Foundations of the Turkish Republic: Social and Economic Change Author(S): Justin Mccarthy Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol

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Foundations of the Turkish Republic: Social and Economic Change Author(s): Justin McCarthy Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 139-151 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282933 Accessed: 29/03/2010 10:22

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http://www.jstor.org Foundationsof the TurkishRepublic: Social and EconomicChange JustinMcCarthy

Those who writeon the foundationsof the TurkishRepublic usually stress the political backgroundof modern Turkey and the personal force and abilityof MustafaKemal Ataturk. They answerquestions such as 'Whydid Kemalistreforms succeed where Young Turk reformsonly sputtered?'by comparingMustafa Kemal to EnverPasa and makingobservations on the developmental nature of reform. Such explanations are correct, but incomplete. They neglect one major factor that led to the success of Ataturk'sreforms and createdthe new Turkey- fundamentalchange in the Turkish population, economy, and society, brought about by the Ottomanwars. Reform,like any otherpolitical action, needsa constituency.Bureaucrats and kings with reformistvisions can achieveonly so much without signifi- cant supportfrom the populace, or supportfrom a significantpart of the populace. The constituencyfor reform comes from those in the populace who, first, have undergonea psychologicalchange that alters their traditional perceptionsand modes of behaviorand, second, have seen personal benefitin change.They are peoplewho know changecan take place and see it as good. Becausethey had limitedconstituencies, the reformsof the Tanzimatand the Young Turks were gradual reforms. Religious schools were left to coexist along with new westernizedacademies; new alphabetswere experi- mented with, but never adopted. Parliamentswere called, but the sultan- caliphremained. Only in the militarywere radical changes more completely accepted,because only in the militarywas there a wide constituencythat favored radical change. The Ottoman military had been convinced by defeatthat the old militarysystem would not work. The constituencyfor the radical reforms that created the new Turkey came from the Turkishpeople. Batteredby wars from 1912 to 1922, the Turksof Anatoliaand Thracehad been drivento the psychologicalaware- ness of the possibility of change by their own mortality and by radical changes in their environment.Their new awarenessof the possibility of changeand the economicconditions of the postwarperiod caused them to see changeas beneficial.

The purposeof this articleis to indicateareas in which conditionsin post- war Turkeyhad changedto createa constituencyfor reformthat had not been present in the Ottoman Empire. No one can prove a single set of causes for any historicalevent, especiallyone as complexas the reformof an entire nation. I do believe, however, that the Ottoman wars, and the mortality and migration that accompaniedthem, were the single most 140 MIDDLEEASTERN STUDIES importantcontributory factor to the creationof the new Turkey. Various social, economic, and political factors fostered reform in the Turkish Republic.The areas consideredbelow - mortality, migration, urbanization, industry, agriculture,and nationalism- are not exclusiveand the distinctionsbetween them are somewhatarbitrary. In fact, no areaof life in Turkeywas unaffectedby the Ottomanwars.

MORTALITY The warsdiscussed here are the BalkanWars, the FirstWorld War, and the TurkishWar of Independence.They wereamong the most destructivewars to a civilian population that have ever been fought. Ottoman Anatolia sufferedworse mortality than any other belligerentin the FirstWorld War. From 1912 to 1922, the population of Anatolia fell by 30 per cent.' Approximately10 per cent of the Anatolian population emigratedand 20 per cent died. Populationsin the East sufferedthe heaviestmortality: in the Ottomanprovince of Van more than 60 per cent of the Muslimpopula- tion died; more than 40 per cent died in Bitlis, 30 per cent in Erzurum. When mortalityand emigrationfigures for Christiansare included, only 23 per cent of the prewarpopulation of Van remainedin 1922;40 per cent of the populationof Bitlisremained, 57 per cent of Erzurum.2

TABLE1 THE POPULATION OF ANATOLIA, 1912 TO 1922*

Muslims 13.7million 11.2million Non-Muslims 2.8 million .3 million

Total 16.5million 11.5million

* excludingThrace, Istanbul Vilayeti, and the Kars-Ardahan area.3

Sources: Ottomanstatistics and the 1927Turkish census, both correctedfor undercountingof womenand children.4

