From the Editor This issue of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) focuses on the intelligence analyst, the individual soldier who works tirelessly to make overwhelming amounts of often-conflicting data clear and concise and later provides predictable intelligence for commanders and soldiers throughout the Army. Through the expe- riences of several of these soldier-analysts serving in a wide variety of assignments throughout the world, we will examine the role of the intelligence analyst within the context of Military Intelligence doctrine and related tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Today’s intelligence analyst, whether a newly assigned Private or a veteran Colonel, must be prepared to support his commander and fellow soldiers by conducting analysis on a multitude of threats in a variety of environments and circumstances. The analyst must integrate significant facts while constantly searching for subtle and fre- quently contradictory details within ever-increasing amounts of information. Through the use of multiple collection and analysis resources, the intelligence analyst searches for these crucial “nuggets” of information, the proverbial “needle in a haystack,” to produce the coherent intelligence product that enables the commanders and fellow soldiers not only to see but also to understand the environment, threat, and situation within their area of operation. The intelligence analyst does not have an easy job. He or she must be a jack of all trades. Not only knowledgeable in the processes of analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the analyst should also exhibit an understanding of the environment, weather, military policy, governmental and threat infrastructures, and numerous cultural and religious aspects of the host nation and locale. Furthermore, the analyst must not only understand these subjects within the context of ground operations but also as they relate to air and amphibious operations. Today’s intelligence analysts increasingly find themselves challenged by situations for which there is little legacy experience, procedures, or doctrine. They often find themselves in positions where, given a lack of lessons learned or doctrine, they must rely on their own experiences while at the same time learn how best to employ the latest in highly technical battlefield processing systems. However, if the analysts have not received sufficient training, or lack experience, they may find themselves struggling to provide the required support their commanders need. Most should have received the requisite training and gained experience through exercises and in garrison training. Those few who fail, however, may do so with devastating results. Therefore, the intent of this issue is to help “share the wealth,” so to speak, and to allow others to share their experiences and learn from them. With our insights and knowledge, we must ensure that we, the intelligence analysts, continue to provide the Army and our fellow soldiers with the best possible intelligence support.* Included in this issue are a number of articles that address problems faced by today’s intelligence analysts. ! Dr. Thomas Kane offers a frank discussion of the challenges facing today’s strategic analysts. ! MAJ Chris Tatarka looks at common errors in analysis and decision-making. ! MAJ David Shin discusses development of the criteria necessary to commit U.S. military forces. ! CW3 Del Stewart focuses on the need to develop new methodologies or adapt existing ones and tactics, techniques, and procedures when analyzing the terrorist threat. ! MAJ Paul Shelton shares lessons learned from U.S. Marine Corps operations in Monrovia, Liberia. ! CW4 Thomas Quedensley focuses on the impact of the proliferation of space-based, commercial, multispec- tral imaging systems, their use by nations and organizations that previously lacked such access, and the increased imagery intelligence threat we face. ! CPT Fred Hoffman focuses on the intelligence implications of President Carter’s decision to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. ! CPT John Bento provides a discussion on maximizing the effectiveness of National Guard units through their incorporation with Active Component units during exercises. ! Mr. Michael Varhola addresses intelligence oversight and AR 381-10. Taken together, these articles provide a rich overview of various aspects of the problems facing the U.S. Army’s Intelligence analysts and their potential solutions.

*Additional information about the roles, TTP, and other aspects of the work of intelligence analysts is available through contact with the Doctrine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), through its website at http:// usaic.hua.army.mil/DOCTRINE/dlbs.htm.

Michael P. Ley ILITARY NTELLIGENCE M Professional I Bulletin PB 34-02-1 Volume 28 Number 1 January-March 2002 FEATURES STAFF: 4 Strategic Analysis: To Hear the Thunder Commanding General by Dr. Thomas M. Kane, Ph.D. Brigadier General James A. Marks 8 Overcoming Biases in Military Problem Requirements, Develop- Analysis and Decision-Making ment, Determination, and by Major Christopher J. Tatarka Integration Director Colonel Charles Atkins Supervising Editor 11 Use of Standing Criteria for Deciding to Commit U.S. Michael P. Ley Forces in Conflict Resolution Editor by Major David Shin Elizabeth A. McGovern Associate Editor 15 Conventional Approaches to Unconventional Problems: JoNell M. Elkins Analyzing Terrorism Operations Supervisor by Chief Warrant Officer Three Del Erin Stewart Captain Brett W. VanHoose Design Director 21 Cities in Chaos: An Intelligence Challenge Specialist Ernesto A. Bolaños by Major Paul A. Shelton, USMC Associate Design Director Staff Sergeant Sharon K. Nieto 24 The Commercial Satellite Multispectral Imagery (MSI) Threat Contributing Designer by Chief Warrant Officer Four Thomas J. Quedensley, NE ARNG Sharon A. Upchurch Administration 28 The Role of Intelligence in President Jimmy Carter’s Specialist Maurice N. Hartley Private Misty L. Simpkin Troop Withdrawal Decisions Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelli- by Captain Fred Hoffman, USAR gence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the Mili- 31 Incorporating National Guard Divisions into Exercises tary Intelligence Professional Have We Established an ARNG Trend? Bulletin quarterly under provi- sions of AR 25-30. MIPB dis- by Captain John C. Bento, CA ARNG AGR seminates material designed to enhance individuals’ knowledge of past, current, and emerging DEPARTMENTS concepts, doctrine, material, training, and professional devel- 2 Always Out Front 51 TSM Notes opments in the MI Corps. 3 CSM Forum 54 Distance Learning Disclaimer: This publication pre- 33 Enduring Freedom 55 Professional Reader sents professional information, but the views expressed herein 45 AIMP 56 From Out Front are those of the authors, not the 47 Doctrine Corner 57 Unit Profile Department of Defense or its el- ements. The content does not By order of the Secretary of the Army: necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not Official: change or supersede any infor- mation in other U.S. Army publi- cations. We reserve the right to edit any submitted material. JOEL B. HUDSON ERIC K. SHINSEKI Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0129209 Always Out Front By Brigadier General James A. Marks Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

Let me continue the dialogue Good analysis results from ag- from the previous MIPB with gressive integration of the total all of you in the field. In the ISR effort and directed, precise last edition I mentioned that collection throughout all ech- intelligence professionals elons of command and across “must stand ready to inte- all battlefield functional areas grate intelligence within full- (BFAs). You must then present spectrum operations….” the results to include our coun- Now more than ever our war terintelligence efforts which help against terrorism makes this protect the force. Your analysis requirement a little more per- should “scratch your bosses sonal for all of us. Make no itch…not scratch yours.” Re- mistake, this war will be a member, know your boss; an- long and complex campaign swer his/her priority intelligence not simply in Afghanistan but requirements (PIR). This is his/ across the globe and, most her read of the enemy, not yours. importantly, leveraging all of Intelligence is for the Com- us in our Intelligence Corps. mander! This is your fight; you will, if Good analysis results from not already, be involved. Step hard work. (I don’t think I’ve ever up, raise your hand. Echo the experienced truly great analysis. words of those professionals Good analysis is 1-½ hours of a before us, “Send Me.” 2-hour JRTC post mission AAR on how screwed up We all are analysts. It is core to what we are. In fact, the S2 is; great analysis is a 1-hour critique of a 2 hour all of our skill sets directly contribute to some form of JRTC post mission AAR on how screwed up the S2 is. analysis. I like to describe “analysis” akin to painting a I never experienced such largess!) You must apply and picture. Depending on the subject (weather, enemy, modify doctrine and your tactics, techniques, and pro- terrain) and the audience (the warfighting cedures (TTP). You must know how to collect…what commander…battalion, brigade, etc), the picture is ei- is available to you in your formation and what is avail- ther complex with many colors, hues, and shadows, or able from higher and adjacent units. You must know it is rather simple using black and white stick figures. how “to reach” to other knowledge centers to flush out You, the analyst, must know both the subject and the your analysis with theirs. You must know how to rec- audience…know the enemy; know your boss. ognize and assess seams and gaps in your collection Now, with that as a foundation, what are our (Military so you can cover down. You must train those around Intelligence) core competencies? Well, the answer is you; educate your battle staff on your core competen- simple. Our core competencies must support our fun- cies and how to apply them. Be the acknowledged damental requirement to analyze. We have five core expert. Be the “go to” soldier. Step up; raise your hand. competencies: Tell all around you “Send me.” ISR Integration In later issues I will get into the details of all of our Collection core competencies, but I need your thoughts. Tell me what you think about what is “core to your corps.” We nalysis A have never been more relevant. We need to share your Presentation thoughts to ensure continued relevance. Our nation, Protection our leaders, our soldiers need you. This is what I call ICAP2, the acronym for our core competencies. Step up; Send me!

2 Military Intelligence CSM Forum By Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps

With the attacks on our home- serve Corps Support Battalion-war land on 11 September 2001 traced to the 525th MI Brigade at and the war on terrorism, these Fort Bragg, North Carolina, into are busy times for our great the Active Army shows the world nation. More than anything, how strong our “Army of One” truly communications with each is. It also reinforces our determi- other and our families are so nation to win this war against ter- important. Noncommissioned rorism. Officers (NCOs) are the key to We must remember this is a war getting on with life and keep- against terrorism, not a religion or ing the soldiers informed. We an ethic group. Many U.S. citi- make it happen! zens are understandably angry Our soldiers must know what with the terrorist attacks on our they will be doing to support nation, but we must not give in to this on-going war against ter- hatred and stereotyping. I ask that rorism and our soldiers’ fami- you all remember our Pledge of lies and loved ones need to Allegiance to our flag and to the know as well. We must ensure United States of America. that our leaders are involved and have their fingers We are one nation, a great nation where no attack on on not only the “pulse” of the soldiers but also the our homeland will create divisiveness among us, for we command information program, family resource are “indivisible.” I ask you all to stay focused and keep groups, and quality of life for our Army and soldiers. the faith. The road ahead will be long. We must ensure The mobilization of the 5th of the 104th Reserve MI we take care of each other and our families. Our nation Battalion at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; the 321st Re- depends on us for we are her defenders. As always, you serve Corps Support Battalion-war traced to the 504th train hard, you die hard, you train easy, you die easy. MI Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas; and the 325th Re- Peace needs protection.

“I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indi- visible, with liberty and justice for all.”

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

January-March 2002 3 of warfare had to begin . . . long before the specific purposes for which the tools were to be used could be known.2

This observation applies as well to long-term state policy as it does to individual campaigns, and it is as valid in peace as it is in war. Countries that wish to develop modern armed forces in this century may require decades to acquire the necessary equipment by Dr. Thomas M. Kane, Ph.D. widen. In military journals, theoreti- and learn how to use it. States that cal writings have become increas- hose who study history know wish to enjoy military power in the fu- ingly futuristic and increasingly ture will have to prepare now, whether Tthe importance of thorough mili- devoid of political context. Even more tary preparation and clear-sighted their leaders have clear ideas about practical studies such as the recent how to use that military power or not. national policy. Nevertheless, even British and U.S. defense reviews The principle that lead-time exceeds the most prudent observers of world offer frustrating generalities on the planning time is as useful for analyz- politics often have trouble knowing issues where strategists need spe- ing other people’s actions as it is for how to prepare for what we may face. cifics. Both military technology and politi- carrying out one’s own. Just as one cal alignments are changing rapidly, How can strategic analysts regain must fashion military tools in advance, and it has become difficult to distin- their focus? There is no certain for- future allies and opponents must do guish between truly significant de- mula for success. Ultimately, all as- the same. If one can acquire informa- velopments in strategic affairs and sessments of future military tion about the types of political and momentary crises that merely hap- challenges depend on informed judg- military “tools” which other countries pen to dominate the headlines. ment, and this means that even the are developing, mobilizing, and distrib- most highly skilled analysts will The distinction is critical. Those who uting, one can gain insight into both occasionally be wrong. There are, their current intentions and their prob- formulate defense policy and military however, things which discerning ob- strategy must learn to see beyond able courses of action in unforeseen servers might seek. Some of the crises. the immediate and the obvious. If we same principles that govern opera- Taken singly, such insights are gen- base future plans on recent events, tional planning apply at the level of erally rather straightforward. The fact or even ongoing trends, we risk find- grand strategy as well, and one can that the People’s Republic of China ing out that we have prepared for the use them to gain insight into the stra- (PRC) discusses the purchase or proverbial “last war.” Furthermore, we tegic significance of various trends construction of aircraft carriers, for in- must keep in mind that our most and developments around the world. dangerous opponents may not be the stance, provides one with some indi- most belligerent ones. Indeed, our The U.S. Army’s official history of cation of the types of operations the most dangerous foes may not even World War II notes that if the Allied Chinese Navy will be able to under- appear particularly successful. If we High Command had been compelled take in the future. One can proceed are to identify our most significant to approach its campaigns without from that point to ask why Chinese potential opponents in this century, prior material preparation, the inva- leaders might be interested in devel- we must learn to see not only what sion of North Africa in November 1942 oping force projection and other re- other countries or groups are doing could not have taken place until lated capabilities, and how other 1 but also what they are putting them- 1944. Although the Allied command- countries might respond. Further- selves in a position to do. ers were able to develop a strategy more, as one collects numerous in- for this campaign in a matter of sights of this nature, one can The Crisis of Strategic months, their logistical preparations assemble these findings into a pat- Analysis consumed almost two years. tern, which reveals more in its totality ven as the importance of The Army historians went on to note than any number of discoveries might Esound analysis and prepara- an important fact: reveal in isolation. The rest of this ar- tion increases, the gap between stra- ticle consists of tips on how strate- tegic thought and the daily realities The process of fashioning, mo- gists can use these principles to of international affairs has begun to bilizing and distributing the tools extract the maximum amount of use-

4 Military Intelligence ful knowledge from the information Although one should never assume States expanded its tiny peacetime available to them. that a nation’s current political align- forces of the 1930s into a military ment will last forever, one should not organization that was able to play a Purpose and Potential ignore politics either. Therefore, when decisive role in World War II. he fact that states must de- analysts assess another country’s Whereas it would be unwise for us Tvelop the tools of national intentions, they must try to distin- to assume that we will always be power before they have decided how guish its momentary political and able to recover from military to use them means that one must diplomatic posture from the endur- unreadiness so handily, it would be interpret the actions of other coun- ing principles that will guide it through equally unwise for anyone to assume tries not only in terms of their pur- decades. This requires extensive that other nations are incapable of pose but also in terms of their knowledge of that country’s history, turning their industrial capacity to potential. In the last decade, for in- geography, economy, and govern- military purposes on similarly short stance, the PRC was building up its ment. Material factors such as ge- notice. Thus, developments that ap- armed forces. Some fear that the ography can shape a country’s pear purely domestic and civilian can Chinese Government hopes to intimi- long-term interests; traditions and have profound effects on international date its neighbors, whereas others deeply held philosophical beliefs can relations and military affairs. believe that leaders of China merely do the same. The tangible fact that Those who wish to understand the wish to protect their country and Britain is an island shapes both its strategic significance of economic achieve recognition within the inter- past and future in undeniable ways, developments must pay attention to national community. For purposes of but intangibles such as the Serbian subtleties. Not only is it hard to tell long-term planning, it may not mat- people’s undying resentment of their how readily a country will be able to ter which set of analysts is right. defeat on the “Field of Blackbirds” in use its resources to build capable By expanding their forces now, the 1389 have equally profound effects. military forces it also can be hard to Chinese leaders of the present are Even when analysts have identified ascertain what resources a govern- giving the Chinese leaders of the fu- a nation as both a rising power and ment actually has at its disposal. ture new options and a collection of a potential threat, they must pay at- States can use the complexities of tools that they will be able to use in tention to the specific ways in which finance and corporate ownership to any way they desire. Other countries its military power is developing. The acquire commodities they need, will have to consider the possibility fact that China is expanding its fleet, deny such commodities to others, that China might exercise these op- for instance, raises different concerns avoid treaty restrictions on their ac- tions and shape the course of world than those that would arise if the tivities, and conceal their activities politics. The Chinese regime will have Chinese regime was assembling from potential rivals. reaped the rewards of an aggressive land armies in Central Asia. By look- Germany used such tactics policy even if its current regime is ing at the types of forces a particu- adeptly following the First World completely Pacific based. lar country is developing, one can War. In December 1917, even before determine the opponents that coun- One cannot, however, view all ris- the war had ended, Krupp began to try will best be suited to challenge. ing powers as identical. The possi- open branch factories in Switzerland. One can gain a sense of how long it bility that North Korea may have These preparations later helped Ger- will take that country to complete deployed a few nuclear weapons dis- many avoid restrictions on German whatever programs it has underway, turbs U.S. policy-makers more than arms production. The Zeiss corpo- and thus an idea of how quickly its the certainty that Britain has de- ration used similar techniques of leaders hope to realize the benefits ployed more powerful weapons in far international diversification to of their preparations. greater numbers. They assume that produce regulated optical devices in North Korea is more of a threat to Beyond Jane’s the Netherlands, and the putatively our interests than is the United King- he acquisition and demobiliza- Danish firm Daugs and Company dom; not only are such assumptions Ttion of military assets are only also served as a front for German re- 3 normally valid they also are always the most obvious signs of change in armament. necessary. Policy-makers must dis- a nation’s strength. The economic Not only do economic resources tinguish between relatively hostile resources of a country or group can and national infrastructure affect the states and comparatively friendly play as large a role in determining quality and quantity of forces a na- ones, if only because no nation could its capabilities as does the forces it tion can field, they also shape the afford to prepare for simultaneous deploys. For a classic example of ways in which they can use them. wars against all the countries that this principle in action, one might The leaders of 19th century Prussia have the physical ability to harm it. recall the way in which the United demonstrated an awareness of this

January-March 2002 5 fact when they designed their that China is helping Burma to im- strong enough, they can force civil- country’s railway system to support prove its roads and harbors is sig- ians to fund and equip them, thus their military preparations against nificant even if both sides hope only turning part of the region’s economy France and Russia. Roads, airfields, to trade and grow rich.5 Again, one to their own purposes. If computer harbors, and rail networks are among discovers the possible meanings of networks are to play as large a role the things that determine a nation’s such developments only when con- in future warfare as some have sug- military possibilities, and analysts sidering them in their full political and gested, hackers might accomplish should consider them in those terms. geographical context. Building a an electronic version of the same Transportation and communication road is not an inherently aggressive gambit. are as integral to commerce as to act, but when one combines the fact Just as forage continues to play warfare, and the patterns of one can that Burma is between China and a role in warfare, conquest contin- become the patterns of the other. India with the fact that there have ues to play a role in international been considerable tensions between Even the most lavishly equipped relations. The fact that the Russian the Chinese and Indian Govern- and technologically oriented armed Navy still operates from port facili- ments, one may decide that road- forces still incorporate civilian re- ties which the U.S. armed forces building in this particular location is sources into their logistical systems. built at Cam Ranh Bay during the a cause for concern. In 1978, the International Institute for Vietnam War serves as a reminder Strategic Studies observed that There are similarities between high- that countries can still win and lose North Atlantic Treaty Organization technology resources and more fa- strategically valuable territory in (NATO) forces would have to rely on miliar types of infrastructure. Just as battle. Thus, when one analyzes civilian facilities for 82 of the 100 nations may press commercial ship- the significance of economic de- airbases they would have at their dis- ping into military service, they may velopment in a particular region, posal in the event of a major land press commercial satellites into mili- one must consider not only the war with the Soviet Union.4 In Op- tary service as well. To stretch the ways in which its initial owners erations DESERT SHIELD and analogy further, one might compare might use it but also the ways in DESERT STORM, the U.S. military information technology to roads and which it might be vulnerable. railways. One can redirect elec- used both the Civilian Reserve Air The Logistics of Ideas Fleet (CRAF) and Ready Reserve tronic data flow far more easily any of the principles that ap- Fleet of civilian cargo vessels to de- than one can lay tracks along new ply to material preparations for ploy forces into the war zone. One routes. However, a nation’s access M war, apply to political positioning as may assume that other countries will to space-based assets and tele- well. Indeed, for those who accept draw even more heavily upon sup- communications networks may Clausewitz’s statement that war is posed civilian assets for their mili- dramatically affect its military op- merely “the continuation of political tary efforts. Commercial ships and tions. In the Gulf War, for instance, intercourse, carried on with other aircraft can carry troops and heavy one of the major reasons the Coa- means,” it is impossible to draw a equipment, while fishing boats can lition armies were able to carry out clear line between the two.6 Just as serve as auxiliary patrol vessels. their war-winning flanking maneu- one cannot carry out military opera- Therefore, one must consider such ver was that the satellite-based tions without building up stockpiles resources when analyzing their mili- Global Positioning System (GPS) of materiel, one cannot put political tary potential. allowed them to operate in parts of the desert where Iraqi forces programs into effect without secur- The principle that the long-term could not. ing support from potential allies and potential of a national asset is more undermining the arguments of poten- important than its initial purpose is Forage and Conquest tial opponents. These requirements doubly true when one analyzes the nalysts must also remember are most obvious in the domestic development of a country’s transpor- A that economic resources may politics of democracies, where poli- tation infrastructure. Few would not remain with their original owners. ticians must win the consent of the claim that U.S. industrialists were When Warsaw Pact commanders people in order to keep their jobs, thinking in military terms when they planned for hypothetical invasions of but they exist even in the most dic- built this country’s railway system, Western Europe, for example, they tatorial regimes. Leaders of despo- but their work still affected the course took it for granted that they would tism may have to work with members of the Civil War. Just as China’s na- be able to seize food and fuel along of a select elite rather than the pub- val buildup is significant even if the the way. Irregular forces can rely even lic, but they must still go through the Chinese Government has only the more heavily upon captured sup- same steps of building coalitions and most peaceful intentions, the fact plies. When guerrilla forces grow preempting their opposition.

6 Military Intelligence This form of “politicking” operates language undoubtedly sounded of grand strategy. Those who apply across national borders and shapes rather benign. Those who were fa- this principle thoughtlessly can eas- strategic affairs in much the same miliar with the writings of Lenin and ily lapse into paranoia. The fact that way that it shapes other public policy the speeches of Khrushchev, how- something happens does not mean debates. During the Vietnam War, ever, would have known that the con- that anyone planned it, and the fact for instance, the North Vietnamese cept of peaceful coexistence went that a country is capable of aggres- regime carried out an open campaign hand in hand with the concept of sion does not necessarily mean that to “[win] the war on the streets of “peaceful competition,” in which the it will commit it. In order to use the New York and the campuses of New socialist countries would supposedly ideas in this article successfully, one England.” 7 Lobbying firms in Wash- crush their rivals through superior must be careful not to take them too ington, D.C., routinely represent for- industrial production and superior far. eign governments to the U.S. political appeal. Thus, the spokes- Congress. In an age when Western person could send different mes- countries typically attempt to justify sages to different audiences. To Endnotes their use of armed force by seeking some, their words were a reassur- 1. Leighton, Richard M., and Coakley, approval from international organiza- ing promise; to others, their words Robert W., Global Logistics and tions and going to war as part of large were a call to action; and to others, Strategy 1940-1943 (Washington, D.C.: coalitions, transnational public opin- perhaps, their words were a blatant U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), page 711. ion will play a crucial role in deter- threat. 2. Ibid. mining when and how these nations When applying these principles, fight. 3. Rood, Harold W., Kingdoms of the never forget that politics is a slippery Blind: How the Great Democracies Just as countries can gain a wider business. Not only will nations, par- Have Resumed the Follies That So range of military options by develop- ties, leaders, and pressure groups Nearly Cost Them Their Life (Durham, ing their armed forces, countries can attempt to affect the way people per- North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), pages 22 and 31. gain a wider range of political options ceive issues, they will try to keep people from realizing how they are 4. International Institute for Strategic by advancing useful ideas. Political Studies, IISS Strategic Survey 1978 persuasion takes place largely in the going about it. They may advance (London: IISS, 1979), page 32. controversial ideas bit by bit, in or- realms of words and images. These 5. Malik, Mohan, “Burma Slides Under are often ambiguous and difficult to der to avoid alerting their audience China’s Shadow,” Jane’s International interpret. Nevertheless, one can gain to their full intentions. Alternatively, Defence Review, Volume 9, Number 7, 1 insight into a country’s political in- they may demand far more than they July 1997, page 319. tentions in the same way as one can actually want, so they appear to 6. Von Clausewitz, Carl, translated by gain insight into its military inten- “compromise.” In all cases, they will Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War cover the more significant state- (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, tions, by looking at the actions it 1976), page 87. takes or advocates and asking what ments with a glaze of platitudes and rhetoric. One takes these things for 7. Le Lanning, Michael, and Cragg, Dan, those actions could allow it to do. Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real granted in domestic politics, and one Not only must one look at the types Story of North Vietnam’s Armed must remember them in the analy- Forces (NY, New York: Ivy Books, 1992), of issues other political actors raise, sis of international affairs as well. page 201. one must look at the way in which they portray those issues. The words Conclusion: On Getting people use often reveal a great deal It Right Thomas Kane, Ph.D., is a lecturer at the about the political effect they hope his method of analyzing inter- University of Hull, United Kingdom, spe- to achieve. Not only can one use Tnational relations is based on cializing in strategic studies. His pub- emotionally charged language to the idea that, although foreign lead- lished research includes studies of the arouse people’s feelings (or emotion- overarching strategic assumptions in the ers may not always plan their future United States Quadrennial Defense Re- ally neutral language to achieve the policies in much detail, they do at- view of May 1997, a historical study of opposite effect), one can use care- tempt to put themselves in a posi- Napoleon’s overall strategy, reports on fully chosen expressions to convey tion to secure various political and mergers in the U.S. defense industry, and special messages to a select audi- more general articles on the economics of material objectives. They also at- national defense. His book with Frank ence. tempt to take advantage of whatever Cass, Military Logistics and Strategic Soviet spokespersons, for in- opportunities they manage to create Performance, is in print, and his book stance, occasionally proclaimed for themselves. In other words, this Maritime Power and the Grand Strat- egy of China, will appear early in 2002. their desire for “peaceful coexist- article assumes that foreign leaders Readers may contact the author at ence” with the West. To many, this practice at least a rudimentary level [email protected].

