1 - - - - measures: of of four main sets EU acombination by the to of migrants number the lower to ambition main its had as has funding envelopes designed and specifically agreements various through offered incentives and financial measures of policy series the decade, past in the and conferences of summits series along at Created commitments. policy EU long-standing other of credibility the on of impact and in terms effectiveness of policy in terms -both record an uneven produced already has Africa and western north of the countries the with strategy partnership migration EU comprehensive in 2016 of the introduction The Introduction

measures aimed at supporting refugee- aimed at supporting measures measures aimed at ensuring orderly orderly ensuring at aimed measures root the tackling at aimed measures discouraging at aimed measures security diaspora-influence/ ( magazine Spectator Clingendael’s the in year this earlier published diaspora”, Senegalese of agency economic and Political citizens: global country’s “Their essay the of apart as published been already people or migrants of all irregular returns assistance) development and structural humanitarian as (such countries hosting etc.) projects development creation, job as (such migration of mass causes etc.) surveillance controls, (border arrivals irregular and preventing Note: Some elements of this policy brief have have brief policy this of elements Some Note: https://spectator.clingendael.org/pub/2018/4/the- the heart of EU migration policies The challenges of placing readmissions at cost what at Returns JUNE 2019 1 ) – if not always unequivocally seen as as seen unequivocally always not – if notable years two past of the course In the point of EU migration agenda. of EU migration point spear and real symbolic the returns making of and limitations risks the understanding –and also policies management migration effective design to in order countries target of the economy political in the of migration role the account into taking and of understanding importance the about similar lessons valuable hold brief, in the elaborated be would which differences, seeming their despite cases these that contention our is It and Morocco. Senegal – cases different quite seemingly of two example parallel the on so does It transit. of origin/ countries of the of view point the –and from states member and individual EU of both of view point the from agenda EU returns of implementing challenges underlying the at looks brief policy This EU. the from citizens of their returns mass organized accept to reluctance clear showing and transit of origin countries targeted of the most with tackle, to one difficult an extraordinarily be to proven has and readmissions of returns question the But countries. refugee-hosting supporting and causes root addressing at funding aimed and dispersing arrivals of curbing terms in made have been –advances positive of residence prior to arrival to prior of residence countries –or of origin countries their to rejected been has request asylum whose

Ana Uzelac Policy Brief Clingendael Policy Brief

The Shape of Migration nowadays, “the true driver of Senegal’s economy is migrants’ income”.4 In order to better understand the importance Senegalese living abroad have also gone of returns/readmissions agenda, we first beyond providing direct remittances to look at the place and role of migration in the their families, and have also been creating two countries’ political economy. A cursory fund-pooling mechanisms to implement look at this question shows in both cases a collective investments in their communities’ deeply entrenched culture of migration and a infrastructure. This engagement is mainly significant role that migration plays in these done through some form of hometown countries’ economic and political life. associations (HTAs) or ”associations des According to the latest World Bank data, ressortissants” that fund collective projects there are 643,640 Senegalese or 4% of the aimed at improving the infrastructure and country’s population officially registered as institutions in the community of origin - living abroad.2 Considering many Senegalese building, renovating, or supplying schools or are not officially registered, the real number medical centres, funding mosques or even is believed to be higher, but there are no improving basic infrastructure such as water, reliable estimates as to just how much. road, or electricity networks.5 In comparison, over 3 million or almost 10% of Moroccan population live in Europe With such a large economic footprint, the alone, making both countries significant country’s diaspora has been increasingly contributors to the net migration to Europe, seen as a key development actor in the and specifically EU. That said, the arrivals country, fulfilling at least three important from both countries have fallen in relative government tasks: terms in the course of 2018 and none of them - Providing access to hard currency and featured among the top-ten countries of stabilizing the exchange rate migrant origin in the first 8 months of 2018.3 - Supporting domestic consumption, and In both countries, migration has played thus economic growth an important social and economic role - Acting as a social safety net, thus in defusing tensions related to economic reducing pressure on the government to underperformance, (youth) unemployment provide these services or even ethnic/demographic tensions. In fact, a case could be made that both in Senegal In view of this, with half of the Senegalese and in Morocco migration inhabits the grey families having at least one member abroad, area between individual choice and state- it could be said that the diaspora plays a encouraged policy solution to structural role of an informal development agency economic and societal problems. and social security net wrapped in one, to This case may be easier to make in case which the state has outsourced a significant of Senegal, where migrants remittances part of its responsibilities in terms of social contribute a significant share of state protection. income. Last year remittances were So while from the European point of view estimated at USD 2,238 billion or almost the economic development of Senegal is 14% of the country’s GDP - equaling the seen as a solution for reducing migration, country’s revenues from export of goods. in particular in its illegal form, Senegal sees In comparison, the Overseas Development migration as an actual tool of development Assistance to Senegal has been averaging and a much needed social security. USD 885 million since 2010‍- barely 40% of the total remittances contribution. Arguably,

