Popular Front Peter Joyce assesses the arguments over progressive unity in the 1930s, and Liberal and Labour responses. TheThe LiberalLiberal PartyParty andand thethe PopularPopular FrontFront
significant aspect of the decline which the Book’) and Britain’s Industrial Future (the ‘Yellow ALiberal Party experienced in the early decades Book’) in . Keynes in particular made a signifi- of the twentieth century was the loss of progressives cant contribution to progressive politics based on to the Labour Party. There were several reasons to social democratic principles in this period. How- explain this situation. The decision by Asquith’s gov- ever, the limited scope of the Liberal revival at the ernment to commence hostilities in resulted in general election (in which MPs were re- pacifist progressives supporting the Union of Demo- turned with .% of the popular vote) suggested cratic Control, many of whose members subse- that the party was unlikely to secure a dominant quently joined the Labour Party (usually via the In- place in progressive politics through independent dependent Labour Party (ILP)). The nature of the political activity under the present electoral system. peace settlement in also offended progressive The division of progressives into the Liberal and La- opinion by contradicting their desire for a ‘clean bour camps coupled with the Liberal Party’s minor peace’. The actions of David Lloyd George were a party status thus made it receptive to suggestions for further source of progressive discontent. His alliance inter-party cooperation which were made in the with the Conservative Party to obtain, and then s which could be directed towards securing a cling on to, the premiership was viewed as ‘oppor- realignment of progressives on terms favourable to tunistic chicanery’ and the actions of his govern- themselves. This article briefly assesses the nature of ment (especially its use of coercion in Ireland) were the call for progressive unity in this period and an anathema to progressive opinion. His resumption evaluates the responses of the Liberal and Labour of the Liberal leadership in accentuated pro- Parties to them. gressive defections at that period. Desertions were also caused by the inability of Asquith to rally pro- gressive opinion following his ousting by Lloyd The United and Popular Front George, especially his failure to offer a radical cri- campaigns: a brief synopsis tique of the peace settlement. The long Calls for joint action by the parties of the left were oc- drawn-out intra-party dispute between Asquith and casioned by the rise of fascism in Europe and the re- Lloyd George also encouraged progressives to leave sponse (or, rather, lack of it) on the part of the Con- a party which seem preoccupied with its own feuds servative-dominated National Government to this to the exclusion of advancing progressive ideals. situation. There were two separate calls for joint ac- Labour thus became a key focus of progressive tion by the parties of the left during the s. The , politics after which had the effect of causing first of these was the united front and the second was some progressives to identify their beliefs with so- the popular front. The former was initiated by the cialism. However, this identification was not accept- Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and able to all progressives and many remained attached sought an alliance of all socialists (i.e. themselves, the to the Liberal Party. During the s much effort ILP and Labour Party) in order to oppose fascism was directed at developing Liberal Party policy to both in Europe and in Britain (where, it was per- appeal to non-socialist progressives; key develop- ceived, the actions of the National Government were ments including the publication of the report on inevitably moving in this direction, since capitalism in Land and the Nation in (known as the ‘Green crisis would adopt undemocratic methods in order to
10 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 stabilise class relationships). This cam- tober , the National Progressive ers of both parties were signatories to a paign witnessed the publication in Council, also failed to achieve progres- manifesto which was issued following of the Unity manifesto by the ILP, sive unity. a meeting at the Albert Hall in De- CPGB and the Socialist League (SL) The British government’s policy of cember but were unable to agree (which following the secession of the non-intervention in the Spanish civil on any further progress which was ILP in was the main organised war, which commenced in was compatible with the concept of a body of left wing politics in the Labour the spur to a more determined attempt popular front, although it attracted Party). This advocated the unity of all to establish a popular front. This policy support from individual members sections of the working class to oppose meant that Germany and Italy were (Lady Megan Lloyd George, for exam- fascism, Britain’s National Government free to arm Franco’s forces whereas the ple, being active in discussions to pro- (which was depicted as the agent of fas- Popular Front government was denied mote such an objective). cism and imperialism), all restrictions on any military help from Britain or The Liberal party regarded itself as a civil and trade union liberties and the France. The deteriorating military posi- key player in the proposal to establish a militarisation of Britain. It has been as- tion