INDONESIA Briefing Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 2002 AL-QAEDA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CASE OF THE “NGRUKI NETWORK” IN INDONESIA I. OVERVIEW community or jemaah islamiyah, and shared experiences of political detention in the 1980s. Many are on the executive committee of an One network of militant Muslims has produced all organisation formed in Yogyakarta in 2000 called the Indonesian nationals so far suspected of links to the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Indonesian al-Qaeda. This briefing paper explains how that Mujahidin Council). network emerged, its historical antecedents, and the political dynamics over the last two decades that led The problem is that the Ngruki network is far wider some of its members from Indonesia to Malaysia to than the handful of people who have been accused of Afghanistan. It is part of an occasional series that ties to al-Qaeda and includes individuals with well- ICG intends to issue on the nature of radical Islam established political legitimacy for having defied the 1 in Southeast Asia. Soeharto government and gone to prison as a result. Many Indonesians have expressed concern that The network has as its hub a religious boarding pressure from the U.S. and Southeast Asian school (pesantren or pondok) near Solo, Central governments on Indonesian authorities to carry out Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, after the village preventive arrests of suspects without hard evidence where the school is located. The “Ngruki network” could be seriously counterproductive. It could easily began to coalesce in the late 1970s as Indonesian turn the targets of that pressure into heroes within intelligence operatives embarked on an operation to the Muslim community – as has happened with Abu expose potential political enemies of then President Bakar Ba’asyir – to the point that they become the Soeharto from the Muslim right. It drew in beneficiaries of substantial political and financial additional members in the early 1980s, many of support. And with a combination of a highly whom had served time in prison for anti- politicised national intelligence agency and law government activities. An inner core of the network, enforcement institutions and courts that are both led by the two founders of Pondok Ngruki – weak and corrupt, such pressure could lead to a Abdullah Sungkar (now dead) and Abu Bakar recurrence of the arbitrary arrests and detentions that Ba’asyir – and radicalised by repression at home, characterised the Soeharto years. fled to Malaysia in 1985. Some associated with the Ngruki network returned to Indonesia after Indonesia is not a terrorist hotbed. Proponents of Soeharto’s resignation in 1998; others stayed in radical Islam remain a small minority, and most of Malaysia but continued to be in close contact with those are devout practitioners who would never those who went back. dream of using violence.2 But even a tiny group of people can cause an immense amount of damage. Most members of the network share common The challenge, both for the Indonesian government characteristics: loyalty to Pondok Ngruki or its and the international community, is to be alert to the founders; commitment to carrying on the struggle of possibility of individuals making common cause Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s; desire to create with international criminals, without taking steps an Islamic state by first establishing an Islamic that will undermine Indonesia’s fragile democratic institutions. 1 For the first publication in this occasional series, see ICG Asia Briefing, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, 10 October 2001. 2 See Ibid. Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia ICG Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002 Page 2 II. AL-QAEDA LINKS: THE PUBLIC Ba’asyir, the founder of a religious school in Ngruki, EVIDENCE outside Solo, Central Java, tried unsuccessfully to sue the Singapore government for defamation after similar statements from Minister Lee in February Following the attacks on the World Trade Centre 2002. He is teaching openly at his school and has and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, authorities gained many admirers both for defying attempts to in Singapore, Malaysia, and the United States connect him to al-Qaeda and questioning U.S. became convinced that a terror network linked to al- motives in the war against terrorism. For the last two Qaeda was operating in the region. In December decades, he has been associated with small groups 2001, Singapore authorities arrested fifteen Muslim called jemaah islamiyah whose teachings had both militants suspected of working with al-Qaeda. Later, religious and political content. a videotape found in Afghanistan confirmed the Singapore connection. Thirteen of the Singapore Through a complex network described in this report, detainees were said to be members of a cell of an Ba’asyir also is linked to the small handful of organisation that authorities identified as Jemaah Indonesians who have been accused of having direct