Claiming the “Moroccan-Dutch”: Dual Nationality and Interacting Citizenship Regimes

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Inge van der Welle Amsterdam Institute of Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt), Universiteit van Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 In today’s globalizing world, national citizenship pédition ». Le débat expose les tensions qui regimes no longer exist in isolation but are inter- surviennent lors d’une conceptualisation exclu- acting more and more. People are increasingly sive de la citoyenneté dans un contexte de sécuri- connected across nation-state borders, and a sation et d’intégration d’une part et de la substantial and growing number of the inhabi- continuation d’une politique de contrôle de la tants of European states hold dual nationality. citoyenneté extra-territoriale des générations As a result, people are more likely to experience diasporiques futures, de l’autre. conflicting or competing national citizenship regimes. This article investigates the interacting Mots-clés : double nationalité, citoyenneté, citizenship regimes that confront the Moroccan- Maroc, Pays-Bas Dutch. These citizenship regimes are looked at from a migration perspective, with a focus on the interaction between the Netherlands as “receiving Introduction country” and Morocco as the “sending country.” The discussion illustrates the tensions arising In June 2005, the Dutch minister of immigra- from an exclusionist conceptualization of citizen- tion and integration, Rita Verdonk, visited ship in a context of securitization and integration Morocco at the invitation of Nouzha and a continuation of diaspora engagement poli- Chekrouni, the Moroccan minister responsi- cies and extraterritorial citizenship over genera- ble for Moroccans residing abroad (les tions. Marocains résidant à l’étranger, or MREs). The Dutch minister wanted Morocco to Key words: dual nationality, citizenship, reconsider the issue of inalienable Moroccan Morocco, Netherlands nationality, which results in MREs acquiring Moroccan nationality automatically at birth. Dans le monde de la globalisation actuelle, les She argued that “If Moroccans of the third régimes nationaux pourvoyeurs de citoyenneté generation choose [single Dutch] nationality, n’existent plus isolément, mais sont en conti- a closer bond arises with [Dutch] society, and nuelle interaction. Les populations sont de plus they will integrate better” (Van der Laan en relation au-delà des frontières des États- 2005).1 For Morocco, this was not an item nations et un nombre important et croissant d’ha- open for negotiation. Moroccan nationality is bitants des États européens possèdent une double available to all emigrants and their descen- nationalité. En conséquence, des personnes dants over generations, without limitation. seront confrontées à des régimes nationaux Besides, Moroccan nationality also reflects a concurrents ou conflictuels. Cet article examine religious bond with Morocco’s king as the l’interaction des régimes de citoyenneté confron- commander of the faithful. The Moroccan tés par les Néerlando-Marocains. Ces régimes newspaper Le Matin, considered to be a sont observés d’un point de vue migratoire, foca- mouthpiece of the Moroccan king, com- lisant sur l’interaction entre les Pays-Bas le mented on Ms Verdonk’s visit and quoted a « pays de réception » et le Maroc, le « pays d’ex- representative of the Moroccan Ministry of

Claiming the “Moroccan-Dutch”: Dual Nationality and Interacting Citizenship Regime 169

Justice as stating that “Le Maroc ne peut et ne and where several Moroccan intellectuals pourra jamais retirer la nationalité marocaine found shelter and could easily engage in à quelqu’un qui en a hérité par son père ou son French public debate (Obdeijn and De Mas grand-père … il s’agit d’une question de 2001, 17). Such an appealing Moroccan intel- souveraineté non négociable [Morocco ligentsia was lacking in the Netherlands. The cannot, and can never, take away Moroccan few political refugees who did engage in nationality from someone who has inherited it public debate in the Netherlands lacked from his father or grandfather … this is a fluency in Dutch, and, because of their urban-

question of sovereignty, and is non-nego- Arabic background and their harsh opposi- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 tiable]” (“Immigrants marocains” 2005) tion to the Moroccan regime (Obdeijn and De Thus, as far as Morocco was concerned, Mas 2001, 17) their ability to act as pioneers Moroccan nationality for MREs is considered for the Moroccan community was limited. A a matter of sovereignty, and therefore not lack of appealing leadership still appears to open to question. be the case nowadays. In addition, many The Moroccan community is the third scholars have noted a lack of social cohesion largest ethnic minority group in the Nether- within the Moroccan community; in the lands, after the Surinamese and Turkish Turkish community, by contrast, mosques and communities. About 300 000 people are organizations lead to strong bonding counted as belonging to the Moroccan (Obdeijn and De Mas 2001). community, whose numbers are the result of Currently, almost 70 % of Moroccans2 in labour migration in the 1960s, family reunifi- the Netherlands hold dual—that is, Dutch and cation in the 1970s and 1980s, and family Moroccan—nationality. About 30 % have formation in the 1990s and 2000s. This Moroccan nationality only, generally community can no longer be considered a combined with permanent-resident status in migrant community, since a large and grow- the Netherlands. Only a little over 1 % have ing share of it—around 50 % in 2005 Dutch nationality only (Municipality of (Statistics Netherlands 2005)—was born and Amsterdam 2005). Therefore, most has been raised in the Netherlands. The Moroccans living in the Netherlands are Moroccan community is mainly concentrated subject to two citizenship regimes, as dual in urban areas, especially in Amsterdam, nationals or as Moroccan nationals with where it constitutes about 9 % of the total extensive citizenship rights in the population. Netherlands. Dual nationality and, in more Most members of the Moroccan commu- general terms, “strong homeland connec- nity in the Netherlands originated from the tions” have increasingly featured as a prob- Northern Rif, because of one-sided recruit- lem in the Dutch public debate on the ment on the part of the Dutch. The Moroccan integration of immigrants and their descen- government allowed recruitment of labour dents, and the Moroccan community in from this area largely because of the social particular. At the same time, the Moroccan and political turmoil there (Bouddouft 2001; state has tried to maintain ties with its over- Obdeijn and De Mas 2001). The population of seas nationals by means of active extraterrito- the Northern Rif was regarded as suspicious rial engagement policies. The Moroccan- and sceptical toward the Moroccan authori- Dutch are therefore subject to claims from ties. two states, and these claims can be conflicting Moroccan migration toward the and competing. Netherlands has consisted primarily of This article investigates the interacting unskilled labourers, as distinct from, for citizenship regimes of Morocco and the example, France where many Moroccans Netherlands and what their interaction means stayed after studying at French universities for people confronted by these regimes. The

