iii

Faculteit Sociale Wetenschappen Centre for Migration and Intercultural Studies (CeMIS)

Feeding the Ties to “Home” Moroccan Diaspora Policies for the Next Generation

Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor in Social Sciences at the University of Antwerp by

Rilke Mahieu

under the supervision of Prof. dr. Christiane Timmerman† (University of Antwerp) Prof. dr. Noel Clycq (University of Antwerp) Prof. dr. Nadia Fadil (Catholic University of Leuven)

Antwerp, 2019

i ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Looking back at the trajectory leading to the completion of this doctoral dissertation, a sense of gratitude dominates. This doctoral dissertation would have not been accomplished without the generous financial support of the FWO Flanders and without the many people involved.

First and foremost, I wish to thank all my respondents, in Morocco and elsewhere, for their willingness to share their thoughts, stories, and networks with me. I cannot put into words how enriching these encounters have been, both academically and personally.

Next, I wish to thank my supervisors: Chris; because of her belief in me and for offering me so many opportunities for professional growth; Nadia; for her stimulating insights and warm encouragement; and Noel; for his readiness to jump into the boat at the final stage and for being there whenever needed. Sadly, Chris passed away in February 2019. While she was unable to witness the completion of this dissertation, I know she would have been immensely proud of me. My doctoral committee members Dimitri Mortelmans and Noël Salazar pushed my work forward with their sharp but always constructive remarks. Scholars like Koen Bogaert, Alexandra Délano Alonso, Lauren Wagner, Jean-Michel Lafleur, Mohamed Berriane, Marlies Casier, Peggy Levitt, Sami Zemni, Maja Povrzanovic Frykman and Martha Bivand Erdal challenged my views by asking the right questions or by pointing at new perspectives. I also wish to thank the anonymous peer reviewers who reviewed my published articles and book chapter, and the jury members at my public defense.

I also received support and encouragement from numerous colleagues at CeMIS, my “home” at the University of Antwerp. Colleagues and former colleagues like François, Edith, Ina, Els, Bea, Sanne, An, Marie-Lou, Joris, Joris, Petra, Rut, Christof, Ward, Lore and many others offered me at one point or another their critical feedback, encouragement, practical support or simply a listening ear.

I also want to thank my friends and family, who offered me the necessary distraction — in the form of their company, music, good food, and other enjoyable

iii things in life. In particular those friends who completed their PhDs before, Els and Joke, inspired and supported me in many ways.

Throughout this dissertation, I highlight the importance of acknowledging one’s “roots”. Speaking of my own “roots”; I owe the development of my talents to the dedicated education of my parents, and I thank them for instilling in me the confidence to pursue whatever aspirations I have. Finally, I owe thanks to Benjamin, my life companion, and our two children Gusta and Rosanne, for teaching me each and every day the most important lessons in life. I am also grateful to my parents and parents-in-law, for taking care of these two little ones so often, in order to allow me to pursue my ambitions.

Bedankt, merci, shukran bezzaf, thank you.

iv COMPOSITION OF THE JURY

Supervisors

Prof.dr. Christiane Timmerman† (University of Antwerp)

Prof. dr. Noel Clycq (University of Antwerp)

Prof. dr. Nadia Fadil (Catholic University of Leuven)

Individual doctoral commission members

Prof. dr. Noël Salazar (Catholic University of Leuven)

Prof. dr. Dimitri Mortelmans (University of Antwerp)

Additional jury members

Prof. dr. Nadia Bouras (Leiden University)

Prof. dr. Anja van Heelsum (University of Amsterdam)

Prof. dr. Kristof Titeca (University of Antwerp)

v vi CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ...... iii Composition of the jury ...... v Contents ...... vii

Introductory summary: on cows and calves 1

Part 1: Studying Moroccan diaspora policies: Theoretical background, case description, and methodology

Chapter 1: Theoretical Background 11 Synopsis 13 Conceptual toolkit: core theoretical concepts 13 Transnationalism 14 Definitions 14 The transnational subject: what or who is transnational? 15 A generational perspective on transnationalism 16 The study of transnationalism: analytic viewpoints 18 Diaspora: what’s in a name? 21 Theoretical debates on diaspora 21 Diaspora as a category of practice 26 Origin states and their expatriate populations: theories and practices 29 Emigration and the state: challenges and state responses 29 Diaspora policies: insights from empirical studies 35 Historical views on diaspora policies 36 Explanatory frameworks for diaspora policies, and their limitations 38 Reception of diaspora policies by expatriate populations 42

Chapter 2: Moroccan Migration, Transnationalism, and the State 45 Synopsis 47 The Moroccan State 47 The Moroccan political system 47

vii The impact of the Moroccan political system on diaspora policies 50 The global position of the Moroccan State 52 Moroccan emigration: patterns and demographics 55 Historical and geographical evolution of the profile of Moroccan migration 55 Demographic shifts in the Moroccan expatriate population: the rise of post-migrant generations 59 Moroccan transnational ties and the Moroccan State 61 Socio-economic ties: individual remittances, collective remittances, transnational investments and entrepreneurship 63 Social ties: return visits and family formation 67 Cultural ties: language and religion 71 Political ties: dual nationality, citizenship, and political participation 74

Chapter 3: Research Questions, Design, and Approach 79 Synopsis 81 Research questions and design 81 Research methodology 86 Political ethnography 87 In-depth interviews 90 Desk research 93 Reflections on my researcher positionality 94

Part 2: Empirical studies on Moroccan diaspora policies for “the next generations”

Overview 107

Chapter 4: Competing Origin Country Perspectives on Emigrants’ Descendants: Moroccan Diaspora Institutions’ Policy Views and Practices Regarding the “Next Generations Abroad” 111 Abstract 113 Introduction 113 Research design and methodology 115 Analytic framework 117

viii The governmentality perspective 117 Governing the diaspora 119 Moroccan diaspora policies 122 Government rationalities: how and why to govern post-migrant moroccans? 126 The homeland-centered rationality 126 The diaspora-centered rationality 134 Comparing and contextualizing government rationalities 138 Conclusion 141

Chapter 5: The Shifting Moroccan Policy Paradigm Regarding the Integration of MREs (Moroccans Living Abroad): Reconciling Transnational Ties and Migrant Integration 145 Abstract 147 Introduction 147 The integration-transnationalism nexus reconsidered: the origin state perspective 149 The Moroccan paradigm shift regarding emigrant integration: from rejection to promotion 151 The antagonistic perspective: integration as a threat to transnational ties 152 The turning point: recognition of integration 154 The synergistic perspective: promoting integration as a diaspora policy goal 155 Transnational attachments as a lever for integration: underlying dynamics 162 The culture of origin as a point of reference and a source of empowerment 164 Openness and tolerance as inherently Moroccan values 169 Conclusion 173

Chapter 6: Feeding the Ties to “Home”: Diaspora Policies for the Next Generation 177 Abstract 179 Introduction 179 Theorizing diaspora policies 180 Research methodology 183

ix Morocco’s diaspora policies for the next generations 184 Morocco’s shifting relationship with its expatriate communities 184 The Summer Universities for young Moroccans Living Abroad 186 A targeted diaspora policy methodology for the next generation 188 Moroccan national identity across borders and generations 189 Polishing Morocco’s image 192 Mobilizing the next generations for Morocco’s development 194 Conclusive reflections: A diaspora policy methodology for the next generations 196

Chapter 7: “We’re not Coming from Mars; We Know How Things Work in Morocco!” How Diasporic Moroccan Youth Resists Political Socialization in State-led Homeland Tours 199 Abstract 201 Introduction 201 Political socialization in homeland tours 204 The Summer Universities 209 Negotiating socialization during the Summer Universities 210 Contesting organizers’ perspectives on Morocco: “This is not the real Morocco!” 211 Questioning managerial practices: The Summer Universities as a mirror for Moroccan politics and society 216 Practice what you preach? Clientelism and censorship 217 Professional management: Clashing perspectives 218 The Summer Universities as a showcase for Moroccan policies 220 Conclusion 222

Chapter 8: Theoretical Contributions to the Academic Debate and Future Avenues for Research 225 Introduction 227 Diaspora Policies 2.0 for the next generations 228 Changing population, shifting diaspora policies 229 Instrumentalization of homeland-oriented identifications 233 Ambitious policies, ambiguous outcomes 235 Routes for future research 238

x Bibliography ...... 243 Nederlandstalige samenvatting...... 268 Annex 1: Chronologic overview of interviews ...... 272 Annex 2: Abbreviations ...... 275 Annex 3: Interview guideline for ex-participants to the Summer Universities ...... 276 Annex 4: Open-ended questionnaire for Summer University Participants ...... 282 Annex 5: Policy report on the summer universities ...... 295 Annex 6: Map of Morocco ...... 315

xi xii I carry two worlds within me But neither one whole They are constantly bleeding The border runs right through my tongue

From “Doppelman” by Şenocak (1984)

(…) ask not what your country can do for you ask what you can do for your country.

Inaugural speech of J.F. Kennedy (1961)

xiii

INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY: ON COWS AND CALVES

La vache à lait or the “cash cow” is an image often used by critics of Moroccan diaspora policies when depicting the relation between Morocco and the Moroccan expatriate1 population. As imageries usually do, this notion evokes multiple layers of meanings. On the one hand, it denotes the strategic importance of the Moroccan expatriate population to the Moroccan economy (Sørensen 2004; Iskander 2010). The financial contributions of les MRE or les Marocains Résident à L’Etranger — the ways Moroccan emigrants and their descendants are commonly referred to in Moroccan public discourses — are especially pivotal here. Contributions may take various forms such as cash transfers and gifts to family members, consumption during homeland visits, and international trade. More broadly, expatriate Moroccans play a vital role in the homeland economy by connecting it with the global economic system. On the other hand, the imagery of the cash cow points at an imbalance in the relationship between Morocco and its expatriate citizens. While the origin state “skims” the benefits of expatriate citizens’ contributions — notably, farming jargon applies here too —, for example, in the form of interests and taxes, little seems to be offered in return. As is often mentioned bitterly by expatriate Moroccans when criticizing the Moroccan state’s approach towards its expatriate citizens, expatriate Moroccans abroad lack voice and political rights in Morocco — just as cows do not have a say in farming policies. As one Moroccan expatriate, denouncing this situation, notes sarcastically, “Have you ever seen a cow eligible for office, or voting? Have you ever seen a cow on strike?2”

1 Throughout this dissertation, the term “Moroccan expatriate population” is used to indicate the vast group of people holding or entitled to Moroccan citizenship but not living in Morocco. As such, when I use the term “expatriate” I refer to the original meaning of ex patria (Latin for being outside of the native country/fatherland). In some literature and in colloquial usage, the term expatriate has come to be linked more narrowly to highly skilled mobile professionals (cfr. “expats” or “business expatriates”) (Fechter and Walsh 2010), but I do not follow this approach.

2 Mraizika, M. (2012) “Les MRE, “vaches à lait” et improbables citoyens”. Online opinion piece. Retrieved August 17, 2017 (https://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/ 9835/).

1 The overall ambition of this dissertation is to contribute to a more fine- grained understanding of origin-country perspectives on emigration and its expatriate population. A major rationale for focusing on sending countries’ perspectives is migration studies’ long-term bias towards studying immigration- related issues while ignoring emigration-related issues (Dufoix et al. 2010; Collyer 2013; Berriane, de Haas and Natter 2015; Sayad [1999] 2004). This tendency has been linked to the preoccupation of the field with the impact of international migration on receiving countries — and in particular, Western receiving countries — rather than on sending countries. Resultantly, migration studies have been dominated by topics related to the incorporation of migrants into various societal domains (e.g., into education, the labor market, politics, etc.) and their impact on receiving societies. Yet, as Sayad ([1999] 2004:1) notes “one country’s immigration is another country’s emigration. The two are indissociable elements of a single reality, and one cannot be explained without reference to the other.”

This singular focus of social scientists on immigration has led to some blind spots. On the one hand, on the level of individual migrants, it has resulted in a one-dimensional perspective on migrants as immigrants only — disregarding the fact that “every immigrant is an emigrant, every alien a citizen and every foreigner a national” (Waldinger and Duquette-Rury 2016:42). Only with the emergence of the transnational lens in migration studies (since the 1990s), migration scholars started to take a more comprehensive approach to migrants’ lives by including migrants’ practices, identifications, and narratives concerning their origin country and community of origin. On the other hand, in the study of state policies in the field of migration, academic research has been dominated by studies on integration/incorporation/assimilation of immigrants, while origin countries’ policy responses to emigration have been ignored. Only recently, a research field has been established focusing on the ways origin states attempt to govern their expatriate communities.

While various dimensions of the expatriate Moroccans’ transnational relationship have been documented and studied, one question has remained largely ignored: what happens when — continuing with the “cash cow” metaphor for a minute — the cattle grows old? Will their calves grow up to become as productive, or does milk production risk drying up? And what action can be taken to sustain milk production? No dairy farmer will lose sleep over such a question, as the law of nature ensures the productivity of the “next generation”. However, when

2 transposed to a human setting, this question becomes a matter of concern since migrants’ (and their children’s) behavior is by no means reducible to the law of nature. To what extent new generations of foreign-born Moroccans, framed here as Moroccan (e)migrants’ descendants or post-migrant Moroccans – continue their parents’ transnational ties to Morocco is defined by a wide range of individual, social, and structural factors.

This dissertation focuses on the role of one particular but central agent intervening in this evolving transnational social field: the state of origin. As becomes clear in Chapter 1, most countries confronted with emigration and migrant transnationalism tend to develop “diaspora policies” based upon economic, political, social, cultural and historical elements (Brand 2006). Morocco has been one of the pioneers in this area, as Moroccan mass emigration, starting shortly after the Second World War, has been paired from the outset by efforts by Moroccan authorities to manage its emigrant population, e.g. by channeling its remittances and controlling it politically (Iskander 2010). Later on, as the profile of the Moroccan expatriate population shifted from mainly male workers towards families with children, the Moroccan diaspora policy approach broadened to include more social and cultural aims. Today, in the original receiving countries of Moroccan labor migration to Europe (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Germany), a large portion of the population with a Moroccan background is born and raised in Europe. Taking into account this context, this study asks the following research questions about current Moroccan diaspora policies:

a. To what extent are emigrants’ descendants considered a special target group in the origin state’s diaspora policy approach? How is this expressed? b. If distinctive diaspora policy strategies are used to target this group, how can we understand the nature and form of these strategies? c. How are these diaspora policy strategies understood and legitimized by the actors creating and implementing them? d. How do emigrants’ descendants respond to those policy strategies?

This dissertation consists of two major parts: the first part constructs the theoretical framework needed to grasp the complexity of these questions; the

3 second part, consisting of four peer-reviewed articles followed by a general conclusion, aims to provide the answers.

The first chapter of this dissertation provides the theoretical foundation of this dissertation by introducing two central concepts, transnationalism and diaspora; it reviews the academic debates surrounding them and discusses how this study is positioned within these debates. With regard to the burgeoning literature on migrant transnationalism, in this dissertation, the focus is not on understanding Moroccans' transnational behavior as such, but on the state policies that attempt to change, expand, manage and/or maintain expatriate Moroccans’ transnational ties. I adopt a critical stance with regard to the use of “diaspora", a concept referring to a triangulation of a dispersed, bounded population, a “homeland” (imaginary or actualized), and a natural connection that is somehow maintained between them (Cohen 2008; Brubaker 2005), because treating diasporas as a given entity obscures processes of genesis (How do so-called “diasporas” emerge?), continuation (How are they maintained?) and domination (Who delineates diasporic membership, and what power processes take place?). Indeed, my study’s foundational research assumption is that a “diaspora” is not a natural, essential given but something being reproduced over time and across generations as the result of socio-political processes, in which political entrepreneurs such as state authorities in the country of origin are important actors. Exemplary of how Moroccan state policy deliberately cultivates the image of an eternal “Moroccan diaspora” is the principle of ius sanguinis in the Moroccan Nationality Code, which perpetuates Moroccan nationality automatically among the descendants of Moroccan emigrants. In the remainder of the first chapter, I explain why and how origin states engage with their expatriate populations, distinguishing among others between diaspora policy strategies aiming at building a “diaspora" versus those mobilizing it.

Whereas the first chapter offers the theoretical foundations, the second chapter introduces the empirical context of the study. Besides introducing the Moroccan case, it reflects on its particularities. The chapter is structured around three core themes. First, the Moroccan political context is introduced, in particular, the functioning of state power in Morocco. This is important since evolutions in Moroccan diaspora policies can only be understood by taking into account the broader political context in which they function. After introducing the Moroccan political context, the chapter continues with an overview of Moroccan

4 migration history. The diversity of the current Moroccan expatriate population is explained through the successive waves of emigration since WWII, which have been marked by increasing diversification. This research dissolves the image of the Moroccan expatriate “community” as being a monolithic unity by highlighting the post-migrant segment of this population. Finally, a review of Moroccan transnationalism is presented, in which major types of transnational ties linking Moroccan emigrants and their descendants to Morocco are outlined. Here, particular attention goes to the Moroccan state agency in each of these fields, demonstrating how private transnationalism and public policies interact.

The third chapter of the dissertation describes the research approach, including the research questions, the research design, the methodology and a discussion of the researcher positionality. This chapter aims at crystalizing the research focus and approach. It first outlines the research questions and then describes how they are approached in terms of research design (i.e., a single-case study). Then, the research methodology is outlined, explaining for what purpose the different qualitative methods have been applied. Finally, as knowledge production is always relational and situated, it is important to reflect on my researcher positionality.

The central body of this dissertation consists of four empirical chapters. The analysis in Chapter 4 is driven by some basic questions: what policies are in place for Moroccan migrants’ descendants and what are the underlying rationales of these policies? It addresses these questions from the perspective of the people working for the two major diaspora institutions, the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad and the Ministry in Charge of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad. The analysis of in-depth interviews with this group reveals how “ways of thinking and speaking” about expatriate Moroccan youth, “ways of acting” towards this group and “ways of being” that are expected from this group are interconnected. Additionally, it reveals how the two institutions are driven by divergent rationalities, thus underpinning a pluralist understanding of the origin state. Chapter 4 was published as Mahieu, R. 2019. “Competing Origin- country Perspectives on Emigrant Descendants: Moroccan Diaspora Institutions’ Policy Views and Practices Regarding the ‘Next Generation Abroad’.” International Migration Review 53(1):183–209.

5 Chapter 5, written in co-authorship with Christiane Timmerman† and Nadia Fadil, explores a puzzling matter in Moroccan diaspora policies: why is Morocco actively promoting the integration of its expatriate nationals in the receiving countries today, whereas it fiercely rejected their integration previously? As in Chapter 4, the analysis disentangles the underlying rationality. Drawing upon the integration-transnationalism interaction typology of Erdal and Oeppen (2013), we argue that this discursive evolution ― from rejection over acceptance to promotion of integration ― can be considered as a succession of reinterpretations of the integration-transnationalism nexus by the state of origin. To gain a deeper understanding of this current embrace of “integration,” the underlying claim that a strong transnational orientation is a fertile breeding ground for integration is further unpacked. More broadly, this chapter reveals how the settlement of the expatriate population, and the reality of its integration into the receiving country, urges Moroccan diaspora policies to alter their approach. Chapter 5 was published as Mahieu, R., C. Timmerman and N. Fadil. 2017. “The shifting Moroccan policy paradigm regarding the integration of MRE’s [Moroccans Living Abroad]: reconciling transnational ties and migrant integration.” Pp. 191-218 in Moroccan Migration in Belgium. More than 50 Years of Settlement, edited by C. Timmerman, N. Fadil, I. Goddeeris and N. Clycq.

Chapter 6 presents an in-depth examination of the annual Summer Universities for young Moroccans Living Abroad, one of the flagships of current Moroccan diaspora policies. Drawing on ethnographic material, it demonstrates that diaspora policy programs are vehicles for conveying targeted messages to the post-migrant generations concerning their transnational ties. In particular, awareness is raised about Moroccan expatriate youth’s Moroccan national identity: a positive image of contemporary Morocco is stressed, and expectations are formulated about their future transnational engagement with Morocco. The analysis thus confirms that the Moroccan State takes an active role in diaspora building. This chapter was published as Mahieu, R. 2015. “Feeding the Ties to ‘Home’: Diaspora Policies for the Next Generations.” International Migration 53(2): 397-408.

Chapter 7 looks at the same policy initiative as Chapter 6, however, it focuses on the experiences and perspectives of the youth participating in the Summer Universities. The analysis highlights how tour participants develop a critical approach to both the discourses and managerial practices of these homeland tours’

6 organizers. As such, the chapter draws attention to the limitations of homeland tours as instruments of political socialization. The participants’ agency builds on their knowledge and views acquired previously (e.g. through regular homeland visits to Morocco). In addition, it is also grounded in this youth’s socialization into (Western) country-of-residence norms and values. The chapter attends to the need to understand better how state diaspora policies are received by young members of “the diaspora”, especially in a situation where state-diaspora relations are tense and policies are top-down. Chapter 7 was published as Mahieu, R. 2019. “‘We're not coming from Mars; we know how things work in Morocco!’ How diasporic Moroccan youth resists political socialization in state-led homeland tours.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45(4):674-691.

Finally, Chapter 8 recapitulates the main findings, stressing how the emergence of the next generations in the expatriate population is paired with new diaspora policy approaches that are going beyond mere mobilization and are investing more strongly in “diaspora building”. Based on the strengths and limitations of this study, I conclude with suggestions for future research.

7

PART 1:

STUDYING MOROCCAN DIASPORA POLICIES: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, CASE DESCRIPTION, AND METHODOLOGY

9 10 CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

11 12 SYNOPSIS

This chapter offers the theoretical backdrop of the dissertation. First, two central concepts, transnationalism and diaspora, are illuminated and theoretical and empirical insights are discussed. Next, a state of affairs on how states deal with their expatriate populations is offered.

CONCEPTUAL TOOLKIT: CORE THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

For several reasons, it is crucial to give sufficient consideration to the clarification, delineation, and discussion of the core concepts of this study. First, the academic field concerned with diaspora engagement policies, migrant transnationalism and the intersections between these two phenomena is relatively new within the broader field of Migration Studies. Second, some of these concepts are essentially contested, such as “diaspora”. Since debates over the different understandings of “diaspora” touch upon the heart of my research question, it is particularly important to address this debate. Third, as is often the case in social sciences, emic usage of academic concepts (such as by policymakers and expatriate citizens) interacts with academic understandings and threatens to lead to confusion, necessitating scholars to clarify their particular understanding of these concepts. Fourth, for another central concept in this dissertation, “transnationalism,” the problem is not so much that it is contested or overused in popular language; rather, due to its status as an academic buzzword, it has become a container term, leading to fuzzy meaning and usage.

The following overview not only serves as an introduction, but also aims to delineate my understanding of these central concepts, and thereby, clarifying my position within this broader academic field. In addition, the different concepts are linked together into a coherent whole.

13 TRANSNATIONALISM

As my research question has been strongly inspired by the burgeoning and multi-disciplinary field on migrant transnationalism, a subfield in migration studies that emerged around a quarter-century ago, it is appropriate to give a brief, selective overview of this field. After introducing some of the core concepts, I will briefly address two particular themes: the transnationalism of migrant descendants, and the role of the state in transnationalism.

Definitions

An early and widely employed definition describes transnationalism as “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations linking their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 1994:6). More particularly, migrant transnationalism refers to “occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation” (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999:19). Another widespread definition of transnationalism is Vertovec’s (1999:447), which identifies two types of actors (people and institutions), but, compared to Portes and his colleagues (1999), drops the necessity of having regular and sustained contacts: “multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states”. For the people engaged in transnationalism, their border-crossing ties lead to a multifaceted “simultaneity” as their lives are embedded simultaneously in distinct places (Smith 2010; Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004). The term “transnational social fields” (Faist 2000) has been coined to indicate the spanning of countries of origin and residence but also other spaces.

While this analytic focus is relatively new, the phenomenon is not. As Lacroix (2014:646) notes, “The reproduction of long-distance ties is a universal tendency that has taken different shapes throughout times, just like migration itself.” However, while there are similarities with historical forms of transnationalism, it is widely acknowledged that new technologies of communication and transportation allow migrants to sustain more frequent, less expensive, and more intimate connections than before (Levitt, DeWind and Vertovec 2003).

14 The transnational subject: what or who is transnational?

Since its introduction, the concept of transnationalism has been adopted by scholars to describe a particular social phenomenon, to identify a distinctive analytic lens, but also to mark an ideological view (Boccagni 2012). Commonly, a distinction is made between two levels of transnationalism. On the one hand, on the relational-behavioral level, there are the tangible transnational practices or “transnational ways of being,” such as sending remittances, voting from abroad, visiting family, going on a religious pilgrimage in the origin country. On the other, on the identitarian-behavioral level, there are transnational feelings or “transnational ways of belonging,” such as long-distance nationalism and a sense of attachment to the origin-country citizenship (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004; Boccagni 2012; Smith & Guarnizo 1998; Lee 2008).

Although some scholars also identify specific groups of people as “transnational”3, problematic in this approach is that by classifying people as such, the impression arises that their “transnationality” is a static or even essential characteristic. This idea is contested by empirical studies demonstrating how transnational activity fluctuates across time, for instance across a person’s life cycle (Levitt 2002), while also ebbing and flowing in response to particular incidents or events (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004), thereby questioning the use of labelling persons as “transnational”. Moreover, the use of this label for people suggests a dichotomous distinction between migrants who are transnational and those who are not, while in reality, the spectrum between the two extremes is very wide.

Similarly problematic is the label “transnational migration” (see e.g. Glick- Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc 1995), which attributes a transnational character to an entire mobile population but leaves us confused about the question what “non-transnational” migration could be. Following the approach of Levitt and Jaworksy (2007) and Boccagni (2010), I consider it more fruitful to identify transnational features in migrants’ everyday lives. By looking at transnational practices and feelings rather than at transnational people, communities or migrations, we

3 For example, Fouron and Glick-Schiller (2002) introduced the term “transmigrants” to classify mobile subjects that create and sustain multiple social relations that link together their societies of origin and residence. This term should not be conflated with transmigrants as the abbreviation of “transit migrants,” a term that came into use in the context of asylum seekers crossing the European continent on their way to the UK.

15 can avoid essentialized ideas about groups as inherently, unchangeably and homogeneously transnational (Faist 2010). By adopting this approach, a more dynamic perspective on transnationalism, as well as an acknowledgment that transnationalism coexists alongside other types of activities and feelings, is possible. These viewpoints reflect best the way my respondents talked about migrant transnationalism, that is, as a dynamic feature in expatriate Moroccans’ lives connected tightly to other aspects of their lives such as their inclusion in their countries of settlement.

In attempts to refine the concept of transnationalism, various classifications have been designed to distinguish between the different types. For example, typologies have been developed according to the scope (narrow vs. broad), intensity (comprehensive vs. selective), sector (economic, socio-cultural or political), position (micro/meso/macro level) and formality (see among others Portes et al. 1999; Boccagni 2010; Boccagni 2012, Levitt, DeWind and Vertovec 2003). Another common distinction is between “transnationalism from below” and “transnationalism from above”. While the former is characterized by “a social space fundamentally grounded in the daily lives, activities, and social relationships of quotidian actors” (Glick-Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc 1992:5), the latter usually refers to practices of powerful elite actors. Smith and Guarnizo (1998) state that categorizing transnational actions as coming from “above” and from “below” enables us to capture the dynamics of power relations in the transnational arena. This is an important recommendation since this dissertation aims to understand how the origin state (acting from “above”) aims at influencing expatriate Moroccan youth’s transnational practices and identifications (acting from “below”). However, we do not consider this distinction as absolute, as each form — above and below — can trigger and influence one another, often leading to intertwined forms where the distinction between private, collective and state practices becomes unclear (Sunier, van der Linden and van de Bovenkamp 2016).

A generational perspective on transnationalism

While many studies show that transnational practices and attachments have been and continue to be widespread among all types of migrants (Barth 1969; Roosens 1994; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007), a central research question in Transnational Studies is to what extent migrants’ descendants reproduce their

16 parents’ practices and identifications. However, there is no consensus on this matter. Some scholars have argued that transnational ties are a one-generation phenomenon and that in natural circumstances they will wither away (Waldinger 2010; Rumbaut 2002; Portes 2001) or, at best, turn into structured celebrations of roots (Hoerder 2012). However, their viewpoints have been contested4 substantially, since others have found how transnational identifications and practices remain significant in the lives of migrant descendants (Lee 2008; Levitt 2002; Somerville 2008; Haikola 2011) while also acknowledging that transnationalism tends to be unevenly distributed among migrant descendants (Perlmann 2002).

Migrant parents socialize their children in their own transnational lives, involving the acquisition of transnational identifications and skills (for instance, mother tongue proficiency) during the formative years. Beside more accidental socialization into daily transnational practices, sometimes specific transnational practices are cultivated across generations, such as return visits for major ceremonies (Smith 2002) and marriage migration (Timmerman 2008). In sum, the early socialization in transnational life may have a deep and lasting effect, since “the transnational ties of migrants’ children can play a central role in the construction of their own cultural identity and shape their interactions with members of their own and other communities in the country to which their parents immigrated” (Lee 2008:viii). As such, transnational activities can aid the construction of a positive identity, as a remedy against the negative stereotyping or assimilationist pressure many descendants of migrants experience (Smith 2002). However, youngsters do not always regard their socialization into the transnational field as positive; sometimes they have to undertake involuntary transnational practices under their migrant parents’ pressure (Haikkola 2011). Various authors (Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco 2001; Smith 2002; Carling 2008) also introduced the notion of “keeping the immigrant bargain” as an impetus for participation in transnational life for the children of immigrants. They want to show their elders and their hometown that they have not forgotten their roots and

4 Critics argue that these viewpoints are flawed, as they are primarily based on the experiences of historical (European) migrations to the USA, while not taking into consideration more recent migration flows or flows in other parts of the world. In addition, these scholars draw strongly on quantitative research taking the first (migrant) generations’ behavior and identifications as the “standard” against which the next generations are compared. However, this type of research does not allow to detect qualitative shifts.

17 repay their parents’ sacrifices resulting from their emigration. Both doing well in their own lives (through educational success) and transnational involvement as strategies convey the following message to their parents: “Look, we have not forgotten or rejected where we come from, and we are doing well, as you wanted, to realize the promise of your sacrifice” (Smith 2002:153).

Not only motives for transnationalism shift, but also the nature of identifications changes across generations. Lee (2008) for example found that, in terms of their identification with the country of origin, migrant descendants tend to adopt more inclusive, pan-ethnic identities compared to their parents, whose identities are tied to specific localities in the origin country. Lyons and Mandaville (2010) argue that loyalties can remain high across generations, but the frames are shifting: as the younger generation comes to imagine homeland politics and conflicts in ways that differ significantly from their parents, it becomes easier for subsequent generations to think of these situations, not in the nuanced shades of grey seen—and lived—by their parents, but rather in starker black and white terms. In sum, rather than considering post-migrant generations’ ties to the country of origin should as a weaker version of their parents’, they should be viewed as substantially different.

The study of transnationalism: analytic viewpoints

Within the research framework of transnational studies, we find that transnational practices and identifications can be studied from different vantage points. First, a range of studies has focussed on the transformative effect or potential of migrant transnationalism. They have addressed how migrant transnationalism affects the origin society, such as its socio-economic development, its democratic functioning (Bauböck 2003) or the dynamics of domestic and international conflicts (Portes and Fernandez-Kelly 2015; Bauböck 2003; Lyons and Mandaville 2010). In addition, studies have addressed the question to what extent migrant transnationalism affects integration processes in the receiving countries (see, e.g., Vancluysen, Van Craen and Ackaert 2009; Sert 2012; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Erdal and Oeppen 2013).

In most of the literature, the prevalence of transnational practices and identifications is treated as a given, neglecting the question of what factors trigger

18 these phenomena. A smaller segment of literature studies how transnational practices and identifications are influenced by a range of processes situated on different levels. On the individual level, explanations for transnational behavior and feelings focus among other things on one’s level of ethnoreligious attachment to the migrant community (Wald 2008). On the group level, the presence of established migrant associations and networks may be important in explaining the prevalence of transnational behavior (Lacroix and Dumont 2015). In addition, it has been highlighted how contextual conditions shape or facilitate transnationalism. For example, the unique migration pattern of the group (e.g., voluntary vs. forced migration) and the host society attitude (e.g., social exclusion, racism) towards the migrants affect to what extent migrants turn their gaze to their origin country (Wald 2008; Basch 1994). Receiving country policies, for instance in the field of citizenship and family reunification, also influence migrants’ transnational behavior. Indeed, liberal family reunification policies are associated with a higher prevalence of transnational marriages (Carol, Ersanilli and Wagner 2014). Global tendencies are important too; the growing tolerance for dual citizenship worldwide (Bauböck 2003; Spiro 2016) facilitates transnational practices such as migrants’ VFR tourism (visiting friends and relatives).

The analytic focus of this dissertation is on a particular (f)actor, the state5 of origin. Through diaspora policies, states of origin aim at influencing the transnational practices and identifications of “their” expatriate population. However, notwithstanding this obvious connection between state policies and migrant transnationalism, the role of the state has long been disregarded in transnational studies. Early transnational scholars (in the 1990s) viewed transnationalism as an expression of subversive, popular resistance “from below,” and as conscious and successful efforts by ordinary people to escape control and domination “from above” by global capital and the state (Smith and Guarnizo 1998:5). Consequently, in early work on transnationalism, the idea dominated that this grassroots-driven transnationalism was an emancipatory force to be celebrated (Boccagni 2012). States were seen as having no role to play in this; some even saw transnational lifestyles as the ultimate proof that the nation-state was withering

5 The state is understood here as the apparatus of government or power, that is, a collection of institutions and actors that act on behalf of the state, such as the government, ministries, and administration.

19 away and becoming obsolete (Smith 2003; Dufoix 2010)6. As such, migrant transnationalism was interpreted through the lens of accelerating globalization.The rejection of the state as a relevant factor in analysis was further reinforced by one of the foundations of the transnational research agenda, that is, its rejection of “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003), i.e. the dominant tendency in migration studies to consider the nation-state as the self-evident frame of reference for all migration dynamics. Based on this critique, many scholars on transnationalism downplayed the importance of the state and the national context as of any major importance: “[…] the state was seen to matter little in creating transnational life itself; its part in the analytic drama was as the oppressive structure being transcended” (Smith 2003:725). As Collyer and Vathi (2007) note, this might explain why transnational relations have been wrongly understood as “relations across international borders that do not involve states” (2007:5). Later studies, however, demonstrated a strong need for nuance, thus relativizing earlier statements on the decline of the nation-state.

States make important contributions to shaping the nature of transnational ties (Levitt, DeWind and Vertovec 2003; Bauböck 2003; Smith 2010; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003). States of origin and residence alike shape the options for migrant and ethnic trans-state social action by creating particular institutional contexts that may hinder or stimulate transnational practices (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Bauböck 2003). For example, citizenship policies in these countries may obstruct or facilitate transnational behavior or feelings (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Koopmans and Statham 2003)7. Indeed, we can consider these institutional arrangements (or lack of them) as an opportunity structure, limiting or empowering individuals’ and groups’ actions. Perrin and Martiniello (2011) too, stress the importance of policy contexts, especially the often-neglected country of origin policies. For example, while transnational practices and identifications are influenced by the receiving country’s migration and minority policies, they are often also shaped by the policies of the country of origin, especially in the economic field. More generally, the reproduction, development, and transformation of transnational practices, can be explained by the policies of

6 E.g. Soysal’s “post-national membership” (1994) as the new form of political membership in a transnational era.

7 For example, allowing double citizenship facilitates traveling between countries of origin and residence.

20 the country of origin towards its emigrants, besides other factors like technological opportunities, and the social and political context in the country of origin (Ibid. 2011).

Though policies in several policy domains may affect individuals’ transnational practices and identifications, the most focused, deliberate efforts to affect these can be found in the diaspora policies of the countries of origin. The existence of this type of policy demonstrates that countries of origin, as stakeholders in the transnational field, may adopt a proactive attitude towards their expatriate population, ultimately aiming at “the reproduction of transnational subjects” (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). These policies are legitimated by a distinctive “social imaginary”8: expatriate populations are approached as if they were a bonded, distinct group with natural affiliations and ties of loyalty to the motherland (Waterbury 2010). This idea of genealogical connectedness to a “homeland” is best captured by the notion of “diaspora” — hence “diaspora policies”. However, as the concept of diaspora is the subject of fierce academic debate, I will clarify in the next issue the position I take.

DIASPORA: WHAT’S IN A NAME?

Theoretical debates on diaspora

The concept of transnationalism has often been criticized as too fuzzy or too broad, but the definition of diaspora has been contested even more vigorously. Numerous scholars have engaged in the debate (Cohen 1997; Sheffer 2003; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003; Bauböck and Faist 2010; Ragazzi 2012) but have not arrived at a shared definition of the term. Definitions have in common that they refer to a triangulation of a dispersed, bounded population, a “homeland” (imaginary or actualized), and a connection that is somehow maintained between them (Cohen 2008; Brubaker 2005; Wagner 2012).

8 A social imaginary refers to a network of significations, collectively shared, that each society makes use of to think about itself (Castoriadis 1975; Arruda 2015).

21 An important source of contestation in the academic debate relates to the expansion of the meaning of the concept over the last decades. While initially reserved for the very particular category of ethnoreligious communities in exile (Jews and Armenians), since the 1970s there has been an inflation of applications and interpretations of “diaspora” (Bauböck and Faist 2010:12). While before, a forced exile, a wish for a return to the (imagined) homeland and strong cultural distinctiveness were necessary criteria for distinguishing a state of diaspora from other situations, in more recent notions interpretations of these dimensions have been stretched considerably. In the current, broader usage, all types of migration flows — including voluntary labor migration — may induce a “diaspora”. In addition, a desire to return to the homeland as a criterion has been replaced by the existence of varying levels of engagement in transnational practices and identifications. However, as a result of this stretching, the concept of “diaspora” has lost its descriptive power as a signifier, because virtually any group of people with a (non-indigenous) ethnic or religious minority background can now be described as a “diaspora”.

This on-going debate on the concept and the current “stalemate” has triggered some scholars to focus on the creation of classifications that help to identify whether and under what conditions particular groups should be considered a “diaspora” or not. An example here is Sheffer’s (2003) diaspora classification, including distinctions between stateless vs. state-linked diasporas, historical vs. modern diasporas, and migrant communities vs. ethnonational diasporas. In addition, Sheffer (2003) outlines the most essential characteristics of diasporas (2003:83), which however apply to almost all migrant populations.

However, other scholars criticize these efforts to classify diasporas or define their essence, because these attempts obscure a more important issue: how the notion is used (Ragazzi 2012). Rather than asking which population is a diaspora (or not), the question should be for what purposes the term is used and by whom. As such, the attention shifts to the performative character of the concept of “diaspora,” because by employing the term, the idea of a bounded community with natural linkages to a distance homeland is reified. Here, I follow Ragazzi’s position (2012:107), who states that it is more important to focus on “the politicality of defining a population or a set of relations as ‘diasporic’”. Therefore, rather than arguing about the “right” definition of diaspora, one needs to question the political grounds of these different ontologies, and their (epistemological)

22 implications (Ragazzi 2012). According to Ragazzi, differing opinions on definitions are simply the consequence of different theoretical starting points or ontologies producing, through different methods, different realities of what a diaspora is. Therefore, “Diaspora need not necessarily be specifically defined because it is, in fact, all of these things” and “the question of truth about diaspora becomes a question of these starting points and the politics they entail” (Ibid. 2012:108). As a result, in this dissertation, I am not interested in the question whether the Moroccan expatriate population is a “diaspora” and why this would be the case; rather, I want to know why and how the Moroccan State contributes to the social imaginary of a “Moroccan diaspora”.

In his meta-analysis of the use of “diaspora,” Ragazzi (2012) identifies six different meanings for diaspora9, which can be reduced to two categories: diaspora as an essence or diaspora as a practice. Meanings in the first category regard any diaspora as a naturally given phenomenon, an essence that precedes social practices. In contrast, the second category stresses how diasporas are social practices, constructing a particular social and political reality. These two ontological viewpoints on the concept of diaspora raise different questions and have different implications. Those embracing this essentialist understanding of diaspora pave the way for mobilization of expatriate populations, as “belonging to a diaspora certainly generates more enthusiasm, pride, and hope of emancipation than belonging to a population of guest workers and deportees” (Ragazzi 2012:109). Contrastingly, the constructivist perspective leads to

“A radical form of suspicion toward the legitimizing grand narratives of diasporic spokespersons […] it also allows for the questioning of transnational claims that governments formulate toward their population abroad, probing the nature of this undisputed link […] it disrupts discourses of collective agency and collective responsibility of entire diasporas in matters of global development or international conflict.” (Ibid. 2012:110)

9 According to Ragazzi, the term has been used in academic literature in at least 6 different ways: (1) an ethnic community, (2) a particular social environment, (3) a distinctive (non-state) actor in international relations, (4) a social movement, (5) a form of consciousness or (6) a political discourse aimed at constructing a community. He then groups the first three meanings as approaching diaspora as an essence — “a thing” existing out there. Contrastingly, the latter three treat diasporas as social practices.

23 Koinova (2010) detects a similar distinction between two categories of perspectives on diaspora, namely, a “positivist” and a “constructivist” approach, while also highlighting the implications of both approaches for social sciences:

“Positivist views facilitate asking questions about the impact of diasporas on the state and political processes within it, the use of comparative and statistical methods and the conception of diasporas as unitary actors or elites with a shared identity. Such research designs simplify the complexity of a diaspora by ignoring generational, gender and location-based differences, but examine correlations and causality between dependent and independent variables. In contrast, a constructivist view of diaspora enables more complexity. It asks questions about how diasporas emerge, who belongs to them from various generations and genders and how identities — in general (rather than a specific group or elites) — affect the political world or are affected by it. This line of scholarship is closer to the humanities, where content and discourse analyses are often the methods preferred.” (2010:150)

As is clear from both Ragazzi’s (2012) and Koinova’s (2010) perspectives, as a social scientist it is most appropriate to embrace the more constructivist understanding of diaspora as a social practice. On the contrary, treating diasporas as a given entity would obscure among others processes of genesis (how do so- called “diaspora’s” emerge), continuation (how are they maintained) and domination (what power processes take place), questions that are central in the understanding of social phenomena. Moreover, my study’s very research assumption — that “diaspora” is not a natural given but something being reproduced over time and across generations as the result of socio-political processes, in which political entrepreneurs have a stake, — is irreconcilable with an essentialist or positivist approach of diaspora.

Oonk (2019) coins another problem with “diaspora,” which is the appropriation of people who do not (or do not want to) maintain connected to their “homeland”:

“[…] many migrants may not (wish to) reconnect with their (mythological) homeland and its culture. In fact, over the years,

24 they have integrated or assimilated in a new culture in a new environment. They have built a new home, with new preferences, prospects and outlooks. They may lose their original language skills and adapt to a new language. They may change their dress and food habits and adapt to the host culture. I do not necessarily refer […] to processes of acculturation or even creolization in which ‘roots’ are increasingly difficult to find. I am referring more specifically to ambivalent relations with ‘roots’ and ‘origins’. […] the umbilical cord is not self-evident. It needs to be nurtured and negotiated, and even then it might disappear.” (2019:285-286)

For the above-mentioned reasons, problematizing the usage of the concept of diaspora, in this dissertation, the Moroccan expatriate population is not framed as a “Moroccan diaspora”. This might seem paradoxical in a study that has “diaspora policies” as its core topic, but it is not, as Faist (2010) explains:

“Nonetheless, it is also obvious that ‘diaspora’ is an opalescent concept, especially given its ubiquitous politicization. Yet, even if we reject ‘diaspora’ as an analytical term, it does not follow that we should give it up wholesale […] while using the term ‘diaspora’ for defining a population beyond the border may be problematic, adopting the phrase ‘diaspora politics’ to describe state action and the contention around those policies may be useful. More generally, in the contemporary world, diasporas are constantly being produced, thus creating new diasporas.” (2010:18)

Resultantly, while I deem the notion of “diaspora” problematic, I consider the notion “diaspora policies” or “diaspora engagement policies” appropriate terms to describe a particular type of policies. However, for some, even the use of the term “diaspora policies” is considered problematic. Ho (2011) for instance states that

“In the studies on sending state strategies towards elite emigrants, there is a troubling analytical slippage that conflates the idea of diaspora (long-distance identification with a homeland) with the emigrant populations targeted by such strategies. On the one hand, geographers engaging with the scholarship on elite mobility

25 and sending state strategies recognize that the idea of diaspora is appropriated in strategic ways (Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Larner 2007) […]. However, it is ironic that the debates are nonetheless anchored on the idea of diaspora and thus the common use of labels like diaspora strategies, diaspora relations, diaspora engagement and diaspora membership (Ancien et al. 2009; Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Gamlen 2008b; Larner 2007) both as descriptors and as analytical frameworks.” (2011:3-4)

While I understand Ho’s critique, I still think that the term “diaspora policies” can be used to describe a particular political project, without reifying the existence of “diasporas”.10

Diaspora as a category of practice

About the use of the concept of diaspora, it should be noted that there is a sharp contrast between, on the one hand, the social sciences, where reservations about its usage prevail and, on the other hand, public policies, where “diaspora” is employed broadly. As different scholars have noted, there is a global tendency among governments and international organizations to develop policies intending to incorporate expatriate populations in a variety of domains, such as citizenship, economic development or diplomatic service (Ragazzi 2014; Gamlen 2006; Dufoix 2010). Resultantly, scholars have argued there to be a “diaspora turn” in policy discourse and practice (Agunias 2009; Ragazzi 2014). In this context, the term “diaspora” has proliferated in policy discourse as a positive signifier to designate populations abroad and their symbolic link to the homeland:

“Through political speeches, bureaucratic practices of surveillance and control, strategies of development, and citizenship regulations, governments from all corners of the world now embrace what they increasingly define as their ‘diasporas’.” (Ragazzi 2014:74)

10 A similar reasoning could be applied to the study of “nationalism” and “nationalist policies,” where “the nation” (as the subject of these policies) is also approached as a social construct by scholars. The usage of terms such as “nationalism” is intended to describe a political project, not to reify the idea of the nation.

26 As Bauböck and Faist (2010) note, the underlying motive to use “diaspora” as a signifier is essentially political:

“Nationalist groups or governments often use the concept of diaspora to pursue agendas of nation-state-building or controlling populations abroad. The concept is invoked to mobilize support for a group identity or some political project.” (2010:12)

The term “diaspora” has not only been embraced by origin country governments, however, increasingly international organizations in the field of development and remittances use it as well. Weinar (2010) notes that influential norm-setting international organizations like the IOM11, the EU and the UN are not only responsible for spreading this notion in the context of the “migration and development agenda”, but also for ascribing to it a very broad content: “the discourse of these international organizations has blurred the meaning of diaspora and merged it with the characteristics ascribed to transnational communities. […] Thus, diaspora has become an all-encompassing concept […]” (Ibid. 2010:80). Consequently, “Governments eager to follow the highly subsidized migration and development agenda have recently embarked on identifying and delineating the target groups” (Ibid. 2010:87).

Resultantly, similar to many of the central notions in social sciences (think of “race,” “ethnicity” or “nation”) “diaspora” has become a category of practice — a buzzword used in the everyday language of migrants and other stakeholders in the field of migration — as much as a category of analysis. The co-existence of similar vocabulary in everyday language and scholarly language is not a problem as such; the major problem is the conflation of these two levels, which Wacquant (1997:22) distinguished earlier as “social” vs. “sociological” understandings, and Brubaker (2004:32) as “folk” vs. “analytic” understandings.

“The problem is that ‘nation’, ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are used analytically a good deal of the time more or less as they are used in practice, in an implicitly reifying manner, in a manner that implies or asserts that ‘nations’, ‘races’ and ‘identities’ ‘exist’ as substantial entities and that people ‘have’ a ‘nationality’, a ‘race’, an ‘identity’.” (Brubaker 2004:33)

11 International Organization for Migration.

27 The same dynamic can be observed in the case of the use of diaspora: the notion has become so widespread in popular language, that entire expatriate populations are — irrespective of their self-identifications, their actual ties to the “homeland” and internal variations in this — often framed as “diaspora” by scholars too, who overlook the reifying implications of this framing.

The increasing instrumentalization of “the diaspora” by a range of actors (states, international organizations, etc.) in a narrow, strictly positive manner as a “development actor,” ignores possible negative effects of diaspora intervention, which are far from hypothetical, considering the historical and contemporary record of diasporas engaging in home country conflicts. The expatriate population's ambiguous role in domestic conflict demonstrates how diaspora engagement represents a double-edged sword (Orjuela 2008). Moreover, the narrow, one-sided approach implies that contentious questions related to diaspora membership (e.g., who defines criteria of belonging to a diaspora) are fully overlooked.

Policy-driven attempts to group internally diverse expatriate populations into a “diaspora” have deep implications, as grouping people under a certain label facilitates and legitimizes policies directed at that group (Faist 2010). By framing a set of people as a “diaspora,” members of this group become legitimate actors in the transnational field spanning the origin and receiving country, while they also become a governable category for the origin state12 . From this perspective of governmentality, we can understand Ragazzi’s observation that governments increasingly refer to their overseas populations as “diasporas” (2009:383). Similarly, Kunz states that referring to a group of citizens abroad as a diaspora can be considered “an act of constituting the subject of the diaspora” (2012:103). Because of this politicization, the term should be used with care and not as an innocent analytical concept (Brubaker 2005).

Inspired by these critical approaches to the particular term “diaspora” and its employments, in this dissertation I investigate the claims that Morocco, as an

12 Policymakers may benefit from this approach; but also grassroots actors within the expatriate communities, who may be willing to present themselves as ‘diaspora representatives' to strengthen their claims or receive funding. In this sense, “The term ‘diaspora’ takes on geopolitical importance, in being able to claim people as part of territories where they do not live or dwell, or in being able to claim one’s own status of existence as part of The Diaspora of somewhere.” (Wagner 2012:4)

28 origin state to roughly five million “Moroccans living abroad,” makes about its expatriate population, and about the descendants of Moroccan emigrants in particular. More in particular, in the state's government rationalities, what are “ways of thinking and speaking” about this population; “ways of acting” towards this population by the Moroccan State and “ways of being” expected from these subjects (Kunz 2008)?

O R I G I N S TAT E S A N D T H E I R E X PAT R I AT E POPULATIONS: THEORIES AND PRACTICES

Now that the core concepts of this dissertation have been clarified, it is necessary to offer a state of affairs of the literature at hand on how states deal with their expatriate populations. I will approach this question from two perspectives. First, on a more theoretical level, how does the existence of an expatriate national population pose a challenge to the nation-state? Here, we mainly draw on the field of political science, where questions about the state, territoriality, and citizenry are central. Second, on a more empirical level, how to understand the actual policies developed by states addressing their expatriate populations? Here, my gaze is much broader, as social scientists stemming from different disciplines (among others, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, historians) have investigated diaspora policies from various angles.

EMIGRATION AND THE STATE: CHALLENGES AND STATE RESPONSES

A classic, ideal-typical view on the modern state is Giddens’ (1985:172) definition of the nation-state as “a power container whose administrative purview corresponds exactly to its territorial delimitation”. More than a matter of logistics, however, the delineation of the national territory relates to the central functions of the nation-state:

“The national territory at the same time traces the frontiers of the sovereign population, delineates the homeland of the citizenry, defines the borderline between social order and disorder and

29 distinguishes between the national home and the wilderness of the foreign. Nationalists thus make a fetish of national territory, a sanctuary that deserves to be defended with the blood of the people.” (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003:309)

Considering the centrality of (sovereignty over) borders in the modern nation- state project, it is not wholly surprising that in a world system organized according to the principles of nation states (im)migration flows are often problematized. As Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2003) point out, in the nation-state project migration is considered an anomaly for at least four reasons. First, migration destroys the isomorphism between people, sovereign and citizenry, since immigrants are perceived as foreigners to the community of shared loyalty towards the state and shared rights guaranteed by that state. Migrants are presumed to remain loyal to the state of origin, whose citizens they are, and under whose sovereignty they fall (as long as they are not absorbed into the national body through assimilation and naturalization). Second, immigrants destroy the isomorphism between people and nation, “appearing as spots on the pure colors of the national fabric”. As such, they represent a renewed challenge to the nation-building project. Third, immigrants destroy the isomorphism between “the people” and “the solidarity group,” because migrants are not meant to be part of the system of social security. Fourth, in the eyes of nation-state builders, every move across national frontiers becomes an exception to the rule of sedentariness within the boundaries of the nation-state (2003:309-311). Due to the centrality of immigration to the modern nation state project,

“Thinking about immigration basically means interrrogating the state, interrogating its foundations and interrogating the internal mechanisms of its structurations and workings.[…] [It] forces us to unveil the state, to unveil the way we think about the state and the way it thinks about itself’’ (Sayad [1999] 2004:280-281).

Concerning immigrants’ transnational ties to their country of origin, it is the first issue in particular (breaking the unity of people, sovereign and citizenry) that troubles nation-state proponents. Because transnational ties break with the ideas of closed societies and exclusive loyalties of citizens to a single state, normative political theory tends to see them as a threat to the state (Bauböck 2003). However, the question remains what challenges migration and transnational ties pose to the

30 state of origin (i.e., the state institutions in an emigration country) since Wimmer and Glick-Schiller’s (2003) analysis only considers the perspective of nation-states confronted with immigration. Observing the ways states of origin have responded to emigration, we can safely state that emigration similarly challenges emigration states, although these challenges are taking different forms compared to those for immigration states. As Sayad ([1999] 2004) points out, emigration gets to the heart of the nation-state project since

“(…) the whole nation is threatened with being mutilated by emigration. It is in danger of losing ‘bits’ of itself and it loses bits of its contemporary and future population (the reproduction of emigrant families outside the nation). Its sovereignty is at risk because part of the nation (part of the sum total of its nationals) exists outside it and outside its sovereignty.” ([1999] 2004:125-126)

For origin states, the tension between “citizenship/nationality” and “distance” (from the national territory) is at the heart of their preoccupations with regard to emigration (Dufoix 2010:28). Historically, in the 18th and 19th centuries, leaving the territory was equated with leaving the homeland, and therefore regarded with suspicion. The issue of emigration was commonly resolved by the automatic loss of nationality after a period of absence. Differently, some countries opted for a strategy of “perpetual allegiance” by basing citizenship acquisition on ius sanguinis, however, neither did they offer citizenship rights to their nationals abroad (Dufoix 2010). Notwithstanding some exceptions such as Italy, most origin countries displayed an indifference, abstention or hostility towards their expatriate populations. Only in the 1960s-70s, this attitude evolved into politics of attention (Ibid. 2010). Differently, today origin states display a wide array of strategies aiming to bridge the distance to their nationals abroad, for instance by promoting inclusive citizenship policies (e.g., tolerating dual citizenship), by expanding voting rights to expatriate citizens or by creating border-crossing symbolic policies fostering the cultural, national and religious homeland ties of their citizens abroad (Bauböck 2003; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). Returning to the challenges listed by Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2003) above, the substantial and practical challenges can be grouped accordingly:

31 First, the question for states confronted with large-scale emigration is to what extent the expatriate population retains full citizenship of the country of origin while living abroad, especially when settlement abroad becomes permanent and new generations are born abroad. Different state responses are possible here. States of origin may not allow the loss of the sending country citizenship or make such loss costly to migrants, for instance when this implies a loss of inheritance or land ownership rights in the origin country (Koopmans and Statham 2003). This may be combined with tolerance or even promotion of dual nationality and/or dual citizenship, while another option is to introduce “origin cards” thus inventing new forms of membership for the descendants of migrants (Dufoix et al. 2010).

