Refugees Flee Into Yunnan After Renewed Violence Along Myanmar Border

Volume 17, Issue 5 March 31, 2017

In a Fortnight: Refugees Flee into Yunnan After Renewed Violence Along Myanmar Border

Xi’s Korea Policies Stumble By Willy Lam

A “First” for the People’s Liberation Army: A Navy Admiral Becomes a Joint, Regional, Commander By Dennis Blasko

Taiwan’s Search for Security Partners: Looking Beyond Washington By Lauren Dickey

PLA Theater Joint Intelligence: Organization and Operations By Kevin McCauley

In a Fortnight: Refugees Flee China in late November 2016. In response, the prefectural government has begun setting up into Yunnan After Renewed temporary shelters (Guanchazhe, November 22,

2016). It is unclear how it will cope with the much Violence Along Myanmar larger, second wave. Border Three prefectures border the contentious area in Myanmar: Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Violence along China’s border with Myanmar is Prefecture, Baoshan and Lincang. Together they threatening yet again to spill across into Yunnan have a population of almost six million people. Province. According to the Chinese Ministry of A string of Border Guard Regiments sit at strate- Foreign Affairs, more than 20,000 refugees have gic points along Yunnan’s long borders with Vi- fled into Yunnan after renewed fighting between etnam and Myanmar. Two guard the area near- the Kachin Independence Army and Myanmar’s est to the Kokang Special Region, one to the Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). These refugees are north at Mangshi (芒市 formerly Luxi), and an- the second wave after more than 3,000 fled into ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 other to the south at Cangyuan (沧源). A PLA in- importantly, it also casts light on how China re- fantry brigade is also positioned nearby in Lin- sponds to crises on its borders. cang to handle contingencies. Local police border guards (公安边防) have also been mobilized The PLA conducted joint Ground-Air military ex- to help direct the stream of refugees. ercises near the border to improve China’s ability to respond to military threats along its fron- The Kachin people are concentrated in northeast tier regions (PLA Daily, March 28, Xinhua, March Myanmar. Further south, a separate group in the 30). The large exercises involved J-10 fighters, Kokang Special Region was the target of a 2015 Z-9 attack helicopters, Mil-8 transport helicop- Tatmadaw offensive that spilled over into Yun- ters, and mechanized infantry (accompanied by nan. Tensions have lasted for decades, but the ZLS 92B armored personnel carriers), 122mm ar- most recent round dates to 2009 and has flared tillery and air defense units (CCTV, March 28). periodically since then. The continued violence The J-10 fighters, which bear markings indicat- has prompted PLA maneuvers and further coming they belong to the 44th Fighter Division ap- plicated China’s relationship with the new dem- pear to be operating out of Luliang (陆良) Air ocratic government of Myanmar. Perhaps more Base, northwest of Kunming. [1] The units of the

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Southern Theater Command are primarily in significant numbers of refugees, highlighted geared to deal with military contingencies in the large numbers of mostly ethnic-Chinese ac- South China sea or along the border with Vi- cepted in the 1970s (Fenghuang, September 6, etnam (China Brief, July 22, 2016). 2016). Indeed, anti-Chinese policies in North Vi- etnam in the 1950s and again after the fall of While the PLA regularly holds joint training ex- South Vietnam in 1975 prompted many ethnic ercises, they are usually held near special train- Chinese to flee to China. China’s short border ing bases—not near the border. The previous set war with Vietnam in 1979 prompted an addi- of exercises this large were held in 2015, after tional 260,000 to flee the Southeast Asian coun- the Tatmadaw dropped ordinance in Dashui try (UNHCR, May 10, 2007). Sangshu ( 大水桑树 ), killing several Chinese farmers. In response, the PLA mobilized, and in- China’s densely populated northeast is also un- fantry, air defense, and fighter units were rotated der threat from a separate refugee crisis. In the close to the border in Lincang (China Brief, July mid-1990s, catastrophic famine and a general 17, 2015). That set of exercises was the largest in breakdown in the economy of North Korea killed the area in 30 years (Global Times, June 11, hundreds of thousands and prompted a large 2016). number to cross into China in search of food. Even today, poor living conditions prompt many In addition to mobilizing its armed forces and North Koreans to defect via the border with police units, Chinese diplomats have tried to China. North Korean soldiers are also known to place pressure on the Myanmar government to rob and murder Chinese citizens just across the end the violence (MFA, March 9). China and My- border (China Brief, January 9, 2015). With ten- anmar’s bilateral trade is worth $15 billion, mak- sions rising on the Korean peninsula due to ing it Myanmar’s most valuable trade relation- Pyongyang’s active nuclear missile programs, ship (MFA, December 2016). Even so, previous the outbreak of war, or poor harvests could re- diplomatic efforts apparently have had little ef- sult in large numbers of Korean migrants fleeing fect, and the democratically elected government to northeast China. (led by President Htin Kyaw, but with Aung San Suu Kyi de facto in charge) maintains a delicate China, however, does not accept many people balance with elements of the former powerful seeking to resettle. Between 2004–2013, China military junta it replaced. It is unlikely that addi- issued only 7,356 Foreigner’s Permanent Resi- tional pressure from Beijing will keep the dence Cards (in contrast the U.S. issued 10 mil- Tatmadaw and separatist movements from vio- lion during the same period) (Sixth Tone, lence near the border. October 12, 2016). Refugees have even more uncertain status. Although China is a signatory Refugees crises, are likely to continue to be an to the 1951 and 1967 international statutes that issue on China’s border. But China lacks concrete govern the treatment of refugees, domestically policies to deal with the issue as a long-term its law is handled via its entry and exit law (出境 problem. Syria’s refugee crisis has already 入境管理法) and 2005 national foreign affairs prompted a debate among Chinese netizens re- emergency law (国家涉外突发事件应急预案) garding China’s refugee policies. Phoenix Media, (Fenghuang, September 6, 2016). Neither law responding to criticism that China has not taken

3 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 has sufficient scope to adequately handle refu- face by failing to make good on its threats of re- gees under current conditions, much less the taliation against damages that “hostile anti- widespread emergency a crisis on the Korean China forces” have supposedly inflicted upon peninsula would result in. China. Now that the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can as well as the United States have defied Beijing’s follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW wishes, Xi could expose himself to criticism from opportunistic political rivals and nationalistic Notes young people that see empty talk in response to 1. Serial Marking - 50755. The three aircraft THAAD. featured in CCTV footage are flying with three drop tanks and two air-to-ground Beijing began revving up anti-Seoul rhetoric in rocket pods. The extra fuel is likely nec- July 2016 when then-president Park Geun-hye essary because the border region is decided to deploy THAAD hardware in response roughly 500km away, right at the edge to the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons. of the J-10s 550km combat radius. The advanced anti-missile system has a radar a maximum range of 2,000 kilometers, which takes in the bulk of China’s northeast. Despite Ameri- *** can reassurance that THAAD would not be used to gather Chinese military intelligence, the Chi- nese Foreign Ministry has reiterated that “we are Xi’s Korea Policies Stumble firmly opposed to the deployment of THAAD.” By Willy Lam Spokesperson Geng Shuang noted in March that the Chinese position was “very firm” and no compromise would be entertained. Official me- On March 7, the United States began installa- dia have discussed retaliatory steps including tion of a Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense “virtually suspending diplomatic relations” with (THAAD) system in on a golf course outside the ROK (Caixin.com, March 3; Global Times, Seou l, South Korea. Washington and Seoul did February 28). Since early this year, Chinese have so over strong economic and diplomatic pres- systematically boycotted Korean products rang- sure from Beijing, which argued that THAAD ing from food and beverage to computers and posed a threat to China. Additionally, in Febru- smartphones. Popular Korean singers and movie ary and early March, North Korea carried out stars are barred from China. Editorial writers re- ballistic missile tests that simulated an attack on flecting hawkish views within the Chinese estab- a U.S. base in Japan. Xi Jinping’s administration’s lishment even hinted at some form of military inability to effectively curb the behavior of its action. For example, commentator Zhan Hao erstwhile ally or influence policy in South Korea said that Beijing should “begin new military de- arguably represent the greatest foreign policy ployment against South Korea.” “We should setbacks since Xi took power in 2012. Since com- push forward our military deployment, with ing to power in late 2012, Xi has eagerly stoked more [weapons] targeting South Korea,” he in- nationalism and sought to project Chinese dicated (Huanqiuzhiyin.com [Beijing], August 17, power around the globe. What the Xi admin- 2016). istration can least afford is to be seen as losing

