Predicates or Categories
Aristotle
Chapter 1
1. [1a1] Things are called “equivocal” of which the name alone is common but the account of the substance according to the name is different, as both man and a drawing [are called] “animal,” for, of these, the name alone is common but the account of the substance according to the name is different. For should someone present the “what it is” for each of these to be animal, he will present a unique account for each. 2. [1a7] Things are called “univocal” of which both the name is common and the account of the substance according to the name is the same, as both man and ox [are called] “animal.” For each of these is called by the common name “animal,” and the account of the “what it is” is the same. For should someone present an account of the “what it is” for each of these to be animal, he will present the same account. 3. [1a12] Things are called “denominative,” which have their name according to another’s name, though differing from it by ending {by falling away}, as “the grammarian” from “grammar,” and “the brave man” from “bravery.” Chapter 2
4. [1a16] Of things said, some are said with composition, and some without composition. Those said, then, with composition are like “man runs,” “man wins;” those said without composition are like “man,” “ox,” “runs,” “wins.” 5. [1a20] Of beings, some are said of something underlying, but are in nothing underlying, as man is said of something underlying, of this man, but is in nothing underlying. 6. [1a22] Some, however, are in an underlying thing, but are said of no underlying thing (I call “in an underlying thing” what is in something, not as being a part, [but as] unable to be separately from that in which it is), as this grammar is in an underlying, the soul, but is said of nothing underlying, and this white is in an underlying, the body (for every color is in body), but is said of nothing underlying. 7. [1a28] Some, however, are both said of something underlying and are in something underlying, as science is in something underlying, the soul, but is said of something underlying, grammar. 8. [1b4] Some, however, are neither in something underlying nor are said of something underlying, as this man or this horse. For not one of such things is either in something underlying or said of something underlying. 9. [1b6] Simply, however, those individual and one in number are said of nothing underlying, but nothing prevents some [of these] from being in something underlying, for this grammar is among things in something underlying. . Chapter 3
10. [1b10] When one is predicated of another as of an underlying, whatever [things] are said of what is being predicated will also be said of what is underlying, as “man” is predicated of this man, but “animal” of man. Therefore, “animal” will also be predicated of this man. For this man is both man and animal. 11. [1b17] Of things in different genera, and which have not been ordered under each other, the differences also are other in kind1, e.g., of animal and of science. For the differences of animal are “footed” and “winged” and “water-dwelling” and “two-footed,” but not one of these is [a difference] of science. For science does not differ from science by being two-footed. 12. [1b20] But nothing prevents there being the same differences of genera under each other; for the genera above are predicated of the genera under them, whence, whatever things are differences of what is being predicated will also be differences of what is underlying.
1 Elsewhere this word is translated as “species.” Chapter 4
13. [1b25] Of what are said without any composition at all, each signifies either substance, or how much, or how, or toward something, or where, or when, or being positioned, or being outfitted, or acting upon, or undergoing. 14. [1b28] To speak with examples: substance is such as man, horse; how much is such as two foot, three foot; how, such as white, grammatical; toward something, such as double, half, greater; where, such as in the Lyceum, in the agora; when, such as yesterday, last year; being positioned, such as is lying, is seated; being outfitted, such as is shod, is armored; acting upon, such as cutting, burning; undergoing, such as being cut, being burned. 15. [2a5] Each of the things mentioned is not said by itself in any affirmation, but affirmation comes to be by the composition of these with each other. For every affirmation seems to be either true or false, but none of the things said without any composition is either true or false, e.g., “man,” “white,” “runs,” “wins.” Chapter 5
16. [2a10] That is called “substance” chiefly, and first, and most of all, which neither is said of something underlying nor is in something underlying, e.g., this man or this horse. Substances are called “second” in which, as in species, the things called first substances are, both these and the genera of these species, as this man is in the species “man,” but the genus of the species is “animal.” These, e.g., “man” and “animal,” then, are called second substances. 17. [2a19] It is clear from what has been said that, of things said of an underlying, it is necessary that both the name and the account be predicated {kategoretai2} of the underlying, e.g., “man” is said of an underlying, of this man, and the name is predicated of [him], for you will predicate “man” of this man. And the account of “man” will also be predicated of this man, for this man is indeed man. Whence, both the name and the account will be predicated of the underlying. 