Notes from a Pilgrimage Ethnography to the Grave of Amran Ben Diwan
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CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Apollo Hespéris-Tamuda LV (3) (2020): 49-64 On Double-Diasporicity: Notes From a Pilgrimage Ethnography to the Grave of Amran Ben Diwan Samuel Sami Everett University of Cambridge Abstract: Each year, towards the end of spring, many Moroccan Jews undertake Hiloulot (festive-pilgrimages similar to ziyārāt) to the tombs of local Sayyid (or Tsadikim, Saints). One such pilgrimage is held near Ouazzane in a douar (village) called Asjen where Amran Ben Diwan’s grave is located. While some claim that Amran Ben Diwan, who is venerated by Muslims and Jews alike, was a Rabbi from the holy land, others report that he was a local healer. Amid the Moroccan protests of 2011 and in spite of the bombing in Marrakesh, the Hiloula of Ouazzane for 2011 was well attended. In the same year, the appointment of a moderate Islamist government indicated a shift towards democratic change for which ongoing protests in Morocco have been appealing. On the basis of an ethnography to the tomb of Ben Diwan (2011), research on the subject over the last decade, and inspiration from interviews with several interlocutors among them the scholar and activist Simon Lévy, this paper takes a look at the tensions between minorities and the changing Moroccan political system. Through the prism of the Hiloula ‒ an important symbolic date for the Moroccan Jewish Diaspora and local Jewish residents alike ‒ this paper discusses the imperatives of Moroccan historiography and Diaspora relation to place, people and culture. Keywords: Belonging, Diversity, Heritage, Pilgrimage, Saints, Tourism. Contemporary Background and Argument of Paper Two nationalisms continue to play a role in global Moroccan Jewish religious community identification. First, Moroccan nationalism, which can be indexed against loyalty to the Makhzan ruling class/system in Morocco1, and second, a form of unfettered patriotism for the modern State of Israel. These national affiliations and their attendant affective implication have created an emotionally elastic double-diasporicity2 among Moroccan Jews residing outside of Morocco3 who are often legal citizens and/or self-ascriptive Moroccans as well, from the perspective of the Moroccan state, part of a broad multi-faith (Muslim-Jewish) diaspora. 1. Makhzan (storehouse) is the vernacular term that refers to all instances of Moroccan monarchical power: judiciary, administrative, military as well as the nub of the crown’s in-group itself. 2. For the purposes of this article and as a literary encapsulation of the theory that this article puts forward, Capital D Diaspora will be used to refer to Moroccan Jews still longer residing in Morocco and small d diaspora will be used to refer to Moroccans (both Jewish and Muslim) residing outside of Morocco. 3. According to the World map of migration (https://www.iom.int, last accessed 22 July 2020) more than 245,000 Moroccans live in Israel making it the fourth site of Moroccans who reside outside of Morocco after France, Spain and Italy. Journal Indexed in Emerging Sources Citation Index (Web of Science) Covered in Clarivate Analytics products and services, ISSN: 0018-1005 50 Samuel Sami Everett In the context of a contemporary North African local and national level renewal of political participation since 2011, this double-diasporicity has become politically complicated as Moroccan Palestinian solidarity has sharpened since the election of the moderate Islamist government4 in 2011, headed by the Justice and Development Parity (PJD)5 leader Abdelilah Benkirane and since 2017 by Saadeddine El Othmani. Nevertheless, Moroccan Jews are not alone in their conceptual identification as diasporic minorities external to a state-endorsed Arab-Islamist frame. Berbers the putative majority,6 living both inside and outside of Morocco, that continue to exist as language groups from the south to the north,7 have gained only limited cultural and political capital notably via the Amazigh (Berber) language movement.8 While the national Moroccan Berber-Arabic hybrid language Darija9 is a marker of the effervescence and expressiveness of Moroccan ethnic diversity,10 the political system has been rather less flexible towards incorporating the multiplicity of minority sentiments present in contemporary Moroccan multi- faith society and diaspora.11 Herein lies a significant challenge at the inception of the Moroccan democratization process for the Makhzan and the PJD: how to maintain the balance between localized and globalized religious, linguistic, social and ethnic identities of Morocco all vying for political influence.12 4. Ashraf Nabih El Sherif, “Institutional and Ideological Re-construction of the Justice and Development Party (PJD): The Question of Democratic Islamism in Morocco,” The Middle East Journal 66, 4 (2012): 660 -82. 