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Park’s impeachment in March could, in theory, the respected Asan Institute of Policy Studies in provide an opportunity for de-escalation of ten- Seoul, China has replaced Japan as the “least sions. Moon Jae-in, who is favored to win in liked country” among South Koreans. China’s presidential polls slated for early May, had spo- rating in the Asan opinion poll fell from 4.31 in ken out against using the THAAD system. How- January to 3.21 in March on a scale of 0–10, with ever, during his recent visit to Seoul, U.S. Secre- 10 representing the most favorable. (Japan’s tary of State Rex Tillerson apparently secured a score was 3.33, slightly better than China’s.) promise from senior civilian and defense officials There are isolated incidents of Chinese students that THAAD would remain. Moreover, the bulk studying in South Korea being subjected to in- of THAAD hardware has already been deployed sults and even manhandling in Korean subway (Yonhap News, March 22; Korea Herald, March stations (Apple Daily [Hong Kong], March 21; 21). Although there is a remote possibility that Deutsche Welle Chinese, March 21). the new Korean president may reverse Park’s decision, relations between China and the ROK Given that the root purpose of the deployment have been dealt a devastating blow. of THAAD is to deter Pyongyang’s clear and present threats against South Korea, Japan and the Driving a Wedge Between Partners U.S.,—and that China is the only country that can influence the DPRK—Beijing does not have a For the past decade, Beijing has enjoyed a rela- moral high ground in the THAAD debate. While tively cozy relationship with South Korea. This is China has previously approved the United Na- consistent with the CCP administration’s long- tions Security Council sanctions against the standing policy of weakening Washington’s DPRK, Beijing has left the impression that it is “anti-China containment policy” by driving a treating its nominal ally with kid gloves. Speak- wedge between the U.S. and its key allies such ing about the Korean crisis after the just-ended as South Korea. Until the THAAD crisis, Beijing National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang enjoyed a close relationship with Park Geun- merely urged “[all] parties involved to de-esca- hye’s administration. Seoul disregarded Ameri- late tensions and return to talks.” Earlier, Foreign can advice by joining China’s Asian Infrastruc- Minister Wang Yi advocated the restart of the ture Investment Bank in early 2015 and again in Six-Party Talks on denuclearizing the Korean July 2015, when Park participated in the Tianan- Peninsula, irrespective of the fact that the talks, men Square military parade in July 2015 that which involved diplomats from China, the two marked the 70th anniversary of China’s “defeat Koreas, Japan, the U.S., and Russia, were sus- of fascism.” Park was the only leader from the pended in 2007 for lack of results. (China Daily, “democratic camp” of the world to have lent le- March 15; TVB, Hong Kong, March 8). gitimacy to Xi Jinping’s nationalistic extrava- ganza (BBC Chinese, August 20, 2015; Korea Given the Kim regime’s dependence on Chinese Herald, March 26, 2015). supplies of food, fuel and other economic aid, Beijing seems to have enough leverage to influ- The anti-ROK protests in different Chinese cities ence Pyongyang’s decision-making. As Peking as well as the boycott of South Korean products, University international relations expert Jia however, have fanned anti-Chinese feelings Qingguo noted last year, it was time that China among ordinary South Koreans. According to turned up the pressure on the DPRK. “China’s

5 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 position on the Korean issue should be stead- different countries [in Asia] and the escalation of fast, and its stance should be tougher,” he said. tensions.” (Global Times, March 9; Xinhua, De- “We don’t want to run counter to North Korea’s cember 15, 2016). [interests], yet we cannot afford to be weak and lax when it is threatening China’s major inter- While it is unlikely that Chinese reaction to ests” (Phoenix TV, March 11, 2016). Yet as Deng THAAD will escalate in the near term, the nuclear Yuwen, a former researcher at the Central Party clock is ticking fast in the DPRK. After launching School and a frequent commentator on Korean four short-distance missiles in early March, issues said, Beijing had blundered largely be- Pyongyang said it would soon test-launch an in- cause of the belief that the DPRK could act as a tercontinental ballistic missile. Moreover, South buffer between China on the one hand, and the Korean officials warned that the Kim regime U.S. and its Asian allies on the other. “The exist- could stage another nuclear test by the end of ence of North Korea itself, not to mention its March. While visiting Seoul, Tillerson warned the ‘provocations,’ will force the U.S. and Japan to DPRK—and China—that “the period of strategic devote more resources to North Korea—and patience is over.” Tillerson further added “all op- this will minimize pressure on China.” [1] tions are on the table,” which was interpreted as a threat that the U.S. and its allies in Asia might Threat to China’s Nuclear Deterrent? launch pre-emptive strikes to take out North Ko- rean nuclear and missile facilities. There are, however, hawks who think that China must take drastic measures to counter what it Conclusion perceives as a threat coming from the U.S., South Korea and Japan. The Beijing Youth Daily There are subtle signs that Beijing might take a ran a commentary soon after the THAAD crisis tougher posture toward the DPRK, which is still, broke that China would have no choice but to in theory, China’s ally. After the alleged assassi- “use a new Cold War to counter the old Cold nation of Kim Jong-un’s half-brother Kim Jong- War.” “We should realign our strategic relations nam, Beijing announced in mid-February that it with Russia and North Korea so as to realize the would stop importing coal from the DPRK (New strategic equilibrium of ‘three against three’” York Times Chinese Edition, February 20; BBC (Xinhua, August 13, 2016). The Global Times re- Chinese, February 18). It is uncertain whether, in cently published an editorial arguing that China the run-up to his meeting with American Presi- should vastly expand its nuclear arsenal to push dent Donald Trump scheduled for later this back the American threat. “The U.S. has come to month, supreme leader Xi might take more de- China’s doorsteps to engage in anti-missile op- cisive measures to rein in Kim’s rogue regime. As erations,” the editorial said. “The original strate- Shi Yinhong, a professor of international rela- gic balance [between China and the U.S.] has tions at Renmin University noted, China now been disrupted. China should counter [the U.S. faces strained ties with both Koreas for the first threat] by developing more nuclear warheads time in recent memory. “This is quite bad, in the and more strategic nuclear missiles that could long term, for the diplomatic security environ- penetrate [American defense shields].” This fol- ment in Northeast Asia,” he said (DWnews [Bei- lowed articles published by Xinhua that jing], March 19; Los Angeles Times, March 1). predicted: “[an] exacerbated arms race among Whether Xi has the foresight and courage to