18. [2a27] But of things in an underlying, for the most part neither the name nor the account will be predicated of the underlying. But in some cases nothing prevents the name being predicated of an underlying, but it is impossible that the account [be said of], e.g., white being in an underlying, the body, it is predicated of an underlying, for the body is called white, but the account of white will never be predicated of body. 19. [2a34] However, all the others either are said of the underlying first substances or are in these underlying things. This is clear from the particular cases at hand. For example, “animal” is predicated of man, and therefore also of this man; for if [it were predicated] of no particular men, neither [would it be predicated] of man as a whole. Again, color is in body, and therefore in a particular body; for if it were not in some one of the particulars, neither would it be in body as a whole. Whence, all the others either are said of the underlying first substances or are in these underlying things. 20. [2b5] Therefore, if the first substances did not exist, it would be impossible that any of the others exist. For all others either are said of these underlying things or are in these underlying things. Whence, if the first substances are not, it is impossible that any of the others be. 21. [2b7] Of second substances, the species is more substance than the genus. For it is closer to first substance. For should someone present what a first substance is, he will present what is more known and more proper in presenting the species than the genus. For example, one would present this man more known in presenting “man” than [in presenting] “animal.” For the one is more proper to this man, the other more common. And rendering this tree, one will render it more known in presenting “tree” than [in presenting] “plant.” 22. [2b15] Moreover, the first substances, because underlying all others and all others being predicated of these or being in these, because of this, they are most of all called substances. But as the first substances are to the others, so is the species to the genus. For the species underlies the genus. For the genus is predicated of the species, but this cannot be turned around and the species [predicated of] the genus. Whence, the species is more substance than the genus also from these [considerations]. 23. [2b23] Among species which are not genera, however, no one is more substance than another. For one will present nothing more proper about this man in presenting
2 Lego – said of; kategoreo - predicated “man” than about this horse [in presenting ] “horse.” 24. [2b26] So too, none of the first substances is more substance than another. For this man is not more substance than this ox. 25. [2b29] It is reasonable that species and genus alone among the others after first substances are called “second substances.” For, of things predicated, these alone make clear first substance. For should someone render, about this man, what he is, he will render properly in presenting species or genus, and he will make it more known in presenting “man” than “animal.” Of the other, however, whichever one might present, he will present something extraneous, e.g., presenting “white” or “runs” or any such thing. Whence, it is reasonable that these alone among the others are called “substances.” 26. [2b37] Moreover, first substances, because they underlie all the others, are most chiefly called substances. But as the first substances are to all the others, so too are the species and the genera of the first substances to all the rest. For all the rest are predicated of these. For you will call this man grammatical, therefore you will also call man and animal grammatical; so too in the other cases. 27. [3a7] Not being in an underlying is common to all substance. For first substance is neither said of an underlying nor is in an underlying. Of second substances, it is also thus clear that they are not in an underlying. For man is said of an underlying, of this man, but is not in an underlying. For man is not in this man. So too, animal is said of an underlying, of this man, but animal is not in this man. 28. [3a15] Moreover, among things in an underlying, nothing prevents the name being sometimes predicated of an underlying, but it is impossible that the account [be predicated of it]. But among second substances, both the account and the name are predicated of the underlying. For you predicate the account of man of this man, and also that of animal. Whence, substance would not be among things in an underlying. 29. [3a21] But this is not unique to substance, for difference is also among things not in an underlying. For “footed” and “two-footed” are said of an underlying, man, but are not in an underlying. For footed and two-footed are not in man. And the account of the difference is predicated of that of which the difference would be said. For example, if “footed” is said of man, the account of footed will also be predicated of man, for man is footed. 30. [3a28] Let us not be troubled at the parts of substances being in an underlying as in wholes, [fearing] lest we at some time be forced to say they are not substances; for what are in an underlying were not so called as being parts which are in something. 31. [3a33] It belongs to substances and differences that all things are named univocally from them. For all the predicates from these are predicated either of the individuals or of the species. For there is no predicate from first substance, for it is said of no underlying thing. Among second substances, however, the species is predicated of the individual, and the genus both of the species and of the individual. So too, the differences are predicated both of the species and of the individuals. And first substances receive the account of the species and of the genus, and the species that of the genus. For whatever is said of what is predicated will also be said of the underlying. So too, both the species and the individuals receive the account of the differences. Univocals, however, were those of which both the name was common and the account the same. Whence, all things [said] from substances and differences are said univocally. 