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UNIVERSITEIT GENT

FACULTEIT POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN

Joint media and conflict resolution: challenges and opportunities. radio and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict

Wetenschappelijke verhandeling

22.601 woorden

THOMAS DEWEER"

MASTERPROEF MANAMA CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT

PROMOTOR: PROF. DR. CHRISTOPHER PARKER

COMMISSARIS: OMAR JABARY

ACADEMIEJAAR 2011 - 2012

" "

Inzagerecht in de masterproef (*)

Ondergetekende, ……………………………………………………. geeft hierbij toelating / geen toelating (**) aan derden, nietbehorend tot de examencommissie, om zijn/haar (**) proefschrift in te zien.

Datum en handtekening …………………………..

…………………………. Deze toelating geeft aan derden tevens het recht om delen uit de scriptie/ masterproef te reproduceren of te citeren, uiteraard mits correcte bronvermelding. ------(*) Deze ondertekende toelating wordt in zoveel exemplaren opgemaakt als het aantal exemplaren van de scriptie/masterproef die moet worden ingediend. Het blad moet ingebonden worden samen met de scriptie onmiddellijk na de kaft. (**) schrappen wat niet past

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" " ABSTRACT

Er bestaan talrijke projecten in verschillende conflictgebieden die gericht zijn op conflictresolutie. Ondanks het feit dat velen ondersteund worden door een resem donoren is de kloof tussen de praktijk en het academisch onderzoek dat het nut van dergelijke initiatieven aantoont opvallend. Het doel van deze thesis is dan ook een bijdrage te leveren aan het onderzoek over het functioneren van vredesmedia in een context van conflict. Meer specifiek zal de focus hier komen te liggen op gezamelijke media, waarbij leden van de verschillende tegenover elkaar staande groepen samenwerken. Dit gebeurt op zijn beurt in deze studie door middel van de exhaustieve studie van één specifieke case, All for Peace, een gezamelijke Israelisch-Palestijnse radio. Het onderzoek gebeurt in twee delen. Vooreerst wordt de achtergrond onderzocht waartegen All for Peace tot stand is gekomen, de historische evolutie van de vredesbeweging, het Palestijnse en Israelische medialandschap en historische precedenten. Vervolgens wordt er in een twee deel dieper ingegaan op de uitdagingen waarmee een dergelijke gezamelijke radio geconfronteerd wordt. Dit gebeurt door middel van een theoretische lens die als een rode draad functioneert doorheen de studie, de drie paradigma’s van Cottle, het ‘manufacturing contest paradigm’, het ‘media contest paradigm’ en het ‘media culture paradigm’. Deze paradigma’s verschaffen zo een inzicht omtrent de problematieken binnen het economische, politieke en culturele domein. Door een dergelijke aanpak is het uitgangspunt om tot een volledige analyse te komen. Zo is het doel een resultaat dat inzicht verschaft in het potentieel van het model waar All for Peace voor staat maar dat eveneens een kritische blik werpt en de belangrijkste uitdagingen schetst waarmee de gezamelijke radio geconfronteerd wordt.

" " Acknowledgements

The fact that you, the reader, are reading this thesis is the result of a process that wasn’t always self evident. The research and the processing of the data gathered is the preceding process that was made possible only thanks to the assistance of many. Likewise, I would like to grab this opportunity to try to transfer in these acknowledgements the gratitude that they deserve. First of all, I want to thank those close to me. Likewise, my parents always supported me throughout my studies. Giving me the freedom to follow my interests, they were always ready to give me advice and that little extra mental push to succeed in what I was doing. Furthermore, also my girlfriend Csilla Dobosi has to be thanked. She was always there, even if it mostly happened through Skype, to listen to my latest excitement on research findings or to give me the motivation to continue when I seemed stuck or when there seemed not to be an end in sight. Moreover her careful reading of this work and her critical remarks proved to be very useful. Next to that, this research would not have been possible either without the support and the resources made available by the Ghent University. Likewise, I want to express my sincerest gratitude towards my promoter Dr. Prof. Christopher Parker who gave the green light for this thesis and whose door was open for answering questions and giving advice. When conducting a fieldwork trip to Jordan, the practical experience and feedback proved to be a great asset when going further afterwards to East-. Moreover, I also want to thank VLIR-UOS that believed in the project and gave me a grant which was of great financial help. Furthermore, while conducting fieldwork in /Palestine I could count on the help of many. The beginning of my stay was difficult when it turned out that when trying to rent a flat in Jerusalem, I had run into a fraud trap. Nevertheless, I was helped out by Jenny Grant and her family, who offered me to stay at their place and were ready to support me. Afterwards, I had the chance of spending the rest of my stay in the Kenyon Institute. Living and researching there was a pleasant experience and likewise I want to thank its staff and inhabitants. The biggest part of my research was done at the studios of All for Peace. This was made possible by Mossi Raz, who deserves therefore special notice in these acknowledgements. Also the staff and many volunteers, such as the always present Yarden Amir, were helpful to answer my never-ending questions, to give me information and were eager to engage into discussions. People outside All for Peace that helped me and to whom I also would like to address my

" " gratitude are Ifat Maoz, Amal Jamal, Gadi Wolfsfeld, Mike Brand, Yanev Dayan and Yizhar Be’er.

" " Preface

Working on the thesis that I wrote last year on 'Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty: Broadcasting in a post Cold War era. Radio Slobodna Evropa and Radio Europa Libera as media of public diplomacy?' I was surprised by the difference of the mission set out by the board of RFE/RL and the situation on the ground. Likewise, I came to the conclusion that even though the model created originally by the United States as a public diplomacy tool and still to some extent set out to function between these lines, on the grounds journalists are embedded within their respective societies. Due to sincere idealism and longing for improvement, by leading the way, they show remarkable agency of working towards the positive evolution of the media landscape of their region. Research on community radio in Jordan conducted as part of a Ghent University fieldwork trip led by Dr. Prof. Christopher Parker learned me as well that even though the community model in itself sounds positive and the actors involved in the initiatives are often sincerely engaged, there are on the other hand red lines restricting the set out goals. Likewise, the model envisioned to pave the way to grassroots participation can be used top down as a steam pot, and consequently limiting the ability to induce structural changes. This lead me to the question of which role media can play in finding a solution to conflicts. Certainly in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, peace is a big structural change in two societies that are to a large extent shaped by the conflict. The research path described above led me to study All for Peace, a joint radio that aims at contributing to conflict resolution. Due to my earlier academic findings, I am particularly interested in the contradiction between sincere agency on the ground and the structural obstacles, economical, political or cultural, resulting from the specific context in which the initiatives are embedded. Both aspects are inspired respectively by the observations made when conducting fieldwork for my previous thesis research and the red lines limiting Jordanian community journalists. Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian struggle is an iconic strive about which much has been written and that has influenced ideas and policies far outside the small region where the tension is actually located. Therefore, studying All for Peace as a case of a joint media initiative in the volatile region seems to hold the potential for providing insight on media in conflict areas at large.

The form chosen for this research is the classical thesis format. I have done this in order to be able to process the large amount of information gathered during my fieldwork. Other formats

" " such as the academic article and the policy survey lead to a more narrow perspective which would have resulted in the fact that a lot of the knowledge collected would remain unprocessed due to a narrow focus. My point of departure is more that of a journey discovering what there is to know about the topic of joint media initiatives in this specific context, taking my time to understand thoroughly the background in which All for Peace functions. At the same time I am aware of the risk that this specific layout brings with it. It can of course not be the aim to present a long overview of all the information gathered. Throughout the chosen thesis format a clear aim has to be envisioned, writing with structure without letting the central questions out of sight. Furthermore, the specific choice has been made to write this study in English. Although it is not my mother tongue and I realise it doesn’t make my job easier, I have nevertheless chosen this path out of respect to those back in Israel/Palestine that were so willing to help me with my research. I do this since I believe writing my research in the current global ‘lingua franca’ will improve the accessibility of my work first of all for all those that have been so helpful during my fieldwork, but at the same time also to whoever is interested in the topic.

" " Acronyms

IDF: Israeli Defence Forces Hamas: Harakat al-Muqawamah al-‘Islamiyya = Islamic Resistance Movement PA: Palestinian Authority PACBI: for the Cultural Boycott of Israel PBC: Palestinian Broadcasting Cooperation PFLP: Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation PNN: Palestine News Network : Wikalat Anba' Falasteen = Palestine News Agency

" " Table of contents

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I. Introduction and problem statement"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888"" II. Methodology"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 2.1. Research design"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 2.2. Method for collecting data"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 2.3. Method for analyzing the data"8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 2.4. Terminology"8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " DDD8"..VQ`7"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888""

3.1. Media effects and agenda-setting"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888"" 3.2. Theoretical framework: the paradigms of Cottle"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 8888888888888888888888"" 3.2.1. The manufacturing consent paradigm"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 8888888888888888888888888888888"" 3.2.2. The media contest paradigm"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888"" 3.2.3. The media culture paradigm"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888"" D8">V:HVG%1CR1J$":JR"D=`:VC1L>:CV= 1J1:J"IVR1:"R" .V"HQJ V6 "GV.1JR"+CC"`Q`">V:HV"8888888888888888888888888888" "

4.1. Peacebuilding: the role of dialogue"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 4.1.1. Meeting the enemy"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 4.1.2. Oslo and the heyday of dialogue"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 4.1.3. Post-Oslo disillusion"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 4.1.4. A future for dialogue?"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 4.2. The Israeli and Palestinian media landscape"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888"" 4.2.1. The tribalised Israeli media landscape and the struggle of the Israeli-Palestinians to put forward their narrative"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888"" 4.2.2. The deficiencies of the state controlled Palestinian media model"888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 4.2.3. Potential for Alternatives?"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 4.3. ‘Give peace a chance’, from radio ‘kol esh-shaloom’ to radio ‘qol esh-shaloom’"888888888888888888888"" 4.3.1. The potential of radio"8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888"" 4.3.2. Abie Nathan’s peace ship"8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888"" 4.3.3. Peace from South Africa: RAM FM"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888"" 4.3.4. Political discussions on the air: All for Peace"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" "

" " 4.4. The All for Peace model and its use in practice"8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 4.4.1. Initiative and design"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 4.4.2. Agenda"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 8"..V"H.:CCVJ$V="`Q`"D=`:VC1L>:CV= 1J1:J"]V:HV"`:R1Q"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" "

5.1. Economical"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 5.1.1. David Ben Bassat and competition"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 5.1.2. Advertisements and donors"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 5.1.3. Manufacturing consent paradigm"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 5.2. Political"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 5.2.1. Political struggle?"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 5.2.2. Media contest paradigm"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 5.3. Cultural"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 5.3.1. A break with the dominant media culture"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 88888888888888888888888888" " 5.3.2. Palestinian-Israeli asymmetry"88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " 5.3.3. Media and the culture of peacebuilding"888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " D8"0QJHC%=1QJ"8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" " ,1GC1Q$`:].7"8888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888" "

" " I. Introduction and problem statement

“Every bullet shot in Bosnia was supported by media activities. The war definitely wouldn’t have been so cruel and bloody without media hate speech,” these are the words of an editor- in-chief of a prominent Sarajevo based magazine (Buric, 2000, p. 67). Yugoslavia, beginning of the 90’s, Serbian and Croatian state owned media portray massacres from the past and as such revive the ghosts of the Second World War and plant the seeds of fear that such events would repeat themselves. National identities are carved out and emphasised, while the other ethnic communities are demonised. Political ownership of media channels had a clear purpose, that of the promotion of ethnic nationalism. It is us or them, with this message leaders as Milosovic and Tudjman prepared their respective populations for war, legitimising even ethnic cleansing. Roman-Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbians and Islamic Bosniaks, groups that used to live next to each other found themselves now as a consequence on opposing sides of the battlefield (Buric, 2000; Kent & Taylor, 2000). Or a better known example, Rwanda 1994 Radio Mille Collines, and other partisan media channels, tell their listeners to crush ‘the cockroaches’. The insects referred to are the Hutus. Differences between Tutsis and Hutus are emphasised, among others the superiority and majority of the latter. Biased voices warn of Tutsis infiltrating with the aim of restoring past repression and the plan to exterminate all Hutus. Even throughout the genocide incitement continues and instructions are given on how to carry out the slaughter (Forges, 1999; Kirschke, 1996).

As illustrated above, the contribution of media to atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda has been carefully researched, recognising the negative role that media can play in conflict. The opposite research, which is one going into media and peacebuilding, has on the other hand remained understudied. On the ground international donors and NGOs fund and actively promote media initiatives whose aim is conflict resolution and reconciliation. As such, the international community has invested a lot of money in independent media.1 On the other hand, the field has been to a large extent neglected by academics. Likewise, there seems to be a disparity between the initiatives on the ground claiming to ensure certain goals and thorough academic research documenting the functioning and potential of these initiatives (Gilboa, 2009). In the last years, however, this gap in the research agenda has been recognised by some """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 1 In the case of Bosnia the promotion of independent media by the international community has been carefully illustrated in ‘Media Transitions in Bosnia: From Propagandistic Past to Uncertain Future’, an article written by Kent & Taylor (2000). " " media scholars.2 Vladimir Bratic, an academic coming originally from Sarajevo, concludes for example a field examining article in 2008 as follows, “This study should be seen as an initial attempt to identify most peace-oriented media projects in order to encourage further academic research on the topic. Further explanation of the relationship between media and peace is seriously needed. Therefore, it is my hope that this research will encourage discussion, evaluation, and, perhaps mobilize efforts that may contribute toward peace developments in all societies in conflict” (Bratic, 2008, p. 501). Consequently, the aim of this research can be seen as an answer to this call and aims to be a contribution to the field.

The choice has been made to go into a specific kind of media, more specifically joint media operating in conflict areas. Borrowing from an UNIDIR report (Atieh, Ben-Nun, Shahed, Taha & Tulliu, 2004), this ‘category’ is interpreted in this thesis as projects bringing together journalists from opposing communities. Such a programme aims at overcoming ethnocentric reporting and building networks across borders. Moreover, as a meeting place for people coming from different backgrounds different point of views will be portrayed leading to dialogue. Furthermore, the research is set in a specific context as well, that of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Middle Eastern society between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean is the typical example of a divided one. and Palestinians are not only separated by generations of conflict, nowadays also by a wall. It is this wall that has become the powerful symbol of the division between the two communities, a separation that is not only physically, but that also exists mentally in the head of individuals. Moreover, since such a clear separation is standing in the way, and Palestinians don’t bother to ask themselves what is happening on the other side. Instead, stereotypes are created, a point of view that is black and white, allowing very little grey. As such, both communities see themselves as the victims and ‘the other’ as the ‘Zionist coloniser’ or the ‘terrorist’. Likewise, the truth has become something relative, depending on the community the individual is part of and which historical narrative is being employed (Isacoff, 2005). Moreover, as an iconic struggle about which much has been written and that has influenced ideas and policies far outside the small region where the tension is actually located. Likewise, the aim is to expand the observations made from a specific case study set to this background in order to provide insight on joint media in conflict areas at large.