6 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 drastically revamp China’s policy toward the two one of the five newly formed joint headquarters Koreas could determine whether he deserves that replaced the seven Military Regions that the hallowed title of “core leader” that his civilian had existed since the mid-1980s. Consistent with and military colleagues conferred on him half a Chinese practice, Yuan shares responsibility for year ago. Particularly at a moment when the U.S. the Theater with a political commissar, Army is viewed as weakened and indecisive, continued General Wei Liang. Nonetheless, Admiral Yuan’s failure to achieve foreign policy objectives might selection as TC commander is a major event in in formidable pushback from Xi’s colleagues in PLA history, and a step toward abandoning “the the Politburo, or from frustrated members of the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea” PLA. (China Brief, June 19, 2015). [1]

Notes Unlike the old Military Regions, which were 1. Author’s interview with Deng Yuwen, March 2 staffed primarily by Army personnel and in peacetime directly commanded Army units in Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The their areas of operation, the five new Theater Jamestown Foundation. He is an Adjunct Profes- Commands are joint headquarters composed of sor at the Center for China Studies, the History personnel from all services. TCs are responsible Department and the Program of Master’s in for operations (战区主战), that is “responding to Global Political Economy at the Chinese Univer- security threats in their strategic directions, sity of Hong Kong. He is the author of five books maintaining peace, deterring wars and winning on China, including “Chinese Politics in the Hu battles” (PLA Daily, February 1, 2016). Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges.” The four service headquarters (Army, Navy, Air *** Force, and Rocket Force) in Beijing, on the other hand, are responsible for “construction” (军种主建) (PLA Daily, December 1, 2016). “Construc- A “First” for the People’s Lib- tion” activities include functions such as organ- eration Army: A Navy Admiral izing, manning, equipping, educating, and training the forces, and possibly may involve some Becomes a Joint, Regional, service-specific operations, such as military op- Commander erations other than war (MOOTW) or potentially single-service combat missions.

By Dennis J. Blasko Theater Commands perform command and con-

trol functions of operational units through their Among recent changes in the People’s Libera- subordinate Theater Service (component) head- tion Army’s (PLA) leadership, the appointment of quarters (TC Army and TC Air Force headquar- Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai to Commander of the ters and the TC Navy headquarters in the three Southern Theater Command is particularly note- coastal Theaters). [2] In addition to reporting to worthy (PLA Daily, January 23). Yuan is the first the TC, Theater Service headquarters have a dual and only non-Army officer ever to command a chain of command back to their service head- Military Region (MR) or Theater Command (TC), quarters in Beijing for day-to-day “construction”

7 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 activities. (Rocket Force bases report directly This pattern of alternating assignments among Rocket Force headquarters in Beijing.) The commander, deputy commander, and chief of Navy’s three fleets (North, East, and South Sea staff is common in the PLA. According to their Fleets) concurrently serve as the TC Naval com- biographies, many officers in this command ponents for their respective Theaters. Fleet com- track do not spend much time, if any, as “regu- manders are dual-hatted Theater deputy com- lar” staff officers in personnel, intelligence, oper- manders as are the commanders of the Theater ations, or logistics billets (instead, specialized Army and Air Force headquarters. staff officers perform those duties and move up the ladder in their own functional specialty). Admiral Yuan’s experience may provide indica- Likewise, Yuan was assigned to one major unit, tions of the kind of officers who will be assigned the North Sea Fleet, for his entire career up to to TC commander positions in the future. While his transfer to the Southern TC. This, too, is a Army officers likely will continue to hold the ma- common practice, as most officers are assigned jority of TC commander (and political commis- to a single region for most of their careers, often sar) billets, a senior Air Force officer probably will in one corps/army leader grade level organiza- be tapped to command a Theater at some point tion, before being transferred to another large in the relatively near future. organization. Once they reached corps/army leader grade, senior officers may be transferred Admiral Yuan’s Biography from one region to another as Yuan was from the NSF to the Southern TC. Likewise, Yuan’s re- At 60 years of age, Vice Admiral Yuan is the same placement as commander NSF, Rear Admiral age as his American contemporary, Admiral Zhang Wendan, former deputy chief of staff of Harry Harris, Jr., commander of the U.S. Pacific the Southern TC, also crossed regions to get to Command. Yuan joined the PLA Navy in 1976 his new post. Previously Zhang had spent his en- and trained at the Qingdao Submarine Acad- tire career in the SSF and also served as com- emy, located in the North Sea Fleet (NSF) area of mander of a Gulf of Aden task force when he was responsibility. Afterward, he was assigned as a deputy chief of staff of the SSF (Xinhua, March submarine crew member in Qingdao. In 1982, he 18, 2010). Some aspects of previous PLA assign- served as the base torpedo chief and then exec- ment procedures may change in the future as utive officer on a submarine, most likely a nu- the force develops a contingent of joint officers clear attack Han-class submarine. In 1990, he capable of serving in any joint headquarters. became a submarine captain and apparently stayed in that position until 2003 when he was Recent Operational and International promoted to chief of staff of the 1st Submarine Experience Base at Qingdao. Four years later he became base commander, followed by assignments as While working as NSF chief of staff, Yuan was NSF chief of staff in 2010 and NSF commander given the temporary responsibility of command- and concurrent Jinan MR deputy commander in ing the Navy’s 14th iteration of its anti-piracy es- 2014. He was promoted to rear admiral in 2008 cort mission in the Gulf of Aden. Even though he and vice admiral in 2015 (China News, January had been a submarine officer, Yuan was in 12). charge of the destroyer Harbin, the frigate Mian-