Islamiyah. Eight of the thirteen reportedly had or indirect ties to al-Qaeda. Five men in particular training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. They stand out among those arrested or currently being were believed to be planning to bomb a shuttle bus sought: service carrying U.S. military personnel, as well as U.S. naval vessels in Singapore.3 Singapore Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, detained in Manila authorities said at the time that the arrested men since January 2002 on the charges of illegal reported to an Indonesian based in Malaysia known possession of explosives and falsification of as Hambali.4 documents. He reportedly confessed to having taken part in a series of bombings in With the naming of Hambali, and with related Manila in December 2000, and Philippines arrests of alleged Jemaah Islamiyah members in authorities have said he took part in the plans Malaysia, including several Indonesian nationals, to attack American assets in Singapore. Al- attention shifted to an Indonesian preacher named Gozi, 30, is from Madiun, East Java, and is a Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. In a speech in Singapore in former Ngruki student. May 2002, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated: Hambali, alias Riduan Isamuddin, alias Interrogation [of the suspects detained in Nurjaman, who is thought to be al-Qaeda’s Singapore] disclosed that Abu Bakar Baasyir, main Indonesian contact. From Cianjur, West the leader of the Indonesian Mujahideen Java, he remains at large but may be in Council in Indonesia, was the overall leader Indonesia. He has been linked by Southeast of the JI organisation, which covered both Asian intelligence sources and the Indonesian Malaysia and Singapore. He was a member of police to a wave of bombings in Indonesia in Darul Islam, which aimed at the violent December 2000; the Manila bombings in establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia which al-Gozi reportedly participated; and since the late 1940s. He was in Malaysia for plans to attack American navy personnel at a 14 years to avoid detention by the Soeharto Singapore train station.6 Minister Lee referred government and returned in 1999 after to Hambali as “Ba’asyir’s right-hand man.” 5 Soeharto fell from power. Abu Jibril, alias Fikiruddin (Fihiruddin) Muqti, alias Mohamed Iqbal bin Abdurrahman, in detention in Malaysia under the Internal Security Act since January 2002. Jibril appears on a videotape recruiting fighters for 3 Singapore Government Press Release, “Address by Senior the Moluccan conflict, but Southeast Asian st Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the 1 International Institute for intelligence sources also claim he was a Strategic Studies Asia Security Conference on Friday, 31 May 2002 at Shangrila Hotel”, p. 3. 4 Jeremy Zakis and Steve Macko, “Major Terrorist Plot in Singapore Discovered; al-Qaeda Believed Well Established in the Asian Region”, www.emergency.com/2002Singapore_terror02.com. 6 Dan Murphy, “Man ‘most wanted’ in Indonesia”, Christian 5 Singapore Government Press Release, op. cit. Science Monitor, 30 April 2002. Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia ICG Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002 Page 3 financial conduit for al-Qaeda in the region.7 III. THE ORIGINS: DARUL ISLAM He is from Lombok, east of Bali. Agus Dwikarna, detained in Manila since The Ngruki network’s interest in establishing an March 2002 on charges of illegal possession Islamic state draws heavily on the experience of the of explosives. The evidence appears to have Darul Islam rebellions. These rebellions, in Aceh, been planted in Dwikarna’s suitcase. South Sulawesi, and West Java, were only three of Philippine authorities have said that based on numerous regional political movements that broke information from al-Gozi and some of the out in the aftermath of Indonesia’s successful men detained as terrorist suspects in guerrilla war against the Dutch. In each case, they Singapore, Dwikarna is thought to have been were led by charismatic militia commanders from involved in bombings in Manila and Jakarta “modernist”10 Muslim backgrounds who controlled and to have had communication with Fathur significant territory during the revolution and were Rohman al-Gozi.8 The precise nature of any reluctant to surrender their authority to the new suspected links to al-Qaeda have never been central government. In each case, whatever the made public. original cause of the rebellion, they ended up demanding an Islamic state. It is important to underscore that with the exception of Fathur Rahman al-Gozi, who has been The leader in West Java, Sekarmadji Maridjan sentenced by a Philippines court to two terms of Kartosuwirjo, remains the primary political twelve and six years respectively, and Hambali, inspiration for Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, his associates, who has not been apprehended, no convincing and the thousands of others – but still a minority – in evidence of involvement in terrorist activities has Indonesia who desire implementation of Islamic law.