of the Spanish Popular Front gov- popular front, and an official publica- serted that a key reason for the interest ernment prompted ten MPs of all par- tion asserted that the pivot to such an shown by Labour’s left wing in this form ties to organise a National Emergency arrangement was ‘an understanding be- of joint action was that it would Conference on Spain in which tween the two largest parties – Liberal strengthen arguments in favour of La- sought to end the policy of non-inter- and Labour’. There were, however, bour’s adopting uncompromising social- vention. Around , delegates from several reasons to explain the Liberal ist politics and undermine the belief that the trade unions, the Labour Party, the party’s reluctance to throw itself whole- such could be achieved through the in- CPGB and the Liberal Party attended heartedly into the popular front cam- stitutions of liberal democracy. The La- this meeting which was chaired by Gil- paign. Although it was a vehicle to bour Party, however, was unwilling to bert Murray and addressed by, among unite progressive opinion, the popular enter into any relationships with the others, Wilfrid Roberts MP. The meet- front’s driving ideology was socialism, CPGB (having refused their application ing heard a call from Sir Charles believing this to be the only effective to affiliate to the party in ) and sub- Trevelyan for the formation of a popu- antidote to fascism. This initially made sequently disaffiliated and then pro- lar front in Britain both to help Spain it difficult for the Liberal Party to in- scribed the SL. This latter action meant but also to remove Chamberlain. In volve itself in the popular front. There that members of the Labour Party practical terms the popular front gave were additional problems in entering would be expelled for supporting the rise to two independent progressive into cooperation with the Labour Party. SL, whose response was to dissolve itself candidatures in by-elections in Oxford Against a background of unhappiness in May . City () and Bridgwater () with their treatment they had received The popular front sought the unity which were strictly not popular front from the Labour governments of – of all who opposed fascism (including campaigns but did witness the Labour and –, Liberals put forward a the Liberal Party and those Conserva- and Liberal Parties withdrawing their number of objections to cooperating tives who were opposed to the appease- candidates in order to give electors the with Labour within the framework of a ment policies of the Chamberlain Gov- opportunity to vote for a progressive popular front. ernment). The Italian invasion of Abys- candidate. The progressive candidate at First, they opposed the fundamen- sinia in resulted in the Hoare- Oxford, Dr A.D. Lindsay, failed to win talist socialist programme to which Laval pact which sought to divide Ab- but Vernon Bartlett did secure a pro- Labour was theoretically committed, yssinia to Italy’s advantage. This was gressive victory at Bridgwater. believing that it would entail abolish- viewed as cowardice by the British ing private enterprise and ownership, government in the face of fascist ag- which Liberals wished to diffuse. gression and this event (together with Liberals, the Labour Some Liberals also perceived that the the formation of popular front govern- Party and the Popular nationalisation of all the means of pro- ments in Spain in February and duction, distribution and exchange France in May ) triggered the for- Front would involve the suppression of lib- mation of the first popular front or- Joint action between the Labour and erty which Liberals sought to pro- ganisation in Britain, the People’s Front Liberal Parties could be justified by mote. This view was forcibly ex- Propaganda Committee, whose sup- the similar views which many of their pressed by Sir Herbert Samuel who porters included a number of Labour members held on key contemporary stated that while he welcomed coop- activists, the Liberal Richard Acland political issues. Both parties endorsed eration in order to bring about a pow- and the Conservative Robert Boothby. similar aims in foreign policy, as evi- erful government able to resist attacks This organisation failed to have much denced in May when Attlee and on freedom and policies which were political impact, principally because left Sinclair publicly endorsed support for dangerous to peace, and which was wing Labour supporters endorsed the the League of Nations and the princi- also ready to tackle unemployment, United Front’s campaign. A second or- ple of collective security in response to the standard of living and land policy, ganisation launched by Acland in Oc- Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia. The lead- ‘I am not willing to lend myself to the