8 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 yang, supply ship Weishanhu, multiple helicop- tactical level do not have unintended strategic ters, and a special operations unit, which de- implications.” (USNI, August 9, 2016). ployed from mid-February to late-September 2013. En route to the Gulf, the task force partic- In 2011, while NSF chief of staff, Yuan acted as ipated in the “Peace-13” multinational maritime Red Force commander for a joint defense exer- joint military exercise in Pakistan. While on cise in the Jinan MR involving NSF assets sup- station, Yuan visited the Portuguese guided- ported by Army and Air Force reconnaissance missile frigate Alvares Cabral, flagship of the EU and radar units (Xinhua, November 19, 2011). Combined Task Force 465 (People’s Daily, July This event was one of the earliest examples in 16, 2013). Later the Harbin and Weishanhu par- which the Navy took the lead in a joint exercise. ticipated in anti-piracy drills at sea with the USS In 2012, Yuan commanded a seven-ship for- Mason (USNI News, August 26, 2013). The task mation during a two-week, multi-task training force made port calls in Saipan, Oman, Saudi mission in the western Pacific (PLA Navy, No- Arabia and Djibouti and stopped in Singapore vember 2, 2012). As NSF commander, he over- and Thailand on it way home to Qingdao saw another joint exercise in 2015 involving (Xinhua, September 5, 2013; China Radio Inter- nearly 100 ships and scores of aircraft from the national September 13, 2013). Yuan’s perfor- NSF and ESF supported by multiple battalions mance on this prominent mission probably was from the Second Artillery and electronic coun- evaluated positively by the PLAN’s senior lead- termeasures units from the Shenyang and Jinan ership in Beijing as indicative of his potential for Military Regions (PLA Daily, July 3, 2015). higher levels of responsibility. As a result of Yuan’s experience in the NSF, he Due to his past assignments, Vice Admiral Yuan should be intimately familiar with the status of is fairly well known to foreigners, and to senior the PLA Navy’s carrier program. The Liaoning is U.S. Navy leaders in particular. While com- stationed south of Qingdao and its aircraft train mander of the NSF, Yuan had additional oppor- onshore in the NSF area of operation near tunities to interact with foreigners, including U.S. Huludao. The PLA’s second carrier is under con- Chiefs of Naval Operations Admiral John Rich- struction nearby at Dalian (ChinaMil, February ardson and Admiral Jonathan Greenert; com- 21). When the second carrier enters active ser- mander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral vice, it could be home ported, or make regular Thomas; the Iranian Navy commander; the Turk- visits, to the Sanya Naval Base on Hainan in the ish Navy Commander; and Australian Defense Southern TC. Yuan’s experience as a submariner Minister. He also attended several international and with surface and air operations provide the conferences, including one in London in 2015 at sort of background necessary for potential naval which he is reported to have said: “The South operations in the South China Sea. China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China.” In August 2016, the U.S. Of the three fleets, the NSF has the smallest con- Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Scott Swift vis- tingent of roughly a dozen amphibious vessels; ited Qingdao and emphasized “the importance the NSF has not (yet) been assigned a Type-071 of transparency, parity, and reciprocity,” noting LPD (amphibious transport dock). [3] Though “it is incumbent upon fleet commanders like the PLA Navy marine force is expected to be ex- himself and Yuan to ensure that actions at the panded during the current batch of reforms, no

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PLA Navy marines were stationed in the region breaking the “big Army’s” influence (ChinaMil, when Yuan was NSF commander. [4] Nonethe- February 3, 2016). It is likely only a matter of time less, the NSF’s amphibious assets have trained before an Air Force general or another Navy ad- with Army units, though their operations tempo miral is assigned to command another coastal likely is lower than the larger amphibious forces Theater or perhaps even the Central Theater found in the other two larger fleets. As Southern Command. [5] TC commander, Yuan will have available to him two marine brigades (as of now, with perhaps To date, former Navy commander Wu Shengli more in the future) and a Navy amphibious force remains on the CMC. Neither current Navy com- of over 20 ships and vessels, which includes mander Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong or Vice Ad- three Type-071 LPDs. miral Yuan Yubai have been assigned to that senior-most leadership and policy-making or- Through his performance as a submarine cap- ganization. The future composition of the CMC tain and commander of surface formations, Ad- is expected to be made public around the time miral Yuan has demonstrated his tactical and of the 19th Party Congress later in 2017. Cur- operational proficiency in multiple Navy func- rently, outsiders have no solid indicators of who tional areas. Though he has no combat experi- will be on the new CMC, if it will keep its current ence, he has deployed successfully on a seven- number of senior officers or if there will be ad- month, high-profile mission to the Gulf of Aden. ditions or deletions. For example, will service Significantly, Yuan also has acted as senior commanders, like Shen, have a place on the new leader in joint training in which the Navy was in CMC as they have for the past decade? Will TC command (compared with most joint training commanders as warfighters, like Yuan, be added where the other services support the Army). to the CMC in contrast to past practice when MR Through his assignments as chief of staff and commanders were not included? Will service commander of multiple units, he has proven his commanders and TC commanders be assigned reliability in the eyes of his superiors in the Navy the same grades and ranks (even if the PLA and on the Central Military Commission (CMC). grade and rank structure are adjusted as reforms Moreover, he has had high-level contacts with proceed)? Will TC commanders rotate among foreign counterparts and senior military leaders services over time or will commanders reflect the from all over the world. For the PLA, Admiral geography and potential combat domains ap- Yuan is well-prepared to be the first non-Army plicable to their Theater? Will TC commanders Theater commander. bring to the headquarters additional officers from their own services with parochial biases? Into the Future Operationally, will the expanded CMC structure Vice Admiral Yuan’s selection to become com- (an example of enhanced centralized control in mander of the Southern Theater Command is an increasingly decentralized environment) be- truly a historic development for the PLA. During come involved with Theater operations to “as- this round of reform, as the Army is reduced in sist” TC commanders in their missions? Will ser- size and the other services increased to better vices be authorized to conduct single-service balance the distribution of forces, Yuan’s assign- missions, such as the Gulf of Aden task force, un- ment as TC commander is another major step in der the supervision of the service headquarters

10 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 without the intervention of the joint TC head- 2. TC commanders and political commissars quarters? have the grade of Theater leader, equiva- lent to the former Military Region leader Despite the initial answers, more changes likely grade; TC Service headquarters com- will be made as the PLA attempts to implement manders and political commissars are as- this tranche of reforms. In the absence of actual signed TC deputy leader grades. The combat, PLA officers will prove their tactical PLA’s grade and rank system may change competencies in training situations both inside in the near future. and outside of China and by performing 3. The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Mis- MOOTW tasks, such as the Gulf of Aden escort sions for the 21st Century, Office of Naval mission, disaster relief efforts, or UN Peacekeep- Intelligence, 2015, ing Operations. Political reliability, as always, will https://fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy- be a necessity for promotion and retention. 2015.pdf 4. One unconfirmed report indicates the Whatever his future path, Vice Admiral Yuan 26th Group Army has transferred the Yubai has already entered the PLA history books. 77th Motorized Infantry Brigade sta- His performance in the next few years will deter- tioned near Yantai, Shandong in the mine whether he is given a full chapter or simply Northern TC to the PLA Navy marines. noted with an asterisk. See https://china-defense.blog- spot.com/2017/02/long-expected-third- Notes plan-marine-brigade.html. This report has not yet been confirmed by official 1. To be fair, Air Force General Zhu Fuxi was sources. assigned as the first political commissar 5. The landlocked nature of the Western TC of the Western TC, the only non-Army and potential ground-based terrorist general to be named as a TC leader at the threats suggest that an Army officer will time of creation. However, Zhu had been likely be most suitable for that command. an Army political officer until 2009 when he was transferred to the Air Force. Earlier *** this year he was reported to have been removed from that position. See “Young Taiwan’s Search for Security star tipped to become political commissar for PLA’s western command,” South Partners: Looking Beyond China Morning Post, January 24, 2017, Washington http://www.scmp.com/news/china/di- By Lauren Dickey plomacy-defence/arti-

cle/2065018/young-star-tipped-become-political-commissar-plas. That In November 2016, Hong Kong authorities same report alleges that Air Force Lieu- seized nine Singaporean Terrex infantry carrier tenant General Fan Xiaojun has been as- vehicles en route home after training exercises signed as political commissar of the in Taiwan (Today News, November 29, 2016; Northern TC. Phoenix News, November 30, 2016). The carriers