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article begins by outlining the theoretical dynamic concept. Since Marshall’s seminal background through a discussion of the work, other aspects have been added to the concepts of citizenship and citizenship Marshallian domains of citizenship. Cultural regimes. Its second part explains the context (group) rights have been included as a citizen- of changes in the conceptualization of citi- ship domain, as these have been considered zenship by exploring the Dutch and crucial for the definition of “state member- Moroccan public spheres. The third part ship” (Delanty 2000; Wilkinson and Hébert demonstrates competing or even conflicting 2003).

claims faced by the Moroccan-Dutch, provid- Citizenship is both a means of exclusion Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 ing examples within different domains of citi- and and a means of inclusion. It can be inclu- zenship regimes. The concluding section sive because it provides the same rights for all discusses the interactions between the two citizens; at the same time, it is exclusive by citizenship regimes and assesses the extent to defining who is a citizen and who is not. which they conflict in the everyday life of the Besides, it is not culturally neutral: processes Moroccan-Dutch. such as xenophobia and identity politics often constrain opportunities for the combination Competing vs. Interacting Citizenship of cultural hybridity and political citizenship. Regimes Multiple citizenship has become a reality for an increasing number of people, thanks to “Ambivalent,” “blurred,” “dynamic,” “highly increasing cross-border connections, migra- contested,” “hyphenated,” “bounded and tion, and European citizenship. This has led to unbounded”—all these terms have been used questions about the extent to which citizen- in the extensive debate on the notion of citi- ship is bound to the nation-state and about the zenship, that is, in discussions of what citi- nature of state sovereignty. Critics have zenship entails and where it is heading. argued that processes of globalization and Citizenship was conceptualized by T.H. increased international migration have Marshall, in his book Citizenship and Social changed the nature of citizenship, that citi- Class (1950), as a historical development and zenship has become less bound to a (nation-) as closely related to class struggles. state (e.g., Cammaerts and van Audenhove Citizenship was presented as a legal status 2005). They argue that nation-states are that provides access to rights and power. losing importance to international institu- Marshall distinguished three domains of citi- tions and that migrants are increasingly zenship rights: civil rights, political rights, located in transnational spaces (i.e., spaces and socio-economic rights. The civil rights across state borders) because of their include such individual freedoms as freedoms membership in more than one state. For of speech, expression, association, thought, example, migrant political participation and faith; liberty of person; the right to across borders and transnational public-inter- conclude valid contracts; and the right to est campaigning could construct “transna- justice. Political rights are those involved in tional citizenship.” Furthermore, it has been actually participating in the political arena; suggested that citizenship has become a the most crucial elements within the political blurred issue because, in many states, there is domain are passive and active voting rights. no longer a sharp distinction between citizen Socio-economic rights include the right to and non-citizen, thanks to the decoupling of minimum means of subsistence, a safe envi- rights and citizenship (e.g., Soysal 2000). ronment, education, and the provision of Increasingly, permanent residents without health care. Marshall’s study also emphasizes citizenship status, the so-called denizens that citizenship entails not only rights but also (Hammar 1990), enjoy most of the rights of obligations. Citizenship has proved to be a citizenship. Because of the decoupling of

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rights and identities, citizenship is presented ality perilous for particular categories of dual as a “multi-tiered” form of membership that citizens” (2006, 337), mainly those of Arabic is no longer bound to national collectives and origin and/or Muslims. Thus, in view of the shifts the source and legitimacy of rights to current geopolitical context, no such trend the sub-national or the international level toward universal acceptance of multiple citi- (Soysal 2000). zenship can be identified. However, despite the emergence of An examination of the arguments for and European citizenship and transnational against multiple citizenship reveals different

spaces, states have continued to play a signif- conceptions of multiple citizenship, namely Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 icant role in structuring class and order. States competing citizenships, flexible citizenship, have control over citizenship rights as well as and advantageous citizenships. From a state- the classification of their residents centred perspective, five arguments have (citizen/non-citizen; legal/non-legal resi- been put forward for preventing multiple citi- dent). States are important actors when it zenship. First, it has been argued that multiple comes to producing and reproducing group nationality will lead to multiple loyalties, identity by description (e.g., Baumann 1998; while national loyalty is usually considered Cohn 1987; Mamdani 2004). Therefore, the indivisible and exclusive. In wars and interna- nation-state has been, and remains, a power- tional tensions, a state could not trust its dual ful identifier (e.g., Brubaker 2003, 556), and citizens. Second, multiple citizenship accords transnational spaces have been shown to be rights and imposes obligations in more than shaped to a large extent by national regula- one country. Opponents of multiple citizen- tions and policies (Koopmans et al. 2005). ship have argued that this might lead to the Jonathan Fox (2005) concludes his explo- bypassing or exploiting of citizenship rules ration of “transnational citizenship” by noting (Stasiulis and Ross 2006, 334). Third, multi- that “multi-layered citizenship is evocative ple citizenship would violate the equality and captures meaningful new trends, but principle, as some citizens might have more there is nothing necessarily cross-border rights and opportunities than others. Fourth, about it” (195). Therefore it is preferable to multiple citizenship could lead to conflicts in use the terms “dual citizenship” or “multiple the domain of international private law, citizenship.” particularly family law; for example, a conse- Because of the processes de-linking cration of marriage in one country might not identity, rights, and citizenship, some have be recognized in another. A more recent argu- argued, people have become more inclined to ment has been that multiple nationality would accept multiple citizenship; in addition, as act as a brake on the integration process in the the “prospect of international conflicts or country of residence, since people would not security risks arising from dual nationality be forced to choose between nationalities. has been reduced to almost nil” (Spiro 2002, These five objections reveal a conception of 20), a universal trend toward acceptance of multiple citizenship as “competing citizen- multiple citizenship has been suggested. ships,” that is, as involving competition However, dual citizenship is increasingly between loyalties and between rights and regarded as a problem in European countries. duties. This development should be contextualized Another conception of citizenship comes in the current geopolitical climate, in which to the fore in the argument against multiple “security” has become a dominant theme in citizenship because of the problem of the discourse on citizenship. The alleged “flexible sovereignty” (Stasiulis and Ross problem of dual citizenship appears to be 2006) and, with it, “flexible citizenship”: selective. As Daiva Stasiulis and Darryl Ross “Governments have become flexible in their argue, “Securitization has made dual nation- management of sovereignty, each responding