The mortalitythat engulfedthe Turkishpeople must have been the prime catalyst that made them accept and desire radical change. Psychological effects of mass mortalitycannot be quantifiedor statisticallypresented, but they are no less real. One can drawanalogies to the Anatoliancondition by consideringradical changes in Europeafter the Black Death or the Thirty YearsWar, but it is sufficientto look at Turkishmortality itself to under- stand why the wars must have caused a radicalchange in the mentalityof the Turkishnation. One in five Muslimswere killed in the wars. With such high mortalityfew Anatolianfamilies could have escapedloss. The psychologicalupheaval of Turks was increasedby dislocationin the most basic unit of society, the family. Thereare no statisticson the extentto whichthe Turkishfamily was affected by the wars, but indirectevidence allows one to infer what great disruptionmust have come to families. In the following provincesover FOUNDATIONS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 141 30 per cent of the women over twenty years of age were widows in 1927: Izmir, Aydin, Mugla, Denizli, Burdur, Antalya, Iqel, Kutahya, Bursa, Trabzon,Rize. Many other provinces(such as Afyon, Manisa, and Balik- esir with 29 per cent widows)were almost as badly affected.5If widowhood statisticsfrom the easternprovinces were accurate,which, unfortunately, they are not, they would surely show the same pattern. (To accurately evaluate the widowhood statistics, one must rememberthat at this time Turkeywas a polygamoussociety in which widowhood would ordinarily have been minimizedby remarriageand multiple marriage,and that the greatestdegree of widowhoodexpected in Turkeyin even non-polygamous circumstancesis 15 per cent.6)The high numberof widows also indicates children without fathers, land without grown men to cultivate it, and extendedfamilies without the patriarch'shand to guide them in traditional ways. Disasterbrings with it a psychologicaldisposition toward change. Simply stated, catastrophicloss changes people's minds, habits, and lives. If nothing else, survivorswish to have somethingbetter than the systemthat broughtdisaster on their heads. Moreover,disastrous mortality dislodges the most basic building-blocksof a rationalized,conservative life - homes are destroyed, family members killed, farms and jobs lost. The losses cannot help but cause changesin traditionalvalues and conservativelife- styles.

MIGRATION Perhapsno single factor is as destructiveto parochialismas is migration. Peasant migrants leave behind their home villages, families, and local customs - factors which would otherwisereinforce traditional and anti- reformattitudes. Thus they themselvesare moreopen to politicaland social change.Moreover, migrants from poorerto richerareas retain connections in theirhome areasand are often conduitsof changeto their brothersback in the village. The migrations that affected Turkey were both internal and international. From 1921 to 1929, 478,000 migrants entered Turkey.7 The compositionof the Europeanprovinces was especiallyaltered by immigration. Over 30 per cent of the populationsof Edirne, Tekirdag,and Kirk- larelivildyets were migrants who had arrivedin the 1920s(see Appendix1).8 Western Anatolian provinces also had high percentagesof international migrants- nine per cent in Bursa, six per cent in Izmir, ten per cent in Kocaeli, ten per cent in Nigde.9 Hundreds of thousands more, as yet unenumerated,came to Anatoliaand Thracefrom 1912to 1921. In Anatolia the greatestnumber of migrantswere from other Anatolian provinces.The 1935census recorded seven per cent of the countryas having been born in a differentprovince from the one in which they residedand threeper cent in anotherkaza of the same province,but the immigrationto 'high opportunity'provinces was much higher. Sixteen per cent of izmir Province'spopulation was born in anotherprovince, as were20 per cent of the Ankarapopulation, 13 per cent of the Samsunpopulation, and 16 per 142 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES cent of the Adana population.'0The earlier 1927 census did not record internalmigration, but it can be theorizedthat the migrantsrecorded in 1935must have come from comparativelydisadvantaged areas and moved to richerareas to take the place of farmersand urbandwellers killed in the wars. Turkishmigrants, both internationaland internal,were a groupwho had, of necessity, left their traditionallife-styles behind in their villages. Con- servatism,like reform, needs a constituency,and its constituencyis drawn from those for whom life has not changedor those who view change as a threat. The Turkish migrants were neither. Their migration perforce changed their lives; by moving to new jobs and farms they had taken advantageof change.They must be accounteda significantconstituency for reform.

