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The Evolution of American Military Intelligence

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The Evolution of American Military Intelligence t ;_ SupR I 02520 May 73 low- I The Evolution of )fflCAi] (J1j AMERICAN 251 41F (158 MILITARY A2 973 INTELLIGENCE PREPARED FOR USE BY THE US ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL, FT. HUACHUCA D AZ. 85613 4. This publication is provided for resident and nonresident instruction at the United States Army Intelligence Center and School only. It reflects the current thought of this School and conforms to published Department of the Army doctrine as closely as possible. UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA 85613 May 1973 Nt I DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY . U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA 85613 ATSI-CO 4 May 1973 SUBJECT: American Military Intelligence All Students Military Intelligence Officers Advanced Course 1. The attached supplementary reading has been prepared as a chrono- logical and analytical account of American military intelligence, with the goal of engendering some insight into the significant trends and developments of this aspect of the military profession, as it has been practiced in the U.S. Army. 2. This reading was prepared by two U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School instructors, Major N. B. Powe and Major E. E. Wilson, for use in the MI Officers Advanced Course. The authors have made con- siderable effort to achieve an accurate and balanced account. It is possible, nonetheless, that there may appear errors in fact and in interpretation, inasmuch as the reading was prepared exclusively from unclassified data. Readers of this material are encouraged to offer suggestions and additions, which should be directed to the USAICS, ATTN: AISI-DI-TIMS. 3. The history of American military intelligence has been marked by significant advances occurring during each American war followed by periods of relative disinterest in intelligence. Yet, in a compara- tively short span of time, the United States has progressed from a nation devoid of a formal intelligence apparatus to a world power possessed of one of the most advanced and successful intelligence organ- izations in the world. This progress has been made possible by extremely able and farsighted personnel in the intelligence profession and by a variety of brilliant military and civilian leaders who recognized the essentiality of intelligence. I am confident that you will find this account to be important and interesting reading. 2z1_, US ARMY INTELLIGENCECENTER N & SCHOOL Colonel, MI MI LIBRARY Commandant ATZSTDSL BLDG 62723 FORT HUACHUCA AZ C5Ci, U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SCHOOL SupR Supplementary Reading 02520 May 73 THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE "Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambig- uously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert workman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion--which is usually too late Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck." Thomas E. Shelling, Foreword to Roberta Wohistetter, Pearl Harbor Warning and Decision, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1962. Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman, 1923 11 PREFACE • Who has not heard the famous remark from George Santayana that "those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them." Unfortunately, this adage has applied all too often in the history of American military intelligence. Mistakes are made in one war, only to be repeated in the next. The theme that runs through this history is that only in very recent times has there been an appreciation in the United States of a need for a continuing professional effort upon which decisions could be based. Modern military intelligence in the U.S. Army has developed as a result of a variety of experiences. First, it has generally progressed in wartime and lain fallow in peacetime. Second, the evolution of our tactical intelligence capabilities has not always kept pace with our strategic intelligence. Third, the experience of the intelligence collectors (cryptologic, human and aerial and ground surveillance) differs considerably from that of those charged with producing and disseminating that intelli- gence, though both have made their contribution. It is inherent in this study that the combination of these strains produced the Army intelligence profession, exemplified today in the Military Intelligence Branch. While not neglecting the significance of national intelligence operations, this history concentrates on intelligence support to tactical forces since, in truth, this is where military intelligence, per se, receives its greatest visibility and its greatest importance. This history cannot claim, in any way, to be a complete record of American military intelligence. There are two reasons for this. First, the information for this paper is drawn from unclassified data, whose authors, as the present ones, had no access to the related classified materials, or chose purposefully to ignore them. It should be recognized, therefore, that the facts, or their interpretation, might suffer revision when compared with official, and still classified, materials. Secondly, this history is not complete because this is a field ripe for investigation. Much additional information is available in unclassified sources and far more in classified materials. This history, moreover, is not an official one and does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Army Intelligence Center and School or those of the Department of the Army. This present history is divided into these chronological segments: Historical Background to 1885 1885 to the End of World War I The Period Between the Wars World War II The End of World War II to 1963 1963 to the Present 111 In these periods, developments in the military intelligence profession will be considered in five interlocking lines of descent: National Intelligence Activities The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence The Counterintelligence Corps and the Intelligence Command. The Signal Intelligence Service and the Army Security Agency Tactical Support and the Military Intelligence Organization This particular history was prepared in an initial draft edition with a request for personal experiences and suggestions for improvement. Though formal interviews with some individuals are footnoted, the volume of the response precludes any extensive listing of those to whom the authors are indebted. They must, nevertheless, express their gratitude to their seniors and elders in Army intelligence for making freely available a vast experience and knowledge; to their current superiors for encouragement in this study as well as for the benefit of their knowledge; to their colleagues for their kindly, but critical reviews; to friends who located documents in far away places; to the USAICS library and editorial staffs for patient understanding; to their students for encouragement and for studies of particular aspects of intelligence history; and to Mr. Jerry Whitehead for graphics. Finally, the authors, one of whom is married and one is not, have always wondered why wives always receive the final expression of thanks; now they know, and reserve their last words of gratitude for their patient wife, friend and critic. The authors emphasize again to the reader that this is not an official history and does not necessarily represent the views of the United States Army or the United States Army Intelligence Center and School. Fort Huachuca, Arizona May 1973 Marc B. Powe Edward E. Wilson iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Table of Contents Chapter I: The Beginnings (to 1885) ......................... 1-9 Chapter II: The MID, The General Staff and the AEF (1885 - 1919) ................................... 10-30 The War Department The MID and the Spanish-American War Ralph H. Van Deman Organization of the General Staff Early Years of the Airplane The Mexican Punitive Expedition Reestablishment of the Second Division America Enters the War The American Expeditionary Force, France The Corps of Intelligence Police The Radio Intelligence Section, G2, AEF Tactical Aerial Surveillance AEF Siberia and North Russia Summary Chapter III: Some Disappointments and Persistence (1919-1941) .................................... 31-39 War Department General Staff, G2 The Corps of Intelligence Police Cryptologic Activities Aerial Surveillance Emerges Summary Chapter IV: Another War, Another Trial, Another Success (1941-1945) .................................... 40-83 Pearl Harbor Coordinator of Information War Department General Staff, G2 Censorship Counterintelligence Corps in the ZI Manhattan and ALSOS General Van Deman Again The Signal Intelligence Service Intelligence Operations, Europe and North Africa v Intelligence in the Southwest
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