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to their own set of interests in the ‘global war access to state institutions, and the accepted against terror’” (Stasiulis and Ross 2006, definition of the nation (Jenson and Papillon 330). Control over dual citizens, and the 2000). The second dimension addresses the protection available to them, could be dimin- state’s stand on the provision of cultural (and ished in the event of multiple citizenship, religious) group rights: allowances for reli- resulting in “flexible sovereignty.” Flexible gious practices, political representation, and sovereignty could, for example, have a nega- affirmative action (Koopmans et al. 2005). tive effect on the diplomatic protection of The culture–state relationship has also been

dual nationals, since states would be able to taken into account. The third covers the over- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 shift the responsibility for such protection all public sphere, with a view to contextualiz- onto other states (Stasilius and Ross 2006). ing the first two dimensions, and includes the Flexible sovereignty, then, results in a reduc- dominant and countervailing discourses on tion rather than an expansion of rights for dual nationality and citizenship. The public sphere nationals compared to some categories of uni- is used here as a broader concept than civil citizens (i.e., persons holding only one citi- society. It is a “site where contests take place zenship; Stasilius and Ross 2006). over the definition of the common good and Other arguments bring to the fore advan- also the virtues, obligations and rights that tageous conceptions of dual citizenship. One members of society require for the common such argument is that multiple citizenship can good to be realized”; The public sphere is enhance integration because it facilitates “where debates take place that influence naturalization (and thereby participation) and political decision making” (Eickelman and because it might spread democratic values Salvatore 2002, 94). through people’s participation in several The current literature primarily looks political arenas (Spiro 2002). Increasingly, upon migration and citizenship from the nationality is regarded as a human right perspective of the “receiving country” and of (Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple 2004). integration. Some authors have dealt with citizenship from an emigration perspective Interacting Citizenship Regimes (e.g., Brand 2002, 2006). In today’s globalizing world, however, with increased interna- To gain an insight into the way in which states tional migration and mobility across borders, interpret citizenship, it is important to these two spheres need to be connected. consider access to citizenship status and how National citizenship regimes increasingly it is defined, although other crucial aspects interact, at the institutional as well as the indi- also need to be taken into account. National vidual level. Increasing numbers of people citizenship regimes have three dimensions: not only hold citizenship in the country where (1) individual equality and traditional citizen- they reside but also hold extraterritorial citi- ship rights; (2) (institutionalization of) zenship, meaning “citizenship in a territori- cultural difference/plurality; and (3) the over- ally bounded political community without all public sphere. The first dimension implies residence in the community” (Fitzgerald access to nationality, equal citizenship rights, 2000, 4). Multiple citizenship involves inter- and anti-discrimination provisions and insti- secting and interacting citizenship regimes, tutions. “Traditional citizenship rights” refers each with its own specific mix of rights and to the three dimensions of citizenship formu- obligations, control mechanisms, and overall lated by Marshall (1950). However, besides public sphere. There is an increasing mere rights and obligations, a citizenship complexity of territorialities that must be regime also concerns the opportunity struc- taken into consideration. Interacting national ture, or mechanisms for exercising these citizenship regimes are the most prominent of rights: the rules of the democratic game, these,3 because the state still is a powerful

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identifier. Their interactions can cause the last few years, the “new realist discourse” conflicts or competition if the legitimacy of has slowly evolved from a critique of Dutch the extraterritorial claims is not recognized by multicultural policies, and the integration of the nationals abroad or by the state institu- the allochtonen in general, to become a tions of the country of residence. Moreover, critique of Islam and the problematization of the extraterritorial citizenship regime may Muslim integration. In 2001 Herman Obdeijn question the legitimacy of specific claims and Paolo De Mas noted that Moroccans made on the dual citizen by the country of appeared to be at the centre of the debate on

residence. the alleged “multicultural drama” (9). This Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 This article looks at citizenship regimes seems still to be the case, although the focus from a transnational perspective and deals in the debate has shifted toward Muslims as a with the interactions between the citizenship homogeneous group. This situation was regimes receiving countries and those of aggravated by the reactions to the events of 11 sending countries. This question is an inter- September 2001 and by the murder of the esting one because of the recent tendency in Dutch filmmaker and publicist Theo van several receiving countries, including the Gogh in November 2004. Radicalization Netherlands, tobe less accepting of multiple among young Muslims became a key issue in citizenship, while sending countries, includ- the debate, and the media have been criticized ing Morocco, promote it. for its predominantly negative portrayal of the Moroccan-Dutch. Certain combinations of The Moroccan-Dutch and the Public citizenship, such as Moroccan and Dutch, and Spheres certain identities, such as Muslim and Dutch, began to be regarded as more problematic Many scholars have highlighted the increas- than other combinations. ingly harsh tone of Dutch public debate on However, a counter-discourse is also cultural and religious diversity (e.g., emerging that mainly addresses (multiple) Koopmans 2002; Prins 2002). For quite a few identities as a right, not a problem. For exam- years the Netherlands was known for its ple, the Arab European League, an organiza- multicultural discourse and tolerance of tion that was very prominent in the Dutch diversity. A shift away from multiculturalism public debate at the end of 2002 and the in the Dutch public debate has taken place beginning of 2003, claimed “Arab European since the beginning of the 1990s, however, and Muslim identity” as a right, in reaction to although it became obvious only in 2000. A the dominant Dutch discourse, which prob- “new realist discourse” began to take promi- lematized these identity configurations. In nence (Prins 2002) in which Dutch multicul- addition, it has been argued that the increas- tural policies were seen as naïve, as failing to ingly negative connotations attached to take account of the “real problems” in Dutch Muslims or Moroccans in the Dutch public society, and as not speaking out for “ordinary debate, along with a very exclusive concep- Dutch people,” known in Dutch as autochto- tion of Dutch nationality, have caused people nen.4 One representative of this discourse has to try to “find a way out.” Such a strategy spoken of the “multicultural drama,” arguing might involve identifying mainly with one’s that beneath the surface of public life there are city of residence—for example as a resident plenty of stories about the clash of civiliza- of Amsterdam rather than a resident of the tions that have not been heard (Scheffer Netherlands. Alternatively, the Amazigh (or 2000). This view became more and more Berber) identity has been mentioned as a prevalent, especially after the election victory possible “way out” for the Moroccan-Dutch, of the right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn, a as most of them are of Amazigh origin. major exponent of the new realist views. Over The city of Amsterdam began a publicity

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campaign in 2005 to stress that all people Although the main focus in Morocco is on living in Amsterdam are first and foremost attracting MREs and including them in the Amsterdammer (residents of Amsterdam), discourse on Moroccan citizenship, other irrespective of nationality, culture, religion, or views have also been expressed; the preferen- residential permit. This initiative was intended tial treatment of MREs has been questioned in to counteract the more exclusionist national the Moroccan press. The fact that policies discourse that dominates the public sphere. concerning MREs are exclusively under the The Moroccan public debate on king’s control (Royaume du Maroc n.d.)