4 World Bank 2017, Bilateral Remittances Matrix 2017, Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/ topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/ 2 World Bank, 2018, Bilateral Migration Matrix migration-remittances-data 2018, Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/ 5 For a more detailed description of how these topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/ pooled funds work, see: Toma, S (2017) Engaging migration-remittances-data with Its Diaspora: The Case of Senegal in J. Mangala 3 https://dtmodk.iom.int/docs/ (ed.), Africa and its Global Diaspora, Palgrave FlowsCompilationReportAugust2018.pdf Macmillan, Cham

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Figure 1 Change needed in Morocco for potential emigrants to stay, 2010-2013

i o or eer o

roee i e ecooy

Beer ooriie for ecio

ore freeo

roee i e oliicl iio

ily or relie rer oe

er reo

Source: OECD (2017) Talent Abroad: A Review of Moroccan Emigrants

Morocco has for decades been similar to The reasons for this migration in recent Senegal - in the sense that it has been mainly decades have been similar to those driving the country of origin for a large population the young Senegalese towards Europe: of migrants in Europe. In the early decades poor economic prospects, high youth of the 1970s and 1980s, this migration has in unemployment, an impenetrable labour fact been organized jointly by the Moroccan market ruled by patronage and influenced by authorities and the governments of the host networks and family connections. According countries.6 Decades of such structural, state- to a recent OECD detailed report, over 60% sponsored migration have created one of of Moroccans considering migration would the largest diasporas in the world – more reconsider if the potential for finding a job than 3 million Moroccans currently live in EU or better job would improve.10 (see Figure 1). countries such as France, Spain and Italy, That said, both countries also feature strong with just above 5,5% of that total population sociocultural incentives for migration, which residing in the Netherlands.7 Their economic is being seen as “right of passage” or duty contribution may not be as high in relative towards one’s family.11 terms as that of the Senegalese diaspora – in 2017, the remittances have brought Despite rising political tensions, the “only” 6,8% of the national GDP or USD 7,47 percentage of Moroccan youth stating billion8 – but they tend to play a similarly improvement to freedoms and improvement important macroeconomic role.9 of political situation would prevent them from migrating is strikingly low. In the case of Morocco, however, lack of job prospects is cases of some demographic groups is seen 6 For a more detailed historical overview of Moroccan migration to EU, see: http://focus-migration.hwwi. as being caused or at least compounded de/uploads/txwilpubdb/CP16Morocco.pdf by political reasons – such as economic 7 World Bank, 2018, Bilateral Migration Matrix neglect and disenfranchisement of its Berber 2018, Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/ population, which constitutes a vast majority topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/ of the Moroccan émigrés to some EU migration-remittances-data countries, including the Netherlands. 8 World Bank 2017, Bilateral Remittances Matrix 2017, Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/ topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/ migration-remittances-data 9 For a more detailed discussion on the macroeconomic impact of remittances in Morocco, 10 OECD (2017) Talent Abroad: A Review of Moroccan see: Marzovilla, O. Mele, M. (2015) Remittances, Emigrants Economic Growth, Exchange Rate Regime: The 11 Wiardi Beckman Stichting, 2017, Over de grens: Case of Morocco, European Journal of Economics, De vluchtelingencrisis als reality test; interviews in Finance and Administrative Sciences, Issue 71 Dakar, March 2018

