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The Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay? Dostal, Jörg Michael

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Dostal, J. M. (2015). The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay? The Political Quarterly, 86(4), 523-531. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55598-0

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The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay?

€ JORG MICHAEL DOSTAL

Abstract This article outlines the rise and fall of the ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West’ (Pegida), a right-wing populist street movement that originated in the city of Dres- den in October 2014 and peaked in January 2015. The Pegida movement combined of ‘Islamisation’ with general criticism of ’s political class and the mainstream media. This ambivalent and largely undefined political profile proved its strength in mobilising a significant minority of right-wing citizens in the local context of and the federal state of , but generally failed to spill over to other parts of Germany. The social pro- file of the Pegida movement, which included ‘ordinary citizens’ with centre-right to far-right attitudes, points to significant overlap between general disenchantment of the political centre ground in Germany with the political system, as outlined in recent sociological research, and the ability of a largely leaderless populism to mobilise in the streets. Keywords: Dresden, German politics, middle class, milieu theory, Pegida, populism

Introduction In order to understand the Pegida phe- nomenon, one must first highlight the domi- BETWEEN late October 2014 and mid-January nance of conservative politics in Saxony. 2015, political debate in Germany was This state’s political system includes three captured by the rapid emergence of a new parties that compete with the governing political movement, namely the so-called CDU on , namely the market-liberal ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation Free Democrats (FDP); the AfD, a - of the West’ (abbreviated to Pegida in Ger- wing political force that was founded in man, with ‘A’ standing for ‘Abendland’ or 2013 and has some similarities with UKIP in Occident in the German original). What was Britain; and the far-right and extremist most remarkable about the Pegida move- National Democrats (NPD). Although the ment was its emergence from the collabora- FDP and the NPD lost their representation tion of around a dozen citizens without any in the regional parliament in the latest 2014 earlier exposure to professional politics (only election, the overall right-wing share of the three of the twelve had previous contacts electorate is probably higher in Saxony than with political parties at the local level, with in any other German state. On , the one each in the Christian Democrats (CDU), major opposition force in Saxony is Die the Free Democrats (FDP) and the anti- Linke, the Left Party, formed from a merger ‘’ (AfD) party). The of the remnants of East German socialism citizen activists all live in or close to the Ger- and West German leftists who split from the man town of Dresden in the East German SPD when it moved rightward in the 2000s. state of Saxony. This federal state has, since The SPD itself, currently junior partner of the 1990s, always been governed by the cen- the federal government in , is very tre-right CDU with an absolute majority or weak in Saxony. in coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD) The group of citizens that founded Pegida (2004–09 and since 2014) and FDP (2009–14) was notable for criticising the Christian in the regional parliament, which is also Democrats and the entire located in Dresden, the state’s capital. in Germany from positions mostly associated

