the introduction of free elections for all levels of government at the centre and the regions have transformed the range of possible future directions for Indonesian politics. But for all the institutional reforms that have occurred, much has not changed in the political scene. Powerful vested interests are still managing to resist a basic change in the nature of power politics and there are still remarkably few new players that have entered political life despite the openings that should, in theory, have been created by reformasi and democratisation since 1998. As a new institution, the DPD has arrived at a time when the building blocks of democracy all seem to be in place, but questions are beginning to be raised about what that actually means in practice.
The DPD was created with two main expectations: that it would provide a way for a new kind of representative from the regions to enter into the world of national level decision‐making and that as an institution it would allow the voice of the regions to be heard in the making of laws and the oversight of central executive government. This paper has attempted to gain some early insights into questions such as how representative of the regions the DPD actually is in practice, what kind of people have been elected to the DPD, how the assembly has operated in its first year of existence and what achievements it has to its name so far. The paper has concluded that the predictable result of the DPD’s very limited powers has been that it has struggled to find a role for itself. This has been exacerbated by a lack of cohesion and strategic direction that appear to flow from the internal structure and composition of the DPD itself. On the other hand, it does appear that the objective of keeping the assembly out of the control of political parties has been largely achieved and that the DPD has attracted some new individuals onto the national political scene, while providing a place where some figures from the old regime have been able to reinvent themselves in the new era of electoral politics.
The DPD is still a very new body and it would be unfair to suggest that it has already failed to fulfil the hopes vested in it by its creators and supporters. But
39 early indications are that fundamental structural features built into the DPD make it very difficult for the assembly to have its voice heard in lawmaking, oversight and accountability of government and the provision of both popular and regional representation. A combination of weak authority and an idiosyncratic method of composition and election have tended to keep it at the margins of political power in Jakarta. The Speaker of the DPD, Ginandjar, has expressed the view that the DPD has about two years to make its mark in political affairs, with the inference that it would otherwise be confined to permanent impotence. Nevertheless, the history of second chambers throughout the world shows that such institutions tend to wax and wane in their power and influence, and it may well be possible for the Members of the DPD to establish an important place for the institution in national political life. The evidence so far is that such a project will be a difficult undertaking.