Moroccans residing abroad (MREs) has also makes these policies hard to criticize politi- Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 changed over time. At first MREs were cally (“F. Abdelmoumni” 2006). regarded primarily as Moroccan citizens, With respect to the interaction between residing abroad on a temporary basis. Active the two public spheres, there appears to be a participation in and integration into their public sphere of inclusion in Morocco and (to countries of residence were discouraged. a certain extent) a sphere of exclusion in the Nowadays, however, MREs seem to be Netherlands. Recent changes in Morocco increasingly regarded as bridge builders have substantially improved the image the between Morocco and Europe and as ambas- new generations of Moroccan-Dutch have of sadors for Morocco. Success stories of inte- the Morocco state (Bouddouft 2006).6 In the gration into Dutch society feature in the Netherlands, in a context of securitization and Moroccan media. Examples are items on two integration, the Moroccan-Dutch are increas- Dutch politicians of Moroccan descent, ingly becoming a problematized population Ahmed Aboutaleb and Naima Azough (El group. No transnational social movement Ouardighi 2005a, 2005b). In the royal speech provides a real transnational public sphere for on Green March Day in November 2006,5 the Moroccan-Dutch. It is important to keep in King Mohammed VI described MREs as play- mind that the situation might be different for ing a key role “in the country’s development, the Moroccan diaspora living in other coun- modernization, cultural influence, social tries, such as France, because most Moroccans harmony and democratic advancement.” living in the Netherlands are not fluent in Several authors have discussed the “culture of French or Arabic. (e)migration” in Morocco (De Haas 2006; The next section of this article describes Sabry 2005), referring to a context in which in more detail the domains of citizenship emigration “is associated with personal, rights that have to be contextualized within social, and material successes, where migra- these public spheres and the frictions between tion has become the norm rather than the them. The conflicts within the separate exception” (De Haas 2006, 125). Even though domains are illustrated by reference to issues the problems facing Moroccans residing in the that have been heavily debated in the Netherlands (e.g., discrimination, unemploy- Netherlands, especially in connection with the ment) have featured in the Moroccan debate, Moroccan-Dutch. the image of the emigrant is still that of a “hero” with high socio-economic status who The Moroccan-Dutch and Citizenship returns to Morocco during summer holidays Rights in a new car, wearing fancy clothes. Furthermore, the conception of Moroccan Dutch and Moroccan Nationality; nationality appears to have broadened to Access to Citizenship include the Amazigh identity and Islamist discourses. A lot of progress has been made The first dividing line between the Dutch and with respect to the human rights situation, and “foreigners” is drawn along the line of their especially in the area of women’s rights. parents’ nationality, the ius sanguinis princi-

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ple. People acquire Dutch nationality if they Netherlands. In 2003, an article was added to have a Dutch mother or a Dutch father. The the Dutch citizenship law providing that territoriality principle, or double ius soli, Dutch nationality can be taken away should a applies to children of parents born in the person provide false information (i.e., Netherlands: they automatically acquire commit fraud) during the naturalization Dutch nationality at birth. Children born in procedure; Dutch nationality can be with- the Netherlands to migrant parents have the drawn up to 12 years after naturalization. The right to opt for Dutch nationality but do not Dutch Ministry of Justice and the Supreme

acquire Dutch nationality at birth. Dutch Court have interpreted this article strictly, and Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 nationality law is based on the “single nation- identity fraud has since been regarded as ality principle,” whenever possible; people fraud. This ground for nationality loss came must renounce their original nationality when to the fore in the case of Dutch politician they acquire Dutch nationality, and they lose Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Because Hirsi Ali knowingly their Dutch nationality if they acquire provided false information about her name another.7 Three issues concerning Dutch and her flight from Somalia to the nationality have been discussed in detail in Netherlands, she had, in the opinion of the recent years: dual nationality, the deprivation minister of immigration and integration, of Dutch nationality, and the conditions that obtained Dutch nationality wrongfully. must be fulfilled in order to acquire Dutch According to the minister, this meant that, nationality. from a juridical perspective, Hirsi Ali should Since the end of the 1990s, it has been not be considered to have had Dutch national- formal Dutch policy to discourage and ity at all. An amendment has recently been prevent dual or multiple nationalities based proposed to allow for the removal of Dutch on the view that they delay integration into nationality from persons convicted of a Dutch society.8 Renouncing one’s original terrorist act, which comes under the heading nationality is considered to reflect a weaker of damage t o the essential interests of the bond with the country of origin and, in Dutch state.10 general, a stronger bond with Dutch society.9 Finally, the increasingly stringent criteria However, not all configurations of nationali- for naturalization have been heavily debated. ties (and therefore citizenship) are perceived The current naturalization procedure consists as equally problematic. The debate has of an integration exam and a naturalization concentrated mainly on the Moroccan-Dutch ceremony. The integration exam focuses on and, to a lesser extent, the Turkish-Dutch; Dutch language acquisition and knowledge of having Italian nationality (or any other West Dutch culture and society. Naturalization European nationality) in addition to Dutch ceremonies are organized to underline the nationality, on the other hand, has never been fact that naturalization involves more than explicitly regarded as a problem. just practicalities; it entails both rights and Although Dutch law formulates a duties. These ceremonies are believed to number of grounds on which citizens can be enlarge and deepen the meaning of Dutch deprived of their Dutch nationality, this can nationality and citizenship for the new citi- only really happen in cases of multiple zens. For people holding the right to opt for nationality, because otherwise the person Dutch nationality, such as children born to would become stateless. Dutch law complies migrants in the Netherlands, the integration with international law in that statelessness exam is not part of the naturalization proce- must be prevented at all times. Currently, the dure. Since October 2006, however, optants two most debated grounds for losing Dutch have been obliged to attend a naturalization nationality are identity fraud and damage to ceremony. Part of the naturalization cere- the essential interests of the Kingdom of the mony is the “declaration of belonging” (verk-