11 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 were taking the same route shipping containers ties to sustain its future. This argument may be have taken for decades as part of the Singapo- misconstrued as a Taiwanese brand of hedg- rean-Taiwan “Starlight Program” (星光部队 or 星 ing—and, indeed, Taiwan today maintains eco- 光计划). [1] After two months of closed-door di- nomic ties with mainland China and security plomacy, Hong Kong customs authorities an- links with the United States. But Taiwan will nounced that the shipment would be returned never be able to “hedge” between the U.S. and to Singapore in time for Chinese New Year. The China the way other regional powers can, for message in seizing the Terrex vehicles was a re- there is little ambiguity in Taipei’s policy deci- soundingly clear one: abide by Beijing’s “One sions. [2] Instead, Taiwan should seek to strate- China” principle (一中原则) or risk the conse- gically diversify its portfolio of security and de- quences. fense partners beyond the United States. With the obvious exclusion of China, this insurance Beijing’s insistence that other countries recog- policy will strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense re- nize the People’s Republic of China as the sole gardless of the person or party in the White Chinese government has led to Taiwan’s mar- House. ginalization. Though Taiwan has been able to maintain unofficial ties around the world, eco- To be certain, encouraging Taiwan to broaden nomic cooperation with mainland China, and re- its strategic vision for defense partnerships does gional trade agreements with Singapore and not diminish the value of the U.S.-Taiwan rela- New Zealand, it continues to face challenges in tionship. Taiwan was the United States’ ninth identifying willing and able security partners. Ra- largest trading partner and among its top-ten ther than utilizing unofficial, largely economic destinations of agricultural and food products in ties around the world to advance its defense in- 2015 (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, terests, Taiwan continues to rely almost exclu- 2016). Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the sively upon U.S. security assurances. Amid the U.S. remains legally committed to supporting uncertainties of President Donald Trump’s U.S.- Taiwan’s defense, “[making] available to Taiwan Taiwan policy, Taiwan must avoid an overde- such defense articles and defense services…as pendence on the United States by actively diver- may be necessary to enable [it] to maintain a sifying the island’s portfolio of defense partners. sufficient self-defense capability.” [3] Presidents Such efforts are particularly important as the Bush and Obama furthered this security com- Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense opera- mitment to Taiwan through arms deliveries val- tionalizes its new “multi-deterrence” strategy ued at $4.5 billion from 2007 to 2014 (Congres- (Focus Taiwan News, March 12). sional Research Service, December 21, 2015). Weapons packages included technology such as Why Look Elsewhere? P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, Patriot missile systems, and F-16 A/B retrofitting aimed at sup- The rationale for Taipei to look beyond Wash- porting Taiwan’s self-defense needs (Congres- ington to the expertise and assistance of other sional Research Service, August 29, 2014). Be- partners and allies is simple. Taiwan’s needs can- yond military hardware, the relationship has not be met by reliance on Washington alone; deepened to involve closer mil-mil exchanges additional relationships are necessary to ensure the island has political, economic, and security

12 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 and a range of track-two security dialogues (Tai- wanese defense forces require for multi-deter- pei Times, December 2, 2016; Up Media, Decem- rence—including cyber, undersea, and anti-air- ber 8, 2016). craft capabilities (Focus Taiwan News, March 16). Like-minded defense partners may also serve as The depth of U.S.-Taiwan ties should not, how- conduits for buying, co-developing, or indige- ever, preclude Taiwanese efforts to diversify se- nously procuring advanced military technolo- curity partners. Due to the unique challenges of gies. Such additional ties will decrease Taiwan’s Taiwan’s strategic environment and the far- current reliance upon the lengthy timelines of reaching responsibilities of the U.S. national se- Congressionally-approved weapons packages. curity strategy, it behooves Taiwanese policymakers to explore additional partnerships. The call for rethinking Taiwan’s security assis- tances beyond Washington is hardly new news Diversifying Taiwan’s Strategic Portfolio to current Taiwanese officials. President Tsai has Taiwan’s sole existential threat, China, is a mere already begun a search for alternative economic 120 miles from its shores. Military planning has partners, as can be best seen in the New South- shifted from a porcupine “Hard ROC” to a bound Policy aimed at broadening business “multi-dilemma” strategic approach (Ministry of links between Taiwan and Southeast Asia as a National Defense (ROC), October 2013; Focus counterbalance to China (BBC Chinese, May 28, Taiwan News, March 12). Despite divergent lan- 2016). Her administration continues to deepen guage, both concepts are focused on one and unofficial ties with Japan, promising a coopera- the same objective: denying the People’s Liber- tive attitude in engaging with the Abe govern- ation Army (PLA) the ability to invade or occupy ment and pro-Taiwan parliamentarians (China the island. Such a defense posture must simul- Brief, October 26, 2016; Radio Taiwan Interna- taneously operate within the limits imposed by tional, March 20). Tokyo could build on these a tight defense budget ($9.7 billion, or 1.8 per- ties by supporting the development of Taiwan’s cent of GDP, for 2017) and a personnel pool of submarine capabilities, such as in sending re- 215,000 active duty troops, of which 23,000 are tired Japanese naval officers, retired defense of- one-year conscripts (Ministry of National De- ficials, or even engineers from Kawasaki and fense (ROC), September 2016; IISS Military Bal- Mitsubishi Heavy Industries—builders of Japan’s ance, 2016; Taipei Times, August 17, 2016). Sōryū-class submarines—to Taipei for dialogues with their counterparts. Strengthening Taiwan’s portfolio of security partnerships must first begin by looking to other Within the region, neighborhood partners offer countries in similar strategic environments; the geostrategic proximity and foothold in intra- namely, those small- to medium-sized countries Asian networks which Taiwan needs. Singapore, building a robust deterrence posture amid a lack with its long history of interactions with Taiwan of strategic depth, tight budgetary and person- and firm observance of “One China” coveted by nel constraints, and an intimate proximity to ex- Beijing, should be a starting point (Apple Daily, istential threats. Taipei should partner with March 23, 2015). With undoubtedly the most ad- countries procuring and training with the sort of vanced defense forces in Southeast Asia, Singa- innovative and asymmetric platforms the Tai- porean capabilities punch far above their weight. The city-state’s defense strategy has