January-March 2002 7 Overcoming Biases in Military Problem Analysis and Decision-Making by Major Christopher J. Tatarka Heuristics are not inherently bad making, these biases can be ex- as they often prove helpful in tremely problematic since they I don’t care what that report says, the making decisions by simplifying the frequently lead to incorrect assess- enemy has to be traveling down avenue of approach #1…because decision-making process. For ex- ments and poor analysis, which can that is what my IPB [intelligence ample, if at your second Joint Readi- lead to disastrous results. preparation of the battlefield] says ness Training Center (JRTC) rotation, he’ll do. you notice a trend in enemy activity Anchoring —Battalion Task Force S2 at the Joint similar to that at your previous rota- One of the most dangerous biases Readiness Training Center, 1996. tion, then you are likely to rely on for intelligence professionals results the previous solution to determine the from limitations in human working Although we added the comment enemy intentions. In this case, you memory. Due to the limitations in above for humor, many Military Intel- would not have to make a completely how much information humans can ligence (MI) professionals are con- new hypothesis about enemy inten- use at any given time, we tend to tinually in danger of making an error tions because this scenario is rep- mentally limit, or screen, the amount in analysis similar to that shown by resentative of a previous experience. of external information we employ to this quote. This danger is not the This heuristic, referred to as “repre- analyze a situation.2 One of the result of a failure in attempting to in- sentativeness,” may have aided you problematic tendencies is for indi- terpret enemy activities correctly, but in quickly making an analysis of the viduals to emphasize information rather from analytical errors psycho- enemy situation. based on when they received it, logically inherent to human decision- rather than on the strength or merit Unfortunately, however, a wide body making and analysis. This article will of the information. discuss the two most serious errors of research has shown that in many in analysis and decision-making, as situations, these heuristics often Anchoring is the most common well as present methods to combat lead to errors in decision-making, bias of this type. It occurs when an these potentially disastrous lapses.1 analytical thinking, and problem solv- individual places too much impor- ing. That is, humans have a psycho- tance on the first or early reports in Heuristics and Biases in logical tendency to make certain a series of information collection (i.e., Problem Solving analytical errors or apply biases people become “anchored” on the Intelligence analysis, by its nature, when analyzing situations. In intelli- initial information). For example, in requires individuals to be decision- gence analysis and military decision- the situation at the beginning of this makers; despite recent advances in technology and decision-support sys- Do You Think You Are a Good Intelligence Analyst? tems (e.g., the All-Source Analysis ! Higher headquarters has various sources that strongly suggest a System), the primary tool for intelli- dismounted enemy unit’s most likely course of action (COA) is to gence analysis is still the human brain move along avenue of approach #1. You consider this information (see Figure 1). MI professionals of- reasonable, given the situation. After you complete the IPB, you ten have difficulties making choices brief your commander that this is the likely enemy course of action because the human brain has limits (ECOA). in its capacity to process informa- ! As the situation progresses, the first three incoming intelligence tion, and then make decisions based reports from solid, trustworthy sources strongly support your pre- on that information using all aspects dicted ECOA. of the available data. Because of ! If the next report, also from a trustworthy source, refutes your pre- these inherent limitations, there is dicted (and publicly stated) ECOA, what decision will you likely a natural tendency for people to make? attempt to take mental shortcuts ! What if you receive a second “disconfirming” report? A third? At in problem analysis and decision- what point might you change your previous prediction and explain making. Behavioral scientists have to your commander that you were wrong? been studying these shortcuts, or heuristics, extensively for years. Figure 1. Are You a Good Intelligence Analyst?

8 Military Intelligence article, there would be a strong ten- decision-making processes is the these COAs at the risk of more dency to place much greater impor- confirmation bias. After a person has analytical thought. Although impor- tance on the early reports than on developed a hypothesis about an tant in the MDMP, creating the those that came later in the scenario event (e.g., an ECOA), confirmation most likely and the most danger- (despite any indications that neither bias leads the individual to— ous ECOAs inherently adds to the report was more valid than the other). ! Seek out only evidence that con- odds of analysts injecting a confir- A large amount of anecdotal evi- firms the hypothesis. mation bias into intelligence analy- dence from participants and ob- ! Disregard evidence that does not sis and the intelligence cycle. That server/controllers (O/Cs) at the confirm the hypothesis. is, intelligence personnel spend a National Training Center (NTC) and ! Fail to use the absences of in- great deal of effort generating what JRTC suggest anchoring is a prob- formation about the hypothesis they believe is the best possible lem for many intelligence (and op- to develop alternate explana- hypothesis about enemy activities; erations) sections when determining tions. once they complete these hypoth- ECOAs. Likewise, historical in- For example, once an intelli- eses, research suggests there will stances of anchoring are equally gence section develops an ECOA, be a very strong psychological ten- common. For example, during the the psychological tendency is to dency for these individuals to seek Civil War Battle of Chancellorsville look for information or reports that out or note only information that in May 1863, General Oliver O. only support that ECOA. There- supports their hypotheses. Even Howard, Commander of the Union fore, if they deploy reconnaissance more troublesome is that this “cog- Army’s 11th Corps, likely became a and surveillance (R&S) assets only nitive tunnel vision” mentality is victim of anchoring. General Howard along the most likely enemy axis even more pronounced under con- received a number of initial reports of advance, this is likely to be a ditions of high stress and mental 4 early on 2 May, suggesting that the confirmation bias. Similarly, re- overload, (which is the primary Confederate forces opposite his po- search suggests that humans will environment for Army operations). sition were a covering force for a naturally tend to either forget or Examples of confirmation bias in Confederate retreat. mentally ignore information that military history are widespread and disconfirms the ECOA. In three These initial reports included a re- similar to the evidence from JRTC JRTC rotations, I have been in in- port from General Joseph Hooker, mentioned above. An excellent ex- telligence sections that simply dis- Howard’s superior, who stated that ample is General Ulysses S. counted reports because they did the Confederate forces were clearly Grant’s actions in the Battle of not fit the proposed ECOAs. Like- in retreat. As the day progressed, Shiloh in 1862. Grant’s assess- wise, if there is not any substan- however, General Howard received a ment was that the Confederate tial information about the most variety of eyewitness reports that forces under General Pierre likely ECOA, we tend to assume indicated the Confederate forces Beauregard were preparing de- it is valid, despite that lack of in- 5 were instead massing for an attack. fenses and were “heartily tired”. formation. For example, when there Despite a large number of these re- Despite information from frontline are no significant negative R&S ports, General Howard apparently units, and one colonel who re- reports, individuals are prone to anchored on the earliest reports. Al- ported “thousands of rebels out assume that the ECOA is accurate 6 though he was aware of eyewitness there in the woods,” General Grant and do not consider that the en- information, he apparently placed refused to alter his initial hypoth- emy might possibly be coming from more emphasis on the earlier reports. esis about the enemy. When he a location where there are no R&S At 5:15 p.m. on 2 May, Confederate continued to receive reports about assets. troops stormed through the com- enemy movements, his assess- pletely surprised 11th Corps, turned Perhaps most significant about ment was that it was, at most, a the Union flank, and eventually won the confirmation bias is that the small attack against an isolated this battle.3 Although it is difficult doctrinal military decision-making division, but clearly not a large- to completely recreate General process (MDMP) lends itself to its scale offensive. The next morning, Howard’s thoughts, it does seem occurrence. Doctrine requires in- as Grant was eating breakfast, likely that anchoring played a vital telligence personnel to generate thousands of Confederates began role in this defeat. hypotheses about enemy activities their attack. Although later able to (e.g., the most likely and most obtain a costly victory at Shiloh, Confirmation Bias dangerous ECOAs) and psychol- Grant’s confirmation bias nearly The second major bias that can ogy suggests that we are likely to led to a stunning defeat for Union hinder the intelligence analysis and bias ourselves mentally to confirm forces.

January-March 2002 9 Overcoming the Anchoring firms or disconfirms an ECOA equally ences and Leadership, United States and Confirmation Biases and impartially is also likely to prove Military Academy) for his input on this beneficial. Research also suggests article. The tendency to commit these that training in these areas needs to two biases in analysis and decision- be specific to the scenarios and envi- making is inherent in human thought. ronments in which these biases oc- Endnotes These biases can lead to disastrous cur. That is, specific training on likely 1. The primary reference for this article errors, making it imperative that in- scenarios and procedures encoun- was Wickens, Christopher D., Gordon, telligence analysts and decision- Sallie E., Yili, Liu, An Introduction to tered by a particular intelligence ana- makers take steps to overcome Human Factors Engineering (NYC, lyst or section is more helpful in them. New York: Longman Books, 1998). reduction of these biases than is less More detailed information is available The literature in decision-making focused, broader scope training. from this text, or other psychology and human performance suggests texts, especially those involving Devil’s Advocate. Assign a “devil’s cognition and problem solving. implementation of three methods advocate” to find errors in analysis or that can help prevent these biases. 2. “Working memory” is a psychological to generate alternate hypotheses con- model to describe one of the “systems” They are the use of decision-support cerning enemy activities. One pos- that humans use in thought and tools, training, and employing a memory. Simply put, this model states sible technique is to assign an “devil’s advocate” to validate or invali- that working memory comprises individual to evaluate each enemy date hypotheses. primarily what a person is thinking of at COA critically, and then task that any given moment. The following task Decision-Support Tools. One of individual to “disconfirm” the stated illustrates the limitations of working memory. the best ways to overcome biases, most likely ECOA. One may also most notably anchoring, is use of have this devil’s advocate create al- Study the words below for 15 seconds. doctrinal and situational decision- ternate ECOAs and graphically dis- orange cat paper house fish bucket support tools. For example, an or- play (or list) all reported information pear cup key pencil tape ganized, updated situation map or that disproves the most probable Now cover up the words, and attempt to display—which graphically portrays ECOA. On occasion, they can also list them in order: unit reports—aids people in weigh- present their arguments against the The fact that very few people can recall ing incoming reports in a less se- all eleven words evokes the limitations of most probable ECOA to the analysts working memory. Although a simplistic quential order. If accurate, organized, in a section. Since time is critical in example, studies suggest that more and updated in a timely manner, most intelligence settings, this pro- complex cues that may be important to these graphic displays are likely to cess does not need to be exhaus- problem solving are “forgotten” in a help analysts overcome anchoring tive nor time consuming. Having one manner similar to the words in this list. on earlier reports. Since these re- individual search for refuting evidence 3. McPherson, James, L., Battle Cry of ports show information graphically, Freedom: The Civil War Era (NYC, is a quick, efficient method, likely to New York: Ballantine Books, 1988). not sequentially, they may alleviate lead to better analysis. the anchoring tendency. Although de- 4. Wickens et. al., page 195. cision-support tools are common for Conclusion 5. McPherson, page 409. intelligence professionals, it is im- The three methods mentioned above 6. McPherson, page 408. perative that analysts actually use provide a framework for overcoming them when analyzing threat activi- two of the most prevalent and danger- ties. ous biases that exist in military prob- lem analysis and decision-making. Major Chris Tatarka received his com- Training. Although overcoming mission from Gonzaga University. He is Although not “cure-alls” for every ana- these biases can be difficult, another currently serving as an Instructor in the lytical and problem-solving bias in Department of Behavioral Sciences and excellent method suggested by the humans, these methods may help Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy. research on decision-making is train- foster better, more accurate, and more He has served as an infantry officer in ing individuals to overcome these the 25th Infantry Division (Light) in relevant intelligence analysis. They biases. For example, training intelli- Hawaii, and as an MI officer in the 172d may also help prevent the problems Infantry Brigade (Separate), Fort Wain- gence professionals and sections that exist when analysts and decision- wright, Alaska. A graduate of the MI Of- about these two biases is likely to makers anchor on early information ficers Transition and Advanced Courses, make them more aware of their own he holds Bachelor and Master degrees or focus too much on confirming their thought processes, and therefore less in Psychology, a Master of Public Ad- own hypotheses. ministration, and is currently complet- likely to make these errors. Likewise, ing another Masters in Management training individuals on the importance Special thanks to Mike Matthews, Information Systems. Readers can con- of considering all information that con- (Ph.D., Department of Behavioral Sci- tact him via E-mail at [email protected].

10 Military Intelligence Use of Standing Criteria for Deciding to Commit U.S. Forces in Conflict Resolution by Major David Shin reevaluate these criteria as the na- turmoil similar to that experienced “The lessons I absorbed from Panama ture of conflict continues to evolve. during the Vietnam War, and would confirmed all my convictions over the As we are aware, war is a serious eventually threaten our ability to build preceding twenty years, since the days business and its consequences may a national consensus for a common of doubt over Vietnam. Have a clear determine whether a state and its political objective and stick to it. Use purpose. In the end, he believed this all the force necessary, and do not people will endure or perish. I believe would lead to low morale in the U.S. apologize for going in big if that is this realization alone requires a more Armed Services and eventually re- what it takes. Decisive force ends wars systematic approach to conflict duce the effectiveness of our ability quickly and in the long run saves resolution, rather than our reliance lives. Whatever threats we faced in to wage war. Therefore, Secretary the future, I intended to make these on what some would call ad hoc re- Weinberger was in search of a more rules the bedrock of my military sponses to crises. Furthermore, our flexible and effective response to deal counsel.” 1 religious values promote the prima with the use of military force. On 28 General Colin Powell facie obligation not to kill or injure November 1984, he outlined six cri- others unjustly, and that value set Some of our senior military leaders, teria for committing U.S. military acts as a constraint in determining as evidenced by General Powell’s forces to include— the use of force. In brief, the very statement, are convinced that the ! When its vital national interests serious nature of war and our moral United States’ past conflicts have were at stake. obligations demand the most shown that general rules for military ! With the intent to win. weighty and significant reasons for success exist. The nation must fol- ! When we have established going to war. The formulation of low these rule to achieve the maxi- clearly defined political and mili- standing criteria for committing U.S. mum results with minimum risk and tary objectives. military forces would be very helpful exposure. Should we commit to a list ! Should have the support of both in our attempts to wage just wars. of standing criteria for committing the the citizenry and the Congress. The question is what our standing military forces of the United States of ! Use of military force should be criteria should be and why? I will America? After all, someone could the last resort. examine several views ranging from argue, “wait a minute, you did not fol- ! We should continuously reas- the just-war (moralist) argument to low one of the rules.” In fact, criteria sess and modify the decisions those promoted by Secretary that amount to rules could become to conduct military operations Weinberger and synthesize them policy and cause the nation to be too when required. to posit my own views on the is- reluctant and averse to use her mili- Most of the above criteria are self- sue. I will begin by examining Sec- tary forces. General Powell shared explanatory; however, some may retary Weinberger’s criteria, the these concerns; however, he believed need further clarification. For in- Weinberger Doctrine, regarding the in the spirit of such rules rather than stance, what does Secretary commitment of U.S. forces. being ruled by them. He argued at his Weinberger mean by vital and what confirmation hearing as Chairman, The genesis for the formulation of are the national interests involved? Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that the set the Weinberger Doctrine was his re- In short, how do we know if the con- of criteria Secretary of Defense alization that there was a growing flict is in our national interest? Next, Casper W. Weinberger proposed for sentiment in the United States ad- what does it mean to have the sup- the use of U.S. military power was a vocating a return to the isolationism port of the our Nation’s people and useful guideline. However, General that was prevalent in this country the Congress? Finally, do we need Powell never viewed these criteria to between the World Wars. He firmly to modify the Weinberger Doctrine be a series of steps that circum- opposed this view because it would since the international environment stances must meet before the JCS detach the United States from the has changed so significantly since would recommend the use of military world community and seem to be a November 1984? force. renunciation of its responsibilities as a world leader. Simultaneously, he Evaluating National Criteria for Committing challenged the view that military force Interests Forces could be brought to bear on any cri- I will address the first issue by high- I share General Powell’s view on sis. He feared the indiscriminate use lighting Donald E. Nuechterlein’s this issue but think that we should of force would bring about domestic work on U.S. policy national inter-

January-March 2002 11 ests in a new security environment.2 decision to intervene in South Korea before committing our troops to com- It helps us to better understand what and President John F. Kennedy’s bat? These questions are quite diffi- our national interests are and to what decision not to allow Soviet missiles cult to address since the end result, degree of intensity they are at stake in Cuba are crises in which our vital whether one has the people’s sup- in a specific crisis. First, he argues interests were at stake. port, can be very difficult to deter- that there are four enduring national Major interests are those not cru- mine. However, the determination is interests: cial to a nation’s well being but are more obvious with either mass pub- lic opposition (for example, the Viet- ! Defending the United States and still considered important. Normally, nam anti-war protests) or its way of life. it involves interests the country can overwhelming support (such as was ! The economic well-being of the negotiate with its adversary. Although observed during Operation DESERT United States. they are of serious concern to our STORM). A good example of how ! Maintaining a favorable world policy-makers, negotiation and com- subjective this issue can be was in order. promise are the policy of choice the debate over the North Atlantic ! Promoting our values (democ- rather than confrontation. For in- Treaty Organization’s (NATO) bomb- racy and the free market sys- stance, the Arab oil embargo in 1973 ing of Serbia during the Kosovo cri- tem). caused significant damage to the sis. A number of Senate Republicans Second, and more importantly, he U.S. economy but it was not a seri- ous long-term threat to that economy. accused President Bill Clinton of argues that our ability to assess the misleading the nation while others intensity of interest during crises will Likewise, the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan threatened claimed that for him to go to war with- help us to correctly determine what out a formal declaration of war from our national interests are. In other our interests but we determined that we could still live with the unsatis- Congress was to abrogate his con- words, it will be relatively easy to stitutional duty and violate his oath determine which of the four national factory outcome without the commit- ment of our troops. In brief, the of office. Others argue that the interests are at stake. The critical Clinton Administration lacked an element in the decision-making difference between vital and major interest is what our policy-makers overarching national strategy and process is to what level of intensity appeared to be responding to crises, we should assess them. He argues believe to be tolerable or intol- erable. as if it intentionally promoted incre- that in addition to the four enduring mentalism and “ad hoc-ism” in our national interests, there are four dif- Finally, a peripheral interest is national strategy. In the end, how- ferent levels of intensity: survival, vi- one that does not seriously affect the ever, Congress voted to support the tal, major, and peripheral interests. well-being of the United States as a President’s decision to bomb the According to Nuechterlein, sur- whole, even though it may be detri- Serbs. vival interests are at stake when mental to the private interests of U.S. citizens and companies conducting It is also understood that the last one’s homeland is threatened if an time Congress declared war was enemy state’s demands are not dealt business abroad. We may need to monitor the situation but the con- during World War II. Since then, with quickly. For instance, Congress has been unable to pre- Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939 cerns are at a lower order of magni- tude. Examples are U.S. citizens vent our Presidents from committing and the North Korean invasion of U.S. forces to combat without a for- South Korea in 1950 are clear sur- imprisoned overseas on drug or other charges and violations of our busi- mal declaration of war to include vival interests for both affected coun- Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, tries. ness interests operating abroad. Again, the point is that correctly dif- and DESERT STORM. Furthermore, Vital interests are similar to sur- ferentiating the levels of intensity in the case of Kosovo, President vival interests but the main difference ranging from peripheral to survival Clinton appeared to have used all of is the amount of time a nation has can provide policy-makers with a his diplomatic options in order to gain to respond to the threat. In short, the clear choice when deciding which the support of the people. Evidently, danger is not imminent and the na- national interest is at stake during as a last resort, Secretary of State tion has time to consult with allies, crises. Madeleine K. Albright convinced him negotiate with the enemy, or to em- to send his Balkan envoy, Richard ploy other instruments of national Garnering Support C. Holbrooke, to Belgrade one last power. In the end, the nation is will- How do the President and his cru- time before committing our military ing to use military force when the cial advisors attempt to gain the sup- forces. At the same time, President enemy refuses to compromise after port of the Congress and the Clinton worked hard for several reaching a certain point. For ex- citizenry? Must they have public sup- months to gain the support of our ample, President Harry S. Truman’s port? Should Congress declare war NATO allies for the bombings if and

12 Military Intelligence when the Balkan peace attempt that military force is sometimes the more than one million Bengalis. The failed. correct instrument of policy. One same held true for the estimated 1.5 should always attempt to garner the million Cambodians slaughtered in However, there are also indications support of the public but leaders that country from 1975 to 1979. Fi- that President Clinton wanted to use sometimes do not have the luxury of nally, The United States troops did force as early as the previous win- determining whether they will attain not respond to the extermination of ter, not as a last resort. Apparently, unambiguous public support before some 800,000 Tutsi in Rwanda in representatives from several NATO committing military forces. In this 1994. The Clinton Administration nev- countries as well as those within his sense, I believe President Clinton’s ertheless appeared to use the mor- own administration who wanted one bombing of Serbia to have been quite alist argument to wage war against more political effort at settling the bold simply because of its political the Serbs. Although we have not crisis forestalled this action. risk. According to Max Boot, the re- been consistent, our religious values Was President Clinton wrong when cent crisis in Kosovo may be “a new do have some influence in our deter- he wanted to use force? Does mili- chapter in the history of American mination of what is and is not a just tary force have to be used as a last foreign policy.”4 He believes that our war. Finally, how valid is the resort? According to Lieutenant actions in Kosovo are a clear act of Weinberger Doctrine today and what Colonel Robert R. Leonhard, our charity and highlight our altruism at should be our standing criteria for a last-resort tradition was an expres- its best. Arguably, we are willing to just war? sion of our desire to avoid total war.3 risk our national prestige and the Validity of the Weinberger In today’s environment, policy-mak- lives of our soldiers even though our ers should consider the military in- national interests are not seriously Doctrine strument of power a full-time at threat. This begs the question of I believe all six of the criteria from component to our strategy, possibly how morality influences our decision the Weinberger Doctrine remain valid combined with the other elements to to commit military forces? today, but there are other criteria, resolve all levels of crisis. I believe such as the moralist argument, that that in cases where our survival or According to U.S. Catholic bish- we should consider. Moreover, we vital interests are at stake (as de- ops, governments threatened by cannot view them as a simple check- fined by Neuchterlein), we may not armed, unjust aggression must de- list in which all the steps must be have the time to exercise all of our fend their people. In their eyes, proper met before the United States would instruments of power before the use defense would include military force consider the use of military force. In of military force. Furthermore, the si- if all attempts at peaceful resolution other words, the Weinberger Doc- multaneous application of all our in- have failed, the cause is just, and trine is a useful guide for determin- struments of power may be exactly use of military force is only as a last ing the rightful use of U. S. military what is necessary to deal with a cri- resort. Additionally, the situation power, but dogmatic application of sis, where the danger is imminent must meet the following criteria: the rules may cause our foreign and the enemy clearly does not want ! A competent authority must de- policy to be impotent. At every turn, a peaceful resolution to the conflict clare war. someone could argue that policy- (as in our post-September 11th ac- ! A nation should use only the makers ignored a rule. As shown, tions). We must sometimes be will- minimal amount of force to leaders may not always have the ing to use military force when the achieve objectives. time to determine whether unam- enemy refuses to compromise, even ! One’s intent must be peace and biguous public support is attainable if it is not the last resort. reconciliation. before committing our country’s I recognize the enduring qualities ! There must be some probability armed forces to a conflict. Moreover, of Carl von Clausewitz’s trinity of war of success. situations may even require the use consisting of the government, the ! Damage caused by conflict must of force, not as a last resort, but early military, and the people. The govern- be proportionate to the good on in a crisis or as a complement to ment provides the political aim; the expected from waging war. other instruments of power. military, the means to achieve the The United States Government, In the end, leaders must do what political aim; and the people provide however, has not always been per- they believe is right and convince the the national will. Nevertheless, as we suaded by the moralist argument to people that military force is some- have seen, the support of the popu- protect the innocent and the help- times the correct instrument of lace is sometimes very difficult to less with military force. For example, policy. Furthermore, it is not enough determine and in the end leaders Washington chose not to commit to simply state that the United States must do what they believe is right. U.S. military forces to Bangladesh should only commit forces when its They must convince the citizenry in 1971 to prevent the genocide of vital interests are at stake; rather,

January-March 2002 13 one must offer some methodology flict from our allies as well as na- apply our military instrument of to determine what our national inter- tional and international nongovern- power in times of crises. ests are and when they are at risk. mental organizations. This would As shown above, correctly differen- require our cooperation with orga- Endnotes tiating the levels of intensity ranging nizations such as NATO, the Red 1. Powell, Colin, with Joseph E. Perisico., from peripheral to survival can pro- Cross, and Doctors Without Bor- My American Journey (NY: Random vide policy-makers with a clear ders. As in the case of Kosovo, our House, 1995), page 434. choice when deciding what national leaders will have to work long and 2. Nuechterlein, Donald E., America interest is at stake during a crisis. hard to win the hearts and minds Recommitted: United States National of not only the populace but also Interests in a Restructured World (Lexington, KY: The University Press of In addition, our religious values of our allies and the rest of the in- do have some influence in our de- Kentucky, 1991), pages 17-18. ternational community. As a leader 3. Leonhard, Robert R., The Principles termination of just war. We have of the free world, we—unlike any no authoritative doctrine for a just of War for the Information Age other nation before—must extend (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998), war in the military and we have not Clausewitz’s trinity of war and con- pages 223-224. always defended the innocent and vince the rest of the world (not just 4. Boot, Max, “When War is an Act of the helpless. Nevertheless, we are ourselves) that just wars are mor- Charity,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 March 1999, page A-22. still moved by the need to protect ally and politically justified. the innocent from unjust attack, to restore rights wrongfully denied, or Conclusion Major David W. Shin is an Assistant Army to reestablish a just order. Argu- In summary, the serious nature Attache, U.S. Defense Attache Office, ably, our recent involvement in of war and our moral obligation to Seoul, Korea. He received a B.S. from the Virginia Military Institute, an M.S. from the Kosovo is the ideal case for supple- wage just wars demands the most Joint Military Intelligence College, and an menting the Weinberger Doctrine weighty and significant reasons for M.A. from the University of Washington; he with the moralist just-war criteria committing military forces. There- is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command listed above. Therefore, the crite- fore, the application of standing cri- and General Staff College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions ria outlined by the Catholic bish- teria (a hybrid of the Weinberger in the continental United States, Korea, and ops and other moralists must be Doctrine and the moralist posi- Japan, to include counterintelligence of- well understood by our decision- tions), with a methodology to dif- ficer, 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne), makers, and they should consider ferentiate the levels of intensity, will Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Staff Officer, United Nations Command Military Armi- it before committing U.S. forces. assist our decision-makers. Rang- stice Commission, Seoul, Korea; and Chief, Finally, we must also anticipate ing from peripheral to survival in- Security Liaison Detachment, Tokyo, 500th greater participation in future con- terests, it will help them to correctly Military Intelligence Group, Japan.