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laring van verbondenheid). The proposed text not about to stop. In 2006, slightly more than is “I declare to respect the Dutch legal order 1 million people had more than one national- and promise to faithfully fulfil the duties ity—about twice as many as 10 years ago (see Dutch citizenship involves (optional: so help Figure 1). At the same time, the number of me God).”11 According to the minister of naturalizations dropped considerably after immigration and integration, the declaration 1996 (Figure 2), mainly because the obliga- is meant to express a “conscious loyalty to tion to renounce one’s original nationality Dutch society and its values.”12 Finally, a when acquiring Dutch nationality was rein-

declaration renouncing the original national- troduced in 1997 (see, e.g., Böcker et al. Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 ity will be compulsory beginning in March 2005). 2008. The idea is that, via sharpened natural- Recent Dutch nationality policies clearly ization criteria, Dutch citizenship will be seen conflict with Moroccan policies toward as a more positive option, because people will MREs, who continue to be Moroccan nation- be more aware of the meanings and implica- als from one generation to the next, without tions of naturalization.13 any limitation. Moroccan nationality is The Dutch naturalization policy inalienable, and the credo is “once a sketched here is one of several recent devel- Moroccan, always a Moroccan.” opments that have changed the meaning of Until 2006, children born to MREs naturalization, transforming it from a crucial acquired Moroccan nationality automatically part of the integration process to a prize for at birth if their fathers had Moroccan nation- being integrated or, as some might say, assim- ality. Moroccan women, however, could ilated into (mainstream) Dutch society transfer their Moroccan nationality to their (Böcker, Groenendijk, and De Hart 2005). children only if the children were born in During the 1980s and 1990s, naturalization Morocco and claimed Moroccan nationality procedures were simplified because natural- two years prior to reaching majority, or if their ization was seen as an important part of inte- father was unknown or stateless (Nazir and gration. From 1992 to 1997, people who Tomppert 2005; ILO 2003). Morocco’s became naturalized Dutch citizens did not Citizenship Code has recently been reformed. have to renounce their original nationality, A Moroccan mother’s citizenship is now because it was believed that naturalization transferred automatically to her children at would enhance integration. Now, a single birth, whether they were born in Morocco or nationality, exclusive loyalties, and a deep- abroad (“New Citizenship Code” 2007). ened feeling of belonging are considered key Because religion is very much interwoven to a successful integration, and Dutch nation- with the Moroccan state system, renouncing ality is the reward. As explained above, these one’s Moroccan nationality is a very sensitive changes should be contextualized within a issue. Morocco is a monarchy with Islam as a Dutch public sphere in which the “war on state religion. The Moroccan king, terror” since 9/11 and the countervaling radi- Mohammed VI, is not only the head of state calization have become prominent. but also Amir al-Muminin (“commander of An examination of naturalization and the faithful”); the country’s heraldic motto is multiple-citizenship figures shows that Dutch “God, the country, the king.”14 Breaking the policies have been selective and symbolic: bond of Moroccan nationality would mean selective, because only those who hold dual apostasy and could undermine the king’s or multiple nationalities can be deprived of position. their Dutch nationality and because not all Aside from mere nationality provisions, citizenship configurations are considered two other issues relating to access to Dutch equally problematic; and symbolic, because citizenship and the Moroccan-Dutch have the increase of people with dual nationality is sparked intense debate. These are the status

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Claiming the “Moroccan-Dutch”: Dual Nationality and Interacting Citizenship Regime 177 Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021

FIGURE 1 Multiple nationalities: Number of persons claiming Dutch nationality and at least one other nationality (prepared using data from Statistics Netherlands 2006)

FIGURE 2 Naturalization rates in the Netherlands (prepared using data from Statistics Netherlands 2006)

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of denizens (Hammar 1999) and the restric- citizenship can be highly contested, tion of access to the Netherlands through however—for example, the thin line between family formation. There has been a major practising freedom of speech and insulting discussion about abandoned women and someone. In addition, people might feel that children in Morocco15 which relates to the monitoring of imams, for example, by the women and children left behind during holi- Dutch secret service impinges on these free- days in Morocco by their husband or father doms. without any official identity documents or In Morocco, MREs enjoy the same civil

residence permits. Most of them do not have rights as Moroccans living in Morocco. Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 Dutch nationality, or cannot prove they have Although recent changes have improved the it. The same could apply to a Moroccan human-rights situation in Morocco, there is woman married to a Moroccan-Dutch part- still criticism of the extent to which civil ner. Such women’s Dutch residence permits rights such as freedom of expression and reli- are derived from their husband’s status for gion can be enjoyed. the first three years of marriage; they can be In the 1970s and 1980s, some conflicts considered denizens while in the were reported concerning the attempts of a Netherlands, but, if abandoned in Morocco Moroccan institution in the Netherlands to without official documents, they cannot restrict some freedoms of Moroccans resid- return to the Netherlands. This example ing there. The case concerned the Fédération reveals the tensions that might arise in a case des Amicales des travailleurs et commerçants combining denizenship in one country with marocains à l’étranger (Amicales), which the nationality of another. tried to intimidate and monitor dissidents and Since 2002, several restrictions have prevent them from activism (Brand 2006).18 applied to those who want to bring a foreign The Amicales did not achieve total control partner (the so called import brides or over the Moroccan community in the import grooms16) to settle in the Netherlands, however, and nowadays it no Netherlands (family formation). To be longer seems to engage in such activities. The allowed to settle in the Netherlands, the overall human-rights situation in Morocco foreign partner must be over the age of 21 has improved in recent years, and there are and must have passed the Dutch integration therefore fewer differences and conflicts exam before departure. For partners living in between the two countries in this domain than the Netherlands, the minimum age has been there used to be. set at 21, and the income of this person must also be at least 120 % of the Dutch minimum Political Rights wage.17 There are several exceptions to this rule, and it does not apply to people of Crucial elements of political incorporation Japanese, American, Australian, or New include the right to vote and to run for office, Zealand nationality, nor to citizens of the as well as the right to political representation. European Union. However, it does apply to Foreigners living in the Netherlands have been Moroccans and the Moroccan-Dutch. entitled to vote, and have been eligible to stand for election at the local level, since 1985. Non- Civil Rights Dutch people have passive voting rights and can become councillors or aldermen. Some In principle, everyone in the Netherlands has requirements must be met, however: non- the same civil rights; there is no difference Dutch residents must have resided legally in between single Dutch nationals, multiple the Netherlands for at least five years or must nationals, and denizens. The concept of be citizens of an EU member state. In order to several freedom rights in the civil domain of run for office or vote in national elections,