© The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 523 with right-wing ideology—the movement ‘Islamisation’ in Germany was his observa- insisted on representing ‘ordinary’ people tion of a rally of supporters of the Kurdish and suggested that ‘true’ conservatism was Workers’ Party (PKK)—outlawed in Germany represented by Pegida rather than the Mer- since 1993—in the city centre of Dresden in kel-CDU. In short, the Pegida supporters early October 2014. The Kurdish activists claimed to defend the mainstream of Ger- demanded solidarity with the citizens of man culture and traditions against a liberal Kobane, a city in Syria then under attack elite and political establishment that was from the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS) terrorist organ- alienated from its own people. isation. According to Bachmann, political To the surprise of practically everyone, rallies of outlawed foreign political organisa- Pegida founders included, the movement tions pointed to the danger of ‘religious quickly took off and proved able to mobi- wars’ on German streets, a subject that lise large numbers of citizens to participate became one of the main mobilising themes in street rallies: the number of participants of Pegida. in weekly manifestations in Dresden (held In reaction to his observation of the Kur- every Monday to copy the tradition of the dish activists, Bachmann and a circle of his mass mobilisations that brought down the friends associated with the local football and East German state, the GDR, in 1989) party scene founded a page that expanded from 350 on 20 October 2014 has ever since been the major mobilising (the day of the first rally) to up to 25,000 device of Pegida. From the start—and point- on 12 January 2015, when the movement ing to the background of some of the Pegida peaked. Soon after, the level of participa- founders, including Bachmann, in public tion in the Dresden rallies declined nearly relations—the movement adapted as its sym- as quickly as it had grown beforehand. bol a pictogram of a person dropping four This rapid decline appeared to suggest that political symbols into a rubbish bin. These Pegida had over-expanded, suffered from included the Nazi symbol of the Swastika; internal contradictions and could possibly the symbol of ‘Antifascist Action’, which disappear as quickly as it had come into was initially invented by the German Com- existence. munist Party in the late 1920s; and the This article offers an analysis of the Pegida two contemporary symbols of ISIS and the phenomenon, suggesting that the new street- Kurdish PKK.1 assertive right-wing populism is likely to The key dates in the rise of Pegida were remain a factor to be reckoned with in Ger- as follows: (1) a Facebook page was put up man political culture. It is argued that the on 11 October 2014; (2) the first rally against movement itself might be transient, but that ‘Islamisation’ took place in Dresden, with the recent right-wing populism questions the 350 participants, on 20 October; (3) the num- ability of the centre-right parties to integrate ber of participants in the Dresden rally grew different streams of conservatism. Moreover, continuously week by week to up to 25,000 many German citizens lack confidence in the participants on 12 January 2015 (some criti- ability of the political system to secure future cal observers believed that the police of Sax- prosperity and large sections of the middle ony overestimated the figures); (4) since the class are overwhelmed by socio-economic beginning of December 2014, Pegida-style and cultural change. They fear that large- rallies started to take place across Germany, scale migration might further decrease their but the number of participants was generally prospects and social status. In this context, small—only in , , and the focus on ‘Islamisation’ must be read as Dippoldiswalde did the number of partici- the symbolic expression of a larger crisis in pants rise above 1000, and these rallies all German politics. fizzled out quickly. Overall, Pegida remained a Dresden and Saxony-based phenomenon, with some Origins of the Pegida movement pockets of support elsewhere, but without a According to the main founder of the Pegida German-wide support base. Moreover, coun- movement, 42-year-old , the ter-rallies stressing solidarity with minorities initial reason for calls to mobilise against soon took off almost everywhere, with these

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4 © The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 rallies clearly outnumbering the Pegida sup- debates in the media, between those who port base in practically all cities other than argued that one should avoid discussion Dresden.2 with supporters due to their lack of valid arguments and those who stressed that the ’ fi degree of support—at least at the local level Pegida s political pro le in Dresden—pointed to the need for demo- In terms of political demands, the Pegida crats to engage with them. Politicians of all founders initially followed a strategy of cal- parliamentary parties were divided concern- culated ambiguity. There was no list of ing how to react to Pegida: many local demands and contact with the mainstream and national politicians, including the SPD media was avoided, since the Pegida foun- leader and Vice Chancellor , ders argued that the media generally lied to favoured engagement and visited a Dresden the public (Lugenpresse€ ). Thus, Pegida sup- rally ‘as private citizens’ to observe the porters were advised not to talk to the media. scene. In December 2014, a list of nineteen demands Until the end of 2014, Pegida’s ambiguity was put forward by the steering committee allowed integrating all kinds of criticism of of the Dresden rallies that included the fol- real and imagined German problems into the lowing: defence of the ‘Christian-Jewish cul- street rallies. The general tone during the ture of the Occident’; a controlled migration Monday rallies was much more radical than policy based on a points system in line with the nineteen-point paper. Moreover, visiting Swiss and Canadian examples; a much speakers raised new topics that did not fea- quicker system of decision-making on politi- ture in the nineteen points—such as criticism cal asylum, followed by the expulsion of all of the German mainstream media regarding rejected asylum seekers from Germany; more ‘anti-Russian’ bias in the coverage of events spending on the police and the introduction in Ukraine and other issues not related to of popular referenda in line with the Swiss ‘Islamisation’. example.3 It was noticeable that direct criti- Some participants in the Pegida rallies cism of Islam was carefully avoided. Instead, showed wit: slogans such as ‘Putin, help us!’ the rise of ‘parallel ’ was criticised as were partially ironic, hinting at the rallies of offending against German laws and civil autumn 1989. At that time, East German liberties. The nineteen-point, single-page pro- demonstrators had called for help from then gramme was clearly intended to appeal to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in efforts to mainstream conservatives, and could be uti- remove the GDR leadership of Erich Hon- lised to avoid criticism of the movement as ecker from power. Moreover, news items extremist. at the end of 2014—such as the revelation Looking back, the period of ambiguity of US intelligence agencies’ spying on and avoidance of the media worked well in the German political class—were easy to terms of expanding the movement’s appeal. integrate into Pegida’s anti-establishment The mainstream media overreacted to the discourse. Pegida claim that it was lying by claiming that this directly pointed to similar Nazi slo- ’ gans against the democratic media. The term Pegida s decline and split ‘’, a single noun in German, was In January 2015, the tide started to turn declared the ‘ugliest word of the year 2014’ against Pegida. First, the movement aban- by a for the protection of the German doned its media boycott and the stage man- language. Many seemed to be ager and public face of the Dresden rallies, personally offended by the polemical dis- 37-year-old Kathrin Oertel, was duly invited course of Pegida. This triggered, in turn, to appear on one of the popular German TV malicious joy on the part of those who criti- talk shows. On 21 January, the main initiator cised the mainstream media for reasons that of Pegida, Lutz Bachmann, made global differed from Pegida’s, and were frequently headlines after the apparent publication of a well founded.4 ‘Hitler selfie’, according to a German tabloid. In fact, not talking to the media resulted The publication of the picture, soon followed in the week-by-week dominance of Pegida by online racist statements by Bachmann