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 11 to dampen the enthusiasm of some of the present emergency it is ready to Liberals for the popular front and to in- subordinate mere party considerations sist, as an alternative, that the main con- and to cooperate wholeheartedly with sideration was to build up Liberal men and women of all parties, who re- strength. These views were evident in alise the gravity of the time’. the approval given by the National Lib- The initial focus of the party leader- eral Federation in May to an ship was directed at policy which could eighty-page policy document, The Lib- form the basis of cooperation with the eral Way, which was depicted as ‘the au- Labour Party. In late , following thoritative exposition of the dynamic Chamberlain’s signing of the Munich principles of liberalism’ and consider- agreement with Hitler, a draft mani- ably influenced the proceedings of the festo was laid before the executive Liberal Assembly. An unofficial committee of the Liberal Party. Sinclair motion was put forward which called gave it his personal approval, arguing for the cooperation of all people of that it ‘breaks new ground in offering peaceful and progressive mind, based to give up controversial party politics if on a specific declaration of policy and a general agreement can be reached with Sir Archibald Sinclair, Liberal leader 1935–45 definite and agreed programme capable members of other parties on interna- of being carried out in the lifetime of a tional and defence questions’. It was destruction of private enterprise and single Parliament’. However, the pros- depicted as ‘a public policy statement personal initiative, to transferring the pect of an impending Liberal revival by the executive on behalf of the party whole of our industrial, commercial prompted the Assembly to approve a – an expression of our readiness, be- and financial system to political man- resolution which, as amended, urged cause of the present emergency, to sub- agement’. Many Liberals, such as the Liberal Party Organisation to use ordinate mere party considerations and Ramsay Muir, perceived that the La- every means to encourage and assist lo- to cooperate wholeheartedly with men bour Party’s attachment to socialism cal Liberal associations to fight by-elec- and women of all parties for the pur- disqualified it from being regarded as a tions wherever they occurred, and dep- poses which are defined in … the progressive party. recated assistance being given by Liber- manifesto’. While it was accepted that Second, Liberals were sceptical als to either Labour or National Gov- neither the Conservative Party nor about the effectiveness of the electoral ernment candidates. Lord Meston, in Transport House would respond posi- arrangements in the constituencies his presidential address, indicated his tively to this policy document, an at- which would be required unless a opposition to an electoral deal with any tempt was made to assume the initiative change first occurred in the electoral other parties or party. in creating progressive unity by appeal- system. They believed that the local as- However, the policy of appease- ing directly to their supporters. It was sociations of both parties would disre- ment pursued by the Conservative argued that ‘there is a great deal in it to gard any arrangement concluded by Party in the late s produced arouse all those – regardless of party – their national organisations and, more changes in the attitude of many Liber- who are disgusted with the govern- importantly, voters who were denied als towards the popular front. Increas- ment’s handling of the international the possibility of voting for a candidate ingly the importance of cooperation situation’. It was especially envisaged of their own party would not neces- with the Labour Party was discussed that those with Labour leanings who sarily support one put forward by a within Liberal circles. Richard Acland accepted these Liberal views and who participant in the popular front. In moved a motion on the popular front were dissatisfied with the ‘narrow- particular Liberals feared that electors at the Assembly in Bath. This de- minded and dog-in-the-manger atti- who had the choice of voting Con- clared that ‘whilst scrupulously safe- tude’ of Transport House would give servative or Socialist would support guarding the independence of our concrete expression of their beliefs by the former and thus the popular front party position’ it was ‘prepared to give supporting Liberal candidates. would ironically become a mechanism assistance to and receive assistance Pressure within the Liberal Party for ‘to perpetuate the dominance of the from, an individual, any group or any cooperation with Labour intensified “National” Government’. organisation which is prepared to re- during . By then the issue of elec- A third difficulty was that coopera- ceive assistance from, and give assist- toral arrangements in the constituen- tion with the Labour Party would limit ance to the Liberal Party in order to cies was the preeminent consideration. the potential for independent Liberal put into operation the foreign policy Sinclair reiterated that Liberals wished political activity. It has been argued that adopted by this Assembly, and in order to work with other parties but insisted Sinclair believed in the imminence of a to achieve, in the immediate future, a that if the other parties wanted Liberal Liberal revival, which might be preju- programme of domestic reform which help and votes it was only fair that they diced if the party was prevented from is not inconsistent with the policy of should also do their share of helping putting forward its distinctive policies the Liberal Party’. Subsequently the and cooperating. He felt that Liberals and ideology. This consideration served party executive declared that ‘because were making more progress than
