DOCSLIB.ORG

Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal CUWS Outreach Journal 1201 5 February 2016 Feature Item: “America’s Delicate Dance Between Deterrence and Assurance”. Authored by David Santoro and John K. Warden; published by The National Interest; February 1, 2016. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-delicate-dance-between-deterrence-assurance- 15076?page=show U.S. security guarantees are extraordinary and complex commitments. The United States puts at risk its deployed forces and personnel, and potentially its homeland, for the sake of shared interests with allies. While the benefits of each alliance are unique, they provide the United States with security and economic partners that help to maintain international stability, promote economic growth and trade, and protect liberal values. But in extending deterrence to cover allies, the United States also increases its likelihood of being drawn into an unwanted war. As a result, the United States must sometimes deter its allies from undertaking certain actions and, conversely, assure its adversaries that it will behave in a measured manner. Plainly, it must balance assurance and deterrence both among and between its allies and potential adversaries. U.S. Nuclear Weapons 1. Ex-Y-12 Contractor Cited for Mishandling Classified Documents U.S. Counter-WMD 1. Russia’s Cutting-Edge S-500 Missile System to Begin Tests This Year 2. U.S. Missile Defense Agency Claims Success in Non-Intercept Test U.S. Arms Control 1. Fresh START: US, Russia Should Resume Dialogue on Nuclear Arms Reductions 2. Under START-3 Russia to Cut Nuclear Arms Along with US — Academician Homeland Security/The Americas 1. Exclusive: U.S. Budget Plan Includes over $13 Billion for New Submarine – Sources 2. Former Energy Dept. Employee Pleads Guilty in Nuclear Secrets Sting Case Asia/Pacific 1. Senior Politician Calls for S. Korea to Have Nuclear Weapons 2. S. Korea Repeats Need for Deploying U.S. Missile Defense System 3. North Korea Says It Can Control Destructive Power of Hydrogen Bomb 4. North Korea Says It's Capable of Making Unlimited Hydrogen Bombs 5. China's Military Regrouped into Five PLA Theater Commands Issue No.1201, 5 February 2016 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama 6. Russia Alarmed by S. Korea-U.S. Contacts over THAAD: Ambassador 7. Tokyo Orders SDF to Shoot Down North Korean Missile if Threat to Japan 8. NK Rocket Test Is to Hit any City in US Mainland 9. N.Korea 'Building H-Bomb Plant' 10. NK Readying Long-Range Missile Launch, Defense Ministry says 11. Telling Tales: Brother of Disgraced Chinese Presidential Aide Ling Jihua Defects to US and Reveals State Secrets, says Report 12. Park, Xi Discuss NK Threats 13. N. Korea Says It Has No Intent to Attack S. Korea with Nukes 14. North Has Prepared a Backup Missile: Sources Europe/Russia 1. Russians to Skip Nuclear Terrorism Summit in March 2. Jeremy Corbyn Accused of Trying to Turn Trident into a 'Taxi Service' Middle East 1. Iran Says It Has ‘Doubled’ Efforts to Develop Ballistic Missiles 2. IRGC to Show “Rational” Reaction to US Stance on Iran’s Missile Program 3. Leader Confers Badge of Honor on IRGC Navy Command for Capturing US Marines 4. “Extensive Information” Obtained from US Sailors Captured by IRGC 5. AEOI: Iran Hopes to Start Construction of 2 Nuclear Reactors This Year 6. Iran's Salehi, US's Moniz among 2016 Nobel Peace Prize Nominees: Report 7. US House Passes Bill Restricting Removal of Iran Sanctions 8. Iran after More Sophisticated Missile Program: Top General India/Pakistan 1. India Is Putting Part of Its Nuclear-Missile Maker Up For Sale Commentary 1. Build up Defense to Thwart US Provocation 2. Known Unknowns: Iraqi WMD, 13 Years Later 3. The Cyber Threat to Nuclear Deterrence 4. Pay Attention, America: Russia Is Upgrading Its Military 5. The Non-Existent Nuclear Weapons Debate Return to Top Issue No.1201, 5 February 2016 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal Knoxville News Sentinel – Knoxville, TN Ex-Y-12 Contractor Cited for Mishandling Classified Documents By Frank Munger of the Knoxville News Sentinel February 3, 2016 OAK RIDGE — The National Nuclear Security Administration this week cited B&W Y-12 — the government's former contractor at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant — for repeated mishandling and improper disposal of classified documents. The preliminary notice identified three violations based on the U.S. Department of Energy's investigation of a "security event" uncovered in 2014. The report proposed fines totaling $240,000, but the NNSA waived the fines because of the contractor's timely response to concerns and because B&W was already penalized by having its management fee reduced for fiscal year 2014. In June 2014, a contractor worker at Y-12 reportedly identified a "work-related paper" that contained markings for "Secret/Restricted Data" in an unclassified waste bag. The waste bag had already been moved out of the plant's high-security "material access area." The bag contained about 19 additional papers that were either marked as classified or appeared to contain classified information. That discovery led to an examination of other waste containers, and more problems — with unclassified containers potentially bearing classified information — were found at Y-12. "B&W Y-12 then decided not to search any additional containers because they were, given the prior