Second, regarding “the nation,” the inclusion of expatriate populations implies a redefinition of this concept (Who belongs to it and what are requirements in terms of membership?). The nation can no longer be imagined as a cohesive community tied exclusively to a specific territory but needs to incorporate a group of people living in foreign territory, thus transcending the borders of the origin-country territory (Smith 2003; Dufoix 2010; Sayad [1999] 2004). Similar to immigration countries, who have been forced to reconsider their view on the nation due to immigration (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003), emigration countries are compelled to redraw their national narratives (Gamlen 2006; González Gutiérrez 1999). This is not a stand-alone process, however: narrative transformation is closely linked to institutional transformation (Smith 2003):

“Where changes in the institutional structures of the ‘emigrant state’ occur, they are a product of similar retellings of the foundational stories of peoplehood that allow those who have left the country a continued role in its history.” (Collyer 2013b:18)

Third, emigration also requires a rethinking of the nation as a solidarity group, because emigrants’ absence from the national territory implies that they (usually) do not contribute to the national welfare system (if this is in place) through paying taxes. However, remittances and other forms of financial transfers can be considered as alternative ways of contributing to the national welfare, while also symbolizing continuing membership of the society of origin. Indeed, remittances have been raised as a central argument in emigrants’ claims to political representation in the origin country (Mahieu 2009).

32 Fourth, just as immigration, emigration breaks with the principle of sedentariness of the national population. As state governance (such as policing, taxing, conscripting, etc.) is limited to controlling people on the national territory, citizens outside of the country largely escape the state’s ability to extract their resources or discipline them for criminal infractions (Torpey 2000). Indeed, the territorial dimension of state power is enshrined in the very definition of the modern nation-state, and options to act (legally) outside of its proper state territory are severely curtailed by international law. These limitations mean that with regard to their expatriate populations, states have to find creative ways of governance such as by installing origin state-sponsored organizations in the country of settlement (Koopmans and Statham 2003, Karrouche 2017)13, by supporting the self-identification of emigrants as “loyal, self-disciplining subjects” (Gamlen 2014:193) or by introducing new institutions into its domestic state infrastructure.

The global proliferation of dedicated ministries, state-secretaries, councils, etc., for expatriate citizens within the origin-state political infrastructure demonstrates how states of origin are tackling the above-mentioned challenges. The traditional approach, where embassies and consulates are the state’s (main or only) satellites abroad in charge of representing the origin state diplomatically and offering administrative services to citizens abroad, is no longer deemed sufficient by origin states. These new types of institutions have been framed as “diaspora institutions” — an amalgam of formal institutions embedded in the state system, “dedicated to the management of emigration and relations with emigrants and their descendants” (Gamlen 2012:319)14. The emergence of the new type of

13 For instance, the Moroccan Amicales and consulates were used to survey oppositional movements abroad, such as the Berber movement (Karrouche 2017; Bouras 2012).

14 A more extensive definition is provided by Gamlen (2014: 184) “Formal offices of state dedicated to emigrants and their descendants. This definition includes only formally named, funded, and staffed offices within the executive and legislative branches of national governments. It includes permanent quotas of seats in the national legislature set aside for external voters […]. However, it excludes non-governmental diaspora organizations led by migrants. It also excludes political parties (which occupy but do not constitute formal state offices), and institutions within the judiciary or military (which operate quite differently from civil service institutions within the executive and legislative branches). This definition also excludes diaspora offices within local governments, which tend to be more restricted in scope and lifespan than national-level institutions.”

33 institutions is significant as they represent deep social and political transformations in the area of international migration:

“Their emergence relates to the evolution of new forms of global governance in the area of international migration, to new forms of state sovereignty and national and transnational citizenship, and new ways of conceiving individual identity in relation to new collectivities. Diaspora institutions extend domestic realms beyond national borders, projecting infrastructural power extraterritorially, shaping migrants’ senses of self, and reconfiguring the spatiality of states in ways unimagined by modernist geopolitical thinking, where the competitive, territorially discrete nation-state unit is the ideal organizational form (Agnew 2003). […] Diaspora institutions are changing the relationships between place, power, and identity that define politics.” (Gamlen 2014:183)

Ragazzi (2014) equally stresses how the increased diffusion of diaspora policies has deeper implications:

“It represents a break with the long process of territorialization of sovereignty that began with the Peace of Westphalia (Agnew 2009), as well as the nationalizing objectives of homogenization of citizenship, initiated in the 19th century with the Bancroft treaties and pursued by the nationality conventions of the early 20th century (Koslowski 2001). Although the previous trend toward territorialization and homogenization aimed to clearly distinguish between the international and the domestic, undoing previous forms of incongruence between territories, populations and political authority, […] these are precisely the type of incongruences that diaspora policies seem to revive.” (2014:87)

Besides evolving state infrastructures, another expression of origin states’ efforts to settle the fundamental challenges emigration raises, are the shifting official discourses about emigration and emigrants. Several scholars have focused on shifting national narratives and political discourses on emigration and expatriate citizens, as representing a shift in state attitudes and practices from

34 negative, repressive, to more positive, even “courting” styles (Brand 2010; Smith 2003; De Haas 2007; Kunz 2012). No longer, emigrants are portrayed as disloyal to their society of origin, or even as traitors; now they are heralded as heroes. In this dissertation too, we aim at capturing origin state discourses on the expatriate population, and more in particular, how “new generations” in the expatriate population are included in them. This cultivation of a new relationship with its expatriate citizens is vital, as it creates a diasporic public sphere and strengthens the political membership of emigrants (Smith 2003).

In sum, emigration touches upon the central functions of the nation-state as much as immigration does: it questions the definition of the national community, citizenship, sovereignty. As a final note, it should also be clear that origin states’ responses to emigration and their emigrants’ transnational ties are not emerging in a vacuum, as receiving states articulate their approaches to immigration simultaneously. It is obvious how the origin state and receiving state approaches to migration may be conflicting, such as if the origin country promotes long-distance nationalism while the receiving country executes assimilationist pressure. Resultantly, migrants may be wedged between opposing state approaches, limiting their opportunities and constraining their agency. As will be discussed later, tensions between origin and destination countries’ approaches become even more pronounced with regard to the descendants of migrants, because the fate of migrant children is often perceived as a “test bed” for receiving countries’ integration policies.

DIASPORA POLICIES: INSIGHTS FROM EMPIRICAL STUDIES

As international migration is a reality15, the question of how origin states deal with emigration/emigrants is as much an empirical question as a theoretical one. In this section, I summarize empirical studies’ insights about origin states’ diaspora policies. This research agenda focusses strongly on explaining variations in these policies across time and space, and explanations for the (non)existence and

15 In 2015, 244 million people live outside the territory of their country of nationality, a 41% increase in comparison to 2000. (UN https://www.un.org/ sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/01/244-million-international-migrants-living-abroad- worldwide-new-un-statistics-reveal/)

35 development of these policies in particular settings. Drawing on the above- mentioned focus on “diaspora” as a performative concept, especially useful for my research purpose are diaspora policy classifications which distinguish between different policies according to their function: policy strategies aiming at building a “diaspora” or mobilizing this “diaspora”. In addition, I highlight scholarship approaching the study of diaspora policies by looking into how expatriates react to these policies.

Historical views on diaspora policies

A major finding of contemporary research on diaspora policies is the observation that last decades a broad range of states — in the global North and South alike — has adopted diaspora policies in one form or another (Gamlen 2006; Ragazzi 2014). The proliferation of diaspora institutions, mentioned in the previous section, is symptomatic of this tendency. However, questions on the relationship between states and their expatriate citizens are much older. As early as in the nineteenth century, emerging nation-states facing large emigration flows, such as Italy and Poland, were trying to maintain connected to their emigrants and their descendants (Smith 2003). For instance, for descendants of Italians living abroad, it was relatively easy to claim Italian citizenship, a practice continuing today among Argentinians and Brazilians with Italian roots (Tintori 2010).

Looking backwards is not only important to point out the predecessors of current policies; understanding the nature and direction of (past) emigration flows is vital to understand the current focus on diaspora policies. For instance, Ireland’s focus on genealogy tourism16, can only be understood by taking into account the massive emigration waves that have taken place in the nineteenth century, leading up to a worldwide “Irish diaspora” of around 70 million17 Irish nationals. Differently, for a range of West-European states, the foundations of their diaspora

16 A particular type of heritage tourism, conducted by descendants of migrants interested in researching their family trees. In the case of Ireland, private and public initiatives publicized through national tourism organizations help them to track down documentation and locate graves (Newland & Taylor 2010).

17 Estimation by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2015) in the report “Global Irish. Ireland’s Diaspora Policies.” Data retrieved December 4, 2018 (https://www.dfa.ie/media/globalirish/global-irish-irelands-diaspora-policy.pdf).

36 institutions and policies have been developed during their colonial-imperial histories18. Colonialism and imperialism not only involved massive flows of capital and goods; in addition, these engendered unprecedented flows of people, both in terms of nationals from the “metropole” moving to the “foreign territories,” return migration of ex-colonials, as subsequent (restricted) immigration into Europe by the colonized. Different from other forms of emigration (such as flows due to poverty, war or famine), in the colonial emigration project, a permanent linkage between the “metropole” and the foreign territory was a constitutive element of this project itself, which lead to a very distinctive understanding of the relationship between the origin state and the expatriate population:

“La colonisation, où le lien à la métropole s’organisait autour de l’idée d’empire et de domination de l’Etat sur des terres plus ou moins lointaines et leurs populations indigènes; et l’émigration, individuelle ou collective, pour laquelle la persistance d’un lien avec l’Etat était subordonnée à l’existence d’un “esprit de retour”. (….) Dans le cas de la colonisation, la nation s’étend, dans le cas de l’emigration, elle perd ses sujets.” (Dufoix, 2010:22).

Illustrative here is the case of France which is often seen as a pioneer with regard to the matter of political representation of expatriate nationals in the domestic political system. However, the French approach can only be understood by considering France’s colonial projects and imperial ambitions, which were characterized by global economic as well as cultural expansion, on the one hand, and the role French abroad played in the anti-nazi resistance and liberation during the Second World War, on the other (Garriaud-Maylam 2010).

Historical research also highlights how diaspora policies are not always related to the emigration of nationals. Instead, the drawing and redrawing of international borders, in the context of larger geo-political shifts (e.g., in the aftermath of WWI and II, the fall of the communist empire), have created

18 Interestingly, a similar argument has been made for immigration policies: Walters (2015) remarks that many of the controlling techniques used in (im)migration policies today can be traced back to the colonial period. More broadly, he argues that migration policies filled the power vacuum (in terms of the control over mobility) left after the end of colonialism. Similarly, Sayad ([1999] 2004) argues that the marginalization and domination of Algerians in postcolonial France can be understood as a reproduction of the power dynamics between the French and Algerians during the colonial period.

37 numerous “stranded (ethnic) minorities” across the border of their “kin state” (Waterbury 2010). In Eastern Europe, for example, the redrawing of borders after World War I has created Hungarian ethnic minorities in all of Hungary's neighboring countries (Ibid. 2010). In sum, understanding a state’s diaspora policies requires attention to the country’s history of emigration and broader geopolitical shifts. Therefore, in my investigation of contemporary Moroccan diaspora policies I will pay due attention to its historic origins.

Explanatory frameworks for diaspora policies, and their limitations

Retrospective studies on the genesis and development of diaspora policies have made clear that diaspora policies always emerge because of several interacting factors; single explanations never suffice. In acknowledgment of this understanding, different authors have developed conceptual frameworks presenting an overview of possible explanations for the rise and shape of state outreach to expatriate communities. Drawing on field research in four countries (Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia and Jordan), Brand (2006) has listed five types of explanation for the development of diaspora policies: macro-historical, international political, economic, domestic political and security/stability explanations. Differently, Ragazzi (2014) looks into existing studies and grouped explanations in three interpretive frameworks. The first, and most dominant, cluster focusses on structural-instrumental explanations, explaining state behavior as resulting from the position of the states at the core, or the periphery, of the world economy and as the outcome cost/benefit calculations. Scholars using this explanation, argue that it is mainly the poorer states that develop diaspora policies, for their economic interests. Second, another group of scholars tends to understand diaspora policies through an ethnic lens, by focusing on “the changes in the conceptions of nationalism brought about by globalization.” (Ibid. 2014:82) Diaspora policies could then be understood an either cosmopolitan or as a nationalist response by states, depending on the viewpoint. Third, Ragazzi distinguishes political-economy explanations drawing on Foucault’s notion of governmentality. Here, “A strong link is assumed between the types of political-economic rationalities and regimes (planned economy, welfare state, neoliberal state) and diaspora policies.” (Ibid. 2014:82) While his statistical analysis concludes that the last framework has the strongest explanatory power, he agrees that the other frameworks remain

38 important (Ragazzi 2014). Indeed, for the Moroccan case, I feel that a combination of these interpretative frameworks is needed to fully grasp its diaspora policies.

Another set of classifications is related to the substantial focus of diaspora policies, answering the question, what types can be distinguished under the broad umbrella term of “diaspora policies”. Various authors (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Dufoix 2010) have proposed classifications, based on the particular domain covered by the policies. Commonly, following domains are distinguished (1) economic diaspora policies, including those stimulating and channelling emigrants’ flows of money and goods (remittances), emigrants’ investments, nostalgic trade19 flows, diaspora philanthropy (2) political diaspora policies, including among others the provision of external voting rights and other forms of expatriate political participation and representation, regulation of nationality, citizenship and/or alternative political membership for emigrants and their descendants, (3) administrative and bureaucratic policies, such as the creation of a registration system for the expatriate population, the legal, social and administrative services offered to expatriate citizens through consulates and the creation of institutions (4) sociocultural policies, consisting of among others homeland language and cultural education, support to national celebrations abroad, support to heritage tourism etc. (5) symbolic policies, referring to the inclusion of the expatriate population in national narratives and in political discourses.

However, these categories should not be considered as mutually exclusive; as often there are overlaps between them (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). Nor are they exhaustive, as new types of policies may emerge. Therefore, rather than a rigid framework for classification, typologies should be understood as a means to identify the presence or absence of certain dimensions in a particular country’s diaspora policy strategies and enhance comparisons across cases. The observation that the borders between different domains are fluid, is also supported in the empirical chapters of this dissertation: while I focus empirically on sociocultural and symbolic diaspora policies, economic and political aims are often looming in the background.

19 Nostalgic trade refers to trade in “nostalgic goods” (including home country food, clothing, etc.) that are in demand by expatriate populations. Many of the small businesses created by emigrants rely on the importation and distribution of such goods (Orozco 2003).

39 In addition, it should be noted that the creation of diaspora policies in diverse areas such as trade, language education, citizenship, banking, tourism, and voting are not the result of an overarching, carefully created policy agenda; more commonly, they are the accidental outcome of a long process of negotiation and trial and error (Iskander 2010). In this process, the state does not operate as a monolithic entity, but as a composition of different actors. Different state actors may have multiple, sometimes conflicting agendas around why and how the state should engage with expatriate populations, while they are also concerned about consolidating their power in this field (Dickinson 2019) and compete for diaspora investments (Chacko and Gebre 2013)

Especially useful for my research purpose is another type of classifications, which makes a distinction according to the particular function of the policy strategies. In line with my earlier discussion on the concept of “diaspora,” we see how various authors identify strategies that aim at building a “diaspora” (which implies the idea of diaspora as something that can be constructed), while another set of strategies aims at mobilizing this “diaspora” (which resonates the idea of the diaspora as a given).

Gamlen (2006:5-6), for instance, distinguishes between three higher-level types of policies: the first type are capacity building policies, aimed at discursively producing a state-centric “transnational national society” through symbolic nation- building, and developing a set of corresponding state institutions through institution-building. The second type consist of the extension of rights to the diaspora, the origin state “thus playing a role that befits a legitimate sovereign”. Third, origin states may also extract obligations from the diaspora, “based on the premise that emigrants owe loyalty to this legitimate sovereign.” While capacity building refers to intentional diaspora building, rights and obligations refer to the definition of the relationship of expatriates with their home country, defining this groups’ (potential) participation in the society of origin.

Building on Gamlen’s threefold distinction, Resende-Santos (2015:93) identifies three constitutive, parallel processes important in diaspora engagement policies: the presence of “diaspora enabling conditions,” “diaspora-building policies” and “diaspora integration policies”. The first category encompasses the general socioeconomic and political conditions in the country of origin, such as the reasons and circumstances of emigration, social and political stability,

40 macroeconomic conditions, and the quality of state governance. While these are not directly related to, or aimed at, the expatriate population, they are central in shaping the incentives, risks and productivity of transnational engagement. Second, diaspora-building policies refer to measures and initiatives aimed at constructing solidarity, shared identity, common purpose, patriotism, and strengthening emotional bonds with the homeland and within the expatriate population. They comprise five subcategories: cultural affirmation, community support and consular services, diaspora organization, opportunities for circular migration, and diaspora-focused administrative structures. This category corresponds with Gamlen’s “capacity-building”. Third, “diaspora integration policies” refer to material connections to the homeland, including cultivating direct diaspora participation in all spheres of national life. This category encompasses the extension of constitutional rights to emigrants, such as external voting, and strategies mobilizing their resources. These strategies refer to diaspora mobilization, as they centre around the question of how emigrants can participate in different spheres of the society of origin (in politics, in the economy, etc.).

Important to note is that Resende-Santos (2015) and others’ usage of the term “diaspora engagement policies” disguises how these policies are not necessarily aiming at engaging (all) expatriate citizens. Indeed, there is often a selectivity in who is invited to participate and who is not (or even prevented from doing so). As such, origin states’ diaspora policies may be as much about “disengagement” as about “engagement” for instance by preventing engagement of oppositional movements. Therefore, I prefer to use the more neutral term “diaspora policies”.

Distinguishing “diaspora building” from “diaspora mobilization” is not only interesting for analytic reasons; it also reveals that studies on diaspora policies tend to focus on the latter, notably, on the mobilization of expatriates' economic resources and political support, treating diaspora building strategies more as a by- product. Likely, this is because of the domination of what Ragazzi (2014, see above) calls the “structural-instrumental” explanation of diaspora policies, asserting that diaspora policies are driven by economic and political interests primarily. Resultantly, diaspora policy strategies that do not relate directly to these interests have received less scholarly attention. However, as Gamlen (2006) notes,

“The capacity of a home-state to implement diaspora engagement policies is dependent firstly on the imagined (or discursive)

41 existence of a cohesive transnational community, based around a common, state-centric national identity, towards which policies can be directed (see Gonzalez Gutierrez 1999).”

Therefore, diaspora building should be regarded as a prerequisite to mobilization, rather than a mere by-product. As I demonstrate in this dissertation, diaspora building strategies become especially important for the descendants of emigrants, whose identification with their ancestral “homeland20” is more insecure and fluctuating compared to emigrants’ (see above). The movement of the research focus from diaspora mobilization towards diaspora building also implies a shift in the type of policies being studied, towards more symbolic and sociocultural policies.

Reception of diaspora policies by expatriate populations

While most studies on diaspora policies focus on the proper policies and the (state and other) actors involved in creating and executing these policies some studies rather address how implemented diaspora policies are received by the expatriate population. This strand of literature has been advanced by anthropologists and others using ethnographic methods to investigate state influence in people's everyday lives (Kahmann 2014). This focus on how expatriates relate to and interact with their state of origin, is highly valuable as it moves the attention to different aspects of diaspora policies that tend to be ignored in policy-centered studies.

First, it helps to reveal differences between general state discourses and policies, on the one hand, and actual policy practices, on the other. This is important because

“There may be a schism […] between the welcoming attitude of ‘the State’ and a less amicable posture among individuals in the

20 Much of the mainstream terminology in transnational studies become problematic or confusing when applied to migrants’ descendants. “Homeland” is one example, as both country of residence (as country of birth) and origin country (as the ancestral homeland) can be considered as this groups’ “homeland”. Resultantly, I prefer to use a more neutral term “origin country,” as it refers to one’s ancestral roots rather than to one’s sense of home.

42 bureaucracy. Emigrants who wish to build houses or otherwise invest in the country of origin are often frustrated by a bureaucracy that may be inefficient and unprofessional in relation to what they are used to in their [countries of residence]”. (Carling 2008:1461)

Second, this focus directs the attention to how the creation, execution and effectiveness of diaspora policies depends on real-life interactions between state actors and expatriate citizens. Iskander (2010) for example, investigated how Moroccan and Mexican diaspora policies were co-created during decades of interpretive engagement between state actors, on the one hand, and expatriate citizens and their hometown development associations, on the other. Kahmann (2014) studied how Dutch Moroccans relate to the Moroccan State and its representatives in their everyday economic, religious, and identity-related practices. She argues that Moroccans living abroad should not be perceived as subjects of Moroccan diaspora policy, but as actors that play a role in creating these policies, and who ultimately mediate their implementation. In addition, she observed that Moroccan officials use preferential treatment based upon the personal traits and identity of the Moroccan Dutch person that they are dealing with; such as the persons’ regional origin (within Morocco), or their socio-economic position.

Third, the focus on the reception of policies also reveals how official diaspora discourses and strategies are actually viewed and received by their target group. Unsurprisingly, expatriate populations are multi-vocal in their response, which in turn highlights their internal diversity, among others in terms of socio-economic status, gender, age, generation, etcetera and how these differences affect their homeland ties and view on the origin state.

As I value the insights stemming from this strand of literature highly, in my research approach (see Chapter 3) I seek to combine a generalist perspective on diaspora policies with a fine-grained, ethnographic approach capturing face-to-face interaction between state actors and expatriates.

43 44 CHAPTER 2:

MOROCCAN MIGRATION, TRANSNATIONALISM, AND THE STATE

45 46 SYNOPSIS

The topics addressed in this chapter represent the contextual backdrop for the empirical analysis in the second part of this dissertation. The following sections are structured around three core themes. First, the Moroccan political context is introduced, in particular, the functioning of state power in Morocco. This is important since the nature of Moroccan diaspora policies can only be understood by taking into account the broader political context in which they are positioned. After introducing the Moroccan political context, the chapter continues with a discussion of Moroccan migration history and the Moroccan expatriate population. The diverse outlook of the current Moroccan expatriate population is explained by tracing back its origins to successive waves of post-war emigration, which have been marked by increasing diversification. This is particularly relevant as this research highlights internal diversity within the Moroccan expatriate population. Finally, a review is offered of the major transnational fields — socio- economic, social, cultural, political — that are linking Moroccan emigrants and their descendants to Morocco. Here, particular attention goes to the Moroccan State agency in each of these fields, demonstrating how private transnationalism and public policies interact.

THE MOROCCAN STATE

THE MOROCCAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Moroccan political system has been described as “monarchical authoritarianism” (Daadaoui 2011), a distinctive form of authoritarian rule in which the traditional monarchy holds the highest political, religious, economic and military position of power. More than secular and one-party authoritarianism in other countries in the wider region (such as Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Libya), the Moroccan system has demonstrated to be stable. The survival and stability of the Moroccan monarchy has been explained by the unique framework of authority, where a “cult of legitimacy” is created based on the Monarchy’s religious capital (as the king is the amir al-mu’minin, commander of the faithful, and the sharaf, assumed to be having a direct lineage to the prophet) and Moroccan traditional

47 socio-religious concepts and ritual practices (Daadaoui 2011). In his analysis on the foundations of Moroccan authoritarianism, Hammoudi (1999) demonstrates how Moroccan authoritarianism is, in fact, a replication of archaic, culturally embedded power relations between individuals and their “chief ” — be it a political chief, a father, a religious authority, a teacher or any other type of superior — that are present throughout Moroccan society.

While resilient, this Moroccan political system has been far from static (Hammoudi 1999). Over the second half of the twentieth century, under King Hassan II’s reign (1961-1999) the Moroccan political system evolved from a highly repressive authoritarian regime (a period referred to as les années de plomb) towards a more liberal system, with first free elections held in 1997. Initially, Hassan II’s successor to the throne Mohammed VI continued the pathway towards further democratization and liberalization21 . However, this process of liberalization stagnated at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Zemni and Bogaert 2006). The Moroccan authorities’ hard-line approach to domestic terrorism (e.g. the Casablanca bombings in 2003, killing 33 victims) and to different waves of mass protests illustrates that whenever an arbitrary “red line” is crossed (i.e. when the position of the Monarchy and the Makhzen – the central government — is threatened), repressive means are used and the King can utilize his special prerogatives to bypass formal decision making processes and institutions (Ibid.). The Moroccan authorities’ response to the 2016 El Hirak mass protests following fish vendor Mouhcine Fikri’s death is a good illustration in case: protesters have been confronted with police violence, individual freedoms and civil rights were curbed, and protest leaders have been jailed and convicted.

In addition to state violence, however, the monarchy has employed a strategy of co-optation of oppositional forces, leading to limited concessions, but leaving the power of the monarchy intact (Zemni and Bogaert 2006). This strategy incorporates the notion of patronage, as a system of rewards and punishments that eventually strengthens allegiance to the central powers and divides oppositional forces (Daadaoui 2011). The introduction of a new constitution in 2011, only a

21 For instance, in 2004, Mohammed VI introduced a more liberal family code (Moudawana) strengthening women’s rights. He also set up a human rights and truth commission (IER – Instance Equité et Réconciliation) to examine the human rights violations under Hassan II. In addition, he launched several social programs for the poor. Due to his interest in the impoverished, he has also been framed as "Roi des pauvres”.

48 few months after approximately 150,000 to 200,000 Moroccans in 53 cities and towns across the country marched on the streets and called for democracy, social justice and change (the “20 February Protests”), is an example of this strategy. The new constitution was designed by a constitutional commission selected by the King and approved by popular referendum22. However, the absolute power of the King remained untouched, leading observers to state that

“The (constitutional) referendum on 1 July 2011 appeared more like a renewal of the traditional act of allegiance (ba’ya) between the sultan and his subjects than anything else. From this perspective, the ‘yes’ vote seemed to reflect the oath of allegiance that binds the Moroccan people steadfast to their king, a reality that places the monarch beyond any divisions and above the constitution. Voting ‘yes’ for the constitution was like acting as a ‘legal witness’ and carrying out a ‘national duty’.” (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni 2012:16)

Resultantly, executive, constitutional, legislative and judicial powers in Morocco continue to lie with the Monarchy and its entourage (the Makhzen, the ruling elite), rather than with democratic institutions. Parliament is subordinated to the government, which is in turn controlled by the monarchy, and civil society has insufficient access to the political process (Ibid. 2012)23. Moreover, the monarchy remains not only the center of political power but also of religious power (Contreras and Martinez 2015) and of economic power since King Mohammed VI “is not only the King of the poor, he is also the most important and powerful capitalist investor of the country” (Bogaert 2013:84).

Apart from the more recent constitutional reforms, other social, economic and administrative reforms under Mohammed VI have also proved ineffective in

22 According to official figures, 98,5% of the registered voters approved the new constitution. However, the validity of the referendum's outcome was contested by the February 20 Movement, who had called to boycott the referendum.

23 For a more detailed critique on the genesis, content, and implications of the 2011 constitution, see Madani, Maghraoui & Zerhouni (2012). For instance, Madani et al. discuss how many of the constitution’s social and civil rights are subsequently emptied of its substance because of restrictive organic laws defining the conditions of implementation: “There is a consistent pattern whereby the principles of rights that are set up in the constitution can potentially be useless due to restrictive laws” (2012:21).

49 addressing shortfalls in governance processes and institutional accountability. This has led to the observation that in Morocco

“The current generation of young adults still complains of the same old practices of privilege, nepotism, and cronyism that have plagued the country for decades. These stubborn failings have retarded meaningful advances in human development and robbed generations of Moroccans of their basic fundamental rights, breeding widespread public cynicism and despair in the country’s governance institutions.” (Boukhars 2011:xi-xii)

Illustrative for the effectiveness of the “cult of legitimacy” surrounding the king, is how most Moroccans hold governmental institutions and political parties accountable for dire living conditions in Morocco, not the king himself (Daadaoui 2011). The king is seen as an arbiter, transcending private interests and partisan squabbles (Hammoudi 1999).

THE IMPACT OF THE MOROCCAN POLITICAL SYSTEM ON DIASPORA POLICIES

The above-mentioned characteristics of the Moroccan political system shape and affect Moroccan diaspora policies significantly. Three elements are important to mention here: the central role of the monarchy, the relative silence of other domestic political actors, and the lack of government accountability.

First, the Moroccan monarchy has taken and continues to take a central role in the design of Moroccan diaspora policies. Different expressions of royal power, such as the royal discretionary legal power to issue Dahirs (binding royal decrees, immune to any judicial control and standing above all other types of legislation), and the practice of delivering authoritative Discours Royaux (royal speeches) should be highlighted here. The palace not only played a decisive role in the creation of all Moroccan diaspora institutions (see Chapter 4), moreover, the king dominates public discourses on migrants through his public speeches in which expatriate Moroccans, including both migrants and post-migrant generations, are frequently mentioned. The power of these speeches can hardly be overestimated, since they

50 have become, over the years, the prime reference for the political parties and government:

“The speeches are the dynamic of every change, the blueprint for various actions and the center around which the politics of consensus is constructed. Most political leaders refer to them, and no one can disagree with their substantive content.” (Madani, Maghraoui and Zerhouni 2012)

In those discourses, the relationship between expatriate Moroccans and the Moroccan king is often framed in filial terms, with the king as “father” and expatriate Moroccans as his “children” (Iskander 2010), a portrayal befitting the image of the king as a symbol of national unity. More than being an expression of tenderness, the usage of filial terminology stresses an indissoluble authoritative relationship between a ruler and his subjects. Since the Moroccan Nationality Code is based on the ius sanguinis principle (children of Moroccan parents automatically acquire Moroccan nationality), this affiliation is also confirmed by the perpetuation of Moroccan nationality among the expatriate population.

Second, in the development of diaspora policies the role of local Moroccan civil society and political actors, such as political parties and trade unions, is negligible. Notwithstanding the large impact of emigration on Moroccan society, the topics of emigration and diaspora policies take a marginal position in the Moroccan public debate and do not play a role of significance on political parties' electoral agenda (Aderghal 2014). Remarkably, this is in sharp contrast with the topic of immigration in receiving countries, where public opinion, media, and civil society activism tend to play a central role in shaping political parties’ opinions and governmental policies on migration (Ibid. 2014).

Third, due to the lack of effective democratic control mechanisms that are critical to ensure government accountability (such as free press, a strong parliament, independent judiciary), there is often a wide gap between official policies, discourses and rights, on the one hand, and policy implementation and enforcement of rights, on the other. An illustration here is the constitutional provisions with regard to “Moroccans living Abroad”: while the 2011 Constitution guarantees external voting rights (Articles 17 and 30), the organic law regulating

51 the execution of these rights24 has curtailed this right de facto by imposing the practice of proxy vote. This type of gaps and inconsistencies between laws and their implementation sparks criticism that the Moroccan diaspora policy agenda is hypocrite and characterized by “unkept promises,” something that is also highlighted in Chapter 7. This illustrates how the particular Moroccan political system not only creates a broader framework in which Moroccan diaspora policies are developed, but it also influences how these policies are perceived by expatriate Moroccans.

THE GLOBAL POSITION OF THE MOROCCAN STATE

This chapter has focussed so far on Morocco’s domestic political system and its internal dynamics, however, an important aspect to be discussed is Morocco’s global position and how it impacts upon the development and shape of Moroccan diaspora policies. Emigration states tend to be in a dependent relationship to destination states; their relatively weak international position influences their policy options (Fitzgerald 2006). Morocco, as a sending country located in the global South, is in a dependent position vis-à-vis the major receiving countries of Moroccan migrants in Western Europe. As the EU is the main commercial partner of Morocco25, maintaining good relations with Europe is vital, and EU-Moroccan cooperation concerning the regulation and control of migration has become part and parcel of these relations (Sadiqi 2004; Aderghal 2014). Morocco’s position at the Southern border of the European Union has led to pressure by the EU to take up a role in the regulation of clandestine migration towards Europe (Ouali 2004). The focus of the current European approach is to establish a partnership with Morocco to reduce irregular migration, fight human trafficking, increase border control and establish bilateral readmission arrangements allowing to send irregular migrants back to Morocco (Cherti 2014). With regard to trade, the relationship between the EU and Morocco has been formalized in an initial commercial

24 Article 72, Dahir° 1-11-165 du kaada 1432 (14 octobre 2011) portant promulgation de la loi organique n°27-11 relative à la Chambre des représentants.

25 The EU is Morocco's largest trading partner, accounting for 59,4% of its trade in 2017. Of Morocco’s exports, 64,6% went to the EU, and 56,5% of Morocco's imports came from the EU. Morocco is the EU’s 22nd trading partner representing 1,0% of the EU’s total trade with the world.

52 agreement in 1969, followed up by successive association agreements26 (Cherti and Collyer 2015). In addition, through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) launched in 2004, the EU provides bilateral assistance to Morocco. For 2014-2000, ENP funding of around 200 million per year targets improving equal access to social services, democratic governance, the rule of law, employment and sustainable, inclusive growth in Morocco. While the program focusses strongly on supporting Morocco’s economy, a share of the budget is also allocated directly to Moroccan migration policies27.

Besides the European level, the global level is important to consider for the realm of migration and diaspora policies. At the turn of the twenty-first century, a “global epistemic community on migration and development” made up by scholars and spurred by a range of international institutions and platforms like the IOM, GMDF28 and the World Bank, gained momentum (Gamlen 2014; Pécoud 2015). These “migration optimists” promote the beneficial effects of migration on homeland development, thereby stimulating origin countries to develop diaspora policies focussing on development (Gamlen 2014). In addition, international institutions financially support this type of policy, also in Morocco29.

The entanglement of Moroccan and European interests on different levels, and especially the dominant position of the EU in this relationship, needs to be kept in mind in our understanding of Moroccan national policies. However, we should also not overestimate the importance of external influences and actors in

26 From 2013 on, negotiations on a "Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area" (DCFTA) started, whose goal it is “to create new trade and investment opportunities and ensure a better integration of Morocco's economy into the EU single market. The DCFTA also aims at supporting ongoing economic reforms in Morocco and at bringing the Moroccan legislation closer to that of the EU in trade-related areas.” (European Commission 2017)

27 EU Commission’s Support Program for Migration Policies of the Kingdom of Morocco (ENI/2016/39-372). In 2016, €35 million has been allocated to Morocco as support for the implementation of its (new) national strategy on immigration and asylum, and as support to Moroccan policies regarding Moroccans living abroad.

28 Global Millennium Development Foundation

29 For instance, the IOM funds and co-manages various programs in Morocco related to migration. Usually, these are related to the development-migration nexus and return migration.

53 explaining Moroccan diaspora policies. Three arguments offer a more nuanced picture here.

First, Morocco's diaspora policies existed for decades before Europe became preoccupied with international migration and before the global agenda on diaspora engagement emerged. An in-depth historical examination of Moroccan diaspora policies reveals how the long-term interpretive engagement with its communities abroad offers the best explanation for the development of Moroccan diaspora policies (Iskander 2010). Indeed, the global agenda on migration and development appears to be inspired by the experiences of “pioneer” states in the field like Morocco, Israel, and Italy rather than the other way around.

Second, it has been argued that the Moroccan State is increasingly developing a position independent from European migration perspectives, a shift that can be framed in the reclaiming of Morocco’s geopolitical position in Africa as a leading power (Cherti and Collyer 2015). This new position indicates the multiplicity of the Moroccan position in the world: depending on the issue at stake, Morocco positions itself as “a Muslim State,” as “a State of Amazigh origin,” “African nation,” as “oriented towards Europe” etcetera (Ibid.). As such, Morocco claims multiple “geopolitical cultures”30 (O Tuathail 2006). These different and sometimes contradicting ways of framing Morocco and its cultural heritage are also apparent in the empirical analysis in this dissertation, especially in Chapter 5: while in diaspora policy discourses Morocco is often presented as a modern nation, increasingly living up to Western standards, at other times, traditional Moroccan values are praised and European societies criticized.

Third, the global agenda on migration is strongly biased towards a limited number of consensual themes such as “development” and “human rights,” omitting other migration-related themes (Pécoud 2015). This is the case especially for politically sensitive issues, such as immigrant incorporation and cultural rights

30 “All states, as recognized territorial institutions within an international system of states, have a geopolitical culture of conceptualizing their state and its unique identity, position and role in the world. Geopolitical cultures emerge from a state's encounter with the world (2006:7)."

54 of ethnic minorities (Maas and Khoser 201031; Pécoud 2015). Therefore, while the existing international normative framework may lead to more uniform diaspora policies with regard to diaspora engagement for homeland development, in other domains like cultural diaspora policies this is unlikely since a global normative framework is non-existent. This is particularly relevant here, as in this dissertation I focus on this type of policies.

Now that I have introduced the central actor of Moroccan diaspora policies, the Moroccan State, the next section will introduce the target group of those policies: the Moroccan expatriate population.

MOROCCAN EMIGRATION: PATTERNS AND DEMOGRAPHICS

HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PROFILE OF MOROCCAN MIGRATION

To understand the current outlook of the Moroccan expatriate population, one needs to take into account the situation in Europe after the end of the Second World War. In need of cheap labor to rebuild Europe, West-European states signed labor treaties with various Mediterranean countries, including Morocco. Morocco’s signature of a series of labor treaties with European nation-states in the 1950s and 1960s can be put forward as the decisive factor in 20th-century Moroccan emigration. However, rather than initiating migration flows, these treaties acted as a catalyst, fueling the emigration of young, male, low-skilled Moroccans who wanted to flee the economic difficulties following Morocco’s

31 Reviewing the major intergovernmental initiatives on migration between 1994 and 2009, Maas and Khoser (2010:40) observed how “social cohesion and integration are among the least prominent topics covered across these […] initiatives, which is surprising given their importance in a national context in destination countries.” Similarly, in the more recent 2018 UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, little attention goes to topics such as culture and integration, while “development” is omnipresent. As an indication, in the draft document "development" was used 83 times. A second major theme is the prevention of irregular migration. Contrastingly, out of 23 goals, only one goal relates to migrant inclusion and social cohesion in the receiving countries. The word "culture" was used only twice.

55 independence in 1956 (Charef 2014). Resultantly, the current Moroccan expatriate population is strongly rooted in low-skilled labor migration. Like Mexico in the case of the USA, Morocco has become the primary source of non-European immigrant workers for the European Union (de Haas 2013). However, notwithstanding the importance of post-war low-skilled, male labor migration, one cannot understand the shape, size, and nature of the Moroccan expatriate population without expounding on this unidimensional picture in at least three ways: first, Moroccan emigration to Europe is much older than the post-war migration; second, the profile of Moroccan emigration has always been more diverse than “labor migration”, and third, after the abandonment of the labor recruitment treaties, Moroccan emigration continued albeit in different shapes and to an increasing number of destinations.

Concerning the first point, Moroccan emigration has a long history, in which the organized labor migration to Western Europe and subsequent family migration were only the more recent variations (Charef 2004). There were various pre- colonial migration flows to neighboring countries (Algeria but also West African countries) but also to Europe. A particular case of Moroccan emigration regarded the recruitment of Moroccan soldiers in European wars, such as WWI, WWII and the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), in order to fight as soldiers in European armies or to replace the native male workforce (Sørensen 2004). Moroccan migration to France even traces back more than a century, to the creation of the French protectorate in Morocco in 1912 (Charef 2014).

Second, people emigrated from Morocco for various reasons, though this often happened under the disguise of labor migration or, later, family reunification. Moroccan emigrants were not merely seeking better job opportunities, they were also fleeing a hopeless situation in their home country conditioned by unemployment, underdevelopment, and repression. For at least a part of Moroccan emigrants, political repression by the regime due to oppositional beliefs and practices forced them into exile (Sørensen 2004). The role of Moroccan State policies in Moroccan emigration is also highlighted by the selective nature of the assisted labor migration, with a relatively high share being of rural and Berber descent. While it has been contested whether the Moroccan State had a deliberate strategy to evacuate Berber majority regions for political reasons (Iskander 2010;

56 Brand, 2006; Cottaar and Bouras 200932), it cannot be denied that the North- Moroccan Berber rural emigration had a particular political dimension because the underdevelopment of their region of origin was caused by long-standing state neglect. As Iskander notes,

“Other than interventions to extract natural resources, especially phosphates, the government ignored rural areas it viewed as useless, and it failed to provide them even with the most basic infrastructure and services.” (Iskander 2010:118)

Importantly, when looking at the conditions Moroccan emigrants were escaping from, these should not be understood as unique; rather, these are associated with the post-colonial condition of the country after its independence in 1956. In many post-colonial states, independence has been followed by large emigration flows, induced by the economic and political instabilities associated with the remaking of borders, and the search for better opportunities in a context of deteriorating economic conditions and unfair distribution of political and economic resources (Dickinson 2019). In addition, post-colonial states tended to encourage unskilled emigration, as they perceived emigration as a “safety valve” for domestic tensions and unemployment (Wiltshire 1992). Moreover, patterns of mobility were also shaped by colonial power practices of recruiting labor from their ex-colonies (Dickinson 2019). These patterns apply to the Moroccan case, where after the end of WWII most Moroccan emigrants headed for France, the colonial metropole; other destinations only becoming important afterward.

To further illustrate the diversity of motives for migration from Morocco, the often overlooked case of the Jewish Moroccans can be mentioned. While in 1948 more than a quarter-million Jews lived in Morocco; from the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 on most moved out to Israel, France, and North America. Peek emigration of Jewish Moroccans happened at moments international Arab- Israeli relations were most tense (e.g., in the aftermath of the Six-Day War in 1967 between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan). As a result, while today only a few

32 While Iskander (2010:118) states "Thanks to government's vigorous direction of European labor recruiters to the rural backlands, immigration was disproportionate from regions located outside le Maroc utile”. Cottaar & Bouras (2009) argue that there is no evidence to support the claim, at least not for the emigration towards the Netherlands.

57 thousand Jews are left in Morocco, the Moroccan population in Israel counts an estimated 700,000 citizens, mostly born in Israel (De Haas 2013).

Third, Moroccan emigration did not wither away after the suspension of the labor treaties in the 1970s. While there was a drop in volume during the recession at the end of the 1970s, in the 80s and 90s migration flows were reestablished and increased (Sørensen 2004). However, due to increasing barriers to migration to Europe, the nature of Moroccan migration has altered drastically. Since the legal labor migration channel has been cut off, most legal migration happens in the form of family reunification or family formation with Moroccan migrants settled in Europe and their descendants. Due to this type of migration, the gender balance of the Moroccan expatriate population altered from male-dominated to gender- balanced. In addition, as legal migration options are limited, irregular Moroccan migration has risen in importance. Paradoxically, it is development rather than underdevelopment that explains the continuation of migration from Morocco. This process of development has been accompanied by deep transformations in Moroccan society, such as rapid urbanization, a decrease of absolute poverty as well as increasing school enrollment rates (de Haas 2013). Resultantly, in a context where large economic and social problems continue, these processes have increased the aspirations as well as the capacities to migrate among young Moroccans (Ibid. 2014).

Over the years, Moroccan migration not only shifted in form; it also diversified in terms of its destinations. While migration to the original destination countries continued (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany; the countries with whom Moroccan had signed a labor recruitment treaty), since the 70s and 80s on, Spain and Italy have become major destinations too. Moroccan migration flows have also emerged to other European countries (e.g., the UK and Scandinavian countries), the United States and Canada (Fondation Hassan II and IOM, 2014). In addition, since the 90s the Gulf has become an important destination (Ibid). Not only destinations of Moroccan migration became more diverse, however, so did the regions of origin within Morocco: while previously mainly a rural affair, from the 1990s on all geographical regions in Morocco became involved in emigration (Collyer et al. 2009).

58 DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS IN THE MOROCCAN EXPATRIATE POPULATION: THE RISE OF POST-MIGRANT GENERATIONS

Due to continuing emigration and rapid natural growth of the expatriate communities, the Moroccan expatriate population grew to today’s estimated size of four to five million people, including the children and grandchildren of Moroccan migrants (De Haas 2013). However, another factor is important to explain this population’s consistent growth: the relatively low rate of return migration to Morocco among the generation of Moroccan guest workers33. Compared to other immigrant groups in Europe, return migration rates among Moroccans have been among the lowest (de Haas 2007); rather than returning home, Moroccan labor migrants tended to bring their spouses and children to the receiving countries.

Moroccans are currently one of the largest and most dispersed migrant populations in Europe, with large expatriate communities in France (1,146,000), Belgium (298,000), the Netherlands (363,000), Italy (487,000) and Spain (766,000) and smaller ones in many other European countries, including Germany (127,000). Outside of Europe, significant populations live in North America (around 90,000), other Maghreb countries (145,000), other (non-Maghreb) Arab countries (69,000) and Israel (700,000) (de Haas 2013).

However, these figures, based on the registers of Moroccan consulates, underestimate the actual size of the expatriate Moroccan population, as people of Moroccan origin who are not registered in Moroccan consulates are left out of the picture. Therefore, data do not take into account irregular Moroccan migrants, Moroccan asylum seekers but also a sizable group of descendants of Moroccan migrants, who have a lower incentive or interest to register at the consulate. As the latter group tends to hold receiving country citizenship too, registration at Moroccan consulates is less important than it is for first-generation migrants.

33 Currently, return to Morocco seems to occur mainly among recently arrived migrants, irregular migrants or retirees, while naturalized or post-migrant Moroccans in their working age are less likely to move to Morocco (Cherti 2014). Looking at the age profile of returnees, younger returnees are usually those forced to return (due to financial or administrative issues, including a lack of papers), while older returnees tend to return voluntarily (Ibid. 2014).

59 Lower registration rates among the descendants of Moroccans explains why estimations of the size of this group within the Moroccan expatriate population diverge strongly. Based on consular data, de Haas (2014) estimated that in 2010, in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany between one-third up to over half of all Moroccans living there were born there, while in France this applied to one out of four Moroccans. Based on this estimation, in those four countries, more than 600,000 citizens are having Moroccan parents or grandparents. However, when taking into account national register data of some receiving countries, a different picture appears, confirming the inaccuracy of Moroccan consular data in their estimation of the size of the post-migrant Moroccan population. For Belgium, Schoonvaere (2014) found that in 2012, 429,000 persons had a Moroccan background (i.e., at least one of their parents was born with the Moroccan nationality) and that within this population, more than 55% were born in Belgium. For the Netherlands, a similar tendency has been found: in 2010, 52,1% of the 349,000 people with a Moroccan background in the Netherlands were born there (Nicolaas, Wobma and Ooijevaar 2010). For France, in 2015 there were 803,000 migrant descendants of Moroccan origin, while the number of Moroccan immigrants (both those naturalized as French citizens, as those holding Moroccan citizenship only) with the same background is only 731,000 (INSEE 2018). In France, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, the share of locally born citizens of Moroccans background (52,1%) outnumbers the group of Moroccans born in Morocco (Ibid. 2018). Based on these figures, a rough calculation34 shows us that for France, Belgium and the Netherlands alone, this group counts yet around 1,221,000, exceeding the estimation based on consular data mentioned above by de Haas (2014) by far. Resultantly, when Wagner (2011) estimates the population of descendants of Moroccan guest workers between 800,000 and 1.5 million people, the above findings suggest that the total number for all destination countries is most likely to be much closer to 1.5 million.

Apart from providing a more accurate figure, these figures highlight how in several destination countries (e.g., France, the Netherlands, and Belgium), the Moroccan expatriate population is increasingly made up of migrant descendants, born and raised outside of Morocco. However, it should be noted that Moroccan

34 Since I add up register data of different years (between 2010-2014), the calculation is imperfect. It still validates my argument that Moroccan consular data is an inaccurate base for assessing the size of the Moroccan post-migrant population.

60 migration is also continuing35, leading to the observation that the Moroccan population abroad is marked both by deepening settlement of the earlier emigrants and their descendants as well as by a continuing influx of new emigrants. This dual dynamic has been framed as the convergence of a “post-migration” and a “migration” situation and is characterized by a complex interplay between the differing dynamics caused by these situations (Bousetta 2008).

MOROCCAN TRANSNATIONAL TIES AND THE MOROCCAN STATE

Considering the vast size and complexity of the Moroccan expatriate population, how can we typify the homeland-oriented relations of this expatriate population?

Some scholars have attempted to settle this question by classifying the Moroccan expatriate population a “labor diaspora36”(Cohen 2008) or an “incipient diaspora” (Sheffer 2003); though this requires considerable stretching of the original understanding of the diaspora concept since the Moroccan migration is (mostly) voluntary migration and return is (for most expatriate Moroccans) not at stake. However, proponents justify the usage of the label because the Moroccan expatriate “community” is seen as conserving its group identity and demonstrating a continuous link to the “homeland” (Charef 2004:142; Cohen 2008; de Haas 2013). Some also consider the social exclusion in the receiving society as a criterion to speak of a diaspora (Cohen 2008)37.

35 In major countries of destination, we see how Morocco remains a top “source country” in contemporary migration flows. For example, in France, 8.2% of all new immigrants in 2016 were Moroccans, making Morocco the most important source country, followed by Algeria (7%) and Tunisia (3,3%).

36 Cohen (2008) distinguishes between 5 Ideal Types (in the Weberian sense) of diasporas: victim, labor, imperial, trade and deterritorialized (2008). A labour diaspora exists when “among overseas workers there is evidence over time of (a) a strong retention of group ties sustained over an extended period (in respect of language, religion, endogamy, and cultural norms); (b) a myth of and connection to a homeland; and (c) significant levels of social exclusion in the destination societies” (2008:61).

37 See the previous footnote.

61 However, taking into consideration the discussion on the concept of “diaspora” (Chapter 1), I agree with Wagner (2011) that

“The application of a broad term to all those who migrated from Morocco, regardless of their conditions of migration, may engender imaginings of a level of unity and solidarity among different Moroccan migrant communities that cannot be demonstrated.” (2011:82)

Others too have rejected the application of this label for the Moroccan expatriate population for similar reasons, stating that the label of “diaspora” naturalizes the link between emigrants and their societies of origin, without really addressing strengthening or weakening factors of continuity and change (Bousetta and Martiniello 2003).

Therefore, instead of employing a single static label to classify an entire 5 million+ population’s relationship to its country of origin, this section takes a more empirically grounded approach highlighting major patterns in the transnational, homeland-oriented ties of members of this Moroccan expatriate population. Drawing on relevant scholarly work, the remainder of this chapter clusters some of the most important practices and identifications under the broad headers of socio-economic ties, social ties, cultural ties and political ties to Morocco. The overview does not have the ambition to be exhaustive; rather, it is the backdrop to Part 2 of the dissertation where different types of transnational ties are touched upon. In line with the research focus of this dissertation, particular attention is given to generational divisions in transnational ties, on the one hand, and to Moroccan State intervention with regard to these transnational ties, on the other. While overall, compared to other countries, the Moroccan state’s approach

62 towards its expatriate population is broad and ambitious38, it becomes clear how in some domains the Moroccan State is more active (e.g., in the socio-economic realm), while other domains are characterized by the absence of state initiative (e.g., in the political area).

SOCIO-ECONOMIC TIES: INDIVIDUAL REMITTANCES, COLLECTIVE REMITTANCES, TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

A major, long-standing transnational practice among Moroccan labor emigrants is the transfer of money “back home” to relatives. Initially, remittances were sent home through informal channels, via trusted couriers, or brought in person during return trips (Iskander 2010). From the late 1960s on, however, the Moroccan State’s Banque Centrale Populaire managed to capture migrant remittances successfully, by addressing the specific literacy and institutional constraints that deterred migrants before from using formal financial channels (Ibid. 2010). Since the early 1970s, remittances have become increasingly important for the Moroccan state’s external balance of payments. Together with tourism, remittances represent the major source of foreign currency receipt and represent a source of income larger than receipts from tourism or foreign direct investment inflows (Sørensen 2004). In 2017, Morocco received 7,5 billion dollars39 of remittances, representing 6,8% of the country’s GDP (KNOMAD 2018). With regard to expatriate Moroccans’ motives for sending remittances,

38 In comparative work, the Moroccan State approach towards its expatriate population has been labeled as the "Global-Nation State" (Ragazzi, 2014), alongside countries as Mexico, India, Ireland, Russia, Greece and Ethiopia, to indicate how these states "represent the widest range of diaspora policy features", including encouragement of lobbying, organization of diaspora conferences, allocation of a number of (civic/social/ etc.) rights, access to national passports or other documents certifying the national origin, organization of language and cultural programs, and economic and political mobilization. Beside the Global Nation-State, Ragazzi (2014) identified 4 other types of origin states: (1) the expatriate state (focussing on socio-cultural services for expats, mainly from high- income countries) (2) the managed labor state (focussing on the management of labour emigration) (3) the indifferent state (states where there is a generalized lack of interest to its population abroad (4) closed states (mainly undemocratic states, that restrict and punish emigration).

39 In this figure, informal transfers and goods are not included. Therefore, the actual size of remittance flows is even larger.

63 these mainly serve to cover basic provisions, such as food, clothing and health care (Saaf, Hida and Aghbal 2009)40.

While the amount of remittances sent to Morocco continues to grow41, it should be noted that further growth seems primarily caused by recent emigration flows. Among more settled Moroccan migrants and migrants’ descendants, this practice seems to have decreased significantly. A growing group is not or no longer remitting to family and friends, and if they do, this seems more an occasional than a structural activity42. Arguably, in the segment of those who do not engage in sending money, there is a significant group of post-migrant Moroccans that do not continue their parents’ practices. In addition, it has been observed that while Moroccan newcomers send remittances and goods to family and friends, this behavior wanes as the length of residence in the receiving country increases (De Bruyn and Develtere 2008). However, this does not necessarily mean that transnational solidarity disappears; rather, across time and generations, transnational solidarity seems to evolve from targeted family-oriented remittances to broader “diaspora philanthropy” (Ibid. 2008).

Indeed, one of the evolutions observed by scholars is the emergence of community-oriented, collective remittances. These collective remittances have also been framed as long-distance solidarity or development initiatives and are closely related to hometown associations (HTAs) (Lacroix 2014). Because in Moroccan emigration, village groups of emigrants were clustered in their arrival settings, community institutions were organized based on hometown affiliation. Initially, collective efforts by these Moroccan HTAs were focusing more on the

40 In this study based on a survey (N=401), Moroccan Belgians were asked why they sent money to friends and families in Morocco. Multiple answering was possible. Most reported motives were: (a) to allow them to buy food and clothing (60%), (b) to cover health care costs of a friend or relative (36%), (c) to cover the school allowance of a friend or relative (11%), (d) to buy household appliances and other goods (10%).

41 In 2017, Morocco received 7.5 billion dollar of remittances, while in 2003 this was 3.3 billion (KNOMAD 2018; Sadiqi 2007).

42 For instance, for Dutch-speaking Belgium, in a sample survey, more than 1 out of 3 persons of Moroccan descent said to never transfer money to Morocco (Vancluysen, Van Craen and Ackaert 2009), while only 1 out of 3 said to remit money multiple times a year. In the Netherlands, the rate of people involved in this practice is even lower, with only 40% saying to send money to family (Snel, Engbergsen and Leerkens 2006). These figures contrast with earlier figures: for example, in 1972, 89% of Moroccans in France remitted money to their families (Charef 1999).

64 improvement of living conditions in the receiving countries. However, from the 1990s on, “the primary aim of hometown groupings was becoming obsolete, and they found in development activities a means to reinvent their legitimacy.” (Lacroix 2014; 2019)43 In addition, considering the growing internal diversity of the Moroccan expatriate population, resulting in a “community” whose members often share little more than their common origin, contributing to development in Morocco has become a consensual issue, transcending professional, class, political and generational divisions among expatriate Moroccans. Resultantly, HTAs started to focus on the building of schools, digging of wells, building health centers, running orphanages, providing electrification, etc., in their Moroccan villages of origin (Lacroix 2014). These collective remittances are an expression — and thereby, a legitimation — of Moroccan emigrants’ multiple embeddings (Lacroix 2019).