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people must have Dutch nationality. However, Often a distinction is drawn between increasing emphasis has been placed on the allochtone (non-native) and autochtone need to extend voting rights in national elec- (native) voters in national elections, even tions to foreigners, under the same conditions though all are Dutch nationals. Exit polls as for local elections. No restrictions apply to show that since the late 1990s the election dual nationals, a category that includes a turnout of non-native voters has been lower number of Dutch politicians. Several politi- than the average turnout. According to exit cians have felt that the debates on dual nation- polls taken at the last local elections in

ality cast doubt on their loyalty to the March 2006, only 37 % of the Moroccan Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 Netherlands.. The Moroccan-Dutch politician community voted, as opposed to 51 % of the Naima Azough raised this question in a debate total population of Amsterdam (van on changes in the Dutch nationality law in the Heelsum 2006). The division of autochtone Tweede Kamer (the lower house of the Dutch and allochtone councillors on local councils parliament), stating, “in front of you stands has often been stressed, based on the someone with dual nationality. I am both assumption of specific ethnic support for the Moroccan and Dutch and I have two pass- latter. Although doubts can and should be ports. Couldn’t I have a true bond with the cast on the alleged ethnic backing of Netherlands then?”19 This debate recently “allochtone” politicians, there has been intensified with the installation of the new considerable evidence of “ethnic voting” in Dutch government in March 2007, when the Netherlands,21 although in the last local right-wing Dutch MP Geert Wilders explicitly elections it appeared to have declined. questioned the loyalty of two members of the During the most recent local elections, 40 % new government because of their dual nation- of the Moroccan community voted for a ality (one has both Moroccan and Dutch Moroccan candidate, by comparison with nationality, the other Turkish and Dutch). the 47 % who did so in the 1998 elections Within Dutch politics, migrant identity (van Heelsum 2006). has tended to receive considerable attention; In the 1980s Morocco reacted to the a politician of Moroccan origin, for exam- policy changes in the Netherlands that ple, may find it difficult to escape the ethno- allowed foreigners living in the Netherlands national label (e.g., Ter Wal 2005). The for at least five years to participate in local political representation of “non-natives”20 elections. The Moroccan king tried to prevent in the Dutch political arena is relatively high Moroccans residing in the Netherlands from compared to other European countries. In becoming active in Dutch politics, asking the major Dutch cities, the proportion of them not to vote or run for office in the local municipal councillors of Moroccan origin is elections in the Netherlands.22 This approach representative of the size of the Moroccan has since totally shifted: nowadays community (IPP 2006). There are also Moroccans who are well integrated and polit- several members of parliament of Moroccan ically active in the Netherlands are seen as an origin. In addition, a system of consultation asset and as ambassadors for their country. encourages the representation of, for exam- The involvement of MREs in the ple, ethnic and religious groups in the form Moroccan political arena has been a subject of advisory boards to the government; ethnic of discussion since King Mohammed VI’s or religious-based political parties, speech in honour of the thirtieth anniversary however—apart from those based in of the Green March in November 2005, in Christianity—have failed to gain ground in which he announced revisions to electoral the Netherlands. legislation to enhance and facilitate the Labelling appears to be part and parcel participation of MREs. These revisions were of the political system in the Netherlands. meant to enable Moroccans abroad to enjoy

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the same political rights as those residing in as a result, many people still choose to marry Morocco. The proposed revisions included in Morocco as well. Moroccan policy is the re-establishment of electoral districts in aimed at establishing bilateral agreements on Europe, which had been abolished in 2002 family law with the countries of residence of (Bouddouft 2005), so that MREs could vote MREs. So far, agreements have been estab- in the legislative elections scheduled in 2007 lished with France and Spain; there is no and also run for office; the establishment of a bilateral agreement on family law with the “Higher Council representing the Moroccans Netherlands, and no short-term intention on

abroad” was also announced (Mohammed VI the part of the Netherlands to establish such Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 2005). One year later, in November 2006, the an agreement. Minister Verdonk has argued royal speech on the same occasion reflected that problems due to the interaction between some changes in this position. The aim of Moroccan and Dutch family law have ensuring the active involvement of MREs was decreased because of the recent changes in stressed, but the main focus appears to have Moroccan law, claiming also that the shifted from representation of MREs in the Netherlands does not have the freedom to Lower House to representation through a enter into a bilateral agreement because the “Higher Council for the Moroccan commu- domain of family law falls, to a large extent, nity abroad” (Mohammed VI 2006). Some under the exclusive jurisdiction of the have argued that, in addition to practical prob- European Commission.24 lems surrounding the re-establishment of In the Netherlands there is a special re- constituencies, reports of increased support migration subsidy program for migrants who for Islamist and leftist parties among want to return to their country of origin. This MREs—and especially the younger genera- program also applies if only one parent has, or tion—have led to these changes in perspec- had, the country’s nationality; it therefore tive (Brouksy 2006). applies to the children of migrants as well. Morocco is one of the countries to which the Socio-economic Rights re-migration subsidy applies. The subsidy includes a contribution in travel and moving Family law, social security, and extracting costs and a contribution to the costs of living obligations are three crucial aspects in the during the first two months in Morocco. interacting socio-economic domain of the Some social-security benefits, including Moroccan and Dutch citizenship regimes. disability and child benefits, can be exported During recent years considerable abroad. Since 2000, however, the possibilities changes have taken place in Moroccan family have been restricted by law.25 There has been law (Mudawwana), resulting in a decrease in much debate about the export of social-secu- competing and conflicting claims. The most rity benefits. It was expected that fraud would important of these reforms concern marriage, be a problem—for example, claims for child divorce, children, and inheritance, and most support for non-existent children, or failure to have strengthened the position of women. The disclose information on property owned reforms have also had some consequences for abroad. The Moroccan authorities were asked Moroccans living abroad; for example, it has to cooperate with an investigation of social- become easier to get married. Marriages security fraud in 2002;26 the authorities in the performed according to Dutch law are now Netherlands threatened to stop “exporting” recognized in Morocco, as long as two some social-security benefits if Morocco Islamic witnesses are present and a dowry has failed to cooperate. Morocco contested the been paid.23 Procedures to have a Dutch legitimacy of the investigation, but, eventu- marriage recognized in Morocco tend to take ally, a treaty was signed to enable the investi- a long time, however, and costs are often high; gation to go ahead. In the end, the fraud