32. [3b10] All substances seem to signify a “this something.” In the case, then, of the first substances, it is most doubtless and true that it signifies a “this something.” For what is made clear is individual and one in number. But in the case of second substances, it appears, from the form of their names, that they signify a “this something,” when one says “man” or “animal.” Indeed, this is not true; but rather they signify how something is. For what is underlying is not one, as is first substance, but “man” and “animal” are said of many. They do not, however, signify how it is simply, as does “white.” For “white” signifies nothing other than how, but species and genus mark out how it is about substance. For they signify a certain substance as how it is. But they mark out more by a genus than by a species. For the one saying “animal” takes in more than the one saying “man.” 33. [3b24] There being nothing contrary to them also belongs to substance. For what would be contrary to first substance? For example, nothing is contrary to this man, nor is anything contrary to man or to animal. But this is not unique to substance, but is also in many others, e.g., in how much. For nothing is contrary to two-foot, nor to ten, nor to any such thing, unless someone should affirm that the many is contrary to the few or the great to the small. Of those which are determined as to how much, none is contrary to any. 34. [3b33] Substance seems not to admit the more and the less. I do not mean that substance is not more substance than substance (for it was said that this is so), but that each substance is not said to be more or less this very thing which it is. For example, if this substance is man, it will not be more or less man, either one thing than itself or one than another. For one man is not more man than another, as one white is more white than another, and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. And the same thing is said to be more and less than itself, as the body which is white is said to be more white now than before, and that which is hot is said to be more and less hot. No substance is said to be more or less. For man is not said to be more a man now than before, nor are any of the others which are substances [so spoken of]. Whence, substance cannot admit of the more and the less. 35. [4a10] It seems to be most proper to substance to be receptive of contraries while being the same and one in number; as in the other cases, whichever ones are not substances, one could not put forth one which, being one in number, is receptive of contraries. For example, a color which is one and the same in number, will not be light and dark, nor will an action one and the same in number be both vicious and virtuous, and so too in the other cases, whichever ones are not substances. But substance, being one and the same in number, is receptive of contraries. For example, a particular man, being one and the same, sometimes comes to be light and sometimes dark, and hot and cold, and vicious and virtuous. 36. [4a21] In the case of no one of the others does a like thing appear, unless one should object, saying that statement and opinion are of this sort. For the same statement seems to be both true and false. For example, if the statement that someone is sitting be true, when he stands, that same statement will be false. So too in the case of opinion. For if someone truly thinks that someone is sitting, when he stands, one, having the same opinion about him, will think falsely. But even if one accept this, yet they differ in their mode. For the ones in the case of substances are receptive of contraries by themselves changing. For what has come to be cold from hot has changed (for it has altered), and black from white and virtuous from vicious, and so too each of the other cases: itself receiving change, it is receptive of contraries. But a statement and an opinion remain wholly immobile in every way, but the thing moving, the contrary comes to be concerning these [i.e., the statement and the opinion]. For the statement that someone is sitting remains the same, but, the thing having changed, the statement comes to be sometimes true and sometimes false. So too in the case of opinion. Whence, being receptive in itself of contraries, by way of change, would be proper to substance in mode. 37. [4b4] If, then, someone accept this, opinion and statement are receptive of contraries. But this is not true. For a statement and an opinion are not said to be receptive of contraries by themselves receiving something, but by a passion having come to be concerning something else. For the statement is said to be true or false by the thing being or not being, not by itself being receptive of contraries. For, simply [speaking], no statement or opinion is moved by anything; whence, nothing coming to be in them, neither would they be receptive of contraries. But a substance is said to be receptive of contraries by itself receiving the contraries. For it receives sickness and health, and whiteness and blackness; and itself receiving each of such things, it is said to be receptive of contraries. Whence, it would be a proper to substance that, being the same and one in number, it is receptive of contraries. 38. [4b19] Let so many things, therefore, be said about substance.