Concerning the involvement of post-migrant generations in HTAs, the evidence is mixed which may indicate how practices are shifting rapidly. For instance, for Belgium, while Bousetta noted at the beginning of the twenty-first century that the associations headed by post-migrant Moroccans were mainly focusing on local issues, not on transnational ones (Bousetta 2001), a decade later Godin et al. (2015:200) finds about Belgian HTAs that they are “often initiated by second- or third-generation immigrants”. In France too, a generational shift has been observed, as "the subject of transnational development has attracted a new generation of community leaders in search of public legitimacy” (Lacroix and Dumont 2015:223). Especially the middle and upper-middle class of Moroccan origin (part of the so-called Beurgoisie, French-born citizens with North-African roots) are claiming leadership in these organizations (Ibid. 2015). The generational shift is paired by a shift in working modus (lower importance of kinship ties) and geographical focus (less focus on villages of origin), while these initiatives are also more formally structured and strongly embedded in durable partnerships with public institutions in the receiving country (Godin et al. 2015; Lacroix and Dumont 2015). Additionally, for post-migrant Moroccan youth, their involvement in development initiatives also aims at a reappropriation of identity both in relation to the origin as the receiving country. Lacroix and Dumont (2015:228) even assert that “this approach — tackling personal integration through the

43 While Lacroix bases his findings on the Moroccan HTAs in France, similar dynamics can be found in other destination countries (for Belgium, see Godin et al. 2015).

65 reappropriation of genealogical roots — is a common experience among all Moroccan second-generation actors involved in development projects”. However, established Moroccan HTAs also report difficulties in getting youth involved in their initiatives (Lacroix and Dumont 2015; Nijenhuis and Zoomers 2015). In sum, as Lacroix and Dumont (2015) state

“Intergenerational differences are central to the understanding of divergent engagement in cross-border activities. Parents use the skills and resources acquired in the host society to fulfill their duties as transnational villagers, while their children use their links with the place of origin to harmonize and legitimate their role as citizens. […] First-generation transnationalism tends to produce translocally delimited linkages, in contrast to youths involved in migrant NGOs, which tend to establish wider bonds with the country of origin.” (2015:229)

Besides individual and collective remittances, other types of transnational monetary flows deserve attention here. Historically, Moroccan emigrants’ demand for goods and products from Morocco has engendered “ethnic” or “nostalgic” trade, which has contributed to the establishment of economic linkages between Morocco and the Moroccan communities in the receiving countries (Martiniello and Bousetta 2003). Trading activities have strongly developed since then, and are also sided by direct investments into various economic sectors in Morocco, such as real estate. These shifts are on the one hand related to changing opportunities in Morocco, but also to generational shifts. More than in ethnic trade alone, post- migrant generations are also involved in investment in Morocco (Ibid. 2008). Lacroix and Dumont (2015) equally find how in France, highly skilled youth of Moroccan origin are interested in business opportunities in Morocco. However, they also find how in the major organizations and networks operating in this field, most members remain Moroccans born in Morocco, not those born in France (Ibid. 2015).

The contribution of expatriate Moroccans to the Moroccan economy has been a priority in Moroccan diaspora policies since their inception, and it is therefore not surprising to find that the Moroccan State has been and continues to be particularly active in this field. With regard to remittances, the Moroccan State played an important role in the formalization and management of remittances

66 flows. Concerning expatriate Moroccan's contribution to local development, there is a long tradition of engagement between Moroccan State actors on different levels and Moroccan HTAs (Iskander 2010).

For (potential) investors and entrepreneurs, programs have been launched by Moroccan diaspora institutions aiming among others at disseminating information about economic activity in Morocco, setting up transnational business networks (through digital platforms and physical meetings) for expatriate investors and entrepreneurs as well as relevant actors in Morocco, boosting cooperation, providing additional funding to investment projects, and offering individual guidance to investors.44

SOCIAL TIES: RETURN VISITS AND FAMILY FORMATION

Massive annual visits during summer to Moroccan hometowns are probably the most tangible, symbolic illustration of the Moroccan expatriate population’s maintained ties to the origin country. These “return visits,” which are also common in many other migrant populations, have been described as VFR – Visiting Friends and Family – travel or tourism (Coles and Timothy 2004). In the case of Morocco, the geographical proximity between the country of origin and the major region of destination (Europe) has facilitated this practice greatly. While in the 1960s, Moroccan labor migrants journey home took several days by car, today the majority of expatriate Moroccans can reach Morocco in less than three hours by plane. According to the Moroccan Tourism Agency, in 2017 there have been 5,484,427 border entries by expatriate Moroccans45. While no cross-country studies have been conducted on the magnitude and frequency of return visits among expatriate Moroccans, survey research in different receiving countries indicates its importance. Different studies in Belgium find that more than half of all people of Moroccan origin visit Morocco at least every year, while most others

44 I consulted a list of current initiatives by the Ministry for Moroccans Abroad on the Ministry’s website. Retrieved on July 17, 2019 (https://marocainsdumonde.gov.ma/ investissement-marocains-du-monde-mcmre/).

45 http://www.tourisme.gov.ma/fr/tourisme-en-chiffres/arrivees-des-touristes Accessed on December 12, 2018. The number of expatriate Moroccans visiting Morocco has grown persistently over the last decades: in 2000, there were less than 2,000,000 expatriate Moroccan visitors.

67 every two to three years (Vancluysen, Van Craen and Ackaert 2009; Saaf, Hida and Aghbal 2009)46. For the Netherlands, similar figures are found, with 90% saying to visit friends and families in Morocco (Snel, Engbergsen and Leerkes 2009). In France, 95,1% of all Moroccan descendants used to travel home with their parents during childhood, of which 65% annually (Bidet and Wagner 2012).

While the practice of visiting persists across generations, the form and meaning of these visits have shifted. Different from their migrant parents, (adult) post-migrant generations do not (only) visit relatives, and are no longer staying in the hometown, but also visit tourist sites across the country, adhering to a tourist logic of consumption of leisure spaces, cultural spaces and other non-essential purchases (Wagner 2008b). Clearly, shifts towards more “tourist”ways of visiting can at least partially be explained by the fact that Morocco has evolved into a major tourist destination47 with articulated, ambitious policy targets about international tourism. Post-migrant visiting practices have a profound impact on homeland-oriented ties, because “although they continue to visit ‘home,’ their conceptualization of the diasporic center of Morocco changes with each expansion of their visit there, from the family house to other spaces within the territory of Morocco” (Wagner 2008b:201). However, while ancestral family ties with (non-migrant) Moroccans may diminish in importance, the role of family ties as a motive for return trips may also take a new turn, as Morocco may become the site where the whole (expatriate) family gathers during summer, where retired migrant parents spend half of the year (and are joined there by their children and grandchildren during holidays), or where in-laws lives (due to marriage migration) (Bidet and Wagner 2012).

Visiting practices also shifted across time in terms of their timing. While summer remains the most important period of homeland visits, increasing numbers of expatriate Moroccans come at other times of the year as well, such as businessmen trading between Morocco and Europe, or retired people sharing their life between the country of their childhood and the country where their children now live (Collyer et al. 2009).

46 In these studies’ samples, both Moroccan migrants and their descendants are included, but in the analysis no distinction is made.

47 In 2017 Morocco registered in total 11,349,344 border entries by tourists, of which 52% foreigners and 48% expatriate Moroccans (http://www.tourisme.gov.ma/fr/tourisme- en-chiffres/arrivees-des-touristes). This is 2,65 times more than in 2000.

68 The Moroccan State is not indifferent towards Moroccan expatriates’ return visiting practices. This is not surprising, as migrants’ use of transport facilities, their locally oriented consumption practices, and destination choices off the beaten track of tourism in the homeland turn them into welcome visitors (Newland and Taylor 2010). Most significant here is the annual “Opération Marhaba”; a program led by the Mohammed V Solidarity Foundation and described by it as “a humanitarian mission consisting of the management of the transfer of 2.5 million Moroccans between their host countries in Europe and their home country, Morocco, during the summer season”. Under the header of this mission, traveling expatriate Moroccans are assisted during their journey to Morocco and during their stay there over summer48. Moreover, Moroccan diaspora institutions are also supporting guided group visits and organizing homeland tours, a policy practice that will be explained and analyzed in depth in Chapters 6 and 7 of this dissertation.

The practice of visiting is not a stand-alone transnational practice, as several other practices are intimately linked with return visits. For Moroccan parents — migrants as well as those with Moroccans roots — homeland visits are used as a strategy for identity building, allowing their children to practice the language and maintain family ties (Clycq 2009). During return trips, money, gifts, and goods are distributed among relatives in Morocco. Regular return trips are also an incentive to maintain or achieve land or real estate49 in Morocco, which are often family houses situated in the hometown villages, but also newly built real estate in larger urban centers.

Besides family visits and diaspora tourism, other social practices by Moroccan migrants and their descendants have been identified as “transnational” or incorporating a transnational dimension, as they can be understood as (at least partly) homeland-oriented and including tangible ties to Morocco. This is the case for the practice of seeking a partner in Morocco, widely spread not only among

48 The assistance encompasses administrative, legal as well as medical assistance. In transit regions (airports, ports, stations) and throughout Morocco, 20 temporary support centers are equipped with around 800 medical staff members and social assistants (http:// www.fm5.ma/en/marhaba).

49 Saaf, Hida and Aghbal (2009) found that more than half of all Belgian Moroccans owned property in Morocco. Remarkably, the ownership rate was higher for those born in Belgium (62%) than for those holding Moroccan citizenship only (46,6%).

69 Moroccan migrants but also among their descendants. While for post-war labor migrants, the choice for a wife from Morocco can be perceived as a continuation of previous marriage practices, transnational marriages among their descendants cannot be seen as motivated by “cultural traditions” only (Lievens 2008). The continuation of this practice across generations has been linked to parents’ preference for an (arranged) spouse from the region of origin, who consider this as a strategy to preserve “traditional” (homeland-related) values among their children (Lievens 1999). In addition, it highlights parents’ strong commitment to the origin community in Morocco, where non-migrants seek for opportunities to emigrate and family reunification has become the only legal migration route to Europe (Ibid.1999). However, over the years, Moroccan migrant children’s voice in partner choice has grown stronger (Corijn and Lodewijckx 2009). Like their parents, post- migrant Moroccans initially displayed a preference for an imported partner (Lievens 1999; Corijn and Lodewijckx 2009)50 but across time, a shift is occurring: recent data shows that while among Moroccan migrants, marriage migration remains important, for migrant descendants it is on the decline (Dupont et al. 2017). Remarkably, among migrant descendants, preferences for transnational marriage are highly gendered; men and women turn to the Moroccan marriage market for different reasons. While men hope to find an obedient woman in Morocco “unspoiled” by Western values, women seek a husband in Morocco who is less traditional and has better socio-economic prospects compared to male co- ethics in the receiving country. In addition, women opt for an imported marriage partner to free themselves of the influence of in-law family, since these remain far away (Lievens 1999; Corijn and Lodewijckx 2009)51. For both genders religiosity is also a factor of importance, as post-migrant Moroccans whose (Islamic) religious identification is stronger, are more likely to choose a transnational spouse: “Preferences for a transnational marriage may indeed be an expression of a desire for strengthening the connection to the country of origin” (Carol, Ersanilli and

50 Corijn and Lodewijcks (2009) found that in 2004 in Dutch-speaking Belgium, around 40% of 2nd generation Moroccan men between the age of 20-29 were married to a marriage migrant, while for woman, the percentage is even higher, between 50% up to 65% (with the percentage of transnational marriages inversely proportional to the women’s age). Other studies confirm that around 50% of the children of Moroccan migrants marry someone coming from Morocco (Carol, Ersanilli and Wagner 2014).

51 This motivation has also been found for Turkish women, see Timmerman, Lodewyckx & Wets (2009).

70 Wagner 2014:406). In sum, preferences for a transnational marriage may be but are not necessarily linked to the preservation of homeland traditions.

Besides the motivations behind transnational marriages, which may be “transnational” as they reflect a desire to (re)connect with the origin country, the broader impact of this practice on expatriate Moroccans’ transnational ties should be mentioned here. The concept of “immigrant replenishment” (Jimenez 2005) is useful here, that is, the understanding that most contemporary settled migrant populations continue to be “replenished” with new migrants, because the forces that initiate and sustain immigration flows appear to be permanent features of the current social, political and economic global context (Massey 1995). Immigrant replenishment “refreshes” the ethnic identity of previously arrived migrants and their descendants by the supply of “fresh” ethnic material, for instance by offering the opportunity to speak the home language, and reviving cultural and religious practices (Jimenez 2005). Arguably, transnational marriages nurture these processes, while also impacting children's socialization into the transnational field.

CULTURAL TIES: LANGUAGE AND RELIGION

Another issue associated with homeland-oriented transnational ties regards the (transmission of) language proficiency in Moroccan languages, which are Classical Arabic, Colloquial Arabic (Darija) and Berber languages such as Tarifit (Berber dialect spoken in the north of Morocco, the Rif), Tamazight (centre) and Tashelhit (south). While learning an ancestral language not necessarily has a transnational dimension, motives may include fostering the link with the homeland or facilitating contact with family and acquaintances living there during visits (Ennaji 2014; Clycq 2009). Garcia-Sanchez (2010) points at how many Moroccan migrants aim at stimulating Arabic literacy among their children, not only for religious reasons (Arabic as the language of the Qur’an52) but also to facilitate ties with other Moroccans and the “homeland”. The primary institutions involved in Arabic language learning for the children of Moroccan migrants are the family (where Colloquial Arabic or Berber languages are transmitted orally)

52 Other reasons may explain why parents pass on their Moroccan mother tongue to their children: for instance, for purely pragmatic reasons (e.g., to enable communication across generations) or for religious reasons.

71 and the mosque (where Classical Arabic is taught, with a focus on Quranic language) (El Manar Laalami 2000). According to Ennaji (2014), especially the family setting is crucial in the transmission of Moroccan languages since Colloquial Arabic and/or Berber are spoken widely in Moroccan families in Europe. In addition, more formal Arabic language education is available in the receiving countries. Here, the Moroccan State plays a role, though a relatively limited one as most Arabic language education available in the receiving countries is provided by host country institutions, not by the Moroccan State (Ennaji 2014). Notable, however, is the language program of the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans living abroad, which receives the lion’s share of this diaspora institution’s funding. Under this ELACM program (Enseignement de la Langue Arabe et de la Culture Marocaine or Education of Arabic Language and Moroccan Culture), in 2016, 522 Moroccan teachers were paid to teach around 62,399 children in different countries (mainly France, Belgium but also Spain, Italy, Germany and a few other countries). While Moroccan language acquisition happens primarily within the receiving country, homeland visits are significant too. For post-migrant Moroccans, trips to Morocco are an occasion for language- practicing (Wagner 2008c). Notwithstanding efforts by parents to transmit their mother tongue, there is a gap between migrants and their post-migrant descendants’ language proficiency53: while the first tend to master Colloquial Arabic or Berber, their children and grandchildren tend to have a good command of the receiving country language, but a weak mastery of Colloquial Arabic or Berber (Ennaji 2014).

Another domain of socio-cultural praxis by migrants that is intimately linked with the homeland, is religion. Academic scholarship has highlighted the persistent importance of Islam among second- and third-generation Muslims in Europe while indicating how this youth's religious identification differs substantially from their parents’ (Fadil 2015). However, it has been argued for European-born Muslims, and Moroccan Muslims in particular, that their religious

53 In the countries of settlement, teachers in Moroccan culture and language courses are allocated to public schools, associations, and mosques. In 2011/2012, almost 60% of these children attend extra-curricular courses in public educational institutions, around a quarter followed classes in Arabic in Moroccan migrant associations or mosques, and the remaining pupils mainly attended classes that were integrated into the receiving countries' curriculum (usually as optional subject). See: www.fh2mre.ma Last consulted on 16-1-2019.

72 orientation and practices are increasingly detached from the Islamic religious interpretations, norms, and practices prevailing in their country of origin. As such, for followers of Islam, a disaggregation of religion and (homeland) culture seems to have taken place in a diaspora context (Vertovec 2000). Whereas for migrant parents, religion and culture were largely indistinguishable terms, (some of) their children — while embracing their Muslim identity — dismiss the ethnocultural traditions related to their parents’ religiosity in their quest for the “pure” Islam (Knott and Khokher 1993). This tendency to disconnect religion and culture has been framed within a wider evolution of individualization of religious practices among Muslims born in Europe (Cesari 2009).

However, the image of the disconnection between religion and ethnicity should be nuanced somewhat. For Moroccan Muslims, the place of origin remains a significant site for the performance of cultural and religious rituals that are marking their lives’ turning points (Salih 2003). Equally, during religious celebrations (in the receiving country), Morocco often remains a point of reference for Moroccans abroad54. Besides, there is also evidence of secular or liberal Moroccan Muslims who see non-Moroccan interpretations of Islam as “unauthentic” and rather see their migrant parents' “traditional” Islam as a heritage to maintain and cherish (Fadil 2015), thus countering the above- mentioned tendency to disconnect their cultural and religious background.

The Moroccan State has tended to take a rather ambivalent position towards the religious life of its expatriate citizens. While the Moroccan State has offered a certain amount of support to the establishment of mosques, education of imams and religious instruction, the volume and reach of support has been relatively small in comparison to other Muslim countries such as Turkey (Fadil 2017). It was only under the pressure of domestic and international Islamist terrorism and under the impulse of King Mohammed VI (as the amir al-mu’minin, the Commander of the Faithful) that during last decades Morocco’s religious policies have become more pronounced, with the reinvigoration of the Higher Council of Ulema (the highest body of religious scholars) in Morocco, and the creation of the European Council for Moroccan Ulema in 2010 for Moroccans in Europe (Sunier, van der

54 For instance, during Moroccan religious feasts Moroccans all over Europe tune in to national Moroccan television channels, listening to the recitation of Quranic verses and the Moroccan king’s speech and prayers (Sunier, van der Linden & van de Bovenkamp 2016).

73 Linden and van de Bovenkamp 2016). Still, there is no particular religious policy for the expatriate Moroccans nor is religion promoted in a specific way by the Moroccan State (Ibid. 2016).

Rather than understanding Moroccan religious life among expatriate Moroccans as being defined by the origin country and state, the religious experiences of European Moroccans can be positioned at the intersection of shifting theological and geo-political transformations that implicate not only the Moroccan State, but other Muslim states (such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan), European states and non-state transnational agents found within the Moroccan sphere, such as the Islamist al-Adl wal-Ihsane55 association, or elsewhere (Fadil 2017; Darif 2010; Contreras and Martinez 2015). In sum, while Morocco continues to play a role in post-migrant Moroccans religious lives in various ways; links between prevailing Islamic identifications among expatriate Moroccans and their homeland-oriented identities are more ambiguous.

POLITICAL TIES: DUAL NATIONALITY, CITIZENSHIP, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The vast majority of people with a Moroccan background holds Moroccan nationality56. This is because the Moroccan Nationality Code is based on the ius sanguinis principle, which implies that all children of Moroccan parents automatically acquire Moroccan nationality irrespective of their place of residence. Moreover, it is not possible to renounce this nationality (Sunier, van der Linden & van de Bovenkamp 2016). The majority of expatriate Moroccans hold both Moroccan nationality as the nationality of the residence country, though actual rates of dual nationality may vary among others due to variations in receiving country’s citizenship regulations and in the composition of local

55 Justice and Spirituality

56 Before the introduction in 2003 of the modern Moroccan family law, the Mudawana, a notable exception were the children of mixed marriages between Moroccan women and foreign men: they were not entitled to Moroccan citizenship. However, from 2003 on this category is also included.

74 Moroccan communities (more established vs. a newcomer population)57. In terms of their citizenship rights, no formal legal distinction is made between Moroccan nationals in Morocco and those living abroad; they are entitled to full citizenship rights58.

Based on their access to Moroccan citizenship and nationality, the formal relationship between expatriate Moroccans and the Moroccan State and nation seems consolidated, even across generations. However, this inclusive application of nationality and citizenship status for Moroccan emigrants and their descendants is not paired by actual political membership for expatriate Moroccans. Despite being confirmed in the 2011 Constitution, external voting rights are not implemented. More than subjects of policy, Moroccan expatriate citizens are seen as objects of policy (Contreras and Martinez 2015).

Resultantly, opportunities for political participation to the formal political sphere in Morocco are severely curtailed. Small numbers of expatriate Moroccans are member of the foreign branches of Moroccan political parties. However, most Moroccan parties have tended to show minimal interest in emigrants, for strategic- electoral reasons (Bousetta and Martiniello 2003; Mahieu 2009).59 This disinterest is mutual, as many expatriate Moroccans do not believe that change in Morocco can be realized through party politics and the political system more generally. As in many countries in the global South, in Morocco, informal political processes are more powerful than the formal electoral system (Lyons and Mandaville 2010).

Rather than realizing the political participation of expatriate Moroccans through the ballot, the Moroccan State has promoted a logic of (non-binding) consultation and created various forums and institutions for this purpose. The CCME (Conseil de la Communauté Marocaine à l'étranger), created in 2007, is a consultative body that aims at bridging the gap between the Moroccan government

57 Dronkers & Vink (2010) estimate that 2 out of 3 expatriate Moroccans have dual nationality.

58 Article 17 of the 2011 Constitution states that "Les Marocains résidant à l'étranger jouissent des droits de pleine citoyenneté”.

59 Bousetta and Martiniello (2003:102) see a sharp contrast with other labor migrations: “L’immigration marocaine en Belgique, contrairement à l’immigration italienne, espagnole ou turque ne se caractérise pas par un haut degré d’encadrement par les partis politiques du pays d’origine.”

75 and the Moroccan expatriate population. However, from the beginning, the CCME’s legitimacy has been undermined by the lack of transparency in the choice of its members (Mahieu 2009). Moreover, Moroccan intellectuals and Moroccan community figures see the Council as an indirect way to curb or eliminate aspirations for political participation in Morocco among expatriate Moroccans (Contreras and Martinez 2015).

Despite barriers, specific groups within the expatriate population engage in Moroccan politics, though outside the formal political sphere. For instance, leftist and far-leftist Moroccan movements uphold a tradition of militantism and resistance against the Moroccan elites in power. However, these movements are anchored in (former) student migration (mainly to France and French-speaking Belgium), and few post-migrant Moroccans participate in them (Martiniello and Bousetta 2003). Dumont (2016) argues too that these forms of transnational anti- regime political activism are on the decline, and that over time most expatriate Moroccan organizations have abandoned the struggle against the Moroccan regime and shifted their focus to “development”. An example demonstrating the relatively low political engagement of Moroccans can be found in the 20 February protests in 2011, which mobilized the masses throughout Morocco, but in which expatriate Moroccan organizations did not play a significant role, “merely acting as an echo-chamber towards the migrant communities” (Dumont 2016:257).

In sum, while diversity in transnational practices and identifications across the Moroccan expatriate population is vast, some major themes emerge; themes that are also picked up in Moroccan State discourses (see Chapters 4 and 5). In addition, it has been demonstrated how expatriate Moroccans’ emotional and spiritual connections to Morocco are paired by tangible practices leading to massive flows of money, goods and people to the “homeland”. Finally, it clear how the Moroccan State intervenes in this transnational field, though with differing intensity.

76 77 78 CHAPTER 3:

RESEARCH QUESTIONS, DESIGN, AND APPROACH

79 80 SYNOPSIS

This chapter aims at crystallizing the research focus and approach. It first outlines the research questions, and then describes how they are approached in terms of research design (a single-case study). Then, the research methodology is outlined, explaining for what purpose distinctive qualitative methods have been chosen. Finally, as knowledge production is always relational and situated, I consider it important to reflect on my researcher positionality.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DESIGN

The first chapter has made clear that the field of diaspora policy studies, as a relatively new domain of study, offers opportunities for theoretical innovation. This dissertation engages critically with one particular issue: the state of origin’s approach to the foreign-born descendants of their emigrants. The four particular research questions driving my investigation are:

a) To what extent are emigrant descendants considered a special target group in the origin state’s diaspora policy approach? How is this expressed? b) If distinctive diaspora policy strategies are used to target this group, how can we understand the shape of these strategies? c) How are these diaspora policy strategies understood and legitimized by the actors creating and implementing them? d) How do emigrant descendants respond to those policy strategies?

The nature of the research questions has a profound impact on research design and methodology. Three points are central here. First, as descriptive evidence on the topic is scarce, an important goal of the research is to offer a rich, in-depth description of the policies observed. This is reflected by research question (a) in particular. Second, the research questions are driven by an interest in understanding the meanings attributed to the diaspora policies in place. A key element is the juxtaposition of different perspectives on diaspora policies, that is, views of those who make and execute them, on the one hand, and those who are

81 targeted by them, on the other. This interest in different perspectives is reflected in research questions (c) and (d). Third, as theory on the particular research topic is underdeveloped, the study engages in (inductive) theory-generation rather than (deductive) theory-testing. This is reflected in all research questions, as none is based on a priori theoretical assumptions.

To attend to all of these points, I consider an in-depth single-case study as the most appropriate approach. Broadly speaking, a case study can be considered “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context using various sources of evidence” (Robson 2002:179). A more specific definition has been offered by Gerring (2004), who described a single-case study as

“An intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units [whereas] a unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon—e.g., a nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person—observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time.” (2004:342)

As this definition points out, while a case study focuses on a demarcated phenomenon in a particular setting, its explanatory reach always aims to go beyond the case studied. The unit of analysis selected here is “Moroccan diaspora policies,” to be understood as official policies of Moroccan state agents targeting the expatriate Moroccan population. This case belongs to the wider class of similar policies that can be found in a broad range of countries worldwide (see Chapter 1). While it is clear from Chapter 2 how Moroccan diaspora policies are rooted in a particular political context and migration history, many aspects are not unique (e.g., authoritarian political context, labor migration history), opening up opportunities for comparison across cases. Importantly, the case under study is state policies, not an (expatriate) population, a society or a country. Therefore, if any claims for comparison or generalization are made, these are limited to the field of diaspora policies.

82 As any research design60, single case studies have their strengths and weaknesses. A major strength of single case studies is the depth of analysis they offer, due to their ability to study real-life phenomena in context. They are particularly suited for theory-generation (Gerring 2004:345), while they also allow for a rich, contextualized description of emergent or understudied phenomena. I follow Kapiszewski, Maclean and Read (2015) who argue that

“[…] descriptive aspects of research projects are far more significant than the general sense of opprobrium that lingers around the word ‘description’ would suggest. Particularly in understudied contexts, such as those emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule — but actually just about everywhere — documentation and analytic description are crucial to the social science enterprise.” (2015:21)

Throughout my interaction with fellow migration scholars as well as broader (academic and non-academic) audiences, I found that there was a general ignorance regarding the type of diaspora policy strategies I was studying. For instance, when describing my fieldwork in the Summer Universities (see Chapters 6 and 7), my audience was in the first place interested in detailed descriptive accounts of “what was happening there”. According to Gerring (2004), “overreporting,” that is, to report all facts and hypothesis that could be relevant, should be seen as a matter of good practice “since it is difficult to tell which features of a given unit are typical of a larger set of units (and hence, fodder for generalizable inferences) and which are particular to the unit under study” (2004:346). In sum, well-informed, empirically grounded reflections on particular cases are of paramount importance to nurture scholarly debate, especially in an emergent field such as the domain of diaspora policy studies.

Single-case studies’ focus on the particular, however, implies that they may not easily support generalization to other settings. Their findings are often considered as unrepresentative for the larger population of cases they belong to; as such, their external validity is argued to be low (Yin 2009). However, case study proponents have argued that this critique is based on a limited, positivist

60 As Gerring (2004) noted, “Research design invariably faces a choice between knowing more about less, and knowing less about more.” (2004:348)

83 understanding of “generalization,” and on a conflation of the notion of a “sample” with a “case”:

“Case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a "sample," and in doing a case study, your goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).” (Yin 2009:15)

Burawoy (1998) has argued that positivist understandings of generalization are limited, because they leave out a more reflexive understanding, based on dialogue and contextualization of findings (Burawoy 1998:16). To avoid confusion of different approaches to generalization, Guba and Lincoln (1989) rather prefer to speak of “transferability” instead of “generalizability” in qualitative research.

Beside theoretical considerations, practical considerations such as limitations in research time, resources and my capabilities as a researcher, need to be taken into account when making research design decisions. To guarantee the quality of my research — especially considering my “outsider” position in some respects (see the last section of this chapter) – I found it important to reserve sufficient time to immerse myself into the research field. I did this in different ways, among others by taking courses in Moroccan Arabic language for over one year, doing explorative interviews with Belgians of Moroccan descent, and visiting several Morocco-related events in Belgium and the Netherlands. I could have never realized a similar approach for multiple cases. Moreover, I traveled to Morocco four times, something that would have been difficult to replicate in a multiple-case design due to budgetary constraints.

An important matter in case study design regards the justification of the case choice, as the position of the case within the broader population of case units defines to what extent findings are relevant to other settings. Case choice is always guided by both theory and pragmatic elements: the case needs the ability to illuminate the research questions, on the one hand, but the researcher needs access to sufficient data, on the other hand (Yin 2009). With regard to the theoretical criterion, Yin (2013) distinguishes 5 possible rationales for case choice in single- case design: cases can be selected because they are considered a “critical

84 case” (meeting all the conditions to test a well-formulated theory), an “extreme case” (having an exceptional, rare quality), a “common case” (representative for the wider population), a “revelatory case” (uncover a phenomenon previously inaccessible to social scientists), or a “longitudinal case” (studying a single case at different points in time).

Based on the information I had at the outset of the research project, I approached Moroccan diaspora policies as a “revelatory case,” assuming that it would help me to reveal an aspect of diaspora policies that had not been properly studied before. Two major elements underpinned my assumptions: first, I noted how the Moroccan State seemed to have an interest in the post-migrant segment of its expatriate population (which assured me that this case would help me to illuminate the research questions), and second, it has been illustrated by other scholars how Moroccan occupies a pioneering role in the field of diaspora policies (which convinced me that this was an appropriate case for investigating original or innovative policy practices). As these elements are treated more elaborately elsewhere in this dissertation (for instance, in Chapter 4, “Research Design and Methodology,” in Chapter 6 “Introduction”) I will not expand on them here.

Beside theoretical motivations, other factors played a role in the case selection. First, being based at a Belgian university, it seemed beneficial to select a case linked somehow to Belgium, as this would facilitate my access to the field. This applies to the Moroccan case since people of Moroccan origin constitute the largest population of non-European origin in Belgium (429,000), including a large group of Belgian-born citizens of Moroccan descent (55%) (see Chapter 2). The size of this population is also reflected by the presence of official Moroccan institutions (Moroccan consulates and embassy) as potential points of entrance to my research field. Second, I had conducted research before on the Moroccan diaspora policies on the one hand, and youth of Moroccan origin, on the other. A few years before the start of my PhD research, I had written a master’s thesis on the external political rights of Moroccan emigrants (Mahieu 2009). Later, I was involved in a project on the school careers of ethnic minorities in Flanders, during which I conducted qualitative research with (among other groups) Flemish youngsters of Moroccan origin. Both studies allowed me to build up some basic familiarity with the case at hand, though from different perspectives. Third, given my aim to conduct an in-depth study, it seemed most feasible to opt for a case where the language barrier was not insurmountable. While I do not master

85 Morocco’s native languages, the widespread usage of French in Moroccan society (e.g., in education, in policy and business environments, in media) would allow me to gather the data I needed.

Within the case of Moroccan diaspora policies, I decided to focus on a particular initiative: the Summer Universities. This decision for this focus came relatively late (after the first year of my PhD scholarship), as I only found out gradually about this specific initiative. In the two chapters on the Summer Universities (Chapters 6 and 7) I elaborate on the motivation for this focus. In brief, as one of the flagships of Moroccan diaspora policies, particularly targeting young Moroccans born abroad, I consider it as a program that helps me to illuminate my research questions.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

As explained above, the research questions are “how” and “what” questions: they aim at explaining a particular type of policies while also unraveling the meaning attributed to them by different groups of people. Given this focus, a qualitative methodology seems most fitted here (Maxwell 2009). Following the logic of exploratory research, the methodological framework was not strongly predefined, but modified as the research unfolded and research opportunities arose61. Therefore, while the research design and case choice were defined at the outset of the research, the particular qualitative methods or field sites were not. For instance, the option of doing political ethnography during the Summer Universities only emerged when I gained access to this field site (see below). In the end, multiple qualitative data collection methods have been used: political ethnography (including participant observation, informal conversations, and an open-ended questionnaire), elite and non-elite interviews, and desk research. The choice of different methods was not only as a means to capture different aspects of

61 A potential danger of an unstructured methodology are field goggles: “a tunnel vision driving the scholar to focus on gathering of information and putting all effort in resolving the challenges that attend that quest — without considering the added value” (Kapiszewski, D., L. M. Maclean and B. L. Read 2015:357). This was especially important, as finding access to relevant people (for interviewing) and field sites (for observation) was time-consuming. Aware of this danger, I attempted to strike a good balance between collecting data through different methods, on the hand, and analyzing it carefully, on the other.

86 the diaspora policies under study but also as a way of overcoming the weakness of single-method research. The triangulation of different methods is a well-known strategy to reduce systematic bias due to the use of a specific method (Maxwell 2009). In addition, the use of particular methods was also informed by the level of access I gained to the field. Below I briefly address each of the methods, while more information on how this data has been used in my analysis can be found in each empirical chapter respectively.

POLITICAL ETHNOGRAPHY

A central period of data collection for this dissertation was my participation in the Moroccan Summer Universities in August 2013. My participation in this diaspora policy program reflects an “ethnographic” approach to state policies, “ethnography” here referring to

“Social research based on the close-up, on-the-ground observation of people and institutions in real time and space, in which the investigator embeds herself near (or within) the phenomenon so as to detect how and why agents on the scene act, think and feel the way they do.” (Wacquant 2003:5)

While ethnography has been taking a central position in the study of culture for a long time (e.g., Rabinow [1977] 2007), in the study of (formal) politics — states, nations, social movements, etc., — it is relatively new. Differently, older studies on authority and power were often more interested in informal processes and institutions, rather than formal ones. One of the major merits of ethnography is that it helps to flesh out or call into question, generalizations and abstractions that dominate the political (democracy, freedom, state, citizenship, etc.) but that are often not grounded in micro-level evidence (Schatz 2009:10). Also,

“While previous studies of politics used broad strokes to paint the picture of political life, political ethnography allows the researcher to bring up the mundane details that can affect politics, providing a ‘thick description’ where one was missing.” (Baiocchi and Connor 2008:141)

87 Baiocchi and Connor (2008) have discerned three distinctive understandings of an “ethnographic gaze” on politics: it can mean that institutions or other political actors are studied using ethnographic methods, it can indicate a focus on people’s encounters with formal institutions and political actors, and third, it can mean a focus on other types of lived experiences of the political, which remain commonly invisible (such as political apathy, or political engagement outside of formal politics). In this study, I refer to the second meaning in particular (that is, political ethnography as a focus on real-life encounters between origin state bureaucracies and (expatriate) citizens) as I consider the Summer Universities as a space of encounter and communication between Moroccan state actors designing and implementing Moroccan diaspora policies, on the one hand, and young expatriate Moroccans, on the other.

Besides its focus on formal political institutions, the ethnographic approach used in this study is also distinctive in terms of its relatively short duration. This approach has been described as "focused ethnography" (Knoblauch 2005) and has been mainly used by ethnographers outside the realm of anthropology, such as in sociology. Compared to conventional (cultural) ethnography, field-visits are shorter and data collection more intensive, targeted and prepared. Commonly, focused ethnography takes place in settings or with populations having a certain familiarity with the researcher (Wahl 2014). Different from extensive ethnography, in focused ethnography the researcher knows to a certain extent what is going to happen and can, subsequently, prepare for and conduct the fieldwork more efficiently. This applied to my fieldwork in the Summer Universities in 2013 because I interviewed several ex-participants before, I was familiar with the organizing institution (the Ministry) and I had spent quite some time in the region (Tétouan) before62. Data collection was highly intensive during the Summer Universities, as I collected a large amount of data during a relatively short time (approximately 2 weeks)63. Besides “traditional” written field notes (noted down during activities throughout the day), I also recorded oral debriefings (recorded during free moments

62 Besides, the format of a summer school also felt somewhat familiar: as a doctoral student, I attended various (academic) summer schools myself — equally involving social interaction between participants, lectures, common meals, etc.

63 Because I shared my bedroom with 4 other participants, and the Summer Universities program was very full, data collection was happening all day long and every day of the program.

88 throughout the day and at night) leading to a 100-page transcript of field notes. These notes include thick descriptions of the setting, the program content, participants, social dynamics between people, as well as numerous informal conversations with most of the Summer University participants.

While there are various reasons to prefer focused ethnography over a more extensive ethnography (for a discussion, see Knoblauch 2005), the major reason for me to draw on this approach was related to the transient nature of my ethnographic field site, the Summer Universities. The Summer Universities are a temporary field site as they are an event taking place during a strongly delineated period (2 weeks every summer), at a particular location (a University campus and its surroundings) with different participants every time. Because the field site “dissolves” after the Summer Universities have taken place, different from “traditional” field sites such as a village, there is no option of a re-visit afterward. Moreover, due to the non-public and political nature of the program, entry to this field site is restricted. It took me more than three months of negotiations at different levels and a more than a bit of good luck before my access was secured by an official permit to research the program64.

64 First, in May 2013 I tried to get access via one of the hosting universities. As I visited the Université Mohammed V Agbal (Rabat) before and had a good contact person there, I hoped to get permission to participate in this way. However, this did not work out as the Summer Universities that year were only based in two other locations (Tétouan and Agadir), something that was communicated by the MCMRE only at a much later stage (in early communication five universities, including Rabat, were mentioned). Second, from June 2013 on, I contacted several persons at the Ministry directly. The standard answer from my main contact person (the person in charge of organizing the Summer Universities) was that he passed my request to his superior and that he was awaiting his permission. However, after waiting for another month, and being frustrated by many unanswered emails and calls in the meantime, I decided to try a third route: my previously established contacts at the Moroccan consulate and in the local Moroccan community in Belgium. In addition, as a fourth strategy, I tried to register as a regular participant via the regular route (an on-line application form), hoping that this would bring my case again to the attention of the Ministry. Finally, after weeks of communication between the consul and the chairman of a Belgian Moroccan mosque, on the one hand, and the Ministry, on the other, I got official permission to participate in the Summer Universities. The consul assured me that this was a difficult process, because “normally non-Moroccans cannot participate” however, he insisted by saying “she is a good researcher” and “her research will be valuable”. Even after this message, my communication with the Ministry remained difficult. For instance, it was only a few days before the actual start of the program that I learned to which city I would go: Tétouan. In addition, it was at the first day of the Summer Universities only that I got approval for taking a questionnaire among the participants.

89 Therefore, I wanted to get the most out of my participation. Under such conditions, I could simply not afford “hanging around and drinking tea,” strategies that are often deemed essential to the ethnographic enterprise in anthropology (Rabinow [1977] 2007). Instead, I needed to adopt a far more focused approach to ethnography. Others too have found that conventional understandings of ethnography were inappropriate to their new research fields, questions or purposes (e.g., leading to multi-sited ethnography) and that therefore, methodological innovation of ethnographic praxis was required (Wall 2014).

As it was not possible to talk extensively with all participants (N=51) due to time constraints, I decided to use an additional research method: an open-ended paper questionnaire65 distributed at the end of the Summer University program. It focussed on three themes: the profile of the participants, their (previous) transnational practices and their assessment of and experience with the Summer Universities program (See Annex 4). In combination with the observational data and informal conversations, this data allows for a more complete description of the participants’ backgrounds and viewpoints. Moreover, the questionnaire was sent out via mail to two other Summer Universities66.

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

Besides ethnographic methods, I also used interviewing as a primary data collection method. Most of the interviews I conducted can be described as “elite” or “expert” interviews, as a distinctive type of in-depth qualitative interviews. Different from other types of interviews, the interviewee is given a “specialized and nonstandard treatment [because] the investigator is willing, and often eager to let the interviewee teach him what the problem, the question, the situation is” (Dexter 2006:19). It is mainly associated within the discipline of political science, where this type of interviewing has been used for “people in important or exposed positions [who] may require VIP interviewing treatment on the topics which relate to their importance or exposure” (Ibid. 2006:18).

65 The participants in Tétouan in 2013 received a paper version on the penultimate day of the program. For participants in Agadir (in 2013 and 2014), an electronic version was sent around.

66 In Agadir in 2013, and in Agadir in 2014

90 A major motivation for using elite interviews was the scarcity of other sources that could help me to get insight into the rationalities of Moroccan diaspora policies concerning emigrants' descendants. This scarcity may be related to the generally limited policy transparency of Moroccan public institutions, on the one hand (see Chapter 2), and to capacity problems, on the other (e.g., lack of resources to maintain a decent website or archive). Moreover, available Moroccan diaspora policy documents were often insufficiently addressing my specific research topic: while useful for a description of policies, they would not teach me more about the underlying logic. Therefore, I decided to use elite interviews as a strategy to circumvent these problems.

During two research visits, one in the spring of 2013 and one in the spring of 2014, I conducted interviews with 15 people employed at different Moroccan diaspora institutions or involved in the implementation of Moroccan diaspora policies. I conducted interviews in four different locations, including three diaspora institutions: at the Moroccan Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad, I conducted seven interviews with six officials. At the Hassan II Foundation (in 2013 and 2014), I conducted four interviews with staff members. At the CCME, I conducted one interview with the coordinator. Finally, at the Abdelmalek Essaâdi University (Tétouan), the educational institution that implemented the Summer Universities program during most of its editions including the one I observed in summer 2013, I also conducted four interviews with staff members.

Characteristic for elite interviews is that no standard interview guidelines are used67; instead, these are tailored to the respondent's expertise or function. Preparation is especially important: the interviewer needs to be well informed beforehand, (s)he needs to have a good command of facts when entering an interview, and interview time is more limited (see also Lilliker 2003). Therefore, for each respondent, I prepared a particular interview guideline based on a priori information about this respondent's position in his/her organization and the particular policy program(s) he/she was involved in68. Besides, during the

67 Because each topic list is particular, for the elite interviews no generic topic list is included in the annex.

68 For example, for the long-standing secretary-general of the Foundation Hassan II, the topic list included questions historical evolutions, while for the financial manager of the Summer Universities, questions focussed on the practical organization of the Summer Universities.

91 interviews, more than in semi-structured interviews, I was open to additional topics raised by the interviewees.

With regard to sampling, elite interviewing implies a distinct approach because

“It is frequently the case that the total population of interviewees is too small to sample from, and/or some of the most important members of the ‘elite’ are secluded behind a dense foliage of gated compounds, security guards, personal assistants and lawyers which is virtually impenetrable to the average academic researcher.” (Gamlen 2012:329)

Therefore, rather than representativity, in elite interviewing, the central issue is getting access to relevant respondents. The importance of hierarchical organizational structuring in Moroccan society impelled me to contact or interview people in leading positions first and to ask for their permission to interview others in their organization. In the cases of the Ministry and the Hassan II Foundation, entrance to those institutions was facilitated by mediators (the chair of a Moroccan mosque in Belgium, the Consul of the Moroccan Consulate in Antwerp, and a Moroccan university professor in Rabat). In addition, the fact that I contributed to a publication of the Hassan II Foundation created benevolence towards me69. However, the hierarchical organizational structure worked restrictively in terms of the number of interviews, as I was forced to stop interviewing when the gatekeeper (a leading person) decided that I had collected "enough" information, and therefore refused entry to other (lower-ranked) colleagues. There were exceptions though: I approached two respondents successfully via other routes (one via a shared acquaintance in Morocco, and one directly via e-mail).

In the analysis of the interview material, I considered the individual narratives mainly as expressions of the rationalities of the diaspora institutions in which they are embedded. However, I also acknowledge that respondents’ narratives are also shaped by their personal experiences and viewpoints and their particular positions within their respective institutions. For my research purposes, I decided it would be most relevant to focus on commonalities across individual

69 Mahieu, R. (2014)

92 accounts and, in addition, on inter-institutional variety (see Chapter 4). In contrast, I do not focus on intra-institutional differences in perspectives or tensions between these viewpoints. However, I also noted how divergency within institutions seemed rather limited, since different respondents from the same institutions were mainly echoing each others' narratives.

Besides the above interviews, I also conducted a smaller number of in-depth non-elite interviews with ex-participants of the Summer Universities (6). For these interviews, I used a snowball sampling, starting with an ex-participant I got to know via an employee at the Moroccan consulate in Hoboken (Antwerp), resulting in interviews with 3 female and 3 male students. These interviews aimed to allow me to prepare my fieldwork in the Summer Universities. They focus on grasping the participants’ experiences, on the one hand, and the structure and content of the program, on the other (see Annex 3). However, as the interviews turned out to be rich in information, I also used them as complementary research data to my ethnographic data on the Summer Universities (in Chapter 7).

DESK RESEARCH

In addition to the above-mentioned primary data collection methods, my analyses also rely on documentary data which I collected from 2012 to 2016. This data can be roughly divided into 4 types: (1) Royal Speeches (Discours Royaux) of current king Mohammed VI and late king Hassan II, (2) News articles and press statements on Moroccan diaspora policies published in Moroccan (francophone) media (such as l’Opinion, Telquel, Liberation, L’Economiste, le Matin, Aujourd’hui Le Maroc) (3) Website content from the three major Moroccan diaspora institutions (MCMRE: marocainsdumonde.gov.ma, CCME: ccme.org.ma, FHII: fh2mre.ma) (4) Policy briefs, policy presentations and internal policy documents published by the Moroccan diaspora institutions, obtained via these websites or by contacting these institutions in person.

In my search for information, I looked for two types of information: on the one hand, I was interested in generic information regarding Moroccan diaspora policies, allowing me to understand the “bigger picture”, while on the other hand, I was on the outlook for specific data in relation to my research questions, i.e., about how Moroccan diaspora policies take into account the growing post-migrant

93 segment in their expatriate population. If I used search engines, I used search terms such as MRE, CME or MDM (the most frequently used French denominators for expatriate Moroccans) in combination with terms such as “génération,” “étudiant” or “jeune,” because these refer at post-migrant Moroccans.

Documentary data was helpful in different ways. First, it allowed me to familiarize with the research topic more broadly and prepare elite interviews properly (see above). Second, it helped me to understand my primary data better, as my (elite) respondents’ answers often referred to broader strategic policy agenda’s and especially to the Royal Speeches in their answers. Third, it complemented the primary data, for instance, as it allowed additional (elite) voices to be taken into consideration in my analysis, such as elite members to whom getting access was excluded such as Ministers or the King himself.

REFLECTIONS ON MY RESEARCHER POSITIONALITY

An important matter is how my positionality impacts upon my research project, most notably, the conduction of fieldwork, including access to the field and data collection. The notion of “reflexivity” has been used to describe this mutual influence of researcher and researcher subject on each other (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).

Of all types of academic inquiry, ethnography is probably the approach where researchers become most strongly aware of their situated position in the field under study and the impact this eventually has on knowledge production. However, as Voloder and Kirpitchenko (2009:13) note “Knowledge is always relational and situational (which) highlights the institutional, historical and political situatedness of scholarly work”. Acknowledging that it is “impossible to identify the precise effect scholars’ position and personal interactions have on the data they collect […] nonetheless, and regardless of whether scholars perceive their positionality to be a help or a hindrance, they should do what they can to critically reflect on their role in the field site and its impact on their data.” (Kapiszewski, Maclean and Read 2015:260-261)

The researcher’s position should not be understood as static and predefined, rather, in the research process “researchers and participants are involved in a

94 dialectical process in constituting selves and mobilizing identities” (Voloder and Kirpitchenko 2009:14; Van Mol et al. 2014). As Rabinow ([1977] 2007:162) argues, the “otherness” of researcher and respondent should not be understood as an “ineffable essence,” but rather as the sum of different historical experiences. Fieldwork in other cultures then becomes an “intersubjective construction of liminal modes of communication,” because it involves different subjects who are not sharing a common set of assumptions, experiences, or traditions (Ibid. [1977] 2007:155).

As I also argued elsewhere together with my colleagues (Van Mol et al. 2014), researchers’ positionality is not static, but constantly shifting and being renegotiated in the multiplicity of contexts discovered in the field. We described this process as “dancing the tango between insiderness and outsiderness”. This was also the case in my fieldwork in Morocco. While my characteristics remained largely70 the same throughout my data collection, my positionality altered depending on the particular field site I was entering or the person I was interacting within this field site.

As a starting point for this reflective exercise, I can summarize my position with regard to my research topic (Moroccan diaspora policies) and the research participants (expatriate Moroccans as well as local (i.e., non-expatriate) Moroccans) with following list of identity markers: I am female, a young adult, highly educated, academic, non-religious, (Western) European and (Flemish) Belgian. Besides, by my interlocutors, I was identified as not Moroccan, Arabic nor Berber and non-Muslim71.

I will now first briefly recall examples of how interlocutors showed their awareness of these markers, and how these affected my fieldwork. In my reflection on my positionality in this research project, comparison with previous research experiences with youth with Moroccan or other migration backgrounds, as well as

70 The only significant personal change throughout my PhD was my motherhood. While this affected my sense of self, this did not seem to affect the content of my fieldwork; only its pace and my planning. During my last fieldwork trip, I was 4 months pregnant, but most participants were not aware of this.

71 This is a non-exhaustive list, it only includes markers that were in my perspective the most relevant ones. Important to add here is that throughout my research, I never engaged in undercover research, so I never concealed aspects of my identity deliberately to my respondents.

95 other fieldwork (in Belgium and Morocco) have been important to assess the weight of certain factors, and the importance of circumstances. To avoid long- windedness, I will not elaborate on earlier research experiences, however, some of these previous experiences have been described in an earlier publication outside of the scope of this dissertation (Van Mol et al. 2014).

Concerning my appearance, upon a first encounter, my Moroccan respondents always identified me immediately as someone having no ancestral link to Morocco; no confusion at all seemed possible here. While the people I met were usually not able to allocate a nationality to me (“German? Dutch, maybe?”), from my general appearance (skin color, clothing style) it was obvious to them I originated in a Western country, probably North-West Europe. This was a correct observation on their side: I do not have Moroccan nationality, nor do I have roots tracing back to Morocco (or to any other African or Arabic country, for that matter). Besides, I also do not have Moroccan in-laws. As a result, I do not have a personal stake in Moroccan expatriate issues. Based on this information, it is tempting to conclude I am simply an “outsider” to my field of study and informants.

However, a unidimensional understanding of positionality, taking ethnocultural background as the single factor to define the researchers’ position vis-à-vis the research subject has been criticized, as other factors such as gender, age and education are crucial to grasp the researcher-participant relationship (Cukut Krilić 2011; Van Mol et al. 2014). More generally, as Schatz (2009) argues “membership in any community or category comes in shades of gray”. I will now discuss in what ways my position as an “outsider” should be nuanced, by looking into the effects of some other identity markers during fieldwork.

A first way of how my non-Moroccanness did not necessarily position me as a complete “outsider,” is related to the geography of Moroccan migration and more broadly, Moroccan long-standing linkages with Europe (see Chapter 2). Through migration, almost every Moroccan has family members or acquaintances living in Europe. Therefore, whenever I mentioned I was Belgian (something I introduced myself with, to satisfy interlocutors’ curiosity on this matter), my nationality sparked recognition rather than estrangement. In Morocco, I met Moroccans who visited or studied in Belgium, others whose family was living there, others who mastered some Dutch. Moroccan respondents often were

96 informed about certain issues happening in Belgium, raising topics such as the problematized condition of Moroccans living in the Brussels neighborhood of Molenbeek72, the Flemish/Walloon political divide. As such, they were able to appeal to my Belgian identity. Due to the fact I am Flemish (something obvious from my French accent), and therefore, Dutch-speaking, I often had similar conversations about the Netherlands too (most notably, on Dutch politician Geert Wilders’ controversial discourses on Moroccans73). My position as an “outsider” was even more blurred when I was conversing with expatriate Moroccans from Belgium or other European countries. For instance, during the Summer Universities, when I talked with a Flemish Moroccan boy, he regularly referred to our shared background. Other post-migrant Moroccan respondents also took for granted how I, as a European, would share some of their “European” viewpoints on Morocco (see Chapter 7). In sum, the fact I am a citizen of one of the major destination countries of Moroccans emigration (Belgium), reveals I am less a complete “outsider” to expatriate Moroccan matters than one would estimate at first. This was far from a marginal issue, as receiving countries’ immigrant policies and political discourses were often discussed in interviews and, moreover, criticized by the respondents. Aware that I, as a Belgian citizen, was somehow associated with these policies and politics, I made sure to distance myself from them (and especially, of assimilationist and extreme-right tendencies there), mainly by sympathizing with the respondents' views. I used the latter strategy more generally (so not only to alter the respondent's perception of me) since “a general sympathy for interlocutors is nonetheless the hallmark of ethnography” (Schatz 2009:7).

Concerning religion, from my respondents’ way of approaching this topic it was clear they assumed me to be non-Muslim (which they deduced from a combination of my ethnicity, way of dressing and behavior). Often they thought it to be necessary to explain some basic Islamic knowledge to me when the topic was addressed in interviews or informal conversations. However, apart from this, the

72 All of my fieldwork took place before the terror attacks in France (13 November 2015) and Belgium (22 March 2016), when Molenbeek came perceived in international media as the safe haven for Islamist terrorists.

73 On 19 March 2014, PVV-chairman Wilders asked the audience during a post- election meeting with his followers if they wanted “more” or “less” Moroccans. When the audience started chanting "Less! Less!", Wilders replied, "Then we are going to fix it".

97 fact I was a non-Muslim did not seem to affect my fieldwork or data collection very much. This has, first, probably to do with the (secular) nature of my research focus: if I had chosen a research focus on religious affairs, and had sought entrance to religious field sites, I would have encountered more obstacles as these are often more secluded. Second, it also has to do with the way religion is dealt with in the public sphere in Morocco, and especially with the generally relaxed attitude towards foreign non-Muslims. For foreigners, it is not expected to dress or behave according to Muslim codes. Doing the same fieldwork in other Muslim countries (such as Saudi-Arabia or Iran), my non-Muslim status — especially in combination with my status as a young, unmarried woman, traveling alone — might have been more complicated. Important to mention, however, is how different identity markers always operate in an interwoven manner. For instance, how my religion was approached, was linked strongly to my ethnicity. It is therefore due to the intersection of my non-Muslim identity with a white-European ethnicity that made it unquestioned and unproblematized74.

With regard to researcher positionality, language is an important marker too. In terms of Arabic language knowledge, I learned the basics of Darija, the Moroccan colloquial language during a one-year evening course in Belgium (2011– 2012) and a two-week summer course in Morocco (2012). This turned out to be useful, for social reasons — as the fact that I was learning Darija was welcomed with pleasure and esteem, as a tacit proof of my profound interest in Moroccan culture — as well as more substantially, as it allowed me sometimes to grasp the essence of a conversation or lecture, allowing me to ask for clarification afterward. However, my knowledge was insufficient to allow me to enter in conversations, let alone doing interviews in Darija. Resultantly, whenever people around me were conversing in Darija, this turned me into an outsider. On a practical level, this meant that I needed to rely on other people’s goodwill to translate or to switch to a shared language. Remarkably, my linguistic outsiderness was somewhat mitigated in the context of the Summer Universities by fact that quite some of the other participants’ proficiency in Darija was very limited too. In addition, just like me, most did not understand and read Modern Standard Arabic. Resultantly, rather

74 Contrarily if I had been of Moroccan background, my non-religious status would have been more contested. Equally, if I had been a European Islamic convert wearing a headscarf, this too would spark different social dynamics, as this might have created either a sense of familiarity in terms of shared Muslim practices and experiences, or tensions, if views on religion were diverging (e.g., in relation to the level of religious orthodoxy).

98 than turning me into an isolated outsider “who doesn’t understand a thing” in this setting I became one of the group’s language learners. Remarkably, due to my basic proficiency in Darija, at times I was more knowledgeable than some of the post-migrant Moroccans surrounding me. With regard to elite interviews, most conversations were held in French, a language Moroccan officials were usually fluent in.