results, presumed likely to contain additional classified information and further searches would have added to the cost and potential safety concerns associated with low-level waste," the investigation report stated. The report said one of the three violations of classified security requirements was determined to be Severity Level I, with "actual or high potential for adverse impact on the national security." The other two violations were Level II, which "represent lack of attention or carelessness" in protection of classified information that can affect national security if not corrected. The investigation, based on talks with some workers, indicated the problem with improper disposal of potentially classified information at unclassified burial sites had been going on for years. The notice said containers were sent to an "off-site burial location" that was intended for unclassified waste, but the location was not specified. The DOE confirmed the investigation of the security event in 2014, and some aspects of the former contractor's missteps were reported in correspondence obtained at the time by the News Sentinel. At the time the problems were made public, Consolidated Nuclear Security — the contractor that replaced B&W on July 1, 2014 — emphasized an internal investigation had determined that no classified information had been "compromised" and told employees that news reports had exaggerated the concerns. According to the notice of violations, B&W Y-12 — during an enforcement conference held in April 2015 — disagreed with the "conclusions and representations" in the DOE investigation report. Issue No.1201, 5 February 2016 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Jud Simmons, a spokesman for B&W —now called BWXT — said the former Y-12 contractor carried out a corrective action plan during its tenure. He said it was "appropriate" the federal agency did not impose a civil penalty. "We do not intend to further contest the NNSA's conclusions," Simmons said. In February 2015, following the initial probe into the classification issue and another security incident, Steven Simonson,the DOE's director of enforcement, noted the problems occurred before Consolidated Nuclear Security took over as manager of Y-12 and that the DOE would not pursue enforcement against CNS. http://www.knoxnews.com/news/local/ex-y-12-contractor-cited-for-mishandling-classified- documents-2ae1ec4a-6f8c-3062-e053-0100007ff32d-367585991.html Return to Top Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency Russia’s Cutting-Edge S-500 Missile System to Begin Tests This Year 01 February 2016 The first prototypes of the next-generation S-500 air defense system will reach completion and begin its pre-tests in 2016. This is a new generation system, capable of destroying aerial offensive targets as well intercontinental ballistic missiles and near space targets. The new system not only combines the best feats of the previous systems, but also offers completely new possibilities in the field of air, missile and space defense, according to the member of advisory council of the Military-Industrial Commission Viktor Murakhovski. Almaz-Antei Defense Company is working on a complex of S-500 ‘Promethey’ surface-to-air missiles from 2010. The long-range system is said to have a range of 600 kilometers (more than 370 miles). The system could simultaneously intercept up to ten ballistic missiles traveling at a speed of 5 kilometers per second. The technical aim consists of creating self-intercept medium-range ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles with the possibility of changing trajectory midflight. The new complex also aims at destroying hypersonic cruise missiles and other aerial targets at speeds of higher than Mach 5 and as well as spacecraft. The Deputy Commander of the Russian Air Defense Lieutenant-General Sergei Razygraev said earlier that the S-500 can shoot down missiles in near space thus it will become an element of strategic missile defense. In June 2014 a long-range anti-missile for the new complex was tested successfully.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Joint Operation Structure of the Chinese People's Liberation Army with Focus on the Reorganization of the Chain of Command
    The Joint Operation Structure of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with Focus on the Reorganization of the Chain of Command and Control under the Xi Jinping Administration* Yasuyuki Sugiura** Abstract In November 2013, at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, announced the implementation of national defense and military reform. Drawing special attention among the series of reforms was the question of what kind of organizational reform China would be doing to strengthen the joint operation structure. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reforms, announced in waves between the autumn of 2015 and February 2016, exceeded the expectations of many observers by beginning with the abolition of the four general departments structure and the seven military regions system. This change has been called the “greatest reform since the birth of the nation,” with some even calling it the Chinese version of the Goldwater–Nichols Act. The main interest of this study lies in revealing the present situations of the joint operation structure of the PLA with a focus on the reorganization of the chain of command and control through the series of reforms. Specifically, the main purpose of this study is to shed light on the following points: 1) Overview: How did the reform unfold, and what changed? 2) The features and the aims: What are the features of the reform, and what are the aims? 3) Political background: Why did they launch the reform, and