12 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 Labour and that cooperation would be attracted into cooperation with the opposed to the principle of supporting only be possible if it was clearly under- ‘socialist’ Labour Party. This view rested candidates not of their own party, par- stood that it was not always the Liberal on the belief that the Labour Party’s ticularly if this was at the expense of that was expected to stand down. stance on key political issues (most nota- withdrawing a Liberal candidate. A On March the Liberal bly foreign policy) was unlikely to secure problem of this nature arose towards Party Council advocated a change of support from those who opposed the end of in connection with the government and called upon ‘all those Chamberlain’s views within the Con- Kinross and West Perthshire by-election who share its lack of confidence in the servative Party, whose leaders included which arose when the incumbent MP, present government to cooperate for Churchill and Eden. In the Liberal the Duchess of Atholl (who had re- the dual purpose of overthrowing it W. Robert Davies observed to Sir signed the government whip in April and bringing into office a National Archibald Sinclair that although neither ), applied for the Chiltern Hun- Progressive government’. The motion of these Conservatives had said that they dreds in order to contest the seat at a by called for the early adoption of Liberal would fight against the Conservative election following the decision of the candidates in constituencies where Party to promote the policy embraced local Unionist association to replace Liberals stood the best chance of win- by the League of Nations Union, a pre- her as candidate at the next general ning, but at the same time did not wish mature alliance between the Liberal and election. The Liberal leadership was in- to prevent arrangements to give Lib- Labour Parties might serve to drive such clined to support the Duchess, whose eral support to candidates of other Conservatives back into their current views on foreign policy, and especially parties – or no party – in seats where a political alignments and help Chamber- her work in connection with Spain three-cornered fight would increase lain win the next general election. and the refugees, commended her to the prospect of a Government vic- Sinclair subsequently referred to Liberal opinion. The problem was, tory. It sought to place some flesh on this danger when he addressed the however, that the local Liberal associa- the bones of previous statements, call- Party Council in March . At this tion already had a candidate in place, ing for inter-party cooperation by ad- meeting, he called on all progressively- Mrs Call MacDonald, who had polled dressing the contesting of seats in a fu- minded citizens of all parties and of no well in a straight fight against the ture general election. The main inten- party to work with the Liberal Party to Duchess at the general election, tion of this motion was to induce La- reverse the progressive deterioration in losing by just over , votes. She bour to stand down its candidates in a Britain’s national and world affairs. stood down and Sinclair praised her number of constituencies by making it However, he subsequently emphasised sacrifice, pledging her the fullest sup- clear that the Liberal Party would only that in recent by-elections the govern- port of the party at the next general fight seats where they had secured sec- ment candidates had performed quite election. This was, however, a decision ond place in , or but, satisfactorily and that to defeat the she took reluctantly and intimated in a where this did not apply, would be government at the next election letter to Lord Rea that she did so as the willing to support a Progressive or a would require the rallying not only of Liberal Party had deployed sanctions Labour candidate. This had clear im- supporters of the existing parties on against her which left her with no alter- plications for the size of the Liberal the left but would additionally require native than to resign. Sinclair disa- ‘front’ at the next election and conse- the support of democratic Conserva- greed that Mrs MacDonald had been quences for the party’s electoral objec- tives. This perhaps suggested that the the victim of some kind of backstairs tives. The mover of this motion, Frank Liberal Party, acting independently of intrigue. He stated that he had advised Darvell, stated that these should be the the Labour Party, would be more the Duchess against resigning and forc- return of Liberal MPs and the for- likely to rally Conservative support ing a by election and also said that he mation of a Progressive Government. against the existing government. A re- would support Mrs MacDonald in such lated consideration was the desire to a contest if she insisted on standing. make inroads into the support of the Problems posed by Liberal Nationals, who would not be Liberal endorsement of attracted by Liberal Party cooperation The Labour Party and the the Popular Front with the Labour Party. Popular Front A second difficulty was that while A further difficulty associated with the The enhanced level of support within the popular front might help the Lib- the Liberal Party in the late s for co- popular front was the unwillingness of eral Party to win some seats (especially the Labour Party to enter into active operation with the Labour Party to in the south and west) if the Labour form a popular front did not, however, cooperation with the Liberal Party. La- Party withdrew its candidates, it would bour was sceptical of the merits of a indicate a total commitment to this not aid Liberal progress in other parts of course of action, and a number of con- popular front. The issue was debated at the country (especially the north) cerns were expressed. Some Liberals the Labour Party Conference where Liberals regarded Labour as their when an amendment to a united front feared it might impede the Liberal Par- main opponent. ty’s ability to secure Conservative sup- motion urged the party to consider se- A final problem posed by the popu- riously the formation of a ‘national port since those voters were unlikely to lar front was that many Liberals were