U.N. convoy with U.S. Forces.

Nato, U.N. Forces working together.

14 Military Intelligence Conventional Approaches to Unconventional Problems: AnalyzingAnalyzing TerrorismTerrorism by Chief Warrant Officer Three include open source. The information process for recommending counter- Del Erin Stewart that surfaces is usually of limited measures. First, it is useful to look scope, fragmented, and can address at existing tools and methodologies anything from financial issues to for analysis, then additional areas of Considering the implications of the those focused on training or opera- focus, and recommending counter- 11 September 2001 attack on the tions. Currently approved doctrinal measures. United States, many changes must symbols do not reflect terrorist op- Existing Analytical Method- erations types of data, nor is there occur in how the U.S. Army conducts ologies Applied Against Ter- its counterterrorist operations. New generally a doctrinal method for methodologies and tactics, tech- graphically portraying such activi- rorist Operations niques, and procedures (TTP) must ties. The question is, then, how can The following analytical tool de- emerge if the Army is to address this an analyst take the disparate, seem- scriptions and examples are from new threat. Based on experience, ingly unrelated data points, and move FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, the following methodology is one forward toward accurate predictive Section VI, Counter-Human Intel- possible interim fix. analysis? One thing is certain: the ligence Analysis, to Appendix A, effort will involve all intelligence dis- Counter-Human Intelligence The theory is simple: if you know ciplines. Techniques and Procedures. We your enemy’s capabilities, vulner- modified the wording slightly for ease abilities, methods, and thought pro- We rethought and revisited these of use in this forum. This section dis- cesses, you are more likely to methodologies because the com- cusses a chronological record and successfully predict when, where, mander was very unhappy with de- three analytical techniques. and how he will attack and be able tailed, multicolored charted and to plan countermeasures. While we graphed after-the-fact analysis; he Time-Event Charting. The time- used the following methodology ex- wanted reasonably accurate predic- event chart shown in Figure 1 is a perimentally at an analytical cell at tions to help in his decision-making chronological record of individual or a numbered Army level, the tools and techniques discussed below may be useful for other echelons. When predicting traditional or con- ventional military threats, the U.S. Army employs analytical methodolo- gies such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and related tools. The terrorist threat, however, is unique in that its nature and sur- vival require it avoid direct engage- ments with main force units. Terrorists are exceedingly mobile, have mastered the art of blending into the surrounding population, and em- ploy harsh measures to ensure se- curity. On the other hand, our national collection assets provide so much diverse information that making sense of it all is a daunting task. Reports on terrorist activity originate from all intelligence disciplines, to Figure 1. Sample Time Event Chart.

January-March 2002 15 groups and associated entities, and related events. Analysts can show the connections between critical players in any event or activity in an association matrix (see Figure 2), which shows associations within a group or similar activity, and is based on the assumption that people in- volved in a collective activity know one another. The construction of this type of matrix is in the form of a right tri- angle, and analysts list personalities in exactly the same order along both the rows and columns to ensure that all possible associations appear cor- rectly. The purpose of the personal- ity matrix is to show who knows Figure 2. Sample Association Matrix. whom. Analysts determine a known group activities designed to store and excellent briefing aids as well as association by “direct contact” be- display large amounts of information flexible analytical tools. tween individuals; a number of fac- in as little space as possible. This Association Matrix. The associa- tors determine direct contact, tool is easy to prepare, understand, tion matrix delineates the existence including face-to-face meetings, con- and use. Symbols used in time-event of relationships between individuals. firmed telephonic conversation be- charting are very simple. Analysts The part of the problem deserving the tween known parties, and all the use triangles to show the beginning most analytical effort is the group it- members of a particular organiza- and end of the chart and to show self. Analysts examine the group’s tional cell. shifts in methods of operation or elements (members) and their rela- Analysts indicate a known asso- changes in ideology. Rectangles or tionships with other members, other ciation between individuals on the diamonds indicate significant events or activities. Analysts can highlight particularly noteworthy or important events by drawing an “X” through the event symbol (rectangle or diamond). Each of these symbols contains a chro- nological number (event number), date (day, month, and year of event), and may contain a file reference number. The incident description is a very brief explanation of the inci- dent, and may include the team size, type of incident or activity, place and method of operation, and duration of incident. Arrows indicate time flow. Analysts also use a variety of symbols, such as parallelograms, pentagons, and others, to depict different types of events and ac- tivities. Using these symbols and brief descriptions, an analyst can analyze the group’s activities, tran- sitions, trends, and operational patterns. Time-event charts are Figure 3. Sample Activities Matrix.

16 Military Intelligence training centers are currently teach- ing this method as a technique in combating organized crime. The par- ticular method discussed here is an adaptation especially useful in coun- terintelligence (CI) investigative analysis in general and terrorism analysis in particular. In link analysis, a number of differ- ent symbols identify various items. Analysts can easily and clearly dis- play obstacles, indirect routes or connections, and suspected con- nections. In many cases, the viewer can work with and understand the picture more easily than the matrix. Link analysis can present informa- tion in a manner that ensures clar- ity. As with construction of association matrices, analysts should follow cer- tain rules of graphics, symbology, and construction. Standardization is critical to ensure that everyone con- structing, using, or reading a link dia- gram understands exactly what the diagram depicts. The standard rules Figure 4. Sample Link Diagram. follow: ‰ Show persons as open circles matrix by a dot or filled-in circle. They Analysts normally construct this with the name written inside the consider suspected or “weak” asso- matrix with personalities arranged in circle. ciations between persons of interest a vertical listing on the left side of ‰ Show person known by more to be associations that are possible the matrix and activities, organiza- than one name (alias, also or even probable, but they cannot tions, events, addresses, or any known as [AKA]) as overlapping confirm it using the above criteria. other common denominators ar- circles with names in each When a person of interest dies, a ranged along the bottom of the ma- circle. diamond next to his or her name on trix. This matrix can store an ‰ Show deceased persons with a the matrix relays that fact. incredible amount of information diamond next to the circle that Activities Matrix. The activities about a particular organization or represents that person. matrix helps to determine connec- group, and can expand on the infor- tivity between individuals and any mation developed in the association ‰ Show nonpersonal entities (or- organization, event, entity, address, matrix. ganizations, governments, activity, or anything other than per- Link Diagram. The third analyti- events, locations) by squares or sons. Unlike the association matrix, cal technique is link diagramming. rectangles. the construction of the activity ma- Analysts use this technique to de- ‰ Show linkages or associations trix is in the form of a square or a pict the more complex linkages be- by lines: solid for confirmed and rectangle (see Figure 3). The ana- tween a large number of entities, and dotted for suspected. lyst can tailor rows or columns to fit can include persons, organizations, ‰ Show each person or other en- the needs of the situation at hand or or almost anything else. Analysts tity only once in a link diagram. add them later as the situation de- use link analysis in a variety of com- velops. The analyst determines the plex investigative efforts including Complementary number of rows and columns by the criminal and terrorist investigations, Methodology Developed needs of the problem and by the analysis, and even medical research. The approach used to meet the amount of information available. Several regional law enforcement commander’s intent for predictive

January-March 2002 17 analysis was to use traditional IPB- available for the group to use in fu- lowed one attack to occur, will oth- style graphic overlays, but then ture attacks. ers follow?) and where authorities modify this methodology to specifi- Note: A crucial consideration in thwarted attacks because the adver- cally monitor the actions of a terror- evaluating this data is to ensure com- saries clearly intended something. ist group and its associated pliance with intelligence oversight re- These interdictions could include elements. The use of overlays on quirements, and not store or depict confiscation of arms shipments. The training, organizations, finances, and any data that violates AR 381-10, U.S. warning reports originate from all in- warnings can be effective. Army Intelligence Activities, Ex- telligence disciplines and may in- Training. The first overlay (Train- ecutive Order 12333, United States clude law enforcement and other ing) may contain all the available in- Intelligence Activities, and related interagency information. formation on training camps and regulatory requirements. Convergence. Analysts may cre- locations, by country, which this or- Finances. The third overlay (Fi- ate additional overlays as needed. ganization and its associated ele- nances) depicts information available Because there are no doctrinal sym- ments reportedly use. This data will on finances, business transactions, bols for most of these overlays, ana- primarily come from imagery intelli- assets, and related issues. Nearly lysts will have to create their own gence (IMINT), human intelligence everything costs money and, as the symbols, and post a legend to de- (HUMINT), and signals intelligence maxim states, “follow the money.” fine them. Flexibility is paramount to (SIGINT). There is utility in knowing The money trail leads through orga- success. Similar to chess masters, what topics specific camps train, and nizations to people and equipment, analysts look for convergent lines to recognizing changes in what they which in turn helps provide an un- indicate the possibility of attack. are teaching or training. As an ex- derstanding of the terrorist’s objec- Despite the adversary’s ability to ample, if a camp that traditionally tives and capabilities. Of particular project into areas where they have worked on the use of RPGs (Soviet importance are reports pertaining to not previously conducted an attack, antitank grenade launchers) and the transfer of funds for training, ei- normally there are indicators graphi- small arms suddenly changes to one ther directly or via NGO surrogates. cally depicted in two or more areas, of hostage taking, analysts would Again, this will come mostly from (for example, to show movement of note this radical change as a pos- HUMINT and SIGINT sources as well important personalities, supplies, sible alteration in organizational ob- as foreign and domestic law enforce- and funds). ment agencies and other interagency jectives. Certainly it would be a key The current doctrinal analytical reporting. indicator. tools discussed above work well to Personalities. The fourth overlay Organizations. The second over- explain how something happened. (Personalities) depicts the current lay (Organizations) may contain all The critical point, however, is to go location of essential personnel within of the available information on non- beyond the stage of describing his- the terrorist organizations. These governmental organizations (NGOs) tory to the essential point of predict- reports will at least include SIGINT, and subordinate or related elements ing when, where, and how the HUMINT, and some measurement (e.g., branch offices of the same or- adversaries will strike next. Getting and signature intelligence (MASINT) ganization, but in a different coun- there requires personal skill, time, and IMINT (e.g., a photograph or a try). That overlay depicts known and experience, and dedication. Addition- sensor confirmed that a vehicle was suspected relationships between ally, it will require analysts possess- at a particular site at a specific time). NGOs (especially those that were ing access to all levels of reporting When looking at the movement of in- essentially front organizations) and and analysts from different disci- dividuals, analysts should ask the terrorist groups. As appropriate, plines who focus exclusively on this “Why?” All movement is risky; some- analysts can include other organiza- form of analysis. tions. Information allowing comple- one can blow a person’s cover and tion of this overlay will mainly come interdict vehicles, so why is he taking Other Considerations from reports issued by HUMINT, CI, this risk? Such risktaking can be an Open-Source Data. Regarding and SIGINT sources. Knowing what indicator in itself, while answering the open-source reporting, the Foreign surrogates are available is essential question of “why?” may lead to other Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) to understanding the extent of the issues and concerns. and Cable News Network (CNN) pro- potential threat. For example, a le- Warnings. The fifth overlay (Warn- vide some of the most readily acces- gitimate mining operation may have ings) shows where (by country) na- sible and timely reporting in the second- or third-hand ties to a ter- tional agencies issued warnings and world. Terrorists have been using pro- rorist group, which could mean that advisories, where previous attacks paganda, media manipulation, and industrial-grade explosives might be occurred (if the security posture al- other similar aspects of information

18 Military Intelligence operations for a long time, as the Visual Cues. Graphic aids are the additional advantage of serving requirement to gain popular support nothing more than visual cues to as a briefing aid. Words alone, and is crucial to their success. Terrorist check the report details, develop re- reams of reports alone, can be con- organizations need to “get the word quests for further information, and fusing. Today’s senior intelligence out” to legitimize their operations, study the matter in greater detail. No officers are accustomed to acquir- actions, and positions. The trained, system or software can begin to deal ing data in visual icon form. The experienced analyst can exploit this with these complex issues. The methodology described herein lent fact. For example, if a respected ter- group synergy and crosstalk derived itself to transitioning instantly from rorist leader were to say something from experts in different disciplines conducting analysis to briefing that like, “In the course of jihad, many looking at the same data is what analysis in a manner in which the innocents may have to be sacrificed makes or breaks this effort. Addition- G2 was accustomed. for the greater good of the will of Al- ally, having “broken the code” on what lah.” That could portend an attack the adversary might be planning is, Countermeasures where mass casualties might occur, in itself, insufficient; the analyst must The final step is recommending and it might also mean that the at- pass data to the affected elements. countermeasures. It is easy to de- tack might occur in an area where Normally, at the commander and velop a siege mentality, such as that Islam is a dominant religion. senior intelligence officer levels, this which existed throughout U.S. Army An experienced analyst will con- transmission will be via secure elements stationed in the Middle sider numerous aspects including– videoteleconference or similar meth- East after the bombings of the Of- ods. Behind the scenes, analysts fice of the Program Manager, Saudi † Timing of the pronouncement. (Is often highlight a specific set of mes- Arabian National Guard (Riyadh) in it a significant date, by either the sages for one another in daily se- 1995, and the Khobar Towers solar or lunar calendars?) cure E-mail crosstalk. Because the (Dhahran in 1996) in Saudi Arabia. † Location. (Is this a culturally or amount of reporting is so great, each However, when everything is always religiously significant site that echelon has its own set of filters for on “high alert,” it defeats the purpose issued the pronouncement?) sorting through the messages. of the heightened alert status. In- † Important personalities who When dealing with more than one stead of temporarily raising defense were present (which may indi- thousand messages a day, it is easy levels, the defense level remained at cate support for the pronounce- for someone to leave out or overlook threat condition (THREATCON) Delta ment, an end to differences something inadvertently. Cooperation (now called force protection condi- between the groups, etc.). is fundamental to success. tion or FPCON) for a prolonged pe- † Other factors. Because the level of detail required riod. There may be other similar cues in involves individuals, and may include Such a prolonged state of high alert other public pronouncements, some single individuals to squad-sized el- had at the minimum the following of them web-based instead of tradi- ements (as employed in the 11 Sep- effects: tional newspaper and radio media. tember 2001 attacks), there is absolutely no utility in developing tra- † Left open the potential for com- Just tracking the public pronounce- placency. ments and postings, looking at them ditional decision-support templates † Created a state where a new in detail, cross-referencing the an- or similar tools. However, depending (stable) pattern nullified the in- nouncements with other data, and on circumstances, location, ech- tent of thwarting hostile surveil- so forth, is a full-time job–which elon, and other considerations, there lance efforts. means dedicating analysts to moni- may be utility in devising specific tor these sites. There is a difference activity-based templates for depict- † Negatively impacted the local between the “normal” rhetoric and ing possible courses of action, etc. economy. something that, in symbolic context, Being in the loop for the daily data Consider the fact that when U.S. is genuinely a potential indicator. feed exceeding one thousand mes- forces no longer engage in or stimu- Again, deciphering these cues re- sages a day is an all-consuming late a local economy, the merchants quires analysts who have the req- business. In my experience, the (and their families, associates, etc.) uisite experience and training, so graphics aid was an effective cue for have no further economic incentive that the terrorism analysis section conducting deeper analysis for con- to having U.S. forces present. What does not begin to suffer from the verging lines. may then develop is a general atti- “chicken little” syndrome in the When using the IPB-style graph- tude that is at best ambivalent to- eyes of the senior intelligence of- ics overlays, not only can this be a wards U.S. forces; for if there is no ficer and the commander. successful methodology, it also has perceived benefit for the presence of

January-March 2002 19 U.S. forces, then it is a short move corporating them into the analysis some flexibility, current doctrine will towards resentment of the U.S. pres- cell! Analysts, however, will have suffice. The critical principle of trans- ence. Once popular sentiment op- nothing to analyze if the collectors lating intelligence into viable options poses the presence of U.S. forces, do not collect. To be effective, intelli- and recommendations for the com- it is difficult to regain good will. From gence and CI assets need to leave mander to evaluate and implement an intelligence perspective, it is use- the compounds, and commanders remains unchanged. ful to keep these economic consid- must provide them with the neces- erations in mind when evaluating the sary freedom of movement as pre- scribed in AR 381-20, U.S. Army threat, the enemy’s ability to blend Chief Warrant Officer Del Stewart is cur- in with the local populace (will they Counterintelligence. Risk man- rently serving as a Training Senior Writer, be reported for suspicious activity), agement must not become risk Doctrine Division, Directorate of Combat and related factors. avoidance. Defensive postures and Developments, U.S. Army Intelligence Cen- countermeasures must change ap- ter and Fort Huachuca. Excluding his 12 The fear that “something might hap- years of enlisted experience, some of his pen” was so great in the Middle East propriate to the threat. assignments have included the 102d MI after the 1996 Khobar Towers attack Final Thoughts Battalion, Korea; Chief, Counter-terrorism Analysis Section, 3d U.S. Army, Fort that Army intelligence and CI ele- The options and techniques de- McPherson, Georgia; and the 501st MI Bat- ments sometimes found it difficult to tailed above are not radical. Our fun- talion, Dexheim, Germany (with 11 months leave the compound and perform damental analytical methodologies in Bosnia supporting IFOR as the OCE Chief their missions. In fact, at least one are adequate to deal with this un- for 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division). Readers can reach him via E- G2 proposed taking all of his intelli- conventional threat, with only minor mail: [email protected] and by tele- gence collectors and agents and in- adjustments; if we grant ourselves phone at (520) 533-9968 or DSN 821-9968.

20 Military Intelligence by Major Paul A. Shelton, USMC cus on detecting observable activity these individuals as soon as pos- and high-level communications. sible, and listen to them. Establish Beirut, Mogadishu, Sarajevo, These indicator sets are completely ground rules early to prevent turf Medellin, and Monrovia are cities that absent in the typical city in chaos. battles and the subsequent souring draw our attention by their names The tactical intelligence officer (S2) of these critical relationships. I rec- alone. The addition of a country on the scene is largely on his or her ommend informing these three offic- name is unnecessary. At times, own to determine and “develop” the ers that they will receive a copy of these cities in chaos have imploded, tactical situation in the city. While all products generated by the S2 and ceasing to function as the highly or- this task is daunting, both nontradi- offering them the opportunity to re- ganized urban centers they once tional and traditional resources offer view any crucial outbound message were, and descended into a bizarre great potential if properly exploited. traffic before transmission. This al- world of factional violence and war- Initial coordination can provide valu- lays their concerns regarding poten- lords. In the recent past, the United able knowledge of the situation from tially erroneous reporting by the new States has repeatedly called the a number of people in the city. If you arrival and allows the S2 to receive U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) into ac- are lucky enough to be working in a the benefit of their experience in the tion in these highly uncertain envi- city with a functioning United States area. ronments, and the future certainly Embassy, start with the various ex- holds additional similar challenges perts there. They are the Defense Collection as the world urbanizes. The USMC Attaché Officer (DAO), the Chief of Information collection in a city in has recognized the growing require- Station (COS), and the Regional chaos is a highly challenging situa- ments for operations in an urban Security Officer (RSO). Meet with tion. The S2 must aggressively pur- environment and has undertaken considerable experimentation to pre- pare for the urbanized littoral of the near future. This article presents les- sons learned regarding intelligence operations in Monrovia, Liberia, dur- ing my two-month assignment as the Assistant Intelligence Officer for the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable). Commencing Intelligence Operations The starting point for intelligence operations in a city in chaos is that no one—neither the theater joint in- telligence center (JIC) nor the desk officers at the various national intel- ligence agencies—can tell you what is going on in “your” city. The popu- lation density and number of fight- Photos courtesy of MAJ P. A. Shelton, USMC. Photos courtesy of MAJ P. ers and factions in a contested major Guinean T-55 of the Economic Community of Western African States city are simply too high to permit (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force passing in accurate situational awareness from front of the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia. The United Nations Observer afar. Our nation’s highly developed Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) cooperated with the ECOMOG first sent to technical collection capabilities fo- Liberia as a peacekeeping force in 1990. (May 1996)

January-March 2002 21 high-intensity combat scenario. The most rewarding signals in a city are typically from low-power handheld ra- dios and cellular telephones in use by combatants and the functioning pub- lic services. Surprisingly, fire and ambulance services continue to op- erate in extreme conditions, and aid agencies frequently establish commu- nications nets to coordinate their ac- tivities. Collection in an urban environment requires 24-hour access to these low-power signals, and SIGINT personnel are a critical ele- ment of the force ashore. The vol- ume of traffic and the necessity of immediate tactical analysis make this a particularly intensive and tir- ing task. There must be immediate dissemination procedures in place to permit rapid warning to the force, a The author on the roof of the U.S. Embassy. From this position we topic addressed in detail below. fused listening to the sounds of the fighting with SIGINT in our initial effort to associate signals with specific parts of the city and factions. Open-Source Information. Com- (April 1996) mercial or factional radio broadcasts are a highly important source of infor- sue all the numerous unconventional such as “Which intersection?” “What mation, and the S2 must quickly iden- sources of intelligence as well as the house?” and “What bridge?” As the tify which faction controls each radio more common ones. intelligence personnel establish rela- station, and monitor them at all times. Human Intelligence (HUMINT). tionships with these people, the S2 The factions and dissident groups use This is the best intelligence source in will establish a net of observers located these stations to keep their support- the city. Tactical units ashore will prob- throughout the city. If the telephone ers informed, and we can acquire a ably not have the time, resources, or system is still functional (and it fre- great deal of information from them. freedom of movement to develop high- quently is), the S2 should develop an Of course, it is only prudent to exer- level sources. They should rely on the overlay showing the locations of these cise great caution in accepting radio established in-country agencies to sources and their telephone numbers. reports. The intelligence officer should provide this reporting and should fo- A quick phone call to the trusted treat them as just another source of cus on the numerous targets of op- source that lives in a high-rise build- information, a source to fuse with data portunity including evacuees, ing in a conflictive neighborhood will from others. The careful analyst will refugees, expatriates who were in yield more information than a hundred note how often he receives HUMINT business (most of whom have exten- E-mail messages to Washington, reports that are nothing more than rep- sive contacts), journalists, relief work- D.C. Making and maintaining many etition of broadcast radio reports— ers, nongovernmental organizations friends is critical to this effort. classic circular reporting. (NGOs). All of these individuals have Everyone who leaves the compound Be Aware. Hard work is necessary insight and move around the city in should periodically undergo regular to detect critical indicators that es- the course of their daily business. debriefing. Detecting changes in the tablish normal levels of activity. An Casual debriefing, generally pleas- city’s rhythm through its traffic and essential element of this program is ant with frequent conversation, is the pedestrian patterns, the mood of the regular personal reconnaissance by best way to collect information from populace, and the number of men in the S2. To the maximum extent con- these sources. A smiling face, a liter the marketplace should be the focus sistent within the force protection pos- of bottled water, and genuine interest of these debriefings. ture, the S2 and essential analysts will yield extensive information. Maps Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). must move around the city daily to and photographs will help enable While SIGINT is a source of great gain familiarity with the ground and the these sources to be specific in their potential, this is a fundamentally dif- city’s tempo. Once the S2 attains fa- reporting as they respond to questions ferent environment from the classical miliarity, he should escort the various