    [Show full text]
  • “Young Guards”: the Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part I: Purges and Reshuffles)
    Promoting “Young Guards”: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part I: Purges and Reshuffles) Cheng Li The continuing consolidation of power has been the most noticeable trend under the leadership of Xi Jinping since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012. Undoubtedly, a key component in this strengthening of both Xi’s personal power and his new administration’s authority has centered on the military domain. Xi has gone about the consolidation process through several important political and tactical moves, including the purges of the two highest-ranking generals under the previous administration on corruption and other charges; the arrest of over 40 senior military officers on various charges of wrongdoing; large-scale reshuffling of generals between regions, departments, and services; ongoing efforts to reform the PLA structure and operations; and, most importantly, the rapid promotion of “young guards” (少壮派) in the Chinese military. All of these bold measures will have profound implications—not only for Xi’s political standing in preparation for the next leadership turnover in 2017, but also for the trajectory of civilian-military relations in the country and for the assessment of China’s military modernization. The first installation in this series focuses on the recent purges and reshuffling of military leaders, which has significant consequences in the political dynamics of present-day China. It is an old saying in the history of the Chinese Communist movement that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”1 Although this famous Mao Zedong slogan emphasizes the Communist doctrine that the party commands the army in seizing and retaining state power, a top party leader’s consolidation of personal power cannot be achieved without strong support from the military.
    [Show full text]
  • “Young Guards”: the Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part III: Personal and Political)
    Promoting “Young Guards”: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part III: Personal and Political) Cheng Li The most noticeable trend under the leadership of Xi Jinping since the 2012 National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been the continuing consolidation of power. In particular, the military has been a key forum in which Xi has strengthened both his personal power and his new administration’s authority. Xi has adopted several approaches and political tactics to achieve this, including purging the two highest-ranking generals under the previous administration for corruption and other charges; arresting 52 senior military officers on various charges of wrongdoing; reshuffling generals between regions, departments, and services; attempting to systematically reform the PLA’s structure and operations; and, last but not least, rapidly promoting “young guards” ( ) in the Chinese military. These bold moves will have profound implications—not only for Xi’s political standing in the lead-up to the next leadership turnover in 2017, but also for the development of civilian-military relations in the country and for the trajectory of China’s military modernization. The third installment in this series focuses on personnel changes that have occurred during the early phase of military reform. Who are the rising stars in the PLA following the recent reorganization and reshuffling? What are the distinguishing characteristics of the “young guards”? What are possible explanations for and implications of some of the highest-level
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C
    CHINA STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 10 Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs The mission of the China Center is to serve as a national focal point and resource center for multidisciplinary research and analytic exchanges on the national goals and strategic posture of the People’s Republic of China and the ability of that nation to develop, field, and deploy an effective military instrument in support of its national stra- tegic objectives. The Center keeps officials in the Department of Defense (DOD), other government agencies, and Congress apprised of the results of these efforts. The Center also engages the faculty and students of the National Defense University and other components of the DOD professional military education system in aspects of its work and thereby assists their respective programs of teaching, training, and research. The Center has an active outreach program designed to pro- mote exchanges among American and international analysts of Chinese military affairs. Cover photo: President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping and Chinese General Fang Fenghui, Chief of the General Staff, before meeting General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Beijing, April 23, 2013 (DOD/D. Myles Cullen) Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications by Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C.