13 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 transformed from purely retaliatory to swift pre- Several European countries face strategic envi- emptive strikes—a strategic shift captured in zo- ronments that bear striking resemblance to Tai- ological metaphors of poisonous shrimp, porcu- wan. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and pines and, now, dolphins. [4] Singapore also Georgia share borders with their primary exis- takes a holistic approach to security in adapting tential threat, Russia. Each lacks adequate stra- a total defense plan comprised of designated tegic depth and must operate with limited roles across its society in a future contingency budgets or personnel. While these countries ar- (MinDef, 2016). As the hub for Taiwan’s eco- guably benefit from forward deployed NATO nomic Southbound agenda, the unofficial but forces, they have pursued independent steps to substantive relationship with Singapore offers a bolster self-defense and deterrence. In response worthy springboard for expanding into closer to the threat of Russian hybrid war, each country security cooperation despite the November Ter- has developed its own military strategy to pre- rex incident. serve and protect territorial integrity. Latvia and Poland have also implemented extensive Beyond Asia, Taiwan has previously looked to cybersecurity strategies, an area in which Taiwan Germany, Italy, and Israel for security assistance hopes to improve (National Information & Com- and arms purchases (The Guardian, February 5, munication Security Taskforce, February 2013; 2010; Security Assistance Monitor, November 5, Taipei Times, January 17). 2014). [5] Under pressure from China, such ties have largely been abandoned—but should not In maritime Europe, one additional possibility be entirely forgotten. Israel, like Taiwan, empha- for future cooperation lies in the Cypriot experi- sizes capabilities that enable it to maintain a ence. An island divided by political recognition, credible deterrent posture and strategic de- Cyprus focuses on platforms and training that fense. A hefty defense budget of $18.2 billion (or will decrease its vulnerability to asymmetric approximately 6 percent of GDP) for 2017–18 threats. Beginning with the 1995 Greece-Cyprus and the benefits accruing from close defense Joint Defense Doctrine, which committed Ath- ties with the United States, Russia, China, and ens to consider casus beli any Turkish attempt to Singapore have supported Israeli efforts to field invade Cyprus, the Greeks have sought to ex- advanced technology (Times of Israel, December pand their naval and air defense footprint in Cy- 21, 2016; World Bank, 2016). The Israeli Navy’s prus and the southeast Mediterranean more diesel-electric Dolphin-1 and Dolphin-2 subma- broadly. U.S. and European governments also rines fall in approximately the same specifica- continue to support Cypriot defense capabilities tions bracket as Taipei envisions possessing, of- to ensure access to the geostrategically im- fering an alternative approach to the costly in- portant island. [6] digenous procurement currently underway (Commonwealth, June 1, 2016). The challenge Diversification From Within Taiwan with Israel, however, will be whether and how Taiwan can navigate around the cooperation, lo- Even as Taiwan looks abroad for additional se- gistical support, and arms sales between the Is- curity partners, policymakers must also under- raeli defense sector and the Chinese military take meaningful, credible efforts to bolster Tai- (China Military, February 21; DefenseTech, De- wan’s self-defense at home. Taiwanese policy- cember 24, 2013).

14 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 makers face the daunting challenge of increas- undoubtedly continue to be—placed under ing the defense budget to 3 percent of GDP, a strain by Beijing’s insistence on recognition of fiscal threshold impeded by the gradual transi- the “One China” principle. However, such a real- tion from a conscription to an all-volunteer force ity does not mean Taiwan should accept sole re- (Focus Taiwan News, June 7, 2016; Taipei Times, liance upon the United States for its security and December 17, 2016). Absent a larger budget, defense needs as a fait accompli. At the domes- Taiwan will struggle to meet the demands of do- tic level, Taiwan must allocate the money and re- mestic procurement for necessary platforms sources necessary to support a robust deter- such as Hsiung Feng missiles and minelayer ves- rence and a military capable of defending the is- sels. An inability to show commitment to de- land against a potential future contingency with fense spending at home will further undermine the PLA. Beyond the island, Taiwanese officials Taiwan’s ventures abroad. must think just as creatively about defense and security partners as they already have in the eco- Taiwan and its overseas representative offices nomic realm. While Taiwan’s defense will con- should also take steps to make the island a more tinue to benefit greatly from the relationship attractive defense partner. In cooperating with with Washington, such ties should not preclude Asian or European neighbors, Taiwan could offer Taiwanese efforts to look elsewhere for partners leased access to its facilities for training—as has in similar strategic circumstances. Prudence de- long been the case with Singapore—or joint mands Taiwan diversify its defense portfolio and training in rapid runway repair, a forté of the Tai- broaden available security partners. wanese military (China Post, January 14, 2014). Taipei should also pursue humanitarian assis- Lauren Dickey is a Ph.D. candidate in War Studies tance and disaster relief (HA/DR) agreements at King’s College London and the National Uni- with more countries, operations in which Taiwan versity of Singapore, where she focuses on Chi- has displayed extensive regional experience. nese strategy toward Taiwan. She is also a mem- Above all, Taiwan needs to demonstrate an in- ber of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program creased resilience to Chinese espionage and at CSIS. psychological warfare (China Brief, December 5, 2014). Defense partners—Washington in- Notes cluded—are less willing to sell advanced plat- 1. Author interview, Singaporean govern- forms to a Taiwanese military weakened by leaks ment official, February 2016. to the PLA. Taiwanese military and civilians need 2. Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reas- to develop greater confidence in their troops sessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment and their own abilities, a mental resilience to in East Asia,” Security Studies 4 (2015): pp. China’s “Three Warfares” and efforts which seek 696–727. to influence and control the strategic discourse 3. Taiwan Relations Act (1979), Public Law on Taiwan (China Brief, August 22, 2016). 96-8, available at: https://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-rela- Conclusion tions-act.html. 4. Bernard Loo, “From Poisoned Shrimp to The relationships Taiwan maintains with partner Porcupine to Dolphin: Cultural and Geo- nations around the world have been—and will graphic Perspectives of the Evolution of

15 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017

Singapore’s Strategic Posture,” in Amitav command, maneuver, and fire strikes with situa- Acharya and Lee Lai To (eds.), Asia in the tional awareness, targeting and battle damage New Millennium, conference proceed- assessments. The PLA’s current stove-piped in- ings (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Aca- telligence system requires continued moderni- demic, 2004), pp. 352–375. zation including automated systems to assist 5. Meron Medzini, “Hands across Asia: Is- analysis and dissemination, improved and ex- rael-Taiwan Relations,” Israel Journal of panded reconnaissance assets, and integrated Foreign Affairs 2 (2015): pp. 237–251. communications for sharing intelligence. 6. Michalis S. Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History (New York: Theater Joint Command Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 146. The new Theater Joint Commands’ Joint Opera- *** tions Command Centers (JOCC—联合作战指挥中心) contain intelligence centers, as do command posts (CP) formed at each echelon down PLA Theater Joint to regiment level. [1] Intelligence: Organization The internal theater command structure, as well and Operations as the intelligence center organization are not By Kevin McCauley uniform and vary as dictated by the special circumstances facing each command. Under the China’s new theater command structure repre- supervision of the theater joint command’s chief sents a major advancement in building a stream- of staff, the joint intelligence center consists of lined joint command structure. One key remain- intelligence staff officers from the services, the ing bottleneck is intelligence sharing. Accurate Strategic Support Force and technical staff. [2] and timely intelligence is always a key compo- This center is responsible for preparing the joint nent of any successful military operation, and reconnaissance plan (联合侦察计划) to support especially so for the advanced joint operations the theater’s command and control center and the PLA envisions. Skilled intelligence and technical personnel, and joint command and coordination regulations are required to support the intelligence process, as well as direct intelligence operations at subordinate echelons. As the PLA attempts to build an advanced joint operations capability, rapid collection, accurate analysis and dissemination of actionable intelligence is critical to support precision

