Peter Joyce, the Liberal Party and the Popular Front
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Popular Front Peter Joyce assesses the arguments over progressive unity in the 1930s, and Liberal and Labour responses. TheThe LiberalLiberal PartyParty andand thethe PopularPopular FrontFront significant aspect of the decline which the Book’) and Britain’s Industrial Future (the ‘Yellow ALiberal Party experienced in the early decades Book’) in . Keynes in particular made a signifi- of the twentieth century was the loss of progressives cant contribution to progressive politics based on to the Labour Party. There were several reasons to social democratic principles in this period. How- explain this situation. The decision by Asquith’s gov- ever, the limited scope of the Liberal revival at the ernment to commence hostilities in resulted in general election (in which MPs were re- pacifist progressives supporting the Union of Demo- turned with .% of the popular vote) suggested cratic Control, many of whose members subse- that the party was unlikely to secure a dominant quently joined the Labour Party (usually via the In- place in progressive politics through independent dependent Labour Party (ILP)). The nature of the political activity under the present electoral system. peace settlement in also offended progressive The division of progressives into the Liberal and La- opinion by contradicting their desire for a ‘clean bour camps coupled with the Liberal Party’s minor peace’. The actions of David Lloyd George were a party status thus made it receptive to suggestions for further source of progressive discontent. His alliance inter-party cooperation which were made in the with the Conservative Party to obtain, and then s which could be directed towards securing a cling on to, the premiership was viewed as ‘oppor- realignment of progressives on terms favourable to tunistic chicanery’ and the actions of his govern- themselves. This article briefly assesses the nature of ment (especially its use of coercion in Ireland) were the call for progressive unity in this period and an anathema to progressive opinion. His resumption evaluates the responses of the Liberal and Labour of the Liberal leadership in accentuated pro- Parties to them. gressive defections at that period. Desertions were also caused by the inability of Asquith to rally pro- gressive opinion following his ousting by Lloyd The United and Popular Front George, especially his failure to offer a radical cri- campaigns: a brief synopsis tique of the peace settlement. The long Calls for joint action by the parties of the left were oc- drawn-out intra-party dispute between Asquith and casioned by the rise of fascism in Europe and the re- Lloyd George also encouraged progressives to leave sponse (or, rather, lack of it) on the part of the Con- a party which seem preoccupied with its own feuds servative-dominated National Government to this to the exclusion of advancing progressive ideals. situation. There were two separate calls for joint ac- Labour thus became a key focus of progressive tion by the parties of the left during the s. The , politics after which had the effect of causing first of these was the united front and the second was some progressives to identify their beliefs with so- the popular front. The former was initiated by the cialism. However, this identification was not accept- Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and able to all progressives and many remained attached sought an alliance of all socialists (i.e. themselves, the to the Liberal Party. During the s much effort ILP and Labour Party) in order to oppose fascism was directed at developing Liberal Party policy to both in Europe and in Britain (where, it was per- appeal to non-socialist progressives; key develop- ceived, the actions of the National Government were ments including the publication of the report on inevitably moving in this direction, since capitalism in Land and the Nation in (known as the ‘Green crisis would adopt undemocratic methods in order to 10 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 stabilise class relationships). This cam- tober , the National Progressive ers of both parties were signatories to a paign witnessed the publication in Council, also failed to achieve progres- manifesto which was issued following of the Unity manifesto by the ILP, sive unity. a meeting at the Albert Hall in De- CPGB and the Socialist League (SL) The British government’s policy of cember but were unable to agree (which following the secession of the non-intervention in the Spanish civil on any further progress which was ILP in was the main organised war, which commenced in was compatible with the concept of a body of left wing politics in the Labour the spur to a more determined attempt popular front, although it attracted Party). This advocated the unity of all to establish a popular front. This policy support from individual members sections of the working class to oppose meant that Germany and Italy were (Lady Megan Lloyd George, for