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 2 Among others Bratic, 2008 & Gilboa, 2009. " "

In 1977, prior to the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Anwar Sadat made an iconic visit to the Israeli and had the following message: “Yet, there remains another wall. This wall constitutes a psychological barrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection; a barrier of fear, or deception, a barrier of hallucination without any action, deed or decision. A barrier of distorted and eroded interpretation of every event and statement” (Sadat, 1977). The issue pinpointed at by the former Egyptian president seems to be, as illustrated, above an endemic problem in Israel/Palestine and to some extent between Israel and its Arab neighbours. That this barrier of ‘distorted interpretation’ exists in the Palestinian and Israeli media is shown by different monitoring organisations such as Palestinian Media Watch, MiftaaH, Keshev and the Ilam Media Center (Iram et al., 2009; Jamal & Massalha, 2012; Marcus & Zilberdik, 2011). Biased and distorted information produced by both sides makes the mental wall only higher and is as a consequence also criticised by prominent communication scholars as Gadi Wolfsfeld. “At least a part of the responsibility should be attributed to the news media. It may not be appropriate to blame the messenger for bringing bad news. On the other hand when messengers tell only one side of a story they can be certainly be hold accountable for the consequences” (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p. 219). The peace movement looking to build towards solutions for the conflict has since the last decennium among other methods focused on media. One of the organisations that is the result of this approach is All for Peace. This media institution, based in East-Jerusalem, will be taken as the dominant case of this research. The joint Palestinian-Israeli radio station broadcasts from through a license it obtained from the Palestinian Authority. As a central aim, the organisation aims at providing a platform for dialogue between the two communities. Moreover, the radio also fights alienation and stereotypes. On its website All for Peace describes its role as follows: “A central aspect of the conflict between the two people arises from the distance and alienation between them. Common sense dictates that the more we know about each other the less we will hate, be angry at and fear each other. … Showing the true face of each side will assist in grappling with these obstacles, which have been built up over the years of the conflict, and will assist in opening hearts towards the better days to come.”(http://allforpeace.org/eng/about, n.d., 1 June 2012). Moreover, many programmes are made by actors from the local civil society. The idea behind this is to support and enhance the organisational and communicational capacity of Israeli and Palestinian civil society groups in order to ensure greater impact over public opinion and policy directives in both societies (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012).

" "

Building further on the above, the main question of this research will be the following one. How do joint media initiatives as All for Peace function, why are they taking up this mission, who are the actors involved and what are the main political, economical and cultural challenges encountered while trying to execute their goals? Utilising this specific focus for the analysis of All for Peace will lead to the research focus to be twofold. First of all, I want to understand how this specific organisation came into being. Being part of the peace movement it has as such, been shaped by the trial and error of its call for conflict resolution and reconciliation. Likewise, the following question can be raised. How did this particular background lead to the creation of the joint media discourse? Moreover, as a media organisation, All for Peace is embedded within a specific media landscape. Understanding this field will lead us to a better interpretation of the studied radio. What is the relation of the organisation with the wider media setting and who are the main actors involved? Furthermore, after understanding the context that made All for Peace the institute it is today, the second research question goes into the current challenges the organisation faces. Can the joint media initiative overcome mere idealism or do obstacles push it back between certain red lines? More specifically, attention is given to economical, political and cultural challenges and how All for Peace deals with them. Questions come up as how does the political establishment react to these initiatives? Are they regarded as a threat for certain policy agendas, rather harmless since they are seen as part of the margins, or encouraged? A second issue is the economic viability of the joint radio. Who is financially supporting these initiatives and does this support mean something is asked in return? Also, are joint media institutes seen as a threat to other players on the media market? Thirdly, going into the cultural sphere the question can be raised on how Israeli and Palestinian culture shapes these initiatives. Are these media organisations culturally accepted? And if yes, how does the specific cultural context influence the structure and functioning of these institutes. And finally, as an overarching question, do these challenges impede joint media initiatives of acting upon their goals? How do they cope with these difficulties? In order to understand the possible economical, political and cultural challenges better, we will go deeper into these questions using the three paradigms of Cottle which will be further explained in the chapter on theory.

But before going into this theoretical framework employed in the second part of the research, in the next chapter the methodology utilised will be drawn out. In order to understand the

" " process of analysis it is important to have first of all a brief introduction into the research design. In the blueprint of how the study is done, it is explained why and how the case study approach is adopted. Furthermore, it is necessary as well to make it clear how the data has been collected and how afterwards this information has been analysed. Finally, short mention is given to the terminology employed and why the choice for certain specific jargon has been made. After understanding how the research has been done, the next part will go into the theoretical aspects. As such, the academic background behind the discourse of joint media will be uncovered. This will lead afterwards to pinpoint the lack of studies done in the field. Moreover, light will be shed as well on the ongoing theoretical discussions. Having made clear the methodology and the theoretical framework employed, in the following two chapters the actual research findings will be presented. As already mentioned while putting forward the research questions, the study is conducted in two parts. Likewise, in the first part attention is given to the specific context that made All for Peace to the institute that it is today. As a peace initiative it is influenced by the evolution within the peace movement. Next to that, being a media organisation means finding itself embedded in a specific media context. And finally, as a radio that sees working towards peace as a central aim, prominent precedents have paved the way. The first research part ends by looking at our case in the light of this context. All for Peace, the idea behind it, how it functions and the main actors involved, is brought to the fore. This leads us then to the second research part in which the economical, political and cultural challenges, to the model and more specifically to All for Peace are drawn out. Utilising the three paradigms of Cottle as a framework and set out against the findings from the preceding chapter, we try to pinpoint the main obstacles. Finally then, this thesis is completed by the conclusion in which the most important findings will be summarised in the light of joint media initiatives in conflict areas at large. All for Peace is the central case studied here, but some of the findings can also lead us to draw lessons for similar initiatives worldwide. We will have to recognise the need for continue research that might utilise the findings of this research. Some final questions generated by this research hope to point to other research gaps and trigger further study.

 " " II. Methodology

2.1. Research design In the introduction the problem statement and the research questions have been set out. But in order to bring the research to a successful conclusion, it is important to draw out a research design that will be followed throughout the study. Working within this framework will help to identify which material has to be gathered and how it has to be analysed. As such, below it is explained why the choice has been made to conduct an explanatory case study and how it will be put into practice.

First of all, in this study there is one central case that of All for Peace. A case is always the case of something, for this study it is one of joint media in a conflict situation. Furthermore, borrowing from John Gerring (2004, p. 342) the aim of the case study is to conduct an “intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”. This unit is bounded in space and is being studied at a specific time. As such, the spatial limits of All for Peace can be drawn alongside the boundaries of the Palestinian and Israeli media landscape of which they form part. Furthermore, the specific time during which the radio is studied is the period when fieldwork is being conducted in the region from the 22nd of April till the 27th of May 2012 and events taking place a month afterwards. The larger class of similar units about which Gerring speaks in his definition, that we want to understand, are similar joint media initiatives. In this study the choice has been made to do an into depth study of just one unit. Many case studies work comparatively, going deeper into different cases on the basis of a fixed set of variables. Here however, due to the lack of such studies in the field of joint media, the approach is to focus on one organisation in particular. Trying to understand one initiative completely has the advantage that a broad perspective is kept towards all the elements involved in the functioning of the institute and that what happens around it. Otherwise, one might be restricted to categories with clear boundaries which on the field itself are not always that relevant. Nevertheless, preceding dialogue organisations and similar past radio initiatives within Israel/Palestine will come to the fore, looking into the aspect of how their trial and error has influenced All for Peace. Furthermore, the type of research conducted is that of the explanatory research. Instead of a mere description of the facts found on the ground, this thesis will try to go behind them and ask the ‘why questions’. Doing this will lead to causal explanations (Vaus, 2001). As such,  " " this study is not a description of All for Peace on the basis of certain elements but following the set out research questions aims at understanding. Likewise, in the first part the goal is to comprehend how the model came to be. Secondly, by employing the three paradigms of Cottle as the theoretical framework, the aim is to understand the challenges faced by the joint radio. Finally, it is important to realise as well that it is an illusion that knowledge gathered from this specific case is totally exemplary for joint media initiatives at large. This is certainly true since the Israeli-Palestinian context is highly specific and thus leads to the formation of All for Peace as a unique case. Unequalled in the sense that the organisation would have been formed totally different if it had been part of a different set of circumstances. Nevertheless, through the analysis made hereafter, information can be gathered that can be tested against joint media models set out by donors and actors alike. Furthermore, with this hopefully thoroughly conducted study, the analysis made here can be re-used comparatively in future studies.

2.2. Method for collecting data Following the advice written by the sociologist C. Wright Mills in the appendix of his ‘Sociological imagination’ (1959), when staying in from the 22nd of April till the 27th of May 2012 I decided to keep a research file. Moreover, I haven’t seperated my life in the region from the more formal acts of research. Since I consider it to be important to understand the context that you write about, my thesis is also shaped to some extent by my personal experiences in Israel/Palestine. As such, notes in my research file are written down on different occasions, varying from thoughts coming from observations made at the All for Peace studios to conversations with demonstrators at the Friday protests. The core of these notes concerns the observations made at the radio itself. Trying to make myself useful in the daily functioning of the organisation and meeting the people involved aimed at getting a complete picture of All for Peace. Next to this participatory approach, I have conducted some in-depth interviews with various central actors involved in the joint radio. Furthermore, while helping out in trying to find funding from various donors I had the chance to get an insight into the process, had access to communication and grant applications. Besides the field research conducted at All for Peace, I further explored the surrounding context. Likewise, I did a series of semi structured interviews with academics, actors that are or used to be involved in similar initiatives and media activists. PACBI, Palestinians for the

 " " Cultural Boycott of Israel, however preferred to answer my questions through e-mail. So instead of interview notes, the material on the dilemma faced by Palestinians in joint media initiatives is gathered through the internet. Finally, also a thorough study of literature on the topic, on subjects related and on the Israeli/Palestinian context were crucial in order to shape the theoretical framework and to understand the background. As my bibliography consists of publications that I received in Israel/Palestine itself, books from the Ghent University library, articles out of different academic journals accessed through the internet, information gathered throughout my last years of university studies and finally of policy documents written by international organisations and donors.

2.3. Method for analyzing the data After gathering the data as described above, the next task is to analyse it. For the first research question that goes into the background of how All for Peace came to be, I fall back on my research file, the interviews conducted and background literature. When approaching the context I make distinctions between the peace movement, the media landscape and like minded radio initiatives. After making this thematic classification I process them chronologically. Afterwards, when going into the second research question, I loosely draw the outline from the theoretical framework of media and conflict developed by Simon Cottle (2004). This forms a structural guideline through which the information gathered throughout the participative observation during a period between the 29th of April till the 23th of May will be analysed. While conducting this exercise, the context explored in the first part will always be considered.

2.4. Terminology The choice of words when talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tends to be highly political. In a struggle, where identity is a core issue, even the used vocabulary can be part of an approach to use a specific narrative. In order to be as objective as possible and also to avoid confusion, there I have chosen to use a fixed jargon. As such, Israel/Palestine is used when talking about the combination of Israel, the and the Gaza Strip. Israel is used when talking about the territory within the 1967 borders, with the addition of East-Jerusalem, which despite its separate identity is completely integrated within the Israeli state structure.

 " " As the situation of the Palestinians within East-Jerusalem is often distinct from the ones in Israel or in the West Bank or Gaza, I will often refer to them seperately. Next, when talking about Palestinians living in Israel and who have the Israeli passport I refer to them Palestinian-Israelis, instead of within Israel as some Israelis prefer to call them. I do this because, if I used the term Arab Israelis I would ignore their distinct Palestinian identity. Moreover, on the ground they do regard themselves as Palestinian, with the difference that they do have an Israeli passport. Furthermore, Palestinians living either on the West Bank or in Gaza will be referred to by their geographic location when the context isn’t clear.

Besides, I make a difference between conflict resolution and reconciliation. Likewise, resolution is the first step when aiming to the end of a conflict, it is the formal agreement negotiated by leaders from the different groups involved. Reconciliation on the other hand, is regarded as going beyond the mere official accords and seeks a sustainable change of behavior of those involved in the struggle. Johan Galtung associates conflict resolution as going hand in hand with ‘negative peace’, which is characterised by an absence of violence. In line with this theoretical analysis reconciliation is interpreted as ‘positive peace’, which goes beyond the end of fighting and means the creation of new relations between former enemies (Gilboa, 2009). According to conflict theories, resolution has to take place before reconciliation and All for Peace is first of all trying to create a culture of peace, by leading the example to show that dialogue is possible and that ideas are out there. As such, civil society aims at pressuring its leaders to retake dialogue with representatives from the other community. Nevertheless, All for Peace states that it attempts to prepare people from both societies for the life after the conflict and therefore carries elements of conflict reconciliation in their mission as well (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). Since resolution is taking place before reconciliation, the leaders have to be willing to negotiate following the pressure from their populations and the change of mentality in the communities at large before reconciliation takes place. Therefore, I will be mainly go into conflict resolution and when focusing on reconciliation clear mention will be made.