URBANIZATION ThroughoutMiddle Eastern history, the city has been the centerof innovation. Urban dwellershave been innovativebecause of their access to the educational,political, and economictools needed for reform, and because urban life in itself gives a psychological push toward innovation. The diversityand opportunityof the city allows its inhabitantsto see what differentmodes of life are possibleand often successful.Village life seldom has supportedsuch perceptions. One of the reasonsthat AnatolianMuslims were more receptive to reform after the wars was that they were more urbanized.No definitivestudy of Anatolianurbanization has everbeen made, but statisticson city sizesin the Empireand Republicare fairlyreliable, when available.They indicatethat

TABLE 2 PERCENTAGE OF NON-MUSLIMS IN MAJOR CITIES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

Ottoman Turkish Empire Republic

Istanbul 55.9 35.2 izmir 61.5 13.8 Edirne* 43.6 18.4 Bursa 24.1 3.2 Trabzon 42.8 1.2 Diyarbakir* 31.9 11.9 Erzurum 31.5 .1 Adana 17.8 9.0 Sivas* 32.8 5.1 Ankara* 32.6 5.2

* These figures are percentages of minority population in kazas, rather than cities. By including the city's hinterland, they artificially decrease the percentage of non-Muslim.

Sources: Ottoman official statistics, ca. 1900 and the 1927 Turkish Census. FOUNDATIONS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 143 the Anatolian cities by 1927 had almost regained the number of inhabitants they had held in the Empire, but that the makeup of the cities was different. Izmir, for example, had 185,000 inhabitants in 1927 and 210,000 in 1912, but was 86 per cent Muslim in 1927 compared to 38 per cent Muslim in 1912. Other Anatolian cities had increased in size at a faster rate than izmir, which had to be largely rebuilt, and had become more Muslim in composi- tion.11 A good indication of increased Muslim urbanism can be gained by comparison of the percentage of total population of urban Muslims in major cities. Although city size was no greater in the early Republic than it had been in the Empire, the percentage of urban Muslims in the population of Turkey increased because more of the urban dwellers were Muslims and the total population had decreased, due to war deaths. Thus, in 1927 the urban Muslim populations of cities such as Izmir, Adana, and Bursa were more than double the percentage of the Anatolian population they had been in 1912. The significance for urbanization of Muslim, Anatolian Ankara being made Turkey's new capital is obvious. In Turkey as a whole, the percentage of Muslim urbanites must have more than doubled.'12 Of all the migrants, it was those who migrated to the cities that most assuredly became constituents of reform. They were more likely to become literate and educated (males 'able to read' in the city of Izmir in 1927 numbered 41.5 per cent; in the city of Bursa, 20.6 per cent; in the city of Ankara, 43.5 per cent; in Turkey as a whole, 8.9 per cent,13see Appendix 2). They were, of course, also more likely to work in non-agricultural industries and innovative occupations than were rural dwellers. All Turkish migrants experienced to one degree or another the psychological changes necessary for the acceptance of reform. The urban migrants must have experienced the change more deeply, since their environment was more radically changed.

COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY Whether Ataturk's Turkey or East African republics today, developing nations have seen that an essential element of reform is commercial par- ticipation by the majority group of the population. In Turkey, the change from minority group to majority control of production was brought about by the wars. The Ottoman Empire was dependent on non-Muslim commercial elements. While it is presently impossible to precisely estimate the share of the minorities in the Gross Product of Ottoman Anatolia and Thrace, one can gain an accurate impression of their share by consulting Ottoman publications that listed factory ownership of commercial endeavors (Appendix 3). In Izmir in 1308 (1890/91), for example, the 10 non-Muslim clock and watch factories had a yearly production of 1,340,000 pieces, while the three Muslim-owned factories produced only 390,000 pieces. All four iron works in Izmir were non-Muslim owned, as was the one modern bread factory (which produced 711,750 kilos of bread a year).'4 In the list of factory owners in Izmir Vilayeti, for every Haci Huseyin Aga there was many an Eftim, Markopolou, Vasil, and Mateos. Other cities showed the 144 MIDDLEEASTERN STUDIES samepattern of ownership;the Ottomanindustrial records listed 41 rawsilk manufactoriesin Bursa, of which only six were owned by privatecitizen Muslims,two by the Government,and the remaining33 by minorities.15 With the coming of the First World War and the TurkishWar of Inde- pendence,the vast majorityof the non-Muslimmerchants and industrialists emigratedor died. Some of the productsand servicesthey had provided, such as luxury goods for the cosmopolitanlife of old Smyrna, were no longer needed. Turkey continued, however, to require the bread, iron goods, clocks, and other manufacturedmaterials that had been made by minorities. Such goods and services, minority-producedor controlled beforethe wars, werestill producedin the new Turkey.For example,Bursa still had 408 textile industriesafter the wars and Izmir 533 metal manu- factories, but these were now companiesowned by MuslimTurks, rather than minorities.The TurkishIndustrial Census of 1927listed 13,683 'enter- prises occupying four persons or more' and in these 94 per cent of the ownerswere citizens of the TurkishRepublic (Appendix 4). Emigrationof the Ottomanminorities from Anatoliaand Thracecreated a Turkishmiddle class. There was an economic need and Muslim Turks steppedin to fill it. This createda formidablegroup of Turkswho had every reason, economic and social, to appreciatethe new order in Turkey. Perhaps most importantly,Muslims in Turkey saw that in the Republic commerceand industrywere possible avenues of personaladvancement. As the Dutch had proved in the seventeenthcentury and the English in the eighteenthcentury, such a realizationof economic possibilitiesis a prime causeof social and politicalchange.