22 Military Intelligence unit commanders around the city, reference number for each building tial for missing essential indicators. highlighting the indicators of “nor- and overhead imagery to enable the Finally, do not forget the force multi- malcy,” and the various factional en- observer to know what is on the other pliers available in the various offices claves and friction points in the city. side of adjacent buildings out of his of the embassy. Consult with the sight. Everyone Can Help. The great- available experts and learn from their est collector in the organization is Analysis experiences in the city. the individual Marine standing his I have described some of the Dissemination: Dissemination post. Encourage all personnel to sources of information available in must reach down to the individual establish the norms of activity in their the city. The volume of reporting gen- level. The S2 should issue updates vicinities and to report anything out erated by an active collection effort in written form twice daily, preferably of the ordinary. For example, the fact is immense. A successful effort will on a schedule that will support regu- that the women did not make their yield a mosaic-like portrayal of the lar updates by subordinate com- usual dawn journey to the well across city with significant gaps in the pic- manders as part of their daily the street could be a critical indica- ture. Sifting through the reports and routines. The force must establish tor of impending combat operations. assembling a coherent understand- procedures for the rapid dissemina- Our snipers and reconnaissance ing of the situation in the city is a tion of time-sensitive information. Marines excelled at this task, as one daunting task requiring the focused SIGINT indicators of impending would expect of trained observers. effort of the best minds in the S2 el- threats will frequently occur within By careful observation, one can iden- ement. The first place to start pre- minutes of the event; the intelligence tify individuals and specific vehicles paring for this challenge is the library. element must broadcast warnings of interest. The S2 can then consult Analysts must fully absorb cultural immediately to all posts for appro- the network of friends to develop a information, an area in which the in- priate action. Detailed information re- cross-index of names, faces, and telligence community rarely excels. garding the source of the report is associated vehicles. Fusing this in- Consult popular literature, periodi- unnecessary, and the S2 must ag- formation with SIGINT to identify spe- cals, social histories, travelogues, gressively employ report sanitiza- cific leaders operating near the U.S. and even fiction to develop at least a tion. force is the next step. Indications of partial understanding of the culture Conclusion surveillance activity against U.S. within which the force is operating. In conclusion, operating in cities in forces constitute an immediate re- The next step is a thorough study of chaos presents unique challenges porting requirement for all observers. the origin of the situation at hand and for the intelligence officer. Aggressive Maintenance of detailed observation the historical precedents for opera- exploitation of nontraditional sources logs at all observation posts (OPs) tions in the city in question. One can of information, cultural awareness, will yield trend data for analysis and be sure that the various factions op- careful cultivation of friendships and ensures high standards of vigilance. erating in the area have done their relationships, full coordination with homework and understand what has Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). in-country experts, and extensive dis- happened in the city in the past. Our The most useful imagery product in semination to the lowest levels are analyst is playing catch-up and must an urban environment is a large for- the formula for success. Do not ex- turn to the task with great intensity. mat, hard-copy print of the entire city. pect anyone at the theater Joint In- The S2 shop and the subordinate The focus of our analytical effort telligence Center or in Washington, commanders’ command posts are ill must be to provide predictive intelli- D.C., to tell you what is going on equipped without these prints—they gence to the supported force and its three blocks away. Getting that in- should be on prominent display and commander. The goal is to prevent formation is the S2’s job. form the basis of reference for op- surprise and promote situational erations in the city. One can overlay awareness. Simply put, analytical a grid system on the photos that duties are extremely important and Major Paul Shelton is a Marine intelligence match the projection of the maps in we should not frequently rotate ana- officer currently serving with the Marine use, if gridded reference products are lysts in and out of the city. They Forces-Atlantic in the G3/5 Future Opera- not available. A further refinement is tions and Plans Section. He is a recent should be completely immersed and graduate of the Marine Corps School of to establish a standardized number- remain committed to the operation Advanced Warfighting. He wrote this ar- ing system to label all structures in until its conclusion or the end of their ticle while attending the U.S. Army Com- contested areas. This is a critical long-term rotations. Short-term rota- mand and General Staff College and based aspect of establishing effective re- it on his two-month assignment in 1996 as tion of analytical personnel will re- the Assistant Intelligence Officer for 22d porting procedures from OPs. Each sult in unacceptable situational Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Opera- OP must have diagrams listing the awareness and an increased poten- tions Capable).

January-March 2002 23 The Commercial Satellite Multispectral Imagery (MSI) Threat by Chief Warrant Officer Four combination has helped place the “ Multispectral scanners (MSSs) Thomas J. Quedensley, most current, accurate, and com- sense energy in several narrow NE ARNG prehensive knowledge of terrain spectral bands simultaneously. At one time, the primary imagery in- and infrastructure quickly into the These bands range from the ul- telligence (IMINT) threat to the United hands of mission planners. The traviolet to the infrared portion of the EM spectrum. States was from the former Soviet U.S. military successfully em- “ The Thematic Mapper (TM) is an Union. Now, through the proliferation ployed commercial imagery during advanced MSS designed to of space-based, multispectral imag- the Gulf War, and support missions achieve higher image resolution, ing systems for profit, nations and or- in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia- sharper spectral separation, and ganizations that previously lacked Herzegovina, and Kosovo. MSI is greater radiometric accuracy in access to these imagery products can generally timelier than other com- comparison to MSS. Thermal use them. mercial systems, may be the only scanners sense only the ther- information available in the early mal portion of the spectrum. stages of a crisis or emergency, “ Panchromatic or “PAN” imagery and it is often the fastest way to provides an image in the visible The most important thing to portion of the spectrum. This im- remember is that any nation, assess post-conflict damage and plan for reconstruction. agery essentially provides a organization, or individual high-resolution, black-and-white with the means to pay for the The most important thing to remem- image of the targeted facility or imagery may now acquire it. ber is that any nation, organization, area. or individual with the means to pay for “ Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) the imagery may now acquire it. For uses its own emitted energy to The commercial space imagery a relatively small investment, a some- record characteristics of the ter- market has developed high-resolu- what unsophisticated organization rain. Because atmosphere and tion imaging technology that has can develop a workable and useful weather have little effect on these both civilian and military applica- imagery analysis capability without radar systems, SAR imagery pro- tions. This technology has made it establishing an expensive and com- vides day-or-night and all-weather largely unnecessary for many poten- imaging capabilities. plicated infrastructure. This capabil- tial adversaries to have their own ity will only improve as costs Unlike traditional photographic imaging capabilities. The Defense In- decrease and hardware and software cameras, MSSs record data in a digi- telligence Agency (DIA) has pub- improve. “Space imagery is going to tal format that we can store, manipu- lished a list of operational and be part of the intelligence trade for late, enhance, and print out on film. intelligence functions that commer- the other 190 countries that haven’t The resulting imagery products can cial MSI systems can support. The had access to it,” says John Pike support a variety of imaging applica- Agency’s involvement in military ex- of the Federation of American Sci- tions: ercises has demonstrated the util- entists in Washington, D.C.1 ity of MSI and helped define the “ Image analysis is helpful for tar- requirements for multispectral data. MSI System Review get area studies, broad-area DIA applications supported by MSI MSI’s analytical potential results search, or other applications include broad-area search, contin- from the sensor’s ability to measure requiring wide-area enhanced gency planning, counternarcotics, both the visible and non-visible wave- imagery. Different band configu- counterterrorism, current opera- lengths of the electromagnetic (EM) rations can enhance various terrain features. Users can “geo- tions, disaster relief, environmental spectrum, and it frequently reveals reference” these images to a spe- monitoring, hydrography, targeting, more about an object than analyz- cific mapping projection to treaty monitoring, mapping, charting, ing an image in only one wavelength provide current mapping data and resource monitoring. band can. Remote-sensing satel- where either no maps or out- During the past decade, the U.S. lites often carry one or more imag- dated maps are available. military has acquired commercial ing sensors on-board, each “ Change detection is a spectral satellite imagery to supplement providing data with unique charac- analysis technique that com- national technical means. This teristics and applications: pares two reference images and

24 Military Intelligence highlights the changes or lack satellite progresses westward, Combinations of collection sys- of change between them. tracking the sun’s progress. There- tems with different resolutions can “ Perspective view imaging is a fore, the satellite crosses the equa- produce a more useful product. For three-dimensional image simu- tor at approximately the same local example, the current Landsat 7 TM lating the view of a given point time, with slightly later crossings in system has 30-meter resolution and from a specified position, alti- the northern latitudes and slightly is suitable for an image map at a tude, and direction. earlier crossings in the southern lati- scale of 1:100,000. If one merged “ A mosaic image uses two or tudes. The French SPOT (System the same data with the French SPOT more adjacent MSI images, pro- Probatoire d’Observation de La PAN image with 10-meter resolution, viding contiguous coverage of a Terre) 2, for example, descends the resulting product could serve as specific area of interest. across the equator at 10:30 A.M. lo- a 1:25,000 image map. Today, com- “ Terrain-categorized (TERCAT) cal time, while the U.S. Landsat 5 mercial satellite imagery can accu- imagery is a color-coded image crosses the equator at 9:45 A.M lo- rately map more than 90 percent of in which the pixels represent various spectral groups such as cal time. the world, with a ground resolution forest, agriculture, water, and Landsat 7 orbits the earth every 98 of 10 meters or less. urban areas. The resulting im- minutes, and it requires 16 days for The MSI Market age is useful in determining ter- its orbital pattern to progress west- The commercial imagery market rain categories and analyzing ward to repeat, or revisit, a point of the area for trafficability. is likely to continue to grow as ad- coverage. This revisit capability is ditional countries and private com- Commercial MSI is available from a important in two respects—it in- panies enter the arena. According variety of space-based sensors. (See creases the potential frequency of to officials of the companies devel- Figure 1.) coverage of areas where cloud cover oping the next generation of MSI is a problem and provides an oppor- Capabilities systems, the biggest near-term tunity for viewing certain areas on market will not be urban planners Most commercial imaging satel- successive days. The development and scientists but defense minis- lites share common orbital charac- of sensors that operators can point tries. Company officials view the teristics, including near-polar and enables off-nadir viewing during the defense market as one way of mak- sun-synchronous orbits. Sun-syn- satellite passes. The French SPOT ing their investments pay. The pur- chronous orbits take advantage of 2 has a 103-minute orbital pattern chase of increasing amounts of the early morning skies, which are that revisits a given location every commercial data by defense and in- generally clearer than those later in 26 days. The off-nadir revisit time, telligence groups “is a given,” ac- the day, and provide repeatable sun using its pointable scanner, is just cording to the Director of The North illumination. With each orbit, the 3 days. American Remote-Sensing Indus- tries Association.2 Spatial Generally, imagery products are Satellite Owner/Operator Resolution available for sale by arrangements between satellite imaging providers CBERS Brazilian/Chinese Governments 20-160 meters and companies which establish RADARSAT Canadian Government 8-30 meters ground stations for the receipt of raw ERS-1/2 European Space Agency (ESA) 30 meters data. These companies (domestic IKONOS Space Imaging, U.S. Commercial 1-4 meters and foreign) pay for the exclusive IRS-1C Indian Government 10 meters rights to process and sell the data EROS-1 Israeli Government 1.8 meters in their respective regions. A client JERS SAR Japanese Government 18 meters purchase of imaging services nor- SPOT-1/2 French Commercial 10-20 meters mally covers a specific number of Almaz-2 Russian Government 5 meters images for an area. All other images Resurs-02 Russian Government 27 meters obtained are then available for dis- SPIN-2 Russian Government 2 meters tribution by the company to any Landsat 5-TM U.S. Government 30-120 meters buyer. Landsat 7 U.S. Government 15-60 meters Any state can negotiate a “sensed- OrbView-2 Orbital Image, U.S. Commercial 1 km state provision,” giving them the right Figure 1. Some Government-Sponsored and Commerical to request and receive the raw data Remote-Sensing Satellites. of images at a reasonable fee to pre-

January-March 2002 25 clude others from buying them. As Gilbert Rye, President of Orbimage Operator Number of Satellites Launched and Planned Sciences Corporation, explains,“... if 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 a regional partner has areas it con- 1 siders sensitive and prefers not to Space Imaging (U.S.) have imagery of those areas widely EarthWatch (U.S.) 2 disseminated, we’re willing to enter into OrbView (U.S.) 11 that kind of arrangement.”3 In 1994, the Clinton Administration, West Indian Space (U.S.-Israel) 1131 fearful of foreign economic competi- Russia 1 tion, decided that private companies India 1 could build and launch satellites with high-resolution sensors previously South Korea 1 available only to the intelligence Figure 2. Potential Commerical Satellites with community. These companies could One-Meter Resolution by 2003. then provide the resulting imagery advantage the United States now has dian Defense Minister Arthur on the global market. Several satel- over other countries. The U.S. military Eggleton said— lite imaging firms began developing envisions a much smaller force on the As modern remote-sensing sat- satellites with 1-meter or better reso- ground in the future, and is counting ellites can produce imagery lution. Recently, Space Imaging, on information dominance to gain the whose quality approaches that Inc., has successfully launched its quick advantage and break an obtained from specialized intel- IKONOS satellite capable of 1-meter enemy’s will to fight. Nations beyond ligence satellites, we must en- resolution PAN images. the first tier of military powers will, for sure that the data produced by Other countries are also entering the first time, have access to viable Canadian satellites cannot be the high-resolution marketplace. satellite imaging capabilities resulting used to the detriment of our Russia is already selling 2-meter- in a decrease in the potential for U.S. national security and that of our resolution images from former mili- military forces to achieve strategic sur- allies.6 tary satellites, and France, Israel, prise and dominance. “It will change and Japan plan to market high-reso- operations. Tactical surprise will be U.S. commercial imagery provid- lution imagery. By 2003, 14 satel- more difficult to achieve,” states Mar- ers collect MSI in accordance with lites capable of producing 1-meter tin Faga, former head of the National an “open skies” principle. This resolution images should be opera- Reconnaissance Office (NRO).5 The means that other nations can have tional (see Figure 2). new generation of high-resolution sat- nondiscriminatory access to data Assessment of IMINT Risks ellites can make it possible to iden- collected anywhere in the world. tify the exact type of aircraft on an The U.S. Government has drafted Foreign intelligence agencies are airfield or a specific type of missile regulations containing a number of among the largest buyers of high- site. provisions that would enable it to resolution images. “International se- restrict, even commandeer, private curity issues are serious,” according Operational Security imagery sensing capabilities for to Ray Williamson, a senior re- The international community, de- purposes of national security, for- searcher at the George Washington spite its best efforts, finds it in- eign policy, and international obli- University Space Policy Institute. creasingly more difficult to control gations. Other nations are also “Iraq would be interested in informa- and regulate the spread of ad- taking steps toward legislation that tion about Saudi Arabia. Iran would vanced technologies that have mili- would give their governments “shut- like to see data about Israel. India tary and terrorist uses. These ter control.” and Pakistan would like to have in- attempts at regulation, or “shutter 4 formation about each other.” If a na- control,” mean that the govern- Conclusion tion had concerns about troop ments reserve the right to prohibit The current commercial satellite buildup on its border, it could put in commercial satellite companies imagery industry can provide a po- a standing order for the satellite to from distributing or gathering im- tentially adversarial nation or group take pictures every time it passed agery of any area deemed impor- with the capabilities to acquire and over the border. tant to national security. When analyze MSI and potentially erode During future conflicts, this greater asked to comment on proposed U.S. battlefield information domi- access could lessen the information “shutter control” legislation, Cana- nance. Mission planners and field

26 Military Intelligence commanders must be aware that other nations a better understand- Defense News, 30 June-6 July 1997, prospective adversaries now have ing of probable U.S. capabilities. page 4. imagery acquisition capabilities The introduction of newer, more 3. Interview with Gilbert Rye, Space similar to their own and may have News, 29 September-5 October 1997, sophisticated commercial MSI sys- page 22. comparable analytical capabilities tems will increase the future IMINT as well. 4. Graham, Mary, “High Resolution threat. Groups or nations seeking Unresolved,” The Atlantic Monthly, What can we do to counter this to exploit this newfound informa- July 1996. threat? First, we must remember tion need only to invest in ground- 5. Holzer, Robert, “Tactical Surprise May that the commercial MSI risk is based processing systems, Be Obsolete,” Defense News, 3 April strategic rather than tactical. MSI high-order software, and analytical 2000, page 1. allows us to detect activities, skills. We should always be mind- 6. Berger, Brian and Pugliese, David, study target and terrain character- ful that the eyes of passing satel- “Canada Aims To Control Commercial istics, and monitor equipment and lites will be watching most of our Space Images,” Defense News, 12 July 1999, page 18. facilities. MSI gives a potential future operations. adversary the means to conduct a more precise and detailed study of future areas of operations. Sec- Chief Warrant Officer Four Thomas ond, the imagery capabilities of Endnotes Quedensley, NE ARNG, has more than 20 years of combined active and reserve duty. 1. Hanley, Colleen and Messina, Joe commercial MSI alone cannot ful- He is currently serving as the All-Source “Commercial Satellite Imaging Helps DOD Intelligence Technician (350B) for the fill an adversary’s intelligence re- Maintain the Peace,” Defense & 3436th Military Intelligence Detachment quirements. Commercial MSI can Security Electronics, February 1996, (Production Group), USAR, Lincoln, Ne- support or trigger other information- page 28. braska. Readers may contact him by tele- gathering activity while high-reso- 2. De Selding, Peter B, “Satellite Firms phone at (402) 471-4486 or by E-mail at lution commercial imagery will give Shift To Military As Market For Images”, [email protected].

Satellite Imagery, photo of Serbia.

January-March 2002 27 by Captain Fred Hoffman, USAR ate supported a U.S. retrenchment Chinese officials had cautioned Kim in Asia. A May 1976 poll conducted Il Sung, then President of the Demo- In early 1975, candidate Jimmy cratic People’s Republic of Korea Carter declared that, if elected presi- by the Foreign Policy Association revealed majority support for the (North Korea), against launching an dent, he would order the withdrawal attack on South Korea.5 In August of all U.S. ground forces from the gradual removal of U.S. Forces in 1 1976, North Korean troops attacked Korean peninsula. Less than a week Korea. Six months later, the Wash- ington Post broke the news that the and killed members of a U.S. mili- after his inauguration, President tary work party in the DMZ. Carter vigorously moved to keep his U.S. Government was investigating campaign pledge. For two and a half an alleged influence-peddling cam- As Director of Central Intelligence years thereafter, in the face of in- paign conducted by the South Ko- (DCI) in the outgoing Ford Adminis- creasing opposition, President Carter rean Government against elected tration, George Bush made several remained steadfast in his determi- U.S. officials, further reducing popu- trips to Plains, Georgia, in 1976 to nation to withdraw all U.S. ground lar support for the U.S. military pres- brief candidate (and then President- 2 forces from Korea by 1981. In July ence in South Korea. “Koreagate,” Elect) Carter on intelligence issues. 1979, however, after only 3,600 U.S. as the press quickly labeled bribery Mr. Bush found President Carter to troops had been withdrawn, Presi- scandal, only worsened the tarnished be attentive, but distrustful of the 6 dent Carter grudgingly announced image of a South Korean Government Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). the suspension of further troop with- already repeatedly lambasted for Given the tenacity with which Presi- 3 drawals. This article examines the human rights abuses. dent Carter later clung to his troop role intelligence played in his sup- Another significant factor contrib- withdrawal policy, one might have port in 1975 for the complete with- uting to support for reduction of the expected him to demonstrate a keen drawal of U.S. ground forces, his U.S. military presence was the interest in any intelligence regarding 1977 policy decision as President to changing balance of military and Korea. Surprisingly, this was not the carry out this withdrawal, and his economic power on the Korean Pen- case. In fact, Don Oberdorfer writes reluctant decision in 1979 to scuttle insula. After peaking at 360,000 dur- that President-Elect Carter turned the plan. ing the Korean War, U.S. troop levels down a proposed CIA briefing on hovered around 60,000 throughout Korea, and during his administration President Carter’s intention to with- rarely attended National Security draw U.S. ground forces from Korea the 1950s and 1960s. During those two decades, rapid growth in South Council (NSC) discussions regard- was first publicly enunciated in Janu- 7 Korean economic and military ing Korea. Not only did intelligence ary 1975, during the early days of play little or no apparent role in Presi- his candidacy; one should consider strength caused some U.S. officials to favor reducing U.S. forces there. dent Carter’s decision to withdraw it within the context of events and U.S. ground forces from South Ko- circumstances during the period be- In 1970, President Richard Nixon withdrew one of the two divisions then rea, neither former President Carter tween his candidacy and inaugura- nor any of his advisors have ever iden- tion. In April 1975, communist forces based in Korea, reducing U.S. mili- tary personnel from 60,000 to tified an intelligence basis for the captured Saigon. In addition to wres- 8 4 withdrawal decision. tling with morale, race, and sub- 40,000. stance abuse problems, the U.S. Despite the initiation of an inter- Troop Withdrawal Decision military at the time suffered from low Korean dialogue in 1972, military On 26 January 1977, six days af- public esteem and consequent re- tensions remained high on the pen- ter his inauguration, President Carter cruiting difficulties. In the wake of the insula throughout the early- to mid- issued Presidential Review Memo- Vietnam conflict, the U.S. economy 1970s. North Korea seized a U.S. randum 13 (PRM 13) Korea. In continued to reel from the long-term naval ship, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. response, Richard Holbrooke, Presi- effects of our “guns and butter” poli- In late 1974, the first North Korean dent Carter’s newly designated As- cies, a situation exacerbated by the tunnel was discovered underneath sistant Secretary of State for East 1973 oil crisis. In the mid-1970s, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) be- Asian and Pacific Affairs, formed the given the sad experience of Vietnam tween the Koreas and a second tun- interagency East Asia Informal and economic problems at home, nel a few months later. In April 1976, Group (EAIG) to conduct this review. most of Congress and the elector- intelligence reports revealed that Members of the EAIG were shocked

28 Military Intelligence when Secretary of State Cyrus R. Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski effec- Advisor Brzezinski all professed Vance soon passed on guidance tively neutralized President Carter’s to have personally opposed the from the White House that the group DCI, Stansfield Turner, by limiting his withdrawal plan, but at the time should not study whether to withdraw access to the President.11 When the they all loyally carried out the ground forces, but merely how to do Carter Administration announced the president’s instructions with re- so. William Gleysteen, an EAIG withdrawal plan, Mr. Turner was to spect to it.15 By contrast, when member who later became Carter’s air his misgivings about the plan at Major General John Singlaub, the ambassador to the Republic of Ko- a special NSC meeting. President Chief of Staff of U.S. Forces in rea (ROK), writes: Carter was unmoved by his DCI’s Korea, told a reporter in May 1977 pleas.12 that the withdrawal plan would lead Angered by this news, we ended Despite strong misgivings even to war, President Carter promptly 16 the first meeting with a mutinous among his closest advisors, Jimmy fired him. This event galvanized agreement about how to deal with Carter doggedly pressed ahead with congressional opposition to the this White House dictate. Some his troop withdrawal plan. plan, opposition which steadily participants threatened to refuse grew during the next two years. to cooperate; others threatened From the beginning of the Carter While his advisors agonized over to publicize the issue, perhaps Administration in 1977 until how to dissuade the President by way of Congress. The angry, mid-1979, the conduct of Ameri- without appearing disloyal, the in- fractious session ended in bu- can policy toward Korea was telligence community continued to reaucratic chaos.9 encumbered by fundamental exploit newly available satellite im- opposition within the bureau- agery capabilities to examine the The ripples from the shock first felt cracy (both civilian and military) North Korean ground force strength by the EAIG quickly extended not and the Congress (both Repub- more closely. As early as May only to dismayed U.S. military and licans and Democrats) to the 1975, John Armstrong, a West intelligence officials but also to U.S. president’s efforts to withdraw Point graduate and Vietnam vet- allies Japan and the ROK. Neither all U.S. ground forces from Ko- eran working as a civilian imagery country had been consulted by any rea.13 U.S. officials before President analyst at Fort Meade, Maryland, Carter’s decision. Examining President Carter’s de- observed the existence of many more North Korean tanks than had As a candidate running in the first cision-making style, Vincent Davis previously been reported. presidential election since in 1979 made three observations Watergate, Jimmy Carter clearly that partially explain this phenom- Within a few weeks, Armstrong 14 benefited from his independence from enon: identified an entirely new tank di- the Washington establishment. As ! He preferred written briefings, vision (about 270 tanks and 100 ar- President, however, his lack of con- which reduced the ability of mored personnel carriers) in a nections inside the Washington staffers to plead their cases valley about fifty miles north of the “Beltway,” in particular among de- before him. DMZ. Before Armstrong’s involve- fense and intelligence professionals, ! He tended to rush into deci- ment, there had been little effort turned his much-touted outsider sta- sions without any long-term to compare the overall strength of tus into a liability. Despite having plan or vision. North Korean units in the latest graduated from the U.S. Naval Acad- ! He placed a premium on per- pictures with those of previous emy, Jimmy Carter did not have sonal loyalty, and preferred months or years. Armstrong’s first close ties to the military establish- working with just a handful of intensive study, completed in De- ment. Sam Sarkesian observed dur- trusted advisors. cember 1975, reported that the ing the latter part of the Carter Carter’s inner circle tightly con- North Korean tank forces were presidency, “National security re- trolled who, and what, the Presi- about 80 percent larger than previ- mains the prime province of military dent saw. The critical players ously estimated. Armed with this experts and civilian specialists who involved in formulating policy to- alarming finding, he persuaded the tend to develop a legitimacy be- ward the ROK during the Carter Army to assign six more full-time cause of their expertise—an exper- years were Secretary of State analysts to his project. During the tise, it might be added, upon which Cyrus Vance, Secretary of De- next two years, his team docu- most Presidents depend.”10 Through- fense Harold Brown, National Se- mented the development of North out his presidency, he held both his curity Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Korean special forces units—which DCI and the intelligence community and the EAIG. Years later, Secre- were training on mock-ups of South at arm’s length. National Security tary Vance, Secretary Brown, and Korean highways and terrain—and