 " " III. Theory

3.1. Media effects and agenda-setting Media initiatives as All for Peace base themselves on the premise that media can at least be a factor in influencing peoples’ perception of each other. The idea that media effects the way their consumers think, goes back a long way. Walter Lippmann, as early as 1922, claims in his classical work ‘Public Opinion’, “that people often don’t act on the basis of actual facts and events, but on the basis of what they think is the real situation as they perceive it from the press” (Weimann, 2000, p. 3). Realities are as such to some extent reconstructed by a set of influences outside the observer. C. Wright Mills goes as far to argue that men live in ‘second- hand worlds’. In order to avoid the insecurity of not knowing, a set of stereotyped meanings and possible interpretations is available. Therefore, the images individuals employ are borrowed from a crowd of witnesses with whom the individual never had any direct contact (Van Ginneken, 1998). Likewise, media is an important factor in creating perceptions utilised by individuals to look at the world. That media has an effect is widely recognised but to which extent it has an influence is still the topic of academic discussion. There are largely two schools. The first one is the ‘powerful media paradigm’. This framework believes that media has a very strong influence on our perceptions and echoes as such Walter Lippmann. While dominant mostly in the beginning of the 20th century, the academic scene has recently seen a return to the concept. Contemporary researchers adhering this school interpret media effects to be indirect and accumulative, able to induce changes for a long period of time when certain messages are repeated. Researchers connected with the second school, that of the ‘limited effect paradigm’, believe that media consumers are not passive receivers of information. Since individuals select the information themselves, media only has a limited potential and cannot impose the way of thinking (Weimann, 2000). Limited or powerful media influence, no agreement exists on the extent of media effects. Another element that is associated with the debate is the issue of agenda setting. Even if the press does not have an influence on how people think about an issue, this theoretical framework states that it influences nevertheless that what people think about. By repeating a topic several times or by placing emphasis on it, media consumers learn to attach importance to a certain issue. As such, also the agenda of political actors may be affected by that what is covered in the press (McCombs, 2002).

" "

While the theories described above have been studied extensively using empirical research, there seems to be a research gap between them that was transferred to cases of media and peacebuilding. To what extent does peace oriented media have an influence on the reduction of conflict? A rare existing study in this context is a workshop organised on the effects of the Israeli/Palestinian joint adaption of Sesame Street. Extensive analysis of perceptions of kids from both communities towards each other was done before and after the programme started airing on television. This was done in order to research if there was any change in the mentality towards peers from the other group. Conclusions were largely positive. Mostly the Jewish kids changed their attitudes towards their Palestinian counterparts. The other way round changes were less drastically though. Palestinian children kept a largely negative vision towards adults from the opposing community, but on the other hand utilised friendship justifications towards their peers (Cole et al., 2003). More studies on media in conflict ridden societies have to be done in order to generalise these conclusions. As such, the extent of media influence and consequently its potential for changing the mindset of people can be questioned in order to prepare them for conflict resolution. Nevertheless, there is a shared belief that media can at least affect that what individuals think about and as such set the agenda. Therefore, joint media initiatives take it as a valid starting point that they can have an impact on their audiences, maybe not on their mentalities but at least on the issues thought about. This study won’t take a place in the discussion between the ‘powerful media’ and the’ limited effect paradigm’, nor judge to which extent agenda setting can weigh on the reality. The aim of this thesis is to understand the discourse between joint media organisations and the political, economical and cultural challenges that they face. Concerning the first part of the research question, it is important though to realise that the idea that media can at least have some influence is a crucial theoretical element behind the discourse that shapes joint media initiatives. The aim of improving the members’ mentalities of both communities towards each other is also a focal point in dialogue theories which are explained in the first part of the body of this thesis.

3.2. Theoretical framework: the paradigms of Cottle “Though conflicts for the most part originate in the social world beyond the media, it is through the different media of journalism and the circulations of news that many of them become publicly known and often pursue” (Cottle, 2006, p. 185). With these words Simon

" " Cottle places himself in the media effect debate and shows his reader the importance of understanding the relation between media and conflict. Therefore, it will be the theoretical framework described in his book on mediatised conflict that will function as a guideline throughout the second part of this study. The paradigms of Cottle are three sets of lenses through which the relation between media and conflict can be analysed (Cottle, 2006). Likewise, in what follows, the ‘manufacturing consent paradigm’, the ‘media contest paradigm’ and the ‘media culture paradigm’ will be briefly described.

3.2.1. The manufacturing consent paradigm The first angle that can be utilised for studying the relation between media and conflict is that of the manufacturing consent paradigm. This lens goes into media ownership by stating that broadcasting and publishing organisations are influenced by those who possess them. This can range from simple promotional purposes to ideological motivations. Therefore, media will mostly defend the economical and political structures of which it is a part and thus marginalise oppositional voices. Embedded in capitalist market structures, media is first of all profit oriented. As such, it will fend off images and ideas that might break its hegemony and will support those that sustain or further expand its position (Cottle, 2006). This frame was dominant in the 1960’s and 70’s. It echoes theories of the Frankfurter Schule on the culture industry and is borrowed by Cottle largely from the interpretation of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky in their work ‘Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media’ (1988). Adorno and Horkheimer analysed for example that media and by extent the culture industry are instruments in the hands of the ruling class through which the masses are deceived. Marcuse added on his turn that the dominant media structures allow very little room for oppositional voices. Therefore, traditional mediation systems through which individuals and those in power negotiate have been largely erased (Calhoun & Karaganis, 2001). Herman and Chomsky speak about five filters utilised by the ‘powerful’ to control the media in order to protect their interests. The first filter, is the concentration of ownership and a strategy oriented towards profit. A second one, pinpointed at is that of advertisements functioning as a primary source of income. Thirdly, Chomsky and Herman speak about the sources of information and the privilege to get access. Flak, is a fourth element, under which the researchers understand the direct or indirect disciplining of media. This can cause in its turn a chilling effect on journalists. Finally, as a fifth filter, the work on manufacturing consent distinguishes dominant ideologies, creating a framework of what is ‘political correct’.

" " Herman and Chomsky refer in this context for example to the overarching sphere of anti communism which was in existence in the United States at the time of their writing (Chomsky & Herman, 1988).

3.2.2. The media contest paradigm The ‘media contest paradigm’ sees media not as something in the stable hands of those in power but as something more dynamic. This second frame sees the media sphere as a place where power struggle takes place with the aim of getting access, influencing the messages put forward by the press (Cottle, 2006). Gadi Wolfsfeld mentions in his ‘Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East’ the fact that “each antagonist attempts to promote its own frames of the conflict to the news media in an attempt to mobilize political support for its cause” ” (Gadi Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 81). Borrowing from the Israeli researcher the paradigm puts forward five arguments. First of all, Wolfsfeld claims that in the first place it is the political process that influences the news then it is the other way round (Wolfsfeld, 1997). In another work on the relation of media and peace the researcher specifies and deals with the politics-media-politics cycle. In this sequence of events what happens in the political domain is taken over by the media. The reporting on its turn then has an influence on the governmental level (Wolfsfeld, 2004). A second element distinguishes the level of control of those in power over the political sphere as a key variable determining the relation between news and conflict. Thirdly, this control is not something stable but varies through time and can change through circumstances. As a fourth argument, competition for access to the media happens in two dimensions, on the structural and the cultural level. Finally, it is also stated that in a conflict those who established a form of control over the production of information before the struggle takes place, hold a comparative advantage towards those who challenge their power (Cottle, 2006; Wolfsfeld, 1997).

3.2.3. The media culture paradigm The last paradigm described by Cottle is the ‘media culture paradigm’. Employing this lens, a specific focus is given to the culture sphere in which media is embedded. More specifically, according to this frame it is the cultural background that helps shaping values and world views applied. It is through this frame that news is produced. Therefore, when researchers

" " want to understand the media in a region, it is crucial to understand the cultural elements that are part of the media culture (Cottle, 2006).

" " IV. Peacebuilding and Israeli/Palestinian media - the context behind All for Peace

4.1. Peacebuilding: the role of dialogue The technique of joint media is one of the many methods that aims at conflict resolution that has been used throughout the Palestinian-Israeli struggle. The objective of this chapter is to give a short overview of the peace process. What has been the role of dialogue between the two communities in this process and how did these dialogue initiatives evolve and got transformed among others into joint media initiatives such as All for Peace? Furthermore, the goal of this part is also to research the mutual influence that the conflict and the various peace initiatives had on each other. Which lessons were learned and how did they affect the functioning of current organisations?

4.1.1. Meeting the enemy Ifat Maoz (interview, 2012, 17 May), professor at the Hebrew University and specialised in the dynamics of intergroup communication, points at Herbert Kelman as the pioneer of dialogue initiatives. The Austrian born academic conducted various dialogue workshops from the 70’s onwards, in which the Palestinian and Israeli elite could meet informally abroad, outside the eye of the media and within an academic framework. This wasn’t self evident, certainly since at that time meeting the enemy was seen as illegal and even punishable. Kelman however, saw positive aspects of such an exercise. He describes them as twofold. First of all, the ambition was that the participants had a more differentiated image of the other after conducting the meetings. Secondly, in order to have any effect of these workshops, the newly gained insights were taken back into the political debate and to the decision making process of the participants’ respective communities (Kelman, 1993). Throughout his many articles that were the result of his practical experiences in the dialogue workshops, Kelman defined what he saw as the main obstacle for peacebuilding during the 70’s and the 80’s. The most important challenge was the refusal from both sides to recognise each other’s existence as a national entity. The PLO, the Palestinian Libaration Organisation, withheld itself from recognising Israel’s right to exist. On the other hand, Israel didn’t see the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinians and even some doubted if Palestinians really existed as a separate Arab identity. In this context Golda Meir’s rhetorical question, “Who are the Palestinians?”, is worth mentioning. As a result, in official multiparty meetings concerning the conflict, the debate was conducted only with the ‘official’ neighbouring Arab states.

 " " The mutual refusal of each other’s nationhood was, and to some extent is till today, the result of the view that each identity is incompatible with the other. Palestinians saw the recognition of the Jewish state at the expense of their ‘homeland’, just as Israelis feared that a state called Palestine would lead to a claim to the whole region. Thus, recognising the claims of the other was perceived as self-destructing. But as Kelman states in his work, a sustainable solution can only be worked on if there is a minimum level of mutual recognition. But due to the strong fear that this might lead to the destruction of the own identity the stakes are very high. A dilemma was thus obstructing the road to meaningful negotiations. On the one hand, recognition from the other was sought in order to assure safety and identity justice. But on the other hand, the act of recognising the other in return was seen as self-destructing. A solution though is to diversify the image of the enemy through understanding his motives. As such, it is important to realise that there is someone on the other side to talk with and something to talk about, understanding that mutual concessions will create a new situation. To come to this point takes time and Kelman sought to pave the way through the preparatory discussions conducted in his unofficial dialogue workshops (Kelman, 1978 & 1987).

4.1.2. Oslo and the heyday of dialogue It was a similar dialogue that was moderated behind the public eye by the Norwegians and that led eventually to the Oslo Accords. Essential to this breakthrough is the official recognition of each other as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian and Israeli nation. The PLO was now seen as more than a terrorist organisation, just as the organisation refrained from denying Israel its right to exist. The technique of mutual recognition seemed to have worked and a further process of negotiations was set in motion aiming at a permanent settlement (Kelman, 1997; Rynhold, 2008). This process was envisioned to be gradual, with each implementation leading to a next one (Barak, 2005). The breakthrough in the peace process also had very tangible effects on the Israeli-Palestinian civil society. Before signing the ‘Declaration of Principles’, cooperation between the two sides was limited to the activities organised by communists on both sides and the radical Israeli left, and was thus far from the more mainstream agenda (Kahanoff, Nasralah, Neumann & Salem, 2007). After Oslo, there was even an institutionalisation of dialogue initiatives through the people to people activities, which are written in the 1995 ‘Interim Agreement’. As such, in Annex VI, Article VIII it is for example stated that “the two sides shall cooperate in enhancing dialogue and relations between their peoples, as well as in

 " " gaining a wider exposure of the two publics to the peace process, its current situation and predicted results” (Oslo II, 1995). The many dialogue projects were seen as a way to strengthen the peace process (Kahanoff et al., 2007). It was the idea that after the top down agreements achieved by the leadership of both communities, there was a need as well for bottom up peacebuilding (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May). In order to achieve successful implementation of the peace process and to avoid relapse into conflict, there had to be a grassroots social and psychological transition in both communities (Maoz, 2004). It is an argument inspired on the theory of multi-track diplomacy (www.imtd.org, 2012, 13 July). Pioneered by the American diplomat Joseph Monteville in the 1980’s, it proposes a series of other forms of mediation next to the first track of government led negotiations. A crucial track is as such that of citizen diplomacy. Diamond & Notter describe it as “building a human infrastructure of people who are committed to engendering a new “peace culture” within the social fabric of communal and inter-communal life” (Diamond & Notter, 1996, p. 6). Ifat Maoz (interview, 2012, 17 May) refers to the post Oslo period as the ‘heyday of dialogue’. A lot of projects could be found under the people to people umbrella and a lot of funding was given to these initiatives, estimated at a sum of 20 to 25 million US dollar. Initially, the financial support came from Norway, which was the principal third party in the Oslo process, but later also many other donors joined, among others the European Union, Belgium, Canada, Ireland and Denmark (Kahanoff et al., 2007). Although nice in theory, in practice and large in financial scope, post Oslo dialogue initiatives faced series of problems. Initiatives in the people-to-people field were first of all very heterogeneous due to the fact that there wasn’t a single definition accepted by all stakeholders. Moreover, there was a lack of clear leadership, coordinating the various activities. This resulted in a wide span of activities, each one of them going into the diverse interests and agendas of the different actors (Hai & Herzog, 2005 & 2006). Furthermore, due to the lack of control and limited assessment there was a lot of corruption, leading to wasted money (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May). Another point of criticism is that the initiatives conducted barely had an impact on the public opinion (Kahanoff et al., 2007). As such, the different dialogue projects reached only about 3 % of the Israeli population. And this small group mainly consists of people who are already convinced of the need for cooperation. A common profile would be that of a left wing activist, often over 50 years old, a European woman, well educated and with a rather high socio-economic status. Consequently, it is a group that is hardly representative for the Israeli society as a whole (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May).