Chapter 6
39. [4b20] Of [the predicate] “how much,” one is discrete {separated, divided, determined}, another continuous. And one is constituted from parts in it which have position in regard to each other, another not from those having position. 40. [4b24] The discrete is such as number and speech, the continuous, lines, surfaces, bodies, moreover, besides these, time and place. 41. [4b25] For there is no common term of the parts of number, at which [term] the parts of it conjoin. For example, if five is a part of ten, the five and the five do not conjoin at any common term, but are separate {discrete}. And the three and the seven do not conjoin at any common term. Nor, generally, could you take, in the case of number, a common term of the parts, but they are always separate {discrete}. Whence, number is among things which are discrete. 42. [4b32] Speech is also among things which are discrete. (That speech is a “how much” is apparent. For it is measured by long and short syllables. I mean that very speech produced by the voice.) The parts of it do not conjoin at any common term. For there is no common term at which the syllables conjoin, but each is separate {discrete} in itself. 43. [5a1] The line is continuous. For one can take a common term at which the parts of it conjoin, a point. And of a surface, a line, for the parts of a surface conjoin at a certain common term. So too, in the case of body, one can take a common term, a line or a surface at which the parts of the body conjoin. 44. [5a8] And time and place are of this sort. For present time conjoins with both the past and the future. 45. [5a9] Again, place is among things which are continuous. For the parts of a body occupy a certain place, which parts conjoin at a certain term. Thus, the parts of the place, which parts each of the parts of the body occupies, conjoin at the same term at which the parts of the body also [conjoin]. Whence, place too would be continuous. For the parts of it conjoin at one common term. 46. [5a15] Moreover, some are constituted from parts in them having position with regard to each other, some from [ones] not having position. For example, the parts of a line have position in regard to each other, for each of them lies somewhere, and one could mark off and say where each lies in the surface and at which part of those remaining it conjoins. So too, the parts of a surface have a certain position, for one could, in the same way, say where each lies, and which ones join with each other. And so too those of a solid and those of a place. 47. [5a25] In the case of number, though, one could not see how the parts have a certain position with regard to each other or lie somewhere, or which of the parts conjoin with others. Nor those of time. For not one of the parts of time endure; but how could what does not endure have a certain position? But you would say rather that there is a certain order, by there being a before and an after of time. And so too in the case of number, by one being counted before two, and two before three. And thus there could be a certain order, though you certainly could not find position. And so too in the case of speech. For none of its parts endure, but it is spoken and one can no longer find it; whence its parts could not have position, if indeed none endures. Therefore, some are constituted from parts having position, some not from parts having position. 48. [5a38] These alone, those mentioned, are chiefly spoken of as “how much,” but all others accidentally. For looking at these, we say “how much” of the others also, e.g., there is said to be much white by the surface being much, and an action is called great and motion much by the time being much. For each of these [i.e., white, action, and motion] is not said to be “how much” in virtue of itself. For example, if someone should say how much a certain action is, he will determine this by the time, saying it is a year long or something like that, and, saying how much white there is, he will determine this by the surface; for however much the surface is, that much will he also say the white to be. Whence, the things mentioned are alone chiefly and in themselves spoken of as “how much,” but not one of the others [is spoken of thus] in itself, but if at all, accidentally. 49. [5b12] Moreover, nothing is contrary to how much [something is]. For in the case of determinate ones, it is apparent that there is no contrary, e.g., to two-foot or three-foot or to surface or to anything among such things; for nothing is contrary. 50. [5b14] Unless someone says that many is contrary to few and large to small. But none of these is “how much,” but they belong to [the predicate] “toward something.” For nothing is called large or small in itself, but in its bearing toward something; e.g., a mountain is called small, but a grain of millet large, by being larger than things of like kind, the other, less than things of like kind. Therefore, the bearing is towards another, since if a thing were called small or great in itself, the mountain would never be called small, the grain large. Again, we say that there are many men in the village, but, though being many more than those [in the village, there may be] few in Athens; and also many in the house but few in the theater, though there are many more [in the theater]. 