16 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 operational forces. The joint intelligence center and control center. The theater intelligence cen- plays a coordinating role to lower level intelli- ter has directly subordinate technical reconnais- gence centers and subordinate reconnaissance sance, special reconnaissance and other units forces. The center is responsible for, coordinat- collecting intelligence. The theater joint intelli- ing theater reconnaissance operations, central- gence center provides guidance to subordinate ized intelligence fusion, as well as coordinating reconnaissance assets based on the joint recon- with the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) naissance plan. The theater intelligence center JOCC, national intelligence agencies and the can request space, network, and electromag- Strategic Support Force. [3] The theater com- netic battlefield reconnaissance support from mand’s intelligence center can establish subor- the Strategic Support Force, and additional in- dinate intelligence centers, for example, ground, telligence support from the CMC’s JOCC, as well air and maritime. These subordinate centers as support from national intelligence agencies. would maintain service-specific situation maps [6] feeding into the joint intelligence center’s current battlefield situation map (战场通用态势图) PLA assessments note that current intel trans- providing a common operating picture to all mission and dissemination is slow, especially in forces. The theater command’s intelligence cen- a joint environment. Improvements in the intel- ter disseminates reports to intelligence centers ligence system include a transition to a flatter at lower echelons supporting subordinate network structure that is intended to break bar- forces, as well as coordinate with other theaters’ riers between services and branches. Collection, centers. [4] analysis, and dissemination of actionable battlefield intelligence, are being standardized and The intelligence centers of various operational automated to speed up the processing and dis- groups (作战集团) or campaign formations (军 semination of intelligence. This is further en- 团) conducting the theater operations and other hanced through the creation of intelligence da- theater subordinate reconnaissance assets tabases that can be queried. [10] transmit intelligence to the theater joint intelligence center, as well as the theater command Planning

Planning and organization of intelligence is crucial to support operations. The theater chief of staff supervises and manages the development of the joint reconnaissance plan, and submits the plan for the joint commander’s approval. The theater command and control center provides the joint intelligence center with the intelligence

17 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 requirements supporting the operational plan. gence will come from “underground party or- The requirements can vary from one operational ganizations,” agents, fellow travelers, prisoners phase to another. The joint reconnaissance plan of war, and captured enemy documents and assigns missions to reconnaissance assets, plans equipment. The fishing fleet and civilian ships missions to support various operational phases, also provide valuable information. [12] prioritizes collection against the most urgent requirements, establishes coordination and sup- The eventual goal is to achieve a “full-dimen- port methods, and assigns timelines for com- sional” 24/7 all-weather intelligence collection pleting tasks. Reconnaissance assets are con- capability. Theater intelligence includes satellite, centrated along the main operational direction, aircraft, maritime, ground, electromagnetic and with assets and missions adjusted as operations network reconnaissance assets. The PLA consid- progress or as the situation changes. Reconnais- ers reconnaissance satellites an important thea- sance operations could be increased in other re- ter intelligence means to provide long-range gions to deceive the opponent as to the actual monitoring of ground and sea targets. Air, mar- main direction. [11] itime, ground and other technical collection means are also important to present a compre- Intelligence Collection hensive battlefield situation for commanders at all echelons. [13] According to the PLA, joint operations require extensive intelligence collection on political, Intelligence Processing and Analysis economic, and military issues that can impact operations. The PLA places importance on Fast-paced modern operations require rapid peacetime collection, including the use of “tour- and accurate intelligence analysis. As the PLA ists” and open sources, as wartime collection be- adapts more complex ISR systems, the quantity comes restricted. Comprehensive peacetime of data produced is quickly outpacing analysts collection can support rapid intelligence pro- ability to process it. Computer-assisted pro- duction to support an unexpected crisis. Units at cessing is required for timely and accurate pro- each echelon down to battalion level have sub- cessing and dissemination of intelligence, ordinate forces to conduct reconnaissance in however, automation levels within the PLA cur- their area of operations. This intelligence is rently is considered low compared to advanced shared with neighboring and subordinate units, countries. Analysis supports updating of a digi- as well as reported up the command chain. Sub- tal battlefield situation map displaying a com- ordinate commands can request intelligence mon operating picture to CPs down to the regi- support from superior headquarters, and intelli- ment level, and possibly to battalion level com- gence centers are required to coordinate closely mand vehicles. The digital display provides lay- with counterparts in neighboring units to share ered information—including operational plans; relevant intelligence. Intelligence centers coor- friendly and enemy force disposition; space, air, dinate with the People’s Armed Police, militia, maritime and ground situation; geographic and and local authorities during a conflict on main- obstacle information; meteorological and hy- land China. In overseas conflicts, in addition to drographic situation; and electromagnetic envi- national and PLA reconnaissance assets, intelli- ronment. Combat statistical tables, text, audio,

18 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 and visual information can also be available for although PLA publications indicate this will in- display. [14] crease in the future including greater flexibility for users to query databases. PLA forces use a The intelligence centers sort, validate and ana- variety of wired and wireless communication lyze collected data, producing finished intelli- methods, and increasingly rely on BeiDou for gence. Critical intelligence is reported immedi- brief, secure messages. Ultimately an integrated ately to the commander, and emergency infor- approach is used depending on the situation. mation is immediately distributed to units. PLA [16] publications state that only trained personnel should evaluate and interpret intelligence data, Information Security and Intelligence Con- including validating the collected information. frontation Specialized personnel analyze technical reconnaissance such as satellite or aerial imagery, Information security is an important aspect of electronic collection, and enemy weapons and intelligence and reconnaissance. These equipment performance. The intelligence cen- measures include not only strict control of infor- ters will initially sort and categorize intelligence mation and systems, but also active and passive in various ways, such as subject (information on counter-reconnaissance measures including de- enemy forces, friendly forces, or the operational ception, terrain masking, electronic warfare and environment), time (historical, current, or future cyber offense and defense. Close coordination intelligence), and priority (critical, general, refer- between the military and local governments, ence intelligence information). Intelligence eval- and strict control over civilian communications uation and feedback is used to strengthen the and news media are considered important in relevance and quality of reporting. The PLA be- maintaining information security. Control of lieves that development of automated systems electronic emanations, radio silence, and tech- will speed up the collection, processing, dissem- nological means such as frequency hopping, ination, and database storage and retrieval of in- spread spectrum, and burst communications are telligence. [15] advocated. [17]

Dissemination The PLA also uses the concepts of intelligence struggle (情报斗争), intelligence deception (情报 The intelligence centers use various methods to 欺骗), and intelligence deterrence (情报威慑) disseminate relevant intelligence to units. It is which includes deception and interference to important to note that higher level commands prevent, or destroy the enemy’s intelligence col- restrict dissemination to intelligence deemed lection capabilities. Intelligence deception in- relevant to a subordinate’s combat missions to cludes spreading disinformation to confuse the limit overloading with unneeded information. enemy leading to inaccurate assessments and Classification levels would also limit access. decisions. Intelligence deterrence is the control Currently, these decisions are made primarily by of intelligence or feeding false intelligence to intelligence center staff, with automated sys- the enemy to lead the enemy to avoid confron- tems assisting to a greater degree in the future. tation or reduce the intensity of his actions. The Intelligence databases currently exist in the PLA, Strategic Support Force is likely responsible for