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© The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4 dating from before his role in Pegida, Her election result of around 21,000 votes, or appeared to prove the movement’s extrem- nearly 10 per cent, in the context of a low ism. The story gained additional twists due turnout of only 51 per cent signified neither to Bachmann’s claim that the picture had success nor failure. been digitally manipulated and the ‘Hitler Before the election, opinion polls had sug- moustache’ added. Crucially, he was not gested that levels of support for Festerling able to deny that the racist statements which were much lower, which the movement circulated on the internet were his, although interpreted as another example of media he insisted that he had only ‘let off steam’ manipulation. Yet the candidacy also proved and was being represented in a ‘falsified’ that Pegida could not claim to speak for ‘the manner and ‘out of context’.5 people’, but only for a small minority. Only The farce of the Bachmann affair—raising about half of the inhabitants of Dresden cast questions about what should be considered their vote, and among those, Pegida support- ‘authentic’ in the context of rapidly moving ers were outnumbered by a factor of 9 to 1. online media—produced a subsequent split In addition, the low turnout underlined the within Pegida’s leadership body between fact that many voters were disconnected, yet Bachmann supporters and Kathrin Oertel. dissatisfied for reasons other than those The latter resigned from Pegida, stating that raised by Pegida. Thus, Festerling’s decision the leadership had not distanced itself clearly to withdraw her candidacy in the second from more radical rallies elsewhere, such as round and to support the centre-right FDP the so-called Legida, a Leipzig-based alliance candidate—who won the second round with a clear-cut influence of the far right. against a centre-left candidate—appeared as She soon founded a new group, ‘Direct an effort to re-join the camp of mainstream Democracy for Europe’. However, this new conservatism, rather than as a sign of association soon fizzled out after only two Pegida’s political strength. poorly attended public rallies. Next, she It would be wrong, however, to assume switched to a group named ‘193 Peace that the Pegida phenomenon has run its Doves’, supposed to represent the states on course. It must be stressed that the mobilisa- earth. tion was clearly based on right-wing dis- Her discourse shifted from her earlier courses and Pegida leaders frequently focus on ‘conservatism’ to new issues that stressed that they located themselves to the were more in tune with the anti-globalisation right of the CDU. One could perhaps go so movement. Subsequently, Oertel attended far to consider Pegida as a kind of prototypi- various rallies that were linked with criticism cal v€olkisch (ethnic nationalist) movement. of US foreign policy, but her apparent politi- Yet this alone cannot explain its initial suc- cal turnaround—which included a public cess, which was due to efforts to put for- apology to Muslims for what she referred to ward demands that were shared by many as a ‘hate campaign’—did not trigger any ordinary citizens. This concerned criticism of larger split within Pegida ranks. Instead, the political class for its distance from ordi- Bachmann quickly made a comeback and nary people and the voicing of concern was re-elected by his peers as a member of about the ongoing refugee crisis in Germany, the Pegida steering group. which derived in turn from the break-up of After Bachmann’s return, attendance at states in the Middle East and the failure of Pegida’s Dresden rallies continued to the to act on this challenge. decline, although the attack in Yet one must also highlight that Pegida Paris produced brief upturns, as did the invi- ultimately failed to appeal to the German tation to the Dutch right-wing populist public at large. Although successful in the politician to attend as a guest regional context of Dresden and some other speaker. The so far final political initiative of places, the movement never developed else- Bachmann was to recruit , where. In short, citizens took note of Pegida a former AfD party member from the West and then moved on. There is also no evi- German city of Hamburg, to put herself for- dence that Pegida mobilised formerly pas- ward as a Pegida-backed candidate in the sive milieus to engage in political activism Dresden mayoral elections on 7 June 2015. for the first time. Rather, a pre-existing local