51a. [5b26] Moreover, “two-foot” and “three-foot” and each of such things signify “how much,” but large or small do not signify “how much,” but rather “toward something.” For large and small are seen in regard to another. Whence, it is apparent that these belong to “toward something.” 51b. [5b30] Moreover, whether one put them down as “how much” or not, there is nothing contrary to them. For how would something be contrary to what one cannot grasp in itself but [only] in its bearing toward something else? 52. [5b33] Moreover, if the large and the small were contraries, it would happen that the same thing would allow contraries at the same time and those things would be contraries to themselves. For it happens that the same thing is large and small at the same time, for it is small in regard to this, but this same thing is large in regard to something else. Whence, the same thing happens to be both large and small at the same time; whence, it allows contraries at the same time. But nothing, it seems, admits contraries at the same time. For example, substance seems to be receptive of contraries, but one is certainly not at the same time ill and healthy, nor at the same time white and black. Nor do any of the other [predicates] admit of contraries at the same time. And it happens that the same things are contraries of themselves. For if the large is contrary to the small, but the same thing is at the same time large and small, the same thing would be contrary to itself. But that the same be contrary to itself is among things which are impossible. The large is therefore not contrary to the small, nor the many to the few; whence, even if someone should say that these do not belong to “toward something,” but to “how much,” it would have no contrary. 53. [6a13] Most of all, contrariety of [the predicate] “how much” seems to belong with regard to place. For they posit up as contrary to down, calling what is toward the middle space down, because the greatest distance is to the middle from the limits of the world. It seems, too, that the definition of the other contraries is drawn from these. For contraries are defined as those standing furthest from each other of those in the same genus. 54. [6a20] “How much” does not seem to admit the more and less, e.g., two-foot. For one thing is not more two-foot than another. Nor in the case of number, e.g., three is not called three more than five, nor one three more than [another] three. Nor, indeed, is one time called time more than another time. Nor generally, is more and less said of any one of those mentioned. Whence, “how much” does not admit the more and the less. 55. [6a26] It is most proper to “how much” to be called equal and unequal. For each “how much” mentioned is called equal and unequal. For example, body is called equal and unequal, and number is called equal and unequal, and time equal and unequal. So too in the cases of the other ones spoken of: each is called equal and unequal. Of the remaining, whichever are not “how much” certainly do not seem to be called equal and unequal. For example, disposition is certainly not said to be equal and unequal, but rather is said to be similar, and white is certainly not [said to be] equal and unequal, but similar. Whence, to be called equal and unequal would be most proper to “how much.” Chapter 7
56. [6a7] Such things are said to be “toward something” which, as regards what they are, are said to be of another or in some other way toward something. For example, the larger just as such is said of another, for it is larger than something. And the double just as such is said of another, for it is said to be the double of something; and so too in other such things. Also among things which are “toward something” are such things as habit, disposition, sensation, knowledge {episteme}, and position. For all the things mentioned, just as such and not as something else, are said to be of another. For a habit is said to be a habit of something, and knowledge, knowledge of something, and position, position in regard to something, and so too the others. Therefore, those things are “toward something” which are, just as such, said “of” others, or in any other way in regard to another. For example, a large mountain is said in regard to something, for the mountain is called large in regard to another, and the similar is said to be similar to something, and other such things are likewise said in regard to something. And lying, standing, and sitting are certain positions, but position is among things which are “toward something.” But to be lying, or to be standing, or to be sitting are not themselves positions, but are denominatively said from the positions mentioned. 