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 13 progressive front’. The formation of a the CPGB was deemed capable of tude to inter-party cooperation with cooperative federation of all workers’ backstabbing and the Liberals were the one which Labour had adopted, ar- parties and groups was advocated in condemned for their actions in the two guing that they had displayed no reluc- which communists would remain com- Labour governments of the s and tance in cooperating with Labour munists, Liberals would remain Liberals for latterly supporting MacDonald’s when it was in the national interest to but which would secure practical coop- National Government and both the do so. Accordingly, leading Liberals had eration in parliamentary action in a savage economies which had been im- spoken in favour of Labour candidates limited and reasonable programme. posed and the foreign policy of aban- at by-elections and Lloyd George had The National Emergency doning China to Japanese aggression in made a significant contribution to Conference (which has been referred . The document concluded by ex- Philip Noel Baker’s victory at Derby in to above) prompted the Labour Party pressing high regard for what was best July 1936. Additionally, efforts had been to publish its response to calls for a in the Liberal tradition but stated that made in a number of constituencies to popular front. This was to reject this de- while the Liberal Parliamentary Party agree on a popular front candidate but velopment for a number of reasons. included sincere progressives and most had been frustrated by the oppo- These included the belief that the for- friends of peace the party as a whole sition of the Labour Party. In the case of mation of a popular front would not was uncertain and unreliable and that a Chertsey in 1937, for example, a pro- lead to the fall of the National Govern- government which included Liberals gressive candidate had stood but had ment, nor to an early election unless would be weak and indecisive and received no help from the Labour lead- evidence could be produced of a crisis might provide fascism with an opening ership who prevented Noel Baker from in the Conservative Party. It ques- in Britain. The way ahead was stated to speaking on his behalf.34 Sinclair be- tioned whether a popular front would be to work for a Labour victory at the moaned the fact that both Noel Baker be more electorally successful than the next general election and to achieve and Colonel Nathan (in Wandsworth, Labour party acting independently, as- this an appeal was made to sympathisers 1937) owed their victories to the help serting that Liberal voters could not be outside the party by arguing: given to them by Lloyd George and relied upon to vote for a Labour candi- We shall go forward in no spirit of party other prominent Liberals but that no date in the absence of one from their exclusiveness. We invite all men and Labour support was ever given to a own party, and that in many constitu- women who desire Great Britain to Liberal candidate.35 Subsequently, the encies the absence of a Liberal candi- take the lead for democracy and peace Liberal Party reinforced these declara- – whatever their political affiliation – to date tended to help the Conservative join us in our effort … We appeal to all tions by withdrawing its candidate at cause rather than Labour’s. It was as- that is best in the Nation – to all men the Oxford by-election in favour of the serted that the participation of the and women of goodwill – to make a Labour Dr Lindsay (1938), supported CPGB in a popular front would make victory for democracy and peace possi- Ver non Bartlett as an Independent Pro- this trend more likely to occur, and, ad- ble while there is still time.33 gressive candidate at Bridgwater (1938), ditionally, that the CPGB was an elec- Thus while Labour was willing to unite and offered to stand down its candidate toral liability which would boost progressive opinion on its own terms, it at the Holderness by-election (1939) in Chamberlain’s poll. It was further ar- was unwilling to endorse any novel po- favour of an Independent Progressive, gued that a popular front government litical arrangements in order to achieve but Labour refused to respond posi- would be unable to govern effectively: this goal. Liberals compared their atti- tively to this approach. However, although Labour’s official Lloyd George flirts with the Labour movement. (Clement Attlee is in the right-hand policy remained the rejection of any deckchair.) 29 May 1936. cooperation with the Liberal Party, Labour activists in the constituencies were sometimes more amenable to such joint action. A notable example of such inter-party cooperation occurred at the North Cornwall by-election in when the Liberal candidate, Tho- mas Horabin, was given a free run by Labour against the Conservative Party, thereby making a significant contribu- tion to his victory.
