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The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity

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The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity The Essence of the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity Alexis HERACLIDES GreeSE Paper NoNo.51.51.51.51 Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe OCTOBER 2011 All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Hellenic Observatory or the LSE © Alexis HERACLIDES _ Table of Contents ABSTRACT ________________________________________________________ iii 1. Introduction _______________________________________________________ 1 2. Three Paths Ahead and their Limitations ______________________________ 2 3. Historical Narratives _______________________________________________ 8 4. An Identity-Based Conflict __________________________________________ 13 4.1 Greek Identity and Demonization of the Turks ________________________ 16 4.2 Turkish Identity and Demonization of the Greeks ______________________ 19 4.3 Additional Caveats ______________________________________________ 22 5. Attitude Change, Paradigm Shift ____________________________________ 24 REFERENCES _____________________________________________________ 28 Acknowledgements: This paper has benefitted from a National Bank of Greece grant (March-August 2011) that allowed the author to have a very fruitful sojourn in London at the LSE-Hellenic Observatory and in Istanbul (April 2011) at Bogazici University. ii The Essence of the GreekGreek----TurkishTurkish Rivalry: National NarraNarrativetive and Identity Alexis HERACLIDES # ABSTRACT The Greek-Turkish dyad is one of the oldest rivalries between neighbours. Since 1999 Greek-Turkish relations are in a state of détente and there have been many attempts to resolve their outstanding differences (Aegean, Cyprus, minority issues) but until now little has come out of these efforts although both sides are committed to an overall settlement. Our thesis is that this lack of progress is due to the fact that various incompatible conflicts are but the tip of the iceberg. The real reasons for the impasse, the essence of the rivalry, are the following ensemble (which is presented in detail in this paper): historical memories and traumas, real or imagined that are part and parcel of their national narratives together with their respective collective identities which are built on slighting and demonizing the ‘Other’. Only if this aspect of the conflict is fully addressed will Greece and Turkey be able to settle their ‘objective conflicts of interests’ and embark on a process of mutually beneficial reconciliation. # Alexis Heraclides, b.1952, PhD. in International Relations (University of Kent), Professor of International Relations and Conflict Resolution (2005-). Latest book: The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) Correspondence: Professor Alexis Heraclides, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, 136 Sygrou Ave, Athens, 17671, Greece, [email protected] iii iv The Essence of the GreekGreek----TurkishTurkish Rivalry: National Narrative and Identity 1. Introduction The Greek-Turkish rivalry is one of the few oldest enduring conflicts between neighbors worldwide. From mid-1999 onwards relations are in a state of détente and there have been many attempts to resolve their outstanding differences (Aegean, Cyprus, minority issues) but until now very little has come out of these efforts and the occasional shows of good will, even though both sides are committed to an overall settlement and a final reconciliation. And the rivalry rumbles on at low ebb in spite of its staggering economic and other costs to both sides (armaments, militarization of border regions, costly over-flights of military aircraft and dangerous dogfights in the Aegean, the spending of valuable diplomatic and other capital that could have been spent more productively elsewhere). The continuing Greek-Turkish antagonism is perplexing to outsiders who point to the following: 1. The borders between Turkey and Greece have been set, conclusively, at the Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947) peace treaties; the remaining boundary disputes, namely those in the Aegean, are on water and in the air and are more amenable to a logical and just settlement. 2. There are no claims over the other country’s territory as was the case until 1922. Both parties have officially claimed (from 1929 until today) that they harbour no territorial ambitions vis-à-vis the other side. There is little reason not to doubt the sincerity of these claims, that both sides are bona fide status quo states (leaving aside the case of Cyprus in bygone days) irrespective of the doubts that linger on about the true intentions of the other party. 3. There have been two decades of cordial relations (1930s and 1945-54) in addition to the recent detente, as a result of a political will at the highest level, which implies that the road to an eventual rapprochement is far from far-fetched but a distinct possibility worth pursuing. Yet the Greek-Turkish rivalry drifts on with remarkable abandon. Could it be, as Henry Kissinger had once put it, that the conflict is centuries-old and emotional and defies rationality (Kissinger 2000: 192, 195)? The first tangible Greek-Turkish conflict following the Second World War was the Cyprus problem from the 1950s onwards. A second objective conflict of interest is the intricate Aegean difference, which includes at least six distinct disputes. 