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4 © The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 rightist political milieu took to the streets, one’s social status. Faced with perceived but remained isolated from the mainstream. and real increases in socio-economic risk, the middle class might adopt a position that is more sympathetic with lower social lay- German political culture and ers, due to the fear that downward social mobility might also hit them in the future.7 Pegida Thus, the remainder of this article will first It still remains necessary to consider Pegida outline what is known about the socio- supporters’ claims that they represent the economic profile of Pegida supporters, centre (the ) of German society. The sec- before comparing these findings with what ond, more analytical part of this article will is known about the centre ground of therefore address the question of the extent German politics. to which the Pegida movement points to the To begin with, social science research had receptiveness of Germany’s political centre trouble catching up with the rapid emer- for right-wing populist discourses. This natu- gence of Pegida. The first snapshot inquiry rally raises additional questions concerning into the movement, based on a very small what is actually known about the political sample of interviewees, suggested that the centre and its relationship with other sec- typical Pegida supporter ‘belongs to the mid- tions of society. In fact, analysis might suffer dle class, is well-educated, employed, has a from the very indeterminate character of slightly-above average after-tax income in what is considered to be located ‘in the mid- the context of Saxony, is 48 years old, male, dle’. There exists an economic middle class, not member of a religious denomination, not usually defined to include those earning closely linked to a political party and is from between 80 and 150 per cent of the median Dresden or Saxony’. The same study sug- income. However, political attitudes, lifestyle gested that general dissatisfaction with poli- and other non-economic factors must also be tics, criticism of media bias in reporting and considered to understand what constitutes concern about migrants and refugees (in this today’s German political centre. order) were the major mobilising factors.8 On the one hand, Seymour Martin Lipset This first study was quickly criticised for warned of potential ‘middle-class extremism’ possible failure to engage with more radical in pointing, among other examples, to many participants and for overemphasising the middle-class Germans’ support for the his- middle class character of the movement. torical Nazi movement. This thesis has also Notably, the largest group of interviewees featured prominently in Marxist accounts claimed to earn between 800 and 1500 referred to by Lipset, stressing that the petty after tax, which was above average in the bourgeoisie might turn to the far right dur- context of Saxony, but below average in the ing periods of economic crisis, when their context of Germany—pointing to a rather relative privileges in comparison with the fragile lower middle-class position of many working class are under threat.6 Pegida supporters. On the other hand, the literature on wel- Nevertheless, subsequent studies largely fare state capitalism has argued that the confirmed the initial picture. A significant middle class has become the backbone of a share of Pegida supporters claimed to belong political coalition supporting policies of to the ‘centre’ on a left–right scale of political inclusive social solidarity. It is argued that attitudes, although the majority located the modern welfare state remains highly themselves on the right but not on the far popular with the middle class and continues right. At the same time, it was noticeable to protect the centre of society against social that Pegida supporters had above-average risks. Slightly less optimistic, yet still within education (mostly in technical fields) and a the theme of solidarity of the middle higher than average tendency to participate classes, is the more recent idea that eco- in elections. A large number of interviewees nomic restructuring and socio-economic stated to have voted AfD in the previous change have made the middle class aware election, while the expressed level of support that reliance on individual effort and for the far-right NPD was not higher than resources is no longer sufficient to protect in the general population. Thus, ongoing