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This particular social and ethnic group has via Morocco returned there.15 This has been increasingly vocal since late 2016, introduced a new degree of complexity to the when a security incident in the coastal city already tense migration diplomacy between of Al-Hoceida prompted the emergence Morocco and the EU and further raised the of the first organised protest movement bar for the country’s already questionable in a decade, Hirak. The members of the human rights and migrant protection record. movement have been demanding more equitable development and attention to the region, which they see as being deliberately The Returns Conundrum neglected by the government. As a result, they have come under strong government Although already a sticky subject before pressure – including detention, and the 2015 Mediterranean crisis, returns and imprisonment that included torture.12 readmissions have since become a priority within the outward-looking elements of While there is no structural registration of the EU migration agenda. Their importance migrants by their ethnicity, it is striking that has been stressed continuously since the rise in the number of Moroccans seeking the enactment of the Returns Directive in political asylum in the Netherlands since 2010, as well as in a range of documents 2016 has coincided with the rising tensions that have emerged since and that are in the Rif, where many of its Moroccan specifically focused on returns, such as the migrants come from. What little information EU Action Plan on Return, updated lastly is known, indicates that the migrants are in March 2017,16 and the numerous Council mainly young single Moroccan males, who Conclusions focusing on return policies. have often already tried and failed to get asylum in other EU countries, or have heard In this latest set of documents, the EU of the alleged Dutch leniency in granting increasingly relies on the so-called “more- asylum through their social networks.13 for-more principle” to obtain cooperation from third countries on the readmission At the same time, Morocco has recently of irregular migrants. This principle entails started becoming increasingly a country of tying readmission demands to other areas transit for the migrants from sub-Saharan of cooperation, and rewarding countries Africa. According to the Spanish Interior for their cooperation on readmission. In Ministry, over 17,000 migrants have arrived countries, like Senegal, where development in Spain this year - twice as many as in 2017. agenda is economically relevant, the In fact, Spain has overtaken Italy as the most “rewards” often relate to EU development popular entry point for migrants to travel to funding and activities. Senegal is, for Europe.14 Since the majority of the migrants instance, the single largest recipient of funds arriving in Spain are coming via Morocco, EU from the EU-supported emergency Trust leaders believe Moroccan government needs Fund for Africa (EUTF)17 – an instrument to play a greater role in stemming the flow that has been established to serve as the of people. For the past 15 years, the EU has main financing tool for addressing irregular been pushing hard for a deal that would see migration from Africa. In Morocco, oh the some of the migrants who came to continent other hand, the more-for-more agenda has evolved around border cooperation and visa easing arrangement.

12 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/05/morocco- king-brushes-evidence-police-abuse 13 https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/ 15 Ibid. waarom-verloopt-het-uitzetten-van- 16 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ uitgeprocedeerden-zo-stroef-~bb2f5ff6/ and homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european- informal conversations with the staff of various agenda-migration/20170302amoreeffectivereturnpo Asylum centres (COA) in the Netherlands licyintheeuropeanunion-arenewedactionplanen.pdf 14 https://www.dw.com/en/morocco-a-risky- 17 https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/ migration-partner-for-the-eu/a-44898635) sahel-lake-chad/senegal