 " " 4.1.3. Post-Oslo disillusion Although Oslo took the crucial step of mutual recognition and seemed to pave the way to sincere dialogue, peace was far from obtained and disillusion quickly followed. Different reasons have been given for the failure of the peace process and much has been written. Taking a look at high level politics it was clear that the most difficult issues crucial for the identity of both communities were being postponed, believing that it would be easier to tackle them later. Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements on the West Bank, the issue of the Palestinian refugees and the outlook of the Palestinian state and its borders, are such points on which conflicting narratives existed. Waiting to agree on these issues till time would have brought both groups closer together proved to be in vain. The situation on the ground declined and the peace process lost its momentum (Barak, 2005). The biggest post-Oslo dramas that lead to a different atmosphere were the killings of 29 Palestinians in Hebron’s cave of the patriarchs committed by Baruch Goldstein on the 28th of February 1994 and the assassination of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin at a peace rally in on the 4th of November 1995. The former, was followed by violent Palestinian reactions (Spinzak, 2000). But also religious Palestinian terrorist acts happened during this period, all culminating in a feeling of heightened insecurity. Moreover, a vital blow to Palestinian identity issues was given when practice showed that the Palestinian National Authority was barely a state and merely encouraged to perform as one. (Barak, 2005). A cycle of violence showed that the peace process was in clear decline at the end of the 90’s. Prime minister Ehud Barak consequently tried at Camp David to push towards a final agreement covering all issues and thus ending the conflict for good. Arafat who refused to sign the far-reaching compromises was blamed not to be a partner for peace. The Israelis who viewed their offer as quite generous perceived this as a Palestinian betrayal of the peace process. Likewise, the Palestinians also felt betrayed by the Israelis whom they judged to be creating facts on the ground while the process dragged on. These frustrations culminated in the reaction to Sharon’s provocative visit to the Temple Mount. The following years are known as the Al Aqsa or Second Intifada, a period that seemed to mean the end of any hope for reconciliation (Barak, 2005; Said, 2003). What is described above are the hard facts on the ground that lead to the failure of the Oslo process. But there also seemed to be at least a partial neglect of a vital element of the conflict, the fact that it is not just an inter group struggle, but also an intra group one (Kelman, 1993). It is as such more than just a conflict between states, also non-uniform actors that are hard to pinpoint are involved. Oren Barak in his article on ‘The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process’, criticises the fact that “tools applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have

 " " drawn on the legacy of peacemaking in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was one of peacemaking between states, despite the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, essentially, an intergroup conflict” (Barak, 2005, p. 3) While it were the Labour politicians on the Israeli and the PLO on the Palestinian side who started the process, they were never representing their communities as a whole. The ideal that a higher level of trust would be reached when cooperating in the peace process was as such countered by the fact that the Israelis and Palestinians were internally divided. Likewise, hardliner point of views that seemed to be either buried or marginal, quickly resurfaced when the circumstances changed (Kelman, 2004). They were allowed a forum, and even succeeded to influence the mainstream debate when the situation on the ground seemed to show that the main promises of the peace process, security in the case of Israel and recognition of its identity in the case of Palestine were not fulfilled (Barak, 2005).

4.1.4. A future for dialogue? The peace that some seemed to have made out of pragmatism failed when vital identity objectives were not achieved. Moreover, one might argue as well that a heightened understanding of the other, something that was at the core of the people to people projects, had failed. In the previous chapter, the vital shortcomings of the different dialogue initiatives, are already described, but with the failure of the Oslo process the situation seems to be worse as ever. The public opinion is biased, stereotypes reign and acts of incitement are never far. Consequently, one might say that it is hard to say that the various dialogue projects have achieved anything at all (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May). Nevertheless the scores of projects conducted after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the violent events of the Second Intifada weren’t prevented (Maoz, 2004). However, some of these initiatives continued, set out to show that through learning from their previous shortcomings they could still be relevant (Said, 2003; Shemesh, 2011). Dominant in this post peace process period seems to be the realisation that peace oriented civil society groups from both communities have to work intensively together if they want to have an impact, and thus cooperate more than was the case in the occasional dialogue workshop (Said, 2003). Kelman (1993) speaks about the fact that the so called ‘doves’ have to support each other. As such, they don’t only reinforce each other but can also show their respective communities that initiatives are taken from the other side as well. An example is the peace coalition that was formed in 2001 as a reaction against the hawks, led by Ariel Sharon, that were leading the decision making process. This coalition consisted of Peace

 " " Now, Meretz and the left from Labour representing the Israeli side and secular nationalists representing the Palestinian community (Said, 2003). A crucial red line seems to be that knowledge about the other alone is not enough. Even understanding the other might still lead to the realisation that the interests of the other side are just different and are hard to cope with. What is important is a common goal, which seems crucial for the survival of the peace movement.

Furthermore, many dialogue initiatives have rebranded themselves into either media organisations or advocacy groups. The reason behind the focus on media as new domain of action is the idea that it seems to be a better platform to spread the message of reconciliation. While the dialogue workshops only reached the few that participated, the aim of newly emerged media organisations was and is to work on a bigger scale (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May). Aviva Shemesh, development director at Keshev, an organisation that does advocacy on media, argues as follows: “The media discourse plays a critical role in societies in conflict by shaping and at times even creating dominant narratives that permeate public opinion and thus limit the options that people are willing to consider” (Shemesh, 2011, p. 2). In order to prevent the hawks to dictate the narratives, engagement of those who aim at reconciliation is crucial (Said, 2003). The idea behind advocacy is that it is futile to improve the relationships between the two communities at a grassroots level when those in power follow a course that impedes sustainable reconciliation (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May). But in the end, only a few of the many institutions active during the post-Oslo period managed to rebrand themselves, a lot of them seized to exist. In a research that Maoz and others conducted, they put forward a set of criteria that helped the Israeli-Palestinian organisations that exist till today to remain relevant. One of the cases they studied in their comparative research was ‘Crossing Borders’, a joint youth magazine that still exists and whose collaborators, the Israeli Givat Haviva and the Palestinian Biladi went on to create All for Peace (http://allforpeace.org/eng/about, n.d., 1 June 2012). Elements that increase the likelihood of survival are first of all a high degree of equality and symmetry between the Palestinians and Israelis. As such, representation of both sides is not geographically limited and the language used is either English or a mix of Hebrew and . This equality may also help to overcome Palestinian resistance, conducting and participating in such programmes instead of perceiving these projects as representing normalisation of the asymmetrical power relations within Israel (Maoz, Steinberg, Bar-on & Fakhereldeen, 2002).

" " As demonstrated above, many joint organisations carried on, but still face many obstacles till today. First of all, the disillusion after the failure of the peace process is still very much present. Even so that talking about peace sounds naive and is almost judged stupid. Some even accuse joint initiatives of being a form of escapism, a place where the fantasy of peace is kept alive (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May)). Furthermore, it is problematic to influence the peace process since decisions that happen at the top can erase the made efforts. Even more so since many initiatives act in the margins. Why then this remarkable persistence? There are first of all those who believe they change small things for the better. Moreover, the view exists that there are still people on both sides that do believe in peace, something that gives hope (Molad-Hayo, interview, 2012, 1 May). Furthermore, others do recognise that change is hard to induce. Arguments put forward in this situation can be summarised as “at least we are keeping islands of sanity, making sure the situation doesn’t get any worse” (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May) and “we have to prepare ourselves for a post conflict situation” (http://allforpeace.org/eng/about, n.d., 1 June 2012). Shortly, the remaining joint initiatives provide a support system for those on both sides that still believe in peace in order to prevent further escalation of violence and mutual dehumanisation. (Maoz, 2004, p. 572).

4.2. The Israeli and Palestinian media landscape The ‘failure of Oslo’, led the peace movement to reshape itself. By learning from previous shortcomings, through interpreting the current needs and driven by personal motivations, new forms of dialogue initiatives came into existence. Those that rebranded themselves against this background into media initiatives are also shaped to a large extent by the existing media landscape in the region. That’s why in the following chapter the aim is to better understand the media sphere in which initiatives as All for Peace are embedded. As such, a description is given of both the situation in Israel as in the . In the end, borrowing from prominent media experts, we shortly assess the potential of alternatives.

4.2.1. The tribalised Israeli media landscape and the struggle of the Israeli-Palestinians to put forward their narrative According to Yizhar Be’er (interview, 2012, 17 May), the director of Keshev, The Center for Protection of Democracy, an organisation that has as one of its core tasks the monitoring of the Israeli media, there are several ‘tribes’ in Israeli society. By using this term, he refers to the set of different groups that exist within Israel. Following its distinct historical context interwoven with conflict and various migration movements from all over the globe, the Israeli society is a heterogenous one (Avraham & First, 2010). The various distinct ‘tribes’ that are

" " the result of this specific context, mostly don’t interact which each other and its members tend to stay within the boundaries of these groups. Therefore, cross-over and mutual influence is rather rare. And as a consequence, every group is represented by its own respective media outlets. This leads to a unique situation in which the mainstream media is produced and consumed mainly by the dominant secular ‘tribe’ (Be’er, interview, 2012, 17 May). An institute as the IBA, the Israeli Broadcasting Authority, which includes different television and radio channels (Lucas, 2005), does try to diversify to some extent. But the main focus of the public channel lies nevertheless on the interests of the dominant tribe. Next to the public broadcast institution, also the biggest commercial television channels like Channel 2 and 10, the main radio channels and the most sold newspapers can be said to portray their point of views (Iram, Nimri & Vlodavsky, 2009). But although there exists a clear secular dominance, the Israeli media landscape can be described as rather heterogeneous. Since the biggest chunk of the mainstream media, although with some exceptions, can be seen as a secular institution, it isn’t produced nor consumed by a considerable part of Israeli society. This segment of the community constitutes of other less dominant but nevertheless relatively present tribes. The lack of government policy to address the needs of the non-secular Israelis led to the emergence of sectoral media, often encouraged unofficially by the government. And since these other groups still represent a rather fair share of Israeli society the existence and the influence of their media outlets can’t be marginalised. The different tribes can’t be regarded as irrelevant, but rather as having influence on the Israeli society as a whole from the near periphery (Doron, 1998; Katz, 2007). Other tribes in Israel3 would include first of all the Russian minority, the Palestinians, whose situation we will address later and the ultra-orthodox. Furthermore, a group that is to some extent already partly represented by the sectoral media of the previous groups but has some personal media outlets as well, is that of the national religious. Finally also smaller minorities such as the Ethiopians can also be said to be different tribes. The Russian minority, roughly estimated as a group of one million tends to be politically right winged (Be’er, interview, 2012, 17 May). The commercial television Channel Nine, also referred to as ‘Israel Plus’, targets this group. Next to many local newspapers and magazines the main Russian language newspapers are Vesty and Novesty (Iram et al., 2009). Estimations about the number of ultra-

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 3 Data of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, published on the eve of the Israel’s 64th Independence day on 25 April 2012 estimate the total population of Israel at 7.881 million residents (Central Bureau of Statistics, press release, 2012, 25 April). " " orthodox are contradicting each other since there are no clear criteria to define the group, but building on different studies it would be safe to estimate them as more than half a million (Haaretz, 2011, 12 April). Their main media outlets are ‘Radio Kol Hai’ and various newspapers and magazines. The written press is with the exception of Mishpacha are mainly party based and consists of Hamodia, Yated Ne’eman, Hamevaser and Yom L’yom. The size of the next ‘tribe’, the one of the ultra-nationalists is hard to pinpoint, certainly since it overlaps to some extent with the previous groups. They are distinctively right winged and advocates of the settlements and even the incorporation of the whole West Bank and Gaza. Many pirate radios, most known among them Arutz 7, broadcast their points of view (International Crisis Group, 2009). In addition, the daily Makor Rishon, can be seen as the leading Israeli nationalist newspaper (Iram et al., 2009, p. 14). Finally, the number of Ethiopians, according to the latest data of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics consists of 105.5 thousand people (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010a). As such, it is a relatively small minority that is currently fighting for more representation within the Israeli society. Their main media channel is IETV, a channel that mainly broadcasts in their native language, Amharic (Iram et al., 2009).

As already stated earlier, the Palestinian-Israelis are one of the ‘tribes’ that is only partly represented in the mainstream media and that largely produces and consumes its own media outlets. When we speak about the Palestinians-Israelis we speak about the Palestinians who managed to stay in what is now regarded as the Israeli state, despite the fact that many fled during the 1948 war. According to the latest data they consist of 1,623 million people, what is about 20,6% of the Israeli population (Central Bureau of Statistics, press release, 2012, 25 April), and are therefore the biggest minority. The biggest concentrations can be found in the North with Nazareth as a big hub, around Haifa and in East-Jerusalem (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010b). By many Israelis they are seen as a separate group and are referred to as Arab Israelis. Although they do have the Israeli citizenship they will not be regarded by many as real Israelis. As early as 1972, Israeli courts ruled that in order to have the Israeli identity you have to be of Jewish ethnicity. Moreover, they are rarely accepted as equal participants in the formation of Israeli culture, being excluded from the main channels of cultural representation like the mainstream media. Not having a Palestinian citizenship either like the Palestinians on the West Bank or in Gaza, they find it hard to identify themselves with the emerging Palestinian state and fall in many aspects between two chairs (Scheijter, 2008).

" " As a result, separate media channels represent the Palestinian-Israeli minority. Looking at the written press we find papers such as Al-Ittihad, published by the communist party, Kul Al- Arab, A-Sinara and Panorama, that are published in the Northern, Palestinian dominant region of Israel. An overview of the audiovisual sector brings us to Radio Ash-Shams and the outlets of the Israel Broadcasting Authority aimed at the Arab speaking population such as Channel 33, Educational Television and the Arab language service of the Voice of Israel radio (Iram et al., 2009). We should notice though that many of these outlets restrict themselves often to local issues. This is partly because of the fact that it is almost impossible for Palestinian-Israeli journalists to get access to official military sources, since they are not seldom perceived as a third column within the state. Secondly, the Palestinian media is confronted with a lack of financial resources. As a consequence, payment is low and journalists who despite the financial limitations decide to take the job, are therefore often less experienced and less professional than their Israeli counterparts (Be’er, interview, 2012, 17 May). This and other structural obstacles with which Israeli-Palestinian journalists are confronted are further elaborated in the most recent publication of the Ilam Media Center (Aiwasi & Jamal, 2012). Going further on the economic limitations that cause less professionalism, the authors show that the low wages in the sector force journalists to combine more jobs, what undoubtedly goes at the expense of their journalistic work. Moreover, quantity is often preferred above quality since many are pressured to produce a certain amount of articles. This situation is the worst in the private media outlets that depend on advertisements and sales numbers for their financial survival. Another Palestinian-Israeli media category is the partisan media, which represents the thoughts of the different political movements. In this kind of press it is very problematic for an employee to report on anything that might go against the own political ideals or that might cause harm to it. In the end, there are also certain issues that journalists are afraid of reporting. This is certainly the case for crime, political corruption and honour crimes. There is a prominent fear of retribution when reporting about these subjects. Finally, the Palestinian-Israeli press also refrains from reporting on sensitive cultural and religious issues.