    [Show full text]
  • TPI English Journal 3.Indd
    TIBET POLICY JOURNAL Managing Editor : Sherab Woeser Design and layout: Tsetsoe Circulation Manager: Tashi Tenzin Issue: 5, December 2016 Copyright@ The Tibet Policy Institute Published by : The Tibet Policy Institute Contact: [email protected] Printed by : Sarah Printers , Dharamshala Funded by: Tibet House Trust, London Tibet Policy Journal is the bi-annual journal of the Tibet Policy Institute, published alternately in Tibetan and in English The views expressed in this journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Central Tibetan Administration CONTENTS China's Tibet Policy 1 Thubten Samphel Penetration of China's Religious Policy into Tibetan Buddhism 8 Tenzin Tseten The Tibetan Plateau: Why it Matters to the Indian Subcontinent 22 Zamlha Tempa Gyaltsen China's Urbanicide in Tibet 34 Dr Rinzin Dorjee Militarisation of the Tibetan Plateau and its Significance 48 Dr Tenzin Tsultrim Life in Exile: Socio-Economic Conditions of Tibetan Women in India 75 Prof. Madhu Rajput China's Tibet Policy Thubten Samphel1 Director of the Tibet Policy Institute CHINA'S NEW CONFIDENCE IN ITS TIBET POLICY hina has become much more confident of its Tibet policy. There are several factors that fuel the confidence. One overriding Cfactor for China's new-found confidence on Tibet is Beijing's perspective that its rule in Tibet has become unassailable. Through improved infrastructure China has bound Tibet more firmly with the Chinese mainland. Highways, airports, an expanding railway line network in Tibet and improved telecommunications between China and Tibet have brought the once remote and almost inaccessible plateau under tighter control of Beijing.
    [Show full text]
  • Cuadernos De Trabajo Del CECHIMEX. El 18O Congreso
    CUADERNOS DE TRABAJO D E L C E C H I M E X El 18°CongresoNacional del PartidoComunistade Eugenio Anguiano Eugenio Roch China Universidad Nacional Autónoma deMéxico Universidad Nacional Centro deEstudiosChina-México Centro Facultad deEconomía Número 2,2013 Número Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Dr. José Narro Robles Rector Dr. Eduardo Bárzana García Secretario General Ing. Leopoldo Silva Gutiérrez Secretario Administrativo Dr. Francisco José Trigo Tavera Secretario de Desarrollo Institucional Mtro. Miguel Robles Bárcena Secretario de Servicios a la Comunidad Lic. Luis Raúl González Pérez Abogado General Facultad de Economía Dr. Leonardo Lomelí Vanegas Director Mtro. Eduardo Vega López Secretario General Lic. Javier Urbieta Zavala Secretario Administrativo Lic. Ma. de los Ángeles Comesaña Concheiro Coordinadora de Comunicación Social Lic. Ricardo Iglesias Flores Coordinador de Publicaciones Centro de Estudios China-México Dr. Enrique Dussel Peters Coordinador Dra. Yolanda Trápaga Delfín Responsable Editor Responsable: Sergio Efrén Martínez Rivera Comité Editorial: Alejandro Álvarez Bejar, Eugenio Anguiano Roch, Romer Cornejo Bustamante, Leonel Corona Treviño, Enrique Dussel Peters, Octavio FerAlejandro Álvarez Bejar, Eugenio Anguiano Roch, Romer Cornejo Bustamante, Leonel Corona Treviño, Enrique Dussel Peters, Octavio Fernández, Víctor Kerber Palma, Juan José Ling, Liu Xue Dong, Ignacio Martínez Cortés, Jorge Eduardo Navarrete López, María Teresa Rodríguez y Rodríguez, Mauricio Trápaga Delfín, Yolanda Trápaga Delfín, Yang Zhimin, Wu Yongheng, Marcos Cordeiro Pires, Cheng Huqiang, Sun Hongbo. Diseño de portada: Mauricio Trápaga Delfín. Corrección de estilo: Ricardo Arriaga Campos Cuadernos de Trabajo del Cechimex, revista bimestral, 2013. Editor Responsable: Sergio Efrén Martínez Rivera. Número de certificado de reserva otorgado por el Instituto Nacional del Derecho de Autor para versión impresa: 04-2010-071617584500-102.
