Strategies for the Human Realm: Crux of the T’Ai-Pai Yin-Ching

80 Book Reviews Ralph D. Sawyer Strategies for the Human Realm: Crux of the T’ai-pai Yin-ching. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012. pp. xxxi, 190. $13.95. ISBN: 9-781479-132386. Ralph D. Sawyer’s latest book is a translation and commentary on the first twenty-five chapters of the Tang Dynasty military treatise, Taibai yinjing (T’ai-pai Yin-ching), completed in 759 CE. The author, Li Quan (Li Ch’üan), also wrote a commentary on Sunzi’s Art of War and served as a military governor in Hebei after the An Lushan Rebellion of the mid-eighth century. The title, Taibai yinjing, has many resonances, but can be rendered literally as The Secret Treatise of Venus (the planet governing military affairs). As most readers of this journal know, Sawyer is a prolific author of monographs on Chinese warfare and translator of classical military texts. In a departure from his previous works, Strategies for the Human Realm is self-published as an inexpensive paperback targeted mainly at a general audience. Consequently, the book lacks endnotes, bibliography, and character lists. Nonetheless, the book is worthy of the attention of specialists in Chinese military history because of Sawyer’s excellence as a translator of martial classics. The book consists of a preface, introduction, twenty-five chapters—each including a translation followed by Sawyer’s commentary—brief suggestions for further reading (three pages), and an inadequate index (two pages). Many chapters end with “minor jottings” that substitute for citations. Though never explained, Sawyer’s commentary and jottings apparently are inspired by the norms of classical Chinese exegesis. The introduction provides background information about Li Quan, Tang military treatises, the ancient martial sources that influenced Li, and an overview of the full 100 chapters of Taibai yinjing. Sawyer translates only the first quarter of Li’s book that deals primarily with the philosophy of warfare. Sawyer argues that the Taibai yinjing is a synthesis that draws heavily upon Sunzi’s Art of War and other classic military texts, and that Li’s originality is as “the first martial analyst to effectively cite historic conflicts” to illustrate concepts and tactics (xiv). This approach subsequently was imitated by authors of other military treatises. The strengths of this book are Sawyer’s solid translations and commentaries built upon his mastery of ancient Chinese military classics. His commentaries invariably demonstrate how Li Quan adopted and reinterpreted elements of ancient Chinese military thought. For example, in chapter fourteen “Submerged Plans 沉謀,” concerning deception in warfare, Sawyer’s deep knowledge of the martial works allows him to conclude that all of the tactical principles mentioned are direct quotations or paraphrases of Sunzi. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��4 | doi �0.��63/��7453-��34��64 Book Reviews 81 The weakness of the book is Sawyer’s shallower knowledge of Tang Dynasty history. For example, the introduction contains several factual errors. The An Lushan Rebellion lasted until 763, not 786, and Li Quan was active not only late in Xuanzong’s reign, but also during the rule of Suzong and Daizong. In addi- tion, “assiduous study of the classic military writings” was not “required” of Tang military officers, who in many cases were illiterate or had foreign origins (ix). More importantly, Sawyer’s commentaries rarely place Taibai yinjing within the context of Tang military or intellectual history and particularly the chaotic civil war period in which it was written. The book’s strengths and weaknesses are displayed strikingly in chapter two, “Earth Has No Ravines or Impediments 地無險阻.” Sawyer persuasively demonstrates that Li Quan contradicts the classical military theorists who “stressed the importance of exploiting the terrain’s strategic characteristics.” Li’s contrarian position is that “advantages of terrain cannot rescue a chaotic and doomed state. Whether terrain is difficult or easy depends on men” (14-15). Since Li provides historical examples to justify his position, Sawyer attributes Li’s perspective to his study of military history. What Sawyer misses is that Li undoubtedly is alluding to events a few years earlier in 756 during the An Lushan rebellion. The main loyalist army suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of rebel forces occupying Luoyang. Taking advantage of the subsequent disarray, the rebels captured the strategic Tong Pass, crossed into southern Shaanxi, and sacked the Tang capital of Chang’an. The military disaster resulted because factional infighting and interference from Xuanzong’s court had undermined the authority of the generals opposed to an attack on Luoyang. Echoes of these concerns also can be found later in the book, including chapter ten, “The Government Executes the Strong 政有誅強”, which warns about private conflicts undermining the state, and chapter twenty-five, “Bestowing the Yüeh [Ax] 授鉞”, which argues for full decision-making authority of generals while on campaign. Li Quan’s oblique criticisms of Xuanzong’s court were acceptable by 759 because Suzong had usurped rule after the fall of Chang’an. Despite these problems, military historians of China will find Sawyer’s translation and commentary to be of value because of his strong grounding in the classical works. Consequently, I am puzzled why Sawyer chose to self publish and target the book at the general reader. Positive aspects of self- publishing—an inexpensive paperback price and higher royalty rate for the hard-working author—are offset by negatives that give the book the feel of a draft manuscript. A lack of peer review and copy editing results in the above- mentioned errors of fact and interpretation, inelegant turns of phrase (e.g. “This chapter forms a pair (sic) with the previous and the twelfth,” p. 14) and some glaring typographical errors (e.g. a period at the beginning of a paragraph Journal of Chinese Military History 3 (�0�4) 7�-88.

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