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© The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4 engagement with the political system—at The Delta and Sinus models are also least in terms of electoral participation— known as ‘potato graphics’, since they both coexists with general lack of confidence in present the different social milieus organised political institutions and the mainstream in the form of overlapping circles. In the media.9 context of the Pegida movement, one might Another study underlined that Pegida sup- identify four milieus as analytically relevant. porters fell into a majority of moderate right- These are, in the case of the Delta model of ists (about two thirds), while the rest 2011, selected here in order of relevance: (1) belonged to the far right. The latter group the ‘bourgeois centre’ (18 per cent, the lar- tended to be younger and economically less gest milieu); (2) the ‘traditionalists’ (15 per established. In terms of party-political prefer- cent); (3) the ‘disadvantaged’ (16 per cent); ence, the AfD enjoyed most support—being and (4) the ‘conservatives’ (4 per cent). seen as not belonging to the established Although the Delta model characterises the party system—followed by the CDU and conservative milieu as part of the socio- NPD. A very small minority indicated sup- economic upper stratum of society—largely port for the Left Party, while the moderate absent from the Pegida rallies—it might still centre-left SPD and Green parties were serve as a reference point for the former practically absent from the Pegida milieu. three milieus. Crucially, more than three quarters were Looking at these four milieus by way of disaffected from democracy as practised in the Delta description (and ignoring the other the Federal Republic of Germany, and more ones as less relevant in the Pegida context), than 90 per cent felt that they were not one might identify at least a partial explana- served by existing parties and politicians.10 tion for the ‘centrist’ features of Pegida. One must conclude, therefore, that most Namely, the ‘bourgeois centre’ favours ‘the Pegida supporters are not political outsiders protection of the status quo’ and ‘aims to but have some connections with the centre advance socially and professionally’, while ground. However, they are very dissatisfied fearing increased job-related demands for with the centre-right parties, namely the flexibility and mobility and potential bio- Merkel-led CDU. graphical disruptions due to economic restructuring. In the case of East Germany and Saxony, these issues certainly form the Can the centre hold? core of the life-biographical experience of How, then, does the Pegida milieu relate to most Pegida supporters. Their age profile is the centre ground of German politics? Here, biased towards the generation over 40, two sociological lines of inquiry offer recent which experienced the end of the GDR and data to locate the Pegida phenomenon in its the full-scale economic restructuring that larger context, namely social milieu models followed. and a recent study about Germany’s political In turn, the ‘traditionalist’ milieu suffers centre ground that was published briefly from rapid aging and decline in significance. before the Pegida rallies took off. This milieu is concerned with ‘security and In the former case, the long-established social order’ and focuses mostly on the fam- Delta and Sinus models (named after two ily and its immediate environment, while companies who sell their respective models avoiding contact with new technology, life- as a commercial service to facilitate con- style and value changes. Thus, traditionalists sumer and political marketing) divide might be the core group of what West German society into around ten different German sociologists have since the 1980s milieus, organised according to socio- described as ‘modernisation losers’. In the economic, value and attitude cleavages. Both East German context of delayed transition models share similarities with sociological towards a middle class-dominated society— concepts of inequality in other countries, in which a relative majority considered such as the Goldthorpe class scheme in the themselves to belong to the working class case of Britain, but they claim to provide a until recently—one must consider the tradi- more multi-dimensional approach that moni- tionalist milieu to be still more significant tors objective and subjective factors. than in West Germany. In addition, their