40
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43 Appendix: DPD Members, Provinces & Votes
1. Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Total No. Votes Percentage Drs. H.A. MALIK RADEN, MM. 211,362 10.14 H. HELMI MAHERA AL MUJAHID 163,683 7.85 H. ADNAN NS, S.Sos 145,733 6.99 Dra. Hj. MEDIATI HAFNI HANUM 143,594 6.89 2. North Sumatra Total No. Votes Percentage Drs. H. ABD. HALIM HARAHAP 810,232 15.38 Ir. NURDIN TAMPUBOLON 321,570 6.10 RAJA INAL SIREGAR 316,358 6.00 Drs. H. YOPIE SANGKOT BATUBARA 277,649 5.27 3. West Sumatra Total No. Votes Percentage H. H. IRMAN GUSMAN, S.E., MBA 348,200 17.59 Drs. H. ZAIRIN KASIM 171,962 8.68 AFDAL. S.Si 170,872 8.63 Dr. MUCHTAR NAIM 116,795 5.90 4. Riau Total No. Votes Percentage Drs. H. SOEMARDI THAHER 226,570 11.38 DINAWATY, S.Ag. 140,069 7.04 INTSIAWATI AYUS, SH. 125,890 6.32 Dra. Hj. MAIMANAH UMAR 124,129 6.24 5. Jambi Total No. Votes Percentage NUZRAN JOHER, S.Ag. 137,018 11.29 Dra. Hj. NYIMAS ENA, MM. 125,548 10.35 MUHAMMAD NASIR 125,205 10.32 Drs. H. HASAN 113,379 9.34 6. South Sumatra Total No. Votes Percentage Hj. ASMAWATI, SE., MM. 447,540 14.31 Drs. H. M. KAFRAWI RAHIM 203,262 6.50 Drs. M. JUM PERKASA 193,920 6.20 Ir. RUSLAN WIJAYA, SE, M.Sc. 143,451 4.59 7. Bengkulu Total No. Votes Percentage Dipl. ING. BAMBANG SOEROSO 126,128 20.56 H. MAHYUDIN SHOBRI, SE. 81,278 13.25 MUSPANI, S.H. 58,742 9.57 Dra. ENI KHAERANI, M.Si. 47,095 7.68 8. Lampung Total No. Votes Percentage
44 H. H. KASMIR TRI PUTRA, S.Pd, MM 289,684 8.73 Hj. HARIYANTI SAFRIN, SH 255,012 7.68 SUJADI 220,382 6.64 A. BEN BELLA 191,441 5.77 9. Bangka Belitung Total No. Votes Percentage H. ROSMAN DJOHAN 47,407 10.09 Drs. RUSLI RACHMAN, M.Si 40,219 8.56 FAJAR FAIRI HUSNI, SH. 39,735 8.45 Hj. DJAMILA SOMAD, B.Sc. 36,392 7.74 10. Riau Islands Total No. Votes Percentage AIDA ISMET 202,283 35.78 Ir. H. IDRIS ZAINI 64,988 11.50 BENNY HORAS PANJAITAN 59,715 10.56 HENDRY FRANKIM 53,218 9.41 11. DKI Jakarta Total No. Votes Percentage Hj. BRA. MOORYATI SOEDIBYO, SS., M. Hum, 457,996 10.30 Ir. SARWONO KUSUMAATMADJA 455,541 10.24 H. BIEM TRIANI BENYAMIN. S 360,573 8.11 Ir. H. MARWAN BATUBARA, MSc 316,528 7.12 12. West Java Total No. Votes Percentage Prof. Dr. Ir. H. GINANDJAR KARTASASMITA 1,869,767 9.83 PRA. ARIEF NATADININGRAT, SE 1,666,685 8.76 Prof. Dr. H. MOHAMAD SURYA 1,551,876 8.15 KH. SOFYAN YAHYA, MA 1,179,439 6.20 13. Central Java Total No. Votes Percentage Dra. Hj. NAFISAH SAHAL 1,767,178 11.26 Ir. H. BUDI SANTOSO 1,043,376 6.65 Drs. H. SUDHARTO, MA. 1,007,669 6.42 KH. ACHMAD CHALWANI 881,050 5.58 14. DI Yogyakarta Total No. Votes Percentage GKR. HEMAS 834,130 43.31 Drs. H. ALI WARSITO 132,407 6.88 Drs. H. ABDUL HAFIDH ASROM, MM. 126,348 6.56 H. SUBARDI 112,282 5.83 15. East Java Total No. Votes Percentage H. MAHMUD ALI ZAIN 1,955,025 11. 15 K.H. A. MUJIB IMRON, SH. 1,434,375 8.18 KH. M. NURUDDIN A. RAHMAN, SH. 1,268,498 7.23 Drs. H. MARDJITO GA 1,050,629 5.99 16. Banten Total No. Votes Percentage