January-March 2002 29 a major increase in the number and intelligence information on Korea Regarding Possible Normalization forward deployment of North Ko- was available to Jimmy Carter of Relations With North Korea,” rean artillery.17 CRS Report for Congress, 94-933S when he was both President-Elect (Washington, DC: Congressional By mid-1978, U.S. imagery ana- and President. However, due to the Research Service, Library of Con- lysts had not only concluded that combination of his leadership style, gress, 29 November 1994), page 5. North Korean tank forces were 80 personality traits, outsider status, 6. Andrew, Christopher, For the percent larger than previously be- and innate distrust of the intelli- President’s Eyes Only: Secret gence community, intelligence in- Intelligence and the American lieved but also determined that Presidency from Washington to North Korean maneuver battalions formation played a minor role in his Bush (New York: Harper Collins actually outnumbered South Ko- decision-making on the troop with- Publishers, 1995), page 426. rean forces by an alarming two-to- drawal issue. The extent of Presi- 7. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, page one (2:1) ratio. In January 1979, dent Carter’s reluctance to 85. these classified findings were abandon his withdrawal plan, and 8. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, page leaked to the media. Within ten the depth of his distrust for the in- 85. days, Democratic Senators Rob- telligence community, are revealed 9. Gleysteen, page 23. ert C. Byrd, Gary Hart, and Samuel in a 1999 statement he made to 10. Sarkesian, Sam C. “Introduction,” in A. Nunn, Jr., of the Senate Armed long-time Washington Post corre- Defense Policy and the Presi- Services Committee, joined with spondent Don Oberdorfer. Fully two dency,” page 13. their Republican colleagues Sena- decades after scrapping his plan, 11. Andrew, page 430. tors William S. Cohen and John Carter voiced suspicion to Oberdorfer 12. Oberdorfer, Don, “Carter’s Decision Tower to endorse suspension of fur- that the 1978 intelligence commu- on Korea Traced Back to January, ther troop withdrawals.18 On 20 nity findings on North Korean mili- 1975,” Washington Post, 12 June 1977, page A15. January 1979, President Carter is- tary strength had actually been sued PRM 45 U.S. Policy Toward manipulated by the Defense Intelli- 13. Gleysteen, page 6. Korea, calling for a new policy re- gence Agency.19 Had the United 14. Davis, Vincent, “The President and States removed all ground troops from the National Security Apparatus,” in view of the withdrawal plan. On 20 Defense Policy and the Presidency, July 1979, he grudgingly an- South Korea during Carter’s presi- pages 66-67. dency, especially so soon after the nounced the suspension of all fur- 15. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, ther troop withdrawals until the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, it is conceiv- page 90. completion of a review of the mili- able that North Korean leader Kim Il 16. Wilson, George C. “House Panel tary balance on the Korean Penin- Sung could have interpreted this as a Begins ‘Frontal Assault’ on Korea sula. Ronald Reagan’s defeat of green light to reunify the Korean Pen- Policy,” Washington Post, 26 May Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presiden- insula by force of arms. 1977, page A1. tial election put the final nail in the 17. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pages 101-102. coffin of President Carter’s stub- Endnotes bornly defended troop withdrawal 18. Wilson, George C. “Troop With- 1. Jan, George P. “The United States, drawal from South Korea Too Risky at plan. China and Japan,” in Defense Policy Present, Senators Say,” Washington and the Presidency: Carter’s First Post, 24 January 1977, page A3. Conclusion Years, Sarkesian, Sam C., Editor This case study demonstrates (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 19. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, page 103. that even the most timely, accu- 1979), page 293. rate, and compelling intelligence 2. Oberdorfer, Don, The Two Koreas: A information can be of limited value Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), if policy-makers choose to ignore page 92. it. The study also underlines the CPT Fred Hoffman, a Human Intelli- 3. Gleysteen Jr., William H., Massive gence Officer is assigned to the Joint critical importance of communica- Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Reserve Unit, Defense Intelligence tions and trust between the Presi- Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washing- Agency, holds a Master of Arts in Asian dent of the United States, his ton, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999), Studies (Chinese) from the University of advisors, and Executive Branch page 3. Michigan (’83). He is a recent graduate of the Postgraduate Intelligence Program 4. Bandow, Doug, “Korea: The Case for intelligence agencies. If a presi- for Reservists (PGIP-R) from the Joint Disengagement,” Cato Institute Policy dent distrusts his intelligence ad- Military Intelligence College. In his ci- Analysis, Number 96, 8 December 1987, vilian capacity, CPT Hoffman works as visors and their subordinate URL , accessed 8 January 2000. to a Department of Defense agency. You ward the information they provide 5. Davis, Zachary S., et. al., Procedural can contact CPT Hoffman by e-mail at: will be limited. An abundance of and Jurisdictional Questions [email protected].

30 Military Intelligence by Captain John C. Bento, witnessed a successful integration (seven of eight National Guard CA ARNG AGR of both AC and Reserve Compo- divisions are still missing an ACE nent (RC) members of all the mili- in their current MTOEs). In con- Building on their successful tary services. Unfortunately, due to trast, during RS 99, the ACE re- “Warfighter ’98 exercise” (WFX 98), the crises in Kosovo, elements of ceived contractor support from the U.S. Army National Guard the 8th Air Force abruptly pulled seven companies. The Battle Com- (ARNG), 40th Infantry Division (ID) out of the exercise. The 8th Air mand Training Program (BCTP) Op- Mechanized (M), kicked it up a Force and other higher headquar- erations Group D, from Fort notch in June 1999 by fighting as ters units significantly adjusted Leavenworth, Kansas, rounded out the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) their commitment to RS 99 by the expertise necessary to prepare Headquarters at “Roving Sands ’99" sending response cells. Only the for RS 99. (RS 99), conducted at Fort Bliss, 40th ID (M) and 32d Army Air Mis- Texas. This was the first time that sile Defense Command (a modified Added Collection and a National Guard division partici- table of organization and equip- Processing Equipment pated in an operational level exer- ment [MTOE]-structured AC/RC cise as an ARFOR headquarters. Enhanced Operations unit) sent a full complement of di- With the U.S. Army at its lowest Just before the exercise, the Di- vision-level players. strength in recent years, we must vision received three ASAS RWS incorporate National Guard divi- Support Provided systems that III Corps dedicated sions into exercises, in part be- III Corps augmented the ARFOR to help the ARFOR ACE receive cause it provides the Guard units ACE with the All-Source Analysis and parse the large volume of data with access to the latest technolo- System (ASAS) Remote Worksta- it would have to process. The 40th gies. For this reason, it is more ad- tion (RWS), unmanned aerial ID (M) matched those three Sun vantageous for a National Guard vehicles (UAVs), and Joint Surveil- Microsystems with three of their battle captain to work with the lance Target Attack Radar System own, modified the architecture from same intelligence indicators that (Joint STARS) operators. A team an entirely WLNB configuration, their active duty counterparts use. of five officers and noncommis- and fielded a complete, RWS-con- sioned officers (NCOs) from the figured ACE. WLNBs became a Exercise Participants 104th Military Intelligence (MI) secondary means to process data, The 40th ID’s Active Component Battalion, 4th ID (M), also sup- which we used as imagery intelli- (AC) teaming headquarters (III ported the 40th ID (M) on the exer- gence (IMINT) sidebar worksta- Corps) and teamed division (4th ID cise. On four different occasions tions. The rest of the systems [M]) augmented the division’s ef- before and during the exercise, the included a Joint STARS Worksta- forts with several Army Tactical team trained and guided the 40th tion (JSWS), two HUNTER UAV Command and Control Systems ID (M) through the growing pains baseline systems, COLISEUM (ATCCSs). The soldiers of the Sun- of standing up an ARFOR ACE. (Community On-Line Intelligence burst Division’s Analysis and Con- This teaming effort closely com- System for End Users and Man- trol Element (ACE) met the pares to the 1st Cavalry Division’s agers) software, and the Advance challenge head-on and achieved a efforts to prepare the 49th Armored Field Artillery Tactical Data Sys- high level of proficiency on the bor- Division, Texas ARNG, for their tem (AFATDS). These added sys- rowed operating systems. Bosnian ARFOR headquarters mis- tems were a revelation for most of the ARNG soldiers who had not RS 99 was a Commander in sion early in 1999. seen them before. Chief, U.S, Atlantic Command- Contractor support at RS 99 was sponsored, U.S. Army Forces extensive. During their last WFX, The ASAS substitute system, Command-executed joint theater the 40th ID (M) relied exclusively WLNB, significantly challenges air and missile defense field train- on one contractor to help incorpo- ACE battle captains that partici- ing exercise employing U.S. joint rate their Warlord Notebooks pate in a typical ARNG division and multinational forces. RS 99, (WLNB) into the architecture of the WFX. They must rely solely on executed 15 through 28 June 1999, G2 section and makeshift ACE these single-source workstations

January-March 2001 31 The upcoming deployment of the 49th Armored Division to Bosnia- Herzegovina demonstrates a need for such training. Another purpose for expanding on this trend is to assist our AC team- ing partners. Shortfalls in MI sol- dier retention have forced many AC units to seek qualified Na- tional Guard personnel that can step into a job and hit the ground running. Teaming Guard divisions with AC units and giving them the experience of a joint exercise have established a trend that can enable the Army to meet its fu- ture requirements. Photos courtesy of Staff Sergeant Tom Murotake. Sergeant Tom Photos courtesy of Staff Captain Bento and colleague in the ACE. to sift through the massive vol- however, that in a heavy-text mes- ume of text messages and push sage environment, the battle cap- Captain John Bento graduated from the pertinent intelligence to the tain could easily fall into the trap Rhode Island College with a Bachelor of focusing on the monitor and of Arts degree in Soviet Studies and all-source section. By then, from Monterey Peninsula College with hopefully, the battle captain, all- lose sight of the big picture, crip- an Associate of Arts degree in Rus- source analysts, and order of pling his ability to orchestrate sian Language. He received his battle (OB) technicians would the ACE. Reserve Officer Training Corps com- have developed an accurate mission from Providence College and Conclusion is currently serving as the Tactical In- graphical intelligence summary The current Army multicompo- telligence Officer for the Division Tac- (INTSUM), updated their superi- tical Command Post, 40th Infantry ors, and adjusted the collection nent concept can only work in Division (Mechanized), California plan accordingly. the military intelligence (MI) com- Army National Guard (CA ARNG). He munity if ARNG division person- is also the division’s full-time U.S. Today’s intelligence community nel have opportunities to work Army Guard and Reserve (AGR) has better collection assets at its Deputy G2. Readers can reach CPT with the AC in a modern archi- Bento via E-mail at FAWARRIOR@ disposal. IMINT has readily be- tectural environment like RS 99. AOL.COM. come one of the customer’s pre- ferred choices for intelligence. In addition to human intelligence (HUMINT), time-sensitive IMINT is a necessity for decision- maker’s use to adjust their plans or approve targets for engage- ment. The old proverb, “A picture is worth a thousand words,” is alive and well at any level ACE. ACE personnel should be able to step back and visually monitor the moving target indicators (MTIs) on the JSWS, dynamically retask collection assets if nec- essary, keep analysts focused on the commander’s priority in- telligence requirements (PIR), and constantly feed the target- ing cell. They should be aware, Lieutenant Colonel Cushing receiving brief during Roving Sands ‘99.

32 Military Intelligence EnduringEnduring Freedom Freedom

Managing Editor’s Note: The tragic variety of related and relevant topics nior leadership and turn them events of 11 September 2001 drew an under this sub-theme and continue over to the United States. The immediate response from the people to do so through the operation’s suc- Taliban refuse. and government of the United States, cessful resolution. However, as this ! 25 September 2001: The U.S. one that now seems to have exceeded is a quarterly publication, with edit- military response to the terror- the expectations of those perpetrat- ing and publishing suspenses set by ist attacks in dubbed “Operation ing the attacks. President George W. contract, it is impossible for us to Enduring Freedom.” Bush vowed to punish those respon- keep pace with the operation’s rap- ! 28 September 2001: The United sible, later identifying the Al Qaeda idly changing tactical and strategic Nations Security Council terrorist group under the leadership of environment. We will, however, pro- passes a U.S. sponsored anti- Osama bin Laden. Founded in 1989 vide relevant background information terrorism resolution requiring by bin Laden and Muhammad Atef, Al on Operation Enduring Freedom, its each member nation to cut off Qaeda was dedicated to opposing impacts at home and abroad, and terrorist-related funding, prevent non-Islamic governments with force more focused impacts on its effects terrorist training and other activi- and violence. One of its principal goals on Military Intelligence professionals. ties on its territory, and make it was to force the United States mili- The articles within the Enduring Free- a criminal offense to support a tary out of Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and dom department reflect what we cur- terrorist organization. other Moslem states, using force as rently believe to be some of the most ! 5 October 2001: Mr. Robert its means. Even before the attacks, important issues. The timeline is pro- Stevens, an employee of Ameri- American intelligence had verified that vided to identify key milestones in can Media, Boca Raton, Florida, the group’s senior leadership were lo- the attack, subsequent reactions, becomes the first to die of an- cated in Afghanistan and under the and Enduring Freedom. It should be thrax. As of 19 November 2001, protection of that nation’s ruling party, expected that as new issues of MIPB eighteen cases have been re- the Taliban. Following the attacks, are published the type of information ported with five deaths. both the United States and Great provided may change, based on the ! 7 October 2001: U.S. and Brit- Britain demanded the Taliban appre- focus on a given area of operations, ish aircraft and missiles target hend Osama bin Laden and al or even the type of campaign being Taliban facilities in Afghanistan. Qaeda’s senior leadership and turn conducted. We will do our best to U.S. aircraft continue strikes on them over to the United States. This provide the best and most current in- Taliban facilities through 20 No- demand was refused and following formation. To assist in our efforts, and vember 2001. President Bush’s vigorous and gen- within security constraints, we request ! 8 October 2001: U.S. President erally successful coalition building that those directly involved in Endur- Bush signs an executive order effort, on 7 October 2001 U.S. and ing Freedom, provide us with relevant creating the Office of Homeland British forces initiated the bombing articles that will benefit the Military Defense. of Taliban facilities and units and Al Intelligence Corps. ! 26 October 2001: The U.S. Con- Qaeda training facilities. This military gress passes the Patriot Act campaign, given the designation, Timeline, Operation (see below) focused on combat- Operation Enduring Freedom, now Enduring Freedom ing terrorism. includes military forces from a dozen ! 11 September 2001: Terrorist ! 15 November 2001: Advances by nations with support from most of the attacks on the World Trade Cen- the Northern Alliance cause the member states of the United Nations. ter and Pentagon. Pentagon to begin thinking about Due to the critical importance and ! 15 September 2001: Osama bin counter-guerrilla operations. the numerous impacts on both the Laden and the Al Qaeda terror- ! 20 November 2001: The Taliban civil and military sectors of our na- ist organization becomes the now controls less than a third of tion, MIPB has established “Endur- focus on the U.S. investigation. Afghanistan with the Northern ing Freedom” as a sub-theme. The ! 20 September 2001: The United Alliance, supported by U.S. air contents are to be treated as a de- States and Great Britain demand strikes, poised to take the last partment within the bulletin’s format. the Taliban apprehend Osama Taliban stronghold in the north, We will publish articles on a wide bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s se- Konduz.

January-March 2002 33 Collecting Information on U.S. Persons by Lieutenant General person information. That collection, 10; collection entails receiving “for Robert W. Noonan, Jr rather, is regulated by EO 12333 use.” Army intelligence may always and implementing policy in DoD receive information, if only to deter- Editor’s Note: Given the recent pas- 5240.1-R and AR 381-10. mine its intelligence value and sage of a number of bills to control b. Intelligence components may whether it can be collected, retained, terrorism by Congress, there has collect U.S. person information when or disseminated in accordance with been concern over individual free- the component has the mission governing policy. doms and the military’s role in the (or “function”) to do so, and the infor- new judicial legislation. This article Military Intelligence must collect all is extracted from a memorandum, mation falls within one of the catego- available information regarding inter- Subject: Collecting Information on ries listed in DoD 5240.1-R and AR national terrorists who threaten the U.S. Persons, dated 5 November 381-10. The two most important cat- United States, and its interests, in- 2001, and signed by LTG Robert W. egories for present purposes are cluding those responsible for plan- Noonan, Deputy Chief of Staff for “foreign intelligence” and “counterin- ning, authorizing, committing, or 1 Intelligence. telligence.” Both categories allow aiding the terrorist attacks of 11 Sep- collection about U.S. persons rea- The 11 September 2001 terrorist at- tember 2001. We will do so - as EO sonably believed to be engaged, or tack on America has presented the 12333 directs - “in a vigorous, inno- about to engage, in international ter- United States and the U.S. Army vative and responsible manner that rorist activities. Within the United with unprecedented challenges. is consistent with the Constitution States, those activities must have a Both our nation and our Army are and applicable law, and respectful of significant connection with a foreign responding vigorously to these the principles upon which the United power, organization, or person (e.g., challenges and will ultimately be States was founded.” a foreign-based terrorist group). victorious over international terror- Key ODCSINT numbers for intelli- EO 12333 provides that “timely and ism. Achieving this victory will not gence oversight questions are (703) accurate information about the be easy, however. Our adversary is 601-1958/1551, or through the 24- activities, capabilities, plans, and in- not a clearly defined nation-state hour Intelligence Watch at (703) 697- tentions of foreign powers, organiza- with fixed borders or a standing 5484/5485. tions, and persons, and their agents, army. It is, instead, a shadowy un- is essential to the national security Endnotes derworld operating globally, with of the United States. All reasonable 1. LTG Noonan’s memorandum, especially supporters and allies in many and lawful means must be used to regarding the impact of AR 381-10, countries, including, unfortunately, deserves more study. This is provided by ensure that the United States will our own. Rooting out and eliminat- Mr. Michael H. Varhola’s article, “AR 381- receive the best intelligence pos- ing this threat to our freedom and 10, An Enabling Regulation.” sible.” That said, my staff has re- way of life will call upon every re- ceived reports from the field of source at our disposal. I am proud well-intentioned MI personnel declin- to say that Army Military Intelli- Attention NCOs ing to receive reports from local law gence (MI) will play a pivotal role Send us your articles and enforcement authorities, solely be- in helping to defeat this threat. book reviews. If you have cause the reports contain U.S. per- any experience you can share Many of the perpetrators of these son information. MI may receive on MI doctrine, professional attacks lived for some time in the information from anyone, anytime. If United States. There is evidence the information is U.S. person infor- development, or “how-to” tips, that some of their accomplices and mation, MI may retain that informa- please send them to Military supporters may have been U.S. tion if it meets the two-part test Intelligence Professional Bulle- persons, as that term is defined in discussed in paragraph b, above. If tin. Topics of interest for future Executive Order (EO) 12333. This the information received pertains issues include: analysis, global has caused concern in the field solely to the functions of other DoD conflicts, MI skills training, and regarding MI’s collection authority. components, or agencies outside tactical operations. E-mail With that in mind, I offer the fol- DoD, MI may transmit or deliver it to them [email protected] lowing guidance: the appropriate recipients, per Pro- and [email protected] a. Contrary to popular belief, cedure 4, AR 381-10. Remember, or call (520) 538-1004 and (520) there is no absolute ban on intelli- merely receiving information does not 538-0979 or DSN 879-1004. gence components collecting U.S. constitute “collection” under AR 381-

34 Military Intelligence AR 381-10, An Enabling Regulation— A View From An Intelligence Oversight Officer by Michael H. Varhola tion on citizens of the United States. tal purpose of AR 381-10 and use it In our zeal to enforce compliance with Procedure 2 gives thirteen criteria as the tool the Army intended it to be. regulations, we sometimes forget under which MI can collect informa- U.S. citizens will be operating in many what they are about. This is particu- tion on U.S. persons. These are all- capacities in every area to which we larly true in the area of intelligence encompassing. I cannot think of a deploy; some may even be members oversight. Vigorous enforcement, par- category of information on citizens that of the opposing force. We cannot ticularly in the 1970s, resulted in a MI would need that one of these crite- anticipte every situation. When MI misperception that lingers to this day: ria does not cover. Unfortunately, some needs to collect information about citi- that the intelligence oversight program individuals find it easier or safer to avoid zens of the United States to accom- exists to prevent Military Intelligence the issue altogether by simply not plish its military mission, AR 381-10 (MI) from collecting information on collecting the data on citizens they provides the procedures that enable U.S. citizens. Nothing could be fur- may need to do their complete jobs. it to do so while protecting their con- ther from the truth. The purpose of the What I hear regularly is, “I’d rather err stitutional rights and privacy. Mission regulation is just the opposite; it en- on the side of caution.” This is unfor- first, constitutional rights and privacy ables intelligence components to carry tunate and defeats the purpose of the always! Erring on the side of caution out their authorized functions effec- regulation. I have even seen units de- is not a viable option. tively while ensuring that they perform stroy information in individual security the activities that affect U.S. individu- clearance files in preparation for an As Mr. Varhola’s article was writ- als in a manner that protects their con- intelligence oversight inspection, not ten before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, MIPB asked for any stitutional rights and privacy. Any realizing that such information is “ad- change in his position. Mr. Varhola intelligence oversight inspector who ministrative,” as AR 381-10 defines provided the following comment: does not understand this may be do- that term, and that the regulation does “As far as I have seen, EO 12333 is ing more harm than good, and cer- not cover its retention. standing up quite well in the post 9/11 world. Regarding collection tainly will not be furthering combat The other side of this coin is just as readiness and mission accomplish- on U.S. persons, I have seen no bad or even worse. A small number of problems. The terrorist attack ment. MI soldiers, not understanding the came from a foreign source, and In my 30 years working in MI, I have regulation, and perhaps having had AR 381-10 allows the collection of never seen a situation in which AR exposure to heavy-handed enforce- military and military related foreign 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Ac- ment in the past, have come to be- intelligence and counterintelli- tivities, prevented an intelligence com- lieve that it is an outdated regulation gence concerning the activities, in- tentions, capabilities, MO, etc of ponent from collecting information on or is simply stupid. While there is international terrorists. The key U.S. citizens that it needed to accom- obviously a continuing need to rein- thing is cooperation and info shar- plish its mission. What I have seen is terpret the regulation as information ing among all the players: strate- intelligence components being right- technology advances and the Internet gic CI, installation security, tenant fully prevented from doing the mission becomes a bigger part of our lives, I units, PMO, CID, FBI, local authori- of others. This was particularly true believe that the regulation is sound ties, etc. If everybody is working to- gether, then the authority that is and its principles are easily transfer- after the Oklahoma City bombing when needed will be resident in at least some MI components shifted their fo- able. It is not a big intellectual leap to one of the players.” cus to domestic extremism. This vio- go from collecting open-source infor- lated AR 381-10, not only because the mation from newspapers to collect- extremists were U.S. persons, but ing the same information from Michael Varhola is currently an Intelligence Oversight Officer with the Department of the more fundamentally because it is not websites. The same considerations Army Inspector General. Mr. Varhola earned MI’s mission. It is the mission of civil- apply to the involvement of U.S. citi- his commission in Artillery through the Re- ian law enforcement, the Provost Mar- zens: mission, mission, and mis- serve Officer Training Corps at Gannon Uni- shal and the Criminal Investigation sion! versity in Erie, Pennsylvania, where he majored in Russian and German. He en- Command, and sometimes, quite As the Cold War sinks into the dis- tered the Military Intelligence Civilian Ex- frankly, MI got in the way. tant past and we move into a future of cepted Career Program (MICECP) in 1979 When it is MI’s mission, AR 381-10 smaller and more varied deployments, and worked with the 511th as a CI Opera- tions Case Officer. Readers may contact is there to provide procedures that it becomes increasingly important that Mr. Varhola via E-mail at michael.varhola@ enable the collection of the informa- MI soldiers understand the fundamen- daig.ignet.army.mil.