19 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 information security and intelligence confronta- technology provides greater security by lower- tion actions at the strategic level. [18] ing the probability of detection and intercep- tion. Detection and direction-finding technolo- Modernization Requirements gies can, long-range battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance radars capable of detecting, lo- The PLA recognizes shortcomings in communi- cating and identifying moving ground, air and cation construction—such as automated com- maritime targets, and passive detection systems munication networks—to meet theater joint are identified as important technologies by the command requirements. The PLA assesses cur- PLA. Stratospheric and tropospheric balloons for rent intelligence sharing and dissemination early warning, reconnaissance, and communica- means as poor, requiring improved communication relay are also discussed in PLA publications tion system integration and personnel training. and advertised at arms shows. The airships can The theaters rely on satellite communications be linked with Navy vessels, AWACS aircraft, for long-range communications, supported by other aircraft and aerostats to create a net- an integrated trunk communications network as worked reconnaissance architecture to provide the main communications systems. China is de- greater redundancy, direction of reconnaissance veloping quantum information technology, in- operations, and comprehensive intelligence sys- cluding a satellite communications system for tem. [20] high capacity, rapid and secure communications. The PLA assesses that the communications The current extent and quality of operational systems, for example the theater field auto- and tactical level intelligence reforms is not mated communication network, require contin- clear. Theater joint intelligence should eventu- ued modernization to eventually reach the level ally provide centralized intelligence fusion of of developed countries. An integrated, net- service reconnaissance assets, and an entry worked intelligence system is required to ensure point for strategic intelligence reporting to sup- real-time sharing of intelligence information. port theater operations. PLA press reports im- The PLA admits that its military reconnaissance provements breaking barriers allowing intelli- units are not as extensive as more advanced gence sharing between branches and units at countries, requiring greater quantity and quality. the tactical level. However, tactical units are solv- Military reconnaissance and early warning long- ing issues on their own, rather than high-level range capabilities are considered weak, a severe direction standardizing communications and the limitation for Navy and Air Force operations at intelligence process (PLA Daily, March 3, 2015; greater distances, and possible expeditionary PLA Daily, October 17, 2015). Tactical unit intel- operations or support for special operations ligence centers also report inundation with vast abroad. The PLA does consider its computer tal- amounts of intelligence in a short time, with over ent a strength to support cyber reconnaissance 60 percent of the information worthless. Not or computer network exploitation. [19] only did the large amount of information stress the communications bandwidth, but also the PLA assessments identify technologies to sup- ability to sort for critical intelligence. Again, units port improved reconnaissance and surveillance have sought their own solutions to filter intelli- operations. Spread spectrum communications gence. It remains unclear whether the current emphasis on high level direction for reforms is

20 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 providing standardization and uniform guidance Kevin McCauley has served as senior intelligence to subordinates (PLA Daily, November 25, 2015). officer for the Soviet Union, Russia, China and Tactical UAVs are allowing units to quickly con- Taiwan during over thirty years in the U.S. gov- duct reconnaissance of their area of operations, ernment. Mr. McCauley writes primarily on PLA overcoming difficult terrain and obstacles that and Taiwan military affairs. His publications in- would restrict reconnaissance patrol’ mobility clude “PLA System of Systems Operations: Ena- (PLA Daily, May 3, 2016). The integrated com- bling Joint Operations” and “Russian Influence mand platform is allowing greater real-time in- Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War telligence sharing, and currently providing digi- to Putin.” @knmccauley1 tweets current Chinese, tal battlefield situation maps to tactical units Taiwan and Russian military news. (PLA Daily, May 11, 2016; PLA Daily, October 30, 2016). Notes

Conclusions 1. The theater’s JOCC acts as the main CP ( 基本指挥所). In addition, there would Rapid and accurate intelligence collection, anal- normally be an alternate CP (预备指挥所 ysis and dissemination will require numerous ), a rear CP (后方指挥所) and possibly a improvements and modernizations to support forward or direction CP (前进(方向)指挥 future PLA requirements for high-tempo ma- 所). The alternate and rear CPs for the neuver operations by dispersed joint forces and theaters are likely fixed and underground. long-range precision strikes. The creation of a The rear CP might be collated with the theater joint intelligence structure should lead theaters’ Joint Logistics Support Center. to improved intelligence fusion. New joint com- Each CP would have to have an intelli- mand and coordination regulations are required gence center and follow the course of op- for full implementation of the theater com- erations closely in the event they need to mands, and the PLA is working to correct the take command operation if other CPs are problems facing joint command and intelligence destroyed or inoperative. At lower eche- operations at all echelons. Current weaknesses lons, this transfer of command could oc- include the quantity and quality of reconnais- cur during displacement of a CP. sance assets, particularly long-range capabili- 2. The level of expertise and experience of ties, as well as integrated communications and the intelligence centers’ staff, particularly automated systems. The PLA recognizes the the technical staff is not known, nor is the dangers of information overload, and intends to shift system employed to maintain 24/7 increase automated systems to assist in dissem- operations. It is likely that the skill levels inating actionable intelligence to subordinates. between shifts varies in quality. Future PLA intelligence operations require an in- 3. The PLA security classifications include tegrated networked system breaking service Top Secret (绝密), Secret (机密) and Con- barriers, increasing speed and efficiency trans- fidential ( 秘密), and dissemination of mitting time sensitive intelligence to support classified material is based on need to decision-making at all command levels. The PLA know. The classification levels available to is making progress, but there is much to be ac- various echelons is not known for the complished. PLA, but would restrict dissemination of

21 ChinaBrief March 31, 2017

intelligence. It is likely that the PLA also Work Course of Study, (Beijing: National has code word and compartmented clas- Defense University Press, 2008) pp. 72– sifications. 75; Chinamil.com, November 17, 2014 4. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Bei- 15. Precision Operations, (Beijing: National jing: National Defense University Press, Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 144– 2016) pp. 82–83, 123 and 158–161 145 5. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Bei- 16. Precision Operations, (Beijing: National jing: National Defense University Press, Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 140– 2016) p. 161， pp. 156-158. 141 and 147 6. Command Information System Course of 17. Military Terms, (Beijing: Military Science Study, (Beijing: Military Science Press, Press, 2011) p. 225 2013) p. 23 18. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Bei- 7. Command Information System Course of jing: National Defense University Press, Study, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2016) pp. 125, 158–159 and 172–173 2013) p. 27 19. Command Information System Course of 8. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Bei- Study, (Beijing: Military Science Press, jing: National Defense University Press, 2013) pp. 64–69 ; PLA Daily, February 24, 2016) pp. 116-118 2017; China Daily, January 19, 2017 9. Precision Operations Command, Shijia- zhuang Army Command College, (Beijing: PLA Press, 2009) pp. 107–112 *** *** *** 10. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Bei- jing: National Defense University Press, China Brief is a bi-weekly journal of information 2016) pp. 168–169; Precision Operations, and analysis covering Greater China in Eurasia. (Beijing: National Defense University China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown Press, 2011) pp. 141–142; Military Terms, Foundation, a private non-profit organization (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011) p. 219 based in Washington D.C. and is edited by Peter 11. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Bei- Wood. jing: National Defense University Press, The opinions expressed in China Brief are solely 2016) pp. 170–172; Precision Operations, those of the authors, and do not necessarily re- (Beijing: National Defense University flect the views of The Jamestown Foundation. Press, 2011) pp. 136–137 12. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Bei- For comments and questions about China Brief, jing: National Defense University Press, please contact us at [email protected] 2016) pp. 122–123 13. Theater Joint Operations Command, (Bei- jing: National Defense University Press, 2016) pp. 119, 123 and 166 14. Precision Operations, (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2011) pp. 145- 146; Joint Operations Command Organ