57. [6b15] Contrariety belongs to things which are “toward something,” e.g., virtue is contrary to vice, both of these being things “toward something,” and knowledge [is contrary to] to ignorance. But a contrary does not belong to every thing which is “toward something.” For there is nothing contrary to double or to triple or to any such thing. 58. [6b20] It seems that things which are “toward something” admit more and less. For similar is said more and less, and unequal is said more and less, each of these being “toward something.” For the similar is said to be similar to something and the unequal, unequal to something. But not all admit more and less. For the double is not said to be more double or less double, nor is any such thing. 59. [6b29] But all things which are “toward something” are said in regard to something which reciprocates; e.g., the slave is called the slave of the master and the master is called the master of the slave; and the double, double of the half, and the half, half of the double; and the greater, greater than the lesser, and the lesser, lesser than the greater; so too in other cases. 60. [6b33] Except that sometimes they will differ according to speech by [grammatical] ending; as knowledge is called knowledge of the knowable, and the knowable, knowable by knowledge; and sensation, sensation of the sensible, and the sensible, sensible by sensation. 61. [6b37] Not that they will not seem to reciprocate sometimes, if the one presenting [the things which are “toward each other”] does not properly present that in regard to which it is said, but errs. For example, if one should present the wing as “of a bird,” “bird of a wing” does not reciprocate. For the first thing, wing of a bird, is not properly presented, for it is not just as bird, that the wing is said of it, but as winged. For there are wings of many other things, which are not birds. Whence, if it be presented properly, it will also reciprocate; e.g., the wing is the wing of the wingèd, and the wingèd, wingèd by the wing. Sometimes it is perhaps necessary to make up a name, if there be not laid down a name in regard to which it would be properly presented. For example, should one present the rudder of the boat, the presentation is not proper. For it is not just as boat that the rudder is said of it. For there are boats of which there are not rudders. Whence, it will not reciprocate. For the boat is not called the boat of the rudder. But perhaps the presentation will be more proper if it somehow be presented thus: the rudder is the rudder of the ruddered, or in whatever other way; for a name is not laid down. And it will reciprocate if it be presented properly. For the ruddered is ruddered by the rudder. So too in the other cases, e.g., the head would more properly be presented as of the headed than being presented as of animal. For it does not have a head as animal. For many of the animals do not have a head. Perhaps one would grasp those for which names are not laid down most easily thus, if one would put down, from {by looking to} the first things, the names for those in regard to which things reciprocate, as in the cases mentioned, “wingèd” from “wing” and “ruddered” from “rudder.” 62. [7a25] Every thing which is “toward something,” then, if it be properly presented, is said in regard to something which reciprocates, since, if it be presented in regard to a chance thing and not in regard to that very thing in regard to which it is said, it will not reciprocate. I mean that none would reciprocate even among those which we agree are said in regard to something reciprocating, and which have names laid down for them, if one should present it in regard to something accidental and not in regard to that according to which it is said. For example, if the slave be presented not as “of a master,” but as “of a man” or “of a biped” or any other such thing, it will not reciprocate. For the presentation is not proper. 63. [7a32] Moreover, if that in regard to which it is said be presented properly, if all other accidental things be removed, but that alone in regard to which it is presented properly does remain, it will always be spoken of in regard to that. For example, if slave is said in regard to master, whatever accidental things are in master being removed, e.g., being two-footed, receptive of knowledge, man, there remaining only being a master, slave will always be spoken of in regard to this. For the slave is said to be the slave of a master. 