AGRICULTURE War-causedchanges in Turkish agriculturewere intimately tied to the mortalityand migrationpreviously described. Destruction of animalsand farm lands and emigrationand death of farmersoccurred in both Eastern and WesternAnatolia, but with very differentpostwar results. In the East, agriculturewas destroyed;in the West, it was altered. TABLE3 LAND UNDER CULTIVATION IN ANATOLIA* (MILLIONS OF DONOMS) IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

Ottoman Republican Anatolia Anatolia 1902-10 1927 Cereals 50.3 34.9 Vegetables 1.6 1.6 CashCrops 3.0 2.6 Total 54.9 39.1

* The area of RepublicanAnatolia that was part of the Otto- manEmpire immediately preceding World War One.

Sources: 1325 Ziraat istatistig-i; and 1927 Recensement Agricole. FOUNDATIONS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 145 Accordingto Ottomanand Republicanfigures, the amountof sown land in Anatolia16dropped from 55 milliondonums before the war to 39 million in 1927(Appendix 5). Most of the loss camein EasternAnatolia, whichlost its most productiveagricultural element, both Armeniansand Turks,in the wars, and whosepeople left for betteropportunities farther west. In the last yearsof the OttomanEmpire, Eastern Anatolia had 23 per cent of the cultivatedland in Anatolia;after the wars,it only accountedfor 13 per cent. WesternAnatolia (the Ottomanprovinces of Aydin, Biga, Hudavendigar, and Izmit) dropped from 16 to 13 million cultivateddonums, a loss of 19 per cent. Yet evenWestern Anatolian farming in 1927seems to have been considerablyless productivethan in the late OttomanEmpire. In the areaof the OttomanAydln Province,for example,only about half as much wheat seemsto have been producedin each yearimmediately after the warsas was producedbefore the wars (121 million to 250 million kilograms).Even five yearsafter the wars, in 1927,the farm animalswere still considerablyfewer than they had been in Ottoman times. In the area of Ottoman Aydln Provinceafter the wars there were 6,000 mules, whereaspreviously there had been 15,000; there were 78,000 horses where there had been 101,000; 20,000 camelsinstead of 41,000;and 940,000sheep instead of 1,200,000.17 Though early Turkishstatistics on agriculturemust be used with great caution, thereseems to have been a significantdecrease in all areasof agriculturalproduction. Part of this is explainedby the loss of ruralpopulation, partby the loss of exporttrade in foodstuffs. Barley,for example,had been a primeexport crop in the OttomanEmpire and 92 million kilos of barley had been exported from Izmir-areaports alone in 1329 M. (1913-1914). After the wars, no barleywas exportedfrom Turkeyin 1923, 1924, or 1925, and only 25 millionkilos wereexported when the traderesumed in 1926.18 The disruptionto agriculturebrought about by the wars was obviously immense. Until more researchis completedone can only theorize on the effects of the disruptionof the new TurkishRepublic. First, the relativeplace of agriculturein the economy was decreasedby war devastation.This is evident from the decreaseof cultivatedland and decreasein production.Since farming is the most conservativemajor sector in a traditionaleconomy, such a decreasemight in itself have led to more dependenceon other, moreinnovative income-producing activities. Second, the relativeimportance of the westernregion of Anatolia over the East was strengthened.Due to death and out-migration,the Eastern ruralareas did not returnto agriculturalproduction after the warsas did the West. The West was a more forward-lookingand innovativeregion, more in touch with Europe and major Turkishcities, and thus more likely to acceptreform. Third, the decreasein export crop may have had the effect of partially turningTurkey away from its rawmaterial exporting, finished good import- ing cycle and may have helpedturn the Turkisheconomy in on itself. Large decreasesin both importsand exportsafter the wars'9seem to supportthis thesis. Fourth, alterationsin farm marketsand production,migration to better land, and changesin crops, yields, and livestockmust have been a factorin 146 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES the psychological predisposition to change mentioned above. The disrup- tion of the Ottoman agricultural system seems to have been fairly complete, and this must have affected the attitudes and perceptions of peasants.

