Hungary by Balázs Áron Kovács and Flóra Hevesi
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Hungary by Balázs Áron Kovács and Flóra Hevesi Capital: Budapest Population: 10.0 million GNI/capita, PPP: US$19,090 Source: The data above was provided by The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Electoral Process 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 Civil Society 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.75 2.00 Independent Media 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 3.25 Governance* 3.00 2.50 2.50 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a National Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 3.00 Local Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.50 2.50 2.50 Judicial Framework and Independence 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.00 2.25 Corruption 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.50 3.50 Democracy Score 2.13 1.96 1.96 1.96 2.00 2.14 2.14 2.29 2.39 2.61 * Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects. NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. 236 Nations in Transit 2011 Executive Summary arliamentary elections were held in Hungary in April 2010. As expected, the opposition Young Democrats’ Alliance–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) Pand its junior partner, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), dealt a crushing defeat to the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which had been in power since 2002 and was deeply discredited due to several factors, including the September 2006 revelation (via leaked tapes) that Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány had deliberately lied to win elections, and the government’s gross mishandling of the ensuing protests. Failed fiscal policies predating the onset of the global economic crisis cemented MSZP’s deep unpopularity. With the 2010 elections, Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán became prime minister of a new government that controlled more than two-thirds of the seats in the parliament. The resulting opposition consisted of the MSZP and the Politics Can Be Different (LMP) party on the left, and the radical nationalist Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)1 on the extreme right. The new government’s supermajority gave it the authority to amend or replace the constitution, and it planned to adopt a new charter in early 2011. Such a concentration of power in the hands of a single political bloc was practically unprecedented in Hungary’s postcommunist history. In 1994–98, the MSZP and its junior partner, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), also had a two-thirds majority, but they were often at odds and practiced self-restraint in amending the constitution, pegging such legislation to a four-fifths vote for the duration of their term. In the conservative coalition elected in 2010, the junior partner is independent in name only, as the small KDNP is effectively under Orbán’s control. Between its inauguration in May and the end of the year, the Orbán government appointed loyal party cadres to head key institutions; adopted a retrospective tax law and reduced the powers of the Constitutional Court after it attempted to strike down the legislation; drastically weakened labor protections for civil servants; summarily eliminated the Budgetary Council, tasked with the independent evaluation of the national budget; used individual members of the parliament to propose important laws, including constitutional amendments, to circumvent the stakeholder negotiations required for government-proposed measures; curtailed freedom of speech through the adoption of new media legislation; intimidated the judiciary by summoning judges to parliamentary hearings on cases related to the riots of 2006; changed election procedures to give the ruling parties an edge in the October municipal elections; and nationalized the savings in a system of compulsory private pension funds. In addition to these concrete steps, the government used problematic rhetoric and political symbolism during the year. The prime minister and other members of Hungary 237 the governing parties declared the April elections to be a “revolution at the ballot box” and the “closure of regime change,” comparing the ouster of the MSZP to the end of communist rule. The Proclamation of National Unity—adopted with votes of FIDESZ-KDNP alone—enshrined this version of Hungary’s recent history in an official document, which a subsequent presidential decree obliged all offices of public administration, services, schools, hospitals, etc. to display in a glass frame. The decree requested, but did not require, that the judiciary and municipal offices do the same. The conservative government also apparently aimed to neutralize the right-wing appeal of Jobbik by appropriating some of that party’s ideological fodder, such as ethnic Hungarian issues in neighboring countries; the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which truncated Hungary’s territory at the end of World War I and continues to be regarded as an injustice by many Hungarians; and even more symbolic concerns like the restoration of the “Sacred Crown” concept, which had formed the basis of the country’s premodern constitutional framework. The government’s actions and rhetoric to date suggest that it intends to undermine liberal democracy in Hungary. While this effort should not be equated with an attempt to establish an outright dictatorship, it does appear to be aimed at reshaping the political, institutional, and constitutional framework to keep the Fidesz-KDNP bloc in power for the foreseeable future, and ultimately to move Hungarian society in a more conservative, corporativist-authoritarian direction. National Democratic Governance. Following the April parliamentary elections, the opposition Fidesz-KDNP coalition formed a new government that controlled 68 percent of the seats in the unicameral National Assembly. It went on to take a series of steps that seriously undermined the independence of key institutions and weakened the rule of law, resulting in the most significant backslide in Hungary’s democratic development since 1989. Hungary’s national democratic governance rating declines from 2.50 to 3.00. Electoral Process. The national elections in April and municipal elections in October were both deemed free and fair. Although new electoral rules adopted ahead of the municipal voting favored incumbents and major parties in general, the effects may balance out in the long run and will not necessarily lead to a decline in the quality of the electoral process itself. Accordingly, Hungary’s electoral process rating remains unchanged at 1.75. Civil Society. With a relatively large number of organizations and a generally hospitable legal framework, Hungary’s civil society is well developed and vibrant. However, the absence of substantial private funding leaves the sector disproportionately reliant on state and European Union resources and exposed to political changes. In 2010, the new government froze the funds of the National Cultural Fund and a variety of other cultural and research entities. New applications for funding were delayed, and payments of assigned grants were withheld. Accordingly, Hungary’s civil society rating declines from 1.75 to 2.00. 238 Nations in Transit 2011 Independent Media. Although Hungarian media can still be considered generally free and diverse, with commercial outlets dominating the broadcast and print sectors, new media legislation that introduced fundamental reforms raised serious concerns in 2010. It drastically curtailed the independence of public-service television and radio broadcasters, and established a new regulatory body with sweeping authority over broadcast media, print publications, and the internet. Due to this alarming concentration of political power over the media, Hungary’s rating for independent media declines from 2.75 to 3.25. Local Democratic Governance. The political independence of each of Hungary’s 3,200 towns and villages is viewed as a key virtue of democracy, but the system often proves to be excessively fragmented and inefficient in practice. A lack of economic and fiscal viability may undermine the municipalities’ capacity to carry out their functions. In order to overcome financial difficulties, numerous cities and villages have issued bonds in recent years, setting the stage for an expected debt crisis in 2011. Meanwhile, overwhelming Fidesz victories in the October 2010 municipal elections added to the party’s national dominance. Hungary’s rating for local democratic governance remains unchanged at 2.50. Judicial Framework and Independence. The judiciary’s perennial problems of transparency and accountability were not resolved in 2010, and the new government took a number of steps during the year to politicize, intimidate, and weaken the courts. The Fidesz leadership changed the regulations governing the chief prosecutor’s office and appointed a former party cadre to the post. In September, a parliamentary subcommittee summoned leaders of the judiciary to question them on decisions following the 2006 antigovernment riots. Finally, the parliamentary majority overruled a judgement by the Constitutional Court and curtailed the court’s jurisdiction over budgetary legislation.