January-March 2002 35 Editor’s Note: In mid-October the U.S. House Judiciary Committee met to discuss adoption of the “Patriot Act” and on 26 October 2001 it was approved by Congress. The Patriot Act greatly increases the government’s ability to conduct surveillance and wiretapping operations as well as give it greater authority to detain suspects. The act is controversial, however, in that civil libertarians see the changes as a danger to our personal freedoms. The following items are the key components of the Patriot Act and are included to supplement LTG Noonan’s and Mr. Varhola’s articles. The Patriot Act would — ! Give any U.S. Attorney or state attorney general the power, in “emergency situations,” to install the Carnivore e-mail snooping system without obtaining a court order. ! Allow law enforcement agencies to obtain telephone voice mail messages with a search warrant, which is issued with less court scrutiny than the previously required wiretap warrant. ! Expand the definition of “terrorist” to include non-violent protesters at an anti-war rally. ! Make it easier for the government to tap multiple phones as part of a “roving wiretap” warrant. ! Allow the government to detain legal immigrants for seven days based only on the accusation of terrorist activity.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War by Ali Ahmad Jalali and live in rural communities in a land opment. What has developed is a Lester W. Grau, dominated by mountains and country composed of somewhat au- Foreign Military Studies Office, deserts. Modern travel is primarily re- tonomous “village states” spread Fort Leavenworth, Kansas stricted to a highway ring connect- across the entire country.1 Afghans Reprinted with permission from The ing the various cities. There is no identify themselves by Qawm—the Bear Went Over the Mountain: So- railroad network. basic subnational identity based on viet Combat Tactics in Afghani- kinship, residence, and sometimes Afghanistan has mostly been a stan, Grau, Lester W., Editor occupation. Western people may re- (Washington, D.C.: National De- loose collection of tribes and nation- fer to this as “tribe,” but this instinc- fense University Press, 1996). alities over which central governments tive social cohesiveness includes tribal had varying degrees of influence and PREFACE clans, ethnic subgroups, religious control at different times. The country Afghanistan, a multi-ethnic state in sects, locality-based groups, and has been historically known for its southwest Asia, is home to diverse groups united by interests.2 The remarkable Islamic and ethnic toler- social communities that share com- Qawm, not Afghanistan, is the basic ance. However tribal rivalries and blood mon experience through interaction unit of social community and, outside feuds, ambitions of local chieftains, with dominant states, empires, in- the family, the most important focus and tribal defiance of pervasive inter- vading armies, trade and cultural on individual loyalty. Afghanistan has, ference by the central government movements that traversed the land at times, been characterized as a dis- have kept the different parts of the land during their thousands of years of united land driven by blood feuds. The at war at different times. In such cases history. The different ethnic groups feuds center on family and Qawm. the kinship-based identity has been in modern Afghanistan (Pashtuns, Yet, the leaders of the various Qawm the major means of the community’s Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Persian- have resolved feuds and held the land political and military mobilization. speaking Hazaras, Balochis, etc.) together. Village elders can put feuds Such identity places far greater im- straddle the boundaries of the state. on hold for a decade or longer and portance on kinship and extended fam- However, their national identity is then let them resume once the agreed- ily than ideology. mostly defined by their differences on time has expired and the matter is with their ethnic kinsmen across the Afghanistan stands at a geographic still unresolved. Afghanistan’s ancient borders rather than their national crossroads that has seen the passage roots and strong ties of kinship pro- commonalities. About 99% of of many warring peoples. Each of vide an anchor against progress, but Afghanistan’s over 17 million popu- these has left their imprint on the an- also the means to cope when central lation are Muslim, of which 85% are cient land and involved the people of authority has collapsed. Historically, followers of the Sunni sect while the Afghanistan in conflict. Often this con- the collapse of the central government rest are Shia. About 85% of Afghans flict got in the way of economic devel- of Afghanistan or the destruction of its

36 Military Intelligence standing armies has never resulted in was apparent by the late 1830s. The its terms and honored them until the defeat of the nation by an invader. Great Game described in Afghanistan 1919 when Afghan troops crossed The people, relying on their decentral- was apparent by the late 1830s. The into British India, seized a village and ized political, economic and military Great Game described the British and attempted to raise a popular revolt potential, have always taken over the Russian struggle for influence along in the area. The British responded resistance against the invaders.3 This the unsettled northern frontier of Brit- with yet another invasion and was the case during two wars with ish India and in the entire region be- the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The Great Britain in the 19th century (1839- tween Russia and India. Afghanistan political settlement resulted in 1842, 1878-1880). This happened lay directly in this contested area be- Afghanistan’s full independence again in the Soviet-Afghan War. tween two empires. Russia described from Great Britain. The tactics of the Mujahideen re- her motives in the Great Game as sim- Afghanistan’s foreign policy from flected this lack of central cohesion. ply to abolish the slave trade and to 1919 and 1978 balanced the de- Their tactics were not standard, but establish order and control along her mands of her immediate neighbors, differed from valley to valley and tribe southern border. The British, however, and external powers such as the to tribe. No more than 15 percent of viewing Russian absorption of the United States, Germany and Great the guerrilla commanders were mili- lands of the Caucasus, Georgia, Britain. Normal relations with her tary professionals. However, Afghani- Khirgiz, Turkmens, Khiva and northern neighbor, the Soviet Union, stan had a conscript army and virtually Bukhara, claimed to feel threatened led to increased Soviet investment ever 22-year-old male served his two by the presence of a large, expand- and presence in Afghanistan. ing empire near India and ascribed year obligation. This provided a basic In April 1978, a small leftist group different Russian motives. The British military education which eased of Soviet-trained Afghan officers stated that Russian motives were to cooperation between the various seized control of the government and weaken British power and to gain ac- Mujahideen groups. The Mujahideen founded the Democratic Republic of cess to a warm-water port. Britain were true volunteers—unpaid warriors Afghanistan, a client state of the claimed that her own actions were to who fought to protect their faith and Soviet Union. Civil war broke out in protect the frontiers of British India. community first and their nation next. Afghanistan. The putsch installed As true volunteers, fighting for their The Great Game spilled into Af- President Nur M. Taraki, a Marxist Qawm and religion, the Mujahideen ghanistan when British forces in- who announced sweeping programs looked down on the professional sol- vaded during the First Anglo-Afghan of land distribution, changed status dier (asker) as a simple mercenary War (1839-1842). Britain claimed for women and the destruction of the who was either the victim of a press that the invasion was supposed to old Afghanistan social structure. Dis- gang or too stupid to ply any other counter Russian influence. After hard regarding the national social struc- 4 trade. This disdain did not attach to fighting, the British withdrew. By ture and mores, the new government the professional officer, who enjoyed 1869, the Russian empire reached enjoyed little popular support. The a great deal of prestige. the banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus) wobbly Taraki government was al- Afghanistan was not a guerrilla war River—the northern border of Af- most immediately met by increased ala Mao Tse Tung or Vo Nguyen Giap. ghanistan. This caused additional armed resistance as the Mujahideen The Mujahideen were not trying to force British concern. In 1878, the arrival ranks grew. In 1978, religious lead- a new ideology and government on a of a special Russian diplomatic mis- ers, in response to popular uprisings land. Rather, they fought to defend their sion to Kabul led to another British across Afghanistan, issued state- Qawm and their religion against a invasion and the Second Anglo-Af- ments of jihad (holy war) against the hostile ideology, an atheistic value ghan War. The British Army again communist regime. This was an ap- system, an oppressive central govern- withdrew. In the Anglo-Russian peal to the supranational identity of ment, and a foreign invader. It was a Treaty of 1907, the Russians agreed all Afghans—a fight to defend the faith spontaneous defense of community that Afghanistan lay outside its of Islam. The combat readiness of values and a traditional way of life by sphere of interest and agreed to con- the Army of the Democratic Repub- individual groups initially unconnected fer with Britain on all matters relat- lic of Afghanistan plunged as govern- to national or international political or- ing to Russian-Afghan relations. In ment purges swept the officer corps. ganizations.5 return, Britain agreed not to occupy Soldiers, units and entire regiments

6 or annex any part of Afghanistan nor deserted to the resistance and by The Great Game interfere in the internal affairs of that the end of l979, the actual strength Russian expansionism and empire country. Although the Amir of Af- of the Afghan Army was less than building in Central Asia began in 1734 ghanistan refused to recognize the half of its authorized 90,000. In and Moscow’s interest in Afghanistan treaty, Russia and Britain agreed to March 1979, the city of Herat revolted

January-March 2002 37 and most of the Afghan 17th Infantry 1979 was masterfully planned and tional and internal repercussions and Division mutinied and joined the re- well-executed. The Soviets seized the began to cast about for a way to with- bellion. Forces loyal to Taraki reoc- government, killed the president and draw with dignity. United Nations ne- cupied the city after the Afghan Air put their own man in his place. Ac- gotiators provided that avenue and Force bombed the city and the 17th cording to some Russian sources, by 15 October 1988, the first half of Division. Thousands of people report- they planned to stabilize the situa- the Soviet withdrawal was complete. edly died in the fighting, including tion, strengthen the army and then On 15 February 1989, the last So- some Soviet citizens. withdraw the majority of Soviet forces viet forces withdrew from Afghani- within three years. The Soviet Gen- stan. Soviet force commitment, Soviet Intervention eral Staff planned to leave all fighting initially assessed as requiring sev- The Soviet-Afghan War began over in the hands of the army of the Demo- eral months, lasted over nine years the issue of control. The Democratic cratic Republic. But Afghanistan was and required increasing numbers of Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was in full revolt, the dispirited Afghan forces. The Soviet Union reportedly nominally a socialist state governed army was unable to cope, and the killed 1.3 million people and forced by a communist party. However, the specter of defeat following a Soviet 5.5 million Afghans (a third of the pre- state only controlled some of the cit- withdrawal haunted the Politburo. In- war population) to leave the country ies, while tribal elders and clan chiefs vasion and overthrow of the govern- as refugees. Another 2 million controlled the countryside. Further- ment proved much easier than fighting Afghans were forced to migrate more, the communist party of Af- the hundreds of ubiquitous guerrilla within the country. The country has ghanistan was split into two hostile groups. The Soviet Army was trained yet to recover. factions. The factions spent more for large-scale, rapid-tempo opera- Initially the Mujahideen were all lo- time fighting each other than trying tions. They were not trained for the cal residents who took arms and to establish socialism in Afghani- platoon leaders’ war of finding and banded together into large, rather stan. In September 1979, Taraki’s closing with small, indigenous forces unwieldy, forces to seize the local Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, which would only stand and fight district capitols and loot their arms seized power and murdered Taraki. when the terrain and circumstances rooms. The DRA countered these ef- Amin’s rule proved no better and the were to their advantage. forts where it could and Mujahideen Soviet Union watched this new com- Back in the Soviet Union there was began to coalesce into much smaller munist state spin out of control. no one in charge and all decisions groups centered around the rural vil- Meanwhile, units of the army muti- were committee decisions made by lage. These small groups were nied, civil war broke out, cities and the collective leadership. General armed with a variety of weapons from villages rose in revolt and Afghani- Secretary Brezhnev became incapaci- swords and flintlock muskets to Brit- stan began to slip away from tated in 1980 but did not die until ish bolt-action rifles and older Soviet Moscow’s control and influence. Le- November 1982. He was succeeded and Soviet-bloc weapons provided to onid Brezhnev, the aged Soviet Gen- by the ailing Yuri Andropov. General Afghanistan over the years. The gue- eral Secretary, saw that direct Secretary Andropov lasted less than rilla commanders were usually influ- military intervention was the only way two years and was succeeded by the ential villagers who already had a to prevent his client state from disin- faltering Konstantin Chernenko in leadership role in the local area. Few tegrating into complete chaos. He February 1984. General Secretary had any professional military expe- decided to intervene. Chernenko died in March 1985. Al- rience. Rebellion was wide-spread, The obvious models for intervention though the military leadership kept but uncoordinated since the resis- were Hungary in 1956 and Czecho- recommending withdrawal, during tance was formed along tribal and slovakia in 1968. The Soviet General this “twilight of the general secretar- ethnic lines. Staff planned the Afghanistan inva- ies” no one was making any major The Soviet invasion changed the sion based on these models. How- decisions as to the conduct and out- nature of the Mujahideen resistance. ever, there was a significant come of the war in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan’s neighbors, Pakistan difference that the Soviet planners war bumped on at its own pace. Fi- and Iran, nervously regarded the ad- missed. Afghanistan was embroiled nally, Mikhail Gorbachev came to vance to the Soviet Army to their in a civil war and a coup de main power. His first instinct was to order borders and began providing training would only gain control of the cen- military victory in Afghanistan within and material support to the tral government, not the countryside. a year. Following this bloodiest year Mujahideen. The United States, Although participating military units of the war, Gorbachev realized that Peoples Republic of China, Britain, were briefed at the last minute, the the Soviets could not win in Afghani- France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Soviet Christmas Eve invasion of stan without unacceptable interna- and the United Arab Emirates began

38 Military Intelligence funneling military, humanitarian and The strategic struggle for Afghani- mountain warrior, using ambush sites financial aid to the Mujahideen stan was a fight to strangle the inherited from his ancestors, can in- through Pakistan. Pakistan’s as- other’s logistics. The Mujahideen flict “death from a thousand cuts”. sessment was that the Soviet Union targeted the Soviet lines of commu- The terrain dictates different tactics, had come to Afghanistan to stay and nication—the crucial road network force structure and equipment from it was in Pakistan’s best interests over which the Soviet supplies had those of conventional war. to support those Mujahideen who to travel. The Soviet attack on the This book is not a complete his- would never accept the Soviet pres- Mujahideen logistics was two tory of the Soviet-Afghan War. ence. The Pakistan Inter-Services phased. From 1980 until 1985, the Rather, it is a series of combat Intelligence (ISI) Agency began to Soviets sought to eliminate vignettes as recalled by the funnel aid through various Afghan Mujahideen support in the rural coun- Mujahideen participants. It is not a political factions headquartered in tryside. They bombed granaries and book about right or wrong. Rather, it Pakistan. Eventually there were rural villages, destroyed crops and is a book about survival against the seven major Afghan factions receiv- irrigation systems, mined pastures overwhelming firepower and techno- ing aid. The politics of these factions and fields, destroyed herds and logical might of a superpower. This were determined by their leaders’ launched sweeps through rural ar- is the story of combat from the religious convictions—three of which eas—conscripting young men and guerrilla’s perspective. It is the story were Islamic moderates and four of destroying the infrastructure. The of brave people who fought without which were Islamic fundamentalists. Soviet leadership, believing Mao Tse hope of winning because it was the Pakistan required that the various Tung’s dictum that the guerrilla lives right thing to do. ethnic and tribal Mujahideen groups in the population like a fish in water, join one of the factions in order to decided to kill the fish by draining off About the Book receive aid. Over time, this provided the water.7 As a result, Afghanistan Author Les Grau, regularly travels the leaders of these factions with became a nation of refugees as more back and forth to Russia. He received political power which they used to than seven million rural residents fled a book from the History of Military dominate the politics of post-com- to the relative safety of neighboring Art department at the Frunze Com- munist Afghanistan. The Pakistani Pakistan and Iran or to the cities of bined Arms Academy in Moscow. authorities favored the most funda- Afghanistan. This Soviet effort de- The book was intended for students’ mentalist groups and rewarded them nied rural support to the Mujahideen, classroom use only and, as such, accordingly. This aid distribution since the villagers had left and most shows both the good and the bad. gave the Afghan religious leaders of the food now had to be carried With Frunze Academy permission, unprecedented power in the conduct along with weapons and ammunition Les translated this book and added of the war. It also undermined the tra- and materials of war. The Mujahideen commentary before it was published ditional authority of the tribal and vil- responded by establishing logistics by NDU Press as The Bear Went lage leaders. bases inside Afghanistan. The So- Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat The Mujahideen were unpaid volun- viet fight from 1985 to withdrawal was Tactics in Afghanistan. Author Ali teers with family responsibilities. This to find and destroy these bases. Jalali, helped in the editing process. meant that they were part-time war- Terrain, as any infantryman knows, “The Bear” showed the tactics of the riors and that spoils of war played a is the ultimate shaper of the battle- Soviets, but the Mujahideen tactics major role in military actions. field. Afghanistan’s terrain is varied were absent. Charlie Cuthbertson Mujahideen sold mostly captured and challenging. It is dominated by and Dick Voltz of the USMC in weapons and equipment in the towering mountains and forbidding Quantico agreed that both sides bazaars to support their families. desert. Yet it also has lush forests needed to be presented and sent Ali As the war progressed, mobile of larch, aspen and juniper. It has and Les to Pakistan and Afghanistan Mujahideen groups emerged. The tangled “green zones”—irrigated ar- to interview Mujahideen command- mobile Mujahideen groups were larger eas thick with trees, vines, crops, ers for a companion volume. and consisted of young (under 25), irrigation ditches and tangled vegeta- Author Ali Jalali has the perfect cre- unmarried, better-trained warriors. tion. It has flat plains full of wheat dentials to do this book. Ali was a Sometimes the mobile Mujahideen and swampy terraces which grow Colonel in the Afghan Army and were paid. The mobile Mujahideen delicious long-grained rice. It is not taught at the Afghan Military Acad- ranged over a much larger area of op- ideal terrain for a mechanized force emy and Army Staff College. His for- erations than the local Mujahideen and dependent on fire power, secure eign education included the Infantry were more responsive to the plans and lines of communication and high- Officer’s Advanced Course at Fort desires of the factions. technology. It is terrain where the Benning, Georgia; the British Army

January-March 2002 39 Staff College at Camberley; and the cally. We have tried to make the book though the Mujahideen always say Soviet Frunze Academy. Many of as accurate as possible, but realize ‘Russian’ instead of ‘Soviet’, we have Ali’s officer students were key resis- that time and retelling may have al- used ‘Soviet’ throughout unless it is tance figures. Ali was also a mem- tered some of the facts. We have lim- a direct quote. ber of the resistance and an ited the span of the book from the We use Russian map graphics on accredited journalist during the con- Soviet invasion until their withdrawal. the maps. The Afghan Army used the flict. Now Ali works as a journalist The war started before the Soviet in- Soviet graphics system and most and has covered Afghanistan and vasion and continued long after their Mujahideen were familiar with them. Central Asia over the last 15 years. departure. We plan to write about Russian graphics are more “user Ali is respected by all the factions these battles in a future book. friendly” (flexible and illustrative) than and has exceptional entre to the We used edition 2-DMA series Western graphics. The Russians can Mujahideen. U611 1:100,000 maps from the U.S. show the sequential development of Ali and Les arrived in Pakistan in Defense Mapping Agency for the fi- an action by adding times or identify- September 1996 and were preparing nal preparation of the material. For ing lines to their graphics. These lines to go into Afghanistan when the those who wish to consult the map are explained in the legend. A table Taliban advance on Kabul closed the sheets, map sheet numbers are of Russian map graphics is located borders to American citizens. Ali in- given with each vignette. We have in the back of the book. Mujahideen terviewed some 40 Mujahideen dur- numbered each vignette within the forces are shown in blue and Soviet/ ing a month in Peshawar, Quetta, chapter and started each chapter DRA forces are shown in red. and Islamabad, Pakistan. Our col- with a country map showing the Endnotes league, Major Nasrullah Safi, con- rough location of each vignette. The 1 Ali A. Jalali “Clashes of Ideas and ducted interviews for another two interviews were long and exhaustive, Interests in Afghanistan”, paper given at months inside Afghanistan for this so many details are available. Many the Institute of World Politics, Washington, book. The interviews are the basis of the interviews were conducted at D.C., July 1995, page 4. of this book. In those interviews different times and places, with dif- 2 Ibid, 3. where we have several sources for ferent people who had been part of 3 Ibid, 4 the same vignette or where we have the same battle or operation. This 4 Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, lots of supporting written reports and allowed us to check and compare 1994, pages 158-159. material, we have written the vignette details and sequences of events. 5 Jalali, 1 in the third person. In those cases Map elevations are given in meters. 6 Section derived from Richard F. Nyrop where the person interviewed is the Contour intervals are not consistent and Donald M. Seekins (editors), primary source, we have written the and merely show elevation. Place Afghanistan Country Study, Fifth edition, vignette in the first person. The vi- and name spelling is based on Ali Washington: US Government Printing gnettes are arranged chronologically Jalali’s best transliteration efforts. Office, 1986, pages 22-73 and Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game, New York: by type of action. Occasionally, Consistency in spelling is difficult Kodansha International, 1994. when the actions occur at the same when two alphabets are involved— 7 Claude Malhauret, Afghan Alternative place over time, we lump those ac- some spellings are different than in Seminar, Monterey, California, November tions together instead of chronologi- other books on Afghanistan. Al- 1993. Air Assaulting and Blocking the Enemy in the Lar-Mandikul’ Valley by Major V.G. Chabanenko1 then sneak up to the valley, block off mission, the regiment would walk to its exits and then conduct a hunt with our bronegruppa. On 16 March 1985, our intelligence part of the regiment, while the rest On 19 March, we hit the LZ and organs received reports of a concen- would cover their movements. Avia- were immediately spotted by the tration of guerrilla forces in the tion would provide fire support as enemy. The enemy opened up with Lar-Mandikul’ Valley, some 30 kilo- would some MRLS located some 15 a heavy volume of fire and began rap- meters northeast of Kabul. The divi- kilometers from the valley with our idly pulling his units out from under sion commander ordered my bronegruppa. Illumination support our air and artillery strikes. Only the regimental commander to destroy would be planned and on call and be forward subunits of our 1st and 2d them.2 My commander decided to furnished by illumination flares, artil- battalions managed to reach their air land the regiment some six kilo- lery illumination rounds, and air-de- blocking positions and they did not meters away from the guerrillas and livered flares. After accomplishing our have sufficient combat power to stop

40 Military Intelligence the enemy main body. During the placed weapons around them. In or- tion order and refine them when at next 48 hours, our search groups der to keep the enemy away from the pick-up point. Pull mortar crews found and destroyed weapons and evacuation points, use air-delivered and mortars out first and riflemen ammunition caches. Our covering or MRLs-delivered RDM on enemy last. The air assault commander di- subunits managed to occupy the approach routes (see Figure 1). rects the evacuation and is on the dominant terrain, support the search When covering a region from domi- last helicopter out along with the last groups, and repulse enemy attempts nant terrain, evacuate the force by part of the perimeter security posts. to clear away the blocking forces. establishing a series of perimeter Hold supporting helicopter gunships Over in an adjacent valley, a simi- posts around the LZ. After evacuat- in full readiness or fire on the enemy lar situation had developed. The en- ing the main force, evacuate the along their climbing paths. Air as- emy managed to extricate his posts simultaneously. When moving sault troopers, once on board the subunits away from the strike of the the assault force to seize an evacu- helicopters, must be ready to con- regiment and conduct a march ation zone, cover the movement with duct small arms fire through aircraft through the valley. This was because overwatching forces and aviation, openings. move in precombat formation, and we landed at the tail end of the en- Experience shows that helicopters lead with reconnaissance. emy column and we could not get to should spend the minimum possible the blocking positions designated by Start helicopter load plans imme- time at the air evacuation point as the regiment. In addition, once again diately upon receipt of the evacua- personnel and equipment are already our landing had been discovered and we had been put down in the wrong place. This was because rather than landing at the designated sites, we landed in places safe from enemy fire and large enough (2 by 2 kilome- ters) for easy landing. It took two hours to assemble my battalion’s subunits and, consequently, I was unable to move to the correct posi- tions in an organized fashion in time. The enemy escaped. FRUNZE COMMENTARY: This op- eration underscores the necessity of conducting continuous reconnais- sance of the enemy and, depending on the existing situation, fine-tuning your plans and, if necessary, chang- ing your LZ. A company should have one LZ, a battalion should have two or three LZs that are no farther than a kilometer or a kilometer and a half apart. You must shield LZs from en- emy fire. Of course, there must be a reserve LZ as well. Combat action in Afghanistan, and in particular this operation, demon- strate that evacuating the assault force after mission accomplishment requires particular attention, since it is during this stage of the operation that the subunits receive their most significant casualties. During the re- turn to the assembly areas on heli- copters, pay particular attention to ensuring that the enemy has not Figure 1. Air Assaulting and Blocking the Enemy in the Lar-Mandikul’ Valley.