Regarding my female gender, while it generally did not impede my fieldwork75, I can recall various situations where it turned out to influence my access to the respondents and the topics being raised by them. During the Summer Universities, my female gender was often a facilitator for female respondents to discuss gender-related issues. For instance, during the Summer Universities, in one situation, a Dutch Moroccan girl offered me an in-depth reflection on the way she was treated as a female expatriate Moroccan during holidays. Besides, due to my female gender, I was invited to join other girls in “feminine” leisure activities. On another occasion, I was invited by Moroccan girls to join them to visit the hairdresser and in their hammam ritual (where we bathed all together, practically naked), creating a sense of intimacy which would last afterward. The fact that I shared my bedroom with four other girls made me spend more time with girls than with boys. Differently, when doing elite interviews in diaspora institutions, I became aware of my female gender (and youthfulness) mainly because most of my respondents were (older) men. As a result, I was careful to not overstress my femininity by dressing up quite soberly, a strategy I used more generally when navigating public areas and transport in Morocco. My impression of the diaspora institutions to be male bastions was somewhat confirmed by the account of one of the few women I interviewed there, a senior staff member who explained how she has been transferred to another department in her institution due to an envious male colleague.

Regarding my educational background and my position as an “academic,” most of the people I interacted with shared a somewhat similar background: in the Summer Universities, being enrolled in higher education was a selection criterion for participation, while all people I interviewed in diaspora institutions were highly educated too. This has various effects on their perception of my academic identity:

75 My experience might have been quite different if I had studied more gender- segregated domains (such as religious education) or if I did similar fieldwork in another country where women cannot travel independently.

99 among all respondents it implied a certain degree of familiarity with academic work, and a generally positive attitude towards it.76 Educational background is closely interwoven with socio-economic status, as my elite respondents were all highly educated professionals with — according to Moroccan standards — high wages. This element reduced the power imbalance between me and my respondents. Among the Summer University participants, I positioned myself slightly more as a “student” (a PhD student) than as a researcher, thus evoking a shared experience of being in higher education (studying, exams, thesis-writing, attending lectures …). As I was 28 back then and only a few years older than many of the participants, this was not hard to imagine.

Besides being influenced by a range of (interwoven) personal characteristics, the relational interplay and engagement with research participants are also located in a particular time and space (Voloder and Kirpitchenko 2014). This is something I strongly experienced in particular concerning my relation to the participants in the Summer Universities. The way participants perceived and approached me (and vice versa) was strongly affected by the particular international, open and diverse atmosphere among the participant group in this program. Participants were coming from 15 different countries and four continents, speaking many different languages. Besides, most people did not know each other before. Indeed, making new friends internationally was a major motivation to participate. Even the fact that I was speaking Arabic at a very basic level only, did not make me stick out; various Moroccan participants did not speak it either and various non-Moroccan languages77 were frequently used by the other participants too. Concerning religious praxis, the group was diverse too, allowing me again to blend in. For example, some of the participants went to the local mosque during their stay, while others didn’t. Another telling example here was the diversity in the girls’ dresses and behavior during the farewell party: while some dressed up in revealing clothes and enjoyed dancing among the boys on a gender-mixed dance floor, a group of the girls (some veiled, but not all of them) preferred to dance without any boys

76 This contrasts with the distrust or misunderstandings with regard to the nature of academic research that is often present among low-educated respondents, something I experienced in previous fieldwork in different settings.

77 English, French, Spanish, Dutch, Italian and German were the most common non-Moroccan languages spoken by participants during the 2013 Summer Universities I attended.

100 around in the neighboring kitchen, as they found it indecent or uneasy to dance in front of male non-family members. Dressing rather modestly and not wearing any make-up, I did not stick out; there were various girls dressed in more uncovering clothes than me. While I danced on the mixed main dance floor, I joined the all- girls kitchen dance floor later, thus maneuvering (literally and figuratively) between different spaces and groups. In sum, despite the shared Moroccan background of all Summer University participants, diversity was the norm, and therefore, my different ethnocultural background became somehow less relevant. This highlights how the particular context in which fieldwork takes place defines the importance of certain personal characteristics of the researcher (Van Mol et al. 2014; Kusow 2008; Mercer 2007).

While the above examples regarding nationality, religion, gender, language, and setting demonstrate the multilayered nature of my insider- or outsiderness, I also want to highlight how in some situations, I benefitted from being non- Moroccan. This advantage of ethnocultural outsiderness has been documented by others. For instance, when faced with an outsider interviewer, respondents tend to explain more extensively their perspectives and experiences, while in their conversations with insiders they would rely more on tacit, shared knowledge (see e.g. Fujii’s (2009) experiences in Rwanda). Acknowledging this dynamic, I often downplayed my previous knowledge of Morocco and positioned myself more as a “student" of Moroccan society, allowing respondents to “teach” me. By deliberately not positioning myself as an expert on the matter, “power differentials are to some degree inverted in such interactions, as subjects’ superior expertise on the research topic is acknowledged” (Kapiszewski, Maclean and Read 2015:260). A certain degree of outsiderness is also beneficial when the research centers on sensitive, political matters. Rarely, I was asked to take sides concerning sensitive topics in relation to my research topic; because I was simply not expected to be informed or to choose sides. This allowed respondents to ventilate their opinions on “internal community matters” without risks. For instance, Arabic Moroccans felt free to express their stereotypical views of Berber Moroccans, French Moroccans could complain about Dutch Moroccans, while Moroccan employees in diaspora institutions could give me their frank impression of Moroccan expatriates. However, this does not mean that I was seen as a complete outsider, it happened more than once that respondents were eager to know my “Belgian” or “European” viewpoint on certain matters. For instance, in a conversation on

101 integration and identity between several Dutch Moroccans, one boy turned to me suddenly and asked “How do you see us, in fact, as Moroccans or as Dutchmen?” thus fishing for my perspective on his membership in the Dutch and Moroccan societies.

Another impression I had, was that some of the elite interview respondents were flattered by the attention I (as a researcher) gave to them because this implied their daily work and their experiences were important to an outsider. I had the impression this feeling was strengthened by my non-Moroccan ethnocultural background (white European) and foreign status (I was merely visiting Morocco, not living there). At times, I felt that as a foreign researcher, I was receiving a privileged treatment; I cannot imagine that a local Moroccan student or researcher would be received in the same manner. Other white, European researchers doing fieldwork in the global South have had similar experiences. As Burrawoy (1998) observed while reflecting on his ethnography of the Zambian Copperbelt mines, researchers are “trapped” in existing networks of power, characterized by racial, class or other hierarchies. This highlights how the researcher’s positionality is defined by “the power relationships within which the researcher and the researched co-exist” (Mercer 2007:4), in my case the global hegemonic power relations between North and South, including post-colonial power relations.

In sum, while it is obvious how I am in some respects an outsider to my respondents, I have demonstrated how various other factors (such as gender, education, religion, particular setting) play a role in the relationship between myself and my research informants or the case at hand. Besides, rather than framing my ethnocultural outsiderness as a mere disadvantage, I argue to adopt a more nuanced viewpoint on this matter and show some of its pros and its cons.

102 103 104 PART 2:

EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON MOROCCAN DIASPORA POLICIES FOR “THE NEXT GENERATIONS”

105 106 OVERVIEW

The central body of this dissertation consists of four empirical studies, which have been published as peer-reviewed journal articles (Chapters 4, 6 and 7, published in International Migration Review, International Migration and the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, respectively) and one peer-reviewed book chapter (Chapter 5)78. Every chapter approaches the topic under study from a different angle.

Chapter 4 highlights the origin-country perspectives on emigrants’ descendants prevailing in two central Moroccan diaspora institutions: the Ministry for Moroccans living Abroad and the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans living abroad. It reveals how origin-country policy actors perceive and (attempt to) govern the post-migrant segment of the diaspora, while also demonstrating how intra-state institutional plurality in Morocco has engendered multiple governing rationalities underlying the cultural diaspora policies in place.

Chapter 5 further continues the previous chapter’s focus on origin-state perspectives, but shifts the attention to a central concept in discourses on migration: the notion of integration. While integration is a much-debated concept in immigration countries, it is usually considered as a non-issue in origin country’s approach to their expatriate citizens. Rather, diaspora policies center on the ways in which emigrants’ multi-layered connections with “home” can be maintained. However, in current Moroccan diaspora policy discourses the notion of integration (into the receiving societies) is prominently present. In this chapter, we trace the historical evolution of the Moroccan official stance towards integration, while also highlighting how transnational ties are reconciled conceptually with migrant integration.

While Chapter 4 and 5 highlight official discourses and the voices of those involved in creating and executing policies, in Chapter 6 and 7 the focus moves to policies as how they are put in practice. This shift is also sided by a shift in methodology: whereas Chapter 4 and 5 are based on interviews and secondary

78 The four different chapters were conceived as independent publications. Changes have only been made in terms of the lay-out and spelling (to American English). In addition, all references have been included in the general reference list. The chapters are followed by a conclusion.

107 data, Chapters 6 and 7 draw primarily on my participant observation during one of the flagships of the current Moroccan diaspora policies: the Moroccan Summer Universities for young Moroccans living abroad, a homeland tour organized by the Moroccan Ministry for Moroccans living Abroad.

Chapter 6 demonstrates how this program is being used as a vehicle to convey targeted messages to the post-migrant generations, concerning their transnational ties to Morocco in particular. As such, this chapter focuses on how policy goals are translated into concrete strategies implemented in the real-life setting of a state-led homeland tour. Discourses emphasize transnational attachment, polish the image of Morocco and clarify participants’ potential transnational engagement for the sake of development. While the Summer Universities employ a mixture of different diaspora engagement methods, the most central element is the transmission of inclusive narratives for the post-migrant generations, addressing them as full-fledged members of the symbolic Moroccan nation.

Differently, Chapter 7 discusses participants’ experiences during the Summer Universities and their viewpoints on their origin country. It highlights these youngsters’ agency, by showing their resistance to the political socialization during this homeland tour. The participants’ perceptions of internal contradictions in the Summer Universities undermine the program’s intentions: instead of engaging the young post-migrant Moroccans as Moroccan development actors, several dynamics at play rather stimulate this group’s disengagement. As such, this article aligns with other research stressing the highly ambiguous role of homeland tours and tourism in homeland ties and identifications of post-migrant diaspora members.

The concluding Chapter 8 lists the main findings, and highlights how these findings contribute to academic discussions. In addition, possible avenues of future research are discussed.

108 109 110 CHAPTER 4:

COMPETING ORIGIN COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES ON EMIGRANTS’ DESCENDANTS: MOROCCAN DIASPORA INSTITUTIONS’ POLICY VIEWS AND PRACTICES REGARDING THE “NEXT GENERATIONS ABROAD” 79 80

79 This chapter was published as Mahieu, R. 2019. “Competing Origin-country Perspectives on Emigrant Descendants: Moroccan Diaspora Institutions’ Policy Views and Practices Regarding the ‘Next Generation Abroad’.” International Migration Review 53(1): 183–209.

80 I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO). In developing the presented ideas, I have received helpful input from Christiane Timmerman, Nadia Fadil and Koenraad Bogaert. A special thanks to Joke Lambelin for editing the article.

111 112 ABSTRACT

This paper contributes to the literature on diaspora policies by offering a deeper understanding of origin-state perspectives on emigrants’ descendants. It addresses how diaspora policies targeting this group are rationalized by the state of origin, that is, how policy practices, expectations, and modes of thought related to this “next generation” of the emigrant population are interlinked conceptually. An in-depth inquiry of two Moroccan diaspora institutions reveals the different governing rationalities underlying the cultural diaspora policies in place. The rationalities disagree on the fundamental question of whose interests diaspora policies should serve primarily: the homeland’s or the diaspora’s. As such, the analysis not only draws attention to the way in which the emergence of post- migrant generations alters the governmentality of the diaspora but also points at implications of intra-state institutional plurality.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most remarkable tendencies in the field of migration policies since the turn of the twenty-first century is the growing number of emigration countries establishing diaspora engagement policies. By 2014, at least 47 countries worldwide had more than one institution dedicated entirely to their respective diasporas (Gamlen 2014). Today, in fact, most countries confronted with significant emigration have installed diaspora institutions, defined as formal state offices dedicated to emigrants and their descendants and located within the executive and legislative branches of national governments (Collyer 2013a; Dufoix et al. 2010; Délano 2014; Gamlen 2014; Agunias 2009). While some state initiatives to engage diasporas trace back to the nineteenth century (Smith 2003), their recent spread and rise in significance are remarkable.

In the growing literature on diaspora policies, a neglected aspect is the fact that origin states’ efforts are usually not limited to their emigrants but also extend to the “next generations” i.e. emigrants’ descendants. Commonly labeled by immigration scholars as “second generation (im)migrants,” this group is more appropriately conceptualized as the “post-migrant” generation: while their ancestors’ migration experiences continue to impact their lives in various ways, the

113 post-migrant generation never emigrated from the country of origin but was born and raised in its respective receiving country (Wagner 2008; Mahieu 2015). This fact has direct implications for this group’s relationship to the ancestors’ birth country: post-migrant generations usually maintain transnational ties, ranging from a sense of attachment to strong transnational engagement, but these ties differ substantially from migrants’ transnational ties (Levitt and Waters 2002; Lee 2008; Wessendorf 2013). Because migrants’ descendants do not engage in transnational practices with the same intensity, frequency, and scope as their parents (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), post-migrant generations’ “homeland” attachments are commonly perceived to be weaker and more precarious than their parents’. In sum, there is no simple unilateral “transmission” of transnational attitudes and behaviors across generations (Huynh and Yiu 2015).

As a response to these shifting transnational ties across generations, diverse emigration countries have implemented targeted cultural policies for post-migrant generations. Examples of these policies include the creation of an educational system in the receiving countries to transmit the national language(s), culture, and/ or religion; the organization of guided cultural-educational exposure tours in the homeland; and support for activities propagating the homeland culture in receiving countries (Garcia-Sanchez 2010; Louie 2003). Generally, these strategies focus on youth, ranging from primary school children to young adults. Apart from their direct importance for target groups, these policies also highlight how diaspora policies engage in not only diaspora mobilization but also diaspora building (Kelner 2010; Gamlen 2006). As such, they reflect the origin states’ long-term diaspora policy visions (Mahieu 2015).

However, the framework in which these cultural diaspora policies are developed is unclear. How, for example, are they understood and legitimized from an origin-state perspective? How do origin states rationalize spending considerable amounts on programs that have no obvious material returns and that benefit a segment of their expatriate communities with rather insecure ties to the homeland? This article offers a deeper understanding of the meaning of these policies by analyzing the government rationalities of Morocco’s diaspora institutions. Drawing on Foucault’s (2007) governmentality perspective on power, rationality here entails a mode of reasoning followed by government (i.e., any systematized, regulated mode of power, such as the state) which defines the ultimate goal of governmental action and the ways to achieve this goal (Lemke 2000; Dean 1999).

114 Since my central aim is to understand origin-state modes of thought on emigrants’ descendants and the way these modes of thought are linked to concrete diaspora policy practices, I believe the governmentality perspective offers a highly suitable framework for my purpose.

In my endeavor to understand origin-state perspectives on the post-migrant segment of the diaspora, the Moroccan State is not conceptualized as a monolithic entity producing univocal policy but instead as a complex institutional landscape (Belgendouz 2006). With regard to the design and implementation of policy programs for post-migrant Moroccans, two major institutions are in charge: the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad (FHII) and the Ministry in Charge of the Moroccans Living Abroad (MCMRE)81. Based on the different backgrounds of both diaspora institutions, I expect their government rationalities to differ as well. Therefore, the article examines the two institutions separately in its main section and offers a comparison afterwards.

The analysis presented here contributes to the understanding of diaspora policies in two ways. First, it reveals how origin-country policy actors perceive and (attempt to) govern the post-migrant segment of the diaspora, while also demonstrating how the diffusion of power across diaspora institutions leads to multiple governing rationalities. Second, and more broadly, my analytic focus on origin-country perspectives on migration offers a refreshing counterbalance in an academic field dominated by receiving-country perspectives that focus on immigration-related concerns, not on emigration (Dufoix et al. 2010; Collyer 2013a; Berriane, de Haas and Natter 2015). In this way, this article attends to the need to highlight underexposed, multiple perspectives on emigration.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This article presents a case study of Moroccan cultural diaspora policies for post-migrant Moroccan youth, with the aim of enhancing the understanding of

81 A third important institution is the Council of the Moroccan Community living Abroad (CCME). However, the CCME is conceived more as a consultative body and has only a few activities that involve post-migrant Moroccans in a direct or systematic manner. Because my analytic focus is on how modes of thought are interlinked with concrete programs I do not include this institution in the analysis.

115 this type of policy. As such, my case study should be understood as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004:342). Morocco is well suited as a case, due to the confluence of two characteristics. First, it has well-developed policy actions explicitly or implicitly targeting post-migrant generations, some of which have been running for more than two decades. This suggests that Morocco’s differentiated approach to post-migrant generations is neither embryonic nor fortuitous but structurally integrated into its policies. The presence of tangible and well-established “technologies” of government allows us to reflect on how policy thought legitimates existing policy practices, as well as on how policy practices themselves are grounded in ideas. Second, and in contrast to the majority of origin states that initiated their diaspora policies from the late 1990s on (Agunias 2009; Gamlen 2014), Morocco occupies a pioneering role, especially in the global South. Its approach to emigration and development has been described as the creative and innovative result of a long on-going engagement with its diaspora (Iskander 2010) and functions as a source of inspiration for other emigration countries. Because policy imitation is widespread among origin states (Smith 2003) and because pioneer states play a central role in diaspora policy diffusion through bilateral and multilateral dialogue (Délano 2014), I expect the Moroccan state’s government rationality with regard to post-migrant youth to catch on elsewhere too. This is most likely to happen in countries with sociocultural linkages to and similar migration experiences as Morocco (Ibid.), such as other post-colonial states in Africa and the Middle East.

To get an overview of Moroccan state policies relevant to my research question, I started with secondary data. From 2012 to 2016, I collected publicly available documentation, such as press statements, policy briefs, and royal statements (Discours Royaux), regarding state-diaspora relations. I found this information through the diaspora institutions’ websites, Moroccan state media, as well as by contacting and visiting the diaspora institutions’ headquarters in Rabat. However, as the rationalities of diaspora policies for young post-migrant Moroccans are only superficially articulated in secondary data, I considered elite interviews to be a suitable method for “tap[ping] into political constructs that may otherwise be difficult to examine” (Beamer 2002:87). Therefore, the primary data sources used in this article are 15 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with people working for the two major Moroccan diaspora policy institutions introduced above

116 in 2013 and 2014. Interviewees included managing directors, policy advisors, civil servants and program coordinators. Interviews explored various aspects of Moroccan diaspora policies concerning post-migrant Moroccan youth,82 such as their goals, implementation, organization, evolution and challenges. The majority of interviews were recorded and transcribed; non-recorded interviews are paraphrased.83

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

THE GOVERNMENTALITY PERSPECTIVE

This article builds on the idea of governmentality, an approach to the study of power introduced by Foucault ([1977-1978] 2007) and further developed and applied by others (Dean 1999; Lemke 2000; Bröckling et al. 2011). According to this approach, the focus of government is not sovereignty over territory but the regulation of human conduct (Dean 1999). The act of governing, thus, entails a range of

“practices that try to shape, sculpt, mobilize, and work through the choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups. [Governmentality] is a perspective, then, that seeks to connect questions of government, politics and administration to the space of bodies, lives, selves, and persons.” (Dean 1999:20)

82 “Post-migrant generations/youth/Moroccans” are analytic labels. Interviewees employed various terms, such as “young Moroccans living abroad,” the “next,” “emerging” or “second” generation(s), or, alternatively, the “third and fourth generations” (the first generation being emigrants who left Morocco as adults and the second those who left as minors — a classification which deviates from the (academic) generational classification where the second generation are the children of migrants who are born abroad, and the 1.5 generation are minor migrants).

83 Interviews were conducted in French (12), English (2), and Dutch (1). As a result, most quotes in the analysis are translations. For confidentiality reasons, interviewees have been anonymized.

117 Governing a population should not be understood as simply forcing people to do what the governor wants; rather, “It is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself ” (Foucault 1993:204). Indeed, a central notion in the governmentality perspective is that governing draws on not only technologies of domination or discipline (external regulation practices) but also “technologies of the self ” (self-regulation practices). As such, self-government is considered an indissoluble element of government.

Pivotal to the analysis of governmentality is the disclosure of government rationalities, that is, ways of reasoning or thinking that render reality conceivable and thus manageable (Bröckling et al. 2011). Political rationality here is not considered pure or neutral knowledge that simply represents the governed reality but is instead seen as an element of government itself, which helps to create a discursive field in which exercising power is “rational” (Lemke 2000). As such, programs of (self-)government are descriptive and prescriptive at the same time: they describe and problematize a presumed reality in which they subsequently intervene with the aim of transforming it (Bröckling et al. 2011). As a consequence, when investigating government rationalities,

“One isn’t assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they play within them.” (Foucault 1991:79)

An important implication of this view is the plurality of rationalities. What is considered rational depends on which assumptions about starting points, means, and goals can claim plausibility; which criteria of legitimacy and acceptability are established; and which authorities and inventories of knowledge are evoked to define statements as true and practices as rational (Bröckling et al. 2011). Therefore, government rationalities include not only rational elements (based on human sciences) but also a-rational elements (such as imagery or mythology) (Dean 1999).

In the governmentality perspective, rationalities and technologies of government, modes of thinking, and forms of intervention are understood to be

118 mutually constitutive (Bröckling et al. 2011). This attentiveness to the interplay between policy rationalities and practices distinguishes the governmentality approach from alternative approaches to the study of thinking and speaking about governing. For example, political discourse analysis (Van Dijk 1997) and narrative policy analysis (van Eeten 2007) build their analyses mainly on language (such as use of vocabularies, internal coherence, and presence of narrative structure) and its employment in the political arena, while governmentality perspectives incorporate tangible “technologies of power” in their analyses. As Dean (1999) stresses, the analytics of government is concerned with “thought as it is embedded within programs for the directions and reforms of conduct,” (Ibid.:27) rather than with the theoretical or abstract dimensions of thought. Consequently, to analyze government rationalities is to analyze thought made practical and technical (Ibid.).

GOVERNING THE DIASPORA

While Foucault’s thinking on government was not limited to the sphere of the state, many scholars, including Foucault himself, have deployed the governmentality approach in their study of the functioning of state power (e.g., Foucault 2007; Dean 1999). With regard to the government of migration, states continue to take a central position in the twenty-first century (Fassin 2013; Iskander 2010; Collyer 2013a). This is the case in not only receiving or transit regions but also in origin countries, where state institutions are increasingly re- claiming and re-defining “their” expatriate populations (Brand 2010; Ho 2011; Gamlen 2014; Portes & Fernandez-Kelly 2015).

In terms of governance, the defining feature of an expatriate population — that is, its position outside the origin state’s territory — creates a fundamental theoretical problem for the origin state: how should state institutions deal with citizens who permanently reside in the territory of another nation-state (Collyer 2013b)? For expatriates who are long-term residents or even citizens in a foreign territory, the origin state’s capacity to employ its conventional array of managing (e.g., population census), disciplinary (e.g., national education), or coercive (e.g., monopoly of violence) governing technologies is severely curtailed. While origin

119 states do have certain tools at their disposal to govern expatriate citizens84, in general, they “lack reliable coercive powers beyond their legal jurisdictions, and therefore, the effectiveness of extra-territorial policies depends on the ability to make migrants self-identify as loyal, self-disciplining subjects” (Gamlen 2014:193). The direct implication here is that other governing strategies, aiming at self- government, move to the forefront. In fact, the core purpose of diaspora policies is to produce a communal mentality among expatriate citizens that renders them governable (Gamlen 2006).

Precisely because of this reliance on forms of self-government in contemporary diaspora policies, the governmentality perspective, which puts self- government center stage, is gaining ground in studies of state-diaspora relations (Kunz 2008; Gamlen 2014). Several scholars using this perspective, in fact, have linked the emergence of diaspora policies to modifications in state power in recent decades (Ragazzi 2014). For example, Kunz’s (2008) case study on Mexico illustrates how ways of governing Mexican emigrants comply with neoliberal rationality. Gamlen’s (2014) comparative work takes the notion of governmentality a step further arguing that not only emigrants but increasingly origin states are being governed: just as origin states mobilize emigrants without coercion into a web of rights and obligations, states are activated into an international community whose members share responsibility for migration management without the need for top-down coordination. In the broader field of diaspora policies, scholars who do not explicitly adopt the governmentality framework often touch upon related issues (e.g., Brand 2010; Nyíri 2001). A recurring theme in this work is the particular language used by governing bodies (such as states and media). This terminology is seen as both an indicator for and a constitutive factor in evolving state-diaspora relations. For example, Brand (2010) argues that the introduction in the 1990s of the notion of kinship in Moroccan state discourses on expatriate Moroccans – who evolved from being mere “workers abroad” to “our sons and daughters abroad” — was an attempt to redefine and strengthen the diaspora’s ties to Morocco. On a more conceptual level, the tendency among policy-makers to frame a loose collection of expatriate citizens and their descendants as a

84 The fact that many expatriates reside temporarily in the origin country on a frequent basis, offers the origin state the opportunity to use some of its “classic” government technologies such as state violence. For instance, up to the 1980s, intimidation and persecution of Moroccan emigrants during their summer holiday return were common practices (Bouras 2012).

120 “diaspora” — a notion assuming a group identity and a natural, eternal bond to a distant territory — can also be regarded as an act of governing because it is a political claim rather than a mere description (Ragazzi 2012).

While I build on this literature, my approach also departs from it in two respects. First, in contrast to what seems to be a default position in the diaspora policy literature (see Gamlen 2006; Ragazzi 2014), I do not presume the origin state to be a unitary actor with one single government rationality. Rather, I adopt a neo-pluralist understanding of the state disaggregating “the origin state” into a multilevel organization of distinct units in which a range of political actors compete (Fitzgerald 2006). This approach corresponds with my understanding of the governmentality perspective, which postulates a plurality of rationalities. It is also consistent with the particular Moroccan institutional context, where the rivalry between various institutions impels us to consider the possibility of different, co-existing rationalities. Second, scholarly reflection on diaspora policies tends to hold on to the image of the diaspora as a monolithic entity and, thus, to ignore the question of whether different segments of the diaspora are governed differently. While others have indicated the implications of class differences within (Ho 2011) and geographical dispersal of the expatriate community (Tsourapas 2015), this article focuses on generational differences between migrants and their descendants.

I argue that the government of emigrants’ descendants raises additional issues on top of those mentioned above. These issues flow from the characteristics of emigrant descendants’ transnational identifications and practices (Levitt and Waters 2002), as well as from their formal relation to the origin state (citizenship status). By definition, post-migrant generations lack lived experience in the origin country. Compared to their migrant parents, they are less proficient in the ancestral language, have a lower sense of obligation toward family members “back home,” and have alternative future prospects regarding return to the homeland. More often than migrants, migrant descendants hold foreign citizenship in addition to (or even without) origin-state nationality, implying different rights and loyalties as well. Foreign citizenship also makes it more difficult for origin states to claim descendants of migrants as full members of “the nation,” because competing, assimilationist rationalities on immigrant incorporation in receiving countries oppose this idea (Brubaker 2004). Equally important, as full citizens in the receiving country, migrant descendants rely less on legal protection or social

121 assistance offered by origin states (Agunias 2009). All these differences have deep implications for this group’s governmentality. Simply put, traditional diaspora governing technologies, such as consular networks, are insufficient to reach out to post-migrant youth, while origin states’ ways of framing their emigrants, such as through the ideal type of the “entrepreneurial migrant” supporting his family back home (Kunz 2008), become inappropriate because they do not relate to post- migrant experiences. Therefore, the general observation that “State institutions must work harder to maintain a claim to represent a nation ‘living in different places’” (Collyer 2013b:2) appears even more accurate when it comes to the descendants of emigrants.

MOROCCAN DIASPORA POLICIES

Moroccan emigration began in the 1960s as low-skilled male labor migration encouraged by the Moroccan State and various West-European countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany). When western Europe’s need for imported labor forces slumped in the 1970s, Moroccan labor migration was followed by family migration (Bouras 2012; de Haas 2013). From the late 1980s, Morocco’s position as an emigration country was further consolidated by flows to Italy and Spain. More recently, significant numbers have moved to other Arab countries, North America, and Israel (Berriane, de Haas and Natter 2015). However, Europe has been and continues to be the primary destination for Moroccan emigrants 85.

Morocco’s diaspora policies developed in response to the mass-scale labor migration to western Europe, through an overarching framework provided by the monarchy. Late King Hassan II’s stand vis-à-vis the expatriate population (r. 1961– 1999), however, was highly ambiguous: while conscious of expatriate citizens’ economic contribution, he also feared them as a political threat (Iskander 2010, Brand 2006). Under his reign, emigrants were intimidated and persecuted by state agents during their holiday returns to Morocco, while state-led Amicales (friendship societies) ensured control in the immigration countries. In contrast to his father,

85 Due to the recent increase of transit migration and immigrant settlement in Morocco, the country is no longer a sending country only, but also a receiving and transit country, especially for Sub-Saharan African migrants (Berriane, de Haas & Natter 2015).

122 King Mohammed VI (r. 1999–) has consistently praised expatriate Moroccans, approaching them as a resource for the country’s development (Ibid.). However, this shift in discourses and governing techniques between the two kings should not obscure that the foundations of Morocco’s two primary diaspora institutions were laid by Hassan II in 1990. Their installation, in fact, marked a new state approach aimed at halting emigrants’ increasing alienation from their country of origin. This sense of alienation was triggered by a number of transformations in Moroccan communities abroad: the abandonment of the hope for return, the emergence of post-migrant generations, the dissociation in terms of language, culture, identity and religion, massive naturalizations, and political participation in countries of residence (Ouali 2004). In this context, old ways of governing the Moroccan diaspora — that is, the management of emigrants’ financial resources, on the one hand, and the repressive control of their social and political activities through the Amicales, on the other — became obsolete and ineffective (Iskander 2010).

In an attempt to revive emigrants’ connection to the kingdom and to make the transforming expatriate population manageable, a more holistic governing strategy was introduced. To avoid losing its grip on expatriate communities completely, the new vision took into account cultural, religious, social, and political dimensions of their homeland connections. The Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad (MCMRE) was ordered (a) to promote social, economic, and cultural actions for expatriate Moroccans, (b) to monitor Moroccan migration, (c) to develop reintegration programs for returnees, and (d) to invest in diplomacy regarding migrants’ living conditions and emigration (Fellat 1995). The Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad (FHII), by contrast, was tasked (a) to provide cultural, religious and language education for emigrants’ children (b) to organize holiday camps in Morocco for them, (c) to provide financial, medical, and judicial aid to those in need, (d) to organize cultural, artistic, and sports events in receiving countries, and (e) to manage the annual return visit to Morocco (ibid.). While mandated by the state and partly government-funded,86 the FHII was not conceived as a political institution but as a quasi-governmental social aid agency, a status that allowed it to circumvent political sensibilities and operate in a more

86 The major source of income constitutes a direct contribution of Moroccan financial institutions governing migrant remittances, based on a fixed interest rate on emigrant savings (Belguendouz 2006).

123 flexible manner. As such, it was seen to complement, rather than to compete with, the MCMRE (Brand 2006).

Many of the transformations that led to the creation of the two institutions related directly to the growing size and importance of the post-migrant cohort in the Moroccan diaspora at the end of the twentieth century. Due to limited return migration among initial labor migrants and their families, post-migrant Moroccans constituted from the 1990s on a large share of Moroccan communities in the original destination countries (de Haas 2013). Additionally, the expatriate Moroccan population’s socio-economic profile started to diversify, due, among other things, to the upward mobility they experienced compared to their migrant parents with lower levels of education (Crul and Heering 2008).

Responding to the emergence of this new category of Moroccans citizens abroad87, a range of targeted policy initiatives were developed by the two Moroccan diaspora institutions. While such policies are situated in the countries of both residence and origin and target various age groups, I group these initiatives together as “cultural diaspora policies” since the transmission and maintenance of various dimensions of homeland culture is pivotal in all of them. The FHII, for example, launched language and cultural education (Enseignement de la Langue Arabe et de la Culture Marocaine (ELACM)) and summer camps for children (first Colonies de Vacances, later Séjours Culturels) in the 1990s, while more recently, the MCMRE has initiated summer universities (Universités d’été au profit des Jeunes Marocains résidant à l’étranger, since 2009), large conferences (Forum des Jeunes Marocains résidant à l’étranger, in 2011 and 2016), cultural stays for adolescents and young adults (Séjours Culturels), and cultural centers (Centres Culturels marocains à l’étranger “Dar el Maghrib’”). Similar cultural diaspora policies aiming at post- migrant or diasporic youth can be found in other countries as well, including Israel (Kelner 2010), India (Agunias 2009), and China (Louie 2003).

Notwithstanding their overlapping authorities, the relationship between the FHII and the MCMRE has been unclear, and coordination of their activities has

87 Every child born to Moroccan parents acquires Moroccan citizenship automatically, no matter the place of birth. As Castles and Davidson (2000) note, “jus sanguinis has been seen historically as being appropriate for an emigration country… that wishes to retain the allegiance of people who have settled elsewhere” (2000:85). In practice, for most Moroccan migrant descendants, it is part of their dual citizenship.

124 been absent from the outset. In their first seven years, the two institutions functioned as one in practice, since the Minister of the MCMRE was also president of the FHII. For the MCMRE, bureaucratic infighting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a general lack of state capacity led to its gradual demolition and eventual absorption by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1997 (Brand 2006). In the absence of an independent Ministry, the FHII became the only national institution dedicated fully to Moroccans abroad. However, under Mohammed VI, the emigration portfolio reemerged in the Moroccan government in 2002, leading to the re-establishment of a separate Ministry (2007) as an important political tool for the implementation of his vision. Since then, the MCMRE has strengthened its position, adding immigration affairs to its portfolio in 201388. Also, while previously, the cultural and educational domain was seen as the FHII’s prerogative, young expatriate Moroccans have increasingly been targeted by the MCMRE too. On top of this, another diaspora institution was created in 2007: The Council of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad (CCME). Notwithstanding its consultative, non-executive role, the CCME’s creation has only reinvigorated the older criticism that there are too many institutions with overlapping competencies in the field of Moroccan diaspora policies (Belguendouz 2006).

Given this context, the existence of inter-institutional rivalry comes as no surprise. However, as I argue in the next section, this rivalry transcends competition over resources and extends into substantial domains, such as the questions of how and why to target post-migrant Moroccans policy-wise in the first place.

88 It should be noted that at the time of publication (of this article in 2018), the MCMRE’s position has shifted again. In the El Othmani government (installed in 2017 after parliamentary elections), the MCMRE lost its status as independent ministry and the emigration portfolio was added to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the first months after the government installation, prior activities of the MCMRE, such as the Summer Universities, have been continued. It is, however, unclear how the institutional shift will affect the government’s diaspora policies in the long term.

125 GOVERNMENT RATIONALITIES: HOW AND WHY TO GOVERN POST-MIGRANT MOROCCANS?

This section identifies and illustrates the government rationalities regarding post-migrant Moroccans for the Ministry in Charge of the Moroccans Living Abroad (MCMRE) and the Hassan II Foundation for the Moroccans Living Abroad (FHII). What, it asks, are these rationalities’ “ways of thinking and speaking,” “ways of acting” and “ways of being” (Kunz 2008) for post-migrant Moroccans, and how do these dimensions connect?

In a nutshell, my analysis reveals that the two institutions’ government rationalities differ regarding the question of whose interest cultural diaspora policies should primarily serve: the homeland’s or the diaspora’s. For the MCMRE, Morocco’s strategic interests are pivotal, whereas for the FHII, expatriate communities’ needs are prioritized. I classify the former set of interests as homeland-centered rationality and the latter as diaspora-centered rationality. The homeland-centered rationality draws on the idea that the expatriate population constitutes a resource for the origin country. Accordingly, diaspora policies are conceptualized as instruments to develop this resource. In contrast, the diaspora- centered rationality starts from the idea that the expatriate population, due to its migratory situation, has a range of special needs. Accordingly, diaspora policies are conceptualized as a way to cater to the expatriate populations’ particular needs, especially with regards to their transnational relationship with the origin country and their wellbeing in the country of residence.

THE HOMELAND-CENTERED RATIONALITY

“Moroccans living abroad have contributed for decades, from the sixties until today, to the development of their region [of origin]... They have contributed considerably to Morocco’s development in terms of infrastructure, in terms of social services, in terms of the battle against poverty, etc. And we would like this to continue, with the coming generations.” (Policy advisor F)

The understanding that emigrants make a significant contribution to Moroccan economic and human development lies at the heart of the MCMRE’s

126 homeland-centered rationality. In the interview with the policy advisor quoted above, the idea that emigrants are an important resource for the origin country is clearly reiterated as a well-established principle for the country. Yet what is particular here is how this idea is transmitted seamlessly to the foreign-born descendants of Moroccan emigrants, to the post-migrant generation. Moreover, addressing this segment of the diaspora is considered essential for Morocco’s development strategy:

“Morocco has approximately 4.5 million expatriate Moroccans. The majority of them are born abroad... Well, Morocco has strategic interests in the preservation of the relationship with its subjects abroad. First, because they are Moroccans, they embody the culture, the Moroccan cultural diversity; [second, because] the future generations carry the hope, regardless of being inside [Morocco] or abroad. Especially by the contribution of the Moroccan competencies abroad: scientific, cultural, athletic, manifold competencies... So, it’s an added value for Morocco; it’s an essential element in its development strategy. “(Policy advisor F)

Underlying this sentiment is the notion that this group’s ties to Morocco are not self-evident. If they were, there would be no need for policies to preserve them. Conceptually, then, a line is drawn between expatriate Moroccans born in Morocco (the “first generation” who emigrated as adults or adolescents) and those born and raised abroad. For the former, a strong attachment to Morocco is considered self-evident — they were born in Morocco, have close family ties there, and have “contributed for decades”. For the latter, however, their relationship with Morocco is thought to be much looser and, thus, must be cultivated. Also, post- migrant Moroccans are considered to be more integrated in their receiving countries. Therefore, the Moroccan State must make a deliberate effort to preserve their marocanité (Moroccan-ness). A second difference between the two groups concerns the (assumed) higher socio-economic and educational status of post- migrant generations, compared to their parents. These generational differences also translate into diverging expectations regarding their contributions to development:

“The generation of the parents… sends remittances. They contribute through community associations by building schools,

127 building roads, building micro-infrastructure for local development, especially in very poor regions. We want the children of these migrants to continue doing this. Not necessarily in their region of origin, [but] by contributing to development, by bringing their skills, by doing investments, by transferring technology, etc.” (Policy advisor F)

While the continuation of transnational ties across generations is pursued, it is not expected or desired that post-migrant generations copy their parents’ transnational practices; instead, other ways of being a “good” expatriate Moroccan are promoted. The adage is that Morocco does not want these post-migrant Moroccans’ money — as “there are always banks that can provide you the capital” (Policy advisor F). It wants their innovative ideas, technologic know-how, and compétences (skills). Here, the demographic transition in the Moroccan diaspora (from migrant to post-migrant) converges with a policy shift from the diaspora’s financial capital to its human and financial capital.

Because the weakening homeland attachment of post-migrant Moroccans is thought to limit their willingness to contribute to Morocco’s development, it is only “rational” for the Moroccan State to invest in the cultural ties of young post- migrant Moroccans. For this reason, cultural diaspora policies are tightly interwoven with the economic and development agendas of broader diaspora policies. This connection clearly emerged in interviews, where the different policy objectives were often mentioned in one breath and connected conceptually:

“In recent years, the Ministry has been concerned about showing [young expatriate Moroccans] that regardless of the country you are in, you should not forget that you are Moroccan; you have rights and obligations towards your country... It’s for this reason we are interested in identity: because if one feels that (s)he is Moroccan; (s)he will defend the interests of Morocco. (S)he will love our country, (s)he will make sacrifices for our country, (s)he will help to improve the situation of our country.” (Program coordinator G)

Here, the connection between ways of thinking and acting becomes clear: by ensuring the preservation of young post-migrant Moroccans’ transnational ties to

128 Morocco, cultural diaspora policies enable the fulfillment of this group’s potential as a resource for development.

In strengthening transnational ties, Moroccan diaspora policies are not developed in a vacuum: an extensive field of established transnational practices exists. For example, it is acknowledged that most post-migrant Moroccans have repeatedly visited Morocco during their childhood through extended family visits. This “summer pilgrimage” is commonly regarded as an established tradition inherited by younger generations. Yet interviewees in this study problematized the widespread practice of homeland visits. Although visiting Morocco is applauded, visiting practices of post-migrant Moroccans are also seen as limiting because they are too narrowly focused on family visits in the village of origin and leave no space for broader, more touristic explorations of Morocco:

“The majority of young Moroccans coming with their families to Morocco do not come in order to get to know Morocco. They come to a specific place, which is their parents’ place of origin, a location either with the tribe or in a small town. As a result, they pass their holidays — or at least, the majority of their holidays — in a very limited space, filled with family visits. In fact, it is not a holiday, because they are not taking a vacation: they came to arrange things with their parents, to visit family members, maybe to distribute some stuff. But they did not come to get to know their culture of origin. Hence, the concern arises for the Ministry, the intention to make programs that incite these people, these young Moroccans, to get to know their [culture of origin].” (Civil servant A)

Interviewees claim that due to the stressful conditions characterizing private homeland visits (such as lack of personal freedom, stress related to distribution of goods and money, and harsh living conditions in rural, under-developed towns), these homeland visits leave a rather negative imprint on post-migrant Moroccans’ relationship with Morocco as a whole and are ineffective or even counterproductive in terms of connecting with the home country. However, limited homeland trips are not the only culprits here. According to interviewees, other factors further contribute to post-migrant generations’ presumed negative perception and limited knowledge of Morocco, especially their parents’ outmoded

129 view of the country based on their rural lives under the brutal reign of late Hassan II. After emigrating, their parents continue to base their view of Morocco on these experiences, uninformed about Morocco’s economic and political evolutions. In addition, media in the countries of residence are reproached for dispersing biased and limited information on Morocco. In sum, for various reasons post-migrant Moroccans are thought to have a skewed view of their ancestors’ country of birth.

Diaspora policies are tasked with counterbalancing these negative perceptions, yet interviewees realize that these cannot be changed easily. Because policy programs like cultural visits and summer universities are too brief to leave deep imprints on participants’ views, policy actions often aim instead to trigger a “change of mind.” A term frequently used by respondents is “sensitization” (in French: sensibilisation), a strategy to raise awareness about the “real” and “modern” Moroccan society and to incite post-migrant Moroccans to imagine themselves as part of it. The hope is that this sensitization will pay off in desirable homeland- oriented behavior in the future; therefore, it is conceptualized as a strategic long- term investment. As Managing Director J explains,

“When one builds a country, he won’t construct it in 2, 3, 4 years. He will construct it in 20, 30, 40, 50 years. Morocco currently needs her Moroccans, regardless of where they are, because even for us, when (s)he has the nationality [of the country of residence], (s)he is Moroccan. Today, (s)he is a student… When (s)he will be 30 years old, (s)he might be either an employee or a manager, so it’s today we need to teach them… It’s not an investment like “We’re going to look for a European company and we’ll tell them: come and invest in Morocco.” [On the contrary] We make an investment in persons, but in the long term.”

The metaphor of “fishing” was used to describe this approach: to catch a fish, you need to cast a fishing rod first. However, it is not just Morocco that is “fishing.” It is well understood that highly educated, post-migrant Moroccans are a sought-after group in the international labor market:

“We need to benefit from the fact it’s a Moroccan. We need to benefit from his experience of being a Moroccan abroad, his

130 studies and so on. Every country would be seeking for someone like him, so why not return to the origins, Morocco? . . . Better [to choose] for their country [of origin, rather] than invest in other countries.” (Program coordinator I)

Due to this global competition for talent, particularly of highly educated post- migrant Moroccans, the promotion of “enterprise Morocco” is a vital ingredient of Morocco’s cultural programs. Illustrative is this reflection on a conference, during which around 500 highly educated young Moroccans living around the world gathered in the city of Ifrane in 2010:

“It was practically like one of those meetings certain commercial companies organize. When they want to attract future employees, they organize hotel stays or trips somewhere, and this allows them to get to know other future employees better and to get to know the culture of the company which [candidate employees] will integrate in. For Morocco, this was the occasion to promote the enterprise “Morocco,” to make known first of all, the modernity of Morocco…” (Policy advisor F)

This approach shows how policy-makers’ ways of thinking about post- migrant Moroccans translate into corresponding ways of acting toward this group: more than only a homeland, Morocco is presented as a competitive, attractive enterprise.

Consistent with the policy aim of strengthening of post-migrant generations’ cultural ties, much attention is paid in the policy programs to sharing knowledge about Moroccan culture, religion, and language. For example, cultural stay programs are designed to enable post-migrant Moroccans to get in touch with the “real” Islam (i.e., orthodox Moroccan Islam) as an indissoluble part of Moroccan culture that is embedded in a broader multi-ethnic “culture of tolerance”:

“Moroccan culture is a rich, diversified culture. It’s an Arabic, African, Berber culture… Moroccan culture is a culture of tolerance... In Morocco you find [various] places of worship: the mosque, Jewish, and Christian places of worship… We want to inform the students about the real Islamic religion, the Islam of tolerance, and not the radical Islam.” (Program coordinator H)

131 Another tangible element of having Moroccan roots is being familiar with Moroccan languages. Interviewees considered proficiency in Standard Arabic and in the Moroccan dialect, Darija, to be crucial parts of expatriates’ cultural ties to Morocco. Post-migrant Moroccans unable to express themselves in these languages are pitied and encouraged to learn it, for instance, by practicing whenever in Morocco or attending language classes.

The framing of the above elements — culture, religion, and language — reveals ways of thinking that problematize post-migrant Moroccans’ current view on Islam, as well as their current (Arabic) language knowledge. The “model” post- migrant Moroccan envisioned here adheres to Moroccan Islam and values, is well- informed about Moroccan history and politics, and speaks Moroccan Arabic fluently. Since cultural diaspora policies are conceived as interwoven with broader economic policies, this “model” post-migrant Moroccan extends into the economic sphere, reconnecting to Morocco not only in terms of homeland- oriented identifications but also through homeland-oriented practices that contribute to development.

“These are the two main messages we try to pass on to them… That Morocco is experiencing change... and it’s true that their place is abroad, but their place can be also here [in Morocco]… [The message is] that their place is here [in Morocco] or rather, that Morocco counts upon them for its development. That’s it; these are the largest messages we try to [convey]. Whether they will attract 100%, I don’t think so. But I’m sure they will attract at least 50%.” (Managing director J)

Frequently used phrases like “Morocco counts upon its citizens, regardless of where they live” and “a Moroccan can help Morocco, either from abroad or from Morocco” illustrate the moral obligation to contribute to Moroccan interests. The model post-migrant Moroccan is given flesh and bones by highlighting “exemplary” post-migrant Moroccans, such as students doing voluntary work or young entrepreneurs launching start-up companies. One program coordinator evoked memories of a visit to an investment project in a highly specialized niche sector, run by Europe-based Moroccans, during an exposure program for young expatriate Moroccans in 2012:

132 “We went to a factory built by Moroccan migrants that produces spare parts for Boeing in Tangier… So, what did they [the program participants] discover? They discovered that the people running this factory were in Europe. [These people] completed their studies in Europe, came to Morocco, and looked for investment capital here in Morocco. Subsequently, they started a project in Morocco with something very profitable, that is, the production of parts for Boeing – which is not an easy thing… If [program participants] hadn’t witnessed this productive project, they wouldn’t have known this [type of business] existed [in Morocco]. That’s the goal.” (Program coordinator G)

Illustrative of the moral obligation to contribute to Moroccan interest, post- migrant Moroccans are considered “ambassadors for Morocco” and encouraged to improve their capacities as such. Familiarity with contemporary Moroccan society is essential here, as, it is argued, one cannot defend Morocco’s interests effectively if one does not know Morocco. Solid knowledge of the country, combined with a sense of national pride, then, constitutes the “ammunition” needed to defend Morocco’s interest and promote a positive image of it.

“We are concerned with informing them about political changes, changes in the field of human rights, changes that Morocco experiences in that area. For us, as long as someone is Moroccan, (s)he needs to have the means to defend Morocco’s cause… Personally, it embarrasses me a little when I meet a young Moroccan of immigrant background, and (s)he does not know Morocco has a new constitution [and] is going through political transformation.” (Program coordinator H)

Building on the idea of ambassadorship, there is also a concern with the “integration” of post-migrant Moroccans into their receiving society, represented by high performance in education and exemplary conduct. Those who do not live up to these standards, such as low-performing or delinquent youngsters, are judged as spoiling the reputation of “decent” expatriate Moroccans and of Morocco itself. As such, the “ways of being” propagated for post-migrant Moroccans are not limited to their transnational ties to Morocco but extend well into their lives in the receiving countries.

133 THE DIASPORA-CENTERED RATIONALITY

“From the moment you give them the microphone, when they arrive, the first thing they ask for is the education of Arabic, for the children, and for themselves. Thus, it is a priority. It is a vital demand for Moroccans. The official departments, that is, the Foundation and the government, are not doing anything but following these tendencies, this demand.” (Managing director N)

In contrast to the MCMRE’s homeland-centered rationality, the FHII’s government rationality is centered on expatriate citizens’ needs and interests. The FHII conceives its role as supportive, as a provider of “services” to the diaspora, on demand. Its core premise is that strong demand for the maintenance of cultural, linguistic, and religious transnational ties with the homeland exists in the Moroccan expatriate community. Initially, this demand was related to the idea of permanent return to Morocco, which was central to the early labor migrants’ project:

“If you are [living] abroad, and you have children, and you think of one day returning to the country of origin, you will make at least some effort to ensure they learn the language of the country of origin.” (Managing director K)

The expected massive return to Morocco, however, never materialized (de Haas 2013)89, implying that Moroccan cultural diaspora policies lost their raison d’être. Notwithstanding, these policies were not abandoned; instead, their rationality was redefined throughout the years. Under the circumstances of unlikely returns, what is the rationality of cultural diaspora policies? The arguments provided by interviewees are multi-faceted.

First, return to Morocco does happen, though in temporary form, through summer visits. During holidays, interviewees stated, it is important that emigrant descendants “are able to speak the language, and that they are not illiterate.” (Managing director K) Thus, policies respond to needs arising from the

89 The return rate among Moroccans is among the lowest of all immigrant groups in Europe (de Haas 2013). Moreover, only a small portion of returnees have children (Cassarino 2008), implying that the reintegration of children upon permanent return is not a principal issue.

134 transnational practice of regular homeland visits. Contrary to the homeland- centered rationality, however, homeland visits are not problematized per se. Policies here aim not to change practices to the homeland’s benefit but rather to improve the quality of the experience for those involved.

Second, beyond their practical utility during homeland visits, language proficiency and cultural familiarity are more broadly understood as means to stay in touch with the origin country on a more permanent basis. Put differently, “This education really enables the Moroccan community to maintain the umbilical cord with the country of origin” (Managing director L). As such, diaspora policies respond to initial migrant parents’ craving to pass on their national, cultural and religious affiliations to their children.

Third, and contrary to popular belief that children and youngsters of Moroccan origin are forced to learn Arabic by their parents, in the FHII it is argued that post-migrant generations themselves consider learning Arabic to be valuable. Thus, the language demand, initially coming from migrant parents, has “spilled over” to the next generations.

“This may appear paradoxical, but the demand today is coming much more from youngsters... [Their parents] have transmitted to their children the necessity of knowing [Arabic] because it opens employment horizons, particularly in the Gulf countries. This has led to the current demand of having some Arabic language proficiency… There is a material interest that is obvious and that is legitimate.” (Managing director N)

If, according to homeland-centered rationality, Arabic language training was key to the origin country’s interests, according to diaspora-centered rationality, its benefits for post-migrant Moroccans themselves are prioritized.

According to the demand-based logic of the diaspora-centered rationality, policies are only required if asked for by members of the diaspora and if these policies address their needs directly. This is because members of the diaspora are considered to know best what they need. Consequently, diaspora policies should not make any special effort to reach out to expatriate community members who show no interest in involvement.

135 “We should not produce actions and activities for people who don’t need them. For example, regarding Arabic language [education] and the practice of sending theater groups or music groups, if there are no requests, we send them there, where there is a demand. Where the demand is absent, we consider that there is no need for these activities and therefore, we are reassured.” (Managing director N)

This demand-driven, non-interventionist approach explains not only where and how the FHII intervenes (ways of acting) but also what it is not doing. This logic legitimizes, for instance, the FHII’s relatively limited offer of education in Tamazight, the Berber language spoken in Morocco (recognized as an official language by Morocco since 2011). While a significant share of expatriate Moroccans originate from Berber-speaking areas and consider Tamazight, rather than Moroccan Arabic, to be their mother tongue, according to FHII employees, there is little demand for Berber language education.

“So far, the entire demand presented to us is formulated as a demand for Arabic… [It is] the demand, the pressing demand… All Moroccans, [when] asked, ‘what are your needs?’ they recount ‘[learning] Arabic,’ ‘being Moroccan,’ and ‘being connected with the culture and the religion,’ that’s it.” (Managing director N)

In this rationality, heterogeneity among post-migrant Moroccans is the point of departure for policy action, since “there is no single ‘young Moroccan living abroad’” but instead “millions of young Moroccans living abroad” (Managing director K). In contrast to the homeland-centered rationality, in the diaspora- centered government rationality, no single issue is put forward as “the” policy problem regarding post-migrant Moroccans. Accordingly, rather than looking for a uniform “miracle receipt,” tailor-made actions are preferred. Also, policy actions do not prioritize “the future elite,” as is the case in the MCMRE. All these elements indicate the more demand-driven nature of the FHII’s rationality.

Overall, a predefined strategic-political agenda regarding transnational attachments or practices of young Moroccans abroad seems consistently absent for the FHII. For instance, no policy position is taken on return migration or emigration, and investments in Morocco are not promoted as such. Rather, the

136 FHII regards its duty as informing potential investors, warning them about pitfalls, and assisting upon request — all with the aim of reducing the risk of failure. This does not mean that the government rationality is non-normative, only that its norms are not grounded in a homeland-centered logic. A central normative position in this rationality is that knowing one’s roots has general benefits for personal well-being and identity development:

“For example, the language courses, they are important for your own identity. Someone who knows his own identity has a strong personality. If you don’t know your own identity, you feel insecure.”(Civil servant E)

In particular, hybrid identities incorporating the national identity of both receiving and origin countries are considered favorable. As managing director K explains, migrant descendants, because of their dual national belongings, “are the ideal interface for partnerships” between Morocco and the countries of residence. He prefers such an approach to an exclusive understanding of belonging, either as part of the “external pillar” of Moroccan society or as part of the country of residence.

“Imagine a Moroccan who was born in [a certain country of residence], has studied there, knows [that country] inside out and is an exemplary citizen of that country — at the same time, he can be a good Moroccan citizen. It’s better to sit on two “chairs” at the same time, than to fall in between.” (Managing director K)

Embracing both national affiliations is put forward as the most fruitful approach to the identity of post-migrant generations. On the contrary, if people choose one nationality — meaning they “give up” their other nationality and assimilate completely — “this is a catastrophe.” The FHII therefore considers it part of its mission to promote a dual (national) identity. It argues that countries of residence should adopt a more relaxed attitude toward dual national allegiance and the transnational practices it brings about: “Why would you impede, for example, French Moroccans to come on holiday to Morocco?” (Managing director K) However, while no moral obligation with regard to Moroccan national interests is articulated and “ambassadorship” is not assumed, the appraisal of a dual national identity in this rationality implies the superiority of post-migrant

137 Moroccans who cultivate their affiliation to Morocco, compared to those who show little interest in their Moroccan roots. As an example, emigrant youngsters’ alienation from their Moroccan origins is considered one of the root causes of their social deprivation. Therefore, although this rationality is in various respects less directive than the homeland-centered rationality, here too a moral guideline for the post-migrant Moroccan’s way of being is presented.