exam- fascism, Britain’s National Government free to arm Franco’s forces whereas the ple, being active in discussions to pro- (which was depicted as the agent of fas- Popular Front government was denied mote such an objective). cism and imperialism), all restrictions on any military help from Britain or The Liberal party regarded itself as a civil and trade union liberties and the France. The deteriorating military posi- key player in the proposal to establish a militarisation of Britain. It has been as- tion of the Spanish Popular Front gov- popular front, and an official publica- serted that a key reason for the interest ernment prompted ten MPs of all par- tion asserted that the pivot to such an shown by Labour’s left wing in this form ties to organise a National Emergency arrangement was ‘an understanding be- of joint action was that it would Conference on Spain in which tween the two largest parties – Liberal strengthen arguments in favour of La- sought to end the policy of non-inter- and Labour’. There were, however, bour’s adopting uncompromising social- vention. Around , delegates from several reasons to explain the Liberal ist politics and undermine the belief that the trade unions, the Labour Party, the party’s reluctance to throw itself whole- such could be achieved through the in- CPGB and the Liberal Party attended heartedly into the popular front cam- stitutions of liberal democracy. The La- this meeting which was chaired by Gil- paign. Although it was a vehicle to bour Party, however, was unwilling to bert Murray and addressed by, among unite progressive opinion, the popular enter into any relationships with the others, Wilfrid Roberts MP. The meet- front’s driving ideology was socialism, CPGB (having refused their application ing heard a call from Sir Charles believing this to be the only effective to affiliate to the party in ) and sub- Trevelyan for the formation of a popu- antidote to fascism. This initially made sequently disaffiliated and then pro- lar front in Britain both to help Spain it difficult for the Liberal Party to in- scribed the SL. This latter action meant but also to remove Chamberlain. In volve itself in the popular front. There that members of the Labour Party practical terms the popular front gave were additional problems in entering would be expelled for supporting the rise to two independent progressive into cooperation with the Labour Party. SL, whose response was to dissolve itself candidatures in by-elections in Oxford Against a background of unhappiness in May . City () and Bridgwater () with their treatment they had received The popular front sought the unity which were strictly not popular front from the Labour governments of – of all who opposed fascism (including campaigns but did witness the Labour and –, Liberals put forward a the Liberal Party and those Conserva- and Liberal Parties withdrawing their number of objections to cooperating tives who were opposed to the appease- candidates in order to give electors the with Labour within the framework of a ment policies of the Chamberlain Gov- opportunity to vote for a progressive popular front. ernment). The Italian invasion of Abys- candidate. The progressive candidate at First, they opposed the fundamen- sinia in resulted in the Hoare- Oxford, Dr A.D. Lindsay, failed to win talist socialist programme to which Laval pact which sought to divide Ab- but Vernon Bartlett did secure a pro- Labour was theoretically committed, yssinia to Italy’s advantage. This was gressive victory at Bridgwater. believing that it would entail abolish- viewed as cowardice by the British ing private enterprise and ownership, government in the face of fascist ag- which Liberals wished to diffuse. gression and this event (together with Liberals, the Labour Some Liberals also perceived that the the formation of popular front govern- Party and the Popular nationalisation of all the means of pro- ments in Spain in February and duction, distribution and exchange France in May ) triggered the for- Front would involve the suppression of lib- mation of the first popular front or- Joint action between the Labour and erty which Liberals sought to pro- ganisation in Britain, the People’s Front Liberal Parties could be justified by mote. This view was forcibly ex- Propaganda Committee, whose sup- the similar views which many of their pressed by Sir Herbert Samuel who porters included a number of Labour members held on key contemporary stated that while he welcomed coop- activists, the Liberal Richard Acland political issues. Both parties endorsed eration in order to bring about a pow- and the Conservative Robert Boothby. similar aims in foreign policy, as evi- erful government able to resist attacks This organisation failed to have much denced in May when Attlee and on freedom and policies which were political impact, principally because left Sinclair publicly endorsed support for dangerous to peace, and which was wing Labour supporters endorsed the the League of Nations and the princi- also ready to tackle unemployment, United Front’s campaign.