64. [7b1] But if whatever it is in regard to which it is said be not presented properly, other things being removed and there only remaining that in regard to which it was presented, it will not be spoken of in regard to that. For let the slave be presented as the slave of a man, and the wing as of a bird, and let there be removed from the man his being a master. For no longer will the slave be said in regard to the man, for there being no master, there is no slave. So too if being wingèd is removed from bird. For the wing will no longer be among things which are “toward something,” for there not being the wingèd, neither will the wing be of something. Whence, one must present properly whatever it is in regard to which it is said. And if a name be laid down, the presenting is easy; there not being one, it is perhaps necessary to make up a name. If things are so named, it is apparent that every thing which is “toward something” is spoken of in regard to something which reciprocates. 65. [7b15] It seems that things which are “toward something” are together {simultaneous} by nature; and in most case this is true. For the double and the half are together, and if the half is, double is, and if the slave is, master is. And the others are similar to these. And these destroy each other. For, if the double does not exist, the half does not exist, and if the half does not exist, double does not exist. So too in other cases, whatever are like these. 66. [7b22] But it does not seem to be true in all the things which are “toward something” that they are together by nature. For the knowable would seem to be before knowledge. For in most cases we grasp knowledge of things which exist beforehand. In few or no cases would one see the knowledge coming to be together with the knowable. Moreover, when the knowable is destroyed, the knowledge is destroyed with it, but when the knowledge [is destroyed], the knowable is not destroyed with it. For, if the knowable does not exist, knowledge does not exist, for there will no longer be knowledge of anything, but if knowledge does not exist, nothing prevents the knowable existing. For example, the squaring of the circle, if indeed it is knowable: knowledge of it is not yet, but it is itself knowable. Moreover, if animal be destroyed, there is no knowledge, but many things among the knowables can be. In the case of sensation, things are disposed similarly to these. For the sensible seems to be before sensation. For, if the sensible be destroyed, sensation is destroyed with it, but if sensation [be destroyed], the sensible is not destroyed with it. For sensations are about body and are in body; the sensible being destroyed, body would be destroyed, for body is also among the sensibles, but if body does not exist, sensation too is destroyed. Whence, the sensible destroys with it sensation. But the sensation does not [destroy with it] the sensible. For if animal be destroyed, sensation is destroyed, but the sensible will [still] be, e.g., body, hot, sweet, bitter, and all other things which are sensible. Moreover, sensation comes to be together with the sensitive, for animal and sensation come to be together. But the sensible exists also before the sensation. For fire and water and such things, from which the animal is composed, exist before the animal or sensation exist at all. Whence, the sensible would seem to be before sensation. 67. [8a14] There is a difficulty as to whether no substance is said among things [which are] “toward something,” as it seems, or this can be in the cases of certain second substances. For it is true in the case of first substances. For neither the wholes nor the parts are said in regard to something. For this man is not called “someone's this man,” nor this ox “someone's this ox.” So too in the case of the parts. For this hand is not called “someone's this hand,” but “someone's hand,” and this head is not called “someone's this head,” but “someone's head.” So too in the cases of second substance, for the most part. For example, man is not called “someone's man,” nor ox “someone's ox,” nor wood “someone's wood” (though they are called “someone's property”). In such cases, therefore, it is apparent that they are not among things which are “toward something,” but in the case of some second substances there is a question. For example, the head is called “the head of someone” and the hand is called “the hand of someone,” and each such thing [is spoken of similarly]. Whence, these would seem to be among things which are “toward something.” 68. [8a29] If, therefore, the definition of things which are “toward something” was presented sufficiently, untying [this knot] so that no substance is said to be among things which are “toward something” is either among things extremely difficult or among things impossible. But if [it was] not sufficiently [presented], but things which are “toward something” are those for which being is the same with being somehow “toward something,” perhaps something could be said about these [difficulties]. The definition presented before, however, closely follows all the things which are “toward something,” but their being said, just as such, of another, this is not being for things which are “toward something.” 