www.ssoar.info The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay? Dostal, Jörg Michael Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Dostal, J. M. (2015). The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay? The Political Quarterly, 86(4), 523-531. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-55598-0 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Free Digital Peer Publishing Licence This document is made available under a Free Digital Peer zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den DiPP-Lizenzen Publishing Licence. For more Information see: finden Sie hier: http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/ http://www.dipp.nrw.de/lizenzen/dppl/service/dppl/ The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4, October–December 2015 The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right-Wing Populism Here to Stay? € JORG MICHAEL DOSTAL Abstract This article outlines the rise and fall of the ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West’ (Pegida), a right-wing populist street movement that originated in the city of Dres- den in October 2014 and peaked in January 2015. The Pegida movement combined fear of ‘Islamisation’ with general criticism of Germany’s political class and the mainstream media. This ambivalent and largely undefined political profile proved its strength in mobilising a significant minority of right-wing citizens in the local context of Dresden and the federal state of Saxony, but generally failed to spill over to other parts of Germany. The social pro- file of the Pegida movement, which included ‘ordinary citizens’ with centre-right to far-right attitudes, points to significant overlap between general disenchantment of the political centre ground in Germany with the political system, as outlined in recent sociological research, and the ability of a largely leaderless populism to mobilise in the streets. Keywords: Dresden, German politics, middle class, milieu theory, Pegida, populism Introduction In order to understand the Pegida phe- nomenon, one must first highlight the domi- BETWEEN late October 2014 and mid-January nance of conservative politics in Saxony. 2015, political debate in Germany was This state’s political system includes three captured by the rapid emergence of a new parties that compete with the governing political movement, namely the so-called CDU on the right, namely the market-liberal ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation Free Democrats (FDP); the AfD, a new right- of the West’ (abbreviated to Pegida in Ger- wing political force that was founded in man, with ‘A’ standing for ‘Abendland’ or 2013 and has some similarities with UKIP in Occident in the German original). What was Britain; and the far-right and extremist most remarkable about the Pegida move- National Democrats (NPD). Although the ment was its emergence from the collabora- FDP and the NPD lost their representation tion of around a dozen citizens without any in the regional parliament in the latest 2014 earlier exposure to professional politics (only election, the overall right-wing share of the three of the twelve had previous contacts electorate is probably higher in Saxony than with political parties at the local level, with in any other German state. On the left, the one each in the Christian Democrats (CDU), major opposition force in Saxony is Die the Free Democrats (FDP) and the anti-Euro Linke, the Left Party, formed from a merger ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD) party). The of the remnants of East German socialism citizen activists all live in or close to the Ger- and West German leftists who split from the man town of Dresden in the East German SPD when it moved rightward in the 2000s. state of Saxony. This federal state has, since The SPD itself, currently junior partner of the 1990s, always been governed by the cen- the federal government in Berlin, is very tre-right CDU with an absolute majority or weak in Saxony. in coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD) The group of citizens that founded Pegida (2004–09 and since 2014) and FDP (2009–14) was notable for criticising the Christian in the regional parliament, which is also Democrats and the entire political spectrum located in Dresden, the state’s capital. in Germany from positions mostly associated © The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 523 with right-wing ideology—the movement ‘Islamisation’ in Germany was his observa- insisted on representing ‘ordinary’ people tion of a rally of supporters of the Kurdish and suggested that ‘true’ conservatism was Workers’ Party (PKK)—outlawed in Germany represented by Pegida rather than the Mer- since 1993—in the city centre of Dresden in kel-CDU. In short, the Pegida supporters early October 2014. The Kurdish activists claimed to defend the mainstream of Ger- demanded solidarity with the citizens of man culture and traditions against a liberal Kobane, a city in Syria then under attack elite and political establishment that was from the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS) terrorist organ- alienated from its own people. isation. According to Bachmann, political To the surprise of practically everyone, rallies of outlawed foreign political organisa- Pegida founders included, the movement tions pointed to the danger of ‘religious quickly took off and proved able to mobi- wars’ on German streets, a subject that lise large numbers of citizens to participate became one of the main mobilising themes in street rallies: the number of participants of Pegida. in weekly manifestations in Dresden (held In reaction to his observation of the Kur- every Monday to copy the tradition of the dish activists, Bachmann and a circle of his mass mobilisations that brought down the friends associated with the local football and East German state, the GDR, in 1989) party scene founded a Facebook page that expanded from 350 on 20 October 2014 has ever since been the major mobilising (the day of the first rally) to up to 25,000 device of Pegida. From the start—and point- on 12 January 2015, when the movement ing to the background of some of the Pegida peaked. Soon after, the level of participa- founders, including Bachmann, in public tion in the Dresden rallies declined nearly relations—the movement adapted as its sym- as quickly as it had grown beforehand. bol a pictogram of a person dropping four This rapid decline appeared to suggest that political symbols into a rubbish bin. These Pegida had over-expanded, suffered from included the Nazi symbol of the Swastika; internal contradictions and could possibly the symbol of ‘Antifascist Action’, which disappear as quickly as it had come into was initially invented by the German Com- existence. munist Party in the late 1920s; and the This article offers an analysis of the Pegida two contemporary symbols of ISIS and the phenomenon, suggesting that the new street- Kurdish PKK.1 assertive right-wing populism is likely to The key dates in the rise of Pegida were remain a factor to be reckoned with in Ger- as follows: (1) a Facebook page was put up man political culture. It is argued that the on 11 October 2014; (2) the first rally against movement itself might be transient, but that ‘Islamisation’ took place in Dresden, with the recent right-wing populism questions the 350 participants, on 20 October; (3) the num- ability of the centre-right parties to integrate ber of participants in the Dresden rally grew different streams of conservatism. Moreover, continuously week by week to up to 25,000 many German citizens lack confidence in the participants on 12 January 2015 (some criti- ability of the political system to secure future cal observers believed that the police of Sax- prosperity and large sections of the middle ony overestimated the figures); (4) since the class are overwhelmed by socio-economic beginning of December 2014, Pegida-style and cultural change. They fear that large- rallies started to take place across Germany, scale migration might further decrease their but the number of participants was generally prospects and social status. In this context, small—only in Munich, Suhl, Leipzig and the focus on ‘Islamisation’ must be read as Dippoldiswalde did the number of partici- the symbolic expression of a larger crisis in pants rise above 1000, and these rallies all German politics. fizzled out quickly. Overall, Pegida remained a Dresden and Saxony-based phenomenon, with some Origins of the Pegida movement pockets of support elsewhere, but without a According to the main founder of the Pegida German-wide support base. Moreover, coun- movement, 42-year-old Lutz Bachmann, the ter-rallies stressing solidarity with minorities initial reason for calls to mobilise against soon took off almost everywhere, with these € 524 J OR G M ICHAEL D OSTAL The Political Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 4 © The Author 2015. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2015 rallies clearly outnumbering the Pegida sup- debates in the media, between those who port base in practically all cities other than argued that one should avoid discussion Dresden.2 with supporters due to their lack of valid arguments and those who stressed that the ’ fi degree of support—at least at the local level Pegida s political pro le in Dresden—pointed to the need for demo- In terms of political demands, the Pegida crats to engage with them. Politicians of all founders initially followed a strategy of cal- parliamentary parties were divided concern- culated ambiguity. There was no list of ing how to react to Pegida: many local demands and contact with the mainstream and national politicians, including the SPD media was avoided, since the Pegida foun- leader and Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, ders argued that the media generally lied to favoured engagement and visited a Dresden the public (Lugenpresse€ ).