The Cripps petition Although the Labour Party was officially opposed to cooperating with the Liberal Party, this course of action was not en- dorsed by the left-wing Labour MP Sir
14 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 cist aggression towards the Spanish and March meeting of the Liberal Chinese peoples), protecting the peo- Party Council. He stated that while ple’s interests (through the control of the Labour leaders were opposed to the armaments industry, agriculture, the Cripps petition they were not hos- transport, mining and finance), defend- tile to constituency arrangements in ing the people (by providing effective some cases, and would be: protection against air attack), and build- willing to join us in the next Parliament ing for peace and justice (by ending the in a Joint Government if the number of exploitation of subject races and laying our respective House memberships, and the foundations of a lasting peace other factors, then make such a combi- nation possible … I am told that if we, through the principle of equality of op- instead of praising Sir Stafford and criti- portunity for all nations). cising Transport House, make it clear This petition could be seen as com- that we would be willing to consider patible with the frequent Liberal state- realistically arrangements with the offi- ments on the desirability of coopera- cial Labour Party … there would be a tion with other parties. The only main real possibility of an arrangement. On the other hand, if we … appear to be disagreement which they had with the welcoming Sir Stafford’s controversy petition was the fourth point, which re- Sir Stafford Cripps MP with the official Labour leaders, we ferred to ‘protecting the people’s inter- shall be destroying all possibility of such Stafford Cripps, solicitor general (– ests’, which could be taken to advocate an arrangement.39 ) in Ramsay Macdonald’s second gov- nationalisation. Liberals emphasised the There were, however, equally good ernment. The National Executive Com- lowering of tariff barriers and electoral reasons for supporting the petition. mittee of the Labour Party had expelled reform under such a heading. It was, Liberal involvement in it would aid the Socialist League from the Labour however, feared that if the party leaders the party’s cause, especially in seats Party in . In October Cripps ‘signed up’ to all of these points the where they wished the Labour Party organised a conference which passed a party would split and the centre-right to stand down in favour of a Liberal resolution in favour of the formation of Liberals would join with the Liberal candidate. Active Liberal support for a people’s government led by the Labour Nationals. A further concern was that the petition in such places would both Party but based upon the broad agree- Cripps sought to ensure that the initia- make it harder for Labour to subse- ment of all progressive forces in the tive in cross-party cooperation was held quently adopt a Parliamentary candi- country. Subsequently Cripps circulated by the Labour Party. A speech by him date and would further get Labour a memorandum to all Divisional Labour in Birmingham on February supporters used to working with Lib- Parties and a number of Labour MPs re- had stated that the aims of the petition erals.40 Additionally, any official oppo- garding his beliefs. These two breaches of were to intensify opposition to the Na- sition to the Cripps petition might party discipline resulted in his expulsion tional Government, to reinvigorate the create difficulties in the constituencies from the Labour Party in January , Labour Party, and to convince the La- if this entailed Liberals who had sup- which was followed by the expulsion of bour leadership that rank and file opin- ported it being constrained to aban- a number of other prominent popular ion favoured cooperation between the don their cooperation with those La- front supporters in March (including political parties. The reinvigoration of bour activists who endorsed it. They Bevan and Sir Charles Trevelyan). the Labour Party was clearly not a Lib- would be unlikely to work enthusiasti- Cripps subsequently launched a pe- eral interest and Liberals thus insisted cally with such ‘turncoat’ Liberals tition in designed to secure the that if they cooperated with the peti- should this course of action subse- adoption of a popular front. This drew tion they should be able to recruit and quently be