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In none of these two countries, however, Moroccan government.21 The identification has the more-for-more principle been of Moroccans without documents features successfully implemented. The latest prominently as one of the main obstacles to Progress Reports on the implementation of effective deportations, but also the logistical the EU partnership agreements published and security challenges of executing forced thus far and the more overarching progress deportations by planes22 and the simple reports of the implementation of the EU challenge of identifying irregular migrants. In Migration agenda suggest that readmission the case of the Netherlands, which still does has in fact remained by far the least not have a bilateral returns agreement with successful of all already challenging aspects Morocco, these obstacles prove harder still. of cooperation.18 Many Moroccans who arrive on their own file an asylum request, but also leave the special Under Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement,19 centres on the eve of what they already Senegal is obliged to re-admit its nationals suspect would be a negative decision, that are being returned from the EU making it hard to trace them down.23 The countries on the grounds of being irregular governments’ attempts to discourage such migrants. Senegal also has bilateral “misuse” of asylum procedure by for instance readmission agreements with Spain, Italy cutting off the modest return assistance and France, and has actively cooperated on or systematically raising the issue with the border management with the EU – though, government has not borne fruit.24 much like Morocco, it has not yet signed or agreed to an EU Readmission Agreement The Dutch-Moroccan difficulties are (EURA). Its record of accepting its returned somewhat out of sync with the wider citizens is dismal, with only 9% return European trend, which is somewhat ratio.20 The main technical obstacles for more positive - in 2017 there were 34,000 slow returns, in the eyes of the EU officials Moroccan citizens who were issued an order is refusal of the Senegalese governments to to leave the territory of the EU, and just over cooperate – by for instance issue temporary 10,000 were returned, making Morocco one travel documents to the Senegalese citizens of the only two countries accepting such who claim to have no IDs, an issues that high number of returnees.25 comes up time and again in every EU progress report in 2017 and was repeatedly Morocco has however structurally avoided stressed by both the EU and the Senegalese committing to EURA that would include third interviewed as a part of this research. country nationals. The negotiations around the EURA have been going on for over a Morocco has signed bilateral readmission decade now, without any real progress, agreements (of nationals only) with Spain, while the pressure of illegal migration has France, Germany, Italy and Portugal. Returns under bilateral agreements have been progressing slowly – even in cases, like for 21 This increased cooperation followed on the 2015 instance Germany, where there is a stated attack on the Christmas market in Cologne, see: full commitment to cooperation by the https://www.dw.com/en/the-difficulty-with- deportations-to-morocco/a-19339006 22 For instance, any flight out of the Netherlands can take only up to two deportees, see: https://www. 18 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/ dienstterugkeerenvertrek.nl/Landeninformatie/ homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european- marokko/020Voorbereidenfeitelijkvertrek/ agenda-migration/20180516progress-report- 23 Informal conversations with the staff of various european-agenda-migrationen.pdf Asylum centres (COA) in the Netherlands 19 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ 24 See, for instance, https://www.volkskrant.nl/ ALL/?uri=CELEX:22000A1215(01) nieuws-achtergrond/waarom-verloopt-het- 20 “Return ratio” is defined as the ratio between uitzetten-van-uitgeprocedeerden-zo-stroef- return decisions and effective return of country’s ~bb2f5ff6/ citizens. For specific figures on Senegal, see: 25 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ index.php/Statistics_on_enforcement_of_ IDAN/2018/570490/EXPO_IDA(2018)570490_ immigration_legislation#Latest_trends_in_ EN.pdf enforcement_statistics

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gradually moved the negotiation of an EURA state, and has gradually managed to assert with Morocco to the centre of its relations its own channels of political influence on with the EU. the country’s governing structures, by translating some of the dispersed economic power it wields through individual migrants’ Migration: a piece of the remittances into a formal place at the political-economic puzzle political decision-making table. Senegalese citizens living abroad can vote in country’s elections, and many observers We argue that Senegal and Morocco, while have argued that they also tend to have an having different economic and political important weight in determining the outcome contexts, share one significant similarity: through their votes as well as through their in both countries migration and migrants influence on relatives back home. In fact, play an important role in the national-level since 2000, all the major electoral campaigns political economy. As the more detailed were organised not only in Senegal but also analysis below will argue, these roles differ, in major migrants’ countries of settlement, but have several things in common: notably the United States and France - with 1. Migration preserves a degree Paris and New York being considered as of economic resilience among “the main battlegrounds” for presidential the population and impacts the elections. With over 400 voting places macroeconomic and societal stability of opened in countries that count even less the county. than 200 registered residents, Senegal seems 2. Migration and migration-created to hold the record for the largest number of diasporas can play important direct diaspora polling stations. political roles in the countries of origin – ‍And although the number of electors by the presence or by absence - further registered on voting lists abroad is low increasing their impact on stability. (about 3.4 % of the total), diaspora’s voice is 3. The combined economic and political expected to reverberate and impact voters’ influence of migration creates challenges choices back in Senegal. Diaspora vote is for the political establishments in both thus expected to have a symbolic value and a countries when it comes to visible mass multiplier effect beyond its actual weight. returns of its irregular migrants from the International migration has thus become EU countries – such returns could be not only a central feature of Senegalese highly problematic or even in some case identity and the standard model of social challenge their claim to power. advancement, but also a tangible element of its daily political life, fully represented In Senegal, the country’s establishment - in in country’s discourse and at all levels an apparent effort to harness the growing of policy-making. The same people that financial flows coming from the diaspora some European policy-makers view as - adopted the discourse at the turn of the law-breakers and a potential economic century linking migration and development, and societal threat, are viewed by their and started setting up institutions aimed at country of origin as valued citizens, future extracting the financial and human capital development agents and voters with formal from the European and later also US-based parliamentary representation. Senegalese diaspora. This approach This, arguably, makes it harder for Senegalese consisted of three key lines of intervention: politicians to agree with and implement promoting private economic investments policies that would undermine the size, of Senegalese living abroad in Senegal, financial reach or political power of its current supporting migrant pooled fund mechanisms or future diaspora – and accepting the forced abroad and their development projects in returns of irregular migrants from high- home communities, and leveraging the earning countries ranks high on that list.26 resources and expertise of the highly skilled diaspora for the benefit of Senegal.