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4 © The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 worries about social change might also over- tion within the larger bourgeois centre, lap with attitudes expressed by the ‘bour- which also includes progressive groups and geois centre’. concerns. As for the ‘disadvantaged’ milieu, ‘strong In order to further conceptualise the politi- fear and ’ and the experience of cal attitude of Germany’s bourgeois centre, ‘low prospects for social advancement’ one might also look secondly at recent focus triggered a ‘resigned (...) basic attitude in group research. Here, a sociological study combination with a retreat towards one’s published directly pre-Pegida is relevant. It own social milieu’. It is noticeable that the covered the political views of the ‘upper’ disadvantaged milieu does not share the and ‘lower’ centre (the Mitte) in three West demographic decline of the traditionalist German cities over a number of years. The milieu. Instead, it remains fairly equally rep- study highlighted general dissatisfaction resented amongst all age groups in Germany with the political system in line with many and is the second largest of all milieus. features of the subsequent Pegida discourse; Finally, the ‘conservative’ milieu is elitist namely, interviewees considered the political and consists mostly of the upper sections of system to be ‘so corrupted and dusty that the bourgeoisie. This milieu aspires to any kind of reform effort is hopeless’. More- defend positions of cultural and socio- over, ‘dishonesty, degeneration and lack of economic leadership. Members are strongly transparency were considered the central focused on maintaining the institution of the business terms of contemporary politics’.In family, considered to represent the principal addition, there was distrust of the main- agent of socialisation, and defend ‘self- stream media, held to be ‘pressured by cor- responsibility’ and ‘normality’. They still porations in terms of advertisement revenue consider their own resources to be sufficient and belonging to a cartel of political and to retain social distance from the popular corporate interests’. The author summed up strata. While this milieu is underdeveloped the pessimistic and negative attitude of the in East Germany, and has been absent from centre, suggesting that ‘a great part of the Pegida rallies, it might still serve as a ref- the centre is at present overwhelmed by erence point for the other three milieus, nota- contingency’.12 bly the ‘bourgeois centre’, due to shared Ultimately, the study suggested that four attitudes regarding society’s ‘natural’ hierar- ideal-types of dealing with contingency exist chies. in the political centre, namely: (1) those Most significant, and worth quoting at searching for orientation to manage reality; length, is that the ‘bourgeois centre’ per- (2) self-confident reducers of complexity; (3) ceives social problems in Germany as fol- ambitious artists of social opportunities; and lows: ‘unemployment, crime, migration, real (4) histrionic idealisers of the past. Ignoring estate prices and rent levels, rising costs in details of this—perhaps not very convincing the health service, protection of the welfare —effort to describe behavioural ideal types, state, neglect of schools, pressure to acquire the most significant result of this qualitative additional educational credentials to protect study was that three of the four types (2–4) one’s social position, concern over the inte- are characterised by more or less aggressive gration of migrants and the perceived expan- hostility towards Germany’s political class. sion of self-contained cultural minorities in The study also clarified, with reference to some city quarters’. These issues result, quantitative data quoted from other sources, according to the Delta researchers, in ‘a that this general loss of confidence in the slowly rising diffuse frustration about social political system has only occurred since the conditions’ and the feeling that ‘one’s own 1990s.13 efforts to adapt are no longer rewarded’.11 In summary, concern about the future direction of German society is very common Conclusion in the political centre ground; yet issues of What lessons can be drawn from the Pegida concern vary and are difficult to unify for case in the context of Germany’s political the purposes of political mobilisation. Thus, culture? Four points deserve to be singled the Pegida milieu constitutes only one fac- out by way of a conclusion. First, the general