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involving Dutch social-security benefits in process of our country at the local, regional Morocco turned out to be just a fraction of and national levels” (2006). Besides being an total social-security-benefit fraud in the asset in terms of financial resources and Netherlands.27 competences, MREs are also seen as an influ- In the socio-economic domain of citizen- ential lobby group that could play a determin- ship, the Moroccan authorities have regarded ing role in defending Moroccan interests MREs as financial resources, as sources of abroad (Royaume du Maroc n.d.). considerable potential, and as lobbyists. From

these points of view, it is not rights that are Cultural and Religious Group Rights Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 central but obligations; hence the Moroccan authorities’ efforts to extract economic and The way in which religion, especially Islam, political benefits from MREs through invest- is dealt with in the Netherlands clearly reveals ment policies, by facilitating remittances, and conflicts between the viewpoint of the send- by encouraging the MRE lobby. The remit- ing country and that of the host country. The tances of MREs are considered to be very aim of the Dutch authorities is to establish a important; remittances were estimated at Dutch form of Islam to enhance integration of almost US$4 billion in 2003, and several Muslims into Dutch society. The notion of banks and financial institutions are encour- creating a Dutch form of Islam should also be aged to facilitate these cash flows. Besides placed in a context of policies to prevent radi- the remittances, the Moroccan authorities are calization and counter terrorism, policies of increasingly trying to attract investments which Islam and Muslims are a key focus. The from MREs. The Hassan II Foundation, unwanted interference of foreign institutions established in 1990 to maintain the bond in cultural and religious institutions or organ- between MREs and Morocco (Fondation izations in the Netherlands has been Hassan II n.d.), is actively involved in encour- perceived as blocking integration and aging investments, specifically targeting preventing the emergence of a Dutch form of young Moroccan Europeans. Several Islam. Religious schools and the education of symposia, conferences, and competitions imams should preferably be organized from have been organized to enhance investments. within communities in the Netherlands. On Another institution, the Global Forum of the other hand, the aim of the Moroccan Moroccan Competences Abroad (Forum Ministry for MREs is to convince host coun- International des compétences marocaines de tries of the desirability of Morocco’s interven- l’étranger, FINCOME) was established in tions in education, religion, and integration 2006, under the auspices of the government policies. The Ministry’s goal is to combine ministry responsible for MREs, to call specif- integration into host societies with the preser- ically on highly qualified MREs to share their vation of Moroccan identity (Royaume du knowledge by participating in projects in Maroc n.d.). Morocco, or by participating from within In the Netherlands, a highly debated their country of residence, both in the public issue is the recruiting of imams from abroad and private sector and in civil society. MREs by Dutch mosques. Because current Dutch are considered “precious assets to the new policies encourage the establishment of a Morocco” (FINCOME 2006). FINCOME Dutch form of Islam, a subsidy has been aims at “bridging the communicational gap granted for the introduction of an imam between Moroccan competences living curriculum at the Free University of abroad and their home country” (FINCOME Amsterdam, which does not target any 2006). Minister Chekrouni adds, “We want specific ethno-national group and explicitly them to exploit their expertise and experience aims to attract Dutch students. Creating a for the sake of a comprehensive development Dutch form of Islam, however, is not really

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about the integration or emancipation of of Islam” (“A hundred religious” 2006; Muslims in the Netherlands; as mentioned emphasis added). above, it should be seen primarily within the Thus, even though the aims of Morocco context of policies aimed at preventing radi- and the Netherlands in religious affairs have calization and combatting terrorism. converged, with the prevention of radicaliza- Representatives of the countries of origin of tion as a shared goal, their proposed policies most Muslims in the Netherlands have cast differ, the latter aspiring to create a Dutch doubt on Dutch imam education and its Islam and the former, to strengthen Moroccan

underlying aims. The Moroccan authorities, Islam. Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 for example, have stressed that imams from Morocco do not preach a fundamentalist Conclusion: Claiming the Islam. Critics have argued that Dutch imam “Moroccan Dutch” education might achieve the opposite of what it is aiming for (Bouddouft 2006). Given the increasing number of people hold- Historically, most Moroccans who ing multiple citizenship, diaspora engage- migrate to the Netherlands have come from ment rather than a lack of interest in diasporas the Northern Rif; as mentioned above, they (and their offspring) appears to be the trend. have a reputation for being suspicious of Interacting citizenship regimes are a reality Moroccan authorities. Imams sent from that must be taken into account. An examina- Morocco are generally distrusted by the tion of the interaction between citizenship Moroccan community in the Netherlands; as regimes covers both the emigration and the a result, only a few have come, and these have integration perspective on citizenship. Both failed to acquire much influence (Bouddouft Moroccan and Dutch authorities acknowl- 2006). However, the Moroccan government edge that, with respect to their citizenship continues to facilitate the sending of regimes, they need to engage with one Moroccan imams abroad, with the aim of another. The Dutch government has even preventing radicalization among MREs, suggested that the Moroccan authorities while the Dutch government’s position is that should be involved in solving the Moroccan- imams from abroad will encourage radical- Dutch young people face in integrating into ization. On several occasions each year, such Dutch society. The gap between the aims of as during Ramadan, imams from Morocco the Moroccan authorities and those of the visit and preach in mosques in the Dutch authorities appears to have narrowed. Netherlands. Their message is often both reli- There is a mutual interest in enhancing inte- gious and nationalist, namely that one ought gration and preventing radicalization; not to forget one’s roots, one’s bond with however, the strategies for realizing these Morocco; “They preach more for Morocco objectives are different. than for Allah” (Bouddouft 2006).The Loyalty and integration have been identi- Moroccan authorities have allegedly fied as the key arguments in the Dutch public launched an “upgrading project for religious debate on restricting multiple citizenship. officials in order to preserve the national Multiple citizenship is considered to be a conscience in matters of faith and abide by the problem; but not every combination of citi- major religious principles” (“A hundred reli- zenships is perceived as equally problematic. gious” 2006; emphasis added). However, it Being Moroccan and Dutch at the same time has also been stated that the religious scholars is perceived as problematic, while other who lecture Moroccan expatriates during combinations, such as being Italian and Ramadan have to focus on “the life of Dutch, are never questioned. At the same Muslims in host societies, while highlighting time, the Moroccan authorities promote the values of love, tolerance and the openness multiple citizenship as a means of preserving