45 K.H. THOYIB AMIR 302,358 7.54 Dra. Hj. RATU CICIH KURNIASIH 298,040 7.44 H. APUD MAHPUD 238,624 5.95 H. SAGAP USMAN 229,776 5.73 17. Bali Total No. Votes Percentage I WAYAN SUDIRTA, SH. 245,343 12.68 NYOMAN RUDANA 157,475 8.14 Drs.IDA BAGUS GEDE AGASTIA 131,780 6.81 Dra. IDA AYU AGUNG MAS 123,961 6.41 18. West Nusa Tenggara Total No. Votes Percentage Drs. H. HARUN AL RASYID, M.Si. 256,944 13.09 Drs, H. SYAHDAN ILYAS 187,713 9.57 Drs. H. LALU YUSUF 135,233 6.89 6.05 H.L. ABDUL MUHYI ABIDIN, S.Ag. 118,716
19. East Nusa Tenggara Total No. Votes Percentage FRANS X ASSAN 291,062 14.09 Drs. YONATHAN NUBATONIS 205,034 9.93 JOSEPH BONA MANGGO 152,952 7.41 WILHELMUS WUA OPENG 148,074 7.17 20. West Kalimantan Total No. Votes Percentage Dr. PIET HERMAN ABIK. M.App., SC 172,563 9.44 MARIA GORETI, S.Sos., M.Si 138,901 7.60 SRI KADARWATI 136,687 7.48 H. ASPAR, SE 133,260 7.29 21. Central Kalimantan Total No. Votes Percentage Dr. KH. HADERANI H.N 121,126 14.68 Prof. KMA. M. USOP, MA 69,106 8.37 H. ABI KUSNO NACHRAN 66,319 8.04 PERMANASARI 64,096 7.77 22. South Kalimantan Total No. Votes Percentage Ir. H.M. SAID 249,888 17.37 Drs. H. MUHAMMAD SOFWAT HADI, SH. 195,988 13.63 H.A. MAKKIE, BA. 136,726 9.51 Drs. H.M. RAMLI 78,914 5.49 23. East Kalimantan Total No. Votes Percentage Drs. NURSYAMSA HADIS 198,964 16.19 LUTHER KOMBONG 160,616 13.07 Ir. Hj. EKA KOMARIAH KUNCORO, MA. CED 79,536 6.47 Ir. Hj. NUR ANDRIYANI 78,249 6.37
46 24. North Sulawesi Total No. Votes Percentage Ir. MARHANY V.P. PUA 238,143 19.30 ARYANTI BARAMULI PUTRI 158,133 12.81 EDWIN KAWILARANG 117,628 9.53 Dra. SIENTJE SONDAKH MANDEY 76,176 6.17 25. Central Sulawesi Total No. Votes Percentage Hj. NURMAWATI D. BANTILAN, SE 186,337 16.28 Drs. ROGER TOBIGO 113,412 9.91 M. ICHSAN LOULEMBAH 101,660 8.88 Drs. H. FAISAL MAHMUD 83,435 7.29 26. South Sulawesi Total No. Votes Percentage H.M. AKSA MAHMUD 790,375 18.89 636,856 Ir. H. ABDUL AZIS QAHAR MUDZAKKAR 15.22
ISHAK PAMUMBU LAMBE 210,866 5.04 BENYAMIN BURA 175,697 4.20 27. Central Sulawesi Total No. Votes Percentage LA ODE IDA 154,367 17.17 Drs. K.H. MARWAN AIDID 66,062 7.35 Ir. H.M. YUNUS SJAMSOEDDIN 52,012 5.79 Drs. H. YOKOYAMA SINAPOY 48,378 5.38 28. Gorontalo Total No. Votes Percentage Drs. A.D KHALY 84,754 17.71 Prof. Dr. HI. NANI TULOLI 52,520 10.98 HI. AMIR ADAM 50,971 10.65 ROELAND NIODE 47,078 9.84 29. Maluku Total No. Votes Percentage Ny. MIRATI DEWANINGSIH, ST 128,193 19.51 ABRAHAM DOMINGGUS TUAPATTINAYA, 62,477 9.51 BA MIDIN B. LAMANY, SH 42,429 6.46 Drs. Hi. H.A. RAHAYAAN 40,711 6.20 30. North Maluku Total No. Votes Percentage ANTHONY CHARLES SUNARJO 65,842 15.36 Drs. JUANDA BAKAR 65,322 15.23 Ny. NITA BUDHI SUSANTI 60,814 14.18 HI. DJAFARSYAH 54,370 12.68 31. West Irian Jaya Total No. Votes Percentage SALOME CHRISTIN SAWAY, SH 52,143 18.54 ISHAK MANDACAN 44,808 15.94
47 Dr. Ir. ABDUL M. KILIAN, MS 37,706 13.41 Drs. H. WAHIDIN ISMAIL 37,476 13.33 32. Papua Total No. Votes Percentage MARCUS LOUIS ZONGGONAO, BA 194,090 20.86 TONNY TESAR 149,078 16.02 FERDINANDA IBO YATIFAY 134,169 14.42 Pdt. Drs. MAX DEMETOUW 102,297 10.99
Source: Sekretariat Jenderal MPR & International IDEA, Profil Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Daerah 2004‐2009
48