The conceptualization of the Moroccan emigrant population as heterogeneous, with ever-shifting needs, results in a flexible policy approach. Should the demand for particular programs (such as language education programs) disappear or change in the future, a shift in the offer of diaspora policy programs would be the rational result:

“I don’t have the numbers but if in a few years, the Foundation wouldn’t receive requests for language courses any longer…, it would be wasted money [to continue this education], in my opinion.” (Civil servant E)

As a result, in this government rationality it is uncertain what the future will bring. Some current programs may become entirely redundant, while new policy actions may need to be developed. This illustrates how “ways of thinking and speaking” about the policy’s target group are dynamically linked to the policy’s “ways of acting”.

COMPARING AND CONTEXTUALIZING GOVERNMENT RATIONALITIES

The previous sections unraveled the government rationalities of the two main Moroccan diaspora institutions. Both rationalities link a particular notion of post- migrant Moroccans and their relation to Morocco (ways of thinking) to certain cultural diaspora policies (ways of acting), and moral guidelines for the governed (ways of being). How, though, do these two distinctive rationalities relate to each other with regard to these three aspects?

Concerning the ways of thinking about post-migrant Moroccans, the homeland-centered rationality underlines the instrumental value of their homeland-oriented ties. A strong transnational cultural affiliation is applauded, as

138 it is considered to be related to profitable transnational practices, such as remittances, diaspora philanthropy, and diaspora investments. As such, cultural diaspora policies dedicated to migrant descendants are rationalized through a variant of the widely used “tapping explanation” that focuses on states’ pursuit of material resources through engaging diasporas (Gamlen 2014). In contrast, the diaspora-centered rationality rejects this instrumental approach of homeland- oriented ties and defines their value more in social and psychological terms: these ties are valuable because they are central to the self-esteem and wellbeing of migrant descendants themselves.

These different conceptualizations of transnational ties correspond to diverging perspectives on cultural diaspora policies, i.e., different ways of acting. In the homeland-centered rationality, cultural diaspora policies are naturally intertwined with other elements of the broader diaspora policy agenda, such as policies stimulating the dedication of the diaspora’s human capital to homeland development. This rationality exudes a proactive, interventionist idea of diaspora policies: post-migrant Moroccans’ existing relationships with the homeland are to be reshaped and modified through policies to ultimately mold them into their desired form. In contrast, the diaspora-centered rationality approaches cultural diaspora policies independently from broader strategic-political agendas. There are few pre-set goals but those that exist are defined by the target group. As such, diaspora policies are attributed a more reactive, assisting role. The policy aim is not to change post-migrant Moroccans’ transnational ties to Morocco but to offer support where needed. These diverging modes of thinking are also reflected in concrete practices. The FHII focuses more on sustainable informal cooperation with Moroccan and non-Moroccan civil society actors from the country of residence, resulting in tailored cooperation. The MCMRE’s actions, by contrast, feature more top-down, standardized initiatives, with pre-set goals explicitly connected to the government’s broader development agenda.

What constitutes the “model” post-migrant Moroccan also differs between the two institutions. While in their “ways of being” both rationalities put forward a well-developed dual national identity as desirable, in the homeland-centered rationality this position is related to the assumed strategic utility of dual identities for Moroccan interests, whereas in the diaspora-centered rationality the positive side-effects for the (post-)migrant dual citizens matter most. Another difference can be found in the articulation of an economic dimension. In the MCMRE,

139 expectations about socio-economic contribution to the homeland are explicit. Actions selectively aim at those post-migrant Moroccans who are considered most likely to accomplish this contribution. The MCMRE’s purposeful aiming at “tomorrow’s elite” reveals the selective nature of extraterritorial state practices: the visible targets are those in privileged class positions, while others, such as low-class labor migrants, are neglected (Ho 2011, Mani & Varadarajan 2005). This focus is evident in programs such as the Summer Universities, in which only expatriate Moroccans enrolled in higher education are eligible to participate.

Contrarily, in the FHII’s rationality, which takes diaspora needs as its starting point, this selective focus seems absent. Programs aim as much at vulnerable categories of expatriates, such as elderly, prisoners and youngsters in a precarious condition, as at the highly skilled.

The co-existence of two different government rationalities within a single national context begs the question, what factors contribute to this plurality? While the governmentality perspective is more concerned with the nature of rationalities than with their sources (Gamlen 2014), reflection on the question is useful to contextualize my findings.

We may assume that the nature of both institutions and their positions within the Moroccan state apparatus deeply impact upon government rationalities. As outlined in a previous section, the FHII operates as a semi-independent institution, while the MCMRE, as a governmental department, is strongly interlinked with national politics. While bound by decree, the FHII is not accountable to the Moroccan government or public and is mainly funded by emigrant money, though indirectly. This may help explain why the FHII’s rationality does not refer to Moroccan national interests and focuses instead on the beneficiaries’. On the contrary, for the MCMRE, as a national political body, the government rationality needs to fit into the broader policy framework of serving the “national interests” in economic and political terms. As the Monarchy sets the course for government policies, it is not surprising to find the MCMRE’s rationality resonating with King Mohammed VI’s discourses. Indeed, the MCMRE’s re-establishment by Mohammed VI in 2007 can be regarded as a strategic maneuver to invigorate his strategic course. In comparison, the FHII is a relic of King Hassan II’s strategic diaspora approach. However, it too has adapted its rationality to shifting

140 circumstances, by moving away from paternalist rationality to a more cooperative diaspora-centered approach.

In addition, differences in institutional continuity are relevant to understanding diverging rationalities. The MCMRE has taken many forms since its inception and was even abandoned completely for some years. In addition, during my fieldwork I observed high turnover of staff members, especially in the higher echelons, which is related to party politics. In contrast, FHII personnel I interviewed had worked there for almost two decades. Consequently, the FHII is characterized by a stronger continuity in terms of expertise and networking with Moroccan expatriate communities. This has nurtured a more historically grounded government rationality, whereas in the MCMRE, the rationality centers on a future-oriented political project.

CONCLUSION

In a global context where diaspora policies have become a regular feature of political life (Gamlen 2014), how do origin states approach the descendants of their emigrants? More particularly, how do diaspora institutions think about and act towards this group? These are important questions, as the current policy approach to post-migrant youth may have strong implications for state-diaspora relations in the long term. My empirical investigation of Moroccan diaspora policies reveals that there is no single answer to these questions. Different conceptualizations of post-migrant Moroccans and their “problems” co-exist, as do diverging ways to respond to these problems policy-wise.

The homeland-centered rationality, dominant in the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad, reveals how the conceptualization of emigrants as a resource is extended across generations to include foreign-born descendants of emigrants. Particularly remarkable in this rationality is the overt instrumentalization of homeland-oriented cultural attachments of post-migrant generations for the benefit of the origin state. The diaspora-centered rationality, articulated by the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad, is notable for revealing an alternative origin-state understanding of diaspora policies. The tone of this rationality, averse to political interests and supporting the self- determination of post-migrant generations regarding their homeland ties, bears

141 little resemblance to the nationalist leitmotif of the competing homeland-centered rationality.

The findings undermine the homogeneity of origin states’ diaspora policies and endorse a neo-pluralist understanding of the origin state (Fitzgerald 2006). The existence of two distinctive diaspora policy rationalities within a single origin state illustrates how competing policy rationalities can co-exist and points to the plurality of government rationalities (Bröckling et al. 2011). As the article shows, diaspora institutions may articulate and act according to very different understandings of the same emigration reality.

In fact, the different rationalities represent competing views on who needs to take care of whom — the homeland of the diaspora or the diaspora of the homeland? In the diaspora-centered rationality, policies are grounded in the state’s historical responsibility toward emigrants and their children, while the homeland- centered rationality stresses that emigrants and their descendants continue to carry responsibility toward their country of origin. These diverging vantage points bring to the fore a fundamental question: should diaspora policies serve the homeland or the diaspora? While the tensions between homeland and diaspora interests have been illustrated before (Ho 2011; Mani & Varadarajan 2005), my analysis shows these tensions are also present at the state level, through diaspora institutions affiliating more with one of these positions.

On a more general level, this study demonstrates how demographic and other evolutions in the diaspora impact origin countries’ outlook on the diaspora. The Moroccan state’s interest in the “next generations” of Moroccans abroad and the development of targeted policies for this group illustrate the state’s attempt to manage shifting migration realities. For migration scholars, these observations underpin the need to reject static, monolithic understandings of diaspora. The adoption of more dynamic, empirically grounded perspectives on diasporic communities, taking into account generational and other changes, is necessary to enable more fine-grained understandings of state-diaspora relations in Morocco and elsewhere.

142 143 144 CHAPTER 5:

THE SHIFTING MOROCCAN POLICY PARADIGM REGARDING THE INTEGRATION OF MRES90 (MOROCCANS LIVING ABROAD): RECONCILING TRANSNATIONAL TIES AND MIGRANT INTEGRATION 91

90 Marocains Résidant à l’étranger

91 This chapter was published as Mahieu, R., C. Timmerman and N. Fadil. 2017. “The shifting Moroccan policy paradigm regarding the integration of MRE’s (Moroccans Living Abroad): reconciling transnational ties and migrant integration.” Pp. 191-218 in Moroccan Migration in Belgium. More than 50 Years of Settlement, edited by C. Timmerman, N. Fadil, I. Goddeeris, N. Clycq.

145 146 ABSTRACT

This chapter focuses on the way in which the Moroccan state approaches the Moroccan expatriate population. Since the outset of large-scale emigration from Morocco, the country’s diaspora policies have evolved thoroughly. A remarkable shift can be seen in the Moroccan official position on the integration of expatriate Moroccans in the receiving countries. This position evolved from rejection to promotion of immigrant integration. In this chapter we outline this evolution. We discuss how, in current Moroccan policy discourses, the maintenance of transnational ties is reconciled with integration in the receiving countries. As such, the chapter contributes to an empirical understanding of the origin-state perspective on the integration of its emigrants in the society of settlement.

INTRODUCTION

Existing literature on diaspora policies has tended to pay attention to the ways in which countries of origin incite emigrants to sustain and cultivate transnational links to their “homeland” (Gamlen, 2006; Dufoix, Guerassimoff and de Tinguy 2010; Collyer, 2013a). Studies have documented the wide spectrum of strategies origin states employ in order to secure their emigrants’ transnational ties, including institution building (Gamlen 2014), the granting of political rights (Lafleur 2016) and language and cultural education. As such, these studies uncover the various ways in which emigrants’ connections with “home” seem to be a continuous point of concern by the countries of origin.

Yet what are we to make of cases in which diaspora policies not only seek to maintain transnational ties, but also to foster smooth integration in the country of residence? This case study of Moroccan diaspora policies seeks to show how, beyond maintaining transnational ties to the “homeland,” diaspora policy discourses increasingly address the expatriates as citizens of and subjects of integration in the receiving societies. Nowadays, notions such as intégration (integration) and similar terms, such as enracinement (the act of “taking root”), are omnipresent in official Moroccan diaspora policy discourses, and are seen to relate positively to continued transnational ties to Morocco. This evolution is especially

147 visible in the field of Moroccan cultural diaspora policies, which focus on the transmission of national culture and languages to the emigrants’ descendants.

This evolution is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, it implies a total rupture with previous Moroccan diaspora policy discourses. A few decades ago, integration — and in particular, naturalization, as the most symbolically loaded expression of integration — of expatriate Moroccans in the receiving country was rejected completely, because it was deemed to undermine their homeland affiliation. On the contrary, current Moroccan diaspora policies do not merely tolerate but also promote integration, and embrace dual citizenship92. Secondly, the current Moroccan policy position goes against the grain of a widespread assumption that predominates in contemporary public and political debates on immigrant integration. This assumption states that there is a zero-sum game of attachment in which stronger integration implies weaker transnationalism and vice versa (Carling and Pettersen 2014; Bouras 2012). This viewpoint resonates with the assimilationist perspective on minorities’ ethnocultural accommodation which is, as Joppke (2007) argues, dominant in Western Europe. Accordingly, migrant origin states investing in their emigrants’ transnational ties are regularly accused of “meddling” in migrant populations affairs, thereby “hindering” this population’s integration in the receiving countries. The current Moroccan policy approach, reconciling the concepts integration and transnationalism, seems to be defying these popular assumptions.

While receiving states’ views and policies on integration of immigrants are generally well-investigated, analysis of how countries of origin regard or respond to the integration processes of their expatriate citizens is scarce. The aim of this chapter is therefore to describe and understand this new Moroccan policy interest in and appreciation of “integration”. More in particular, how did integration, once considered to be fully inconsistent with Morocco’s interests, evolve into a desirable outcome of Moroccan diaspora policies? This pertinent reorientation also raises

92 It should be noted here that there is no trade-off between naturalization in the receiving country and retaining the Moroccan nationality. Based on the principle of ius sanguinis, the Moroccan nationality is passed automatically, irrespective of other nationalities. Article 6 of the Moroccan Nationality Code stipulates that any child born of a Moroccan father or mother is a Moroccan citizen. Provided that it is allowed by the receiving country, dual citizenship is tolerated and, indeed, widespread among emigrants (Perrin 2011).

148 the question how the notion of integration is understood in Moroccan policy discourses, especially in relation to transnational ties.

These questions relate to the academic debate about the tension between integration and transnationalism (see e.g. Erdal and Oeppen 2013), concepts that broadly represent the relationship of emigrants (and their descendants) with their country of residence and their country of origin, respectively. In the next, second section of this article we explain how this debate provides us with a suitable analytic framework for studying the Moroccan state’s approach to integration.

In order to understand Morocco’s current policy focus on integration, it is necessary to take into account the historical trajectory leading up to this point. Therefore, in the third section of this article we outline the historical evolution of the Moroccan official stance regarding integration, drawing on literature, policy documents and political discourses.

In the fourth and main part of the article, we disentangle Moroccan diaspora policy makers’ understanding of the interaction between transnationalism and integration, based on an analysis of in-depth interview material.

THE INTEGRATION-TRANSNATIONALISM NEXUS RECONSIDERED: THE ORIGIN STATE PERSPECTIVE

“We will continuously support your efforts to integrate in the countries of settlement […].” (King Mohammed VI, Royal Speech of 20 August 2012)

Studies looking into diaspora policies tend to focus on the sending states’ attempts to turn their emigrants into “transnational subjects” (Smith and Guarnizo 1998) and the wide range of strategies employed for this purpose (Gamlen 2006). Strategies consist of the management and safeguarding of the transnational practices and identifications of emigrants regarding their “homeland,” for instance through emigrant-oriented investment and banking policies (to capture expatriate remittances) or language and cultural policies (to ensure expatriates’ identification with the homeland). Accordingly, diaspora policy discourses cultivate the idealized image of the loyal emigrant, contributing to the homeland’s economic and political

149 interests. Therefore, diaspora policies can be regarded as the origin state’s policy response to the reality of migrant transnationalism.

However, in our case study on Moroccan diaspora policy discourses, a matter emerged which cannot be understood through this transnational lens, since it seems largely unrelated to homeland issues and interests. Besides continuing homeland-oriented (transnational) concerns, we detected a growing policy interest on behalf of the Moroccan State regarding the issue of integration, that is, the adaptation and incorporation of the migrants into their respective receiving societies. In-depth empirical studies that investigate this policy dimension of diaspora policies are rare and usually do not take into account the origin state perspective93.

To make sense of this emergence of the notion “integration” on the Moroccan diaspora policy agenda, we need a conceptual framework not only incorporating the notion of integration, but also taking into consideration its complex interaction with continuing transnational ties to the homeland. For this, we turn to the scholarly debate on the complex empirical relationship between migrant integration and transnationalism (Erdal and Oeppen 2013; Snel et al. 2006). While this debate is mainly confined to understanding the micro-level interaction between both processes in migrants’ everyday lives, the conceptual framework of the “transnationalism/integration nexus” is useful as well to frame the state of origin position regarding integration and the interrelation between emigrants’ integration and their transnationalism. Particularly suitable for this purpose is the typology of Erdal and Oeppen (2013:878) distinguishing between three forms of interaction between integration and transnationalism. The first type of interaction is “additive”: here the result of the interaction between processes of integration and transnationalism equals the sum of the two, implying they are separate processes not influencing one another. The second type of interaction is “synergistic,” where the result of the interaction is greater than the sum of the two parts, meaning that integration and transnationalism processes stimulate each other. The third type of interaction is “antagonistic”; here the outcome of the

93 In their explorative study, Desiderio and Weinar (2014) observed that “The main origin countries of migrants residing in the European Union — such as Turkey and Morocco—have progressively moved away from rhetoric that stigmatizes integration in the receiving society, and have instead started to encourage integration as an instrumental process for leveraging development returns to emigration.”

150 interaction is less than the sum of the two. This is the opposite of the synergistic interaction, because here integration and transnationalism processes thwart each other. While the case of antagonistic interaction supports the popular belief that migrant integration necessarily implies a loosening of ties to the homeland, the case of additive interaction does not support this hypothesis and the case of synergistic interaction even refutes it.

We argue that this basic typology, while in origin interested in describing empirical relationships between two dimensions of migrants’ daily lives, can be used as an analytic lens to study shifting (state) discourses on integration and transnationalism. More precisely, this typology allows us to make sense of the emergence of “integration” as a goal in the Moroccan state’s diaspora policies, and makes clear how integration is conceptualized in relation to other, “classic” homeland-related aims. A core question is to what extent we can observe in discourses a conceptual juxtaposition between integration on the one hand and loyalty to one’s roots on the other hand, or reconciliation of both positions.

THE MOROCCAN PARADIGM SHIFT REGARDING EMIGRANT INTEGRATION: FROM REJECTION TO PROMOTION

Over the course of the last decades, the Moroccan state’s position on the integration of its expatriate citizens in their countries of residence has evolved from outspoken hostility to warm embracement. The paradigm shift was not sudden, but the result of a gradual evolution in the official position occurring in two stages. First, in the 1990s, there was a shift from rejection to acceptance of integration, and more recently, there was a shift from acceptance to promotion. The first shift, documented by various scholars (de Haas 2007; Brand 2006; Iskander 2010), implied that the Moroccan State started to recognize and tolerate that Moroccan expatriates were increasingly incorporated in all realms of the host society, that is, de facto integration was taking place. Moreover, the state acknowledged that this integration did not necessarily harm emigrants’ transnational ties to Morocco. As a consequence, the Moroccan State no longer denounced its emigrants’ integration, nor its main symbol, naturalization.

151 Based on our empirical examination of current Moroccan diaspora policies, we now argue that a second discursive shift has taken place: from mere acceptance to more active encouragement. Today, integration is not only tolerated by the Moroccan State, moreover, it has become a constitutive element of its official policy agenda. In addition, the state promotes the idea that continued transnational ties have a positive effect on integration. As this current paradigm has not been investigated yet, we will describe it more extensively than the first shift.

Using Erdal and Oeppen’s (2013:878) threefold interaction typology as analytic lens, we argue that over the course of the last three decades, the Moroccan official understanding of the relationship between integration and transnationalism has evolved from antagonistic to synergistic. This implies that the assumed relationship between integration and transnationalism, which also depends on a specific understanding of integration, has been redrawn.

THE ANTAGONISTIC PERSPECTIVE: INTEGRATION AS A THREAT TO TRANSNATIONAL TIES

In the first decades of Moroccan mass emigration, durable integration of Moroccan migrants in the receiving countries was a non-issue for the Moroccan State, as well as for the receiving states. Moroccan labour migration was considered temporary and transitory (Benkirane 2010; De Haas 2007), an assumption supported by the circular character of Moroccan migration in the 1960s (Iskander 2010). However, the question of integration would soon enter the political agenda. Due to the wave of family reunification following the 1974 labour recruitment stop, the demographic composition of the expatriate communities started to shift, from male workers to families with children. As the profile of Moroccan emigrant communities shifted, transnational practices and homeland loyalties started to change too. As Brand (2006) notes, this was a matter of state concern because “no longer could Rabat assume that these Moroccans would all eventually return home to retire, bringing with them their accumulated savings and expertise. Nor could it simply expect or assume that they would maintain their ties of loyalty to family, culture, religion, or, most importantly, king” (2006:89).

152 While the dream of return was not abandoned completely, expatriate Moroccans were de facto integrating into their receiving societies. However, this reality was not recognized by the Moroccan State. On the contrary, the Moroccan monarchy and government strongly rejected and denounced any form of integration in the receiving countries up to the early ‘90s. For instance, emancipatory migrant movements advocating for Moroccan migrants’ (political) rights in the receiving countries were fiercely condemned, just as the idea of naturalization. Exemplary here was the interview of late King Hassan II on national French television in 1989, in which he defended his anti-integration stance and imprinted on Moroccans in France not to participate in French politics:

“I am against it . . . for the simple reason that for me, there is no distinction between a Moroccan born in Morocco and raised in Morocco and a Moroccan born in France and raised in France. […] I am against integration, in any sense of the term. […] I told them [Moroccan emigrants], you shouldn’t fill your head and your spirit, at night before going to bed, with electoral problems that do not concern you, that are not yours. Because you are definitely not French. They’ll always court your voices but then they’ll always forget you afterwards.” (King Hassan II as quoted in Iskander 2010:324)

The main reason for this Moroccan reluctance regarding emigrants’ integration and political participation in European countries was the fear that Moroccan dissidents would be politically empowered abroad and cause unrest in their homeland (Desiderio and Weinar 2014). During the nation-wide French labor strikes in the 1970s in which French Moroccan labor migrants took a prominent role, Morocco grew concerned that these organized protests would spill over and destabilize the Moroccan political system (Iskander, 2010). In addition, the state worried that incorporation into the receiving country would decrease remittances (de Haas 2007). In sum, during this period the Moroccan State considered emigrants’ transnational loyalties to be irreconcilable with deeper entrenchment into the receiving countries, which attests to an antagonistic understanding of the interaction between integration and transnationalism.

153 THE TURNING POINT: RECOGNITION OF INTEGRATION

However, by the end of the 1980s, this approach by the Moroccan State proved counterproductive, only increasing the sense of alienation of Moroccan emigrants and their descendants of the Moroccan State. As a result, the government’s drive to keep emigrants from becoming enfranchised workers undermined the government’s ambition to convert Moroccan labor into capital for the Kingdom’s economy (Iskander 2010). Moreover, opportunities for migrants to participate in the receiving countries grew, irrespective of Morocco’s approach. Increasingly, Western European states offered immigrants a range of opportunities for social and political participation, and in some cases, access to citizenship. These evolutions represented a direct threat to Hassan II’s claim on its subjects, which triggered the Moroccan State to change its approach radically. From the late ‘90s on, the Moroccan State began to acknowledge that only by accepting the gradual integration of MREs into European host states, there would be a chance of preserving ties of sovereignty. As such, the Moroccan State moved away from its former position, which rejected integration in order to hold on to its subjects (Brand 2006).

As the demographic outlook of Moroccan expatriate communities shifted from male workers to emigrant families, the Moroccan government shifted its focus accordingly, from controlling workers’ organizational activities to engaging with emigrant families in order to define their cultural relationship with Morocco. Within this new approach the officially promoted cultural identity for expatriate Moroccans, and accordingly, the official discourses on integration, showed a significant departure from previous state rhetoric. Return to the homeland or exclusive allegiance to the Moroccan State was no longer required for Moroccan cultural belonging, moreover, “in an abrupt about-face from the position the king had maintained vociferously for decades […] the Moroccan regime was no longer against Moroccan emigrants’ integration into their host societies” (Iskander 2010:174). While integration no longer implied weakening ties of loyalty to Morocco, the Moroccan State stressed however that Moroccan nationality was inalienable (de Haas 2007). The indissoluble, perpetual nature of the connection to Morocco was further underlined as the relationship between expatriate Moroccans and the Moroccan King was reframed in filial terms (the King as father, the Moroccans abroad as his children) (Iskander 2010).

154 In sum, the antagonist understanding was abandoned, making way for a more pragmatic position. Integration of Moroccan emigrants and their descendants in the receiving countries was tolerated, and was no longer considered to impact emigrants’ transnational loyalties in a negative sense. Moreover, slowly the understanding emerged that structural integration could support MREs transnational engagements such as the practice of sending remittances (de Haas 2007). Brand (2006) understands this paradigm shift as a pragmatic move: a more limited form of sovereignty over expatriates was accepted “in order not to lose them entirely by joining what would certainly be a losing battle against the reality of growing integration” (2006:83). However, at this stage, Moroccan policies did not consider integration to be an official policy goal in and of itself, nor was integration linked substantially to the idea of maintaining loyalty. Therefore, we propose to read this period as a transition period between two opposite paradigms: overt rejection of integration (an “antagonistic” understanding of the integration- transnationalism nexus), on the one hand, and encouragement of integration (a “synergistic” understanding of this nexus), on the other.

THE SYNERGISTIC PERSPECTIVE: PROMOTING INTEGRATION AS A DIASPORA POLICY GOAL

Looking at Moroccan diaspora policies today, approximately two decades later, we initially seem to find similar notions as before: acknowledgement of the permanent settlement of Moroccan migrants and their descendants in the receiving societies. In the strategic plan of the leading Moroccan diaspora institution, the Ministry for Moroccans Residing Abroad and Migration Affairs (MCMRE)94, the “permanent installation” and the “emergence of new generations” are recognized as major evolutions in Moroccan expatriate communities:

“Integration of MRE in the receiving countries is irreversible; due to massive naturalization, the socio-economic insertion of the younger generations and political participation. […] The integration of the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad in the

94 At the time of fieldwork and analysis for this chapter, the MCMRE was an independent ministry. However, in the new government presided by El Othmani, which was installed in April 2017, the migration portfolio was assigned to the Minister-Delegate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

155 countries of residence does not affect the consistency of their primary loyalty to the country of origin. The relationship with Morocco is an elementary socio-cultural and economic component of Moroccan emigration. It is situated at the origin of the migratory project […].” (MCMRE 2012/2013)

Clearly, integration is no longer defined as a threat for the expatriates’ loyalty; on the contrary, strong ties with Morocco are presented here as an inherent characteristic of Moroccan migrant communities, unwavering across time and generations. The incorporation of expatriate Moroccans has also been legally enshrined: the new Constitution of 2011 recognizes the citizenship of expatriate Moroccans in their respective countries of residence95.

However, at the same time, current Moroccan diaspora policies increasingly frame integration not just as a reality to take into account, but also as a central policy goal. First signs can be found in the early years of the new millennium. In a 2003 government-supported strategic note, for instance, the Deputy Minister for the Moroccan community living abroad96 aims

“To encourage integration and coexistence in the receiving societies, while preserving fully Moroccan national identity in its Muslim, Arab and Amazigh dimension […] [and] to incite [the Moroccan community abroad] to assume responsibility as citizens, as well as membership in political, syndicalist and associative life [in the receiving societies].” (Deputy Minister for the Moroccan Community Living Abroad, as quoted in Benkirane 2010:8)

By this time, expatriate Moroccans’ integration is actively encouraged, and this notion is incorporated throughout state discourses. Especially since the

95 Article 16 stipulates “the Kingdom of Morocco works to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the Moroccan citizens (f/m) residing abroad, while respecting the international law and the laws effective in the countries of residence […]. It guards the strengthening of their contribution to the development of their fatherland, Morocco, and to the tightening of the friendship and cooperation ties with the governments and societies of the countries where they live or where they are citizens too.” [Italics added]

96 At that time, a fully fledged Ministry for Moroccans living abroad was missing; instead a Minister-Delegate had been appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

156 reinstallation in 2007 of a fully fledged Ministry for Moroccans Residing Abroad, this new approach seems to have gained momentum. According to the first minister in charge of this institution, Morocco seeks to develop diaspora policies “embracing all aspects of the daily life of the community,” replacing the narrow mercantile approach characterizing Morocco’s diaspora policies up to the early ‘90s. This policy vision translates as a holistic, dual policy approach “supporting the integration of MRE in the host societies, while contributing to the consolidation and strengthening of ties with Morocco.”97 In the same vein, the first out of four objectives in the Ministry’s 2008-2012 Strategic Plan is

“To assist the integration (l’enracinement98) of the new generations in the countries of residence without uprooting (le déracinement) their ties with the country or origin.” (MCMRE 2008)

Interestingly, integration and transnationalism are now conceived as intertwined processes. The subsequent 2012-2016 Strategic Plan further recognizes that the Moroccan diaspora institutions take on some “new roles” vis-à-vis Moroccans living abroad; namely, the roles of “representing the Moroccans Living Abroad, promoting their integration and defending their rights” (italics added).

Observing the widespread use of this notion in current Moroccan diaspora policy discourses, the question raises what actually counts as “integration”. By and large, we find that when integration is mentioned, in the first place structural integration is meant, rather than more extensive interpretations including socio- cultural integration or even assimilation. For instance, one of the policy objectives of the 2008-2012 Strategic Plan clearly hints at structural integration only:

“Favoring cultural proximity to Morocco, by offering the Global Moroccans an adapted cultural offer coherent with the objectives of their socio-economic integration in the receiving societies.” [Italics added] (MCMRE 2008)

97 Press article “Les Marocains du monde et du Canada sont un gisement de compétences. Entretien avec Mohamed Ameur, Ministre Chargé de la Communauté MRE.” Le Matin, 1/12/2010.

98 Literally, enracinement means “taking root” while déracinement refers at “losing your roots”.

157 More specifically, high value is placed on obtaining an educational degree and participating in the labor force, while language acquisition, naturalization99 and political participation in the receiving country are acknowledged to facilitate these processes. Also, obedience to the laws and regulations of the host society is promoted.

There is however a clear limit to what “integration” entails, as conceptualizations of integration that require “loosening” or “cutting” cultural, linguistic and religious ties with the country of origin are rejected. This position is illustrated in the MCMRE Minister’s intervention on the Global Diaspora Conference in 2013:

“The cultural enrichment the migrant brings to his two countries, contributes to the rapprochement of nations, to breaking up and fighting prejudices and stereotypes, and the promotion of tolerance, and to the rejection of discriminatory and xenophobic attitudes. In this sense, it is incumbent on all of us to encourage models of integration that are uniting in a balanced manner the freedom and right of preservation of the cultural identity of the migrant, while respecting the social values and civic and legal duties in the host country.100” [Italics added]

When it comes to ethnocultural identity, expatriate Moroccans are expected to remain “Moroccan at heart”. Desiderio and Weinar (2014) also note the Moroccan state’s tendency to focus on functional, i.e., economic, civic and political, integration. Smith & Guarnizo (1998) discern a similar pattern in various sending states: while states encourage their emigrants’ instrumental accommodation to receiving society, simultaneously, these states inhibit the emigrants’ cultural assimilation and promote their own national culture. Thus, while origin states (including the Moroccan State) incorporate the concept of “integration” in their discourses, they can be seen to put forward a particular understanding of it that does not contradict other (transnational) claims.

99 See footnote 92.

100 International Dialogue on Migration 2013: Conférence Ministérielle sur la Diaspora Genève 18 & 19-6-2013. Session 3: Migration et Développement. Intervention de Mr Abdellatif Mâzouz Ministre Délégué auprès du Chef du Gouvernement chargé des Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger.

158 The new Moroccan policy paradigm on integration is also reflected in the reframing of older policy programs dating back to the era during which integration was denounced completely. A good example here is the organization of education aimed at transferring national language(s) and culture (a program commonly referred to as ELACM – Enseignement de la langue Arabe et de la culture Marocaine) and religion to the “next” generation (the emigrants’ descendants). This education is at the heart of Moroccan cultural diaspora policies, and different diaspora institutions are involved in it. Previously, these programs were aimed at smoothening eventual return migration and the preservation of an “umbilical cord” with the country of origin. According to de Haas (2007), they were actually the Moroccan state’s attempt to prevent migrant descendants’ integration in the receiving country and their alienation of the country of origin. However, in current policies, we see a different meaning being attached to these policies: they are presented as beneficial for integration. For instance, the Strategic Action Plan 2008-2012 (MCMRE 2008) explains that education of the Arabic language and Moroccan culture for children with Moroccan background is organized in order to “preserve their cultural identity, strengthen their ties with the motherland, and realize the conditions necessary for their integration in the countries of residence” (2008:23) [italics added]. Also more recently developed cultural policy programs, such as the establishment of Moroccan cultural centers in various receiving countries (Dar el Maghrib) and the Summer Universities for young Moroccans living abroad, are inscribed into this logic: they are consistently presented as either “fully coherent with” or “contributing to” integration.

Similarly, Moroccan diaspora policies increasingly promote social cohesion and interaction between expatriate Moroccans and the other (non-Moroccan) citizens of receiving societies. Some exposure programs (like the Ministry’s Séjours Culturels) involve bringing not only expatriate Moroccans to Morocco, but also their non-Moroccan peers, in order to improve the latter group’s perception of Morocco and Moroccan culture. Other programs support Moroccan cultural events in the country of residence, actions that are equally aiming at harmonious intercultural relations and at reducing negative stereotypes about Moroccans. Again, policy actions that were previously conceptualized ― in a “transnational” logic ― as preserving expatriate Moroccans’ ties to Morocco are now understood from a different angle: they are seen to be improving social cohesion and intercultural understanding, and therefore, to be paving the way to integration.

159 However, this does not imply full abandonment of older, “transnational” claims. Rather, both viewpoints exist simultaneously. This characterizes the new synergistic understanding, in which integration and transnational ties go hand in hand.

Moroccan diaspora policies also increasingly aim at supporting structural integration of expatriate Moroccans in a more direct manner. For instance, the Ministry for Moroccans living abroad recently started paying attention to the issue of school failure among expatriate Moroccan students. In 2015, this attention translated into a pilot study on the subject across various residence countries. Among other things, this study concluded that European education policies have failed to integrate Moroccan children. In response to the study’s results, the Ministry launched a participative, project-based policy approach in close cooperation with Moroccan migrant organizations active in the field of education. This focus on school failure was framed as a new approach of the Ministry regarding the educational support for expatriate Moroccan children, complementing the existing educational programs101.

Clearly, this current approach to integration is more ambitious than previous approaches. The policy discourses display overt ambition to contribute to the emigrants’ integration. Through its diaspora policies, the Moroccan State appears to be claiming a position as a legitimate stakeholder in the integration process of expatriate Moroccans. This ambition is explicitly expressed in a media interview of the Moroccan ambassador in Belgium (2009), explaining the Moroccan State perspective regarding its expatriate communities to a Belgian audience:

“The reality is: there is a large Moroccan community […] that has ties to Morocco. Our position is: one needs to make the difference between citizenship and identity. Too often, the Moroccan identity of Moroccans [living in Belgium] is denied; they want to make Belgians of them […]. Because of integration troubles, unfortunately, many Moroccan youngsters end up as petty criminals or in religious extremism. We need to control the

101 Press article “La performance scolaire des enfants MRE conditionnée par plusieurs facteurs (étude). Atlasinfo.fr (MAP) 29-02-2016.

160 situation, and this can be done more effectively in cooperation. We [the Moroccan State] can help you.”102

On the one hand, this excerpt reveals how the Moroccan state, by offering the receiving state a “helping hand” in dealing more efficiently with integration-related challenges, is claiming the legitimacy of its authority regarding Moroccan expatriate communities. The ambassador conveys the message that the Moroccan State is a significant stakeholder, capable of improving the integration of expatriate Moroccans in their receiving societies. On the other hand, the excerpt illustrates the critical view of the Moroccan State regarding the way many receiving countries — and most in particular, European countries — pursue and conceptualize integration. Especially assimilationist policies are denounced fiercely by Morocco. This point is repeatedly articulated, though usually in rather veiled terms. For instance, a Strategic Note of the Ministry (2008) states that

“Host countries of the Community of Moroccans Living Abroad are posing more and more openly the question of the integration of this population. This integration, if it is done according to the standards and policies of the countries of residence, risks, eventually, to separate this community from its country of origin, with all the consequences.”103

In sum, the emergence of “integration” on the diaspora policy agenda does not only imply that the Moroccan State is broadening its policy agenda; it also reinforces its authority regarding expatriate Moroccans’ affairs. However, throughout the process of incorporating the notion of integration, we also witness how Moroccan State actors articulate a very particular understanding of integration that complies with Morocco’s broader political (transnational) agenda. This point is discussed in the next section.

102 Press article “Dossier Belliraj: Interview met de Ambassadeur van Marokko,” 29-8-2009, MO* Magazine.

103 Note Synthétique Relative à La Stratégie de mobilisation en faveur de la Communauté Marocaine Résidant à l’Etranger. Ministère Chargé de la Communauté MRE. Undated, probably 2008.

161 TRANSNATIONAL ATTACHMENTS AS A LEVER FOR INTEGRATION: UNDERLYING DYNAMICS

“Well, there is a Moroccan proverb, I don’t know how to translate it, but it is saying that ‘If we don’t not know our roots, we cannot integrate easily in other countries’. So, we can say that it’s integration without [uprooting]; it is putting down your roots without uprooting […]. Because someone who does not really know his roots or where he comes from, cannot integrate himself easily. Therefore, the objective [of our policies] is not only to have a Moroccan identity, it is to incite them to integrate more in the societies of the receiving countries.” (Interview with civil servant C, MCMRE)

In the previous part, we outlined how the official Moroccan position on integration evolved throughout the last decades, and highlighted the radical shift in paradigms regarding integration. In this section, we look into the underlying implications of the current paradigm, which reconciles the notion of integration with continuing transnational ties.

The promotion of integration as an official policy goal implies that the Moroccan State is claiming a stakeholder position in the integration of Moroccans living abroad. As explained above, policy programs that were once conceived in order to maintain transnational linkages are now presented as “supporting integration”. Broadly speaking, the recurring argument employed in Moroccan state discourses is that “A strong transnational orientation is a fertile breeding ground for integration”. Resultantly, Morocco’s cultural diaspora policies make a dual claim: not only do they claim to strengthen transnational ties, but also to support Moroccan expatriates’ integration into the receiving country. A closer examination of this argument is necessary, as it explicitly contradicts the widespread, more skeptical belief that diaspora policies thwart emigrants’ integration.

In order to disentangle this argument, we turn to in-depth interviews conducted with a range of officials employed or commissioned by Morocco’s main

162 diaspora institutions (MCMRE, FHII, CCME)104. In the interviews, respondents were inquired extensively about the aims and strategies of cultural diaspora policies. The interviews were especially useful to get a deeper understanding of the concepts underlying more generalist public discourses. Besides interviews, we also consider publicly available documents, such as media interviews with officials and the website content of various diaspora institutions.

In line with our research question, the analysis particularly focuses on how diaspora policy officials assume that their cultural diaspora policies have a positive effect on the expatriates’ integration abroad. What kind of dynamics are these policies supposed to engender, relative to integration? Concretely, how is the transmission of culture, language and religion of origin considered to smoothen the integration of young expatriate Moroccans105? With respect to our analytic framework (see above), respondents’ answers reveal how Moroccan state actors understand the synergy between transnationalism and integration in the Moroccan expatriates’ lives and how they operationalize this understanding policy-wise.

The respondents’ support for the idea that transnational cultural ties to Morocco offer a fertile breeding ground for integration is based on a combination of two distinctive arguments. The first is of a more general nature: it argues that preservation of the culture of origin is a condition for integration, since it is understood that the “culture of origin” offers migrants and their descendants a “point of reference” and a “source of empowerment” in the receiving country society. Contrasting to this more general argument, the second line of reasoning draws on a particular characteristic of the Moroccan culture. Tolerance regarding diversity is portrayed as an inherent characteristic of the Moroccan culture, therefore, a stronger internalization of Moroccan culture by emigrants and their descendants is understood to facilitate integration. As will become clear, the

104 15 interviews conducted in May 2013 and May-June 2014 in the Moroccan Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad (MCMRE), Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad (FHII) and the Council for Moroccan Community Living Abroad (CCME). From the end of 2013, on, “Migration Affairs” was added to the MCMRE’s name (referring to its new competency regarding the incorporation of immigrants in Morocco), but to avoid confusion, we employ the same acronym throughout the article. Interview citations have been anonymized upon request of part of the respondents.

105 The focus of Morocco’s cultural diaspora policies are Moroccan children and youngsters born and raised outside of Morocco.

163 distinction between both arguments mainly serves analytic purposes, as they are usually employed in an interwoven manner.

While the articulation and disentanglement of discourses may appear as a purely conceptual matter, it should be noted that state discourses may have a deep impact on the ground. By presenting the promotion of integration as a shared concern of both origin states and receiving states, opportunities open up for cooperation between diaspora policy actors and a broad range of actors in the receiving countries concerned with “immigrant integration”. As Pécoud (2015) points out, the federative power of shared narratives should not be underestimated. Particularly when the issue at stake is highly sensitive ― like migration ― or the actors have little in common, the existence of shared narratives can constitute the cement of relationships that would not exist otherwise (Ibid. 2015). Therefore, as a result of the paradigm shift, local authorities or community organizations that promote minority incorporation in receiving countries may see the value of cooperating with Moroccan diaspora institutions106.

THE CULTURE OF ORIGIN AS A POINT OF REFERENCE AND A SOURCE OF EMPOWERMENT

“Besides maintaining the ties between the MRE and their motherland and promoting knowledge of the culture and languages of Morocco among the new generations, these cultural policies stimulate a healthy integration in the country of residence, and bring solutions to the identity conflict some young MRE are confronted with [Italics added] (Media interview with Minister of MCMRE).”107

Within Moroccan diaspora policy discourses, a major argument in favor of fostering transnational ties states that in immigration contexts, knowing and acknowledging your roots is essential for the development of a balanced identity

106 In other areas of the Moroccan diaspora policies, the inscription of Moroccan diaspora policies into broader, global policy agendas has proven effective yet: for instance, its participation in the global agenda on migration and development generates a wide range of partnerships and corresponding funding.

107 Identité: l’offre culturel au profit des MRE se renforce. Le Matin, 20-11-2014.

164 and a strong personality. In these discourses, frequent reference is made to the persistence of ethnic, racial and religious identities in other minority groups (such as Jews and Afro-Americans), thereby implying that “knowing your roots” is a universal need transcending the Moroccan context.

Academically, this argument resonates strongly with studies in various academic disciplines (i.a. sociology, social psychology, political philosophy) indicating that when immigrants are allowed to retain socio-cultural praxis and identifications of their “country of origin,” this eventually benefits their incorporation in the receiving societies (Roosens 1998; Modood 2007; Berry et al. 2007; Levrau et al. 2014). One of the explanations given is that such praxis and identifications have a positive impact on immigrants’ self-esteem (Kivisto 2001).

In a similar manner, the manager in charge of the extensive language and cultural education program of the Hassan II Foundation (FHII) frames the culture of origin as a necessary point de repère (point of reference) for Moroccan expatriate citizens, without which one could not adapt sustainably to a new environment ― the society of residence.

“Our actions aim at allowing these Moroccans [living abroad] to just know this [Moroccan] culture, because, if one does not know his own culture, he won’t be able to comprehend or adapt to the place where he is living. […] If we do not manage to situate ourselves, it will be difficult to position ourselves in relation to the country of residence. That’s a bit the essence of our actions.” (Interview with directing manager N, FHII)

However, as he points out, this policy perspective only arose when the return perspective of the initial Moroccan emigrants started to wither away and a new, post-migrant generation emerged:

“We have tried to make this education today an element that offers something valuable to them, that helps these children to integrate. […] To integrate, you have to situate yourself first, [you need] to have this point of reference. This education has evolved somewhat in this sense, from an education to facilitate return [to Morocco] to an education that contributed, more or less, to their integration in the receiving country. That’s the evolution from the

165 sixties on, and it still continues.” (Interview with directing manager N, FHII)

However, the “culture of origin” is here more than just a point of reference, it is also considered a source of empowerment. By increasing expatriate Moroccans’ pride, knowledge and conscience about (the value of) their ethnocultural roots, their self-confidence will rise. A particular cultural model seems to inform these views, which conceives of a strongly defined and valorized (ethnic) identity as a possible resource and cover against alienation. A fragmented and incoherent self- understanding is, on the other hand, perceived as a facilitator of social anomia and marginalization. Having a strongly demarcated Moroccan identity is, consequently, deemed to be an effective protection to withstand negative stereotyping regarding immigrants’ ethnocultural and religious background (like racism and Islamophobia) in the country of residence. Knowledge provides the “ammunition” to shield immigrants from internalization of these stereotypes108.

The underlying dynamic here, that is, the empowerment of expatriate Moroccans by embracing their ethnocultural background, is clarified passionately by one ministry official. He starts his argument by describing the harsh living conditions of young Moroccans growing up in Europe. Particularly problematic, according to him, is the everyday stigmatization young Moroccans experience due to their Arab and Muslim background, a phenomenon that is fueled by misinformation:

“So, if a youngster, for instance in the suburbs of a European city, [faces] problems like exclusion, unemployment, delinquency, criminality, etcetera; if they keep repeating all day long ‘you are a dirty Arab, you are a terrorist, your Qur’an incites murder, your prophet was [a murderer]’, things that are not accurate; he feels unarmed, without means for answering to these things. He [this Moroccan youngster] will be convinced himself that indeed, he is coming from such a country. […] The description of Arabic countries, Muslim countries, in certain societies is horrible; it shows zero degree of knowledge about this Arabic country, this

108 Social psychology studies on minority adolescents indicate too how a strong ethnic identity increases self-esteem and may buffer the negative outcomes of discrimination (see e.g. Rivas-Drake, Hughes & Way, 2008).

166 Muslim country [Morocco]. These [Moroccan] youngsters need to know this Morocco where they are coming from.” (Interview with policy advisor F, MCMRE)

He continues explaining how young Moroccans’ should respond to stigmatization: by embracing their roots proudly and in an informed manner. One important strategy here is remembrance of the historic Arabo-Andalusian civilization, a Muslim civilization that was at the time more advanced than its non- Muslim counterparts on the European continent. By evoking this glorious past, contemporary stigmatization of Moroccans living abroad (who are framed as inheritors of this Arabo-Andalusian legacy) can be invalidated:

“So, how can we make them understand, and what’s the objective of making them understand? It is in order that they [would] know, they would be able to respond to those who are accusing them of coming from an underdeveloped country, a murderous country, a country of ... terror, of I don’t know what, they need to know that in the Middle Ages, when Europe was still thinking about what language to speak, what art to use, what science etcetera, Muslims and Arabs, who were at that time living in Spain, already reached a cultural level that was evoking admiration of the Europeans.” (Interview with policy advisor F, MCMRE)

Besides being undesirable, this ministry official also considers assimilation to be an illusion. Referring to Afro-Americans, he stresses the indissoluble connection with one’s roots, even across generations:

“This notion of belonging to a civilization ... whether one likes it or not, they still have Arab blood in their veins, African blood in their veins. This remains, even if one lives three or four centuries in the country of residence. The slaves who gave birth to the American nation of today, the Africans, the Americans of African origin, they cannot strip themselves of their origins. [...] So it is an indissoluble element of one’s personality. [...] Even when trying to assimilate in the receiving society, they always stay Moroccan, they always stay African, they always stay Muslim. Consequently, he needs to, to accept this belonging [...] so that he make it into a

167 positive aspect of his personality, instead of a negative aspect.” (Interview with policy advisor F, MCMRE)

Finally, the ministry official explains how this view informs the policy vision of the Moroccan diaspora policies, while also referring to royal speeches on the matter.

“[Immigration], it’s an added value to the society . . . it’s for this reason that we try to make sure that the effort we make to maintain the Moroccan identity of the immigrant, remains equal to the effort we make to make him integrate the best as possible in his receiving society. We do not dissociate these elements. But, on the level of the [official] discourse — the most official one existing in Morocco being the discourse of His Majesty the King — [the King] incites the government to work in this sense. The constitution, the new constitution [of 2013] puts forward two objectives simultaneously: to maintain the ties with Morocco with its subjects [abroad] and to help them to integrate in their countries of residence. So these are not two contradictory things.” (Interview with policy advisor F, MCMRE)

Following this line of argumentation, the persistent Moroccan focus on ethnocultural transnational ties should not be interpreted as an attempt to ensure exclusive loyalty to and identification with Morocco. On the contrary, a balanced dual hyphenated identity, reflecting the emigrant population’s affiliation with the country of origin as well as the country of residence, is presented as the ideal. For instance, one program coordinator commissioned by the Ministry explains,

“We encourage them to integrate in society. But integration in European societies, that does not mean that the ties with the country of origin really need to be cut, no. For me, both are complementary. […] They need to integrate, [be] Moroccan for 100% and [be] Belgian for 100%. So these two, for me, they are complementary. And it is not because one integrates himself, that this implies forgetting [the country of origin] because I’m sure that someone who forgets his roots, has no future.” (Interview with directing manager J, MCMRE)

168 At the Hassan II Foundation, the metaphor of the two chairs is recited frequently to indicate the value of a dual identity:

“Someone who knows his identity has a strong personality. If you don’t know your identity, you feel insecure […] someone who’s sitting on two chairs simultaneously, bridging from the one to the other, is better off than someone who’s sitting in between two chairs. In between two chairs, you cannot sit in a comfortable manner. But if you know, if you have a good knowledge of the [receiving society] culture, the [receiving country] language, you can achieve more, and if you know the Moroccan language, the Moroccan culture, the same applies.” (Interview with civil servant E, FHII)

As El Asri (2012) observed, this embracement of dual nationality and multiple belongings is relatively new; until the ‘90s, Moroccan public policies aimed at maintaining a strong and exclusive national connection.

The argument that embracing one’s identity of origin enables successful integration in the country of residence is often used in an inverted manner, that is, by pointing at negative examples. Expatriate Moroccans who ignore or undervalue their ethnocultural roots are considered to be more susceptible to suffer an identity crisis, as they are “footloose”. They get “lost” more easily and they are more likely to fall prey to delinquency or “harmful” (non-Moroccan) ideologies — like religious extremism.

OPENNESS AND TOLERANCE AS INHERENTLY MOROCCAN VALUES

“When a youngster is proud about [his] Moroccan identity, proud of his country of origin, when he has a good Moroccan culture, he can integrate easily in the receiving society. […] The Moroccan culture is a culture of openness, and as such, it helps him to integrate in his country of birth [in Europe or elsewhere].” (Interview with program coordinator H, MCMRE)

169 Besides the more general claim about the value of knowing your culture of origin, a second context-specific element is mentioned by the respondents to explain how Moroccan cultural policies enhance the integration of expatriate Moroccans. It is the (assumed) open and tolerant nature of Moroccan society and culture. This culture d’ouverture et de la tolérance is regarded as the historical product of the country’s location at the crossroads of different civilizations109. This notion is widely present throughout Moroccan official discourses and relates to various particular claims regarding the Moroccan historical and contemporary experiences with diversity. A central element to this claim is the religious diversity in Morocco, notably the historical presence of a large segment of Jews in the Moroccan population110. Further, Moroccan interpretations of Islam, grounded in the Maliki Sunni School, are commonly regarded as moderate and tolerant towards non- Muslims111. The claim of being an open and tolerant society is further supported by reference to various evolutions in the last decades, such as the increase of civil liberties, expanding rights for women and cultural recognition of the Berber minority.

This conceptualization of the Moroccan society and culture as open and tolerant is also employed in Morocco’s state discourses regarding her emigrants. Expatriate Moroccans can benefit especially from the open and tolerant mind-set this entails, since they are confronted on a daily basis with different religions and

109 For instance, the website of the MCMRE states “the different civilizations which have followed on from each other in Morocco have each influenced our [current] identity. Which undoubtedly explains the tolerance and open-mindedness of Moroccans. There are no culture clashes here, just meetings and sharing.” http:// www.marocainsdumonde.gov.ma/fr/culture/culture/histoire-du-maroc Retrieved in January 2016; but as this website has been refurbished later, the link is no longer active.

110 However, Boum (2013) notes ambivalence according to the audience: “internationally, the government promotes Morocco as a nation of Jewish-Muslim historical symbiosis and contemporary tolerance. [On the contrary] nationally, the state has maintained a relative silence about its Jewish history and culture.” (2013:130) Boum explains this ambiguity by pointing at the negative sentiments regarding Jews in the Moroccan popular opinion, which are due to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Externally, “Moroccan Jewish heritage is emphasized to enhance the image of Morocco as a place of tolerance and therefore a positive destination for tourists.” (2013:129)

111 For instance, drawing on their ethnographic fieldwork experience in Morocco, anthropologists Crawford and Newcomb make the assessment that “While many Moroccans are religiously conservative, Moroccan society is friendly, open and tolerant” (2013).

170 cultures in their receiving societies. As such, the Moroccan “culture of tolerance and openness” is considered to offer the perfect attitude to fit into a diverse society without forsaking one’s own identity.

“A youngster, who takes into account the richness and the strength of belonging to [the society of residence], but who at the same time belongs to a society like the Moroccan society, with her values, her inherent values, the values of tolerance, the value of respect for diversity, because we are a country that respects diversity, the value of equilibrium, the value of openness ... Well, frankly spoken, this can only result in added value for the [society of residence] and for the Moroccan society.” (Interview with directing manager O, CCME)

Another illustration of the idea that Morocco can set an example of peaceful coexistence for young expatriate Moroccans was offered by the program coordinator of one of the major cultural visiting programs (the Summer Universities for young Moroccans living abroad)

“Here in Morocco, there are many ethnic groups: there are Berbers, there are Soussi, there are Arabs, there are Riffians. Even like that, we manage to live in peace, with peace. So, we show them [young expatriate Moroccans] this reality, that is, we try to make them feel [the effects of this diversity]. Resultantly, when they leave [Morocco and return] abroad, I believe that this will help them, as a sort of ‘supplementary course’. This way, we try to give them the means to integrate well in Europe.” (Program coordinator I, MCMRE)

The intention to promote and cultivate a tolerant attitude among Moroccans abroad is also expressed in the Moroccan king’s royal speeches, which can be considered to constitute the blueprint for Morocco’s diaspora policies.

“Just as I commend the members of the Moroccan community abroad for abiding by the laws and regulations of host countries, I am keen to ensure they preserve their distinctive cultural and religious identity, which is based on tolerance, respect for others

171 and moderation as advocated by Islam.” (King Mohammed VI, Royal Speech of November 6, 2006)

Accordingly, Morocco’s cultural diaspora policies do not merely aim to transmit cultural knowledge to the Moroccan expatriate population, but equally aim to teach “Moroccan” values of openness and tolerance. The underlying assumption is that young expatriate Moroccans, especially those born abroad, are ill informed about the true nature of Moroccan culture.

A particular variant of this argument relates to Morocco’s dominant religion, Islam. Morocco tends to represent itself as the holder of a “moderate” Islam (Fadil 2017). Reconnecting with Moroccan Islam (as a constitutive part of Moroccan identity) is therefore considered to affect integration in the receiving country positively. As one official at the Ministry states, young generations of expatriate Moroccans need to know “what Moroccan Islam is: the tolerant Islam, the open Islam, the Islam not excluding intercultural and inter-religious dialogue” (Policy advisor F, MCMRE). Moroccan Islam is therefore considered highly suitable for smooth integration and coexistence in the country of residence, in contrast to conservative or “radical” approaches (especially Saudi-Arabia is accused of importing these radical approaches into the receiving countries)112. As a result, educating young expatriate Moroccans about the values of Moroccan Islam (next to other values inherent to Moroccan culture) is seen to help their integration.

“Throughout these [policy] actions, we build relationships, we can, you see, instill them with good, civilized manners but also even, the Islamic education, we are showing them that [Islam], it is completely different from extremism. [This is necessary] because ― can you imagine! ― immigrants are more extremist than people here. Why is this the case? Because [these immigrants] misunderstand Islam. They are not immunized against [wrong interpretations of Islam]. They are influenced by other cultures, where there are extremists. Islam in Morocco is a moderate Islam, an Islam of the middle ground, it is an Islam that is not extremist. […] I took Islam or the religious dimension as an

112 A particular element underpinning the difference between “moderate” and “conservative” interpretations is the revised Moroccan Family Code of 2004 (Moudawana) that is among the more gender-equal ones in the Muslim world.