NATIONALISM One of the most successful of Ataturk's policies was his development of the nationalism of the Turkish people. He realized that in order to work together as a nation, the Turks first had to feel themselves to be a nation. However, nationalism is not something that can be forced on a people. As European examples in Italy, Germany, Poland, and Balkan countries have shown, the people must have a sense of national identity and brotherhood before nationalism can develop. How did this proto-nationalism arise among the Turks? Before the wars, the nationalism of writers such as Ziya Gokalp had affected Turkish intellectual circles and Turkish nationalism had become government policy under the Committee of Union and Progress. It is doubtful, however, whether a feeling of 'Turkishness' had become common among the Turkish peasantry. There was little constituency for Turkish nationalism beyond the salons and government offices of Istanbul. Yet Ataturk's call to a Turkish national identity was heard and answered by the Turkish people immediately after the wars. This change was a direct result of the Anatolian wars. During the wars in Anatolia Turkish peasants found themselves in an 'us vs. them' situation in their own villages. Turks fought Greeks in the West and fought Armenians and Russians in the East. Turks were forced to think of themselves as Turks and to fight as Turks, even if they had not previously thought such identification to be important. Those who had considered themselves to be Ottomans found that no such identity existed in times of inter-communal warfare. Those who had primarily identified themselves as Muslims, probably the majority, found that their brother Muslim Kurds raided them and their brother Muslim Arabs revolted against their rule. In short, Turks were forced by circumstances of war to consider themselves as Turks and as part of a Turkish nation. This was the base upon which the Turkish nationalism of the Republic was built.

CONCLUSION Investigation into the social and economic underpinnings of reform raises many questions that have not been answered here. Some of these issues are methodological and include the question of the relative completeness and comparability of Ottoman and Republican statistics. Others are interpreta- tive - for example, what of the person who, his life disrupted by wars and migration, took refuge in reactionary love of the old ways and hatred of reform? To what extent did such persons cancel out the constituency for reform that was created in others? Much of my reason for advancing my thesis is the conviction that drastic change in environment must open men's minds to the possibility of changes in politics and society. I hope that further research will more surely demonstrate this to have been true in the Turkish Republic. FOUNDATIONSOF THETURKISH REPUBLIC 147 APPENDIX 1 REFUGEE MIGRATION INTO ANATOLIAN PROVINCES, 1921 TO 1927*

Proportion Refugee Recorded of Recorded Immigration Population Population Balikesir 37,088 421,066 .0881 Bursa 34,148 402,595 .0850 C,anakkale 10,856 181,735 .0597 Edirne 49,336 150,840 .3271 Izmir 30,095 526,955 .0572 Istanbul 35,487 794,444 .0447 Kirklareli 27,254 108,989 .2501 Kocaeli 20,470 286,600 .0714 Manisa 13,829 374,013 .0370 Nigde 15,671 166,056 .0944 Samsun 22,579 274,065 .0824 Tekirdag 30,243 131,446 .2301

Source:Annuaire Statistique de la Turquie,v. III, pp. 100and 101.

* The actual numbersof refugeesare much higherthan the figures above indicate.Refugees streamed into the Empireat the beginning of WorldWar One and continuedto cross the borders,especially in EasternAnatolia, throughoutthe war. Neitherthey nor the many unregisteredimmigrants are included in the figures.20The refugeesin Table2 are those whose refugeestatus resulted from the Population Exchangethat followedthe warbetween Greece and Turkey.

APPENDIX 2 PROPORTION ABLE TO READ (BOTH SEXES) IN SELECTED CITIES AND PROVINCES, 1927

City Province* Adana .1629 .0791 Ankara .3848 .1004 Diyarbakir .1502 .0341 Edirne .2324 .0963 Erzurum .1863 .0375 Istanbul .4275 .3942 Izmir .3304 .1734 Konya .2298 .0633 Maras .1235 .0359 Trabzon .2322 .0550 Van not available .0131 TURKISHREPUBLIC .0841

* Includes the city.