    [Show full text]
  • PLA DELEGATES to the 18TH PARTY CONGRESS: a BRIEF ANALYSIS Jayadeva Ranade Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi
    74\12 13 September 2012 PLA DELEGATES TO THE 18TH PARTY CONGRESS: A BRIEF ANALYSIS Jayadeva Ranade Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi The release on August 9, 2012, of the list of People’s Liberation and, the 14th Group Army and Chengdu Military Region were Army (PLA) Delegates to the 18th Party Congress indicates that particularly investigated till July by at least four or five teams preparations are firmly on track. Reports emanating from Beijing of the Central Party Discipline Inspection Committee. The PLA suggest that the 18th Party Congress would be held around has additionally been subjected to at least three successive October 18. These appear to be substantiated by a Reuters year-long political and ideological education campaigns. The report, which quoted organizers of the ‘11th China International release of the list of 251 PLA delegates to the 18th Party Exhibition on Public Safety and Security’ from October 22-25 to Congress confirms that these investigations have largely been December 3-6, as saying “we have received notice from the Big completed. The list includes 1 person from the 14th Group Army Events Management Office of the Beijing Public Security Bureau and 6 from Chengdu MR. There are also some notable inclusions that the Communist Party’s 18th Congress will be held in the of prominent PLA officers associated with Bo Xilai namely, middle of October 2012.” The Beijing authorities additionally Gen Zhang Haiyang, Gen Liu Yuan and Gen Zhang Youxia. “requested that all big public events in Beijing scheduled for Some promotions were effected just before the 17th Party October be rescheduled in order to fully safeguard security in Congress in which three officers, namely Wang Guosheng, Fang the capital before, during and after the 18th Party Congress.” Fenghui and Zhao Keshi were beneficiaries of double promotions.
    [Show full text]
  • Refugees Flee Into Yunnan After Renewed Violence Along Myanmar Border
    Volume 17, Issue 5 March 31, 2017 In a Fortnight: Refugees Flee into Yunnan After Renewed Violence Along Myanmar Border Xi’s Korea Policies Stumble By Willy Lam A “First” for the People’s Liberation Army: A Navy Admiral Becomes a Joint, Regional, Commander By Dennis Blasko Taiwan’s Search for Security Partners: Looking Beyond Washington By Lauren Dickey PLA Theater Joint Intelligence: Organization and Operations By Kevin McCauley In a Fortnight: Refugees Flee China in late November 2016. In response, the prefectural government has begun setting up into Yunnan After Renewed temporary shelters (Guanchazhe, November 22, 2016). It is unclear how it will cope with the much Violence Along Myanmar larger, second wave. Border Three prefectures border the contentious area in Myanmar: Dehong Dai and Jingpo Autonomous Violence along China’s border with Myanmar is Prefecture, Baoshan and Lincang. Together they threatening yet again to spill across into Yunnan have a population of almost six million people. Province. According to the Chinese Ministry of A string of Border Guard Regiments sit at strate- Foreign Affairs, more than 20,000 refugees have gic points along Yunnan’s long borders with Vi- fled into Yunnan after renewed fighting between etnam and Myanmar. Two guard the area near- the Kachin Independence Army and Myanmar’s est to the Kokang Special Region, one to the Armed Forces (Tatmadaw). These refugees are north at Mangshi (芒市 formerly Luxi), and an- the second wave after more than 3,000 fled into ChinaBrief March 31, 2017 other to the south at Cangyuan (沧源). A PLA in- importantly, it also casts light on how China re- fantry brigade is also positioned nearby in Lin- sponds to crises on its borders.
    [Show full text]
  • The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part I: Purges and Reshuffles)
    Promoting “Young Guards”: The Recent High Turnover in the PLA Leadership (Part I: Purges and Reshuffles) Cheng Li The continuing consolidation of power has been the most noticeable trend under the leadership of Xi Jinping since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012. Undoubtedly, a key component in this strengthening of both Xi’s personal power and his new administration’s authority has centered on the military domain. Xi has gone about the consolidation process through several important political and tactical moves, including the purges of the two highest-ranking generals under the previous administration on corruption and other charges; the arrest of over 40 senior military officers on various charges of wrongdoing; large-scale reshuffling of generals between regions, departments, and services; ongoing efforts to reform the PLA structure and operations; and, most importantly, the rapid promotion of “young guards” (少壮派) in the Chinese military. All of these bold measures will have profound implications—not only for Xi’s political standing in preparation for the next leadership turnover in 2017, but also for the trajectory of civilian-military relations in the country and for the assessment of China’s military modernization. The first installment in this series focuses on the recent purges and reshuffling of military leaders, which has significant consequences in the political dynamics of present-day China. It is an old saying in the history of the Chinese Communist movement that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”1 Although this famous Mao Zedong slogan emphasizes the Communist doctrine that the party commands the army in seizing and retaining state power, a top party leader’s consolidation of personal power cannot be achieved without strong support from the military.