172 example, [but] it’s the same story for other aspects. You see, I talked about religion; [but] there are other sides: the political, the social, that is, other aspects. So we, what we offer is support. Support in order that they integrate in an honorable manner, without causing troubles, neither for the receiving countries, neither for themselves.” (Program coordinator G, MCMRE)

The example of religious homeland ties also illustrates how (first) general and (second) context-specific arguments about the importance of retaining Moroccan identity are mobilized in an intertwined manner. On the one hand, Moroccan Islam is more generally framed as one of the “points of reference” for expatriate Moroccans to not get “lost” in the receiving society; on the other hand, the particular nature of Moroccan Islam as moderate and tolerant contributes to smooth integration.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shed light on the origin-state perspective on the integration of expatriates in the society of residence, a perspective migration scholars have tended to neglect so far. Based on our investigation of how the Moroccan State links the notion of integration to the promotion of the “culture of origin” among their expatriates, we have demonstrated how contemporary Moroccan diaspora policies rely on an active promotion of the idea of “integration”.

Drawing upon the integration-transnationalism interaction typology of Erdal and Oeppen (2013), we have argued that this discursive evolution ― from rejection over acceptance to promotion of integration ― can be considered as a succession of reinterpretations of the integration-transnationalism nexus by the state of origin. Over the course of the last three decades, the Moroccan state’s understanding of the relationship between preserving transnational ties and integration has moved from an antagonistic to a synergistic understanding. Consistent with this paradigm change, the cultural programs in place have been reframed. A closer look at Moroccan state discourses further reveals a particular understanding of integration that is fully compatible with the maintenance of transnational ties.

173 To gain a deeper understanding of this embracement of “integration” by the Moroccan State, this chapter has unpacked the underlying claim that a strong transnational orientation is a fertile breeding ground for integration. We observed two different but intertwined arguments used by state actors to support this claim. On the one hand, reverberating academic knowledge, Moroccan officials stress that preserving the culture of origin supports integration, since it serves as a point of reference and source of empowerment for expatriate Moroccans. On the other hand, the Moroccan culture is seen as an appropriate mind-set for integration, as it promotes the values of tolerance and openness. These arguments imply that, through its cultural diaspora policies, the Moroccan State claims a role in the integration process of its expatriate citizens.

Clearly, the paradigm shift on integration should not be interpreted as fading ambition on behalf of the Moroccan State. It shows, rather, the Moroccan state’s capacity to adapt continuously to shifting circumstances, thus allowing it to pursue its ambitions further.

174 175 176 CHAPTER 6: FEEDING THE TIES TO “HOME”: DIASPORA POLICIES FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 113 114

113 This chapter was published as Mahieu, R. 2015. “Feeding the Ties to ‘Home’: Diaspora Policies for the Next Generations.” International Migration 53(2):397-408.

114 The research project was funded by the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).

177 178 ABSTRACT

How do countries of origin deal with their post-migrant generations, the emigrants’ descendants who are born and raised abroad? In this article we examine the diaspora policies of Morocco, a country that relies heavily on its expatriate communities115 and that is confronted with growing post-migrant generations. Theoretically, the article draws on the literature on diaspora policies and migrant transnationalism and connects the two. An in-depth examination of the annual Summer Universities for young Moroccans Living Abroad, one of the flagships of the current Moroccan diaspora policy, demonstrates that diaspora policy programs are vehicles to convey targeted messages to the post-migrant generations concerning their transnational ties.

INTRODUCTION

Although diaspora policies — policies that states use to connect with expatriate citizens — are no novelty in international politics, they have only recently become a focus of academic study. While this increased academic attention to state of origin policies has been sparking theory development, many issues remain unaddressed. One major gap relates to the internal demographic evolution within expatriate communities: the emergence of post-migrant generations. What happens policy-wise when states of origin are confronted with a growing group born and raised outside the country of origin? Is a targeted diaspora policy methodology developed?

In this article, we focus on the diaspora policies of Morocco, a country heavily relying on its expatriate communities and well known for its long-standing and extensive efforts in this area (Iskander 2010). Morocco serves excellently as a case for examining the aforementioned questions, as it combines a clear policy interest in maintaining ties with the expatriate communities on the one hand, with a vast and growing post-migrant generation in its expatriate communities — roughly estimated at 1 million by the Moroccan government — on the other hand.

115 Personal note (November 2020): this article was written in an early stage of analysis, where I was unaware of the problematic nature of classifying a loose group of individuals as a “community” (as it presumes a level of connectedness which cannot be demonstrated). Now, I would rather opt for the more neutral “population”.

179 Moreover, in a field of literature still dominated by case studies of sending states with large communities in the USA, the examination of a country having around 80% of its emigrants based in Europe is more than welcome.

Since large-scale Moroccan migration began in the 1960s, the Moroccan expatriate communities have evolved from young, male, low-educated guest- worker communities in a few Western European countries (Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany) to a heterogeneous, globally dispersed population. Despite on-going migration, the group of “Moroccans” born and raised in the original destination countries approximate or outnumber those who actually migrated from Morocco. In fact, over half a century, those Moroccan communities have evolved from migrant communities to (to a large extent) post-migrant communities. While the Moroccan case has been studied before (see e.g. Brand 2006; Iskander 2010; Bouras 2012), no attention has been paid to how Morocco’s diaspora policies deal with its post-migrant generations. Neither has this been the case in studies on other countries. The aim of this article is therefore twofold: to explore empirically a crucial aspect of Moroccan diaspora policies that has not been examined and to initiate broader theoretical reflections about diaspora policies for the “next generations”.

The following section, briefly addressing the literature on diaspora policies, provides the theoretical backbone of the article. Then, the research methodology is explained, followed by an introduction to Moroccan diaspora policies, with a focus on the particular policy program under scrutiny; the Summer Universities for young Moroccans Living Abroad. In the subsequent and major section of the article, the results of the analysis of this program are discussed. Finally, conclusive reflections are presented.

THEORIZING DIASPORA POLICIES

For the last 15 years or so, scholars such as Østergaard-Nielsen (2001), Smith (2003), Brand (2006), Gamlen (2006), Iskander (2010), Kunz (2012), Bouras (2012) and Collyer (2013a), most of whom come from the political science field, have started to scrutinize if, why and how states reach out to their emigrant communities. One theoretical focus has been the rich description and classification of diaspora policies. Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) indicates the different forms

180 sending-states’ mobilization strategies may take, which range from encouraging expatriates to invest in the country of origin, including them as members of the transnational political community, involving migrant organizations in decision- making, organizing academic and student exchanges, to supporting cultural events. Gamlen’s (2006) threefold typology for diaspora engagement strategies, based on a comparison of over 70 migrant-sending countries, aims at capturing this diversity of strategies in a more systematic manner. He distinguishes between capacity building, extending rights and extracting obligations. The aim of capacity building policies is to produce a state-centric “transnational national society” using a particular type of discourse (a project also called “symbolic nation-building”), while simultaneously developing a set of corresponding institutions. A second type of diaspora engagement policy extends rights to expatriates, the state “thus playing a role that befits a legitimate sovereign” (Gamlen 2006:6). An antithesis of this rights-based approach, the third policy is aimed at extracting obligations, based on the premise that emigrants owe loyalty to this legitimate sovereign (Gamlen 2006:5–6). A second theoretical focus has been the explanation of the emergence and development of diaspora policies. Looking at both historical (Italy, Poland) and contemporary cases (Mexico), Smith (2003) argues that sending-state diaspora relations evolve through the state’s changing relations with the global system, their domestic politics, and migrants’ ability to act politically with respect to the homeland. Drawing on evidence from four states in North Africa and the Middle East, Brand (2006) offers five broad categories to explain state diaspora policies: macro-historical, international, economic, domestic and security/stability. As she demonstrates, different explanations often occur at the same time, showing that simplistic explanations that consider state interests as the only impetus shaping diaspora policies are insufficient.

Remarkably, despite the massive diversity of political regimes involved in diaspora policies, one recent tendency has been observed in a wide range of countries: a shift from ignorance about or contempt of emigrants by the state of origin to appreciating them (Collyer 2013a). This attitudinal shift is seen in courting strategies “acknowledging the efforts and achievements of expatriates, encouraging diaspora activities, establishing policies and programs to expand the scope of national regulation to include emigrants, and involving the diaspora in development and political processes” (Kunz 2012:105).

181 However, while major theoretical advances have been made in terms of describing, classifying and explaining diaspora policies, up to date theories on diaspora policies do not address properly the policy implications of demographical diversity in the expatriate community. In particular, the blindness to the generational perspective (i.e., the fact that every expatriate community is composed of different migrant generations) is quite surprising, considering that for more than a decade one of the core themes in transnational studies — the closest field of research116 — has been whether and how post-migrant generations continue their migrant parents’ transnational activities and attachments. Empirical studies usually demonstrate substantial differences between migrants and post-migrant generations: some provide evidence of continuing, but changing ties (Lee 2008; Levitt and Waters 2002); others conclude that transnationalism is merely a one- generation phenomenon (Portes 2001). Regardless of the actual nature of changes in transnational ties across generations, they clearly have implications for diaspora policies, especially when the communities abroad are of strategic importance for the country of origin. A quick glance at some countries with substantive communities abroad shows that targeted diaspora policies for the next generations are not a marginal phenomenon. Taiwan’s “Love Boat,” Israel’s Birthright Program, India’s Know India Program, China’s Youth Summer Program for Overseas Chinese and Morocco’s Summer Universities for young Moroccans Living Abroad all illustrate a common interest in fostering ties across generations.

Taking the internal diversity within expatriate communities as the analytic starting point helps to uncover diversified, tailored diaspora policies for different segments of the diaspora and highlight the transformative effect internal demographic transition may have on diaspora policies. Moreover, the empirical focus on intergenerational dynamics brings to the forefront themes like cultural education and the transmission of national identity across borders, “soft” aspects of diaspora policies that are often overshadowed by “hard” topics like remittances and political lobbies.

116 While the link between diaspora policies and transnational ties is rarely made explicit, the management of transnational ties vis-!a-vis the country of origin is in fact the central goal of diaspora policies. Diaspora strategies either support or hinder particular types of transnational activities and attachments. Some strategies aim at stimulating economic transnationalism in all its aspects (sending remittances, investing, buying real estate, etc.); other strategies aim at strengthening transnational identifications (by supporting national celebrations, cultural events, etc.); still others want to affect political transnationalism by extending citizenship rights to expatriates or by blocking those rights.

182 A focus on diaspora policies for post-migrant generations does not only elucidate under-exposed aspects of diaspora policies, however, it also offers a fresh take on a central theoretical puzzle in the field of diaspora studies: the question of whether a diaspora is a pre-existing (positivist approach) or a constructed (constructivist approach) entity (see e.g. Ragazzi 2012; Koinova 2010). Larner (2007) argues that diaspora policy strategies are often about (re)producing a sense of diaspora for instrumental purposes rather than simply addressing an existing diaspora. In particular, symbolic nation-building strategies are used to create legitimate ties with the communities abroad (Gamlen 2006). The importance of narratives that include emigrants (and their descendants) as members of “the people” or “the nation” should not be underestimated; Collyer (2013b) even considers those narratives a necessary precondition for the development of diaspora policy instruments. As symbolic and emotional transnational ties are central in the transnational attachment of post-migrant generations (Lee 2008), our case holds the promise of illustrating the dynamics of symbolic nation building.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The analysis presented is based mainly on participant observation during the Summer Universities for young Moroccans Living Abroad in 2013, complemented with documentary analysis of policy documents of the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad. Putting participant observation at the centre in policy research — also dubbed “political ethnography” (Schatz 2009) — is rather unique, as it is far more common to study diaspora policies through documentary analysis and/or elite interviewing only. The major theoretical asset of participant observation in a policy context is that it allows understanding of how abstract, generic policy goals are translated into practice in a complex real-life setting. This distinctive aspect of politics cannot be revealed properly by other qualitative techniques like elite interviewing and text analysis. As Schatz (2009:11) notes, “Ethnography holds out the promise of epistemological innovation. Research conducted at close range invites the researcher to ‘see’ differently; heterogeneity, causal complexity, dynamism, contingency, and informality come to the fore”. A particular advantage of combining participant observation with other methods is that it brings us to a core question in politics: to what extent are policy practices a reflection of what is propagated by policymakers? Not surprisingly, there is often a wide gap between

183 the policies “in theory” and “in practice,” caused by a variety of factors ranging from practical, contextual issues to deeply political dynamics. In order to avoid a one-sided account of policies, it is necessary to look into the actual policies — a task for which political ethnography is particularly suited.

Concerning the access of the researcher to the field site, special admission of the Ministry was needed due to the ineligibility of the researcher according to the program’s conditions of admission.117 Admission was obtained with the help of key figures in the Moroccan expatriate community. This formal entrance to the field did not strongly influence data collection, but it led to a commitment of the researcher to report her findings to the Ministry and program staff. Beyond this, the researcher participated under similar conditions to the others, as she attended the full program and stayed with the other participants all the time. As a result, while all staff members and participants were aware of her research intentions, she was considered as one of the participants rather than a detached observer.

MOROCCO’S DIASPORA POLICIES FOR THE NEXT GENERATIONS

MOROCCO’S SHIFTING RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS EXPATRIATE COMMUNITIES

Morocco is an example of a non-industrialized emigration country that relies economically on its citizens abroad. The Moroccan community abroad, currently estimated by the Moroccan government at five million Marocains Résident à l’étranger (about 15% of the Moroccan population), contributes in various respects to Morocco’s economy and society. Most notably, there is an annual remittance flow of around $7 billion (through official channels only), making remittances the second source of hard currency after tourism receipts, which are also to a large extent provided by expatriate Moroccans during summer holidays (MPC 2013) as more than two million Moroccan expatriates return every year during holidays. Because of this huge financial input, the Moroccan community abroad is often

117 For the eligibility criteria, see below.

184 depicted as the “cash cow” of Morocco. Many also own a house in Morocco, and at the community level, numerous small-scale non-governmental initiatives improve general welfare and contribute to local development in Morocco.

While all this may give the impression that the “Community of Moroccans Living Abroad”118 is simply generous and loyal to her country of origin, persistent diaspora policies may provide a better explanation for the durability of her transnational ties. Since the beginning of Moroccan mass emigration in the early 1960s, there have been attempts by the Moroccan State to control the Moroccan communities abroad and to manage and consolidate their economic contribution (Iskander 2010). However, over time Moroccan diaspora policies have changed drastically and are often described as an evolution from a repressive “long arm of Rabat” to a cooperative “outreached hand” (Bouras 2012). Today, a wide range of political and other state institutions, among them the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs, the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad, the Council for Moroccan Community Living Abroad, the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are producing a multitude of diaspora engagement initiatives, mainly in the economic, cultural and social domain.

But to what extent are Morocco’s diaspora policies taking into account post- migrant generations? Considering the strategic importance of the expatriate Moroccan communities, we can assume that this evolution has not gone unnoticed at the policy level. Indeed, we witness various diaspora policy initiatives addressing the needs of the younger generations, most notably in the cultural and educative sphere. For example, there are cultural-educative stays in Morocco (Séjours Culturels) for both children and young adults, language and cultural classes (ELACM, Enseignement de la Langue Arabe et de la Culture Marocaine) in the countries of residence and annual Summer Universities for students of Moroccan origin in higher education (les Universités d’été au profit des jeunes MRE). In this article, we focus on the latter initiative for two reasons. First, it explicitly targets post-migrant generations (while many other initiatives lack this clear focus) and second, as external influences and constraints in the programme’s design and execution are

118 In the political discourse, people residing outside Morocco with Moroccan origins are considered La Communauté Marocaine résidant à l’étranger ((C)MRE) or Marocains du Monde (MDM). Unlike in some other countries, there is no distinctive term or status available for post-migrant generations — they are simply MRE.

185 minimal (see below), we can assume that the program content will primarily reflect the Moroccan diaspora policymakers’ vision, rather than being a compromise between various interests.

THE SUMMER UNIVERSITIES FOR YOUNG MOROCCANS LIVING ABROAD

Since 2009, the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad has organized annually 10-day Summer Universities for young Moroccans Living Abroad. Moroccan universities all over the country host the program. Although the number of attendees is relatively modest (ranging from 100 to 400 students every year), the initiative is considered as one of the flagships of the current Moroccan diaspora policy by the Ministry and will be continued in the future. The program consists of a mixture of lectures, formal meetings, workshops, cultural activities and sightseeing in the region around the university. A variety of topics are addressed, including Moroccan history, culture, religion, development and politics. The participants are students of Moroccan origin in tertiary education, aged 18 to 25, who live outside Morocco. The overall majority is born outside Morocco, and most have parents who left Morocco at an adult age. As the Moroccan community abroad is represented today not only in Western Europe but also in North America, Australia, North and West Africa and the Middle East, this has resulted in a vast heterogeneity among the participants in terms of their countries of residence.119

The program is part of a broader strategic diaspora policy plan launched in 2008 by the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad. Spanning a four- year period, this “2008–2012 Strategy” is considered the prelude to a new national strategy (the 2030 National Strategy in Favor of Moroccans Living Abroad), based on a global approach to the affairs of Moroccan citizens living abroad. A new and comprehensive policy strategy was deemed necessary to deal with “the profound and significant transformations of the Community of Moroccans residing abroad, in particular on the demographic, economic and human capital level”. In this

119 In 2013, 15 different countries of residence were represented. Most of the participants (60 out of 103) lived in Europe: the Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Norway. Others came from Canada, the USA, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Libya and Qatar.

186 policy plan, much attention is paid to post-migrant generations. Out of four policy objectives, the first is “to assist the integration of the new generations in the countries of residence [l’enracinement] without uprooting their ties with the country or origin [le déracinement]”. The Summer University program is one of the cultural- educative policy initiatives serving this broader objective. It also embodies the new style of diaspora policy approach — the outreached hand — as it cultivates an image of Moroccan public policy as a welcoming, cooperative partner.

The core aim of the Summer Universities, as declared in various press statement of the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad, is “to strengthen the cultural and spiritual ties between the Moroccan diaspora and the native country (la mère patrie)” or, to be more specific, “to strengthen the attachments of the new generations to their country of origin and to keep them informed about the developments the Kingdom experiences at all levels”. In the official announcement about the program and in subsequent press statements, three particular objectives are explained in greater detail:

1. The preservation and the promotion of the national identity of the new generations of Moroccans Residing Abroad, regarding its linguistic, religious and cultural dimensions, through the dissemination of the original values of Moroccan civilization based on dialogue, tolerance and coexistence, which allows the positive integration of young Moroccans Residing Abroad in their receiving countries. 2. The presentation of the big projects and investment opportunities in Morocco, and the raising of awareness among young Moroccans Residing Abroad to participate in the major areas of development in Morocco, through direct investments or by their active participation as experts in high value-added human resources. 3. The gathering of Moroccans of the world who are studying allows, on the one hand, the strengthening of the ties of belonging to the country of origin, and on the other hand, allows establishing the first beacons of a student network of Moroccans of the world. These networks aim to promote the image of Morocco abroad and to develop its appeal in various international

187 forums. They could mean an added value for the socio-economic development of Morocco and the receiving countries.

The Ministry is in charge of the entire organization of the program. As there is no substantial involvement from expatriate community-based or other actors, the Ministry has quasi-total freedom to define the content of this program, whereas in other programs, this is instead based on negotiations among different stakeholders. The program is also widely uniform across the hosting universities, besides small differences due to region-specific content and activities. The Ministry pays the largest share of the costs (apart from a registration fee for the participants), further increasing its capacity to define program content independently.

In sum, external influences and constraints in the programme’s design and execution are relatively minimal. In contrast to similar programs where participation is mediated through membership in a local Moroccan organization120, or where participants are personally invited based on their merits,121 access to this program is fairly democratic: in principle every interested person can participate, as long as the formal criteria122 are met. Because the Ministry covers most of the costs, the financial threshold for participation is also low.

A TARGETED DIASPORA POLICY METHODOLOGY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION

After introducing the wider policy context and the program, we examine how the Moroccan Summer Universities intend to reach their goals, or, to put it another way, what policy methodology is involved. In the analysis, the focus is on the

120 For example, for the Séjours Culturels of the Fondation Hassan II, participants are usually children who have excelled in local Arabic or Koran schools.

121 For instance, for the annual national celebration of the Fête du Trone, a number of “Moroccans Residing Abroad” of particular merit in the Moroccan community are invited.

122 There are six criteria: you have to (a) be a Moroccan living abroad, (b) be enrolled in tertiary education, (c) be at minimum 18 and at maximum 25 years old, (d) be registered at a Moroccan consulate, (e) be a first-time participant in the program and (f) to have insurance that is valid in Morocco.

188 different methods used to reach the official policy goals. Because of the nature of the program (semi-academic), many of the methods identified are of a discursive nature, that is, consist of an attempt to influence audience opinion and attitude through speech. The “messengers” belong either to the programme’s organization (Ministry officials, university staff) or were experts invited by the organization to deliver a lecture or to address the group during an excursion. While some speeches were undeniably designed to serve policy aims (e.g., a speech delivered by the Minister himself), this does not imply that all were part of some overarching, intentional master plan. However, because of the strong top-down control of the program content, we can safely assume that all opinions expressed by lecturers and other speakers were approved by the programme’s organization.

MOROCCAN NATIONAL IDENTITY ACROSS BORDERS AND GENERATIONS

Throughout the program, both subtle and explicit messages were conveyed about the participants’ identification with and attachment to Morocco, their country of origin. Various speakers addressed directly the importance of acknowledging one’s roots. In his opening speech, the Minister for Moroccans Residing Abroad importuned participants not to “undervalue their Moroccan origins, as they are not something superficial but deeply rooted with a long history”. He added that Morocco wants “to invest in the Moroccan youth abroad, in order to make them feel not only French or Dutch but also Moroccan”. In a similar vein, during the program evaluation on the second to last day, the program coordinator stated that the goal of this program was “to make you feel the spirit of Morocco, the spirit of where you belong,” because “maybe you’re living abroad, but you need to feel that you belong in Morocco”. Another day, a legal scholar started his elucidation on the Moroccan constitution by declaring “irrespective of the country where you live, Moroccans stay Moroccans forever”. He added that “Moroccanness” is “your natural origin,” and that it is important not only to have knowledge of your country of origin, but also to have a grasp of the opportunities it offers. During a visit to the local Council of Ulema, a prestigious Islamic advisory council for religious affairs, a council member stated, “Don't forget or neglect the Moroccan culture and be proud to be Moroccan. Don’t follow the

189 tendencies in Europe. Don’t engage with European culture. Even if you have a European nationality, remain proud that you’re Moroccan”.

While reference to Moroccan roots was omnipresent, there was some variation in the nature of the statements. For instance, while the Council of Ulema member seemingly rejected all identities other than Moroccan, some, like the Minister, acknowledged the (co-) existence of other (national) identities. However, all speakers addressed the importance of “knowing your roots” or “staying Moroccan” as a self-evident, inescapable truth. Rarely did anyone speak about why this is important. During a lecture on Moroccan culture, one lecturer said, “It is very important to keep your identity, because in this globalized world, it is easy to lose your identity”. The Minister also referred to an economic return to knowing your roots: he stated that a proficiency in Arabic is beneficial not only because it is the language of their country of origin, but also because of its growing global importance.

Part of the discourse also centered on the way Moroccans in Morocco perceive post-migrant Moroccans. As the Minister stated, “The fact that you have Spanish or French nationality does not mean that we regard you as only Spanish or French”. Another speaker explained that the new Moroccan constitution (contrary to the previous one) fully supports the equality of expatriate Moroccans in all respects. He said it is therefore the duty of Morocco to care for her expatriates as much as for their co-national citizens in Morocco, and to know her expatriates well. The message is that the young post-migrant Moroccans are today also considered fully fledged Moroccan citizens. This argument may be a response to the often-heard complaint of post-migrant Moroccans that while they are considered Moroccans in their country of residence, they are seen as foreigners (rather than co-nationals) in Morocco.

The national Moroccan identity was also addressed by means other than discourse. National symbols were often present or referred to. As is common in Morocco, large portraits of the Moroccan king, the symbol of national unity, were displayed in the classroom and dining room, for example. During various speeches, gratitude to the king was expressed and reference was made to his Royal

190 Discourses, which regularly address (young) Moroccans living abroad.123 It was also made clear by the organization on various occasions that it was the king’s deepest desire that the new generations of Moroccans abroad be taken care of and have the opportunity to discover their country. Participants were expected to join in nationalist practices. For instance, during a radio broadcast about the program, the entire group was asked to stand up and sing the Moroccan national anthem. Backed up by an instrumental version of the anthem, the group sang, an act that was welcomed enthusiastically by the present university staff members, ministry officials, and the reporter.

The management of language use was another method used to stress the participants’ common Moroccan identity. Throughout the program, the use of the main national language in Morocco, Darija (spoken Moroccan Arabic), was not only strongly encouraged but also controlled. The common practice among participants of speaking in their own language (e.g., Dutch among the Dutch Moroccans) or to switch to a common foreign language (e.g., English or French among European and North-American Moroccans) was denounced by staff members. During the closing session, the program coordinator of the university justified this strict approach by stating, “Darija is the connection between all of us, or at least most of us. On the contrary, French and English are foreign languages not known by all”. This expresses on the one hand the concern that the use of foreign languages would create fractures in the group, while on the other hand, it stresses the uniting power accorded to the main national Moroccan language.

While it is not surprising that the messages about Moroccan national identity by people directly related to the official diaspora policy were consistent, it is remarkable that various other people (lecturers, the university staff) also participated actively in spreading similar normative messages about participants’ common Moroccan identity, even when this was unrelated to the topic of their speech or lecture. Together, they all contribute to outlining a global, inclusive, symbolic Moroccan nation.

123 On several national holidays, the king delivers a nationally broadcasted speech. These discours royaux can be considered as the defining guidelines for Moroccan politics on all levels.

191 POLISHING MOROCCO’S IMAGE

One of the core objectives of the Summer Universities is to inform the participants about developments in their country of origin. The basic assumption is that expatriates, and the post-migrant generation in particular, have only limited or out-dated knowledge of their country of origin. This is considered problematic, as having a negative image of Morocco as a backward or underdeveloped country could hinder potential transnational involvement. The Summer Universities therefore stress in particular different aspects of its modern development, both with respect to the economic sphere and, to a lesser extent, to the political and social spheres.

Several speakers promote an image of Morocco as a rapidly modernizing country. As the Minister explains in his opening speech, “Morocco moves with the times. Morocco is a country that evolved a lot; things you previously saw in Europe only, can be found today in Morocco as well”. After summing up various booming industrial industries, among them the automobile industry, he concludes, “We have more than you think”. The base line of a class on the development plans of Morocco, in which the Moroccan economic prospects and policies are explained, is similar: “Morocco may not have petroleum, but it has a competitive economy with many international companies and the infrastructure conforms to international standards”.

Morocco’s position is often compared to other countries in the North African and Middle Eastern region as either an exception to them or as more advanced. During a class on religion, Islam is described in terms of tolerance and modesty, implicitly juxtaposing the Moroccan Malikite interpretation of Islam to other tendencies in the Islamic world or beyond. Also, the improved position of women in Morocco is sometimes addressed as an indicator of modernization. For instance, a female Council of Ulema member stresses that, unlike various other Islamic countries, “In Morocco, women do have the right to participate in this kind of council and in discussions on religion”. When it comes to the 2011 constitutional reforms, one lecturer explained that in contrast to other countries in the region, Morocco’s constitution is modern, effective, and based on universal human rights. Also, unlike for instance Egypt, the army is not involved in politics, and innocent people and political opponents do not disappear into jail.

192 Raising awareness of Morocco’s development is also taken quite literally: while making trips in the area, the group is constantly made aware of signs of economic development in the region. For instance, during an excursion, we stopped at the brand-new cargo and passenger port, Tangier Med, which is surrounded by a free zone. As one of the biggest ports in Africa, it is a symbol of Morocco’s economic ambitions and development. Another afternoon, we visited a tourist beach town with high-priced housing, a posh marina filled with yachts and a building site with luxury apartments.

Informing the participants is, however, not limited to demonstrating economic development; sometimes, political issues are addressed as well. For instance, in a history class, the lecturer demonstrates the strong historical connection of the Western Sahara to Morocco, thus implicitly underpinning the validity of the Moroccan claim on this disputed territory in the Western Sahara conflict.

Different complementary rationales for updating the participants’ views on Morocco can be found, all related to the idea of transforming the participants into better ambassadors for their country of origin. First, there is the goal of increasing the post-migrant generations’ factual knowledge about contemporary Morocco, either because they are assumed to be informed insufficiently (because information sources on Morocco are lacking in the countries of residence) or incorrectly (because the respective countries of residence defend a different stance compared with the official Moroccan one, for instance on the Western Sahara conflict). Second, because of their distinct profile (students in higher education with good professional prospects), the participants are considered the future elite in the Moroccan expatriate communities. Therefore, showing recent developments potentially raises their interest as future investors and business partners. Third, by familiarizing the participants with positive changes in the country and impressing upon them the richness of the Moroccan culture and its long-standing history, their sense of pride in their country of origin, and thus their transnational attachment, will ostensibly be strengthened.

193 MOBILIZING THE NEXT GENERATIONS FOR MOROCCO’S DEVELOPMENT

In the past few decades many sending states have replaced repression and intimidation as diaspora policy methods with seduction and persuasion, a governing technique labelled the “courting strategy” (see above). Part of this strategy entails treating the target public with high esteem. This approach was omnipresent, most notably in the overall concept of the program (the invitation by the King and the Ministry to visit Morocco, the personal welcome by the Minister), but also in the exclusive character of some of the activities (like attending the celebrations of the National Emigrant Day at the famous National Theatre in Rabat) and in the large number of staff that attended to the organization and wellbeing of the group (including a personal doctor, nurse, a famous TV cook, and a group of waiters), which created a genuine VIP atmosphere. The significant media attention throughout the program, among others from one of the main national TV channels, further contributed to this atmosphere.

The purpose of this strategy is not just to express appreciation for emigrants and their descendants, but rather, as Kunz (2008:16) explains, “This shift towards representing migrants as heroes and agents for development, and targeting them with courting initiatives and encouraging their institutionalization and activities is linked to the creation of new subjectivities, i.e., the ‘entrepreneurial migrant’ and the ‘migrant development actor’”. Therefore, policy strategies are not merely highly appreciative; they also aim to place responsibility with their audience by implying a moral obligation to contribute to the country of origin.

On various occasions, awareness about participants’ (potential) contribution to Morocco’s interests was raised. For example, one lecturer on Moroccan culture asserted that “You are all role models, it is you who define the image of Morocco outside Morocco”. Another speaker stated he was “very happy when [expatriate] Moroccans return to Morocco and bring with them new knowledge, aiming at Morocco’s development. As Moroccans residing abroad, you have to incorporate the good things and this for the sake of the development of Morocco”. It is made clear that Morocco’s development interests should be at the centre of the post- migrant Moroccans’ concerns. During a radio interview in the presence of the participants, a ministry official clarifies why the young generations are so

194 important: “The Moroccan Community Abroad is under metamorphosis, her face is changing. This new generation is characterized by excellence: they have the potential to contribute to Morocco. They define the Morocco of tomorrow”. Through this kind of rhetoric, post-migrant Moroccans are made aware of their importance and of their responsibility to their country of origin.

The moral obligation to contribute to Morocco’s development is also presented as legally anchored: in a lecture on the implications of the new Moroccan constitution for Moroccans living abroad, the speaker explains that the constitution offers the opportunity for expatriate Moroccans to take up a more active role in its development. He supports this evolution since, according to him, “their experiences and ideas should be used for Morocco’s developments”.

For those participants who think that contributing to Morocco’s development is not possible for a student, the Minister invalidates this idea by explaining that as students they have good networks and innovative insights — the most important things, according to him, to start up a project.

In addition to speeches and lectures, raising awareness about their responsibilities was also built into the program structurally through the organization of a paper contest. The best paper would be awarded a gift from the Ministry. Three topics were suggested:

(a) If you are ever called upon to assume the responsibility of managing the affairs of the MRE, what strategy would you adopt in different fields about you? (b) How can you contribute to the development of Morocco? (c) What are your expectations for summer schools? What do you know of Morocco from your country of residence?124

Besides the last one, the topics are clearly intended to stimulate reflections on participants’ potential role as expatriates in the country of origin’s development and to have participants imagine themselves in these roles. Few papers were actually submitted (mainly because of lack of time), but the contest definitely caused the participants to reflect on these topics. An indication that the call to take

124 The organization supplied the original text in English.

195 up responsibility has not gone unheard is that, shortly after the Summer Universities, a small group of participants set up a development project focussing on education in isolated areas in Morocco. The initial fund-raising call resulted in financial support by more than half of the participants. On the organization’s website, the initiators explain their motivation:

“We are a group of students who participated in the Summer University program organized in August 2013 by the Moroccan government… Our country gave us and spent a lot for us. We just want to return the favor with our ideas, brains and means… We are people from all over the world […] but we all have the same HEART (Morocco)… We are young, we are students that want to do something for OUR country.”

While it is too simplistic to conclude that the lectures presented during the Summer Universities fully explain the participants’ engagement, the program did bring together the “right” people, incited them to start up their own initiative and provided them with a useful network in Morocco.

CONCLUSIVE REFLECTIONS: A DIASPORA POLICY METHODOLOGY FOR THE NEXT GENERATIONS

First, we can conclude that targeted diaspora policies for engaging the post- migrant generations do exist. Based on participant observations during Morocco’s Summer Universities, we distinguished three different yet intrinsically connected methods that particularly target these groups. They reflect the policymakers’ ideas on the post-migrant Moroccans’ sense of attachment to their country of origin, their perception of this country and their role in its future. As the messages conveyed emphasize transnational attachment, polish the image of Morocco and clarify participants’ potential transnational engagement for the sake of development, they all relate directly to the participants’ transnational ties. While the Summer Universities employ a mixture of different diaspora engagement methods, the most central element is the transmission of inclusive narratives for the post-migrant generations, addressing them as full-fledged members of the symbolic Moroccan nation.

196 Second, as the potential direct economical or political gain for the country of origin from educational/cultural initiatives targeting the young post-migrant generations, such as the Summer Universities, appears limited (these groups are unlikely to contribute financially or politically in the short term), this case reminds us that diaspora policies are about much more than managing cash flow and political influence. Indeed, the transfer of a strong narrative about the symbolic nation seems essential, especially if the policies have long-term, generation- crossing, aspirations.

Third, it is confirmed that states, as one of the core stakeholders in the transnational field, intervene actively in the reproduction of (a sense of) diaspora across generations. The analysis reveals a diaspora policy methodology aiming at the purposeful strengthening or even creation of transnational ties, thus supporting the validity of a constructivist approach to diaspora (as opposed to a positivist approach, which considers the diaspora as a given entity).

Finally, this article confirms the value of participative observation for policy research. It allows us to capture policies in real-life settings, outside the sterile environment of policymakers’ offices and beyond the abstraction of policy documents.

This article has taken the first step towards documenting and comprehending diaspora policies for the next generations, a policy dimension that has not been investigated previously. However, many questions remain unanswered, especially those related to divergence across national contexts and time. We hope the insights presented here will stimulate reflection and engender a theoretical debate about these issues.

197 198 CHAPTER 7:

“WE’RE NOT COMING FROM MARS; WE KNOW HOW THINGS WORK IN MOROCCO!” HOW DIASPORIC MOROCCAN YOUTH RESISTS POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN STATE-LED HOMELAND TOURS 125 126

125 Chapter 7 was published as Mahieu, R. 2019. “‘We're not coming from Mars; we know how things work in Morocco!' How diasporic Moroccan youth resists political socialization in state-led homeland tours.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45(4): 674-691.

126 This work was supported by the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO), with a PhD scholarship running from 2011 to 2016. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my supervisors Christiane Timmerman and Nadia Fadil.

199 200 ABSTRACT

Diaspora policies, to be defined as emigrant state policies aiming at maintaining and strengthening ties with its expatriate population, have become a regular feature of twenty-first century international politics (Gamlen 2014). A particular diaspora policy strategy adopted by various emigration countries including Morocco is the introduction of state-led homeland tours. These can be understood as an origin-state tool to socialize mainly young expatriate community members with homeland orientations and identities. Both by opponents as by sympathizers of these tours, it is often assumed that homeland tours are effective in their socialization project (Kelner 2010). However, this assumption undervalues the agency of tour participants. This article presents an in-depth investigation of the Moroccan Summer Universities, annual state-led homeland tours for college and university students of Moroccan descent, based on participant observation and qualitative interviews. The analysis highlights the tour participants’ resistance against both discourses and practices of these homeland tours’ organizers. As such, the article attends to the need to understand better how state diaspora policies are received by young members of the diaspora, in a situation where state- diaspora relations are tense and policies are top-down.

INTRODUCTION

Return visits tend to take a central position in the transnational practices and attachments of emigrants and their descendants (Levitt and Waters 2002; Ali and Holden 2006; Vathi and King 2011). More than anything else, visits “back home” symbolize emigrants’ continuing transnational ties to their societies of origin. While return visits are commonly private or community-based initiatives, states of origin are increasingly exploring the possibilities of organized educational travel to the “homeland” as a strategy to bolster the transnational ties of the young segment of their expatriate population. While state-organized visiting programs widely differ in focus, format, and participant profile, the general ambition of these “homeland tours” is to acquaint young members of their expatriate communities with the ancestral “homeland” through a first-hand experience while inciting them to explore their roots further in the future (Kelner 2010). In terms of their target

201 group, they are usually designed for people that have little direct experience with their ancestors’ birth country (Newland and Taylor 2010).

The best-known and most-studied example of diaspora homeland tours—not at the least because of its large scale—are the Taglit-Birthright Israel Tours for young Jews living outside Israel. Since 1999, hundreds of thousands young American Jews have visited Israel on this all-expense-paid pilgrimage-like tour, which is the outcome of a collaboration of the Israeli State, Jewish diaspora organizations and private benefactors (Kelner 2010; Saxe et al. 2004; Abramson 2017). However, other countries whose diasporas stem from more recent emigration compared to the Jewish experience have adopted similar initiatives, often in cooperation with migrant community organizations. For instance, in mainland China the Roots program was launched in 1991 to enable young Chinese Americans to see their ancestral villages and rediscover their familial roots (Louie 2003). Similar “know- your-country” programs can be found in countries as different as South Korea and Taiwan (Kibria 2002), Eritrea (Conrad 2006), and India (Agunias 2009). The Moroccan State equally offers a range of visiting programs for young Moroccans living abroad. In this article, I focus on the Summer Universities, which is Morocco’s largest state-sponsored homeland tour for young adults. This annual program offers a two-week educational visit to Morocco to post-migrant127 Moroccan students, aged 18 to 25. These Summer Universities are not a stand-alone initiative, but fit into the Moroccan state’s broader diaspora engagement approach, which is characterized by a strong focus on consolidating the socio-economic contribution of the expatriate community (Mahieu 2015). The current Moroccan approach is grounded in a long process of policy evolution starting at the outset of Morocco’s mass-scale labour and family emigration in the 1960s (Iskander 2010; de Haas 2007).

In two ways, the Moroccan Summer Universities differ from other similar programs, such as Taglit-Birthright Israel. First, there is a lack of expatriate community involvement in its design or implementation: it is a top-down initiative designed, organized and funded entirely by Moroccan State agencies. Second,

127 “Post-migrant” has been coined as an alternative to “second generation (migrants)” based on the observation that the latter implies that the individuals in question are still in a process of migrating whereas “post-migrant generation(s),” in contrast, refers to the rupture of migration as an event, and the contexts it creates in aftermath (Wagner 2008:16).

202 regular travel to Morocco is a widely established transnational practice among the expatriate Moroccan population, including the foreign-born younger generations (Wagner 2008). Beside a range of specific facilitating factors, such as Morocco’s geographical proximity to Europe (as the major destination region) and the availability of tourist facilities, the salience of diasporic tourism can be related to the relatively recent nature of Moroccan migration compared to some “old” diasporas documented in the diasporic tourism literature (e.g., the Jewish, African- American and Armenian diasporas).

Towards potential participants of homeland tours, which are usually adolescents or young adults, sharing ancestral roots in this “homeland,” these tours are commonly advertised as a unique opportunity to get to know the country and culture of origin, meet peers and locals with a similar background, and ultimately, through these encounters with people and places, get to know yourself. By returning to the country of origin, participants “are promised an encounter with facets of ethnic culture and history that are said to be unavailable to them where they live, or available only in attenuated, adulterated or otherwise altered form” (Kelner 2010: 89). However, the organizers’ rather a-political framings (as cultural education) should not obscure that homeland tours are in fact a deeply political enterprise, because

“On the one hand, the tours are efforts to garner diplomatic and material advantage for nation-states by mobilizing the support of foreign nationals; on the other hand, they are thoroughly implicated in the grand ideological work of imagining community and asserting relationships between people, cultures, and place.” (Kelner 2010:193)

Consequently, these programs should be regarded as origin state instruments of political socialization, aiming at transmitting particular orientations and values to diasporic members, in order to facilitate their mobilization for the state’s political, economic or social projects. As part of this, they also aim at symbolic nation-building, to be understood as state initiatives strengthening or engendering diaspora members’ sense of national belonging to the “homeland” as well as their sense of belonging to a larger transnational community (Gamlen 2006).

203 I study the processes of political socialization taking place during the Moroccan Summer Universities, an annual diaspora homeland tour running since 2009. More precisely, I investigate through participant observation, informal and semi-structured interviews and an evaluation questionnaire how young expatriate Moroccans, participating in this program, react to the Moroccan state’s diaspora policy strategies.

Theoretically, this article wishes to contribute to a better understanding of how diaspora engagement policies are received by members of the diaspora. Literature in the emerging field of diaspora policy studies is concerned mainly with understanding why and how states of origin develop diaspora policies, and the various forms these policies take (Collyer 2013a; Dufoix, Guerassimoff and de Tinguy 2010; Gamlen 2006), rather than with how ordinary expatriate citizens perceive the implemented policies (Kahmann 2014; Erdal 2016). Systematic efforts to understand the ways these policies are received by their target groups are commonly absent.128 Therefore, the article deliberately focuses on micro-level social dynamics, as this level of analysis enables me to investigate the policies' recipients’ perspectives, experiences, and agency (Délano and Mylonas 2019). More broadly, the article highlights the often-neglected temporal-generational dimension of diaspora building (Abramson 2017), by examining origin-state strategies targeting the younger generations in the diaspora (Huynh and Yiu 2015; Délano 2018).

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN HOMELAND TOURS

As Délano and Mylonas (2019) indicate, while the existing literature in the field has provided useful typologies to distinguish different types of diaspora policies, emigrant states' differential treatment for different groups within their expatriate population—such as different migrant generations—has received rather little attention. In contrast, for emigration states’ diaspora engagement policies, how to reach out to the descendants of emigrants is a central puzzle (Mahieu 2015;

128 If diaspora voices are investigated, usually only those having a direct influence on diaspora policies are considered. Indeed, diaspora policy scholars regularly employ interviews with expatriate political representatives (Lafleur 2008) or trade union representatives (Iskander 2010). Broader perspectives of “ordinary” expatriates on diaspora policies tend to be ignored.

204 Délano 2018). How to ensure these individuals’ homeland ties and loyalties, while they are born and living outside of the territorial reach of the state of origin? One strategy adopted by Morocco as well as other countries (Ho 2011; Castles and Davidson 2000) is the allocation of expatriate citizenship status to this group. However, this strategy alone guarantees neither homeland-centered identities nor homeland-oriented political loyalties among “next generations” of expatriate citizens. This brings us to the matter of political socialization, as an understanding of how “polities and other political societies and systems inculcate appropriate norms and practices in citizens, residents, or members” (Sapiro 2004:2). Regarding expatriate citizens, this approach focuses not on what being a diaspora member means, but on how one becomes one (Friedman 2010) and what role the state of origin plays in this process. State-led homeland visits are one instrument origin states are using with the aim of political socialization (Kelner 2010). It is no coincidence state-led homeland tours commonly target adolescents and young adults. As “individuals probably experience more change in their political views between the ages of about fourteen and twenty-five than at any point later in their lives” (Niemi and Hepburn 1995:5), it is broadly accepted that these are the years in which youth must be formally educated about government, politics, and citizenship.

Similar to other forms of homeland-oriented education, such as origin language, culture and religious courses available to migrant children in their receiving societies (see, e.g., Garcia-Sanchez (2010) on Moroccan state and community-based education; Piqueray, Clycq and Timmerman (2016) on Polish state and community-based education), during homeland tours local guides, seminar speakers and staff members engage in “explaining” the country of origin to the participants through their verbal acts. Different, however, from these forms of homeland-oriented education and other contexts of political socialization (such as the family), homeland tours are short-lived as socialization settings. Notwithstanding, for the Birthright Israel tours, Saxe et al. (2004) found that “As a relatively brief educational intervention, Birthright Israel is an anomaly—unlike other educational interventions of comparable duration, its impact is sustained over time.” This may be related to the fact that socialization in homeland tours “operates not simply at the discursive level but deeply beneath it as well, through embodied, emotional and interactional experience.” (Kelner 2010:65-66) Therefore, while usually political socialization is supposed to have an effect only

205 when sustained over a longer period, the immersive, all-encompassing and targeted nature of homeland tours tends to turn them into an exception.

However, homeland tours also carry inherent contradictions undermining their ability to impose their ideologies on their participants (Kelner 2010). Contradictions mainly arise from the fact that during homeland visits, migrants’ descendants not only discover “home,” but equally, their otherness vis-à-vis the local population and society. Resultantly, homeland visits enable processes of both identification and disidentification (Kelner 2010). For instance, in her study of homeland trips of second-generation American Chinese and Koreans, Kibria (2002, 305-306) found that “homeland trips were marked prominently by experiences of being seen and treated as ‘different’ by the local population,” with language and cultural mannerisms as main markers of difference. Conrad (2006) too, reflecting on Eritrean “Know-your-country” tours, concludes that they lead to disillusionment among Eritrean diaspora youth, as the “real,” present-day Eritrea diverged from the images the youth had created, based on their parents’ and the exile organizations’ narratives. Resultantly, “Far from solving the question of belonging, these transnational journeys often complicate them” (Ibid.:16). This is because

“[Homeland] tourism does not just represent a vehicle for straightforward, practically automatic voyages of self-discovery and identity affirmation. Visits to homelands or elsewhere in the diaspora may result in troubling, disconcerting and ambiguous experiences as well as new-found ambivalences.” (Coles and Dallen 2004)

A major shortcoming in dominant perspectives on homeland tours is their assumption that participants are passive and captive (Kelner 2010). Participants are supposed to be naive novices to the country of origin, taking for granted whatever told. However, for the Moroccan Summer Universities this picture is unlikely to be accurate for several reasons, related to particular characteristics of the Moroccan “homeland” and its diaspora:

First, the relationship between expatriate Moroccans and the Moroccan State is far from spotless. This is highly relevant when considering the Summer Universities, since it is an initiative organized and subsidized by the Moroccan

206 State. While it is difficult to make generalist claims, both historical (Iskander 2010) as well as contemporary experiences of expatriate Moroccans with origin-state institutions, represented by, for instance, police and consular staff (Kahmann 2014), contribute to a general sense of distrust regarding the Moroccan State. Diaspora policy institutions in particular are regularly being accused of being inefficient, non-transparent and undemocratic (Belguendouz 2008; Østergaard- Nielsen 2012). More generally, major deficiencies in the Moroccan political system further spur a skeptical stance regarding Moroccan State discourses and actions. While Morocco has held free elections since 1996, some of the core principles of democracy, such as an effective protection of basic civil liberties are still not respected (Storm 2007). Observers note therefore that the term “democratization” does not apply well to the very limited and controlled processes of political liberalization in Morocco over the past decades (Østergaard-Nielsen 2012). Other cases have demonstrated the significance of these dynamics: distrust of the state and frustration with corruption and ineffective governance represent major obstacles in the development of diaspora-state relations, eventually leading into dissociation between the diaspora and origin-state institutions (Erdal 2016; Agunias 2009; Huynh and Yiu 2016; Margheritis 2016). While the participants in the Summer Universities are too young to have experienced much of the above issues personally, they have been socialized in migrant families and communities where these problems were manifestly present. While the transmission of attitudes across generations is unlikely to happen unilaterally (Huynh and Yiu 2016), younger generations are likely to be influenced by their elders’ views on the Moroccan State to some extent.

Second, due to the established habit of visiting family in Morocco during summertime among expatriate Moroccans,129 most post-migrant Moroccans have spent entire summers of their youth in Morocco (Wagner 2008). The impact of these extensive summertime stays in Morocco on the migrants’ children should not be underestimated, as return visits may be considered as a “primary socialization” device into the origin-country traditions, rituals, values and norms (Ali and Holden 2006:222). Moreover, while relatively few complete the ultimate “myth of return” by moving to Morocco permanently, post-migrant generations are very much present in Morocco as seasonal visitors, spending their holidays with family and

129 According to Moroccan authorities, around two million “Moroccans Living Abroad” return annually for summer holidays.

207 seeking leisure and pleasure in Morocco’s touristic facilities (Wagner 2014). As a result, for most descendants of Moroccan migrants, Morocco is not merely an imaginary homeland; it is also a perceptible, embodied homeland. Their status of experienced homeland-visitors impacts further socialization processes, since unlike first-time visitors, they can put new experiences and information into perspective by comparison to earlier visits and acquired wisdom.

An additional factor contributing to agency among the Summer Universities’ participants is their educational status. All are enrolled in higher education in their respective country of residence, which assumedly decreases the likeliness that participants are passively incorporating the organizers’ messages.

Considering the particular nature of homeland tours, as an immersive encounter with the homeland, participant observation is the most appropriate data collection method here. Others too have used it to study socialization processes (Garcia-Sanchez 2010). It is particularly useful to detect individual agency during socialization processes. Golden (2001), for example, demonstrates how Russian newcomers to Israel taking part in Hebrew language classes for adults are resisting teachers’ ethnonational views of Israeli citizenship and the matching Israeli political perspectives.

My analysis is based on an in-depth study of the Moroccan Summer Universities taking place in 2013 in Morocco. In the particular program observed, 51 college and university students of Moroccan origin participated in a twelve-day program. As part of the participant observation, I engaged in informal conversations with all participants during the program. As it was impossible to have in-depth conversations with all participants, an open-ended evaluation questionnaire distributed among the participants at the end of the program was used to acquire a more complete picture. To widen the reach of my study beyond this single Summer Universities’ edition, I gathered additional data on other editions in two ways. First, I added (6) in-depth interviews with ex-participants of previous editions, who participated between 2010 and 2012. Second, I repeated the open-ended questionnaire in another location in 2013 as well as in 2014130.

130 In total, 75 students participating in 3 different Summer Universities completed the questionnaire. By no means, this sample is considered as statistically representative. Accordingly, the data has been analyzed qualitatively.

208 THE SUMMER UNIVERSITIES

Les Universités d’été au profit des Jeunes Marocains Résidant à l’Etranger, or Summer Universities for Young “Moroccans Living Abroad,” were launched in 2009. The program is set up and funded131 by the Ministry in charge of the Moroccans living Abroad. Created in its initial form in 1990 by late King Hassan II, this Ministry deals with a broad range of emigration-related affairs and operates in the cultural, educational, judicial, social and economic domain, as well as in diplomacy. Beside the annual Summer Universities, its activities for young expatriates also include the establishment of Moroccan cultural centres in various receiving countries and the organization of two Forums (large conferences for Moroccan expatriate students) in 2011 and 2016.

The Summer Universities’ official goals are threefold: to preserve the national identity of the “new generation of Moroccans living abroad,” to reinforce the ties between this group and their country of origin, and to raise awareness about socio- economic and political change in Morocco.132 The central occupation of the organizers is to show the participants the “real” Morocco, that is, to demonstrate that Morocco is a modernizing and tolerant nation with favorable economic prospects. The organizers’ hope is that the participants will internalize this optimist message, act accordingly by contributing to Moroccan development as well as spread the word as “ambassadors” in their respective countries of residence (Mahieu 2015).

Candidate-participants for the program apply directly with the Ministry. In terms of their profile, the organizers target students in higher education aged 18-25 with a Moroccan background. Beside a large group from Europe (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Italy in particular), participants come from North America, the Middle East and Gulf, the Maghreb and Australia. Every summer, between 100 and 400 students participate in different cities throughout the country such as Rabat, Agadir and Tétouan. Last years the participant number was usually around 250 and the program was concentrated in the northern city of

131 In previous editions there was sometimes a small registration fee (between €100 and €250).

132 http://summeruniversties.com

209 Tétouan. While the participant group is particular in terms of its age and educational profile, in other respects it reflects quite well the diverse Moroccan expatriate population. In terms of countries of residence and socio-economic background, the participating post-migrant Moroccans are a microcosm of the wider expatriate Moroccan population. Also, both genders are represented, with a female dominance133, however. While participants mainly motivate their application to the program substantially (i.e., to get to know Morocco better, to strengthen one’s attachment to Morocco, to socialize with peer expatriates), the prospect of enjoying an all-expense-paid visit to Morocco further adds to the appeal of the Summer Universities.

Its concept is not entirely unique as other Moroccan state initiatives also offer short homeland visits for post-migrant Moroccan children and youngsters. For example, the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans living Abroad, another national diaspora institution, has been organizing annual summer camps for children aged 9 to 13 for more than 20 years. Consequently, the Summer Universities can be regarded as another step in a longer tradition of bringing young expatriate Moroccans “home” to educate them about their country and culture of origin.

NEGOTIATING SOCIALIZATION DURING THE SUMMER UNIVERSITIES

In the next sections, I investigate how participants receive the program. Two domains of contestation and resistance are distinguished. First, the program’s content is being contested as biased. Second, several of the managerial practices of the organizers are met with critique, as participants consider them as incompatible with the core message of the program. These criticisms do not stand in isolation, since the contradiction between state discourses and practices is seen as symptomatic to broader Moroccan society.

133 Based on information of various editions, approximately 6 out of 10 participants were female.

210 CONTESTING ORGANIZERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON MOROCCO: “THIS IS NOT THE REAL MOROCCO!”

A central concern of the Summer Universities organizers is to show the participants a glimpse of the “real” Morocco; that is, a land of opportunities on the verge of modernity (Mahieu 2015). The underlying presumption of the organizers is that expatriate Moroccans’ current views on Morocco are biased, selective, pessimist or even flawed, and therefore need correction. A core ingredient in the Summer Universities’ political socialization strategy are the daily seminars, offered by Moroccan academics and experts. Seminars usually consist of an ex cathedra lecture with a Q&A-session afterwards, with topics ranging from Moroccan history, economic reforms and the 2011 constitutional changes to cultural heritage and religion in Morocco. Presented as state-of-the art academic classes, various participants felt however the content was in fact strongly biased. They depicted the content of the lectures as well as the general message of the program as one-sided “cliché-stories” which were “strongly politically oriented” (Evaluation form, Hassan134 from France), especially regarding the prospects of socio-economic development and the current human rights situation in Morocco.

“These lectures . . . they were always the same story: ‘Morocco is a beautiful country, with many opportunities, there are no problems, there is this and that.’ But if you simply open the door and go outside, you see the opposite yet of what the person on stage was saying.” (Interview, Sami from Belgium)

When asked how he developed his own, more critical, perspective on Morocco, Sami explains:

“You know, you read the news from time to time; you follow it. My parents, for instance, watch Moroccan television chains regularly. If you also have a group of friends that are mainly Moroccan, for instance, you stay in touch with your roots, somehow. And if you see this from early age on … You hear stories of older people living there (in Morocco), and they are

134 All participant names are nicknames.

211 only confirmed over the course of the years.” (Interview, Sami from Belgium)

As this participant points out, his current viewpoint on Morocco has been shaped by an interplay of a various previous socialization processes, occurring both in the country of residence (at the family home, at school, through media) but also during previous stays in Morocco (at the Moroccan family and friends, through personal experiences in Morocco). As a result, he — as many others — has an outspoken opinion yet on how Moroccan society functions and is therefore unimpressed by the attempts of the Summer Universities’ organizers to change this.