Source: 1927 Turkish Census. 148 MIDDLEEASTERN STUDIES APPENDIX 3 OWNERSHIP OF SELECTED MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES*. OTTOMAN EMPIRE, CA. 1913

Muslim Non-Muslim Government Unknown** Total Flour Milling 7 16 1 7 31 Macaroni Production 1 7 1 9 Carpentry and Cabinet Making 1 9 2 13 Metal Working 1 20 3 24 Oil 4 42 Printing 11 26 3 11 42

* As indicated by name of company. ** Names give no indication of ownership.

The above are obviously only major manufacturing concerns. 'Carpentry and Cabinet Making', for example, does not include local craftsmen who made chairs and tables for the common man. The following has been drawn from the 1329, 1331 Seneleri Sanayi Istatistigi, in which companies in various industries were listed by name. An example is the Macaroni industry: 1. Arslaniyan Ekmek ve Malulat-i Dakikiye ... 2. Islam Makarna Fabrikasi 3. Polizo ve Leko Makarna Fabrikasi 4. Rake BiraderlerMakarna Fabrikasl 5. Samolada Ibrisimci ve ~urekasl Makarna Fabrikasi 6. Kazilas Istimatyos Makarna Fabrikasi 7. Kiraste (CubuluKimon Makarna Fabrikasi 8. Mika Mahdumlarl Makarna Fabrikasi 9. Yildiz Makarna Fabrikasl Only the second number is (very) obviously a Muslim concern. Ownership of number nine is not verifiable. The rest appear to be Christian or Jewish concerns.

APPENDIX 4 LAND UNDER CULTIVATION (DONUMS) BY TYPE OF CROP AND GEOGRAPHIC AREA, OTTOMAN ANATOLIA IN 1909-10

Cereals Vegetables Cash Crops Central 19,353,776 343,827 1,835,319 (38.5%) (21.6%) (60.80%o) West 12,125,577 639,523 670,338 (24.1 %lo) (40.2%) (22.207o) East 11,795,826 247,424 335,348 (23.4%) (15.6%) (11.1%No) North 7,060,220 360,262 175,685 (14.0%1o) (22.6070) (05.807o) 50,335,399 1,591,036 3,016,690 FOUNDATIONSOF THETURKISH REPUBLIC 149

APPENDIX 4 (contd.) LANDUNDER CULTIVATION (DONJMS) BY TYPEOF CROPAND GEOGRAPHIC AREA,REPUBLICAN ANATOLIA IN 1927

Cereals Vegetables CashCrops Central 14,865,818 434,156 1,249,268 (42.6%) (26.5%) (48.1%) West 10,891,663 856,035 1,074,421 (31.20/0) (52.2%) (41.3%o) East 4,094,912 106,623 58,782 (14.1%) (06.5%) (02.30/o) North 4,234,490 243,187 217,400 (12.1%) (14.8Wo) (08.4Wo) 34,896,883 1,640,001 2,599,871

APPENDIX 5 PERSONNEL OF INDUSTRIES EMPLOYING FOUR OR MORE PERSONS,TURKEY, 1927

Numberof Industries 13,683 Owners: Aliens 642 (.0587) TurkishCitizens 10,299(.9413) Total 10,941 Employees: Aliens 702 (.0898) TurkishCitizens 7,115 (.9102) Total 7,817 Workers Under 14 Years of Age Aliens 103(.0045) Turkish Citizens 22,851 (.9955) Total 22,684 Workers Age 14 and Over Aliens 244 (.0020) Turkish Citizens 124,200 (.9980) Total 124,444

Source: Republique Turque, Presidence du Conseil, Office Centralde Statistique,Annuaire Statistique, Premier Volume, 1928, pp. 96-9. 150 MIDDLEEASTERN STUDIES

APPENDIX 6 TRADINGPARTNERS

A changein tradingpartners is an indicatorof changein the economicand political orientationof a country.Unfortunately, available commercial statistics do not allow an adequatecomparison of Turkishtrading partners in the Empireand the Republic. The closest possible comparisonis betweenthe statisticsof Empire-widetrade in 1329 (1913-14) and the statisticsof the Republicin 1923. The former statistics includedtrade of the Arab World, as well as that of Anatoliaand EasternThrace. The Arab Worldtrade made up 32 per cent of the total. Thus, strictcomparison of the two sets of statistics is impossible and no analysis of changes in trading partners had been attempted in this paper. Nevertheless,the trading record is perhaps indicativeof changesin tradeorientation:

