Illiberalism in the Western Balkans? by Tzveta Dryanovska

17 2017 LUZITANIJA/ADOBE STOCK

Recent political developments in the Western a continuation of the status quo in Serbian politics, Balkans have led the EU to re-focus its attention on dominated by Vucic’s SNS party, thousands of pro- the region. Countries in southeastern Europe have testers taking to the streets calling for Vucic to re- been struggling to embrace and implement reforms sign tell a different story. The demonstrators were that would steer them along the path towards EU disgruntled by the growing centralisation of power accession. The recent rise in political tensions in the around Vucic and the erosion of the rule of law in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania the country. In addition to cracking down on me- and Serbia clearly illustrates the worrying trends in dia and political opposition, Vucic and the SNS the region, including poisonous nationalist rheto- have also been accused of manipulating the elec- ric, widespread corruption and the drift towards the tion process by monopolising media coverage in the centralisation of power. run-up to the vote while threatening and bribing voters. Furthermore, opposition parties have sup- This was showcased by Skopje’s failure to form a ported the protests and have called for a re-count. government for four months after the elections held While protests have remained peaceful, they illus- in December 2016 and increasing signs of discon- trate growing popular discontent with a model of tent in a politically divided society. Similarly, in behaviour closely mirroring that adopted until re- Belgrade, newly elected President (and outgoing cently by former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia PM) Vucic has succeeded in concentrating power Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. in his party’s hands while disregarding the growing opposition against him. Finally, in Tirana, the divi- The ‘Macedonian model’, if there is one, could be sions between the ruling party and the opposition characterised by increasingly authoritarian and an- (which initially demanded the resignation of the ti-democratic developments and elements of state current government over accusations that it will not capture. Following wiretapping scandals involving conduct free elections) became so acute that they the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party in April 2016, the resulted in a three-month long political deadlock streets of Skopje were filled with thousands of pro- which has put future general elections in jeopardy. testers demanding the resignation of Gruevski and his government. The situation further deteriorated Between Belgrade and Skopje a few months later, in December 2016, when par- liamentary elections saw a coalition of opposition In Serbia, presidential elections in early April 2017 parties win 67 out of 120 seats in parliament. The resulted in former Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic incumbent government, however, refused to cede becoming the new president with a solid majority power to the opposition, and President Ivanov of 55% of the votes. While some have seen this as blocked the forming of a new government where

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) June 2017 1 the opposition would hold a majority. What is backed by the EU and the US. The judicial reform more, in the run-up to the elections civil society or- issue was resolved by a provision to create a body ganisations, journalists and opposition figures were which would vet judges and prosecutors. Moreover, threatened. Even so, following an outbreak of vio- a further provision designed to accommodate lence in the country’s parliament and subsequent in- Basha’s demands was also introduced – the opposi- ternational pressure to resolve the crisis peacefully, tion will be able to appoint technocrats to seven of President Ivanov finally awarded opposition leader the future ministries, including the interior and jus- Zoran Zaev the mandate to form a new government, tice portfolios. Likewise, concerns of electoral fair- thus paving the way for a resolution of the two-year ness will be addressed by allowing the Democratic political deadlock. Party to choose the head of the election commis- sion, as well as introducing electronic voting in the The newly elected Serbian president, however, does next elections. Hence, despite uncompromising not seem to take the protests against him too seri- rhetoric from both political sides and the failure ously. On the contrary, he has hailed the demon- of some previous mediation efforts undertaken by strations as a healthy symptom of democracy, while the international community, political tensions in pro-government media outlets fuel tensions by ei- Albania did not reach breaking point. While bear- ther downplaying the size of the demonstrations or ing some resemblance to the political situation in just ignoring them, and by delegitimising the oppo- former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, then, the sition through allegations that the protesters plan to political impasse in Albania seems to have been re- turn violent and could jeopardise political stability solved in a much shorter timeframe and without in the country. Thus, while Vucic’s grip on power any outbreaks of violence. has tightened, his internal policies could actually lead to more serious tensions. Keep calm but don’t carry on Tirana’s deadlock Still, the path towards democratic consolidation for the Western Balkan states remains a long and dif- In Albania, political tensions between Prime Minister ficult one. With the curbing of independent media, Edi Rama and his current ruling coalition on one control of the judiciary, pressure on civil society, side, and the opposition Democratic Party headed and rising unchecked corruption, new sources of by Lulzim Basha on the other, led to a three-month political instability have emerged in these countries. political deadlock. In February 2017 the opposition The lack of a tangible prospect of accession to the party renewed its calls for the government to resign EU may have encouraged established rulers to drift and be replaced by a technocratic caretaker cabi- towards illiberalism and authoritarian rule; in turn, net. For example, the Rama government proposed however, such drifts risk making that prospect even a judicial reform with a view to taking further steps more remote. This said, such trends should not towards European integration, but the opposition be overstated and lead observers to conclude that accused it of using the reform to centralise power countries in the Western Balkans are on the brink of and distort the fairness of the forthcoming elec- collapse or violence. Inflammatory political rheto- tions. The opposition also demanded the introduc- ric is not new to the region and is consciously ex- tion of electronic voting for the upcoming elections, ploited by elites, mostly to detract attention from but the government argued it would not be possible underlying domestic problems and political clashes. to introduce the reform at such short notice. For the time being international pressure has succeeded in preventing the outbreak of a political cri- Basha’s rhetoric was also supported by sit-in pro- sis in Albania, and has put an end to the one in tests in Tirana, as well as the boycotting of the par- former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the liament in an effort to obstruct the judicial reform. new government has already taken some bold steps The opposition also claimed it would not partici- to break the vicious circle of the previous years. pate in the forthcoming elections and expand its protests to the rest of Albania. Antagonistic rhetoric Meanwhile, in Serbia, the opposition is still gaining was further evident in the opposition’s accusations traction but lacks the ability to challenge the cen- that the current government is not only authoritar- tralisation of power by Vucic. If political actors do ian in nature, but also involved in criminal activities not take tangible steps towards reform to address and drug trafficking. the ongoing illiberal trends in an effective and ir- reversible manner, political instability could re- Despite the animosity between the two parties, emerge once again in the region. Albania’s political deadlock was recently resolved when a compromise deal was struck between the Tzveta Dryanovska is a Junior Analyst at the two sides through the ’McAllister-plus’ proposal, EUISS.

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