A good illustration of how the organizers’ discourses on both the participants’ emotional ties to Morocco as well as on Moroccan society are refuted, is offered by Ali from Belgium. As most other participants, Ali visited Morocco almost every summer since childhood. Of Moroccan Berber descent, he speaks both Moroccan Arabic and Berber fluently. While he identifies himself as Moroccan, he does not identify with the nationalist rhetoric and practices of the organizers who impress the participants to be “proudly Moroccan.” With respect to the program, he expresses his dissent by keeping silent when participants are asked to sing the Moroccan national hymn. As such, he rejects the universalizing “ideology of nationhood” (Mügge 2012) as presented by the Moroccan State, and he contests exhortations for patriotic contributions by the origin state (Ho 2011). At various occasions, he also expresses his critical viewpoint on Moroccan power structures:

Ali explains he doesn’t buy the organizers’ “hyper-positive” messages. On the contrary, he sees many persistent problems in Moroccan society. “Little is improving; today there are more poor people than ever.” He considers the biased perspectives of the organizers are characteristic for Moroccan media more broadly: state-controlled media channels give attention only to accomplishments of the King and government, rather than offering a critical view on societal problems. Another day, Ali is sitting next to me in a seminar on Morocco’s national development plans. He rolls his eyes and whispers, “The seminar is nothing but publicity for Morocco.” “If we would believe everything, Morocco wouldn’t even need more investments

212 because it is the most powerful country in the world yet,” he adds with a smirk. (Observation notes)

While not all participants have outspoken, well-informed opinions as Sami and Ali, the general tendency of the organizers to present a very rosy picture of Moroccan society is a widely shared source of irritation. This is not only because it does not match with the participants’ own perceptions, but also because it reveals the organizers’ denial or ignorance of participants’ previously acquired knowledge on Morocco. As Ouassima from Germany says,

“We are not stupid, of course. Those people [the lecturers] maybe think we’re naive. They try to do their best, but they really think we believe everything they say. But we’re not coming from Mars; we know how things work in Morocco!” (Observation notes)

In terms of socialization strategies, besides the academic seminars, other non- discursive experience-oriented strategies are used. This focus on personal experience distinguishes homeland tours from traditional classroom education where abstract subject material is conveyed, largely stripped from personal experience and emotion (Kelner 2010). From this perspective, the Summer Universities differ as socialization strategy from homeland-oriented language, cultural and religious education offered to Moroccan children in the receiving societies (Garcia-Sanchez 2010). An important element in the program were the guided excursions; varying from short guided tours in the city nearby, to more extensive day trips crossing the region by bus. Usually, these visits were linked thematically to the seminars; as such, they were intended to underpin the content of the seminars. Generally, participants enjoyed these field trips as a welcoming variation to the seminars, as an opportunity to socialize with their peers and to see locations in Morocco they had not seen before. However, the participants’ behavior reveals how these trips transcend the level of mere distraction; they appeal to their emotional attachment to Morocco. For instance, during a guided tour in the scenic, blue washed mountain town Chefchaouen, a tourist hotspot in northern Morocco, various participants express their sense of pride about this spot and exclaim their emotional attachment to Morocco. For instance, when interviewed by a joining reporter, Youssef from the USA cries half-jokingly, “I want to live here!” Effectively, visiting particular sites may serve as a more powerful tool for political socialization than talking about them. Hassan’s behavior during a visit to the port

213 of Tangiers demonstrates this. Standing on the hills bordering the Mediterranean coast and staring over the vast harbor, he exclaims emotionally that seeing this “makes him feel so proud and hopeful of Morocco.” While during the lectures, he is usually the first to ask critical questions on Moroccan state policies, the overwhelming view of the harbor convinces him that Morocco’s economic prospects are favorable—which is exactly the sort of conclusion organizers hope the participants will draw.

However, the participants’ general enthusiasm about field excursions does not prevent them from reflecting critically upon what exactly is shown to them. The selective choice of destinations—which are either tourist spots or sites symbolizing economic progress—also strengthens the sense that they are not being shown the “real Morocco,” and that the Summer University organizers want to impress certain perspectives upon them. For instance, tourist-like excursions are made to Asilah, known for its colorful murals, Chefchaouen and the archeologic Roman site of Lixus. Several spots embodying economic progress in the region are visited too, such as the harbor of Tangier-Med and a yacht harbor in Cabo Negro, an area known for its upper-class tourist facilities. At another occasion, a factory producing parts for Boeing is visited, representing Morocco’s growing aeronautic industry. While less the object of strident critique compared to the one-sided discourses, participants are aware of the selectivity of sites visited and the impact this has on their views. As Naima from Canada suggests, “Making us leave the tourist zones would allow us to form our own opinions on our country” (Evaluation form). Several think that volunteering work (such as assistance to orphans or the poor) should be included in the program, as it would not just allow them to do something back for their country of origin, but also offer them a more balanced perspective, to “see at once the negative and the positive side of Morocco” (Evaluation form, Ouassima from Germany).

However, notwithstanding the organizers’ control over the sites participants are visiting, alternative viewpoints are developed contesting hegemonic discourses on Morocco. This is obvious in the way Sami recalls the visit to a leather tannery site. Instead of adopting the organizers’ perspective, valuing the importance of handicraft for the Moroccan national economy, he looks at it through the prism of unfair labour conditions:

214 “The stench was very, very strong. The way people were working there, surrounded by all those chemicals, with little protection, that was absurd. You could see these people were living on the streets, that their wages were very low, while the prices of leather goods are very high. There, you see the duality between the rich and the poor (in Morocco).” (Interview, Sami from Belgium)

In sum, participants contest the perspectives on Morocco as presented by the homeland tour organizers. Both in the literal sense as well as figuratively, the views presented to them are considered as too one-sided. However, it should be noted that not all participants feel this way. Some participants are clearly more sympathetic to the discourses presented. At least two factors seem to contribute to their captive attitude. First, a small minority of the participants never visited Morocco before. Usually, they have grown up in families that were investing only minimally in homeland ties. Consequently, these individuals are rather ill-informed about Moroccan society and politics, which decreases their capacity to recognize biased information, in contrast to more experienced Morocco-goers. However, even among participants with stronger transnational ties to Morocco, not everybody expresses outspoken critical opinions on Moroccan society or on the ways it was presented in the program. For instance, Bouchra from the Netherlands, who has visited Morocco over twenty times, explains that due to the program,

“My view became much more positive, and also more diverse. In this program, it was proven that Morocco offers many opportunities and that much can be done in the country, both economically as policy-wise.” (Evaluation form)

Unlike the more skeptical participants introduced above, Bouchra’s viewpoint does not contest the program’s optimist tenor. An explanation for this relates to the nature of previous experiences with regard to Morocco and, as part of this, previous state encounters. This element has been underscored by Kahmann (2014), who found that expatriate Moroccans’ divergent positions to the Moroccan State related to previous experiences, such as successful holidays in refurbished neighborhoods (as a positive experience) or confrontation with poverty and repression (as a negative experience). In turn, these experiences are related to structural inequalities, such as class differences. Some of the Summer Universities’ participants belong to upper-class families, a few even having direct relations to

215 Moroccan state functionaries. Presumably, their elite position shields them to some extent from ordinary live in Morocco, in turn influencing their political understandings of Morocco. Therefore, participants who do not contest the Summer Universities' discourses should not necessarily be regarded as more “passive.” Rather, the discourses comply with their previous viewpoints.

As these two factors illustrate, post-migrant Moroccans’ political views on Morocco are influenced by a variety of factors, ranging from holiday experiences to more structural factors, such as their class position and relation to state authorities. Therefore, rather than assuming the Summer Universities’ project to be either “effective” or “ineffective” as an instrument of political socialization for all participants, it is more fruitful to look into the diverse socialization dynamics at play.

QUESTIONING MANAGERIAL PRACTICES: THE SUMMER UNIVERSITIES AS A MIRROR FOR MOROCCAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Political understandings emerge through the interaction of verbal representations and nonverbal contexts of experience (Kelner 2010). Consequently, it is important to push our analysis beyond the participants’ assessment of the program content, and consider participants’ lived experiences during the homeland tour more broadly. Participants’ political understandings with regard to Morocco are also affected by the way the Summer Universities are organized and managed, which include aspects such as the entrance procedure, staff communication before and during the program, regulations regarding participant behavior, the quality of accommodation, time management, feedback mechanisms, the marketing of the program , etc.

Several of these management aspects are received with criticism. As I will illustrate below, these criticisms do not stand in isolation, as the managerial practices are regarded by the students as symptomatic to broader Moroccan society.

216 Practice what you preach? Clientelism and censorship

A first type of criticism regarding managerial practices comes down to the detection of a sharp discrepancy between the organizers’ discourses on Moroccan society and some of their practices. Certain practices directly contradict the organizers’ claims of Morocco as an increasingly modern, open and democratic society. This discrepancy is not considered as accidental; rather, it is perceived as demonstrating deeply rooted problems in Moroccan society. Illustrative here are two incidents occurring during the program, one related to clientelism and another to censorship. In general, these are considered as major problems in Morocco by expatriate Moroccans (Saaf, Hida, and Agbal 2009). The participation in the program of a formally ineligible candidate demonstrated to the other participants that clientelism remains omnipresent:

After a few days, suddenly a new participant joins the group. He is not an expatriate Moroccan but a local student. During a joint meal, four female participants discuss his situation. Rumor goes he managed to circumvent the eligibility criteria and registration procedure because his upper-class father is friends with someone within the organization. The four girls are strongly displeased. They regard it as particularly unfair that a privileged person is occupying the place of an expatriate Moroccan, while there were so many eligible candidates. To them, this incident demonstrates that equality in Morocco is non-existent: people with good connections have more chances. (Observation notes)

At another occasion, it is the direct intervention of the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad that stirs the participants. More in particular, the freedom of speech of one of the participants, Anissa, is obstructed during the opening session of the program, which is attended by the Minister, various Ministry officials and the local university’s vice-rector.

Anissa has been appointed by the staff to give a thank-you-speech on behalf of the participants. She has prepared a speech herself, but a few minutes before the speech, Ministry officials take away her paper and force her to use one that is prepared by the Ministry. Anissa obeys, but she is enraged. She tells the other

217 participants afterwards that she wanted to address some of the problems of expatriate Moroccans in her speech. She is very upset about the censorship by the Ministry, and concludes that “It is typical for Morocco: they try to distort and manipulate everything.” (Observation notes)

Due to this incident, various other participants feel disillusioned about any progress in Morocco regarding the freedom of speech. For instance, Hassan sees this as a barrier to further progress in Morocco:

“I know now that the freedom of speech, which the propaganda tries to make us believe is existing, is inexistent [in Morocco]. The [constitutional] reforms of 2011 have not unplugged the changes hoped for ... I think that a lot of work needs to be done with regard to mentality change and education and that without this fundamental work, all the big projects [the organizers] don’t stop talking about, don’t make sense …” (Evaluation form, Hassan from France)

Professional management: Clashing perspectives

A second point regards the level of professionalism of the Summer Universities management. Many perceive there to be lack of professionalism, which is considered something “really typical” for Morocco. Again, the problems experienced during the program are not considered as isolated issues, but as telling examples of how Morocco functions in reality:

On the second day, when I asked two girls for their opinion on the program, they said that regarding the organization, it is all going really “the Moroccan way”: the fact we’re waiting all the time for the others, the chaos, the lack of a clear timing on behalf of the organization, etcetera. In their country of residence, the organizational culture is exactly the opposite: everything is neatly organized. The girls prefer this to the Moroccan system. (Observation notes)

218 While sticking to the time schedule seems a trivial issue, it raised a lot of consternation. At a certain point during the program, there is a long and heated discussion between the entire participant group and the staff over the lack of punctuality. Remarkable in the first place is the assertive attitude of various participants: in fluent Arabic, they invalidate the staff’s accusation that participants are not respecting the time schedule. Instead, they point at the organizers’ attitude as the source of the problem. Displeased about one particularly long delay—of around 5 hours in total—a Dutch boy named Amin shouts “if in the Netherlands we say to be leaving at 11 am, we do leave at 11 am.” As such, time management issues are framed as a sign of the backwardness of Moroccan culture, whereas “European” organization style is considered the (superior) frame of reference. Amin’s reference to culturally defined norms and customs of his country of residence to evaluate the program’s management is not an isolated example. For instance, when evaluating her overall impression of the Summer Universities, a German-born participant states:

“I started to value a lot certain German habits, like punctuality, organization skills and discipline. Unfortunately, these are customs of which Moroccan people make rarely use.” (Evaluation form, Sara from Germany)

Sara’s example illustrates how negative experiences related to the management of the homeland tours may trigger participants’ disidentification with the society of origin while strengthening identification with the society of residence.

Various participants also express a sense of not being taken seriously by the staff, who treat them as if they were irresponsible children. For instance, in one Summer University edition a curfew was placed at 9 pm after a conflict between participants and staff over the low attendance rate in the seminars. Similarly, in another edition, participants were unhappy about the fact they were chaperoned the entire day by staff members, allegedly to avoid them getting into trouble. Especially some of the girls were discontent about this, as they felt patronized. As Rabiya, a 21 years old girl living in the Netherlands, says to a staff member in a heated discussion,

219 “I have been coming to Morocco on my own for the last 10 years, so I don’t need someone holding my hand, I want to go and do what I want!” (Observation notes)

Warda from Canada summarizes well how inappropriate management ultimately undermines the Summer Universities’ aims:

“I was disappointed by the lack of professionalism and this has confirmed my idea about the lack of commitment existing in Morocco. The false promises and all the troubles before and during the stay would have never occurred in countries like Canada or France. So why do they occur in Morocco? I am still asking myself the question and I know I should not generalize, (but) this was not my first visit to Morocco, so I’m not basing my opinion on just one trip . . . This program wants to encourage us to return to our country to invest and work there, but this lack of professionalism damages the good intentions of the organization.” (Evaluation form)

Whereas others have illustrated yet how homeland visits by diasporic youth lead to processes of identification but also disidentification (Kibria 2002, Conrad 2006), the above examples demonstrate how state-led homeland tours may not just lead to diaspora mobilization, but may also lead to disengagement. While it is beyond the scope of this article to address the deeper origins of his dynamic, one of the elements contributing to it seems to be the organizers’ lack of understanding of participants’ views and norms with regard to “proper” management. This, in turn, may be caused by the top-down nature of Summer Universities, whereby critical input of expatriate community members in the design or implementation of the program is absent.

The Summer Universities as a showcase for Moroccan policies

On a more general level, two factors contributed to a sense among participants that the Summer Universities were in the first place a symbolic initiative, serving not their interests but those of the Moroccan State: high media

220 exposure and the use of Modern Standard Arabic (MSA). Both elements, resulting from managerial choices by the Ministry and local staff, were criticized widely.

Media coverage was omnipresent throughout the program. Media reporters of local and national (state-controlled) media systematically dropped by to take pictures and film footage, and to interview participants. Moreover, a camera team followed the group for about one week, the resulting documentary to be screened on Moroccan national television two months afterwards. This quasi-permanent media attention was however only mildly appreciated by most participants. The abundant presence of reporters led to the feeling among participants that the program served primarily as a showcase for Moroccan diaspora policies, and that this aim was harming the participants’ interests. This feeling was further strengthened by the fact that the program content was regularly adjusted to fit into the time schedule and framing of the reporters. Participants were forced repeatedly to reproduce particular statements or actions in front of the camera. Moreover, the state-controlled media reporting on the Summer Universities, such as newspaper Le Matin, were blamed for just reproducing the organizers’ one-sided views, instead of offering a genuine view into the participants’ experiences.

A second factor strengthening suspicion about the real aims of the Summer Universities was language use. Some of the seminars were taught in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), a formal language bearing little similarity to the colloquial Moroccan Arabic (Darija). While most participants had conversational skills in the latter, few had a good command of MSA. While some of the staff translated simultaneously (to Darija or to French, Spanish or English), this was far from sufficient to help all students.

An illustrative situation where both elements—media presence and the use of MSA—converged was during a seminar at a regional Islamic advisory council. Throughout the entire session, reporters were taking pictures, while a radio station was interviewing some of the participants. Except for one, all speakers (members of the Council) were addressing the group in MSA. Reflecting on this session afterwards, various participants expressed their doubt about the Summer Universities’ true aims. What puzzled them in particular, was that the organizers were well aware of the groups’ lack of proficiency in Moroccan Standard Arabic. As Amin put it ironically to decry the incongruity of the situation: “you could as well talk in Dutch to a group of Chinese tourists.” In sum, it appeared to various

221 of the participants that the organizers prioritized “making a nice television show” over the Moroccan expatriate youths’ genuine interests.

CONCLUSION

Homeland tours for emigrants’ descendants are one of the tools states of origin employ to safeguard the transnational ties of their expatriate communities in the long run. The article’s focus on the foreign-born or “post-migrant” segment of the Moroccan expatriate population responds to the call for the examination of specific groups—such as emigrants’ descendants—within the broad category of diaspora (Délano and Mylonas 2019). This is needed as these groups’ characteristics and responses to diaspora politics are often lost in general categories and broader policy frameworks. In addition, the analysis engages with the temporal dimension of migration (Ibid. 2017), by indicating the role of origin states in “diaspora building” aiming at the continuous transnational ties across migrant generations.

The article draws attention to the limitations of state-led homeland tours as a tool of political socialization. Focusing on post-migrant Moroccan youth participating in the Moroccan Summer Universities, I demonstrated the participants’ agency in contesting various elements of the program. Their agency to resist builds on knowledge and views regarding Morocco acquired previously (e.g., through regular homeland visits) but is also grounded by the youth’s socialization into (Western) country-of-residence norms and values. As such, post- migrant Moroccans’ perspectives on the Summer Universities’ discourses and practices also highlight the role of socialization agents other than the state of origin, such as parents, family, friends, media, educational institutions in the country of residence , etc., when it comes to the development of this group’s political understandings of the origin country. While the analysis presented does not investigate what factors are paramount in their previous socialization, the respondents’ frequent reference to country-of-residence values and norms in their reflection on the Summer Universities and Moroccan society was remarkable. Clearly, the notion of post-migrant youth as “blank canvas” when it comes to their relationship to the origin country is inappropriate.

222 In particular, I have shown how the participants’ perceptions of internal contradictions in the Summer Universities undermine the program’s intentions: instead of engaging the young post-migrant Moroccans as Moroccan development actors, several dynamics at play rather stimulate this group’s disengagement. As such, this article aligns with other research stressing the highly ambiguous role of homeland tours and tourism in homeland ties and identifications of post-migrant diaspora members (Bruner 1996; Kibria 2002; Conrad 2006; Wagner 2014), but focuses on the implications of the state entering into this realm.

A distinctive feature of the Summer Universities is the absence of expatriate community involvement in the set-up and implementation of the Summer Universities, a feature distinguishing it from similar homeland tours. This lack of critical input by expatriate community members may explain to some extent the divergence between participants’ expectations and views on the one hand, and the program content and management on the other. This resonates the general experience that diaspora policy programs are more likely to succeed if diasporas have input (Agunias 2009). A such, the lack of opportunity for input in state diaspora policies can be considered a major factor shaping the microfoundations (Délano and Mylonas 2019) of the relationship between Moroccan State and expatriate communities, a point also made earlier by Østergaard-Nielsen (2012).

These findings not only confirm the relevance of focussing on the receiving end of diaspora policies, they also demonstrate the importance of taking into account discourses and practices alike when assessing the way diaspora policies are perceived. As Agunias (2009) asserts, both policy process (i.e., how the policy program is realized) and policy output (the program as such) are important. In the Summer Universities, participants’ were questioning management practices as much as program content. With participants lamenting that the management was “so typical for Morocco,” the program also served as a mirror to Moroccan society, reflecting its problems and their persistence. Ironically, it was here that the “real” Morocco manifested itself in the program to the participants, more than in the organizers’ polished, idealized accounts of the “real Morocco.”

223 224 CHAPTER 8:

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ACADEMIC DEBATE AND FUTURE AVENUES FOR RESEARCH

225 226 INTRODUCTION

The overall ambition of this dissertation is to contribute to a more fine- grained understanding of origin-country perspectives on emigration. The field of migration studies has long been characterized by a bias towards studying immigration-related issues, while emigration-related issues have been ignored. This one-sided focus was also reflected in studies on migration policies, as emigration and diaspora policies of the countries of origin received little academic attention compared to immigration and integration policies in the receiving countries. Only recently has a research field been established, focusing on the ways in which origin states attempt to govern their expatriate communities (Dufoix et al. 2010; Bouras 2012; Collyer 2013a; Gamlen 2016; 2019). Within this emerging field of study I have identified a particular blind spot; a topic that has not received proper theoretical and empirical attention: diaspora policies that are not targeting emigrants, but their (foreign-born) descendants. This topic becomes relevant when expatriate populations reproduce and settle more permanently in receiving societies.

Morocco, “home” to an estimated five million expatriate population that emerged from post-war labor migration to Europe, has been engaging with its expatriate population for a long time (Brand 2006; Bouras 2012; Iskander 2010). This Moroccan expatriate population is, however, increasingly an integral part of the receiving societies. This is particularly clear in the original destination countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany), in which the majority of the current “Moroccan population” was born locally and has dual citizenship.

Throughout this study, I have explored how the emergence of post-migrant generations within the Moroccan expatriate population have affected these diaspora policies in content and shape. This is an important matter, as it reveals the long-term vision and aims of Morocco’s diaspora policies. More broadly, Moroccan policies focussing on the descendants of Moroccan emigrants demonstrate how states of origin not only attempt to mobilize their “diaspora,” but also engage in the very construction of this “diaspora”.

In the following sections, I structure my main findings around this study’s four central research questions. While these findings primarily summarize the insights from the empirical chapters, I add some reflections on their deeper

227 theoretical implications. Afterwards, I take the opportunity to point out avenues for further research, based on the limitations and strengths of this study.

DIASPORA POLICIES 2.0 FOR THE NEXT GENERATIONS

Research Question A: To what extent are emigrants’ descendants considered a special target group in the origin state’s diaspora policy approach? How is this expressed?

Findings: The Moroccan state’s diaspora policies show an awareness of the growing importance of post-migrant Moroccans within the expatriate Moroccan population, and indicate an understanding of some of the particularities of this group. This is reflected in shifting official state discourses, on the one hand, and in the creation of particular policy initiatives, on the other.

In the Moroccan State’s diaspora policies, we can observe various evolutions that are directly connected to the emergence of post-migrant generations. Shifts can be found in the State’s “ways of thinking and speaking” about, as well as in the “ways of acting” (Kunz 2008) towards the Moroccan expatriate population.

With regard to policy practices, a variety of policy initiatives has been created for Moroccan migrant descendants, such as cultural, religious and language education (offered in the receiving countries), and a range of “homeland tours” or “homeland visits” (in Morocco) like seasonal universities, cultural visits and summer camps. I have noted the importance of homeland tours within current Moroccan policies, which can also be linked to the central position of tourism in the Moroccan economy. Arguably, these targeted policy initiatives are no transient phenomena135 and will remain important in the foreseeable future as the Moroccan expatriate population continues to take root in the receiving societies— in the original destination countries located in Western Europe, but also elsewhere.

135 In 2017, the MCMREAM extended the program of the Summer Universities by introducing "Seasonal Universities" all year round: besides two Summer Universities, an Autumn University, a Winter University and a Spring University have been organized from 2017 on. The aim is to drive up the capacity to 500 participants per year while spreading the organizational workload more evenly throughout the year. Besides, participants can choose more freely a period fitting their (academic) agenda, whereas before, for some students the Summer Universities coincided with their exam period.

228 Discourses have evolved as well. It is remarkable how in Moroccan state rhetorics, an ethnocultural affiliation with Morocco (celebration of their marocanité) has become positively linked to taking root and participating as fully fledged citizens in the receiving societies (enracinement). Therefore, a “model” expatriate Moroccan is not only transnationally engaged; he is also well-integrated into his/her country of residence. In addition, cultural policy programs that were initially presented through the frame of transnationalism (in terms of maintaining ties to the homeland and to facilitating the eventual return) are now being reconsidered through an “integration lens” (as to support inclusion and social cohesion in the receiving country). Interestingly, current Moroccan diaspora policy discourses resonate academic understandings about the optimal acculturation strategy for ethnocultural minority youth, as developed by Berry (1980)136. In state discourses, core elements of acculturation theory are replicated by linking young post-migrant Moroccans’ (often) disadvantaged position in the European societies with suboptimal acculturation strategies that are marked by a loss of their Moroccan ethnocultural identity.

CHANGING POPULATION, SHIFTING DIASPORA POLICIES

Research Question B: If distinctive diaspora policy strategies are used to target this group, how can we understand the nature and form of these strategies?

Findings: In programs for young expatriate Moroccans, the focus is on building homeland-oriented ties (diaspora building) more than on immediate diaspora mobilization. As a part of this approach, young expatriate Moroccans are encouraged to view Morocco not only as their ancestral homeland but also as an attractive tourist destination. In addition, the position of this group in the receiving country influences diaspora policies. Finally, diaspora

136 Berry argues that out of four possible acculturation strategies (assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization), the strategy combining "maintenance of heritage culture and identity" with intergroup contact and participation in the wider (receiving) society is not only the most preferred strategy by immigrant youth; moreover, it leads to the highest levels of psychological adaptation (having few psychological problems, high self-esteem and life satisfaction) and sociocultural adaptation (good educational adjustment, few behavioral problems). However, Berry (2005) also draws attention to the societal context, where successful acculturation ("integration") "can only be ‘freely’ chosen and successfully pursued by ethnic minorities when the dominant (receiving) society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity.” (2005:705)

229 policies for emigrants’ descendants reflect the shifting homeland-oriented practices and identities among this group.

Shifting homeland-oriented practices and identities among emigrants' descendants, and altering positions within the country of settlement have triggered new policy discourses and practices. Rather than introducing wholly new ways of relating to Morocco, though, policies tend to follow and build on practices and identifications still extant in the expatriate Moroccan population. In policy initiatives oriented towards Moroccan migrant descendants, there is a focus on the cultivation of homeland-oriented identifications, resonating post-migrant Moroccans’ need to (re)discover their ethnocultural roots, and explore their ancestral birth country of Morocco. Interestingly, this cultivation of a strong transnational orientation is justified in Moroccan state discourses as a fertile “breeding ground” for optimal integration into the societies of settlement.

Whereas close family ties (with non-migrant Moroccans in Morocco) were pivotal in Moroccan migrants’ transnational activities, and earlier diaspora policies were capitalizing on these particular ties (e.g., by channeling remittances), shifts in transnational practices across generations are followed by shifting policies. Across generations, transnational family ties are weakening, and the Moroccan State adjusts its focus accordingly, for instance by adopting the notion of a moral obligation to contribute to Moroccan development at large (rather than to the well- being of one’s family or hometown in Morocco) and by promoting diaspora tourism (rather than more narrow, family-oriented return visits).

The content of particular programs set up for young expatriate Moroccans, such as the Summer Universities, not only entails learning about Morocco (its languages, history, cultures, religions, politics, etc.) but also learning to view Morocco (and their own relationship to Morocco) in a particular way: Morocco as a modern, rapidly evolving country full of opportunities, and themselves as fully fledged, loyal, productive member of the Moroccan nation and society. As such, the focus is not on the meaning of being an expatriate Moroccan, but rather on how one becomes a “model” expatriate Moroccan (Friedman 2010). Moreover, the set-up of the Summer Universities, as a meeting place for Moroccans from all over the world serves as a way to create and strengthen intra-diaspora connections. In sum, I have argued that more than an educational trip, it is a political socialization project, serving as a platform to communicate tailored messages about the

230 “homeland,” to create intra-diasporic bounds and aiming at strengthening participants’ ties to this “homeland”. This focus reveals how, besides “mobilizing” the descendants of Moroccan migrants, “diaspora building” (Kelner 2010; Gamlen 2006; Resende-Santos 2015; Abrahamson 2017) is at stake.

These findings endorse other scholars’ observations that origin states can employ tourism as a tool to forge linkages with people having ancestral roots there, even if actual social networks are minimal or absent (e.g., Israel, see Kelner 2010). However, the Moroccan case differs from other countries of origin where “old diasporas” are drawn towards their ancestral country through heritage tourism because of the strongly developed “transnational field” spanning Morocco and the countries of settlement of Moroccan emigration. Also, Morocco’s status as a popular international tourist destination distinguishes it from some other origin countries where tourism is less developed.

However, shifting Moroccan policies do not only reflect shifts in the Moroccan expatriate populations’ transnational ties; they also reflect the increasing incorporation of the Moroccan expatriate population into European (or other) societies as well as broader tendencies in Europe. The paradigm shift on integration (Chapter 5) shows how Moroccan diaspora policies are urged to take into account the reality of the incorporation of the next generations into European societies. In current official Moroccan discourses, Moroccans abroad are expected to be “well-integrated” in the receiving society and dual citizenship is applauded, whereas historically, full participation and membership in the receiving societies were deemed irreconcilable with continuing transnational loyalties to Morocco.

Remarkably, the result of these evolutions is that Moroccan diaspora policy discourses today are more in convergence with dominant discourses on immigration in Europe, which tend to emphasize “integration”. However, unsuccessful or assimilationist immigrant policies in Europe and increasingly xenophobic tendencies in European societies have also been identified as part of the problem, whereby religious radicalization leading into terrorist attacks by young men of Moroccan descent on European soil are perceived as symptomatic. It is in reaction to this particular international context that the Moroccan State has altered its position on integration, and now promotes the maintenance of the Moroccan ethnocultural identity by its expatriate Moroccans as a part of the solution to the above-mentioned social problems. As such, the social problems and

231 failing social inclusion policies in the European destination countries constitute a new source of legitimacy for Moroccan diaspora policies, especially with regard to youth of Moroccan background.

Linkages between evolutions in origin and settlement countries, as illustrated by the Moroccan paradigm shift, are complex. These linkages are also undertheorized, which is mainly due to the separation of the field of migration studies into different subfields concerned with either migrant incorporation or transnationalism. By applying Erdal and Oeppen’s (2016) integration- transnationalism interaction typology, these two rather separate fields of study within migration studies (migrant incorporation and transnationalism) are connected in two distinct ways. On the one hand, the case of Morocco provides evidence for how migrant incorporation processes affect diaspora policies; on the other hand, it also offers evidence for how origin country institutions are (or aspire to be) a stakeholder in migrant integration; observations that other scholars have also started to make (Délano 2018; Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx 2015).

In the particular policy strategies targeting emigrants’ descendants, it is also remarkable how the thematic shift is paired with evolutions in the political infrastructure and in the type of activities. The traditional approach, where embassies and consulates are the state’s (main or only) satellites abroad in charge of representing the origin state diplomatically and offering administrative services to citizens abroad, is no longer deemed sufficient and complemented by a range of specific diaspora institutions. As Moroccan consulates seem to have lost relevance for the post-migrant expatriate generations, other institutions such as the Ministry for Moroccans living Abroad develop initiatives reaching out to this group.

In addition, the “VIP-style” nature of these initiatives seems no coincidence; it fits into the wider tendency of origin states to adopt “courting” strategies towards their expatriate populations (Brand 2010; Smith 2003; De Haas 2007; Kunz 2012).

Furthermore, it is notable that homeland tours such as the Summer Universities are characterized by a blend of cultural, social and economic goals and are therefore difficult to classify in terms of the domains addressed (economic, political, administrative-bureaucratic, sociocultural, symbolic). Indeed, this eclectic approach seems characteristic for this type of initiative, just as its focus on

232 embodied experiences. These findings underpin how typologies should not be applied in a rigid manner (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), but used only as a means to identify the presence or absence of certain dimensions in a particular country’s diaspora policy strategies and to enhance comparisons across cases. In recognition of their particular role in state-diaspora relations, I propose youth-oriented diaspora policies to be included more systematically in research on and taxonomies of diaspora policies, as they represent a particular type of “symbolic nation-building” (Gamlen 2006) or “diaspora-building” (Resende-Santos 2015).

INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF HOMELAND-ORIENTED IDENTIFICATIONS

Research Question C: How are these diaspora policy strategies understood and legitimized by the actors creating and implementing them?

Findings: Emigrant descendants’ ethnocultural ties to Morocco are instrumentalized by origin state actors. In addition, a stronger ethnocultural orientation is framed as a way to improve young Moroccans’ integration in the receiving countries. However, there is variation across diaspora institutions. In the Moroccan Ministry for Moroccans Abroad’s policy discourses and practices, cultivating homeland-oriented ties is an instrument to advance broader Moroccan development agendas. This approach is however not shared by the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Abroad. Their competing viewpoints can be characterized as homeland-centered versus diaspora-centered.

The general course of Moroccan diaspora policies is defined by the monarchy, which despite some liberalizing tendencies continues to hold the highest political, religious, economic and military position of power in Morocco — a power system that has been defined as “monarchical authoritarianism” (Daadaoui 2011). Within this setting, a state apparatus targeting expatriate Moroccans has been developed that includes several diaspora institutions. As I have found, these institutions vary in terms of the way they understand and legitimize their policies targeting young expatriate Moroccans. While targeted programs for Moroccan migrant descendants aim at strengthening this groups’ national sense of belonging to the larger Moroccan “symbolic nation,” homeland-oriented ethnocultural identifications are sometimes seen as a leverage for strategic policy goals. As such,

233 post-migrant Moroccans ethnocultural identifications with Morocco are instrumentalized: they are valued because of their (assumed) potential to contribute to the realization of these goals serving Moroccan (state) interests. While this instrumentalization is strongly pronounced in the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad’s discourses and actions (such as the Summer Universities), this appears to be less the case in the Hassan II Foundation. Contrarily, the latter is more supportive of post-migrant generations’ self- determination regarding their homeland ties. However, both underline the value of dual identities of this group including identification with its Moroccan roots.

In the instrumental rationale, the focus on the Moroccan post-migrant youth’s identities is considered an “investment,” as homeland-oriented affiliations are hoped to lead to profitable (future) transnational practices such as investments in Morocco, diaspora tourism and diaspora philanthropy. There is the understanding that to ensure this group’s future engagement, the origin state needs to connect with them now, while they are young and — as it is assumed — most open to the state’s messages. For young high-potentials in particular, there is the hope that affirmation of their ethnocultural affiliation with Morocco will enhance Morocco’s position in the global competition for their talents and financial resources. As a part of this approach, we see how the Moroccan State’s expectations about the post-migrant generations have crystallized into an idealized “model” post-migrant Moroccan subject, indicating how the state engages in defining “ways of being” for its expatriate citizens (Kunz 2008). As the ideal type of the “entrepreneurial migrant” supporting his family back home (Kunz 2008) does not relate to post- migrant experiences, alternative images emerge. Different from their parents, migrant descendants are not expected to transfer remittances, but are encouraged to engage in other transnational economic activities (investments, philanthropy, entrepreneurship, tourist consumption, etc.) and to act as an “ambassador” for their origin country.

For migrant descendants, these moral obligations and expectations do not emerge in a vacuum; rather, they reflect migrant descendants’ own attempts to “keep the immigrant bargain” (Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco 2001; Smith 2002; Carling 2008). Continuing transnational involvement in and identification to Morocco can be perceived as strategies by post-migrant Moroccans to show their elders and their hometown that they have not forgotten their roots and want to repay their parents’ sacrifices resulting from their emigration. Moroccan state

234 strategies, then, capitalize on the moral economy of transnationalism137 (Carling 2008), represented by the notion of emigrants’ “eternal debt” to the home society.

By focusing on strategic agendas as well as on individual agency, this research has highlighted the dynamic interplay between individuals’ daily transnational activities — the “transnationalism from below”— and the macro-level contexts, opportunities and barriers created by powerful transnational actors such as origin states — the “transnationalism from above,” (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). As such, this research contributes to the research agenda linking the state to transnationalism (Smith 2003). The Moroccan State, and the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad in particular, develops a deliberate, strategic approach with the aim of cultivating and consolidating certain transnational ties. However, an important question is to what extent this approach is successful; which brings us to the fourth and last research question.

AMBITIOUS POLICIES, AMBIGUOUS OUTCOMES

Research Question D: How do emigrants’ descendants respond to those strategies?

Findings: The case of the Summer Universities demonstrated how the narrow focus of the organizers on the promotion of strategic national interests, combined with a lack of input by the target group and internal contradictions in the program eventually undermine this program’s ambitions. Under such circumstances, state-led homeland tours discourage expatriate citizens to engage with their home country rather than encourage them to do so, thus promoting diaspora disengagement rather than diaspora engagement. Consequently, while the Summer Universities’ ambitions are high, outcomes are ambiguous.

Others have pointed out how homeland tours may enable processes of identification and disidentification with the community of origin for diasporic youth (Kelner 2010). My findings suggest that state-led homeland tours may trigger engagement with the origin country, state, and its diaspora policy agenda; but they may just as well discourage engagement. The Summer Universities reaffirmed for many participants that if they wanted to contribute to Moroccan development, the

137 Carling (2008) argues that through their transnational practices and identifications; migrants (and their descendants) repay a sort of “moral debt,” and if they fail to do so they are considered as ungrateful towards their origin society (2008:1458).

235 Moroccan State was an actor to avoid rather than to cooperate with. For them, participation in this state-led homeland tour thus stimulated disengagement.

During the Summer Universities, participants contested the program on two different levels: on the one hand, the program’s content was seen as biased, while on the other, managerial practices were criticized and seen as representative of wider problems in Moroccan society (clientelism, censorship, lack of professionalism, etc.). Much of the contestation results from the lack of room for critical dialogue on the content and management of the program. As such, my findings confirm that diaspora policies have more chances for success if expatriate citizens give their input (Agunias 2009).

I have identified various factors contributing to the participants’ critical stance and ability to recognize biased information. First, due to the tense relationship between the expatriate Moroccan population and the Moroccan State, a certain level of distrust regarding the Moroccan State was present among many participants before entering the program. Second, as experienced homeland- visitors, participants can put the messages into perspective by comparing their earlier visits. Third, as participants are highly educated, they are more likely to have the analytic capacities and knowledge needed to note inconsistencies in the hegemonic, optimist discourses on Morocco. However, I also note how various other characteristics, such as class, country of residence and previous experiences play a role in participants’ perspectives on the Summer Universities.

As a final note, while this in-depth case study on contemporary Moroccan diaspora policies for young expatriate Moroccans has contributed to a better understanding of these policies’ actions, rationale and reception, the long-term effects of these policies constitute the true litmus test. Will the current policies in general, and flagship programs such as the Summer Universities in particular, achieve their ambitious long-term aims? Have individual experiences during homeland tours been powerful enough to spark more than the temporary youthful enthusiasm among the participating students? And will it eventually inspire them to “do something” for their origin country in a later stage in their lives? More generally, will policy makers be able to pick the fruits of their continuous “investments” in the Moroccan migrants’ descendants’ transnational ties? And will these make up for net decreases in remittances in the future? Or will, in contrast, effects be limited, and today’s cultivation of post-migant Moroccans’ ties to

236 “home” be replaced by another approach? For now, these questions cannot be answered — only time will tell.

237 ROUTES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In addition to the above findings, the research process engendered other reflections worth sharing here in the form of recommendations for future research. These recommendations draw on both the limitations and strengths of the research approach of this dissertation.

The most important limitation of this study is related to the single-case research design: clearly, the Moroccan case does not allow for easy generalization to other cases. However, the research questions asked about Morocco in this dissertation can be asked for other countries of origin too. Various other countries seem to be characterized by contexts and policies that are (at least partly) similar to Morocco’s. One interesting avenue here would be to explore differences between the diaspora policies developed by states to engage with their “old diasporas” which result from historical migrations (such as the Irish emigration or the transatlantic slave trade) and the diaspora policies focusing on more recent migrations. The in-depth material presented in this study can serve as a basis for formulating questions to be addressed in further single case or multiple-case comparative research.

A second limitation of my research approach regards the scope of my research question and data collection. In this dissertation, I have focused strongly on a limited number of formal political actors, namely the state institutions whose core business is related to expatriate populations. However, it could be relevant to expand this focus, by looking more closely into other political institutions, such as other branches of the Moroccan government in charge of domains that are still relevant to expatriate affairs (e.g., Economic Affairs, Trade, Tourism, etc.). Besides, it could be worthwhile to investigate cooperation between diaspora institutions and non-state actors in the origin and receiving countries. A deeper understanding of non-state actors’ engagement in the transnational field and their interlinkages with state action is important, especially in situations where the boundaries between state and non-state action are blurry. For example, it would be relevant to study how commercial agencies, such as Moroccan and foreign real-estate agencies, financial institutions, and tour operators approach post-migrant Moroccans as a target group and develop targeted ethnic marketing strategies, and how these interact with state strategies in different ways.

238 Another recommendation for future research would be to reject the homogenizing notion of “diaspora” as an analytic category. As my research approach has demonstrated, when the internal heterogeneity of emigrant populations is acknowledged, this allows a new set of questions to emerge. A general question arising from this is how countries of origin deal with heterogeneity in their expatriate population, and how they approach the substantial and practical challenges this heterogeneity causes in their diaspora policy projects. One possible route would be to explore systematically how origin states develop particular policy discourses and adapt their practices, as their expatriate populations diversify demographically (in terms of age, gender, generation), legally (variety of legal statuses, from irregular to dual citizenship), spatially (across several destination countries) and socially (shifting SES status). In future research, three particular types of heterogeneity need more attention:

First, drawing on the findings of studies on migrants’ transnational practices and identities, my central suggestion would be to acknowledge generational divides as a major factor in expatriate citizens’ transnational ties to the “homeland”. As studies on diaspora policies are usually generation-blind, I would plead for infusing the field of diaspora policy studies with an attentiveness towards generational differences. More in-depth case studies and comparative research would help us to answer questions such as: “how do youth-oriented policy initiatives vary across different types of emigration states,” and “what explanations can be offered for this variation”?

Second, the geographical dispersion of expatriate populations should receive more attention in studies on diaspora policies. Future research should investigate more systematically how geographical dispersion impacts homeland relations. Research should consider at least two aspects here. First, one question is how political socialization in the receiving country influences diaspora-homeland relations. In my research on the Summer Universities, I observed how for instance Algerian, Libyan and Qatari Moroccans had quite different views on Morocco compared to Moroccans from Belgium or the Netherlands. The role of socialization in the country of settlement (among others, through formal, national education systems), on the one hand, and the relative status of the country of settlement versus Morocco, on the other hand, are likely to play a role here in explaining this divergence of viewpoints. Therefore, an interesting route would be to compare the evolution of state-diaspora relations across different countries of residence. How

239 do the opportunities, political environments and cultures presented in the different receiving countries influence how post-migrant expatriates interact with their origin country? Second, attention should be aimed at how geographical dispersion affects the origin state’s capacity to reach out to its diaspora. For instance, a direct result of geographical dispersion of Moroccan emigration (in combination with the multilingualism of Moroccan society, with Arabic and Berber-language speakers) is that the post-migrant expatriate Moroccan population has become an increasingly multilingual population lacking a unifying language. As a result, effective communication with this population is becoming a considerable challenge for the Moroccan State.

Third, more scholarly attention should go to the way countries of origin deal with their underprivileged expatriate citizens. As argued in this dissertation, while from a state perspective it is somehow “rational” to aim at privileged post-migrant expatriate Moroccans, such as the highly educated and well-connected; it remains in such a framework unclear why origin states sometimes pay attention to for instance marginalized expatriate youth. For what reasons do states of origin reach out to underprivileged parts of their expatriate communities? Are distinctive engagement strategies used for different groups? This research agenda should also include the study of diaspora policies (or lack thereof) regarding undocumented (Moroccan) migrants, a group almost completely overlooked in this field of study, with some exceptions (Délano 2018).

Finally, as mentioned above, the question remains as to what extent Morocco’s current policy approach is effective. Are the particular policy strategies designed to secure young post-migrant Moroccans’ transnational ties to Morocco reaching their goals? What is the actual “return on investment” of initiatives like the Moroccan Summer Universities in the long run? Does the motivation of young adults of Moroccan origin “to do something for our homeland” translate into concrete action at a later stage? To answer these questions, a longitudinal research approach needs to be adopted, also investigating shifts in transnational ties to the homeland throughout people’s life courses.

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267 NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING

DE BANDEN MET “THUIS” VOEDEN: HET MAROKKAANSE DIASPORABELEID VOOR DE VOLGENDE GENERATIES

Emigranten blijven vaak een belangrijke rol spelen in hun land van herkomst omwille van de transnationale sociale, economische, culturele en politieke praktijken die zij ontwikkelen en aanhouden. Hun strategische impact op de economie (o.m. door geldzendingen en thuislandtoerisme) en politiek (o.m. door extern stemrecht) van herkomstlanden zorgen ervoor dat staatsactoren daarvoor steeds vaker een actief diasporabeleid ontwikkelen (Brand 2006; Gamlen 2006). Ook Marokko, het herkomstland van ruwweg vijf miljoen “MRE” (Marocains résidant à l’étranger of mensen met Marokkaanse nationaliteit of origine die niet in Marokko wonen), heeft een diasporabeleid uitgebouwd. Meer nog, Marokko wordt vaak als een pionier beschouwd op vlak van de ontwikkeling van een effectief diasporabeleid (Iskander 2010).

Echter, transnationale banden veranderen over migratiegeneraties heen. Terwijl voor de Marokkaanse arbeidsmigranten die in de jaren ’60 en ’70 van de vorige eeuw naar Europa vertrokken geldzendingen naar de achtergebleven familie in Marokko een vanzelfsprekendheid waren, komt deze praktijk bij hun nakomelingen — de “post-migratie” generatie van Marokkaanse herkomst (i.e. een groep die zelf niet gemigreerd is, maar wiens (groot)ouders wel) — veel minder voor. Andere transnationale praktijken, zoals thuislandreizen, houden dan weer stand over generaties heen maar veranderen van inhoud en betekenis: familiebezoek neemt af in belang ten gunste van toerisme (Wagner 2008).

Deze vaststellingen doen de vraag rijzen hoe deze generationele verschuivingen weerklank vinden in het Marokkaanse diasporabeleid. Aangezien vandaag in de oorspronkelijke vestigingslanden van de Marokkaanse arbeidsmigratie, zoals België, Frankrijk, en Nederland, de meerderheid van de “Marokkanen” daar geboren en opgegroeide burgers zijn, kan de relevantie van deze vraag moeilijk onderschat worden.

268 Aan de hand van een casestudie van het Marokkaanse diasporabeleid, gesteund op verschillende onderzoeksmethoden zoals diepte-interviews en etnografie, worden in deze doctoraatsverhandeling volgende vragen beantwoord:

(a) In welke mate worden de nakomelingen van emigranten beschouwd als een specifieke doelgroep in het diasporabeleid van het herkomstland? Hoe wordt dit uitgedrukt? (b) Indien specifieke diasporabeleidsstrategieën voor deze doelgroep worden toegepast, hoe kunnen we de aard en vorm hiervan begrijpen? (c) Hoe interpreteren en legitimeren de actoren die het diasporabeleid vormgeven en implementeren deze diasporabeleidsstrategieën? (d) Hoe reageren en reflecteren de nakomelingen van emigranten op deze diasporabeleidsstrategieën?

De bredere doelstelling van deze doctoraatsverhandeling is om bij te dragen aan inzichten in de perspectieven van herkomstlanden op het emigratie-thema. Hoe kijkt Marokko als herkomstland naar “haar” populatie “in het buitenland”? Deze aandacht voor het herkomstland-perspectief biedt een noodzakelijk tegengewicht aan de dominantie van (Westerse) aankomstland-perspectieven in het domein van migratiestudies. Daarin wordt migratie doorgaans eenzijdig als “immigratie” benaderd, daarbij de gevolgen van emigratie op de samenleving van herkomst geheel buiten beschouwing latend (Dufoix et al. 2010; Collyer 2013a; Berriane, de Haas en Natter 2015). Ook de Marokkaanse migratie is al veel vaker bestudeerd in het kader van integratievraagstukken in de “ontvangende” samenleving dan vanuit het standpunt van de “achtergelaten” samenleving.

Deze doctoraatsverhandeling bestaat uit twee luiken. Het eerste luik omvat een theoretisch, contextueel en methodologisch kader. Hierin wordt uiteengezet hoe de onderzoeksvragen zich verhouden tot een aantal centrale theoretische concepten, waaronder transnationalisme en diaspora, hoe de onderzoeksvragen (en antwoorden) gesitueerd zijn in een specifieke context (deze van de Marokkaanse migratie), en hoe de onderzoeksvragen beantwoord zullen worden aan de hand van specifieke onderzoeksbenadering. Het eerste luik legt dus de fundamenten voor het tweede, empirische luik.

269 Het tweede luik bestaat uit vier originele, gepubliceerde peer-reviewed papers, gevolgd door een algemene conclusie. Elk hoofdstuk benadert een of meerdere onderzoeksvragen vanuit een andere invalshoek.

Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt enkele kernvragen: welk diasporabeleid bestaat er momenteel voor de nakomelingen van Marokkaanse migranten; en wat is de onderliggende rationale van dit beleid? Het perspectief van mensen die werken in of voor Marokkaanse diaspora-instellingen staat hierbij centraal. Analyse van diepte-interviews legt bloot hoe de denkwijzen en discoursen over jongeren van Marokkaanse herkomst van de respondenten samenhangen met het Marokkaanse diasporabeleid gericht op deze groep alsook de verwachtingen ertegenover. Echter, in twee voornaamste diaspora-instellingen, de Hassan II Stichting voor Marokkanen in het Buitenland en het Ministerie voor de Marokkaanse Gemeenschap in het Buitenland, blijken verschillende rationales te circuleren (een diaspora-centered vs. een homeland- centered). Deze bevindingen bevestigen het belang van een pluralistisch begrip van de staat — en van “de staat van herkomst” in het bijzonder.

Hoofdstuk 5, geschreven in co-auteurschap met promotoren Christiane Timmerman en Nadia Fadil, belicht een verrassend aspect van het huidige Marokkaanse diasporabeleid: waarom promoot Marokko vandaag actief de integratie van haar geëxpatrieerde onderdanen in hun landen van verblijf, terwijl voorheen elke vorm van integratie als “landverraad” werd gezien? Net als Hoofdstuk 4 richt de analyse zich erop om de onderliggende rationale te begrijpen van deze verschuiving. Geïnspireerd door de Typologie van de Interactie tussen Integratie-Transnationalisme van Erdal & Oeppen (2013), argumenteren we dat deze discursieve evolutie ― van de verwerping naar de aanvaarding naar de promotie van integratie ― kan gezien worden als een opeenvolging van herinterpretaties van het verband tussen integratie en transnationalisme door de Marokkaanse staat van herkomst. Om tot een nog beter begrip te komen van de huidige omarming van het concept “integratie” in het Marokkaans beleid, wordt in dit hoofdstuk ook de onderliggende claim dat een sterke transnationale oriëntatie een vruchtbare voedingsbodem voor integratie is, verder ontleed. Meer algemeen bevestigt dit hoofdstuk dat de innesteling van de migrantenpopulatie in de landen van vestiging een factor van belang om evoluties in diasporabeleid te begrijpen.

Hoofdstuk 6 bestudeert de jaarlijkse Zomeruniversiteiten voor Jonge Marokkanen in het Buitenland, een van de paradepaardjes van het huidige Marokkaanse

270 diasporabeleid. Gestoeld op een analyse van rijke etnografische data wordt vastgesteld dat diasporabeleidsprogramma’s vehikels zijn om aan jongeren van Marokkaanse herkomst gerichte boodschappen over te brengen over hun band met Marokko. Tijdens dit programma wordt het bewustzijn van hun Marokkaanse nationale identiteit aangewakkerd, wordt Marokko in een positief daglicht gesteld en worden verwachtingen gecommuniceerd over hun toekomstig transnationaal engagement gericht op Marokko. Dit initiatief toont aan hoe de Marokkaanse staat een actieve rol opneemt in het proces van diaspora building.

Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt hetzelfde beleidsprogramma als het voorgaande hoofdstuk, maar richt de aandacht op de ervaringen en perspectieven van de deelnemers aan de Zomeruniversiteiten. De analyse belicht hoe de deelnemers van dit programma een kritische houding ontwikkelen zowel omtrent het discours als de managementpraktijken van de organisatoren van de Zomeruniversiteiten. De analyse legt zo de beperkingen bloot van georganiseerde thuislandreizen als instrumenten van politieke socialisatie. De kritische houding van de deelnemers baseert zich enerzijds op de kennis over en perspectieven op Marokko die zij eerder verworven hadden (bijvoorbeeld door regelmatige thuislandbezoeken tijdens hun jeugd) maar wordt ook ingegeven door de socialisatie van deze jongeren in de specifieke (Westerse) waarden en normen van het land waarin ze opgegroeid zijn. Het hoofdstuk vult een kennishiaat over hoe diasporabeleid onthaald wordt door de jonge leden van de “diaspora”, in het bijzonder in een situatie waar relaties tussen de staat en haar populatie in het buitenland gespannen zijn en er weinig ruimte is voor inspraak.

Tot slot recapituleert Hoofdstuk 8 de belangrijkste bevindingen. De vier onderzoeksvragen worden beantwoord. Een centrale bevinding is dat de opkomst van nieuwe generaties binnen migratiegemeenschappen gepaard gaan nieuwe benaderingen in diasporabeleid. De Marokkaanse case leert ons dat voorbij louter mobilisatie van de “diaspora” (“diaspora mobilization”) herkomstlanden ook investeren in het opbouwen ervan (“diaspora building”). Tot slot worden nog enkele suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek gedeeld, met als centrale aanbeveling om in onderzoek rond diasporabeleid meer aandacht te hebben voor diversiteit binnen migratiepopulaties.

271 ANNEX 1: CHRONOLOGIC OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWS

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH EX-PARTICIPANTS OF THE SUMMER UNIVERSITIES

1. 4/12/2012 Mr. Youssef A., Ex-participant in the Summer Universities of 2011 (Rabat). Interview location: Antwerp, Belgium.

2. 21/2/2013 Ms. Samira H., Ex-participant in the Summer Universities of 2011 (Rabat). Interview location: Leuven, Belgium

3. 20/3/2013 Mr. Khalid A., Ex-participant in the Summer Universities of 2010 (Oujda) and 2011 (Tétouan). Interview location: Antwerp, Belgium

4. 3/7/2013 Ms. Sarah A., Ex-participant in the Summer Universities of 2011 (Rabat). Interview location: Leuven, Belgium.

5. 15/7/2013 Mr. Nabil Q., Ex-participant in the Summer Universities of 2011 (Tétouan). Interview location: Halle, Belgium

6. 26/3/2013 Ms. Sofia Z., Ex-participant in the Summer Universities of 2012 (Marrakech), Interview location: Brussels, Belgium.

ELITE INTERVIEWS WITH STAFF MEMBERS IN DIASPORA INSTITUTIONS

1. 2/5/2013 Mr. Fouad Benmakhlouf, Director of the Pôle Cooperation et Partenariat at the Hassan II Foundation, Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

2. 2/5/2013 Mr. Hakim Ben Achour, Advisor to the Minister at the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad. Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

272 3. 3/5/2013 Mr. Soufiane Ait Hammu, Officer at the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad, in charge of the Summer Universities and Cultural Journeys. Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

4. 8/5/2013 Mr. Brahim Abbar, Hassan II Foundation, Director of the Pôle Education et Diversité Culturelle. Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

5. 28/4/2014 Mr. Abelillah Maknass, Group supervisor at the Summer Universities in Tétouan (from 2011 on). Interview location: Tétouan, Morocco.

6. 29/4/2014 Mr. Chokri Barbara, Secretary-General at the campus Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS) of Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi (Tétouan), and coordinator of the Summer Universities in Tétouan, Interview location: Tétouan, Morocco.