MAIN TRADING PARTNERS, BY PERCENTAGEOF TOTAL TRADE. THE OTTOMANEMPIRE IN 1913-14AND THETURKISH REPUBLIC IN 1923

OttomanEmpire TurkishRepublic 1913-14 1923 IMPORTS England 20%o Italy 20% Austria-Hungary 15% England 17% Germany 11% France 9% France 9% U.S.A. 8% Russia 9% Germany 6% Italy 7% EXPORTS England 22% England 19% France 20% Italy 18% Austria-Hungary 10% France 12% Egypt 9% Germany 9% Germany 6% U.S.A. 8% U.S.A. 6% Holland 8%

Source: AnnuaireStatistique I, p. 107. Statistiquedu Commercede l'EmpireOttoman pendant l'anne'e1329 (1913-14), Constan- tinople, 1331,p. 11. It should be noted that the figuresin the table have been derivedfrom lists of official and legal trade, and this was by no means the only trade of the Ottoman Empire. FOUNDATIONS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 151

NOTES

1. Justin McCarthy,'The Populationof OttomanAnatolia from 1878 to 1927', unpub- lisheddoctoral dissertation, UCLA, 1978. 2. Ibid. 3. Theareas of the Ottomanvilayets of Hudavendigar,Aydin, Kastamonu, Trabzon, Sivas, Ankara,Konya, Adana, Bitlis, Mamuretulaziz,Diyarbakir, Van and Erzurumand the IndependentSancaks of Bolu, Canik,Izmit, Biga, Karahisar, Karasi, Kutahya, and Urfa. 4. McCarthy,op. cit. 5. 1927Turkish Census. 6. Basedon the percentageof widows recordedin the Turkishcensus of 1965 and 1970. Becauseof greaterfemale mortality due to deathsin childbirth,etc., the percentageof widowsin earlierperiods would have been lower, given normal events and peace. 7. AnnuaireStatistiquedela Turquie, v. III, 1930, p. 99. 8. Basedon the figuresfrom the 1930Annuaire Statistique and the populationsas recorded in the 1927 census. The 1927 census undercountedthe population, especiallyin the EasternRegion of Anatolia, but the undercountwas not sufficientto affect the results givenhere. 9. Seenote 7. 10. 1935Turkish census. 11. The figuresin this sectionare drawnfrom the 1330Nufus-i Umumi and the 1927Turkish census,both as correctedin McCarthy,op. cit. 12. For example,the same phenomenonis found in the smallermain cities of the Ottoman AydinVilayeti. Other cities have not beenexamined. 13. 1927Turkish census. 14. Ticaret ve Ziraat Nezareti, 1329, 1331 Seneleri Sanayi Istatistigi, Istanbul, 1333. 15. Ibid. Thenames of two couldnot be identified. 16. Orman ve Maaden ve Ziraat Nezareti, 1325 Senesi Asya ve Afrika-yi Osmanf Ziraat Istatistigi, Der Saadet, 1327. RepubliqueTurque, Office Centralde Statistique,Compte-Rendu du RecensementAgri- cole de 1927, Angora, 1928. 17. Ibid. The area of the Ottoman provinceof Aydin was made up by the Republican provincesof Aydin, Mugla,Denizli, Izmir, and Manisa. 18. AnnuaireStatistique, 1934/35. 19. Ibid. 20. It is not possibleto accuratelycorroborate these statisticsor to estimatethe numberof wartimerefugees into Anatolia by studyingthe 'Place of Birth' categoryin the 1927 Turkishcensus. Whenthe censuswas recordedthose who wereasked whether they had been bornin 'Turkey'were obviously confused as to the geographicarea covered by the designation 'Turkey'. Many born in areas that were in Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, and the ArabWorld in 1927,but in the OttomanEmpire when they wereborn, obviously consideredthat they had beenborn in 'Turkey'.Thus the numbersfor those bornoutside Turkeywere too low (458,756out of a total recordedpopulation of 13,648,270).

Muchof the informationin the sourcescited above is repeatedor supportedin other Republican yearbooks and Ottoman salnames. Volumes 3 to 10 of the yearbooks and the Aydin and Hudavendigar salnames are especially helpful.