    [Show full text]
  • Occasional Paper FEBRUARY 2016
    88 Occasional Paper FEBRUARY 2016 Xi Jinping and PLA Reform M J Xi Jinping and PLA Reform M J ABOUT THE AUTHOR Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation. He is a columnist and author, and his views on a variety of national issues are frequently solicited for panel discussions on television. He studied in St Stephen's College, Delhi, and the Lucknow University. He has a keen interest in issues related to national security and has written two books and a number of scholarly articles, and is co-editor of another book. He obtained his PhD from the Jawaharlal Nehru University. 2016 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF. Xi Jinping and PLA Reform ABSTRACT In the past three years since Xi Jinping assumed leadership of the Communist Party of China, the international community has witnessed the People's Liberation Army becoming more active, across the disputed Sino- Indian border, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. As Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping is leading a historic transformation of the PLA from a land-centric homeland defence force, to one that is capable of intervening in regional contingencies. While it will take time before the PLA can match the global reach of the US military, the PLA is seeking to model itself on its American counterpart, emphasising joint operational capabilities and an ability to ght in a high-technology, 'information technology' environment.
    [Show full text]
  • China : Pla, the Party and Analysis
    78\12 10 December 2012 CHINA: PLA, THE PARTY AND ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY IN THE 18th CENTRAL COMMITTEE Jayadeva Ranade Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi The role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in communist With the PLA increasingly recruiting better educated personnel China has always been important and is reinforced by present and college graduates, the CCP leadership perceived the need day statements of senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders for enhanced ideological and ‘political education’ of PLA that the “Party must firmly control the gun”. In recent years and, personnel. A key vulnerability identified was the potential more so with the departure from the scene of ‘Long March’ susceptibility of these newly recruited better educated veterans who commanded great prestige and influence in China’s personnel to “hostile” foreign propaganda, which argues that armed forces, command of the PLA has become more important. the PLA should be an army of the State and not subservient to Growing popular discontent, combined with the political fallout the CCP. Three successive year-long “political education” following the ouster of former Politburo campaigns, including one this year, have member Bo Xilai including his efforts to Today there are at least 90,000 been launched in the PLA to counter this make inroads into the PLA, compelled top cells of the CCP, comprising five propaganda, which was troublingly noticed echelons of the Party leadership to focus members each, throughout the PLA. to have been also articulated in the run up greater attention on the PLA. Strengthening The training, role and authority of to the recently-concluded 18th Party of Party control over the PLA was Political Commissars in the PLA has Congress by some of the more liberal facilitated by Deng Xiaoping’s farsighted simultaneously been increased and Chinese economists calling for political move of creating the Central Military their remarks in the dossiers of the reform.
    [Show full text]
  • Diplomacy Defence
    DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY IN PURSUIT OF NATIONAL SECURITY VOL. 1 NO. 4 l JULY-SEPTEMBER 2012 SPECIAL IssUE ON CHINA DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES New Delhi DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY is published quarterly by the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, established under an independent trust titled Forum for National Security Studies registered in 2002 in New Delhi. Board of Trustees Shri M.K. Rasgotra, former Foreign Secretary and former High Commissioner to the UK Chairman Air Chief Marshal O.P. Mehra, PVSM, former Chief of the Air Staff and former Governor Maharashtra and Rajasthan Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi, PVSM AVSM VM, former Chief of the Air Staff Secretary Defence (Finance) Ministry of Defence 139 South Block New Delhi. (Ex Officio) Dr. Sanjaya Baru, former Media Advisor to the Prime Minister and Editor, The Business Standard Captain Ajay Singh, Vice President, Jet Lite Airways, FID, DGCA, former Deputy Director Air Defence, Air HQ Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, former DG, IDSA Managing Trustee DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY Journal welcomes research articles on defence, military affairs and strategy (especially air power and space issues) of contemporary and historical interest. Articles in the Journal reflect the views and conclusions of the authors and not necessarily the opinions or policy of the Centre or any other institution. Editor-in-Chief Air Commodore Jasjit Singh AVSM VrC VM (Retd) Associate Editor Ms Anuja Thakar Distributor KW Publishers Pvt. Ltd. All correspondence may be addressed to Associate Editor DEFENCE AND DIPLOMACY Arjan Path, Subroto Park, New Delhi 110 010 Telephone: (91.11) 25699131-32 Fax: (91.11) 25682533 e-mail: [email protected] website: www.aerospaceindia.org © Forum for National Security Studies All rights reserved.
    [Show full text]