More importantly, with time, Senegalese 26 Ibid., interviews with Senegalese state officials and diaspora has become interested in the western diplomats, March 2018, Dakar and Europe.

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Figure 2 Moroccan emigrants’ citizenship of main destination countries, 2010/11

ly i ery ie Beli rce ie eerl e io

re i ciiei ere re of e o cory

Source: OECD (2017) Talent Abroad: A Review of Moroccan Emigrants

Morocco is facing another kind of challenge Moroccan state specifically stimulated labour when it comes to the place of migration in recruitment from relatively marginal Berber- national political economy. With 5,8% of speaking areas, including the northern Rif, a GDP coming from remittances,27 Morocco’s region with a history of protracted tensions dependence on this source of income, while with the government. It has been argued that high, is lesser than that of Senegal. But the the remittances were most likely expected to security valve that the labour migration has diffuse some of the existing economic and represented in the past and still continues to political tensions in this part of the country.29 represent is highly important for maintaining Until the 1990s, the Moroccan government an extraordinary level of stability in the had attempted to maintain tight control troubled region. This may be even more of Moroccans living in Europe by actively the case in the Rif area, which has a worse discouraging their integration into the than average record both on economic receiving societies, including naturalization. development and on political freedoms, The legacy of this policy is still strong: and where a significant part of Moroccan Moroccan migrants in Europe, including diaspora in Europe – and certainly the the second generation, are not too quick to Moroccan diaspora in the Netherlands - take the citizenship of the host country – on comes from. average only half of them hold the host- country citizenship, with the Netherlands at In fact, the Moroccan government has 70% being a notable exception. The number actively encouraged emigration for political of Moroccan migrants with local citizenship and economic reasons – as witnessed by is especially low in Spain and Italy, where organized state involvement in the 1970s less than 20% of Moroccans aged 15 and 1980s with formal recruitment agencies and above hold host country citizenship scouting for low-educated manual labour (see Figure 2). for emptying western European factories.28 Unlike Senegalese, the Moroccan migrants were also actively discouraged from

27 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/bx.trf.pwkr. dt.gd.zs?yearhighdesc=false 28 For a history of Moroccan migration in this period 29 For a detailed discussion on this topic see: see also de Haas, H (2016) Moroccan migration De Haas, H. (2005) Morocco: From Emigration trends and development potentials, pg.11-14, GIZ, Country to Africa’s Migration Passage to Europe, Available at: https://www.giz.de/fachexpertise/ Migration Policy Institute, available at: https://www. downloads/giz2016-en-moroccan-migration- migrationpolicy.org/article/moroccoemigration- trends.pdf country-africas-migration-passage-europe/