Despite the tribalisation of the media landscape, organisations as the Ilam Media Center for Arab Palestinians in Israel are trying to break out of this segmentation and reach out to the mainstream Israeli press. They believe that their involvement is a necessary reaction to the under- and misrepresentation of the Palestinians that live in Israel. By being part of the

" " mainstream media they focus on improving this situation (Jamal, interview, 2012, 24 May). A recent study of the Center illustrates for example that only 2% of the articles in the written and electronic media feature Palestinian Israeli issues. Moreover, when tackled, 39 % are articles on the topic of public security and 34 % on issues in the category of crime and violence. Also according to this research, the representation of Palestinians, not only the ones living within Israel but as a whole, risks being a stereotypical one and it is not rare that they are perceived as a threat to Israeli society (Jamal & Massalah, 2010). This is the result of the specific context in which the media operates. First of all, there exists as illustrated above, a high form of segregation of the different tribes and specifically of the Palestinian-Israeli one. Different groups are living next to each other, a situation that leads to further estrangement. Secondly, media is confronted with the overarching conflict narrative. Likewise, more than half of the news items are related to the Palestinian-Israeli struggle. There is the feeling in Israeli society of being under constant threat of ‘Palestinian terrorists’ and its Arab neighbours. The dominant nation under siege discourse results in the fact that the Palestinian narrative and point of view is being overlooked. As such, the struggle is also carried out through the media. The perceived fight for survival of the Jewish state results in a high form of militarisation of the Israeli society, something that highly influences the media culture as well. (Jamal & Massalah, 2010; Peri, 2007) This specific media culture in the dominant secular mainstream press can be described as follows. First of all, we notice that information about national security is monopolised by the IDF, what leads to restricted access. And if access is granted, this happens only under certain conditions. Secondly, there is a lack of balanced and well-informed reporting on the Arab world. No journalists report from cities as Cairo or Amman, and Arab sources are seldom used. The primary source for these topics is the IDF, the Israeli Defence Forces. Thirdly, most of the journalists have been part of this army during their military service and it is therefore hard for them to retain the position of a neutral, outside observer. Moreover, some of the Israeli journalists even got their press training from the journalistic apparatus within the IDF. And finally, self censorship within the Israeli media can be observed. This happens mostly when the conflict is tense and patriotism is high. Journalists tend to identify in these times with what is regarded as in the countries’ interest and refrain from that what gives Israel a negative image. The media avoids to talk about things that might compromise the country’s opinion. This attitude is also regarded as positive by the general public. As such, in a poll taken in 2003, 70 % suggests that freedom of press is secondary to a matter of public relations (Be’er, interview, 2012, 17 May; Peri, 2007).

 " "

These are shortly the problems the Israeli media faces. The landscape is highly diversified and the mainstream media that is produced and consumed by a relative majority, suffers from the security threat discourse. Many Israelis directly or indirectly seem to realise this. According to recent polls only 36 % of the Israelis still trusts the mainstream media. Although this number is really low, the media consumption is still rather high and even when the information is not regarded as completely true, some aspects might still have an indirect impact in creating a negative perception of the Palestinians, keeping them estranged (Jamal, interview, 2012, 24 May).

4.2.2. The deficiencies of the state controlled Palestinian media model We can criticise the Israeli media landscape, but also the Palestinian press isn’t without deficiencies. It is only fair to make an assessment of the situation of the media on the West Bank and in Gaza as well. We won’t go as far as Palestinian Media Watch, an organisation that monitors the Palestinian press, and that illustrates in their latest book named ‘Deception’ with examples from the Palestinian media that there is no sincere partner for peace (Marcus & Zilberdik, 2011). The Palestinian media landscape is wider than for example shows calling for ‘the extinction of the Zionist enemy’ on the Hamas owned Al-Aqsa satellite channel and than broadcasts of nationalist speeches. Just as the Israeli media landscape is more diverse than the ultra nationalist programmes on Arutz 7. Therefore an overview of the different media channels will be given in the next part of this chapter. Furthermore, some problems within the Palestinian media landscape will be recognised as well. These and the context that leads to them will be tackled in the second part.

When we take a look at the media in the Palestinian territories we can historically distinguish roughly three important formation periods that influence the landscape till today. Firstly, after 1967 Six Day War, the IDF keeps a strong control on information and as such also on the press in order to maintain its control on the West Bank and Gaza. To some extent, a semi- independent press was allowed to prevent the emergence of an underground press. Al Quds, a newspaper that existed since 1951, could therefore keep its license and as a result exists till today. A second period starts in 1972, when the PLO, after being pushed out from Jordan by the events of Black September, decides to reach out more to the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. Likewise, this period sees the emergence of a nationalist press, partly

 " " countering the moderate and pro Jordanian Al Quds. In the wake of the PLO, other liberation movements as the PFLP, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the rising Islamic movement establish their presence in the written press. Finally, after Israeli security control and the different nationalist/religious movements had interwoven themselves during the previous decades, the landscape changed drastically in 1994 when the 1993 Oslo Accords were implemented. It was in this year that the government owned PBC, the Palestinian Broadcasting Cooperation was established. While previously only the written press had existed, the sector was now widened with the allowance of audiovisual media (Jamal, 2000). This situation was confirmed one year later in 1995 in the ‘Oslo II, Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’. As such, in Annex III, Article 36, B1 the following is written: ‘Israel recognizes that the Palestinian side has the right to build and operate separate and independent communication systems and infrastructures including telecommunication networks, a television network and a radio network’ (Oslo II, 1995). This leads us to the media landscape of today. The three most prominent daily newspapers are Al Quds, Al-Ayyam and Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah. While the two first ones are privately owned, the latter is subsidized by the Palestinian Authority. This is also the case for the monthly journal Al Awda, while Al Risala on its turn is an outlet that can be associated with Hamas. As mentioned above, the PBC which includes both radio and television was established in 1994 and resides under the Palestinian Authority. While it was previously part of the Ministry of Information, it was moved after Hamas’ election victory in 2006 under direct control of the chairman of the PA Mahmoud Abbas. Promises have been made to make the institute more independent. But they have remained till today without result. Partly as a reaction, Hamas who already owned a radio station, launched the Al-Aqsa satellite channel in 2006. Next to this local television and radio stations also exist in relative large numbers, although they are less influential. Furthermore, worth mentioning as well are the news agencies. WAFA is the official one and is part of the PLO executive committee. Next to this organisation, we can find smaller and independent ones such as Ma’an news agency and PNN. (Iram et al., 2009; Marcus & Zilberdik, 2011; Tiborn, 2011)

The changes after the Oslo Accords led to a more plurastic Palestinian media landscape. Nevertheless improvements, some technical and structural problems do persist. First of all, there are some problematic legal issues in existence. Although Article 27 of the Palestinian Basic Laws assures that “freedom of audio, visual, and written media, as well as freedom to print, publish, distribute and transmit, together with the freedom of individuals working in this

 " " field, shall be guaranteed” (Palestinian Basic Law, 2003), the Press and Publication Law complicates the situation. According to this law, a number of articles impose restrictions on the press. The problem is that these limitations are rather vague and as such broadly interpretable. For example, in Article 37 of the Press and Publication Law, it is written not to publish anything that might be harmful to national unity, religious doctrine or the national currency. Furthermore, incitement and publication of anything considered as a secret of the state services is forbidden (Article 19, 1999; Khasan & Mendel, 2006). The danger of this vague legal situation is that it can function as a tool in the hand of the powerful. It is true that there is no official censorship mechanism but interpretations of the law lead to indirect control on the media through different legal and formal forms (Nossek & Rinnawi, 2003). An administrative and bureaucratic constraint is for example the fact that in order to get a license from the Ministry of Information a prove of good behaviour has to be given, something that is problematic for those critical for the regime. Another aspect is the difficulty to get access to governmental data. Due to political advantages it is prioritised to give such information to state controlled institutions such as the PBC (Jamal, 2001). An illustration of political control over the Palestinian media can be given by comparing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A segregation can as such be observed since in the areas respectively Fatah and Hamas have obtained a dominance over the media landscape (Tiborn, 2011). Next to legal and political restrictions, there are economic constraints as well. Being a journalist in the Palestinian territories is not something that brings a lot of personal financial benefits. In these circumstances the press is very vulnerable to manipulation. Moreover, some organisations only exist at the grace of financial backers and can’t afford to go against the interests of their patrons (Jamal, 2000 & 2001). Furthermore, there are also some practical issues resulting from the situation on the ground with which the journalistic profession is confronted in the Palestinian territories. As such, mobility is very problematic in certain areas of the West Bank, where the control of the IDF over strategic roads and checkpoints impedes optimal movement. Likewise, in Gaza, due to the isolated position the Strip finds itself in, it is very difficult to have a journalistic investigation outside this limited area (Tiborn, 2011). A last point with which the Palestinian media landscape is being confronted is that of self censorship. This attitude is first of all the result of fear of economic, legal or political retributions described above. Secondly, it can also be seen as a cultural result of the conflict (Jamal, 2000 & 2001). Since Palestinian journalists have a sense of belonging to their

 " " community and are confronted with dramatic events, it is very hard to remain objective and neutral. Logically, some journalists become passionate advocates of the Palestinian cause, making themselves guilty to unbalanced reporting, in which they only denounce ‘Israeli crimes’, while ignoring Palestinian violations. Moreover, even when aware of this asymetrical reporting, journalists will mostly still be inclined to take the Palestinian side. Not doing this and being critical of the ‘own side’ might cause normalisation with that what is regarded as occupation. For many the status quo can’t be accepted as normal and Palestinian journalists are therefore afraid of serving it through their work (Tiborn, 2011).

4.2.3. Potential for Alternatives? Having learned about the media challenges in the region and having All for Peace in mind, the question is if there is still place for alternative media channels portraying different points of view. As discussed above, Yizhar Be’er (interview, 2012, 17 May) recognises the fact that the media landscape is highly diversified. Moreover, nowadays, with the possibility to access so many sources using technology as internet and satellite, it is hard to hide information. In order to influence the public opinion it is easier to publish biased information using alternative media. These forms of media are often uncontrolled, since they form part of the margins. Arutz and Al-Aqsa satellite channel immediately come to mind. The director of Keshev sees it as the task of his organisation to monitor this biased information. Amal Jamal (interview, 2012, 24 May) of the Ilam Media Center believes that alternative media can have an impact for the good as well. According to him, there exists mutual influence between the alternative and the mainstream media. For instance, stories first only appearing in alternative media might be picked up by the mainstream. The context behind this statement is the Center’s recent video on freedom of expression, which is currently being spread. But according to the director of the Center, alternative media can be seen as an opportunity to have a positive influence from the margins. Following this logic, all alternative media, right or left, can influence the mainstream media from time to time. Gadi Wolfsfeld (interview, 2012, 9 May), professor at the Hebrew University, wouldn’t agree with Amal Jamal though. When talking about the alternative left-pacifist media such as All for Peace, he says that it only has the potential of mobilizing the few already converted to the message. He states that alternative media is more a hobby done by naive pacifists. “If you want to change the Israeli media and improve the mutual understanding between Israelis and Palestians’, he says, “then it would be wiser to work from within the mainstream media”. Integrating more Palestinian journalists in the mainstream media and criticising the

 " " discriminatory way of selecting journalists would already be an important step forward, a point that is also strongly advocated by the Ilam Media Center.

4.3. ‘Give peace a chance’, from radio ‘kol esh-shaloom’ to radio ‘qol esh-shaloom’ This chapter will go into these alternative media initiatives. More specifically, the focus lies here on the radio sphere, and aims to understand its potential. Afterwards, historical precedents will be given. Likewise, the ‘legendary’ pirate station and its specific context will come to the fore. Furthermore, attention will be drawn to RAM FM, a short lived joint radio inspired by a South African model, and which can be compared to All for Peace. Finally, the end of this chapter will present a brief description of the radio that is the topic of this thesis.

4.3.1. The potential of radio In a time when internet and cable television are available, why the focus on radio, a rather ‘old medium’, one might ask. Even Gadi Wolfsfeld described it as outdated, and placed questions on the research focus of this study (interview, 2012, 9 May). Others though, are more positive about this form of communication through the airwaves and speak instead about the ‘forgotten medium’ or the ‘invisible medium’, pinpointing at its importance as the first electronic mass medium which thoroughly influenced the innovations that came after it (Jurriëns, 2009). But as Marshall McLuhan states in his widely cited book ‘Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man’, “the medium is the message”. More specifically, “it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 23). By understanding what distinguishes radio from other media, we aim at shedding light on the potential of the medium and the kind of messages that it shapes. First of all, the barriers of gaining access to radio are rather low compared to other forms of media. While television might be expensive for some, internet connection is not assured everywhere and newspapers need to be bought frequently by readers that know how to read. As such, even in underdeveloped regions it isn’t that rare to find radio as the prime source of information. Radios are something small that are easy to take with you wherever you go. Likewise, the consumer is not bound to it and can combine listening with performing other daily tasks such as driving the car or household chores. Secondly, also on the level of production, the challenges are lower than for the other media. The complexity and technical requirements are relatively limited. As such, radio signals don’t need a form of fixed physical network in order to get spread since they find their ways naturally through the airwaves. Due to limited barriers

" " of production and consumption in many poorer regions, radio is therefore still the medium with the most impact. Thirdly, radio is not only characterised by a small number of technical challenges, it is also a very direct medium. Since everything happens live on the air, when drastic events take place, there is the possibility to go directly into current events (Deweer, 2011; Jurriëns, 2009). There are other aspects as well that are not per se unique for radio only, but nevertheless form part of the strengths of the medium. As such, radio has the potential of crossing borders and therefore spreading news also to those that would otherwise only have access to the local censored media. This is the case since information gets transferred by airwaves and doesn’t stop at manmade frontiers (Deweer, 2011). Finally, when looking at Israel, we can observe how the peace movement has been using the medium to spread its message of conflict resolution. Therefore, All for Peace has been to some extent inspired by a historical tradition, described in the next part.

4.3.2. Abie Nathan’s peace ship Pirate radios have always been part of Israel’s media landscape. Unlike their Western European counterparts they were not that much opposed by the establishment. On the contrary, sometimes they were even encouraged in their mission. While their famous British counterparts broadcasted popular recorded music and fought judicial battles, the various Israeli pirate radios were an accepted part of the media culture. The attitude towards them depended though on the parties being part of the government and to which extent they agreed with the owners or the message of the radio (Soffer, 2010). This unique situation is partly the result of the specific historical context of the Israeli radio landscape. Pirate stations find their roots in the British mandate period when paramilitary groups as Hagannah, Stern Gang and Irgun used this mode of communication to broadcast their messages and to air their calls for recruitment. Former members of the underground Hagannah radio station even became later employees of Israel’s first public radio, called ‘Kol Israel’ in Hebrew, what means ‘Voice of Israel’. Nevertheless the radio market still remained restricted, with no commercial radio being allowed till the 1990’s. It is in this grey market that the gap is filled by the pirate stations. Even today there is a divide since the radio licenses available are always less than the actual demand for them (Dzodin, 2008). Yaniv Dayan (interview, 2012, 8 May), one of the passionate volunteers and webmaster behind the 2009 relaunch of the ‘legendary’ Voice of Peace, states that it is even not worth trying to obtain a license.