January-March 2002 41 concentrated there as a tempting tar- forces would rejoin the main force than establishing a series of far- get. Helicopters can spend a maxi- and other subunits would move for- off posts as this vignette recom- mum of one and one-half minutes on ward to the next overwatch posi- mends. the ground. tions. In this manner, the regiment The withdrawal of the force maintained a high tempo of move- mounted in its bronegruppa appears Airborne and air assault forces ment and suffered minimal casu- to be a withdrawal under pressure. can return to their initial assembly alties during encounters with the Night movement of a mechanized areas after mission accomplish- enemy. column through the Pandshir valley ment on helicopters or in their ar- using parachute flares and com- mored vehicles. In this operation EDITOR’S COMMENTARY: Pull- passes seems to be an option that in the Lar-Mandikul’ Valley, the ing out the mortars prior to the in- a commander would adapt only un- regiment withdrew mounted in their fantry is a commander’s call and der pressure. bronegruppa after fulfilling their depends on the tactical situation. mission. They pulled out at night. However, there are times when the Endnotes In order to navigate at night, com- mortars will be the final system a 1. V.G. Chabanenko served in the commander wants to evacuate. Republic of Afghanistan from December manders used compasses and 1983 through June 1985 as a battalion parachute flares. During the day, Many commanders prefer form- commander. they could have used route recon- ing an uninterrupted “collapsing 2. The 103d Airborne Division (according naissance. The regiment’s various ring” for evacuation zone security. to Mr. Grau). bronegruppa moved by bounds as This ring gets tighter with each lift- 3. Reprinted with permission from The subunits provided overwatch for the off. The collapsing ring has a bet- Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, Grau, main body. Once the main body ter chance of preventing enemy Lester W., Editor (Washington, D.C.: had passed through a covered seg- infiltration of the perimeter and National Defense University Press, ment of the route, the overwatching evacuating the security personnel 1996). Extract from the President’s Executive Order 13228: Establishing the Office of Homeland Security & the Homeland Security Council

The White House the adequacy of the national strategy Prevention: The Office will coordi- Office of the Press Secretary for detecting, preparing for, preventing, nate efforts to prevent terrorist at- October 8, 2001 protecting against, responding to, and tacks within the United States. In recovering from terrorist threats or at- Mission & Management: The performing this function, the Office tacks within the United States and will President will establish the Office of shall work with federal, state, and periodically review and coordinate re- Homeland Security that will be local agencies, and private entities visions to that strategy as necessary. headed by the Assistant to the Presi- to facilitate the exchange of informa- dent for Homeland Security — Gov- Detection: The Office will identify pri- tion among such agencies relating ernor Tom Ridge. The mission of the orities and coordinate efforts for col- to immigration and visa matters and Office will be to develop and coordi- lection and analysis of information shipments of cargo; and, working nate the implementation of a com- within the United States regarding with the Assistant to the President prehensive national strategy to threats of terrorism against the United for National Security Affairs, ensure secure the United States from ter- States and activities of terrorists or coordination among such agencies rorist threats or attacks. The Office terrorist groups within the United to prevent the entry of terrorists and will coordinate the executive States. terrorist materials and supplies into branch’s efforts to detect, prepare the United States and facilitate re- for, prevent, protect against, respond Preparedness: The Office of Home- moval of such terrorists from the to, and recover from terrorist attacks land Security will coordinate national United States, when appropriate; within the United States. efforts to prepare for and mitigate the coordinate efforts to investigate ter- consequences of terrorist threats or rorist threats and attacks within the National Strategy: The Office will attacks within the United States. In United States; and coordinate efforts work with executive departments and performing this function, the Office will to improve the security of United agencies, state and local govern- work with federal, state, and local States borders, territorial waters, and ments, and private entities to ensure agencies, and private entities. airspace in order to prevent acts of

42 Military Intelligence terrorism within the United States, Response and Recovery: The Of- advising and assisting the President working with the Assistant to the fice will coordinate efforts to respond with respect to all aspects of home- President for National Security Af- to and promote recovery from terror- land security. The Council will serve fairs, when appropriate. ist threats or attacks within the United as the mechanism for ensuring Protection: The Office will coordi- States. coordination of homeland security- nate efforts to protect the United The Homeland Security Council: related activities of executive depart- States and its critical infrastructure The President’s Executive Order es- ments and agencies and effective from the consequences of terrorist tablishes a Homeland Security development and implementation of attacks. Council which will be responsible for homeland security policies. Geography and Transportation of Afghanistan Extract from The World Factbook Climate: Arid to semiarid, cold win- irrigated (1993 estimate). Damaging 2001 (Washington, D.C.: Central In- ters and hot summers. earthquakes occur in the Hindu Kush telligence Agency Directorate of Terrain: Afghanistan consists mountains to the northeast. Flood- Intelligence, 2001). mostly of rugged mountains, with ing and droughts also threaten the Location: Southern Asia, north area. and west of Pakistan, east of Iran, plains in the north and southwest. in a box bounded by 29° to 39° North, The lowest point is Amu Darya at 258 Transportation: Afghanistan has 060° to 075° East. meters. Nowshak at 7,485 meters a total of 21,000 km of highways. Of is the highest point. Twelve percent that total, 18,207 km are unpaved Area: 647,500 square km or of the land is arable, but the country (1998 estimate). The total railway 250,000 square miles (slightly smaller has no areas of permanent crops. length is only 24.6 km (broad gauge than Texas). Area is 100% land, 0% Nearly half the land area is perma- rail at the borders with Turkmenistan water. nent pasture, and another 3% is for- and Uzbekistan). There are 1,200 Boundaries: Total 5,529 km or ests and woodland. Much of the km of navigable waterways, mostly 3,436 miles, all land with no coast- remaining forest land is being cut the Amu Darya River, which forms line (landlocked). Bordering countries down for fuel and building materials, part of the country’s northern border. and length of shared borders are and deforestation is a current envi- There are 45 airports (2000 esti- People’s Republic of China 76 km, ronmental issue. There are also mate). Ten of these are paved and Iran 936 km, Pakistan 2,430 km, problems with soil degradation, over- only three of these have a runway Tajikistan 1,206 km, Turkmenistan grazing, and desertification. Approxi- length over 3,047 meters. There are 744 km, and Uzbekistan 137 km. mately 30,000 square km have been also three heliports. Applicable NIMA Products Covering Afghanistan and the Middle East The National Imagery and Map- the Defense Automatic Address- DAAS system that allows cus- ping Agency (NIMA) has pro- ing System (DAAS). Electronic tomers to order mapping prod- duced standard hardcopy and ordering allows Geospatial In- ucts via an Internet website. digital map and imagery products formation and Services consum- Refer to the Richmond Map Fa- covering Afghanistan. Army logis- ers to take advantage of their cility Website at http:// tics elements (S4s) can assist intraservice or agency logistics www.dscr.dla.mil/pc9/ and follow in the requisitioning of these systems to electronically trans- the links to Ordering Info and Web products. You may obtain them mit their orders to Richmond. In Ordering. from the Defense Logistics lieu of intrasupport systems, the NIMA standard product cover- Agency (DLA) through a variety Defense Automatic Addressing age of Afghanistan, as of Sep- of ordering methods, although System Center (DAASC), Wright tember, 2001, includes hardcopy electronic ordering is preferred. Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, topographic and aeronautical DLA’s Defense Supply Center- offers alternate electronic meth- products available from the NIMA Richmond (the map facility in ods that greatly reduce order pro- Library (see Figure 1). There are Richmond, Virginia) requests cessing and shipping time. One no hydrographic products at this that you use the Military Requi- such method used by customers time. NIMA also offers six stan- sitioning and Issue Procedures for DAAS connectivity is Web dard digital products and an ad- (MILSTRIP) and submit orders via Requisitioning (WebReq), a ditional one (see Figure 2).

January-March 2002 43 Topographic. ! Series U611, 1:100,000 scale (Topographic Line Map). There are 505 sheets available, covering the entire country. ! Series U911, 1;25,000 scale (City Graphic), Kabol sheets 1 and 2. No other city graphics for Afghanistan are currently available. Aeronautical. ! Series 1501A (aeronautical) & 1501C (combined aeronautical and ground), Joint Opera- tions Graphics (JOG) 1:250,000 scale. There are 65 sheets available that cover Afghani- stan. ! Series TPC (Tactical Pilotage Chart), 1:500,000 scale, 7 sheets. ! Series ONC (Operational Navigation Chart), 1:1,000,000 scale, 4 sheets.

Figure 1. NIMA Hardcopy Products on Afghanistan.

Standard Products. ! VMAP1 (Level 1 Vector Map) Vector-based geospatial data in Vector Product Format (VPF). Data separated into ten thematic layers, each of which contains thematically consistent data. A reference library provides general information to orient the user. All data are topo- logically structured, and each coverage contains a set of files that describes the features in that thematic layer. VMAP1 contains medium resolution data at the 1:250,000 scale. There are 5 compact discs (CDs) that cover Afghanistan. Currently, we offer no coverage of the Kabul area. UVMAPAFGHANISTA is a city-scale vector map of the city of Kabul. ! DTED1, Level 1 elevation data (90-meter post spacings), 2 CDs, TCDXXDTED135 covers most of the country, south tip is on TCDXXDTED149. ! CIB5, Controlled Image Base-5 meter. In Raster Product Format (RPF), which is compatible with the National Imagery Transmission Format (NITF) standard. 12 CDs available. The Kabul area and other parts of the north and east are not yet available. ! Arc-Digitized Raster Graphics (ADRG), a 254-dots per inch (dpi) scan of NIMA hardcopy products. Series ARC9 Kabul 1 & 2 (City Graphics) Series ARC1, 1:500,000 (Tactical Pilotage Charts). 7 CDs. ARC1XU611x0001, 45 CDs (most of AF) ARC5, 16 CDs (most of AF) ! Compressed Arc-Digitized Raster Graphics (CADRG) Also in RPF format. A 169-dpi downsampling of ADRG. Provides a 55:1 compression ratio. Series is CDRG. CDRGXAF100K, 1 CD with entire country at 1:100,000 scale (Topographic Line Map), 2 CDs at the 1:250,000 scale (Joint Operations Graphics). CDRGXONCTPC, 2 CDs, containing both 1:1,000,000 and 1:500,000 scale aeronautical charts. ! Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) Level 1 and 1C. Vector data consisting of selected natural and manmade features classified by size and composition. Format is sequential (spaghetti) vector and data is segregated into 1° x 1° geographic cells. DFAD 1 is from imagery, DFAD 1C is from cartographic source. Density of detail approximates that of me- dium scale (1:250,000). Stock number TCDF1WORLDREG6 is both DFAD 1 and 1C and covers Afghanistan and much of the Middle East. Nonstandard Products. ! Feature Foundation Data (FFD). Vector data at medium scale in VPF. Along IR Border, 1° x 1°, available on NIMA secure websites.

Figure 2. Available Afghanistan-Related Digital Products from NIMA.

44 Military Intelligence ArmyArmy IntelligenceIntelligence MasterMaster PlanPlan by Keith Masback Army, AIMP’s critical linkages to joint Crucial to the AITCP is a sound as- and national agencies and organiza- sessment of our shortcomings and The immediate challenge for Army In- tions are crucial. desired capabilities. By examining the telligence is to meet the myriad chal- AIMP Areas of Focus. AIMP’s fo- doctrine, training, leadership, organi- lenges associated with the global war cus areas are intelligence futures, data zational, materiel, soldiers, and policy on terrorism and emerging homeland management, and decision support (DTLOMS-P) impacts, we begin to security issues while simultaneously tools. identify solutions that, considered in proceeding with the ambitious Army Intelligence Futures. The AIMP the light of other intelligence issues, Transformation process. The Army employs a methodology and process lead to solidified Army positions. In Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP) is at to articulate the vision of Army Intelli- turn, the output, the electronic AIMP the nexus of Army Intelligence Trans- gence for the future, a frank assess- (eAIMP), is the primary means of dis- formation, and the AIMP team is ment of where we are today, and an seminating the established Army po- heavily engaged in responding to the analysis of the “delta” that results in a sitions on intelligence-related issues. current crisis. AIMP integrates and plan to move forward, focused on the The eAIMP is the virtual home of the synchronizes the efforts of diverse or- envisioned end-state. The Army Intel- AITCP. As the eAIMP evolves, it will ganizations, both inside and outside ligence Transformation Campaign foster sharing and facilitating discus- the Army. Plan (AITCP) codifies that result. sion among the Army Intelligence Established in 1986 through a unique Embedded within the AITCP is an community. The eAIMP website (http:/ partnership of the Army’s Deputy Chief action plan that identifies the high-level /aimp.dami.army.smil.mil) is a valu- of Staff for Intelligence, Deputy Chief goals and objectives as well as the able resource for all military intelli- of Staff for Operations and Plans, and organizational responsibilities for re- gence (MI) professionals. the Commanding General of the U.S. fining and executing the actions. Ulti- Data Management. The AIMP pulls Army Training and Doctrine Com- mately, this will serve to synchronize data from more than a dozen dispar- mand, AIMP comprises a government the activities of the entire Army Intelli- ate Army corporate databases to as- and contractor integrated concept gence community on the journey that sess issues critical to the MI force team (ICT) and integrated product is Army Transformation. and to provide answers on force struc- team (IPT). The AIMP principal office is in Falls Church, Virginia, with addi- tional locations at Fort Huachuca, Ari- zona, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, the Pentagon, and Fort Meade, Maryland. AIMP, while focused on the future, daily engages in issues that span the full spectrum of Army Intelligence is- sues. The AIMP charter is: “To provide a single, synchronized strategy for the evolution of Army Intelligence, at all echelons, to successfully support Army Transformation to the Objective Force.” Enabled by resident subject- matter expertise and an extended network of consultants and advisors, the AIMP coalesces the efforts of all the important players in Army Intelli- gence to build a coherent strategy for achieving Army Intelligence Transfor- mation. Since Army Intelligence Trans- formation extends far beyond the Figure 1. The AIMP functions of the primary participants.

January-March 2002 45 ture, manpower, and programmatics. sion tool designed to support program define and implement Army Intelligence This AIMP program, called the Ana- development for those elements and Transformation. AIMP, through the AITCP lytic Assessment Tool (AAT), provides activities of the National Foreign Intel- and eAIMP, will facilitate the discussion a detailed analysis of MI programs for ligence Program (NFIP) that fall un- and document the effort. We need the the current year through the Army der Army supervision. involvement of the entire MI Corps to transform Army Intelligence to achieve Program Objective Memorandum The second decision support tool is (POM) years and enables action of- the goal of providing the Army with deci- the Force Development Intelligence sion dominance on the battlefields of the ficers and senior leaders alike to make 2 Investment Strategy (FDI S), a robust future. We must remain “Always Out informed decisions on the future MI prototype software tool to support force. It is the data warehouse for Front” and the AIMP is integral to that analysis and presentation of the Army challenge. Army. Total Obligation Authority by portray- Intelligence – the “one-stop shop” for ing funding data from the appropriate Keith Masback is the Director of the Army documenting and facilitating analysis Army databases. Although developed Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP), Headquar- and used for Army Intelligence, in rec- ters, Department of the Army, Office of the about how we want to look in the fu- Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence ture. The ability to derive the right an- ognition of its powerful analysis ca- (ODCSINT). During his Army service, Mr. 2 swer at the right time to enable a pability, the Army has mandated FDI S Masback was an Infantry officer with the decision is key to enabling Army In- for use by every battlefield functional Berlin Brigade, transitioned to the Military area in the Office of the Deputy Chief Intelligence Branch and then served with telligence Transformation. the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. He served in the of Staff for Programs to build the ODCSINT Initiatives Group and as the Mili- Decision Support Tools. The AIMP Army’s POM. tary Assistant to the DCSINT. In his final has developed automated decision Final Thoughts. The MI leadership position as an active duty officer, he man- support tools to map future Army In- aged requirements and resourcing for the presented the Army Intelligence Vision telligence requirements against pro- Army’s Tactical Exploitation of National and essential parts of the AITCP at the Capabilities (TENCAP) Program. Most re- jected budgets. These tools help September 2001 Army Worldwide Intel- cently, Mr. Masback served as the Deputy identify unfunded requirements and ligence Conference (held at Fort Director of the Director’s Initiatives Group assist action officers and decision- at the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Huachuca). The presentation docu- makers to determine “bill payers” for (NIMA). He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree ments are available on the eAIMP. AIMP in Political Science from Gettysburg Col- the future force. encourages all MI professionals to be- lege, completed the Post-Graduate Intelli- The first of these tools is the Na- come involved in the transformation of gence Program, and is a candidate for a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence tional Foreign Intelligence Program In- Army Intelligence. You must speak the from the Joint Military Intelligence College, telligence Investment Strategy language, understand, and embrace Defense Intelligence Agency. (NFIPI2S) which is a prototype deci- Army Transformation so you can help

New Website for Future Leaders CompanyCommand.com is a website dedicated to company-level leaders who want to learn and share their ideas on command issues from a myriad of topics ranging from leadership to Army policies. Eight Army officers currently assigned as staff and faculty at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, operate CompanyCommand.com during their off-duty hours without remuneration. The website offers many interesting topics such command philosophies, Army policies, leadership counseling, officer professional development (OPD), and even a recommended professional reading program. The website’s goal is to improve the institutional knowledge at the company-level of Army leadership by improving the lateral flow of information. Its purpose is to serve as a user-driven forum in which former and current company commanders share their best ideas, products, and lessons learned to benefit current and future company com- manders. Infantry Majors Nate Allen and Tony Burgess, the site founders, commented that their sole purpose is helping leaders to grow great units and soldiers. CompanyCommand.com has established a section organized by branch that links unique experiences and competencies of former and current commanders. For the intelligence community, the website lists military intelli- gence contacts including three former MI company commanders who are volunteer mentors. The operators of the site plan to expand it with platoon leader tools for those junior leaders. Among the site’s other offerings are the “command tools” section with professional presentations, lessons learned, surveys, and stories from the contributors. There are quizzes, after-action reviews, tactical scenarios, monthly updates, and more. The web site also provides its users with links to other military websites. CompanyCommand.com’s popularity has increased since its debut in February 2000. The number of “hits” has increased from 11,114 hits in February to more than 600,000 hits as of 30 September.

46 Military Intelligence DoctrineDoctrine Corner Corner

ven before 11 September 2001, the end of the Cold War; the proliferation of regional, ethnic, and religious Econfrontations; and the increasing number of stability operations and support operations had forced a change in the way the Army’s intelligence analysts conducted business. The tragedies in New York and Washington, the anthrax menace, and the still unknown threats posed by terrorist organizations have again changed the way the intelligence analyst must think. Today’s threats and missions span all aspects of full-spectrum operations. Even worse, the analyst might face several of these threats simultaneously. This was not the case during the Cold War when the focus was on the Soviet Union and both nations faced the same threats and, for the most part, addressed them in the same manner. The soldiers of the Gulf War understood Warsaw Pact doctrine well and the United States had, over the years, refined the analytical processes to address it. Today’s analysts must seek innovative solutions to increasingly complex problems and threats. “The Doctrinal Corner” will serve as one means to identify potential solutions to these problems by providing intelligence professionals with the latest in emerging doctrine. Future issues of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) will focus on homeland defense, counterterrorist operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and other topics. Its accomplishment, however, requires input from two sources. The Doctrine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH), will provide the baseline or emerging doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for your review. You, the intelligence professional, must then respond by addressing, through your submission of articles to the MIPB, the effectiveness of this doctrine and identify new methods and TTP that may have merit. Together, through the MIPB medium, all will benefit. The Intelligence Analyst and Unique Environments by Michael P. Ley ‰ Counterterrorist. identified on 11 September 2001. For the analyst, the types of opera- ‰ Nuclear, biological, and chemi- One example is preparing for opera- tions conducted since the Gulf War tions in an urban environment in have followed no particular pattern; cal (NBC). which, according to Marine General each operation offered its own ‰ Many others. Charles C. Krulak, he may find the unique challenge not only to the For the intelligence analyst, the “three-block war,”1 an environment in National Command Authority (NCA) order to prepare to deploy in sup- which peacekeeping, humanitarian but also to the analyst tasked with port of an operation in a unique envi- aid, and full-scale combat operations providing intelligence for the deci- ronment often presents the problem may occur simultaneously and within sion-makers. The unique environ- of “where to start?” Focused train- blocks of each other. ments could include any combination ing opportunities such as the mis- of mission and location (“unique” sion readiness exercises (MREs) The physical environment may being both a physical environment that prepare our units for deploy- also offer unique challenges. For ex- and a “type” of operation for which ments to Bosnia and Kosovo may ample, a study of the Fulda Gap there is a lack of current operational be missing. Instead, the intelligence might include its vegetation, eleva- experience by U.S. military forces). analyst’s experience may be more tion, and percent of slope datum, Such operations and environments along conventional lines, such as location of water sources, and oth- might include– force-on-force offensive and defen- ers. Now overlay those physical el- sive operations. As well trained as ements with the population, layout, ‰ Urban. he may be for the conventional infrastructure, and cultural aspects ‰ Mountain. battleground, he may find he is ill- of a major metropolitan area and you ‰ Littoral. prepared to cope with the threats begin to see the challenge.

January-March 2002 47 Figure 1. Sample Urban Analytical Framework.

What was necessary was an a graphic aid showing both the criti- maintainable in both analog and digi- analytical tool that allowed analysts cal elements and a process for reach- tal formats. to focus on the important elements ing understanding of a situation. Note The Urban Analytical Framework in of the target environment (mission, that the framework identifies this pro- Figure 1 reflects use of this method- terrain, and threat). They must do so cess through labeling each element ology and process. We chose to dis- in a timely manner, and accomplish as a “step.” This step process will pro- cuss the urban environment because it while working within the four-step vide a logical methodology in identify- of its complex nature and the fact IPB process. ing the critical details of the urban that since 1995 the larger Army con- The result was development of the areas. Like the rest of the framework tingencies have been in and around Analytical Framework and Analytical design, however, the user defines and urban areas. The twelve elements Worksheet (shown in Figures 1 and modifies it as desired. Finally, the identified on the framework resulted 2, respectively). The analytical analytical worksheet serves as the from lengthy discussions held at the framework and worksheet are inter- data-recording element of the frame- Joint level. Participants included dependent, the framework providing work-worksheet combination and is be representatives of the British Army,

48 Military Intelligence Urban Analytical Worksheet

Figure 2. Sample Urban Analytical Worksheet.

January-March 2002 49 the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and These would seem to place more initial priority intelligence re- all U.S. Army Training and Doctrine emphasis on the physical properties quirements (PIR). Command (TRADOC) proponents than on the remaining elements; ‰ Serving as a ready-made brief- under the guidance of the Combined however, we developed this sample ing tool. Arms MOUT (military operations on framework specifically to support a ‰ Providing user-defined level of urbanized terrain) Task Force. One study of Pristina, Kosovo. Other situ- detail on any element or should not, however, assume that ations may call for the identification subelement under study. these elements were the only ones of different elements. Any element ‰ Identifying information gaps. identified. This framework focused on may develop additional frameworks those elements deemed most criti- at any time to show a higher resolu- ‰ Identifying patterns (pattern cal to planners and analysts at the tion for that specific element as analysis). operational level. The division and bri- needed. This would hold true espe- ‰ Assisting with visualization gade levels should develop additional cially through a corps level exercise and understanding. frameworks and worksheets. Below where the G2 wished to see the ‰ Providing a graphic illustration brigade, the level of detail more accu- points of focus not only at corps but of the urban operations critical rately reflects elements identified by also at each division and brigade. By elements. the OCOKA (observation and fields of netting and linking the various frame- More work is necessary to refine fire,concealment and cover, obstacles, works to show the focus of the infor- this process, and the author solic- key terrain, avenue of approach) fac- mation collection and analytical its input and recommendations from tors. efforts, we can accomplish this eas- users. Additional research may be We must emphasize that we in- ily. Additional information on this pro- conducted at the Doctrine Website tended the twelve elements only as cess will be available in Chapter 5, at http://usaic.hua.army.mil/DOC- a blueprint. The elements employed ST 2-01.3-1. (Untitled). TRINE/dlbs.htm and at the MOUT in any framework are user defined. In using the analytical framework and Homepage, http://www.geocities. The intelligence analyst should worksheet process, the analyst de- com/Pentagon/6453. carefully choose the framework’s termines the details of the element elements in such a manner as to identified on the framework and Endnotes allow him to address an existing records the information on the need. We should also note that worksheet where it is available for later 1. Remarks for The National Press Club on 10 October 1997. work on the framework might begin analysis. When he has identified and in garrison, at the first indication recorded the details of all elements, Mr. Michael Ley is a doctrine writer and the that a unit will deploy, or even as the analyst has not only an initial Managing Editor, Military Intelligence part of contingency planning. Ini- framework portraying his environment Professional Bulletin (MIPB), in the Doc- trine Division, U.S. Army Intelligence Cen- tial data sources may include the but also has achieved focus on his ter and Fort Huachuca. He served two tours various readiness packages, Na- efforts. Additionally, this provides both in Vietnam as a Military Advisor, Military tional Imagery and Mapping Agency a tool and a methodology within the Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) (NIMA) products, commercial pub- IPB process to accomplish the analy- Team #62, and later served in a variety of electronic warfare, collection management, lications, or other sources. sis mission. Other uses of these tools operational testing, and topographic posi- include— As seen in the framework, the first tions. He retired from the U.S. Army in 1990. Readers may reach him via E-mail at eight elements identify the physical ‰ Providing the potential for rapid [email protected] and by telephone attributes of the urban environment. response to the commander’s at (520) 538-0979 or DSN 879-0979.