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organizing themselves politically – fearing The inclusion of third-country citizens in that this may form an opposition force from the readmission negotiations has made abroad.30 this already difficult situation additionally The Moroccan state changed course in complex. The EUAR foresees that Morocco the early 1990s, when a sharp drop in also readmits those third-country nationals, remittances and a strong pushback on as well as its own citizens. According lack of integration of Moroccans created a to migration experts, an agreement that push for the liberalisation of nationalization would include Morocco accepting the third practices, and acceptance of dual nationality country migrants is “unrealistic”.33 This – as well as renewed push to overcome despite an increasing number of migrants the perceived alienation of Moroccan from Sub-Saharan Africa – especially from diaspora from their country.31 A ministry for Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria - that have Moroccans residing abroad was created in made Morocco their home, offering respite 1990, as well as “Fondation Hassan II pour from economic and political troubles in les Marocains Résidant à l’étranger,” which their own countries. Morocco’s own high aims to foster links between Moroccan unemployment rate has fuelled concern over migrants and Morocco. Through this and foreign migrants in the labour market and other institutions, these days Morocco runs a general anti-migrant sentiment among extensive programmes aimed at ensuring the public. Much like in neighbouring a sense of closeness to its diaspora – Algeria, there is increased racism against exchanges, projects that leverage the skills these migrants in Morocco, fuelled by a of Moroccan émigrés and nurturing the combustible mixture of “fear, competition social and economic impact of migrants – as and poverty.”34 According to reports long as it aligns with the vision set out by published by humanitarian and rights the country’s ruling family and its political organisations, the majority of surveyed sub- establishment.32 Saharan migrants has experienced deliberate physical violence, most commonly committed In terms of returns and readmissions, this by Moroccan security forces.35 complex social, economic and political situation leaves Moroccan government In response to this challenge, in December with limited internal manoeuvring space. 2017 the EU Trust Fund adopted a new Internally, the level of dependency on programme (EUR 4.58 million) aiming to remittances may be lower than that of strengthen the protection and resilience of Senegal, but still high enough for their loss migrants and refugees, displaced persons to create significant economic impact. It and host communities in Morocco – reflecting may also affect the political cushion they the policies already used in the framework of have provided over the decades – and EU compacts, the main policy tool used in the potentially bring back to the country EU response to mass protracted displacement its dissatisfied youth, a prospect that is in the Middle East. This programme - which increasingly concerning in the face of the is in line with Morocco’s own National protest in the Rif picking up momentum and Strategy on Migration – is aimed to “help civil the state being increasingly criticized for society actors ensure awareness of migrants’ the hard-handed approach to the brewing rights and access to legal counselling” and dissatisfaction of the Berber community. the EU policymakers hope it will “promote For those invested in the current political the integration of migrants into Moroccan settlement in Morocco, accepting returns society”. carries significant risks – without offering any structural benefits that could offset them.

33 Lalous, M. (2014) Morocco’s Experience of Migration as a Sending, Transit and Receiving Country, IAI, Italy, interviews in Europe 34 Lalous, M. (2014) Morocco’s Experience of 30 Ibid. Migration as a Sending, Transit and Receiving 31 Ibid. Country, IAI, Italy 32 OECD (2017) Talent Abroad: A Review of Moroccan 35 https://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/migrants_ Emigrants in_morocco_report.pdf

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Under the current political and social agenda may be poorly adjusted to this circumstances, however, it seems unlikely purpose. that this or other similar programming would bring about either an immediate It may also be internally contradictory. improvement in the living conditions of The assumption behind the current set of sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco or the EU migration management policies is that country’s readiness to accept returns of border management, addressing the root third-country nationals in any short-term causes of migration and enacting returns timeframe. and readmissions are not just mutually compatible but also mutually strengthening The other path of influencing seems to objectives. As the cases of Morocco be equally unsuccessful. In early 2018, and Senegal show, this assumption may EU offered Morocco also an additional require a closer look and potentially some assistance package to strengthen border re-examining. management capacity, building on the funding already provided to support In many countries of North and West Morocco’s migration policies (EUR 35 million Africa, migration is a phenomenon deeply assigned in December 2017). During the embedded in the political, economic and migration talks in November, Morocco has, even social fibre of these countries. It plays a in theory, agreed to re-launch negotiations significant role in the national-level political of the Readmission Agreement. By May economy – through the multi-pronged this year, “technical contacts /…/ with a economic impact of remittances or by view to designing an assistance package to serving as social security or political valve, strengthen border management capacity and sometimes also through its feedback- and re-launching negotiations on Visa impact on the national-level policymaking. Facilitation and Readmission Agreements” Migration may be planned, encouraged or have been rekindled. In August this year, EU condoned by the government, and informally Commission reiterated its readiness for a incorporated in the national-level economic further financial commitment to Morocco.36 and political model. And due to the urgency The negotiations around the readmission of EU’s and its member states’ need to agreement, however, haven’t started yet. appear to be managing it, it may have also become an unexpected tool for leveraging various forms of related assistance and Conclusions incorporating it in this model.

The cases described herein show that Addressing root causes of mass migration in order for any migration management would most likely require an adaption of the to be successful, it needs to begin by current political-economy model of these understanding the role of migration in countries – a structural change that goes the political and economic settlements in beyond the current mandate, policy reach or place in those countries, and find a way to funding capacity of the EU Trust Fund or any reconcile the different roles that the same other migration management instrument at people play in the respective societies EU’s disposal. Such changes also take time, through which they move – their countries motivation and determination on the side of of origin, transit and host countries. With the reforming authorities to actually see them its main focus on stemming the flow of through – none of which is being foreseen, migration from sub-Saharan and North discussed or accounted for in the current Africa, without fully incorporating in the migration management toolbox. policy making the internal dynamics that determine these flows, the current EU Mass returns of these countries’ citizens present therefore a serious challenge to the political-economy model endorsed by these countries, either by choice, necessity or a combination thereof. Successful returns 36 https://euobserver.com/migration/142511 would require visible and viable political