" "

“From somewhere in the Mediterranean, we are the Voice of Peace”, this sentence together with the corresponding tune is part of the collective mind of many Israelis and others living in the Middle East. From the MV Peace, an old Dutch ship, lying in front of the coast of Tel Aviv, pirate radio shows were broadcasted to Israel and the whole Middle East between 1973 and 1993 (Dzodin, 2008). The man behind the initiative was Abie Nathan, quite a figure himself within the Israeli peace movement. He became renown as a peace activist when flying to Egypt with a message of peace in 1966, a period in which the tension between Egypt and Israel was high and would ultimately culminate in the 1967 Six Days War. Furthermore he refused to follow the law that forbade to meet members of the PLO and was therefore imprisoned twice for meeting Yasser Arafat (http://www.abie-nathan.com/pages- eng/main.html, 2012, 15 June). Acts like these gave him an anti-establishment image, making him an increasingly popular with those who believed in peace. Although he was by some judged as naive, his acts were brave at the same time, earning him the respect of many. But the man wasn’t without criticism either. Some saw it all as a hypocrite act from a figure who was very keen on being in the spotlights. Abie Nathan was a prominent figure featuring in the Israeli gossip columns, being present at and organising fancy parties which gave him the name of being a hedonist. Consequently, his biggest critics judged the Voice of Peace as a business model on which the peace activist could enrich himself and further enlarge his fame (Soffer, 2010). The original idea behind the Voice of Peace was to establish a joint radio which would be a platform for Israeli Arab discussion. As such, the point of departure was to make negotiations and tolerance core aspects. Next to dialogue Abie Nathan envisioned a station with objective news, Arabic melodies, Hebrew songs, pop music and readings from the Thora, the New Testament and the Quran. The initial vision soon turned out to be hard to realise, certainly since it was hard to convince Arabs to take service on the ship. Consequently, the radio started to look more like the British pirate radio model. The crew consisted of many British radio producers and pop music that couldn’t be heard on the official Israeli radio. Nevertheless, Abie Nathan left room for those who wanted to pass a message through the radio. Likewise, there was a daily show featuring everyone who wanted to speak up. Using this method the pirate radio managed to speak out to the whole Middle East as radio waves cross state borders and blur frontiers. As such, in a daily minute of silence for all the victims of violence throughout the region and the world, Abie Nathan invited his listeners wherever they came from to join in a moment of prayer (Soffer, 2010). Or as the Israeli author Yoram

" " Kaniuk put it: “Everyone is so goddamn right. And it is hard to reach some kind of rational thinking. Then, Abie came along with the Beatles and the Rolling Stones, and he will bring peace. Because peace is music, peace is a smile, peace is living together. It is to think about homes, not about boundaries” (Soffer, 2010, p. 166). It is this feeling that left an impact on the collective mind of many left minded Israelis and others throughout the region. During the 70’s, the situation of Voice of Peace within the media landscape was rather unique. Likewise, there was a lack of pluralism with only the state owned ‘Voice of Israel’ and the IDF owned radio station ‘Galey Zahal’ broadcasting officially (Caspi & Limor, 1999). During the 60’s, when even a Beatles concert was forbidden due to the reason that it ‘would corrupt pure Jewish culture’, getting access to such Western pop music wasn’t self evident. Looking at the MV Peace lying in front of the coast of Tel Aviv, meant both literally and figuratively looking to the West. Or even more, looking for an alternative, with music as a red thread connecting people. ‘Music makes friends, friends make peace’, one might even naively say (Dayan, interview, 2012, 8 May). Besides the fact that the Voice of Peace gave a voice of those believing in peace, it also filled a gap for those who wanted to listen to another kind of music. The state broadcaster, the Voice of Israel quickly realised this and in order not to lose any more young listeners, it established a third radio station in 1976 which was more dedicated to the new Western music trends (Caspi & Limor, 1999). Even though the several attempts to legalise the popular pirate station failed, it was never impeded by the Israeli authorities to broadcast (Soffer, 2010). Caspi & Limor (1999) give the following reasons for this situation. First of all, the authors of ‘The In/Outsiders: Mass Media in Israel’ argue that the presence of pirate radios caused an illusion of media pluralism, weakening in its turn public demands for deregulation of the Israeli media landscape. Secondly, as long as pirate radios didn’t take up a role as political mediator and were mainly focusing on entertainment and music, they didn’t pose a threat to the states monopoly of creating the political media frame. Finally, as long as the illegal stations don’t cause any practical disturbance, such as interfering with military frequencies, there doesn’t seem to be an urgent incentive for a crackdown orchestrated by the authorities. In the spirit of hope that was very much present after the signing of the first Oslo Accords in 1993, Abie Nathan concluded that the Voice of Peace had done its work and the famous pirate radio stopped broadcasting (Soffer, 2010). The transmitter was even donated to the newly established Palestinian Broadcasting Cooperation (Dayan, interview, 2012, 8 May). The name Voice of Peace was purchased by one of the DJs who worked on the MV Peace, consequently

" " setting up an internet radio in the United States (http://www.voiceofpeace.com/, 15 June 2012). Recently in 2009, a group of Voice of Peace DJs and volunteers decided to relaunch the Abie’s station as an internet radio in Israel as well under the site http://www.thevoiceofpeace.co.il/ (15 June 2012). The internet station makes use of a generic DJ that plays listeners’ choices, requested through an online request system. Furthermore, various DJs previously active on Abie Nathan’s pirate radio join in from their respective home studios. Statistics of the website show that the Voice of Peace hasn’t been forgotten and is still fairly popular. It manages not only to reach out to an Israeli public but also to the larger Middle East. By connecting to the Arab world, the radio succeeds to show that initiatives for peace still exist in Israel (Dayan, interview, 2012, 8 May).

4.3.3. Peace from South Africa: RAM FM Another radio station set up with the mission of peacebuilding was RAM FM, a station that was in existence from the first of December 2006 till the 8th of August 2008. The initiative was taken by the South African businessman Issie Kirsh, owner of Radio 720, an independent broadcaster that is considered to have played a positive role in the Apartheid period. The studios were based in Ramallah, from which the name of the radio station came, and Jerusalem. Modelled on the successful South African example, the Beatles song, “we can work it out”, seemed to be the motto of the radio and was consequently frequently played (Dayan, interview, 2012, 8 May; Haaretz, 2007, 4 May). Mike Brand, former DJ at the Voice of Peace, volunteer at All for Peace and broadcaster at RAM FM told his personal account (Brand, interview, 2012, 9 May). Brand recalls somewhat nostalgic his period at the radio station that according to him at its heyday managed to reach out to 300.000 to 500.000 listeners. The radio presenter hosted in the beginning a morning show and later an afternoon show. The unique aspect of this afternoon show was that it was presented by an Israeli, Brand himself and a Palestinian co-host. The language used was English and the topics discussed weren’t political but handled more about everyday things. For example, when the Israeli police entered the Jerusalem studio on the 7th of April 2008 in order to shut it down, the topic of the interrupted afternoon show was tea. Why this crackdown on the Jerusalem studio? The problem was that the management had placed an antenna on the top of the Holiday Inn hotel, something that was technically illegal and that Mike Brand claims not to have known of. The main issue was that the license the radio used was one obtained by the Palestinian authority. Therefore, permission only existed to send out radio signals from the Palestinian territories. Consequently, RAM FM ran into legal

" " difficulties and found all of his broadcasting equipment in Jerusalem seized. The radio continued for a while to broadcast from the Ramallah studio, but due to the lack of profit and thus no return on investment, the South African management decided to close down the station. How can this financial unavailability be explained? After the initial financial injection from Issie Kirsh in order to set up the radio station the goal was to be sustainable through incomes from advertisements. The main concern though was that in order to remain neutral the decision was made to have an equal amount of commercials from Palestinian companies as from Israeli ones. Since this symmetry wasn’t obtained, with the exception of the beginning period, no advertisements were broadcasted at all.

4.3.4. Political discussions on the air: All for Peace Unlike RAM FM, All for Peace has, always been careful with the legal procedures since its founding in 2004. After initially being set up only through the internet, it waited to broadcast on air till there was certainty that all the legal requirements were fulfilled. Just like the South African radio, a license wasn’t obtained from the Israeli administration and broadcasting permission was thus asked successfully from the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, when being confronted with some problems at the end of 2005, the frequency went of the air for a while and a filter was put on the transmitter in order to make sure not to cause any disturbance to the air traffic (Brand, interview, 2012, 9 May). Furthermore, All for Peace is clearly inspired by the Voice of Peace. As such, to the untrained ear the name of both radio stations sounds similar in Hebrew. In free transcription the difference would be something like, Kol Esh-Shaloom, Voice of Peace and Qol Esh-Shaloom, All for Peace with the latter Q being pronounced more in the back of your throat. The result is that when talking about All for Peace in Hebrew it is not seldom confused with Abie Nathan’s radio station (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). Moreover, when Issie Kirsh was doing preparatory work for setting up RAM FM, he initially wanted to cooperate with All for Peace. But the latter one refused since in the end its approach is different (Brand, interview, 2012, 9 May). The Voice of Peace and RAM FM abstained to a large extent from political programmes and carried the message of peace mostly through music. In the case of All for Peace on the other hand, giving the civil society a voice is one of the core activities (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). On the 17th of November 2011 however, the Israeli Ministry of Communications forced the joint radio station to shut down its Hebrew radio frequency. Just as it was the case for RAM FM, All for Peace was accused of illegally broadcasting into Israel. Since All for Peace had

 " " been broadcasting from Ramallah since it first came to the airwaves, the recent crackdown came as a surprise. The reasons behind it are a mixture of political and economical reasons which will be discussed in the second research part. Moreover, the forced stop of the Hebrew frequency didn’t remain without reaction from the media institute’s side and a long judicial process was started (Raz, interview, 2011, 30 November). An appeal has been made to the high court and at the time of writing, the 15th of July 2012, the joint technique committee has been consulted. The first outcome that resulted from this consultation was rather favourable to the joint media institute. At the moment, a subcommittee for radio is currently asked for advice as well (Raz, personal email, 15 July 2012).

4.4. The All for Peace model and its use in practice The brief overview here above illustrates how joint media initiatives, within Israel/Palestine such as All for Peace Radio are the result of a specific context. First of all, Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation is confronted with an Israeli media landscape which is dominated by the secular Israeli majority while different other ‘tribes’ in the periphery find it hard to be represented. The mainstream media is highly ethnocentric and dominated by an ‘under siege mentality’. The Palestinian media landscape on the other hand, is characterised by a high political influence. Both of these factors have led to the underrepresentation of the Israeli-Palestinian minority within Israel and stereotypes and estrangement of the other in both media landscapes. Secondly, we can observe a clear evolution of dialogue initiatives through time. The disillusion after the failure of the peace process led some to believe that these initiatives didn’t make a difference. As a consequence the few organisations that didn’t seize to exist chose to rebrand themselves into either media organisations, advocacy centres or a combination of both. Likewise, joint media initiatives can be seen as a novel tactic employed by the pacifist movement. Finally, the pioneering of Voice of Peace, which was highly successful and that became crystallised in the collective mind of many in the region, was a factor that led to the popularity of radio as a medium for peace building. All these elements have a clear influence on All for Peace Radio. But to which specific form has this context led? What is the motivation of the different actors involved and what is the current modus operandi of the joint media organisation?

A brief overview of All for Peace will be done borrowing the outline that Caspi & Elias (2011) have set out to classify media made by and for minorities in Israel. In this chapter, their analytic model is copied and used as a red guideline. Likewise, instead of utilising the

 " " frame on media for and by ethnic minorities’ for which it is constructed, it will be employed on alternative media made by the peace movement, a minority in Israeli society in itself. The first broad angle that will be brought to the fore for introducing the joint media organisation is ‘initiative and design’. This part goes into the initiative. Who is behind All for Peace? Furthermore, it will briefly go into ownership and financing. After that, we will look into the personnel. Who is working or better volunteering in the joint media initiative? Finally, there will be attention given to constitution of the management. The other angle employed is that of the ‘agenda’ of the organisation. First of all, we will briefly look into the goals set out and the method used to reach them. In the article of Caspi & Elias a following point is about the affinity for country of origin and co-ethnics in other countries, something which is not relevant for this study on All for Peace. A next point will be the attitude towards the majority, the political establishment. Furthermore, a next question asked is, for who is the radio made, who is the reference group? A last point analysed in this part is the access and representation of those the radio claims to represent.

4.4.1. Initiative and design All for Peace was established in 2004 by two organisations, the Palestinian publishing house Biladi and the Israeli Jewish-Arab Centre for Peace. Both had worked together on a joint youth magazine called ‘Crossing Borders’. Pursuing the path of their successful cooperation, they went on to create a radio station (http://allforpeace.org/eng/about, n.d., 1 June 2012). Parallels can be drawn with what is learned in the first chapter on dialogue. Ifat Maoz names ‘Crossing Borders’ as one of those initiatives that managed to survive the end of the heyday of the people to people projects since it was the result of a cooperation between representatives from both communities on an egalitarian basis (Maoz, Steinberg, Bar-on & Fakhereldeen, 2002). Likewise, when looking at joint radio researched, the representation of both sides is not geographically limited and the language used is either English or a mix of Hebrew and Arabic4 (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). Setting up a radio went together with the search for the necessary financial resources. The two organisations behind the joint media initiative convinced their backers of the potential of the new initiative and attracted new ones as well. Among the funders, the Norwegian Embassy in Israel and the European Union, both also important donors in the people to people projects stand out. Moreover, also advertisements proved to be an important source of income. But

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 4 Sometimes there are however also broadcasts in Russian and German. These are rather rare though and depend on the volunteers engaged in the radio at that moment.  " " since many of them came from Israeli companies and organisations, the forced shutdown of the Hebrew frequency in November 2011 went together with companies losing interest. This meant financial losses since the station used to secure 30 percent of its income from advertising and airtime (progress report to the United Nations Alliance of Civilisations, 30 April 2012). This resulted in the restructuring of organisational capacity and staff. As such, most of the people involved in All for Peace are volunteers who are identifying themselves with the radio’s goal and method. Likewise, many representatives of the Israeli civil society and institutions representing a diverse range of topics from anti-nuclear to women’s issues, are active within the joint media institution. Naturally, also prominent civil society actors, working towards Israeli-Palestian peacebuilding like One Voice, Abraham Fund Initiative, Grassroots Jerusalem, Combatants for Peace, volunteer at All for Peace. Next to and among those active in these organisations, the radio station managed to attract individuals representing different opinions and backgrounds, coming from the ranks of activists, journalists and high ranking officials (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). The guidance of the joint radio falls under a dual management (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). Unlike RAM FM where there was only one Palestinian manager, All for Peace chose for an approach in which both the Israeli community as the Palestinian would be equally represented at the top of the organisation. This once again follows what Maoz describes as a key for joint organisations’ survival (Maoz, Steinberg, Bar-on & Fakhereldeen, 2002). Mossi Raz, a man with a background in the left Meretz party, stands as such for the Israeli part of the management and Maysa Baransi-Siniora, an activist with extensive experience in media and peace initiatives, represents the Palestinian side (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012).