approved by the Labour attention to a world threatened by war enrol members to the Liberal Party at leadership. Accordingly the official and fascism and called upon the parties the same time. Liberal line was subsequently stated to of progress to act together and at once The Cripps petition presented the be that while neither the party nor its for the sake of peace and civilisation. Liberal party with a dilemma. The pe- affiliated bodies would officially take The petition covered six main areas – tition could be viewed as a ruse by part in promoting the signing of the the defence of democracy, planning for him to gain support within the Labour petition, individual Liberals were free plenty (which involved reducing un- Party. Further, overt support for his to determine their own course of ac- employment, increasing old age pen- course of action would alienate the tion on this matter. If they did partici- sions and securing a higher standard of leadership of the Labour Party with pate, it was recommended that they life, education and leisure for the old whom a deal might conceivably be should seek to enrol new members to and young), guaranteeing the security made at some future point in time de- the Liberal Party.41 of Britain (by organising a peace alli- spite their current opposition to such The Cripps petition was timed to ance with France and Russia which an arrangement. This view was articu- exert pressure on the Labour con- would rally American support, and by lated by Frank Darvell who moved the ference. However, its decision to en- discontinuing the appeasement of fas- resolution on cooperation at the dorse the views of the NEC regarding
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000 15 the popular front, and also on the ex- conclusion of arrangements with other 12 Ramsay Muir, presidential address at the Na- pulsion of Cripps, led him to terminate progressive parties at the forthcoming tional Liberal Federation, Bournemouth, 3 May 1934. his campaign in June and seek readmis- general election. This motion was de- 13 Liberal Party (1937) op cit., pp. 12–13. sion to the party. feated on a card vote by the narrow 14 G. De Groot, Liberal Crusader: The Life of Sir margin of ,, to ,,. La- Archibald Sinclair, (London: Hirst, 1992, p. 119–20, 130–1 and 145). bour’s landslide victory at that election 15 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to A Wood, 23 The demise of the was accompanied by the Liberal Par- November 1936, The Thurso Papers, Volume II, ty’s failure to achieve a substantial re- item 31/1. Popular Front 16 Sir Archibald Sinclair, speech at the National covery. This resulted in Labour subse- The above discussion has suggested that Liberal Federation, Bournemouth, 3 May 1934. elements in both the Labour and Lib- quently adopting a predatory stance 17 Resolution of the Liberal Party Assembly, Buxton, 1937. eral Parties displayed an interest in co- towards the Liberal Party, seeking to absorb its radical support rather than to 18 Lord Meston, presidential address at the Liberal operating under the umbrella of a Party Assembly, Buxton, 27 May 1937. popular front. However, a realigning is- coexist with it within some form of in- 19 Resolution of the Liberal Party Assembly, Bath, sue was required in order for such a ter-party mechanism. 1938. The popular front was an expression 20 Resolution of the Liberal Party Executive Com- project to ‘take off’, and it is doubtful mittee, October 1938. whether opposition to appeasement of the progressive tradition which set 21 Note from Sir Archibald Sinclair to W. Robert was sufficient to secure a popular front the scene for future attempts to rally Davies, 18 October 1938, The Thurso Papers, progressive opinion. Grimond’s call af- Volume 11, item 64/6. in time for the general election which 22 Letter from W. Robert Davies to Sir William ter the general election for the should have occurred in . How- Goodchild, 4 November 1938, ibid. ever, it is quite possible that a number realignment of the left echoed the ob- 23 Liberal Party (1937), op cit., pp. 12–13. 