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© The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4 loss of confidence in the political system in the centre while abandoning the more left- (Politikverdrossenheit) has become the domi- ist and more rightist poles. nant political attitude in the centre ground Fourth, the Pegida phenomenon of largely of German politics. This trend should be leaderless right-wing populism does point to acknowledged as real rather than as a kind a crisis of political representation. While Ger- of tactical attitude of centrist citizens to place many’s party system appears more stable more pressure on the political class to than is the case in other EU countries, this is improve its performance. In this context, the largely due to the disengagement of large rapid decline in electoral participation in sections of the electorate and particularly of Germany—although not concentrated in the the disadvantaged groups. In order to make centre, but rather mostly amongst the disad- right-wing populism electorally viable, push vantaged groups—is alarming, as is the low and pull factors both need to be in place. In confidence of the centre in its socio-economic the German context, right-wing populism stability and future prospects. has suffered from organisational competition Second, the centre’s distrust of the political between moderate rightists and a far-right system is due to structural factors that have pole. In this context, the AfD party—the been building up since the 1990s in the con- most recent effort to construct a ‘moderate’ text of neoliberal economic restructuring. In party to the right of the CDU—has recently particular, the decision of the then SPD and suffered a split between ‘national liberals’ Green party government to severely retrench and ‘national conservatives’. Thus, the push the welfare state (the so-called ‘Hartz factor of a right-wing populist movement in reforms’ after 2002) produced large-scale the streets is not necessarily going to directly demoralisation of the centre-left SPD’s elec- spill over into the realm of parliamentary toral base. This triggered in turn a perma- politics. Yet the Pegida surprise has shown nent disengagement of disadvantaged that political stability in Germany should not milieus from the political system. Notably, be taken for granted. How the existing gap the SPD lost half of its electoral support after in political representation is going to be the Hartz reforms and has never since been filled is anybody’s guess. able to recover. Thus, the fact that SPD sup- porters have been largely absent from the Pegida rallies should not be considered a Notes sign of strength of the centre left. On the 1 No stated author, ‘Demo gegen vermeintliche contrary, former SPD supporters have by “Islamisierung”’, S€achsische Zeitung, 27 October now been disengaged for so long that they 2014; P. Becher, C. Begass and J. Kraft, Der no longer show up in opinion polls. Aufstand des Abendlandes,Koln,€ PapyRossa, – Third, the Pegida mobilisation raises the 2015, pp. 8 9. question to what extent ‘modernisation 2 For basic facts on Pegida, see https://de.wiki pedia.org/wiki/Patriotische_Europ%C3%A4er_ losers’ on the right of the political spectrum gegen_die_Islamisierung_des_Abendlandes (ac- will permanently disengage from the centre cessed 23 September 2015). right. It is conceivable that the CDU will 3http://www.i-finger.de/pegida-positionspapier. now suffer losses among former core sup- pdf (accessed 23 September 2015). porters. There are certainly many issues that 4 R. Dillmann, ‘Stichwort Lugenpresse€ ’, Sozialis- could trigger a breakdown of the CDU’s tische Positionen, 1, 2015; Rosa-Luxemburg-Stif- electoral coalition, such as the never-ending tung, ‘Der NDR und die Lugenpresse€ ’, 1 July euro currency crisis or the poor management 2015, http://www.nrw.rosalux.de/news/41621/ of refugee-related problems in Germany’s der-ndr-und-die-luegenpresse.html (accessed 23 complex and slow-moving federal system. In September 2015). 5 ‘PEGIDA-Zwischen Burgerprotest€ und Radika- fact, the structural decline of the SPD might lisierung’, WDR TV documentary, reference now be followed by a similar process in the 32:40 minutes, http://www.daserste.de/infor- CDU milieu. This tendency is more likely to mation/reportage-dokumentation/dokus/sendu persist since the centre right and the centre ng/wdr/pegida-108.html (accessed 23 Septem- left—currently governing Germany in a ber 2015). grand coalition—are overwhelmingly con- 6S.M.Lipset,Political Man. The Social Bases of cerned with competing for marginal voters Politics, New York, Doubleday, 1960, pp. 134–49.

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The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4 © The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 7 S. Marg, Mitte in Deutschland. Zur Vermessung nationales Parteienrecht der Universit€at Dusseldorf€ , eines politischen Ortes, , Transcript 21, 2015, 133–43. Verlag (Studien des Gottinger€ Instituts fur€ 10 W. J. Patzelt and C. Eichardt, ‘Drei Monate Demokratieforschung), 2014, pp. 167, 179, nach dem Knall: Was wurde aus Pegida?’, 201–3. Dresden, 21 May, pp. 76–9, https://tu-dres- 8 H. Vorlander,€ M. Herold and S. Schaller,€ Wer den.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/philosophi geht zu PEGIDA und warum?, Dresden, Zentrum sche_fakultaet/ifpw/polsys/for/pegida/patzelt- fur€ Verfassungs- und Demokratieforschung, analyse-pegida-mai-2015.pdf (accessed 23 Sep- 2015, pp. 43–73. The quote derives from the tember 2015). press release, 14 January 2015, https://tu-dres- 11 All quotes translated by the author from C. den.de/aktuelles/newsarchiv/2015/1/pegida_ Wippermann, Milieus in Bewegung: Werte, Sinn, € pk (accessed 23 September 2015). Religion und Asthetik in Deutschland,Wurzburg,€ 9 K. H. Reuband, ‘Wer demonstriert in Dresden Echter, 2011, pp. 62–9. fur€ Pegida? Ergebnisse empirischer Studien, 12 Marg, Mitte in Deutschland, pp. 209, 212, 219, methodische Grundlagen und offene Fragen’, 240. Mitteilungen des Instituts fur€ deutsches und inter- 13 Ibid, pp. 244–50.

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