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emigrants’ bond with their nation and religion processes of selectiveness, exclusion, and intact. In Morocco, interest in MREs has been interaction with Morocco and with suprana- selective in another respect. Lately, consider- tional institutions such as the European able efforts have been made to reach and bind Union. In future research, therefore, it would the talented, highly educated, and better-off be interesting to examine other combinations Moroccan-Dutch. This, of course, is not a of citizenship and interacting citizenship group the Netherlands wants to lose. regimes. The problems arising from the flexibility

of sovereignty have not been sufficiently Acknowledgements Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 discussed with respect to the Moroccan- A previous version of this paper was Dutch context. Restricting people to a single presented at the Euro-Arab Encounter: citizenship appears not to be a solution, as is Geographical Linkages and Cross-Cultural shown by the example of women and children Research Agendas Conference, sponsored by abandoned in Morocco. Denizenship status The Arab World Geographer and the Lebanese combined with another nationality than the American University, Beirut, Lebanon, 7–9 country of residence can result in a shift in December 2006. I wish to thank Virginie sovereignty when people cross borders. Mamadouh, the anonymous referees, and the Some trends point in the direction of conference participants for their helpful decreasing conflict. The human-rights situa- comments on an earlier version of the article. tion in Morocco has improved, for example through the reforms in family law and in the Notes Code of Nationality. These developments 1 All Dutch quotations in this article were trans- have decreased scepticism among the lated into English by the author. younger generations of Moroccan-Dutch vis- 2 In Dutch statistics a person is considered a à-vis the Moroccan authorities and the member of the Moroccan ethnic group if he or involvement of these authorities with MREs. she was born in Morocco or if at least one of On the other hand, the Moroccan-Dutch have his or her parents was born in Morocco. If both been confronted, in the Netherlands, with parents were born abroad, the homeland of the exclusionist discourses and with the prob- mother takes precedence. lematization of being Moroccan and Dutch 3 Other interactions, such as those between local (and Muslim) at the same time. The Dutch and national levels or between European and authorities rely very heavily on the attractive- national levels, are interesting and very rele- ness of Dutch citizenship, assuming that vant as well, but they do not fall within the people required to choose between nationali- scope of this article. ties will prefer to be Dutch. A continuation of 4 In Dutch, a difference is made between the current exclusionist discourses, however, allochtonen and autochtonen. Allochtonen might well decrease the attractiveness of means people who were born abroad or who Dutch nationality. have at least one parent who was born abroad; The Moroccan-Dutch situation is not autochtonen is the opposite, referring to the representative of the Moroccan diaspora as a “native” Dutch. whole, given the specific size, composition, 5 From 1884 until 1975, the Western Sahara and perception of this ethno-national group in (then called “Spanish Sahara”) was a colony of the Dutch context. The policy context differs Spain. When in the 1970s Spain wanted to from one state to another, and the interactions withdraw from the Western Sahara, a conflict between citizenship regimes may therefore be arose between Morocco, which claimed the different. Nor are the issues described illus- territory as its southern provinces, and the trative of the way in which the Netherlands Polisario, which strove to create an independ- deals with other dual citizens, because of the ent republic. In November 1975 King Hassan

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of Morocco launched the Green March (green Constitution of Morocco, 1992, http://www.al- representing Islam) to reclaim the Western bab.com/maroc/gov/con92.htm Sahara as part of Morocco. 15 For part of the discussion see Tweede Kamer, 6 Said Bouddouft is a former director of the Vergaderjaar 2004–2005, 29 742, no. 19, Association of Moroccans and Tunisians Interpellatie inzake het achterlaten van (SMT). vrouwen en kinderen in Marokko. 7 Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap [Statute 16 Tweede Kamer, TK 60, 16-03-2005, Inbur Law on Dutch Citizenship], 19 December gering in het buitenland.

1984, c. 5, art. 15(1)(a). 17 Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Neder Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/awg/article-pdf/9/3/168/1449674/arwg_9_3_34p2637481780885.pdf by guest on 27 September 2021 8 For more information on the Dutch debate on landen, 2004, no. 496. dual nationality see, e.g., de Hart (2005). 18 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 28 9 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal [lower 689, nos. 8–9, c. 8, Onderzoek Integratie house of the Dutch parliament], Vergaderjaar beleid, Landen van Herkomst: Turkije en 2005–2006, 30 166, no. 6, per M.C.F. Verdonk, Marokko. Minister for Integration and Immigration, 19 Tweede Kamer, TK 8, 4-10-2006, Beperking Wijziging van de Rijkswet op het Neder- meervoudige nationaliteit. landerschap tot beperking van meervoudige 20 A politician is labelled an “allochtoon” (non- nationaliteit en tot invoering van het verlies native) if he or she was born abroad or has at van het Nederlanderschap wegens het toebren- least one parent born in a non-Western country gen van ernstige schade aan de essentiële (most allochtonen are of Moroccan, Turkish, belangen van het Koninkrijk of van een of Antillean, or Surinamese origin). meer van zijn landen 21 In the last national elections in 2006, a Dutch 10 Ibid. politician of Turkish origin was elected by 11 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006–2007, 30 write-in votes; it was said that a Turkish organ- 584 (R 1811), no. 7, Wijziging van de Rijkswet ization in the Netherlands had e-mailed advice op het Nederlanderschap ter invoering van een on how to vote to about 200 000 members of verklaring van verbondenheid, en tot aanpass- the Turkish community in the Netherlands. ing van de regeling van de verkrijging van het 22 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, 28 Nederlanderschap na erkenning. 689, nos. 8–9, c. 8, Onderzoek Integratiebe- 12 Tweede Kamer, 30 584 (R1811), no. 6, 13-06- leid, Landen van Herkomst: Turkije en 2006, per M.C.F. Verdonk, Minister of Marokko. Immigration and Integration, Wijziging van de 23 For a fuller discussion of the reforms in the Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap ter invoer- Mudawwana, see Buskens (2003); Jallal ing van een verklaring van verbondenheid en (2006). tot aanpassing van de regeling van de verkri- 24 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005–2006, 28 jging van het Nederlanderschap na erkenning. 689 and 29 742, no. 39, Brief van de minister 13 Ibid. voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie, 14 See article 19 of the Moroccan Constitution: Onderzoek Integratiebeleid, Interpellatie (1) The King, Commander of the Faithful, inzake het achterlaten van vrouwen en Supreme Representative of the nation, Symbol kinderen in Marokko. Note that the letter in of its unity and guarantor of the permanence which Minister Verdonk makes this claim and continuity of the State, ensures the obser- refers explicitly to divorce, child abduction, vance of Islam and the Constitution. He is the and child support, which are not European protector of the rights and liberties of the citi- competences. zen, social groups, and collectivities. 25 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999–2000, 17 (2) He guarantees the independence of the 050, no. 210, Misbruik en oneigenlijk gebruik Nation and the territorial integrity of the op het gebied van belastingen, sociale zeker- Kingdom within its authentic borders. heid en subsidies.

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