Writer of the Quarter

MIPB is pleased to announce the Writers of the Quarter are 1st place, Major Christopher J. Tatarka for his article “Overcoming Biases in Military Problem Analysis and Decision-Making” and runner-up is, Dr. Thomas M. Kane, Ph.D. for his article “Strategic Analysis: To Hear the Thunder.” Congratulations to winners and thanks to all of our authors for their articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make MIPB the professional forum for military intelligence professionals.

50 Military Intelligence TSMTSM NotesNotes Analysis the Prophet Way by Colonel Kevin C. Peterson Prophet is the U.S. Army’s next gen- ! Perceptive environmental sur- Since the Prophet program design eration, multispectrum, multi-discipline veys. is for a five-block, acquisition strat- collection, jamming, processing, and ! Indications and warning. egy program, PC will include follow- reporting system. The Prophet sys- ! Location, tracking, and identifi- on block preplanned product tem will be modular, scalable, improvements (P3Is) over the next cation of hostile forces and deployable, and tailorable to address five years. The initial phase PC will equipment. the full range of conflict required of only consist of automation and com- Determination of enemy plans the U.S. Army. ! munications equipment. Two All- and intentions. The initial version is the high-mobility Source Analysis System-Light multipurpose wheeled vehicle It will also serve to cross-cue other (ASAS-L) workstations will comple- (HMMWV)-mounted Prophet sys- battlefield sensors (e.g., Tactical ment the PC. ASAS-L workstations tem. Prophet also has a dismounted Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [TUAV], connected through a local-area net- manpack capability, which is the Future Combat System of Sys- work (LAN) will provide a distributed uniquely suitable for airborne inser- tems [FCSS], and Firefinder radars), processing environment for access- tion and early entry into the as well as to provide amplifying data ing and managing intelligence data battlespace. Prophet’s primary mis- to confirm indications and collection and information. These workstations sion will be to provide around-the- from other battlefield sensors. will host a core set of common ap- plications, services, and tools that clock, all weather, enhanced Prophet disseminates intelligence appropriate intelligence, surveil- situational awareness and situ- information on the battlefield through lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) ational understanding to maneuver a Prophet control (PC) element col- sensor planning, management, and commanders in near-real time (NRT). located with the brigade tactical op- presentation software can augment It will do this through the detection, erations center (TOC). PCs will or update. This software tool set will– collection, and exploitation of perform emitter mapping and nodal radiofrequency (RF) emissions analysis on Prophet-derived intelli- ! Enable analysts to research and (Blocks I through V), as well as col- gence, and then forward timely and determine traffic densities and lected signatures and measurement accurate targeting information, intel- network structures. data (Blocks IV and V). Prophet’s ligence products, and predictions on ! Locate emitters. secondary mission will be to provide probable enemy courses of action ! Display historical trends in elec- an array of nonlethal technology to the brigade commander. The tronic order of battle (EOB). (Blocks II, IV, and V), which will be Prophet control element will provide able to interrupt, spoof, disrupt, or reports to higher echelons using ! Produce tactical, multiple intel- disable select target command and standard, digital reporting formats ligence discipline (“multi-INT”) 2 control (C ) nodes. and voice reporting functionality. reports. Prophet will consist of ground RF Envisioned to operate at the Secret These tools will also assist the op- and measurement collection plat- collateral level only, PC will provide erator in interrogation and the re- forms that operate in direct support C2 and technical steerage to Prophet trieval, processing, and correlation of the maneuver unit. The system systems and receive situational up- of intelligence information from will provide “niche” sensor coverage dates and supplementary tasking multi-INT databases. Operators will to support full-spectrum operations. from higher echelons. We will field use these workstations to receive Prophet’s “niche” coverage will provide each set of Prophets with a PC op- and process Prophet’s digital intel- reinforcing and NRT intelligence to erated by four soldiers: two signals ligence reports and to provide tech- tactical maneuver commanders under intelligence (SIGINT) Analysts (mili- nical tasking. a variety of deployed configurations tary occupational specialty [MOS] As we add the P3I upgrades, PC will (division, brigade, regiment, task force, 98C) and two Communications In- migrate into a multi-INT processing etc.). This intelligence will provide– tercept/Locators (MOS 98H). role and possess the capability to

January-March 2002 51 conduct operations mounted on- The Army will upgrade PC’s worksta- collateral Integrated Broadcast Sys- board a single vehicle. The PC ve- tions to be interoperable (information tem (IBS) data digitally, as well as hicle will have a small but capable exchange) with the Army Battle Com- the ability to inject Prophet-derived analysis, control, and technical mand System (ABCS) suite and the intelligence data and reports into steerage ability. This capability will Global Command and Control Sys- IBS. Increasing the commander’s permit system operators to receive tem (GCCS) baselines. As the ex- ability to leverage and cross-cue large amounts of incoming data– tended battlespace grows and the available sensors, PC’s ability to such as lines-of-bearing (LOBs) and speed of operations increases, PC transmit reports enables the shar- measurement and signature data will be able to provide for the rapid ing of Prophet-derived data with from seismic, acoustic, or infrared processing, analysis, and through- other ISR assets operating in the- sensors–and efficiently fuse this data put of ISR information. PC’s primary ater, thus enhancing the supported with non-Prophet sensor data, such interface will be the signals and sig- commander’s overall operational ef- as moving target indicator data from natures enclaves of the Division fectiveness. the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Common Ground Station-Army Maneuver commanders on the Radar System (Joint STARS). (DCGS-A). At the brigade level, PC high-speed battlefield of today re- Prophet analysts will be able to con- will preprocess Prophet-derived in- quire the capability to respond rap- vert the “blobology” of undefined data telligence for subsequent digital in- idly to changing operational intersects into solid identifications, jection into the supported battle scenarios that PC and the Prophet verified by fusing target matches in command system enroute to the suite of systems provide. PC will be and across several databases. applicable DCGS-A enclave. PC the critical link between Prophet, its The PC will have an on-the-move workstations will interface with au- supported commander, and higher 2 (OTM) capability that gives the tac- tomated C and intelligence pro- echelons. The PC element’s ability tical commander the flexibility to cessing systems over various to process, correlate, fuse, and dis- monitor new developments during battlefield communications sys- play Prophet-derived intelligence highly fluid operations and while re- tems. These communications are data will meet these demands and deploying a TOC. Objectively, the PC vital to the exchange of information will ensure the lethality and surviv- element will also serve as the with other Prophet systems, brigade ability of U.S. forces in the field. exfiltration node for remoting se- operational and intelligence ele- lected voice-grade channels to ments, ISR integration cells, and higher echelons for further exploita- applicable DCGS-A. We will accom- tion. Remoting is essential to ex- plish all multi-sensor (SIGINT and measurement and signature intelli- Colonel Kevin Peterson is the U.S. Army Train- tend collection baselines to ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Sys- maximize collection, exploitation, gence [MASINT]) tasking, reporting, tem Manager-Prophet (TSM Prophet) at the and lethality. cross-correlation of databases, al- U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort gorithm updates, and remoting of Huachuca (USAIC&FH). Readers may con- The PC element will be capable of tact him via E-mail at kevin.peterson@ signals within this framework. digitally interfacing with the sup- hua.army.mil and telephonically at (520) 533- 3 5579 or DSN 821-5579. You may also contact ported division well as the tactical Additionally, P I will include a PC the Deputy TSM, Major Mark Oleksiak, at warfighter “at the point of the spear.” element with the ability to receive [email protected]. The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) at DCX II

by Michel M. Strack While much work remains to be generated due to problems with the In October 2001, the U.S. Army done, the results were encouraging. CTP; these reports described the Training and Doctrine Command Presented below is a brief discus- system’s inability to send, receive, (TRADOC) System Manager sion of some problem areas and pos- or plot operational overlays from the (TSM) ASAS participated in the sible solutions. CTP Explorer due to lock-up and successful Division Capstone Ex- booting problems. Throughout the ercise Phase II (DCX II) held at Fort Problem Areas and Opera- CPX, the tactical operation centers Hood, Texas. This was a good tor Concerns (TOCs) observed that when the CTP opportunity to observe the proto- The most significant problem con- was stable and operational, the ana- type ASAS Remote Workstation tinues to be with the stability of the lysts sometimes had to input graph- (RWS) Version 6.2.1 software in a common tactical picture (CTP). DCX ics multiple times. Thus, aside from command post exercise (CPX). II produced 38 known trouble reports probing into the various stability is-

52 Military Intelligence sues, we are also looking at devel- cesses were running in the back- the transformation effort at the U.S. oping a way to convert ASAS over- ground. When the operators updated Army Intelligence Center. One area lays to operational overlays and vice their databases with new information, that must continue to evolve is the versa. the systems would often lock during training of competent digital opera- the data entry. As usual, the soldiers Soldiers experienced with the RWS tors–at both the initial entry and ad- and contract technicians were able Version 4.3 systems were generally vanced levels–who are proficiently to find “work-arounds” like minimiz- disappointed with the Version 6.2.1. trained on ASAS with good under- ing the other processes running at The common complaint was that the standing of the total ABCS Version the same time; this increased sys- intelligence functions in the Version 6 6 environment. Training should start tem stability and restored reasonable system did not meet the standard set with a familiarity of the ABCS prod- processing speeds. by the earlier version and the overrid- ucts and later include the basic ing concern was that the Version 6 Solutions cross-system troubleshooting. system is inflexible and unreliable. TSM ASAS is committed to sup- However, many of the soldiers’ con- port the digitalized Army. To shift our cerns were actually with the Army focus from the “boxes” to the battle, Mr. Michel Strack is the Acting TSM for ASAS. Readers can contact him via E- Battlefield Command System’s we are examining improved ways to mail at [email protected] and (ABCS) foundation software rather transfer data between computers and telephonically at (520) 533-3504 or DSN than the Version 6 ASAS. Observa- systems. We will overcome the soft- 821-3504. The Deputy TSM is Lieutenant tions of the RWSs revealed unex- ware complexities and improve the Colonel Vic Fink. Readers can reach him by E-mail at james.fink@ hua.army.mil and plained lock-ups and screen freezes reliability and stability of our systems. by telephone at (520) 533-5145 or DSN when multiple operations and pro- In doing so, we focus on supporting 821-5145.

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January-March 2002 53 DistanceDistance Learning Learning

the military ethos in their formative Broadband Intelligence years. The Intelligence Center is propos- Training System ing a government and industry ar- rangement that would implement a The Training Development Director- to teach soldiers to effectively adapt 1000 user pilot over two years. This ate, Futures Development Integration to unknown and/or rapidly changing will validate the potential to capital- Center, USAIC&FH, is introducing a environments. The courseware cre- ize on IPDBS return path technol- broadband intelligence training sys- ated in this authentic environment ogy in conjunction with courseware tem designed to provide high fidelity requires collaboration and can be platforms optimized for real-time de- adaptive training with collaborative media intensive when using a signifi- livery. The business model will pro- learning environments to soldier and cant bandwidth requirement. To pro- vide the impetus needed to sustain civilian homes that will not com- duce courseware, the Constructivist industry support as economies of promise operational security. The Learning Theory by J. Bruner is used scale create competitive pricing that training available includes counter- as the basis for instructional design will lower the government cost to dis- intelligence, intelligence analyst, strategies. Analysis showed IPDBS tribute in-home training to more us- force protection, and foreign language technology as the most efficient way ers. This results in higher quality training for active and reserve com- to meet audience requirements glo- products and services delivered to ponent military professionals. bally and deliver high fidelity prod- more users for considerably lower cost than the Army currently spends The commercial broadband tech- ucts combined with full motion for distance learning, a pervasive mar- nology will be used as a way to multi-point collaboration. In theory, ket base for industry, and a techni- provide high bandwidth for Internet- constructive and virtual simulations cally competent, competitive country. based training and collaboration to could also be distributed to the soldier and civilian homes. The home. Internet Protocol Direct Broadcast We can ascertain that those who Satellite (IPDBS) technology, com- are most successful in the informa- bined with software for asynchro- tion age warfare and global com- nous and synchronous learning merce are those immersed in the Distance Learning environments, exploit the technology information age techniques as a cul- Update and implement cost savings, particu- ture. Integrating our training with larly when bundled with existing com- communication and entertainment in munications and entertainment the home will in turn mature the user New! Anti-terrorism training is now services. base needed for global competition. available at the MI Distance Learning The proposed initiative comple- Soldiers and civilians will become Website. Lessons are web-delivered ments The Army Distance Learning globally ready when the information and self-paced; instruction that you Program by extending training from age is commonplace, just as the can download includes anti-terrorism, the classroom to the entity level. We telephone and television are today. intelligence in combating terrorism, and SAEDA (subversion and espio- postulate that integrated services to The benefits will transfer from el- nage directed against the Army). You the home will allow training to be- ementary to higher education, and may access some of this training via come part of the user’s lifelong cul- on into the business sectors na- the Distance Learning Website at ture in a convenient environment that tionwide providing an industrial www.intel.army.mil/. Some lessons facilitates growth, and optimizes base that will allow the United are currently available on CD-ROM only time. One advantage is the advance- States to be more competitive in a and can be requested via E-mail at ment of warfighters from analog to global economy. An ancillary ben- [email protected]. You can reach the the digital environment. efit could be an increase in the DL point of contact, Mike Dascanio, In addition to delivering courseware, number and quality of potential re- at [email protected]. the Intelligence Center is challenged cruits who may be introduced to

54 Military Intelligence Leonhard lays out his three Laws of War and his seven Principles of War. As a result of his analysis of the current principles, he describes for the reader why there are three ProfessionalProfessional Reader Reader Laws of War which have risen from and above the principles: the Law of Humanity, the Law of Economy, and the Law of Duality. The first law exists because all warfare is The Principles of War for the Information Age by Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Leonhard, a human endeavor in one form or another. Novato, CA, (Presidio Press, Inc., 1998), 287 pages, paperback 1995. Warfare is a most “wasteful enterprise,” since “one must economize as much as by LTC Rich Holden technology...sometimes leading to disaster,” possible,” to win and hence we have his which he highlights in his discussion of the second law. Nested within his second law Why do we need principles of war? Ac- principle of Surprise. He shows how Sur- is an intriguing truth on the purpose of cording to LTC Bob Leonhard’s book, The prise will remain a principle that applies intelligence: “Information leads to a precise Principles of War for the Information to not only tactical surprise, but also to expenditure of resources, and therefore to Age, “Principles serve to make us do things technical surprise (the extreme example is economy. Indeed, the entire purpose of that we would otherwise not naturally do of the atomic bomb use which led to the defeat intelligence in warfare is to economize— our own accord. Principles are intended to of Japan in World War II—their “disaster”). to inform our efforts in order to gain effect at change behavior.” Well, that is exactly what With a view toward the new FM 3-0, Op- the least cost.” he proposes, and demands, with his new erations, the ongoing Army Transformation His final proposed law, the Law of Duality, set of principles of war—to change our and the development of the Interim Brigade lays the foundation for his proposed Prin- military behavior in order to fight and win in Combat Teams (IBCTs), the various Battle ciples of War. A senior observer in a BCTP the information age. LTC Leonhard sets the Labs, and the Advanced Warfighting Experi- exercise recently highlighted this duality of stage for introducing his new principles by ments (AWEs), has the Army finally realized warfare by stating, “If you ain’t attacking, conducting a great forensic analysis of the the need to get doctrine up to technology’s you’re defending!” Therefore, all of LTC current principles, how they came to be, speed? The AWEs include the Task Force Leonhard’s principles have a dual, how some should never have been prin- XXI AWE in March 1997, the Division AWE double-edged nature. There is one inde- ciples, and how all but two are no longer (DAWE), in November 1997, the Joint Con- pendent principle, Knowledge and Ignorance. relevant. tingence Force AWE in 2000, the Division This principle underlies the reason we have Our steady transformation from analog to Capstone Exercise (DCX) I this past March intelligence professionals. Additionally, LTC digital is changing the way we operate in at the National Training Center (NTC), and Leonhard, while an apparent fan of Military new and different ways every day. If we the November 2001 DCX II at Fort Hood, Texas. Intelligence, also issues some serious are truly “in the midst of a ‘revolution in Since a large part of the exercises challenges to us with the statement “Our military affairs’” then part of this revolution mentioned above revolve around simula- intelligence doctrine and processes— needs to start with the Industrial Age prin- tions, LTC Leonhard hits the nail on the head arguably the best in the world—are ciples of war, according to LTC Leonhard. concerning simulations and their effects on inextricably bound up with this idea: We This book is even more relevant now that the results of “doctrinal degeneration” on are fundamentally ignorant of the we have begun to use the new contempo- the Army. A commonly heard phrase within enemy’s whereabouts and intentions, rary operational environment (COE) with Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) is and so we estimate the future.” With this its new opposing force (OPFOR) as the that “BCTP has taught the Army as many bad challenge, he proposes that we need to framework against which we plan all Army ideas as good ones.” Since BCTP primarily change from “estimate-based” planning training. LTC Leonhard issues a challenge uses simulations for its brigade through to “truth-based” planning. This needs to to the reader “to question...175 years of ARFOR level exercises, this concern about happen to a degree; however, we will military convention and usage.” It is a chal- simulations is well founded. However, as still have to estimate our enemy’s future lenge that we must take up if we are to be the Chief of Staff of the Army has stated at intentions. The rest of his proposed prin- successful in information age warfare. numerous after-action reviews regarding ciples are— The principles of war are a mental frame- simulations used, “It is about warfighting, it is Aggression: dislocation and work developed to address problems in not warfighting.” As LTC Leonhard correctly confrontation, and distribution warfare. The currently accepted Principles, points out, part of this “doctrinal degenera- and concentration. better remembered by the acronym tion” derives from the fact that OPFOR in Interaction: opportunity and reac- MOSSMOUSE (mass, objective, security, simulations have always fought to the very tion, and activity and security. surprise, maneuver, offensive, unity of com- last soldier. This has caused us to become Control: option acceleration and mand, simplicity, economy of force), are a target-and precision strike-centric in order objective, and command and set of tactical ideas we have extrapolated, to destroy the OPFOR down to that last anarchy. over time, to operational and strategic levels. soldier while not taking into account the In conclusion, The Principles of War for A problem with the current principles is synergistic effects of combined-arms the Information Age, is worth reading trying to determine to what level of conflict warfare or the moral dimensions of war. and discussing in a variety of forums. His they should be applied, given that all of the Fortunately, this approach is changing. analysis of the current principles of war is principles started at the level of the tactical Coding changes are in the works so that outstanding. His proposed new principles battle. Since every problem is different, the COE OPFOR will not fight to the last of war are worthy of incorporating into our military professionals have to apply and person, and we are building several levels doctrine as we develop our 21st century adapt their own experience and judgment of disengagement criteria into the current information age military behavior. while following the principle’s guidance. and future versions of simulations (the corps LTC Leonhard includes a great annotated However, this application by military lead- battle simulation specifically). “Works Cited” that contains one of the best ers throughout history has varied greatly, LTC Leonhard uses an interesting comments from the whole book. On the oft- and LTC Leonhard’s examples from World framework for discussing the necessary quoted Karl von Clausewitz’s On War, he War I highlight some of the worst cases changes from the current Principles to states, “Many commentators on Clausewitz of not adapting (the Battle of the Somme, his new set. His use of a Civil War battle in have missed the tremendous application for example). western Maryland in September 1862 works of his thought to future warfare, fixed as With the principles of war being one of very well by highlighting the differences be- they are on endless semantic debate. the foundations of our doctrine, another tween the current and proposed principles Read Clausewitz; he is smarter that important issue that LTC Leonhard raises in terms of known and potential outcomes his interpreters. [Emphasis added]” throughout the book is this: Which comes of the battle. first, doctrine or technology? He states With that framework in place, and after that “Doctrine typically lags behind dissecting all of the current principles, LTC

January-March 2002 55 From Out Front How to Submit an Article

This is your magazine and we need your support number and E-mail addresses, and a com- in writing articles for publication. When writing an ment stating your desire to have the article article, select a relevant topic to the Military Intel- published. ligence community; it could be historical or about A release signed by your local security officer or current operations and exercises, equipment, TTP, SSO stating that your article is unclassified, or training. Explain lessons learned or write an nonsensitive, and releasable in the public do- essay-type thought-provoking piece. Short “quick main. (MIPB is available for sale by the Gov- tips” on better use of equipment, personnel, or ernment Printing Office.) methods of problem solving and articles from Pictures, graphics, and crests/logos with “hot spots” are always welcome. Seek to add to adequate descriptions. Submit clear “action” the professional knowledge of the MI Corps. Pro- photos that illustrate your article with captions pose changes, describe a new theory or dispute an for the photos (the who, what, where, when, exciting one, explain how your unit has broken new why, and how; the photographer credits; and ground, give helpful advice on a specific topic, or include the author’s name on photos.” explain how a new piece of technology will change The full name of each author in the byline and the way we operate. a short biography for each. The biography should include the authors’ current duty posi- Consult DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writ- tion, related assignments, relevant civilian de- ing for Army Leaders, and be clear, concise, and grees (degree, school, major), and any spe- complete in your writing. cial qualifications. (Indicate whether we can Maintain the active voice as much as possible. print your telephone number and E-mail ad- Make your point. Avoid writing about internal or- dress with the biography.) ganizational administration. If your topic is a new We cannot guarantee that we will publish all sub- piece of technology, tell the readers why it is mitted articles but we will send you a letter ac- important, how it works better, and how it will af- knowledging that receipt of your article. We may fect them. Avoid lengthy descriptions of who ap- notify you again when we get ready to publish it. proved the new system, quotations from senior Please inform us of any changes of contact infor- leaders describing how good the system is, re- mation. It can take a year or more before we run ports your organization filed regarding the sys- some articles. tem, etc. The MIPB staff will edit the articles and put them in a style and format appropriate for the maga- zine. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin You can send the articles via E-mail to 2002-03 [email protected] or brett.vanhoose Themes and Deadline for Article Submission @hua.army.mil with a courtesy copy to Issue Theme Deadline [email protected], or mail (with a Apr-Jun EAC 5 Jan 02 soft copy on disk) to Commander, U.S. Army In- Jul-Sep Homeland 5 Apr 02 telligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: Security ATZS-FDR-CB, Bldg 61730, Room 103, Fort Oct-Dec ISR Integration 5 Jul 02 Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. (Please do not use Jan-Mar Battlefield special document templates and attach the Visualization 5 Oct 02 graphics separately. We can accept articles in and Presentation Microsoft Office 97, Word 6.0, Word Perfect Apr-Jun Force Protection 5 Jan 03 6.0a, and ASCII and PowerPoint or Corel graph- Jul-Sep Information 5 Apr 03 ics.) Please include with your article: Operations A cover letter with your work, home phone

56 Military Intelligence 743d Military Intelligence Battalion

The distinctive unit insignia for the 743d MI Bat- talion is a silver-color metal and enamel device consisting of a medium blue oval gridlined sil- ver delta flight symbol, enclosed in base by a black scroll inscribed with the unit motto in sil- ver; overall, a diagonally crossed black dag- ger and yellow lightning flash. Oriental blue and silver gray (silver) are the traditional colors of the Military Intelligence Corps. Black and white/ silver denote the day and night continuous op- erations conducted by elements of the unit, as well as the covert and overt nature of the bat- talion. The black dagger symbolizes stealth and military preparedness, as soldiers of the bat- talion are continually prepared for worldwide de- ployment with and for warfighters. The flash denotes speed and accuracy, as well as the battalion’s ability to provide worldwide communications and intelligence support. The gridlined oval represents the global mission of the unit and its soldiers’ widespread deployment. The delta flight symbol extending beyond the boundaries of the globe symbolizes the unit’s as- sociation with space and its mission to exploit space-based assets, and underscores the unit’s motto, “Beyond All Boundaries.” The 743d MI Battalion traces its lineage back to 1954 when the Headquarters and Head- quarters Detachment, Detachment Army Security Agency (ASA) Troop Command, and 7200th Administrative Area Unit organized at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. On 8 November 1963, the ASA Troop Command redesignated the Army Security Agency Support Group. With the redesignation of the ASA as the United States Army Intelligence and Security Com- mand (INSCOM) in 1977, the ASA Support Group became the Continental United States Military Intelligence Group on 1 November 1977. In March 1980, the Army redesignated the group as the 704th MI Brigade. On 3 October 1989, the 743d MI Battalion provisionally activated and the Department of the Army formally approved it in 1990 as a subordinate unit of the 704th MI Brigade. In July 1998, the Battalion underwent major reorganization as the Headquarters moved to Colo- rado. With the move came a marked change in mission. The 743d MI Battalion’s mission is to support the joint military support activity at the Buckley Air National Guard Base. They provide continuous worldwide signals and technically de- rived intelligence operations to satisfy national, joint, combined, and Army information supe- riority requirements. The Battalion has supported every contingency operation in which the United States has participated since 1989. The unit achieved the award of two National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citations and the National Security Agency-sponsored Travis Trophy in recognition of service sites and units making significant contributions to the national cryptologic effort. The 743d MI Battalion also earned the Cypher Wheel Award. Beyond All Boundaries!