5. Parti de la Justice et développement (hizb al adala wal tanmia). For more a more detailed analysis on the rise of the PJD in Morocco and Benkirane as a figurehead in the movement, see Farid Boussaid, “The Rise of the PAM in Morocco: Trampling the Political Scene or Stumbling into it?,” Mediterranean Politics 14, 3 (2009): 413 19; Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner, “The Justice and Development Party in Moroccan Local Politics,” The Middle East Journal 69, 1 (2015): 32-50. 6. Gabriel Camps, Les Berbères: Memoires et identités (Paris: Actes Sud, 2007). 7. Jean Servier, Les Berbères (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011), 11. 8. Moha Ennaji, “Recognizing the Berber Language in Morocco: A Step for Democratization,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 15, 2 (2014): 93-99; Eva Pföstl, “Challenges for Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in Contemporary Maghreb: The Berber/Amazigh Movement in Morocco and Algeria,” European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online 11, 1 (2014): 211-25. 9. Darija or Moroccan /Algerian/Tunisian Arabic is not considered a national language and yet used as a lingua franca across North Africa. 10. Madeleine Dobie, “Francophone Studies and the Linguistic Diversity of the Maghreb,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 23, 1 (2003): 32-30; Az Eddine Jalaly, Initiation à l’ arabe parlé au Maroc, Volume 1 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2012). 11. Youssef Boutahar, “Religious Minorities as “Subalterns” in Post-2011 Morocco: Between Modalities of Co-existence and the Quest for Recognition.” In Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in the MENA Region: Minorities, Subalternity, and Resistance, eds. Hamza Taybi and Jochen Lobah (Rabat: Hans Seidel Foundation, 2019), 111-26. 12. In addition to Jewish Moroccan diasporic communities and the microscale Jewish community of Casablanca, contemporary Moroccan ethno-religious diversity spans multiple groups, some transient others less so, including a significant Christian minority, predominantly settled sub-Saharan African, On Double-Diasporicity: Notes From a Pilgrimage-Ethnography to the Grave of Amran Ben Diwan 51 Al Yahud wal Berber Sakin Almaghrib Qadimoun (Jews and Berbers lived in the ancient Maghreb). During my travels across Morocco and in my interactions with friends and interlocutors since 2010 the famous Moroccan history textbook phrase sukān al-Maghrib al-aqdamūn huma al-barābira abnā’u māzigh (in ancient Morocco/Maghrib lived the sons of Amazigh Berbers) has, on several occasions been relayed to me as al-yahūd wa al-barbar sukān al-maghrib al-aqdamūn (Jews and Berbers lived in ancient Morocco/Maghrib). The insertion of a Jewish genealogy demonstrates perhaps, at least at the level of the imaginary, that Jewish and Berber influence on Moroccan culture is thought to be such that it is inscribed into Moroccan children’s history books.13 It would appear that a significant Jewish Moroccan past though often officially absent in the historical development of Morocco and its national identity maintains an enduring oral presence. Building on the work of Boum regarding generationally differentiated perceptions,14 within Morocco a confusion exists regarding the size of the Moroccan Jewish community dialna (belonging to us), sometimes by opposition and at other times related to ukhrā “other” Jews, often perceived to be solely from the US and Israel. This mystification continues to have an impact, both positive and negative, on non-elite Muslim attitudes towards Jews.15 For the ruling Makhzan16 but also within elite Moroccan circles however there is a pride in the outward ex-patriate (including large numbers of French and Spanish) who are Catholic and Evangelical as well as small autochthonous Christian Berber groups in addition to Shi‘a and Bahā’i Muslim minorities (Hamza Taybi and Jochen Lobah Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in the MENA Region: Minorities, Subalternity, and Resistence (Rabat: Hans Seidel Foundation, 2019). 13. Thanks in particular to the Moutaïb and Charrat families (interviews July and September 2011, 2012, Tangiers, Casblanca) for these insights. In reality this point is extremely tendentious in Morocco given the importance of History to nation-making. There is in fact no mention of Morocco’s most illustrious Jewish history (Emily Gottreich and Daniel Schroeter. Jewish Culture and Society in North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011; Emily Gottreich, Jewish Morocco: A History from Pre-Islamic to Post-colonial Times (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020) in Arabic school textbooks (see on this subject, Abdelelah Hmid, “Ṣawt al-yahūd fi an-nizām al-taʻlīmī al-maghrîbī,”(Thése de Doctorat, Université Mohammed V, Rabat, 2016). 14. Aomar Boum, Memories