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and economic alternatives to offset or Recommendations cushion the anticipated loss of income and economic and political pressures that would Based on the analysis above, we would be the inevitable consequences of any like to propose the following broad-line serious curbing of Senegalese or Moroccan recommendations for improving cooperation migration to Europe – in support of the on readmission not just with Senegal or long-term structural shifts away from the Morocco but also with a broader set of migration-based political-economic model of countries in west and north Africa. these countries. The EU policymakers often 1. Readmission as a stand-alone stress the incentives on offer - development policy objective is not necessarily programmes, capacity building in border complementary or mutually reinforcing management, maybe even occasionally some with other key EU-wide migration policy visa liberalization. But while these forms of objectives, such as border control or compensation may be welcomed by the local addressing the root causes of mass establishment, they simply do not weigh up irregular migration. Understanding to the complex web of economic and political internal political-economic settlement benefits of migration that these countries in individual partner countries and the are deriving – nor resolve the deep-seated role migration plays in it is crucial for governance and political issues that drive it tailoring the return dialogue, embedding in the first place. it in the correct sequence and supporting with effective policy measures. It is not reasonable to expect that migration Policymakers should, therefore, conduct will cease to be part of the economic and an individual political-economy analysis societal model for many countries of origin – of each partner country, focused on certainly not in short, but probably also not it understanding the role that migration mid to long term. There, where countries rely plays in their political and economic heavily on remittances, and where migration settlement and its mutual relation with is part of the social fabric, every government other migration-related objectives as a – regardless of the level of its democratic basis for tailoring migration dialogue with accountability – is likely be judged by its those countries. capacity to deliver to own citizens engaged 2. Return agenda that is (perceived as) in, or dependent on, migration as the main undermining the existing national- source of financial stability. Some, like level political settlement and the Morocco, may also be deeply reluctant to underlying economic model is unlikely serve as second-choice hosts for rejected to be effective, as its impact may be EU–bound migrants from third countries. (perceived as) destabilising for the country’s economy and its political It is also questionable whether a dramatic status quo. Return should, therefore, be shift away from migration-based model is approached as a part of a comprehensive desirable from the point of view of these set of measures designed to allow the countries economic interests, or even countries of origin to replace some of the possible in the increasingly globalised world economic roles of migration with realistic economy, premised on increased ease of alternatives within a reasonable length movement of goods, services and also people of time. This means, for every country, a – also between these countries, many of tailored combination of measures such which belong to the Economic Community of as migration quotas, controlled circular West-African States (ECOWAS). Migration migration, economic and governance management and adaptation, therefore, reforms. seem to better respond to the actual needs 3. As the cases of Morocco and Senegal of northern and western African societies show, the countries with higher stakes than straight-out curbing and “stemming”, or higher leverage over the EU partners envisioned by the EU policy documents. will be in stronger position to negotiate readmission agreements that do not tackle the root causes of mass migration (economic or political shortcomings in

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the county). This means that the price for the capacity of third countries to offer successful returns and readmissions may, reception and protection to asylum in fact, be condoning or not tackling some seekers is crucial. Requesting such of the very issues that cause migration readmissions without a functional in the first place: poor governance and/ protection framework in place would or rights violations. The EU’s unenviable further undermine both the international choice may be between tackling root normative framework on migration causes or negotiating readmission and EU’s normative reputation. agreements, and it’s the one EU countries Any readmissions programmes must, should be cognizant of. therefore, go hand in hand with tailored 4. Finally, as the Morocco example shows, programmes aimed at improving human under the EU cooperation that aims rights and protection records of hosting to ‘stem’ the flow of asylum-seekers, countries.

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About the author

Ana Uzelac is a former Senior Research Fellow with the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Clingendael Institute, where she focussed on migration and conflict

DISCLAIMER: This paper has been commissioned by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence within the PROGRESS framework agreement, lot 2, 2018. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the authors; publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The PROGRESS Lot 2 research programme revolves around Europe and its Neighbours. It is a joint effort of the Clingendael Institute, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and Chatham House.

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