24 Sir Archibald Sinclair, the BBC 9 O’Clock News, of local arrangements would have been jectives which were expressed by a number of Liberal and Labour support- 16 February 1939. negotiated in the constituencies to pro- 25 Motion of the Liberal Party Council, 15 March vide for straight fights against Con- ers in the s, and the Liberal/Liberal 1939. Democrat cooperation with the La- 26 Letter from Frank Darvell to Milner Gray, 24 servative candidates, particularly as February 1939, The Thurso Papers, volume II, there was no requirement on Constitu- bour Party which has occurred, or been item 63/3. ency Labour Parties at that time to field suggested, since the late s is com- 27 Letter from W. Robert Davies to Sir Archibald a candidate at a Parliamentary election. parable with the attempts to organise a Sinclair, 5 April 1937, ibid., volume II, item 64/5. popular front in the years before the 28 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to W. Robert The outbreak of war and the resultant Davies, 14 April 1939, ibid., volume II, item 63/4. Second World War. party truce sidelined the debate on the 29 Memorandum by W. Robert Davies, ‘Mr. popular front, although some Liberals Acland’s Resolution’, 16 May 1938, ibid., vol- ume II, item 64/5. who sympathised with this course of Peter Joyce teaches in the Politics and Phi- losophy Department of Manchester Metro- 30 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to Gomer action (including Horabin and Acland) Owen (North Wales Area Federation Secre- continued their quest to construct an politan University. He is the author of Rea- tary), 13 December 1938, ibid., volume II, item lignment of the Left? A history of the re- 67/7. anti-Conservative arrangement for the 31 Letter from Mrs Call MacDonald to Lord Rea, 16 next general election through the Lib- lationship between the Liberal Democrat December 1938, ibid., volume II, item 64/6. eral Action Group, later known as and Labour Parties (Macmillan, ), re- 32 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to W. Robert Radical Action. viewed in the Journal of Liberal Democrat Davies, 21 December 1938, ibid. History (summer ). 33 National Executive Committee of the Labour The subject of a popular front was Party, Labour and the Popular Front, (London: again raised towards the end of the war 1938, p. 8). 1 David Bleazer, The Popular Front and the Pro- and was debated at the Labour 34 Letter from W. Robert Davies to Sir Archibald gressive Tradition: Socialists, Liberals and the Sinclair, 5 April 1937, ibid., volume II, item 64/5. Party conference, when the report of Quest for Unity, 1884–1939, (Cambridge: 35 Letter from Sir Archibald Sinclair to W. Robert the Conference Arrangements Com- Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 102). Davies, 15 February 1938, ibid. mittee was discussed. Some delegates 2 Sir Charles Trevelyan, From Liberalism to La- 36 Labour Party, Unity – True or Sham? (London: bour, (London: George Allen and Unwin 1921). Labour Party, 1939). put forward the proposal that Labour 3Peter Joyce, Realignment of the Left ? A History 37 Liberal Party Organisation briefing, ‘The Cripps should cooperate with other parties to of the Relationship between the Liberal Demo- Petition’, 17 February 1939, The Thurso Papers, bring about the downfall of Conserva- crats and Labour Parties, (Basingstoke: volume II, item 63/3. Macmillan, 1999, p. 64). tism. The Liberal Party was occasionally 38 Ibid. 4 Unity Manifesto, quoted in Bleazer, op cit., p. 170. 39 Letter from Frank Darvell to Milner Gray, 24 mentioned in this context but was 5 Bleazer, op cit., p. 147. February 1939, ibid. largely bypassed in a debate concerning 6 Ibid., p. 175. 40 Letter from Richard Acland to Lord Meston, 17 7 Ronald Sommer, The Organisation of the Liberal the wisdom of securing ‘a coalition of February 1939, ibid. Party 1936–1960, (unpublished PhD thesis, 41 Letter from W. Robert Davies, 22 February 1939 the left for the purpose of bringing so- University of London, 1962, p. 30). circulated by the Liberal Party Organisation, cialism in our time’. The following 8 Liberal Party, For Peace and Democracy: The ibid. year an attempt was made to refer back Liberal Party and a ‘Popular Front’, (London: 42 B. Howells, speech at the Labour Party Confer- Liberal Party Organisation, 1937, p. 3). ence, London, 11 December 1944. Quoted in a section of the report of the Confer- 9 Bleazer, op cit., p. 183. Labour Party Conference Report,1944, p. 116. ence Arrangements Committee be- 10 Liberal Party (1937), op cit., pp. 11–12. 43 Joyce, op cit., p. 97–117. cause the conference agenda contained 11 Sir Herbert Samuel, speech at Bournemouth, 4 44 Bleazer, op cit., p. 197. May 1934. no specific resolution concerning the
16 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 28 Autumn 2000