7. 29/4/2014 Mr. Hassan Ezbakhe, Vice-rector at Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi (Tétouan), Responsible for the Summer Universities. Interview location: Tétouan, Morocco.

8. 30/4/2014 Mr. Abderrahim Omari. Director of Economic and Financial Affairs at the Ecole Normale Supérieure of the Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi (Tétouan), and in charge of the financial management of the Summer Universities in Tétouan. Interview location: Tétouan, Morocco.

9. 6/5/2014 & 14/5/2014 Dr. Abderrahmane Zahi, Secretary-General of the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad. Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

10. 6/5/2014 & 8/5/2014 Mr. Omar Bardai, Staff member at the Pôle Observatoire and Pôle Cooperation et Partenariat, in charge of all contacts with expatriate Moroccans in the Netherlands. Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

11. 7/5/2014 Mr. Hatim Amrani, Head manager of Service d’Action Culturel at the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad. Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

273 12. 7/5/2014 Mr. Soufiane Ait Hammu, Officer at the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad, in charge of the Summer Universities and Culturel Journeys. Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

13. 14/5/2014 Mr. Jawad Dequiuec, Secretary-General ad Interim at the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad and Director of Social, Cultural and Juridical Affairs. Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

14. 20/5/2014 Ms. Ghita Mdarhri Alaoui, Head manager of Logistic Affairs at the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad, previously in charge of the Summer Universities in the Service d’Action Culturel (in 2009-2010-2011). Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

15. 26/5/2014 Mr. Driss Ajbali, Coordinator at the CCME, Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

16. 27/5/2014 Ms. Hasnae Fathi, Officer at the Ministry for Moroccans Living Abroad. Interview location: Rabat, Morocco.

274 ANNEX 2: ABBREVIATIONS

CCME Conseil de la Communauté Marocaine à l’Etranger, Council of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad CME Communauté Marocaine à l’Etranger, Moroccan Community Living Abroad DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area ELACM l’Enseigment de La Langue Arabe et de La Culture Marocaine, Education of Arabic Language and Moroccan Culture EU European Union FHII Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocaines Résidant à l’Etranger, Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Living Abroad GDP Gross Domestic Product GMDF Global Millennium Development Foundation HTA Hometown Association IOM International Organization for Migration MCMRE (until 2017) Ministère Chargé de La Communauté Marocaine à l’Etranger Ministry in Charge of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad MCMREAM (from 2017 on) Ministère Délégué auprès du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de la Cooperation Internationale Chargé des Marocains Résident à L'Etranger et des Affaires de la Migration Ministry-Delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs. MSA Modern Standard Arabic MRE Marocain à l’Etranger, Moroccan living abroad MDM Marocains du Monde, Global Moroccans UN United Nations VFR Tourism Visiting Friend and Family Tourism

275 ANNEX 3: INTERVIEW GUIDELINE FOR EX- PARTICIPANTS TO THE SUMMER UNIVERSITIES

Personal background questions

• When were you born? • Where were you born (country + city) • What nationality or -ies do you have? • Where were your parents born (country + city + region of origin)? • When did your parents come to Belgium? • What is your “ethnic” background (Berber, Arabic, Jewish, mixed, etc.)? • Where do you live for the moment (city, neighborhood) and are you still living with your parents? • What is your civil status? Do you have children? • What education did you have? (secondary school, higher education) Did you ever study abroad? In Morocco? • If you are working, what job do you have? • What languages do you speak and how did you learn them? • Have you ever attended Moroccan, Islamic or Quranic classes? Did you ever receive private education in these matters? • What do you do in your leisure time?

Questions on transnational practices related to Morocco

Visiting Morocco

• How often do you visit Morocco, normally? • Would you go more often, if this was possible? What is holding you from doing so (e.g. time/financial limitations, family duties) • Do you feel guilty when you cannot go or when you are going less often? • Are there any people living in Morocco that expect you to visit on a regular base? Do you have close family in Morocco? • Did you travel to other countries, recently?

276 • Which other foreign countries have you visited yet? • Is Morocco your most important destination? • How long time is it ago that you traveled to Morocco? • If it is a long time ago, do you regret this? • For how long are you going, usually? • At what time in the year do you travel usually? • Did the frequency/timing change compared to childhood visits? • Do you always visit the same spots in Morocco? What is your primary destination? • Do you always travel with the same people? With whom are you traveling? • Can you describe a regular day during your stays Morocco? What are the main activities? Do you do things there you wouldn’t do in Belgium? • Where do you stay during your visits in Morocco? (your own holiday house, at your (local) family’s place, in a hotel) • Do you have a holiday house in Morocco? • Would you like to have this, do you have any plans to buy this? • Or is there a (collective) family house available (like your parents’ house or other family members not living there) • Could you imagine living in Morocco? Why (not)? • Did you ever consider moving to Morocco? • What is for you the main reason to travel to Morocco? (vb. family, nostalgia, …)

Financial support to people and organizations in Morocco

• Do you (or you family) offer financial support to anyone in Morocco? • If yes, how much and to whom? • Is there an expectation to offer support to family or acquaintances? Who exactly is expecting this from you? (e.g. you parents, the people involved) • Do you bring any goods or money with you when you travel to Morocco? What type of good? • Have you offered money yet to charities in Morocco? Where do you know this charity from?

277 • Have you offered money yet to humanitarian or development aid NGO operating in Morocco? • Have you supported any other projects in Morocco? • Are you involved in transnational economic projects? • Do you have any other engagement related to Morocco?

The Summer Universities

In which edition of the Summer Universities did you participate (city+year) ?

Before Participation

• Did you participate in similar programs before (e.g., an educational exchange program with a Moroccan school, a summer camp as a kid, another summer university)? • How did you hear about the Summer Universities program (mouth-to- mouth, website, community association, consulate) • Have you hesitated, or were you enthusiastic from the first moment? • What did your parents say about it? • How much did it cost to participate? • How did the cost affect your decision to participate • Did you pay the cost yourself, or did your parents do this? • Did other people you already knew from before, attend? • Was this important to you? • Did you persuade others to register too? • Did you know others who participated in earlier editions? • Could you choose in which university/city you wanted to attend the Summer Universities? • How did the selection of candidates take place? • What were the main criteria to participate? • Was it required to speak Darija and read MSA? • What was the role of the consulate in the organization of the Summer Universities? (Did they select participants?) • Did you get in touch with the consulate before this?

278 • The Summer Universities were organized by the Ministry for Moroccans Abroad. Did you hear about or get in touch with this institution before? • What was your personal motivation to participate? • Can you say something about the expectations you had about the Summer Universities before you departed?

During participation

• You participated in the Summer Universiteit at the University of (name city). • Did you visit this place before? • What was your impression about this University? • There was a general reception event on the first days, by the Minister for Moroccans Living Abroad. How did you experience this reception? • How would you describe the group of participants? • Were there any people you knew from beforehand? If yes, where did you know them from? • Can you say something about the group composition? • What nationalities were represented? • Are participants mainly born in Morocco or are mostly abroad? • What regions in Morocco did they originate from? • Language (all Darija-speakers, or also Berber language speakers? And were there any people who did not speak any Moroccan language)? • Age? • Gender? • Did you notice any differences in “mentality” between participants (e.g., according to their country of settlement)? • How was the general atmosphere in the group? • What language(s) were spoken usually between the participants, what languages by the staff? • To what extent did language differences constitute a barrier? (between staff and participants, or between participants)? • Contacts with local Moroccans (=non-migrant Moroccans in Morocco)

279 • When you encountered local Moroccans during the program, did you feel there was a “gap" between you and them? Can you give any examples of this? • Did you experience similarities between you and local Moroccans? • Can you give any examples of this? • Can you say something about the lectures, classes or debates you attended in the Summer Universities? What was your general impression about these activities? • What were the main themes? • Did you learn something new? If so, what? • Did your opinion change about certain subjects? • Did you have the idea that your viewpoint or knowledge about certain themes was quite different from the viewpoints and knowledge presented? • Did the way of teaching differ from Belgian higher education? • Historical/cultural site visits. • Have you visited yet historical or cultural sites during previous visits to Morocco? Is this something you do regularly? • What places will you remember the most and why? • Can you describe what you feel when visiting such place? Is this like any other site in other tourist destinations (such as Rome, …) or is it different? • Visits to economic activity sites / corporations • What is your impression of the state of the Moroccan economy? • Would you consider investment or any other economic activity in Morocco? • Recreational activities (e.g. water sports) • Are these activities you would also do normally when you’re in Morocco? • Now that you have become more familiar with this recreational offer, would you do it more in the future? • What did you learn about Morocco that you didn’t know before? Did you discover new things you didn’t know yet?

280 • Did this trip to Morocco change your view of Morocco? If yes, in what way (e.g., does it make you more proud about Morocco? Do you feel now that many people have a wrong image of Morocco?) • How did this trip differ from your earlier visits to Morocco? (in terms of locations visited in Morocco, nature of activities, type of company, cost) • What would you change in the program, if you were the program organizer? (e.g., Content of the program, logistics, staff, group composition, etc.)

After participation

• Are you still in touch with the other participants? • Are you still in touch with other people or organizations in Morocco, that you got to know due to the program? • Did you visit Morocco since your participation in the Summer Universities? • Have you returned (during more recent visits) to spots you visited during the Summer Universities? • Would you recommend the program to others? And did you recommend it to others? • Would you say your bond to Morocco has changed due to this experience? • Do you know people who attended in 2012 or are planning to go in 2013? • (View pictures together, if they have brought any to the interview) • Do you also make a lot of pictures when you are in Morocco, or did you make more this time?

Question for snowball sampling

Could you refer me to others who also participated in your Summer University group, especially French- and Dutch-speaking participants from Belgium and the Netherlands?

Do you know people who participated in other editions?

281 ANNEX 4: OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SUMMER UNIVERSITY PARTICIPANTS

Your answers to this questionnaire will be used in the PhD project of Rilke Mahieu, who works at the University of Antwerp (Belgium). The data will be treated in an anonymous way. Ce sondage fait partie du projet de doctorat de Rilke Mahieu, qui travaille à l’université d’Anvers (Belgique). Les données seront utilisées d’une façon anonyme.

You may answer the questions in one of following languages: English, French, Dutch, German, Spanish, Italian. Vous pouvez répondre les questions en anglais, en français, en néerlandais, en allemand, en italien ou en espagnol.

If you don’t have enough space for answering a question, feel free to write on the back side of the page. Si l’espace vous manque afin de répondre à une question, n’hésitez pas d’écrire sur l’arrière de la page.

Thanks for your time! Merci d’avance pour votre temps! Shukran bezzaf!

(1) PERSONAL INFORMATION / DONNÉES PERSONELLES

Year of birth / Année de naissance: ......

Sex/Sexe:......

Nationality1/ nationalité2 ...... (1one or several / 2une seule ou plusieurs)

Marital status / état civil......

282 Place of birth / Lieu de naissance City/Ville: ...... Country/Pays: ......

Place of residence / Lieu de résidence: City/Ville: ...... Country/Pays: ......

If your country of residence differs from your country of birth, at what age did you move there? Si votre pays de résidence n’est pas votre pays de naissance, à quel âge vous y avez déménagé?

......

Father’s place of birth / Lieu de naissance de votre père City/Ville: ...... Country/Pays: ......

If your father’s country of residence differs from his country of birth, at what age did he move there? Si le pays de résidence de votre père n’est pas son pays de naissance, à quel âge y-a-t-il déménagé?

......

Mother’s place of birth / Lieu de naissance de votre mère City/Ville: ...... Country/Pays: ......

If your mother’s country of residence differs from her country of birth, at what age did she move there? Si le pays de résidence de votre mère n’est pas son pays de naissance, à quel âge y-a-t-elle déménagé?

...... Your region(s) of origin within Morocco: / Votre région(s) d’origine au Maroc:......

283 Have you ever lived in Morocco? Avez-vous habité au Maroc?

YES / NO OUI/NON

If so, at what age, for how long and where?

Si oui, à quel âge, pour combien de temps et où?

......

How many brothers and sisters do you have?

Combien de frères et soeurs avez-vous?

......

Which position do you have among them? (For example, “I am the 2nd oldest”)

Quelle est votre position parmi eux? (Par exemple, “je suis la deuxième plus vielle de la famille)

......

284 What is/are your native language(s)?

Quelle est/sont votre/vos langue(s) maternelle(s)?

......

What other languages do you speak? Quelles autres langues parlez-vous?

Good command/ Haut niveau de compétence:

......

Moderate command/ Niveau modéré de compétence:

......

Basic command/ Notions de base:

......

Do you consider yourself as religious? If so, which religion do you adhere to?

Est-ce que vous vous considérez réligieux? Si oui, à quelle réligion vous appartenez?

......

What are you studying currently? Qu’est ce que vous étudiez?

......

Where do you study (name of the institution)? Où étudiez-vous (nom de

l’institution)?

......

285 What is/was your fathers job? Quel est/était l’emploi de votre père?

......

......

What is/was your mothers job? Quel est/était l’emploi de votre mère?

......

......

(2) PREVIOUS TRAVEL EXPERIENCE / VOYAGES PRÉCÉDENTES

How many times have you been in Morocco yet (this stay not included)?

Combien de fois avez-vous déjà visité le Maroc (cette séjour non comprise)?

......

When was the last time you visited Morocco?

Quand était la dernière fois que vous avez visité le Maroc?

...... Do you visit Morocco on a regular basis, and if so, how often?

Est-ce que vous visitez le Maroc régulièrement, et si oui, avec quelle fréquence?

......

How long do you usually stay? Pour combien de temps vous rester normalement?

......

286 Where do you usually stay during your visit? (For example: at your Moroccan

family’s place, at your own or your parents house, at a hotel, …)

Où est-ce que vous restez normalement durant votre visite? (Par exemple: chez votre

famille marocaine, chez votre popre maison où celle de votre parents, dans un hôtel,

…)

......

To which region(s) do you usually go, when visiting Morocco?

Quand au Maroc, quelle(s) region(s) vous visitez habituellement?

......

......

What are your main reasons for visiting Morocco? (For example: work, administrative issues, maintenance of family ties, weddings or funerals, leisure, volunteering, training, cultural sightseeing, nostalgia, …. )

Pour vous, quels sont les raisons principales pour visiter le Maroc? (Par example: travail, administration, maintenance les liens familials, des marriages et des sepultures, volontariat, éducation, loisir, nostalgie, …)

......

......

......

287 Have you visited any other countries yet (besides Morocco and your country of residence)? If so, which ones?

Avez-vous déjà visité des autres pays (sauf le Maroc et votre pays de résidence)? Si oui, lesquels?

......

......

(3) FAMILY and CULTURAL TIES

How many of following family members are living in Morocco?

Combien des membres de famille suivantes vivent au Maroc?

Parents / parents......

Siblings / frères et soeurs ......

Grandparents / grand-parents ......

Cousins / cousin(e)s ......

Aunts and Uncles / Tantes et oncles ......

288 Have you ever donated money to family members in Morocco? If so, how often and what amount? Donnez-vous parfois de l’argent à votre famille au Maroc? Si oui, avec quelle fréquence?

......

......

Have you ever donated money charity organizations working in Morocco? If so, which organizations did you support? Donnez-vous parfois de l’argent a des associations caritatives, qui oeuvrent au Maroc? Si oui, quels organisations vous avez soutenues?

......

...... How often do you watch Moroccan TV channels (in your country of residence)? What kind of programs do you watch usually? Avec quelle fréquence vous regardez la télévision marocaine (dans votre pays de résidence)? Quel genre de programmes vous regarder habituellement?

......

...... Do you follow the Moroccan news? If so, how do you do so?

Suivez-vous l’actualité marocaine? Si oui, de quelle façon vous le faites?

......

289 (4) THE SUMMER UNIVERSITY/ L’UNIVERSITÉ D’ÉTÉ

How did you discover the Summer University initiative? (For instance: through ex-participants of previous editions, through the Moroccan Consulate/Embassy, through a local Moroccan association, through a social network site, …)

Comment avez-vous découvert l’initiative de l’Université d’été? (Par exemple: via des ex-participants des éditions précédentes, via le Consulat/ Ambassade marocaine, via une association marocaine locale, via la mosquée, via des sites de réseau socials, ...)

......

......

...... Do you know any persons who participated in previous Summer University editions (in 2012, 2011, …)? YES/NO

Connaissez-vous des personnes qui ont participé dans des éditions précédentes (en 2012, 2011, …)? OUI/NON Did you know any of the other participants before? If so, how many of them, and where do you know them from?

Est-ce que vous connaissez des autres participants d‘avance? Si oui, combien d’eux, et d’ou est-ce vous les connaissez?

......

......

290 What were your personal motivations for participating in the Summer University?

Quelles étaient vos motivations personelles pour participer à l’Université d’été?

......

......

......

...... For what reasons did you pick this particular university as your destination? (If this wasn’t your first choice, which one was and why so?)

Pour quelles raisons avez-vous choisi cette université comme destination préférée? (En cas cette université n’était pas ton université préféré, quelle était votre premier choix et pourqoui?)

......

......

Did you ever visit Tétouan before? Aviez-vous déjà visité Tétouan?

YES/NO OUI/NON How would you evaluate your Summer University experience?

Comment vous évalueriez votre expérience de l’Université d’été?

......

......

......

291 In what respect did the programme influence your view on Morocco/ Moroccan culture/ the Moroccan people?

En quoi le programme de l’université d’été a influencé votre avis sur le Maroc/la culture Marocaine/la population Marocaine?

......

......

......

......

What would you change in the programme or the practical organization, in order to improve it further?

Qu’est ce que vous changeriez concernant le programme ou l’organization logistique, afin de l’améliorer?

......

......

......

...... Are you planning to recommend others to participate in next year’s edition?

Est-ce que vous conseillerez des autres personnes à participer l’année suivante?

YES/NO OUI/NON

292 (5) FUTURE PLANS / DES PROJETS D’AVENIR

Do you have any future plans to travel to Morocco? When?

Avez-vous l’intention de voyager au Maroc dans l’avenir? Quand?

......

Did your future travel plans change due to your Summer University experience? If so, how did they change?

Est-ce que vos plans de voyage ont changé à cause de votre participation à l’Université d’été? Si oui, comment ont-ils changé?

......

...... Would you ever consider buying real estate in Morocco (an apartment, a house, …)? For what reasons would you do so?

Est-ce que vous consideriez à acheter de la propriété immobilière au Maroc? Pour quelles raisons?

......

......

......

293 Would you consider living in Morocco (in the close future or at a later stage)? Under what circumstances would you consider this?

Est-ce que vous considerer à habiter au Maroc (dans le futur proche ou loin)? Sous quelles conditions vous le considéreriez?

......

......

Did you opinion on this matter change due to your Summer University experience? If so, how did it change?

Est-ce que votre avis sur ce point-là a changé à cause de votre participation à l’Université d’été? Si oui, comment a-t-il changé?

......

......

If you wish to be informed about the results of my research project, please fill out your name and email adres here:

Si vous vous intéressez à recevoir les résultats de ma recherche, remplissez votre nom et adresse électronique ici:

......

Thanks for your time! / Merci beaucoup pour votre temps!

In case of questions, please contact / En cas de questions, contactez

Rilke Mahieu (University of Antwerp/Université d’Anvers, Belgium/ Belgique) – [email protected]

294 ANNEX 5: POLICY REPORT ON THE SUMMER UNIVERSITIES 138

LES UNIVERSITÉS D’ETÉ AU PROFIT DES UNIVERSITAIRES MAROCAINS RÉSIDANT À L’ETRANGER. ANALYSE DESCRIPTIVE DU QUESTIONNAIRE139

1. Introduction

Ce rapport est destiné à tous ceux qui s’intéressent à mieux comprendre les expériences des participants aux Universités d’été au profit des universitaires marocains résident à l’étranger. Ce programme est organisé annuellement par le Ministère Chargé des Marocains Résident à l’étranger et des Affaires de la Migration, en collaboration avec des universités marocaines.

Le rapport est basé sur les données recueillies sur la base d’un questionnaire, distribué parmi les participants à la fin de l’édition 2013. Le questionnaire fait partie d’un doctorat sur les liens transnationaux des jeunes générations des MRE. Alors que dans ce doctorat les données seront interprétées d’un point de vue théorique, dans ce rapportage, les résultats sont présentés d’une manière plutôt descriptive et transparente. Ainsi ils pourront être utiles à tous ceux qui sont impliqué dans l’organisation des Universités d’été.

138 Note: this internal policy-oriented report was written in March 2014 for the Summer Universities’ staff members, especially those who were involved in the Summer Universities 2013 in Tétouan. The content is solely based on the results from the questionnaire, which was distributed among the 2013 Summer Universities’ participants in Tétouan and Agadir. The report was presented and distributed (on paper) during interviews with staff members in 2014 in Tétouan and Rabat. As such, it was both a return favor (for their hospitality during the previous summer) as an incentive for giving me an interview (since some were curious about the outcomes of the questionnaire).

139 All images in this report are taken by the author.

295 Trois questions générales se trouvent au cœur de ce rapportage et guident aussi la structure de ce rapport. Premièrement, quel est le profil des participants? Un éventail des caractéristiques sera adressé. Certains facteurs sont évidents (comme le sexe, le pays de résidence), mais on adresse aussi le pays de naissance, région d’origine au Maroc, les études, le nationalité, le connaissance de langues et les expériences précédents au Maroc des participants. Deuxième question, pourquoi participent-ils? Quelles étaient leurs motivations à participer, et quels autres facteurs influencent leur inscription? Troisième question, quels étaient leurs expériences durant le séjour? Quels aspects ou activités sont bien appréciés, que pensent-ils du programme?

Evidemment, durant la préparation du programme et le séjour même, les organisateurs se sont fait une impression du profil des participants, de leurs motivations à participer et de leurs expériences durant le séjour. Bien que ces impressions soient souvent valides, l’approche scientifique de ce rapport apporte un procédé structurel et systématique, aboutissant à des connaissances plus complète et solides. Ainsi, cette analyse vise à compléter et raffiner la compréhension existante, souvent en confirmant les idées existantes, mais aussi parfois en réfutant quelques-uns.

Le questionnaire, qui forme la base de cette analyse, a été distribué parmi les participants à la fin du program (sur papier) et en addition, une version électronique a été envoyée simultanément. Sur un total de 103 participants, 50 ont remplis le questionnaire. Le groupe des répondants est représentatif pour le groupe total en terme de sexe et régions de résidence140. Comme le nombre effectif des répondants reste sous les 100 personnes, on n’utilisera pas de pourcentages dans le rapportage des résultats. Dans l’interprétation des résultats, il est important de ne jamais perdre de vue le fait qu’il s’agit d’un groupe à nombre modeste. Concernant la représentativité, bien que le groupe des répondants soit représentatif du groupe total des participants, on ne peut bien-sûr pas simplement extrapoler les résultats vers une population plus large (tous les jeunes d’origine Marocaine).

140 Pour cette raison le taux de non-réponse n’est pas considéré problématique. La plupart des répondants ont participé au programme à Tétouan (34/50), les autres à Agadir (16/50). Cependant, cette disparité est compréhensible: parce que la chercheuse à participé au programme de Tétouan, le rapport plus personnelle avec la chercheuse les a stimulé à remplir le questionnaire. Comme les expériences peuvent différer selon la location du programme, dans la section sur ce thème on est attentif pour différences entre les deux groupes.

296 Avant de commencer le rapportage des résultats, on veut remercier toute l’équipe des Universités d’été pour leur volonté de faciliter le travail du terrain et leur hospitalité vis-à-vis de la chercheuse. Sans leur soutien, cette étude n’aurait pas été possible. Aussi, on veut remercier les participants aux Universités d’été, qui ont sacrifié leur temps pour remplir le questionnaire.

2. Quel profil des participants?

Bien que la question principale dans cette section soit toute simple (qui sont les participants?), la réponse est nécessairement multi-dimensionné. Dans le questionnaire, une série de questions était posée sur les caractéristiques des participants, afin de mieux comprendre qui exactement a participé au programme. Le but général est de déterminer si le groupe est un échantillon représentatif de la population jeune des MRE, ou un groupe plutôt particulier.

Le genre

Il y a une surreprésentation des femmes parmi les participants: 62 femmes versus 41 hommes ont participé. Il est cependant remarquable que cette participation diffère selon le région de résidence: pour les participants de l’Europe et de l’Amérique du Nord, les femmes forment la majorité (Europe: presque 2 sur 3 participants sont féminins, l’Amérique du Nord: plus de 3 sur 4 sont féminins), mais cette répartition est totalement inversée pour ceux venants de l’Afrique ou du Moyen Orient (moins d’un 1 participant sur 3 est une femme).

Pour comprendre ces différentes répartitions, il est nécessaire de considérer la situation des jeunes femmes et hommes dans les différentes régions, et surtout les relations de genre avec lesquelles ils sont confrontés. Pour ces pays avec une attitude plutôt conservatrice concernant le rôle de la femme, comme il est le cas dans certaines pays du Moyen Orient, il n’est pas surprenant que les jeunes femmes MRE sont moins porté à participer à un programme tel que les universités d’étés. Mais aussi pour les femmes venant des pays de l’Occident, qui sont surreprésentées, leur position en tant que femme joue un rôle: pour un grand nombre d’entre elles, les universités d’été sont une opportunité unique pour découvrir leur pays d’origine sans leurs parents et leurs familles. Plus que les hommes, elles n’ont pas encore eu l’opportunité de visiter le pays d’une façon plus

297 “libre”, par exemple avec un groupe d’amis. Ces considérations montrent que la répartition de sexe n’est pas nécessairement accidentelle.

L’âge

Une des critères pour participer est l’âge du candidat: seulement ceux entre 18 et 25 ans étaient éligibles. En réalité, la diversité d’âge est plutôt limitée, comme la plupart des participants ont entre 21 et 24 ans.

Pays de résidence

La répartition selon les pays de résidence démontre une diversité riche, comme en total, 4 continents (L’Europe, l’Amérique, l’Asie et l’Afrique) et 15 pays sont représentés.

La plupart des participants (60 sur 103) résident en Europe, plus particulièrement ils habitent aux Pays-Bas (20), en France (10), en Allemagne (10), en Belgique (6), en Italie (10), en Espagne (4) et en Norvège (1). Dans l’Amérique du Nord, un groupe de 15 participants habitent au Canada, et 8 aux Etats-Unis. Les autres vivent répandu dans le Nord de l’Afrique et le Moyen-Orient: en Algérie (5), au Sénégal (1), en Côte d’Ivoire (1), en Tunisie (1), en Libye (10) et au Qatar (1).

Cette composition n’est pas du tout accidentelle. Au contraire, la réalité migratoire détermine la composition du groupe dans une grande mesure. La forte représentation des pays de résidence “originaux” (vers lesquelles la migration marocaine a commencé il y a plus de 50 années) est le résultat du fait qu’ils hébergèrent des communautés marocaines établis, avec une grande deuxième et même troisième génération des jeunes d’origine marocaines. Pour des autres pays Européens, la migration marocaine est plus récente (notamment, dans le Sud de l’Europe), ce qui réduit le nombre de candidats éligibles dans les pays concernés. Comme environ 80% des MRE vivent en Europe, la dominance de ce continent n’est pas du tout surprenante, comme la moins forte représentation des autres continents.

Néanmoins, des facteurs externes déterminent également la représentation de certains pays de résidence: par exemple, le nombre plutôt limité des Marocain- Belges est causé par le calendrier des examens dans ce pays. Aussi, les degrés de

298 recrutement des candidats et de distribution du program (à travers les réseaux sociaux et par des institutions, comme les consulats locaux) joue aussi un rôle.

Pays de naissance

La plupart des participants sont nés en dehors du Maroc (38/50). Parmi ceux qui sont nés au Maroc, la plupart ont quitté le pays avant l’âge de 10 ans. Donc, la majorité des participants appartiennent à la « deuxième » ou même « troisième » génération des MRE.

Nationalité

Parmi les participants, la majorité a la nationalité marocaine (31/50). La plupart de ce groupe a également une autre nationalité (du pays de résidence) (22/31).

Un groupe signifiant a seulement la nationalité du pays de résidence (19/50). Au contraire, seulement 9 ont exclusivement la nationalité Marocaine, ce qui est généralement lié au fait qu’ils ne sont pas nés au pays de résidence.

Evidemment, la législation du pays de résidence sur l’acquisition d’une double nationalité est déterminante dans ce cas-là. Néanmoins, on voit aussi qu’une partie des participants qui sont éligible d’avoir la nationalité marocaine (parce que le pays de résidence accepte le double nationalité), ne l’ont pas. Un deuxième facteur décisif est la trajectoire migratoire de l’individu concerné; il n’est pas surprenant que des personnes avec une résidence plutôt courte dans le pays de résidence n’ont pas déjà acquis la nationalité de ce pays.

Etudes

En termes d’études, tous les participants suivent ou ont complété l’éducation tertiaire. Certaines domaines semblent très populaires parmi les participants: presque 1 participant sur 5 suit une formation en Economie/Business, et beaucoup entre les autres ont choisi des études dans le domaine de la Santé, Humanités et Sciences Sociales, et en moindre mesure, Droit et Ingénieur. Certains domaines sont sous-représentés, notamment l’enseignement et des formations créatives sont

299 rares comme choix. Une explication possible pour la dominance de certains domaines d’études est que le programme attire certains profils plus que d’autres.

Région d’origine au Maroc

Juste comme il y a une diversité riche selon les pays de résidence des participants, il y a également une diversité concernant leurs régions d’origine au Maroc. En utilisant les régions Marocaines administratifs, 11 régions sont représentées en tant que région d’origine. Cependant, certaines régions sont plus fortement représentées que d’autres. Notamment, un quart des participants a des origines Orientales. Cette observation ne surprend pas, parce que cette région est une des régions d’émigration traditionnelles. Aussi les régions de Grand Casablanca, Tanger-Tétouan, Marrakech-Tensift El Haouz, Rabat-Salé-Zemmour- Zaer et Gharb-Charda-Beni Hssen étaient bien représentées.

Remarquable est que certaines ont indiqué 2 régions comme “région d’origine”, à cause du fait que les familles de leurs parents se trouvent à différents endroits dans le pays.

La connaissance de la langue

La connaissance des langues Marocaines

Vu le profil du groupe (majoritairement né en dehors du Maroc, vivant dans 15 pays différents, ayant des origines à travers tout le Maroc) on s’attendrait à une diversité concernant la connaissance du darija, du berbère et de l’arabe littéral.

Premièrement, il est utile de faire une distinction entre les jeunes MRE qui vivent dans des pays arabophones, et ceux qui vivent dans des pays non-arabophones. Pour le premier groupe, l’arabe n’est pas seulement la langue d’origine (sauf si les parents parlent une des langues berbères) mais aussi la langue quotidienne dans

300 leur pays de résidence. Cette situation aboutit à une excellente connaissance de l’arabe littéral, généralement accompagné par une bonne connaissance du Darija.

Au contraire, pour ceux vivant dans les pays non-arabophones (en Europe, en Amérique, dans certains pays Africains) la situation est différente. Quand on leur pose la question “Quel est votre (vos) langue(s) maternelle”?, la moitié des répondants répond une langue Marocaine et la langue du pays de résidence simultanément. Un autre quart considère seulement la langue du pays de résidence comme langue maternelle, et pour les autres, seulement une ou deux langues marocaines sont regardées comme langues maternelles.

C’est remarquable que le berbère est nommé comme langue maternelle 3 fois moins que le darija/arabe, ce qui indique une faible présence des personnes d’origine berbères dans le groupe des participants.

La plupart des participants indique comprendre et parler l’arabe bien, cependant, en référant au darija seulement. Important de constater qu’une partie signifiante ne comprend pas du tout l’arabe ou le darija, et un groupe assez grand indique n’avoir qu’une connaissance faible ou modéré de ces langues.

La connaissance des autres langues étrangères

La majorité des répondants déclare connaitre d’autres langues, outre leur langue(s) maternelle(s). Les langues indiquées le plus fréquemment sont l’anglais, le français, l’espagnol et l’allemand.

Avant tout, l’anglais semble la langue partagée par tous: sauf 2 exceptions, tout le monde indique connaître cette langue à un niveau modéré ou élevé (ou même au niveau de la langue maternelle).

Au contraire, la connaissance du français est généralement limitée. Parmi ceux qui vivent dans des pays ou le français n’est pas une langue nationale (en dehors de la France, la Belgique, le Canada et certains pays Africaines), seulement 8 indiquent parler le français à un niveau modéré ou élevé. Donc, la position du français au Maroc en tant que première langue étrangère est en contraste avec la connaissance de cette langue parmi les jeunes MRE.

301 Expériences précédentes au Maroc

Nombre, fréquence et régularité des visites au Maroc

Pratiquement tous les participants ont déjà visité le Maroc avant leur séjour dans le cadre de l’université d’été. Beaucoup ont visité ce pays déjà plusieurs fois – 20 fois n’est pas du tout exceptionnel. Egalement, pour la plupart, il n’y a pas longtemps qu’ils ont fait leur dernière visite; pour la majorité il y a moins de 2 années, pour un grand groupe, il n’y a qu’une année. Environ 2 participants sur 3 indiquent visiter le Maroc sur une base régulière, qui va d’une fois à 3 années à différente fois par ans. Presque un tiers dit visiter le Maroc annuellement, et seulement un petit groupe visite le Maroc irrégulièrement.

Il est remarquable que la location du pays de résidence (loin ou proche du Maroc) ne joue aucun rôle dans le fréquence ou la régularité des visites. Il y a par exemple des jeunes MRE vivant en Amérique du Nord qui viennent chaque année, par contre, d’ autres vivant en Italie ou l’Afrique du Nord ne fréquentent pas du tout le Maroc. Cet observation démontre que la distance du pays d’origine n’est pas le facteur décisive pour comprendre le modèle des visites – ce qui est probablement beaucoup plus important, sont les facteurs socio-économiques. Par exemple, il y a deux participants pour qui c’est leur première fois au Maroc parce que leurs parents manquent l’argent pour faire la visite.

Caractéristiques des visites?

La pratique de rester toutes les vacances d’été au Maroc est plutôt rare parmi les participants; la plupart ne reste que 3 à 4 semaines chaque visite. Egalement, le cliché du “vacances d’été annuelles au Maroc” n’est pas correct, comme beaucoup des participants font des visites en dehors la saison d’été.

302 Concernant l’hébergement durant leur séjours, une moitié reste dans la maison des parents (impliquant que leurs parents possèdent une maison au Maroc), les autres restent habituellement chez la famille marocaine. Néanmoins, certains utilisent aussi l’offre touristique (des hôtels), visitant d’autres régions au Maroc ou parce qu’ils désirent plus de tranquillité.

Plus d’un tiers des répondants déclare visiter seulement leur région d’origine au royaume. Par contre, une moitié explore régulièrement d’autres régions, et un petit groupe a déjà traversé tout le pays. En plus, certains indiquent de ne pas visiter leur région d’origine, par exemple parce que leurs parents ont acheté une maison ailleurs. Toutes ces réponses démontrent que pour les jeunes générations des MRE, la nature des visites au Maroc est en pleine mutation; également, elles reflètent leur désir à découvrir le pays d’origine.

Raisons pour visiter le pays d’origine

Pour quasi tous les participants, il y a différentes motivations à visiter le Maroc. Presque tous mentionnent maintenir les liens familiaux, et dans ce cadre, attendre des célébrations importants (comme des mariages). Cependant, la visite familiale est rarement la seule raison de visite. Le Maroc est aussi un pays de récréation peur eux, une place pour se détendre, un environnement qui les “recharge”. En plus, la connexion identitaire au pays et à sa culture est mentionnée régulièrement. Par exemple, une personne dit qu’elle visite le Maroc simplement parce qu’elle l’aime, et des autres veulent maintenir les liens nationaux au royaume ou connaitre mieux les traditions.

Pas surprenant, à cause de leur jeune âge, la vie professionnelle n’est pas une motivation de visite. Seulement une personne déclare avoir visité le Maroc pour des raisons professionnelles.

Autres expériences de voyage

Afin de comprendre mieux l’importance des visites au pays d’origine, il est nécessaire d’avoir une image du comportement de voyage des répondent en général. La vaste majorité a déjà voyagé vers d’autres pays que le Maroc; une moitié s’est déjà rendu vers quatre autres pays au moins.

303 Chose étonnante, est que le comportement de voyage vers les autres pays ne semble pas influencer la fréquence des visites au pays d’origine. Par exemple, ceux qui ont visité un grand nombre d’autres pays, ne vont pas moins ou plus fréquemment au Maroc que ceux qui sont moins aventureux. On peut conclure que la fréquence des visites au Maroc n’est pas influencée par le fait que les jeunes MRE ont l’habitude de visiter des autres pays aussi. D’ailleurs, cette constatation ne compte pas nécessairement pour la durée de leur séjour – ils est probable que le désir de voir des autres coins du monde (que leurs pays de résidence et d’origine) a un effet négatif sur la durée de leur séjour au Maroc.

3. Pourquoi participent-ils?

Première rencontre avec les universités d’été

Un aspect qui définit le profil des participations, est le façon de communication sur l’initiative: via quels réseaux l’existence du programme est communiqué au public ciblé? Quand on demande les participants où ou par qui ils ont entendu parler de l’existence de l’université d’été, leurs réseaux sociaux personnels joue un rôle primordial. La majorité a entendu parler de l’université par des membres de leurs familles ou par leurs amis, et généralement, il concerne des ex-participants. En outre, plus qu’une moitié des participants déclarent connaître des ex-participants des éditions précédentes. Cette information démontre l’importance de publication bouche-à-oreille pour l’université d’été.

Cependant, presque 2 participants sur 5 rapportent d’avoir être informé à travers des autre voies. Une moitié de ce groupe a vu une annonce au consulat ou ambassade marocaine locale (ou a été informé par une connaissance qui travaille là). L’autre moitié a été informée à travers autres formes de publicité, comme une affiche dans la mosquée ou association locale ou les médias marocaines nationaux.

Un effet potentiel de la prépondérance du réseau social est la tendance de se registrer “en groupe” plutôt que de façon individuelle. Donc, était-il important pour les candidats de connaître des autres participants auparavant? Cette hypothèse n’est pas supportée par les données. Environ une moitié des participants ne connaissait aucun autre participant d’avance. Parmi ceux qui connaissaient quelqu’un d’avance, il s’agit souvent d’un membre de famille – alors, il n’y pas d’évidence pour grandes groupe des amis qui viennent ensembles. Alors,

304 indirectement, on peut conclure que partager l’expérience du séjour avec ses amis n’était pas un facteur décisif pour participer.

Motivations à participer

Les motivations à participer ont été évaluées à travers une question ouverte. Les réponses sont concentrées autour de 5 catégories, qui n’ont pas une importance équivalente.

(a) Apprendre plus sur le Maroc et leur origine

(b) Agrandir leurs réseaux sociaux mondiaux

(c) Avoir des bonnes vacances

(d) Faire connaissance avec les opportunités et développements au Maroc

(e) Visiter la famille

a) Apprendre plus sur le Maroc et leurs origines

Pour la majorité, apprendre plus sur le Maroc et leurs origines était un aspect crucial de leur motivation. Même si ils ont visité leur pays maintes fois, ils pensent que leur connaissance actuelle est plutôt limitée, et ils désirent de découvrir leur pays d’origine d’un point de vue différent. Par exemple, un répondant explique que “je pensais que l’échange avec une université me donnerait une expérience extraordinaire, car normalement, on passe ses vacances au Maroc pour s’amuser, mais l’université m’a donné la chance de faire la connaissance avec le Maroc d’une autre façon”.

Certains répondants expliquent aussi sur quels aspects ils désiraient apprendre plus. Découvrir d’autres régions que leur région d’origine est très important pour eux. Cela explique pourquoi la plupart des participants ont choisit une université dans une région qu’ils n’ont jamais visitée auparavant comme destination. Ils s’intéressent aussi à découvrir des segments de la société marocaine qu’ils ne connaissent pas bien, comme le monde académique, la politique marocaine et

305 l’économie. Outre d’étendre leur connaissance, certains voient l’université d’été comme une opportunité à se rattacher au pays d’origine, de renforcer l’attachement.

b) Agrandir leurs réseaux sociaux mondiaux

Une deuxième motivation de participer qui est fréquemment mentionnée est l’élargissement des réseaux sociaux. Particulièrement, les répondants s’intéressent à rencontrer des jeunes qui se trouvent dans la même situation que eux: des jeunes universitaires d’origine Marocaine qui habitent ailleurs. Ils sont aussi curieux de “rencontrer des marocains vivant dans les 4 coins du monde et leurs façons de vivre”. La plupart des participants ont l’opportunité de rencontrer d’autres jeunes MRE dans leurs pays, alors l’aspect novateur de l’université d’été est de rencontrer des jeunes MRE d’autres pays d’accueils.

c) Avoir des bonnes vacances

Remarquablement peu de personnes disent de participer pour des raisons de loisir. Seulement pour une personne c’est la seule raison de participer. Cette constatation indique que le programme des universités d’été n’est pas “abusé” par ceux qui s’intéressent qu’à passer des vacances bon marché.

d) Faire connaissance avec les opportunités et développements au Maroc

Un groupe signifiant s’intéresse à s’installer au Maroc après ces études, et pour ceux-là, le programme offre la possibilité de prospection. Par exemple, une étudiante explique que “je pense sérieusement à m’établir au Maroc dans le futur et donc je voulais en apprendre plus sur les facettes du Maroc inconnu pour moi et savoir plus du domaine d’études dans lequel je suis”.

Quelques autres, qui ne mentionnent pas d’avoir l’intention de s’installer au Maroc, veulent savoir plus des opportunités économiques du pays. Comme illustration, un répondant déclare que “le motif principal (pour participer), c’est de découvrir les grands projets et chantiers de développements au Maroc et les perspectives du futur”.

e) Visiter la famille

Uniquement 2 répondants disent qu’ils voulaient participer afin de voir leur famille marocaine. On peut constater à nouveau (voir (c) ci-dessus) qu’il n’y a pas

306 d’usage abusif du programme de l’université d’été pour des motivations alternatives. Néanmoins, une grande partie du groupe a rencontré des membres de sa famille durant le programme, mais dans ce cas il n’est pas question d’usage abusif, mais ils se sont servis de cette opportunité.

4. Comment est-ce qu’ils ont vécu leur séjour?

Evaluation du séjour

Avec une question ouverte on a donné l’opportunité aux participants d’évaluer toutes les facettes de l’université d’été.

En général, les réactions sont très positives, voilà quelques réactions fréquentes: “c’est une superbe expérience, du point de vue culturel, du point de vue personnel” et “J’ai beaucoup apprécié ce séjour, ce fut très enrichissant”.

Outre une évaluation générale, la majorité ajoute des commentaires ciblés et plus nuancés, qui pourraient être regroupés en quatre catégories:

(a) l’atmosphère parmi les participants

(b) découvrir et apprendre sur le Maroc

(c) le contenu du program

(d) l’organisation pratique du séjour

a) L’atmosphère parmi les participants

Il y a de l’unanimité concernant l’atmosphère parmi les participants: chaque participant évalue l’atmosphère comme simplement excellente et aussi le dynamisme du groupe et l’amitié sont énormément appréciés. Quelques participants comparent le groupe avec “une grande famille” et pensent qu’ils ont fait des nouvelles amitiés "pour la vie”.

307 En particulier, un grand nombre de répondants citent que la diversité interne dans le groupe (en tant que venant de différents pays de résidence) est considérée comme un élément très enrichissant. Par exemple, une étudiante dit que “Tout était génial. J’ai rencontré autant d’amis, j’ai appris sur nos cultures différentes, nos traditions différentes.”

b) Découvrir et apprendre sur le Maroc

Beaucoup de répondants disent qu’ils ont appris “beaucoup” durant le séjour. Cependant, souvent ils ne spécifient pas ce qu’ils ont appris exactement ou ils le disent seulement d’une façon très générale. Comme illustration, une répondante dit qu’elle a appris “tellement sur le Maroc, la vie et nous-mêmes”, un autre dit qu’il a vu le Maroc du point de vue touristique pour la première fois.

c) Le contenu du programme

Généralement, les visites guidées et les excursions sont appréciées beaucoup. Souvent, les participants sont surpris par la beauté et la richesse de la région (qui était inconnue pour eux), ce qui les donne envie d’explorer encore plus de régions dans leur pays d’origine.

Les cours, au contraire, évoquent des évaluations divergentes, ce qui reflète dans une certaine mesure les intérêts personnels et la connaissance préalable divergente des participants. Par exemple, certains participants trouvent les cours trop long, des autres ne les trouvent pas suffisamment profond ou trop partial, et par contre, quelques autres les trouvent très intéressant.

Néanmoins, outre des opinions personnelles divergentes, il y avait aussi au moins deux facteurs plutôt structurels que beaucoup de participants considéraient comme sont problématique. Durant certaines lectures et rencontres, l’arabe littéraire était la langue utilisée, causant des problèmes pour une grande partie du groupe, qui manquait une bonne connaissance de cette langue. Aussi le darija était un problème pour certains participants (voir ci-dessus), mais dans une moindre mesure. Cela permettait aux encadrants de le prendre en charge plus systématiquement (par traduction parallèle pour un petit groupe). Dans le groupe d’Agadir, le français était aussi courant comme langue de discussion. Les non- francophones trouvaient cela frustrant. Deuxièmement, le style pédagogique des professeurs (lecture ex-cathedra, questions après) n’est pas toujours apprécié. En

308 particulier, les participants venant de certains pays Occidentaux sont habitués à des méthodes pédagogiques plus diversifiés et plus dynamiques.

d) L’organisation pratique du séjour

Beaucoup de participants considèrent le manque de communication auparavant, surtout concernant les changements dans l’offre des destinations, comme un grand défaut. Aussi pour le retour, des problèmes avec des billets d’avion (qui devraient être réglé par le ministère) étaient une source de frustration.

Au contraire, les efforts des encadrants à l’université pour les donner une expérience inoubliable, leur attitude chaleureuse et la réception hospitalière étaient très appréciés. Par exemple, selon un répondant “ils étaient à l’écoute et très respectueux, j’ai admiré leur patience”. “Les moniteurs étaient très dynamiques, j’ai eu énormément de plaisir à les côtoyer”.

Pour les participants à Agadir, l’accommodation était une déception, surtout à cause d’un manque d’hygiène et la grande distance entre l’accommodation et la mer.

Parce que le programme était très rempli, beaucoup de participants se plaignaient d’un manque de temps libre. Ils expriment le désir d’avoir un peu de temps libre pour visiter des membres de famille, pour explorer la ville en petit groupe ou pour se relaxer entre les cours.

Néanmoins, pour la majorité, des défauts dans l’organisation ne gâchent pas leurs expériences.

Effet à long terme?

Evidemment, le questionnaire comme instrument de recherche ne permet pas d’évaluer l’effet de la participation au programme à long terme, parce qu’il s’agit d’une capture instantanée des perceptions des répondants. Afin d’éviter ce problème partiellement, les participants-mêmes sont demandés d’évaluer l’impact de l’expérience sur certains aspects, comme leur perception du Maroc, leur désir de découvrir le pays, etc. Cependant, on doit interpréter leurs réponses avec prudence puisque’ il ne s’agit pas de changement de comportements actuelles, mais des changements perçus par les participants.

309 La plupart indiquent que cette expérience a changé leur perception du Maroc. Selon certains participants ce séjour a renforcé leur image existante du Maroc, des autres citent des compréhensions nouvelles.

Pour la plupart, leurs impressions durant le séjour mènent à une meilleure image du pays et de la culture marocaine. Par exemple, ils concluent que la culture Marocaine est plus riche et diverse qu’ils pensaient “qu’il y a beaucoup de possibilités professionnelles: c’est un pays en développement” et qu’il y a “un vent de changement positif ”. A cause d’un changement de perception, certains ont adapté leurs plans futurs: “(Le séjour) m’a influencé sur le fait que maintenant, je pense peut-être travailler au Maroc une fois mes études finis pour contribuer à l’amélioration de celui-ci”.

Egalement, pour divers participants, l’expérience renforce leur attachement émotionnel au pays: “J’ai toujours aimé le Maroc, et cet expérience a élargi mon amour”, “je suis devenu plus fière de mon pays” “j’ai m’approché de mes origines”.

Néanmoins, pour un plus petit nombre des participants, l’expérience a mené à une perception plus négative de leur pays d’origine. Différentes personnes (surtout à Agadir) qui étaient frustrées par la mauvaise organisation, expriment que ça renforce leurs impressions que tout le pays est mal organisé et qu’il y a un problème structurel. Quelqu’un d’autre se plaint qu’il reste encore un manque de liberté d’expression, et “qu’il reste un grand travail à faire pour changer les mentalités et l’éducation”. De la même façon, quelqu’un dit qu’elle apprécie plus les capacités allemandes comme la ponctualité et la discipline, “des choses que la plupart des marocains ne possèdent pas”.

Au contraire, pour quelques personnes, ce n’est pas leur image du Maroc, mais leur image de la Communauté Marocaine à l’étranger qui a changé: “cependant, ce qui a changé c’est ma vision des MRE, chacun a mélangé sa culture d’origine avec la culture de son pays d’accueil”. Aussi, une personne indique que cette expérience a engendré une plus grande tolérance vis-à-vis des personnes de certaines régions au Maroc qu’il n’aimait pas auparavant.

Remarquablement, la quantité des visites précédentes au Maroc ne joue aucun rôle dans le changement de leur perception. On pourrait s’y attendre que pour ceux qui ne visitent pas souvent le pays, ce séjour à un impact plus profond sur leur

310 changement de perception que pour ceux qui fréquentent souvent le Maroc, mais cette hypothèse n’est pas confirmée.141

Suggestions concrètes des participants

A travers les réponses des participants, beaucoup de suggestions sont données pour affiner le programme. Dans cette section, ces suggestions sont filtrées et regroupées.

Concernant la nature des activités, il est suggéré de créer plus de possibilités pour des rencontres avec des marocains locaux (en dehors l’atmosphère académique). Certains ont l’impression que le programme ne montre qu’un segment de la réalité marocaine: “J’aurais aimé d’explorer la réalité d’une autre façon que des conférences données par les personnes de l’université.” Il y a l’idée de, outre l’approche académique, d’introduire l’approche humanitaire. “Par exemple, il aurait été génial de faire du bénévolat dans une école défavorisée, de pouvoir sortir de la zone touristique car cela fait également partie du Maroc.”

Egalement, il est suggéré par quelqu’un de réduire les rencontres protocolaires.

Beaucoup de participants trouvaient qu’il y avait un manque de temps libre pour explorer la ville et la région à leur rythme. Conséquemment, des suggestions différentes sont faites afin d’augmenter le temps libre: prolonger la durée du programme, réduire le nombre ou la durée des cours ou observer l’horaire plus strictement.

Aussi, concernant les repas, on déclare qu’il n’y a pas de besoin d’avoir 2 fois un repas à trois plats, ce qui pourrait diminuer les coûts pour l’organisation.

5. Conclusions et quelques recommandations

Juste comme le programme de l’université d’été est une opportunité pour les participants à apprendre plus sur leur pays d’origine et leurs racines, cette

141 Note: on this point, I developed a more nuanced position in later analyses, which also include the observational data collected in Tétouan in 2013 and interviews with ex- participants (see Chapter 7). There, I argue that the amount of previous visits does matter.

311 rencontre pourrait être considérée comme une opportunité pour le Maroc d’apprendre plus sur ces jeunes ressortissants à l’étranger, un groupe mal connu.

Le but des conclusions n’est pas de généraliser (ce qui est d’ailleurs impossible, considérant le nombre limité des répondants), mais de donner des outils pour réfléchir d’une manière plus profonde et systématique sur les expériences des participants. Outre des conclusions, on fait une tentative de distiller quelques recommandations concrètes de ces conclusions.

Les caractéristiques des participants

Comme la première section du rapport a démontré, le programme attire un bon mélange de profils différents (en termes de sexe, région d’origine au Maroc, région et pays de résidence, études, langues parlées, ...). En fait, on pourrait dire que la diversité des communautés Marocaines à l’étranger est très bien reflétée dans la composition du groupe des participants : la diversité des pays de résidence, et la diversité des régions d’origine au Maroc. En ce qui concerne des autres facteurs, le profil du groupe des participants semble plutôt spécifique : leur connaissance du Darija est plutôt élevée, par contre le nombre des parleurs des langues Berbères est très limité. Au sujet de leurs expériences précédentes avec des visites au Maroc, on peut conclure que pour la majorité, un lien solide existe déjà et aussi qu’en général, ils ne semblent pas manquer les moyens à visiter leur pays d’origine.

Bien que cette diversité, et en particulier la diversité des pays de résidence, soient considérées comme des atouts majeurs selon tous les répondants, elle constitue également des défis pour l’organisation. Surtout sur le plan de la communication (communication en différentes langues) mais aussi pour le contenu des cours (causé par la connaissance et des expériences précédentes divergentes) il n’est pas du tout facile de satisfaire tout le monde.

• Quand il y a trop de différences entre les participants en ce qui concerne le niveau de compétence ou de connaissance, il est recommandable de créer des groupes selon le niveau (par exemple, pour un workshop de calligraphie).

• Car la plupart des participants ont de l’expérience étendu en tant que visiteurs dans leur pays d’origine (le Maroc et la société marocaine ne sont pas du tout nouveau pour eux), il serait intéressant d’utiliser leurs expériences comme point de

312 départ pour le contenu de certains cours, par exemple le cours sur la culture marocaine, la religion etc.

Un défi pratique majeur constitue la connaissance de la langue arabe des participants. Pour la plupart, l’arabe littéral est une barrière insurmontable, et pour un nombre substantiel, même le darija forme une barrière importante.

• Bien que les participants comprennent la valeur de pratiquer le darija, ils comprendraient mieux le contenu des cours si les organisateurs tendraient plus compte du multilinguisme des participants. Une suggestion est de soutenir les cours en utilisant du matériel écrit, comme des résumés, des articles, des fichiers PowerPoint, etc. dans d’ autres langues que l’arabe, notamment en anglais (a la première place) et en français (a la deuxième place).

Bien que le but central du programme est d’apprendre plus sur leur pays et culture d’origine, les participants sont également énormément curieux à savoir plus sur leur compatriotes qui vivent dans des autres pays d’accueil.

• Cet élément pourrait être intégré dans le programme-même– par exemple, dans la forme d’une session de débat sur la vie dans différents coins du monde, des présentations sur les pays d’accueil par des participants, etc.

Les motivations pour participer

L’analyse des motivations pour participer montre que « apprendre plus sur le Maroc et leur origine », « l’agrandissement de leurs réseaux sociaux » et « faire connaissance avec les opportunités et développements au Maroc » sont les motivations les plus courantes, par contre, « avoir un bon séjour » et « visiter la famille » sont presque négligeable. Cette constatation indique que le programme des universités d’été n’est pas “abusé” par ceux qui s’intéressent qu’à passer un séjour bon marché.

Les expériences des participants

En général, tous les participants sont très enthousiastes sur l’atmosphère parmi les participants. Egalement, ils pensent qu’ils ont découvert des aspects de leur pays d’origine inconnu auparavant.

313 Beaucoup de participants indiquent la valeur des cours académiques et en particulier les activités et les visites en dehors de l’université étaient très bien appréciées. Aussi, il y a la suggestion d’acquérir des expériences en dehors de l’atmosphère académique (par exemple, dans l’assistance humanitaire, un projet de développement) afin de découvrir la vie marocaine “réelle”.

• C’est une question ouverte si ce dernier type d’activité pourrait être intégrée dans le programme de l’université d’été, où si ça pourrait être plutôt le sujet d’un autre type de programme complémentaire.

En ce qui concerne l’organisation pratique, la communication etc., il est clair que les participants mettent la barre haute, puisqu’ils sont habitués à des standards et des attitudes occidentaux. Pour eux, une communication transparente et une organisation ponctuelle sont indispensables.

314 ANNEX 6: MAP OF MOROCCO

315 316