1 Minority questions are also a constant point of friction together with issues related to the Patriarchate in Istanbul. All these questions however complex and of great importance to both parties are resolvable provided there is an abundance of mutual good will and readiness for compromise by both parties. 2 2. Three Paths Ahead and their Limitations At the outset it is worth remembering that in both countries there are many experts, diplomats and politicians that regard the rivalry as a given, as inevitable, along existential lines within the logic of Carl Schmitt: ‘the Other’ (Andere ) is the great ‘Enemy’ ( Feind ) that can never be ‘a friend’ (Schmitt, 1932). Within this perspective, which was dominant in the two publics from 1 See Wilson 1979/1980; Rozakis 1988: 269-492; Theodoropoulos 1988: 266-300; Pazarcı 1988: 101- 20; Ayd ιn 1997: 115-22; Syrigos 1998; Acer 2003; Bölükba şι 2004; Heraclides 2001, 2010: 167-219. 2 This has been convincingly argued by specialists on Greek-Turkish affairs and several insiders. See in particular: Wilson 1979/1980: 1-2, 27-29; Clogg 1983: 124-5, 128, 131; Couloumbis 1983: 124-30; Groom 1986: 147-8; Bahcheli 1990: 129-30, 152-4, 192-3; Haass 1990: 59-64; Heraclides 2001, 2010: 151-4, 223, 228-31. Among insiders see former ambassadors Theodoropoulos 1988: 324-5; Stearns 1992: 134-44; Tzounis 1990: 217-21. 2 1974 until the late 1990s and still far from a spent force, the only realistic strategies are deterrence, diplomatic victories (outwitting and cornering the adversary), the threat of armed violence and other paraphernalia of the traditional realist paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s. Those in Greece and Turkey that do not regard the Greek-Turkish antagonism as inevitable tend to follow the tradition of soft realism, pluralism/liberalism or constructivism. In practical terms they have tended to follow three paths in their attempt to cope with the Greek-Turkish rivalry. One path is to put the main emphasis on the settlement of the Cyprus problem that had derailed the cordial Greek-Turkish relations in 1954 and has poisoned them ever since. According to this line of reasoning as long as the Cyprus conflict looms in the Greek-Turkish horizon the bilateral differences would defy resolution. Conversely if the Cyprus conflict was resolved by the reunification of the island than the settlement of the Aegean and other points would be almost a child’s play. At political level this approach was first put forward by Greek leaders, Constantinos Mitsotakis (1990-1993) and more erratically by Andreas Papandreou (1985-1988). The Turkish stance for most of the time, prior to the rise of the AKP government (November 2002) was the Bülent Ecevit line, that the Cyprus problem was resolved in 1974. From 2003 onwards primer Recet Tayyip Erdo ğan has repeatedly stressed the need to resolve the Cyprus via reunification and more recently has said that with the resolution of the Cyprus problem the other differences would be easily resolved. Skeptics of this approach (including this author) argue that since the Cyprus question may not be resolved, at least not in the foreseeable future, this approach lacks pragmatism. Obviously it is to the interests of Greece and Turkey to resolve the Cyprus problem in a mutually acceptable way, preferably by reunification in a loose federal framework or if that proves impossible by way of a velvet divorce with the return of some 7-10% of the territory to the 3 Greek-Cypriots. But it is hardly for the two ‘motherlands’ to do so. Resolution has to be negotiated and accepted by the two communities in Cyprus; it cannot be imposed by Athens and Ankara, as bitter experience has shown (namely the 1959 Zurich-London Agreements and their attempts in the period 1964-1970, starting with the 1964 US mediation by Dean Acheson) or by the UN for that matter (the attempt of all the UN Secretary-Generals from U Thant in 1964- 1965 to Koffi Annan in 1999-2004). The two Cyprus communities or one of them can – and has – repeatedly frustrated reasonable attempts at resolution from 1968-1974 (when the first promising inter-communal talks took place) until today (the recent inter-communal talks from 2008 onward under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Ban-ki Moon). It may well be that the Cyprus problem simply defies resolution via reunification (Heraclides 2011). Thus Greece and Turkey may have to learn to live with a divided Cyprus and not allow their relations to be marred as a result constantly frustrating their attempts at settlement of their many differences. Effective decoupling/delinking is called for: of the Cyprus problem from their bilateral relations that need to be settled once and for all. Put more emphatically, Greek-Turkish relations cannot be a hostage to the Cyprus problem.
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