4.4.2. Agenda All these efforts are done aiming at the following goals. First of all, the ambition of the radio station is to tackle central themes that feature in the Israeli-Palestinian context and the daily reality. Furthermore, a platform is offered to various Israeli and Palestinian civil society organisations through which they can express themselves. As such, a voice is given to initiatives that would otherwise absent from mainstream media. Likewise, the organisational and communication capacity of these groups is supported. Moreover, the joint media institute also aims to be a platform for in-depth, complex, open and critical dialogue on contemporary

 " " issues affecting members of both communities. As such, the ideas existing in the Israeli- Palestinian society come to the fore, stimulating thinking in order to find a solution together (application for the BTC Micro Intervention Programme, May 2012; fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). With the aim of reaching these aspirations, the followed path is one that gives the different volunteers and civil society organisations the freedom to make their own programmes. This often results in going into current issues using a personal thematic angle covering their own interests. For example, an organisation as the Abraham Fund Initiative tackles the news from an Arab-Israeli perspective. Most programmes feature in depth interviews conducted on air, discussions and present a variety of views. Most radio shows are talk shows but there are some music shows as well like ‘from Casablanca to Beirut’, ‘This is a Test’, a Blues programme presented by Bari Davis and others (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). But the difference in the way of working of All for Peace in comparison with RAM FM and Voice of Peace is remarkable. The latter two focused more on music broadcasting and discussions on everyday non-political issues. The attitude towards the political establishment is one of dialogue. Although the radio is critical it aims to present the range of opinions in Israeli-Palestinian society in order to engage in a dialogue. Since the views in the heterogeneous region are more than only the believes coming from the dominant political actors that appear in mainstream media, voices not represented in the establishment are given a platform on All for Peace as well. Likewise, access to the radio station is liberal, anyone who wants to speak up is allowed to do so and is not silenced in any way by the directors. As such, the reference group the programmes are made for are both communities in all their diversity. Some critical footnotes can be placed though with the fact that All for Peace is mostly consumed by the same peace activists that in the end make the programmes (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). The challenge is to go beyond only preaching to the own choir and also reaching out to the Israeli and Palestinian majorities.

 " " V. The challenges for Israeli/Palestinian peace radio

As illustrated, the initiative to establish All for Peace comes forth from actors active in the dialogue initiatives. The organisation can therefore partially be seen as the result of the trial and error process that the peace movement went through. Furthermore, its design is influenced by the media landscape in which the joint initiative is embedded and is inspired by the Voice of Peace. Nevertheless the keenly set out design and a set of goals against which one might find it hard to oppose him or herself, the radio station faces a series of challenges. The most noteworthy is as mentioned earlier, the crackdown on the Hebrew frequency by the Israeli Ministry of Communications in November 2011. Why this happened will be analysed in this chapter. Moreover, in order to fully understand all the obstacles, the research design aims at avoiding a narrow focus. Therefore, the joint media organisation will be looked at through a set of three different lenses. First of all, the analysis will take place using economical frame. What are the economical reasons behind the move of the Ministry of Communications, how does All for Peace ensure its financial sustainability and what can the ‘manufacturing consent paradigm’ tell us? Secondly, utilising a political angle will take us to the political side behind the events of November 2011. Moreover, Cottle’s ‘media contest paradigm’ can shed light on the question to which extent All for Peace can have an influence in the local media landscape. Finally, in the last part of this chapter the frame is a cultural one. An analysis on the basis ‘media culture paradigm’ takes a look into the Israeli/Palestinian media culture. This is in its turn constituted by Palestinian-Israeli cooperation issues and a specific culture of peacebuilding.

5.1. Economical 5.1.1. David Ben Bassat and competition An important reason for the crackdown of the Israeli Ministry of Communication on All for Peace was economical. Since the joint media organisation was already in existence since 2004, the sudden forced shutdown of the Hebrew frequency came as a surprise. Therefore, we should ask ourselves what the changes were that had happened in the period before November 2011 that might explain this reaction. As an answer to this question, the fact that All for Peace was giving airtime to a radio called Radio Ghol comes to the fore. This station specialises itself in the niche of Mizrahi, Jewish-Arab music. But by doing so, it found itself on the territory of David Ben Bassat, a media mogul who among others owns Lev Hamadina, a similar radio station (Brand, interview, 2012, 9 May; Dayan, interview, 2012, 8 May). In the

" " media market where the focus lies on profit and business calculations this didn’t stay without a reaction. Certainly not since the competition is tense on the small Hebrew media market. There is as such not much potential for broadcasting outside Israel since the community is largely restricted to the country itself (Naveh, 2001). When speaking about Mizrahi music, the niche market is even smaller, having place for almost no diversity of players. Moreover, David Ben Bassat is an influential figure. As a member of the ruling party, it seems that he was able to influence the decision making of the Israeli Ministry of Communication in order to prevent Radio Ghol of being a competitor (Raz, interview, 2011, 30 November).

5.1.2. Advertisements and donors For its financial survival All for Peace depends on donors, even more now since the shutdown of the Hebrew radio frequency has made the radio channel uninteresting for advertisers. Depending on donors poses some challenges as well. Likewise, there is an asymmetry between the real needs of the organisation and the offered funding opportunities. Looking for funding means trying to get financial backing in a variety of ways. As such, the danger is to end up following guidelines and conditions that are set out by the funders instead of being the result of the needs of the own organisation (Shemesh, 2011). This is certainly the case since donors have their own agendas as well. The danger is as such that these agendas are also bound to change when the context in which the donor operates, transforms, something which is not always in the advantage of the supported organisation. The International Peace and Cooperation Center and the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies criticise this situation in an evaluation as follows, “changes in setting goals and choosing target groups do not allow for a continuous, cumulative process and identification of specific goals which suit grassroots needs, rather than the requirements of donors” (Kahanoff, Salem, Nasralah & Neumann, 2007, p. 126). Recent changes in the field of donors affecting All for Peace is for example the evolution away from people to people dialogue projects and in favour of governance and human rights. Furthermore, there is also an increased focus on one time funding or micro funding in order to ensure sustainability of organisations instead of continuous support (fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012). Moreover, some donors like the Flemish government have transferred their financial means from concrete projects like All for Peace to multilateral organisations in the region (Verbeurgt, personal email communication, 29th June 2012).

" " 5.1.3. Manufacturing consent paradigm Progressive Democracy, one of the organisations that has a radio show on All for Peace employs a left discourse that sees the market as something that is to some extent controlling the democratic institutions. Likewise, the press, a mediation system that allows a form of control and negotiation with those in power, falls as well under this overarching market structure (Gatenio, personal conversation, 2012, 2 May). This is an argument echoing the Frankfurter Schule critical theory on the culture industry. Furthermore, looking at Israel, a strong power concentration can be observed in the media landscape in which rich owners possess a variety of media outlets. The problem this causes is that media barons like David Ben Bassat, who have similar interests in the protection of the status quo, will work together to protect their dominance in the media landscape. Likewise, the problem this might cause is that media is no longer plurastic, as such serving the interests of the general public, but will protect the influences of those in power. A further danger is as well that these media conglomerates become part of multinational cooperations and as a consequence extent their interests beyond mere business into the sphere of international relations (Caspi & Limor, 1999). Shabi Gatenio, the executive director of Progressive Democracy speaks about a capitalist democracy in which the strongest reign and the minorities are no longer protected. More even, it is no longer possible to challenge those who have a dominant position and such reporting is as a consequence suppressed. In order to fight this situation, the most challenging fact is that people got used to the system and are thinking within it, not being able to look outside the set out mental boundaries (Gatenio, personal conversation, 2012, 2 May). Censorship has likewise become something complicated and takes more the subtle form of self censorship. Eetta Prince Gibson puts forward the argument that it is hard to accept that mom and dad aren’t perfect. This is similar to the fact that it is hard for normal citizens to see the failures of leaders controlling the system in which they live. This requires a process of learning to step out of the collective and think as an individual (Prince Gibson, interview, 2012, 6 May). Democracy instead should be able to go outside this predetermined set of accepted ideas, subordinate to the dominant market interests. All for Peace can likewise be seen as an alternative to the regulated market that functions as a platform for different opinions. As such, all point of views are allowed a platform even if the directors don’t agree with them. It is the dialogue between them that lies at the core of the method of All for Peace (Gatenio, personal conversation, 2012, 2 May; fieldwork All for Peace, 29.04 – 23.05.2012).

" " 5.2. Political 5.2.1. Political struggle? Also political reasons are given as the cause for the forced shutdown of the Hebrew language frequency of All for Peace in November 2011. First of all, David Ben Bassat, as mentioned in the previous chapter, made use of his influence within the Likud party of Benjamin Netanyahu to push towards the move of the Ministry of Communications. But next to that, some of the media went as far as suggesting a crackdown on critical voices by the state (Anmuth, 1 February 2012; Stewart, 21 November 2011). This stems from the fact that Danny Danon, representing the more Zionist right wing of the Likud party, filed a complaint two months before the events in November and took credit for what happened. On Arutz 7 the politician accuses the radio of illegal incitement (Benari & Ezra, 22 November 2011). As such, some voices on All for Peace called for support for the Palestinian UN bid to statehood and a Palestinian journalist who had lost a child in the conflict interviewed conscientious objectors presenting them as heroes (Raz, interview, 2011, 30 November). These aspects don’t fall together with the opinions of those in power. This argument is echoed by the Palestinian co-director of All for Peace who claims that the critical joint radio station is unwanted by those in power (Baransi-Siniora, interview, 2012, 30 April). But some are critical about the political anti-establishment image that has been portrayed. Since the topics and opinions of All for Peace didn’t change that much since its initial broadcasting in 2004, they see the reason for the forced shutdown solely as economical (Brand, interview, 2012, 9 May; Dayan, interview, 2012, 8 May).

5.2.2. Media contest paradigm According to Cottle’s second paradigm, that of the ‘media contest paradigm’, media is a sphere through which different influence groups try to disperse their messages and consequently try to establish control over it. Likewise, there is a contest in order to try to air the own opinions through which the political debate in Israel/Palestine might be influenced. Israel is in its essence a democracy based on a very plurastic party landscape where parties can’t come to power without consensus building. Consequently, there is an arena of struggle for influence. But next to that, some agreements, overarching frameworks exist that are hard to impose change upon such as the dominant military security paradigm. But within these red lines there is still room left for diverging opinions. Looking at the Palestinian territories, a dominant paradigm isn’t so clear. On the other hand, the political landscape is less pluralistic, if we consider the strong dominance of Fatah on the

" " West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. As such, there is sometimes a problem regarding the respect for media (Baransi-Siniora, interview, 2012, 30 April).

All for Peace as an alternative media organisation aims at bringing different voices and opinions into the mainstream debate within Israel/Palestine. Likewise, it tries to claim a position in the information sphere in order to push for a peaceful dialogue between the two sides. Moreover, civil society, consisting of advocacy initiatives and organisations that monitor the power structures, is central in the functioning of All for Peace. As such, the joint media institute can also be interpreted as a radio that gives civil society a voice that would otherwise be neglected in the mainstream media. But to what extent is there the potential for influencing the political agenda? When discussing the relation between the media and the peace process, Wolfsfeld writes that “the greater the level of elite consensus in support of a peace process, the more likely the news media will play a positive role in that process” (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p. 28). Analysing the media coverage of the Oslo process, it is clear how in the beginning there was a dominant frame positive towards peacebuilding. But when disappointments started to follow each other, questions began to be raised about the validity of the peacebuilding frame and with it the growth of alternative points of view. Likewise, with the growth of opposition, the controversy among the ruling elites, more different opinions came to the fore (Wolfsfeld, 2004). During the 90’s both the opinion that Oslo was the ideal chance for peace and the vision that it meant a national disaster, existed alongside each other, with neither side being able to dominate the public discourse completely (Naveh, 2001). Even till today, there seems to be a high division among the political elite about which path to follow towards conflict resolution. Even to the extent that peace seems to be of the political agenda (Molad-Hayo, personal conversation, 2012, 30 April). It is in this context that All for Peace tries to be a voice striving for access to the information sphere in order to put peace back on the political agenda. But since the joint media institution is an alternative voice, it struggles with reaching out and going behind the mere preaching to the own choir. Here we find the opinions of Amal Jamal and Gadi Wolfsfeld diametrically opposed to each other. The Israeli professor sees as such, alternative media as something naive and irrelevant within the media landscape. He reasons that it is the reporting within the mainstream media that has to be changed. Moreover, the ideal push for the peace process would be a dramatic event that induces a change of mindset. Here, he refers to the example of the visit of Sadat to the Knesset. Likewise, Wolfsfeld analyses media through a politics-media-politics cycle in which real changes are often started

" " first at a political level. Afterwards, the political events will be reported by the media on which in turn will be reacted by those in power again (Wolfsfeld, interview, 2012, 9 May). The Palestinian director of the Ilam Media Center on the other hand, sees a potential when stories starting in the alternative media are being picked up by mainstream channels. Unlike Wolfsfeld, he sees the relation between media and politics not as linear but rather as having a mutual effect on each other. Likewise, Jamal speaks of media, politicians and society all having an equal influence on one another. Talking about the influence of media on politics, he gives the example of Netanyahu who every morning gets a 45 minutes briefing about the latest news reporting. This is an illustration of the fact that politicians in a democratic country will think twice when political decisions result in negative imagery in the media (Jamal, interview, 2012, 24 May). Likewise, when criticising politicians on certain issues, it might very well lead to set the agenda.

5.3. Cultural 5.3.1. A break with the dominant media culture In their groundbreaking article Galtung & Ruge point at the features inherent with news reporting. According to their study, the choice for news topics is characterised by intensity, simplicity, cultural proximity and unexpectedness. Moreover, what is reported has to coincide with the consumers’ mental images about the topic and the possibilities of the news medium used (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). It are these elements that make it problematic to cover the peace process. Wolfsfeld clarifies this in his book ‘Media and the Path to Peace’. Certainly since the road to peace is long, complex and only knows rare sudden breakthroughs, it doesn’t quite correspond with the simple, unexpected and intense stories expected by the media consumers (Wolfsfeld, 2004). As such the financial necessity to sell news, makes producers give in to the expectations of their clients. Amal Jamal says that this argument, one also often employed by media owners often doesn’t make much sense. Since all big mainstream media with the acceptance of Channel 2 seem to be losing money. Jamal interprets this as an estrangement of the media with the life of daily Israelis/Palestinians (Jamal, interview, 2012, 24 May). Tami Molad-Hayo recognises the same shortcoming and argues that the media has to focus more on issues affecting peoples’ daily lives (Molad-Hayo, personal conversation, 2012, 30 April). The director of the Ilam Media Center sees this as an opportunity to seize the space for representing Palestinians properly in the mainstream media (Jamal, interview, 2012, 24 May). Similarly, Molad-Hayo states that attention has to be given to the many voices that are into

" " existence into society. By bringing women, Palestinians, new immigrants and others on the air the audience will get used to these voices, realising that the Israeli society is more diverse then the one portrayed in the mainstream media. Instead of the simplicity usually shown, media shouldn’t be afraid to show the complexity. Moreover, by bringing opinions together thinking will be stimulated through dialogue (Molad-Hayo, personal conversation, 2012, 30 April).

5.3.2. Palestinian-Israeli asymmetry To avoid media of being ethnocentrically and falling in the trap of only showing the point of view of one community, involving Palestinians as well can be a solution. Although the aim of All for Peace is to be a joint media initiative, the asymmetry between Israeli and Palestinian staff is striking. A similar problem existed as well on the MV Peace. Abie Nathan imagined that by recruiting a joint Arab-Israeli crew, an image of cooperation would come to be. But he failed however to find Arabs willing to work on the ship (Soffer, 2010). What are the cultural reasons behind the disparity? Maysa Baransi-Siniora speaks about the fact that Palestinians don’t really have a culture of volunteering. Many have other issues to cope with such as facing socio-economic difficulties. Before the crackdown on the Israeli bound radio signals in November 2011, different Palestinian journalists were employed at All for Peace. As clarified earlier, judicial issues lead to financial losses. As a consequence, these experienced Palestinian employers went on to other jobs, such as working for prestigious satellite channels (Baransi-Siniora, interview, 2012, 30 April). Ifat Moaz adds that volunteering is difficult for Palestinians since it lacks legitimisation. When cooperating with Israelis has a sufficient financial benefit, the status of an almost academic job is reached necessary for resisting social pressure (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May). Amal Jamal on his turn, pinpoints at the specific situation of Palestinian East- Jerusalemites. They fall between chairs and have a hard time associating with both the Israeli state, whose identity they don’t carry, and to some extent also with the Palestinian territories by whom they often feel neglected. Unlike the Israeli Palestinians, who are formally part of Israel and its structures, the East-Jerusalemites have the option of exiting cooperation with Israelis (Jamal, interview, 2012, 24 May). Another cultural issue is the normalisation versus cooperation discussion. Organisations like PACBI, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, place question marks behind joint Israeli-Palestinian initiatives. They warn for the trap of normalisation, a situation in which there might be cooperation but not to the extent that the

" " situation of Palestinians is improved. Instead, by working together, the status quo is confirmed and even strengthened when compromising facts on the ground keep on being created. Moreover, the danger exists that such initiatives are used as an Israeli propaganda tool, trying to pretend that there are no real problems and covering up injustice. Therefore, PACBI sees it as essential for joint initiatives in order to make a real difference to recognise the basic rights and the identity of the other. Likewise, recognition of Palestinian rights and recognition of the occupation are seen as basic requirements in order to proceed. By pinpointing the oppressive system, co-resistance, for many Palestinians the only legitimate form of cooperation, is possible (PACBI, personal email communication, 13th May 2012). Here we can recognise an echo of Kelman’s arguments. In order to achieve sustainable peace, pragmatic cooperation is not enough, but instead has to go as far as recognising the others identity. Something which is especially difficult when identities are perceived as inconceivable. But these are nevertheless required to base peace on objective criteria of truth, justice and responsibility (Kelman, 2004). One might argue that it is very hard to fulfil these prerequisites for cooperation and that first initiatives have to be taken to better understand each other before embarking on the path of co-resistance and fully recognising each other’s identity. PACBI’s response goes as follows, “It assumes that the conflict would be resolved if only the two people recognised the humanity of the other. But this is belittling peoples’ intelligence on both sides. Israelis know Palestinians are human, and they have no problem with these humans should they be living in New York, Cairo, or Sydney. They have a problem with Palestinians insofar as Palestinians compromise Israel’s narrative as an ethno- national Jewish state.” Likewise, the perception exists that projects as a joint radio are only possible after justice is brought back. Now, some see it as a form of normalisation, a project that can only exist after coresistance has been successful (PACBI, personal email communication, 13th May 2012).

When looking to the other side, the motivations for Jewish participation, there are a few critical remarks that can be made. Amal Jamal judges likewise that cooperation in joint initiatives is not seldom a way for Israelis to gain experience. Moreover, Jewish citizens have the advantage of being on the strong side and some of them engage themselves in order to clean their consciousness. Ifat Maoz on her turn criticises that the peace movement is interlinked with Israel’s political left. Despite these negative judgements that can be made in some cases, there are also many who carry motivations of sincere peacebuilding.

" " 5.3.3. Media and the culture of peacebuilding Nevertheless those who strive towards peacebuilding, many who have walked the path before them have become disillusioned and a lot of scepticism towards peace initiatives exists nowadays in the region. Not only did the hope fire up after the start of the Oslo peace process proved to be futile when violence emerged during the Second Intifada as heavy and even more deadly than before. Also at the time of writing, little prospects of peace seem to exist. Worse even, peace negotiations seem to be far from the political agenda and existing peace treaties, such as the Egyptian one, can apparently not be taken for granted anymore. Israelis await tensely who or which institution is going to consolidate power in the neighbouring country and the recent cutting of gaslines is seen as a negative omen for future relations. Furthermore, when asking people about the relative quite during symbolic days as Nakba and Jerusalem day, an answer is that people don’t see the purpose of being active anymore. The perception exists that activism doesn’t change anything anyhow (Molad-Hayo, personal conversation, 2012, 30 April & 23 May). For those still active in the peace movement this results in a struggle with the current paralysation of the peace process and the doubt if the work done enhances any structural sustainable change. But despite the negativity, there still is a culture of peacebuilding in existence. Ifat Moaz brings up the motivation of keeping islands of sanity in which it is prevented that the situation doesn’t get any worse (Maoz, interview, 2012, 17 May). Others reason that there are still many believing in peace and that the debate in which they look for solution has been kept going (Molad-Hayo, personal conversation, 2012, 30 April). Some, finally, state bluntly that there simply isn’t any other option. If you lose hope you can as well just leave the country, an act impossible for those to whom the country is very dear (Baransi- Siniora, interview, 2012, 30 April).

" " VI. Conclusion

“The news media can play a central role in the promotion of peace. They can emphasize the benefits that peace can bring, they can raise the legitimacy of groups or leaders working for peace, and they can help transform images of the enemy. The media, however can also serve as destructive agents in the process. They can emphasize the risks and dangers associated with compromise, raise the legitimacy of those opposed to concessions, and reinforce negative stereotypes of the enemy” (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p. 1). These words are borrowed from Gadi Wolfsfeld and speak foremost about the mainstream media. Nevertheless the fact that this idea is similar to the goal set out by All for Peace, the Israeli academic is highly sceptical of the joint media initiative. Likewise, he seriously doubts that the radio station has any influence on the Israeli and Palestinian media landscape. After this analysis it has to be recognised indeed that All for Peace operates on a relatively small scale and likewise only has a limited influence. As such, the potential for agendasetting and direct peacebuilding as described in the quote from Wolfsfeld seems to be rather limited. But on the other hand, one might argue that the joint media organisation has some potential because of the mere fact that it exists. It maybe doesn’t set the political agenda, but by being out there, it has the potential of putting pressure on the mainstream media. As such, it shows that there are more voices in both the Israeli as the Palestinian society, opinions that are otherwise largely neglected in the mainstream press. Organisations as All for Peace, but also others as Keshev and the Ilam Media Center, can by being out there as a possible alternative example or by monitoring and advocating, influence the media landscapes in both communities. As Yizhar Be’er (interview, 2012, 17 May), the director of Keshev, states: “We are an annoying fly and we will keep on buzzing till something changes”. Moreover, the joint radio succeeds to give different civil society organisations a platform, as such improving to some extent their communicational capacity. Furthermore, it is an open house where without restrictions everyone who wants can start making a radio programme. As such the radio can meet behind the scenes as a meeting place between different groups that further expand their networks and that can in this manner engage in dialogues.

It is highly questionable if All for Peace can reach out to as many listeners as Voice of Peace during its heydays. To have a similar influence seems to be an ideal. Times have changed, resulting in a totally different context. Moreover, the joint media initiative studied has to cope with a large set of challenges.

" " First of all, there is the issue of financial sustainability. As joint media initiatives are not part of the mainstream media market structures, they don’t have access to the same financial sources. Consequently, there exists a big dependency on donors. The risk herein however is that these donors have their own requirements and follow not seldom the latest trends in development policy obliging their beneficiaries to do the same, instead of listening to the specific goals that suit grassroots needs. Furthermore, as the analysis showed, acceptance within the media market is not always self evident neither. Joint media initiatives when set up enter a market already populated by other players. Since their success goes often at the expense of someone, this might lead to conflict. Such challenge is even worse when entering the media market in divided societies where each group possesses its own channels, making the stakes even higher. In the case of All for Peace broadcasting of Mizrahi music led to a clash with media mogul David Ben Bassat, who owns a radio status specifically focusing on this kind of music. Consequently, he used his political influence with the governing Likud party to get All for Peace out of the air. Next to competition issues, an overpopulated media landscape can have little place left due to government limitations. As such, in Israel it is very difficult to obtain a radio license from the authorities. Consequently, pirate radios and legal constructions getting their license from the Palestinian authorities form a grey market. The result of such a situation is that the official attitude towards them highly depends on which parties are part of the government and to which extent they agree with the owners or the message of the radio. Likewise, comparing All for Peace with the Voice of Peace and RAM FM, shows that the latter two focus less on political sensitive issues. According to the ‘media consent paradigm’, taking up the role of political mediator instead of broadcasting music and entertainment can be dangerous for the status quo. As a consequence, the set up of All for Peace increases the risk of a political and/or economical reaction. New media can be an important alternative for these often unsustainable constructions. As such, spaces as the internet enjoy relative freedom. Moreover, foreign support can also be an important protection, something All for Peace is currently to some extent trying to employ.

Analysing joint media through the ‘political contest paradigm’, we can observe how the peace movement that is otherwise largely neglected by mainstream channels seeks an alternative for getting heard by creating its own media outlet. Similarly, All for Peace can be interpreted as a radio empowering Israeli and to a lesser extent Palestinian civil society alike, encouraging their cooperation. This approach is the result from the failure of the post Oslo people to

" " people dialogue workshops which had a very limited impact, reaching only few. The rebranding of dialogue initiatives into media organisations can be seen as reaching out to a larger audience. But at the same time, we can question to which extent such form of joint media manages to actually get access to the public opinion. Many criticise the model as being active in the margins where it preaches to the own choir. A radio as All for Peace is as such seen by some as an island of naive pacifists, staying in the margins of the media landscape and thus convincing only a few of its message of conflict resolution. Critics say that in order to induce change you have to convince a large audience that on its turn will bring those to power sharing your ideas. According to them, conflict resolution first has to take place from a top down level, reshaping the conflict framework. A push for such a political move might happen by dramatic events such as Sadat’s visit to the Knesset illustrated. Others say that alternative media is important nevertheless just by the sake of its existence. Showing that cooperation is possible and carrying a message of peace would put pressure on the more mainstream media that might copy aspects. Likewise, hawks are prevented of dominating the narrative. Moreover, cooperation means mutually reinforcing each other as well, by showing that there are doves on both sides willing to work towards peacebuilding and thus gaining credibility.

Moreover, conflict shapes the functioning of media. As such, dominant paradigms are imposed or grow naturally shaping the lens through which news is made. For the case of the Israeli society this clearly is the security framework. Realising this is crucial for thinking outside the box. Such an approach might eventually lead to more perspectives for creative conflict resolution, something that lies at the core of the ambition of joint media. Utilising the ‘media culture paradigm’ further, we can observe how conflicts in divided societies have identity issues at its core. The problem this leads to, even more when the struggle is asymmetrical, is that cooperation through a joint radio as All for Peace runs the risk of being interpreted by one side as normalisation. Likewise, some Palestinians refuse to join such alternatives stating that the only form of cooperation is co-resistance. The latter can only happen when the other side recognises its basic identity rights and inscribes itself in the struggle against ‘occupation’. Everything less is confirming the status quo, a situation on the ground that is interpreted as highly dishonest.

" " As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis hopes to contribute to the limited body of research that exists on the topic of media and conflict resolution by looking into a specific kind of media, that of joint media initiatives. Since the research was set up as an extensive study of one case, the conclusions made will have to be tested by comparing them to other joint media initiatives. Likewise, this is an invitation to future researchers to make use of the data gathered. Personally, I would propose to focus in a comparative approach on the three following issues. First of all, do new joint media initiatives in conflict areas establish themselves in a grey zone or do they succeed in being accepted in the mainstream media landscape? And moreover, as new players are they vulnerable to the economic interests of the players already present? Secondly, it would be interesting to find examples of joint media organisations that are successful in weighing on the public debate and how they succeed to do this. Or do most of them like All for Peace, play a more indirect role? Finally, to which extent is cooperation between rival communities in other contexts of conflict possible? Do similar questions of normalisation come to the fore and in which way does this impede the set out goals?

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