69. [8a38] From these things it is clear that if someone should determinately see something which is among things which are “toward something,” that thing in regard to which it is said will be seen determinately. This is, then, apparent from itself. For if one should see that this certain thing is among things which are “toward something,” but being is, for things which are “toward something” the same with being somehow toward something, he also knows that toward which it somehow is. For if he does not at all know that toward which it somehow is, neither will he know whether it is somehow “toward something.” And such a thing is clear in the particular cases. For example, if one knows determinately that this certain thing is double, he knows determinately right away that of which it is the double. For if he does not know it to be the double of any one of the determinate things, neither does he know that it is double at all. So too, if one knows that this certain thing is more beautiful, it is necessary, through these things, that he know determinately that than which it is more beautiful. He will not know indeterminately that this more beautiful than the inferior. For such a claim is opinion, not knowledge. For he will no longer know certainly that it is more beautiful than an inferior; for if it so happen, nothing is inferior to it. Whence, it is apparent that it is necessary that one know determinately that in regard to which what one knows determinately to be among things which are “toward something” is said. But one can know determinately the head and the hand and each of such things (which are substances), just what they are, but it is not necessary [to know] that in regard to which they are said. But one cannot determinately know [by this knowledge alone] whose head or whose hand it is. Whence, these things would not be among things which are “toward something.” But if they are not among things which are “toward something,” it would be true to say that no substance is among things which are “toward something.” 70. [8b22] Perhaps it is very difficult to make firmly known such things without having looked into them often; still, to have raised difficulties about each of them is not useless.
Chapter 8
71. [8b25] I call “qualities” those [predicates] by which it is said “how” some men are. But “quality” is among those said in many ways. 72. [8b27] Habit and disposition, then, may be called one species of quality. But habit differs from disposition by being more durable and more long-lasting. Both sciences and virtues are such things. For science seems to be among things constantly remaining and difficult to move, even if someone should grasp science in a moderate way, unless a great change should come to be, due to sickness or some other such thing. So too virtue; e.g., justice and temperance and each of such things seems not to be easily movable or changeable. What are easily movable and quickly changeable are called dispositions, e.g., feverish and chilled and sickness and health and any other such things. For a man is in some way disposed by these, but changes quickly, from being feverish and to being chilled, and from being healthy to being sick. And so too with the others, unless one of these should happen to be presently, after a great time, natural and incurable or very difficult to move, which one would then perhaps call a habit. 73. [9a5] It is apparent that one wishes to call those things “habits” which are long-lived and more difficult to move. For one does not say that those who do not wholly possess the sciences but are easily movable have a habit, but they are disposed somehow by the science, either worse or better. Whence, habit differs from disposition by the one being easily movable while the other is more long-lasting and more difficult to move. 74. [9a12] But habits are also dispositions, while dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have habits are somehow disposed by them, but those who are disposed do not have a habit at all. 75. [9a14] Another genus of quality is that by which we speak of “born boxers” or “born runners” or the “healthy” or the “sickly,” and, simply, whatever are spoken of in regard to a natural ability or inability. For each of such things is not said by being somehow disposed, but by having a natural ability to do something easily or to suffer nothing, as the “born boxers” or “born runners” are spoken of not by being somehow disposed but by having a natural ability to do something easily, while the “healthy” are spoken of by having a natural ability to suffer nothing easily by any chance thing, the “sickly” by having an inability to suffer nothing. Similar to these are the hard and the soft, for the hard is said by having an ability not to be easily divided, the soft by having an inability for this same thing. 76. [9a29] A third genus of quality is affective qualities and affections. Such things are, e.g., sweetness and bitterness and sourness and all things of like kind with these, moreover, heat and coldness and whiteness and blackness. 77. [9a32] It is apparent, therefore, that such things are qualities. For how the things receiving them are is said by these. For example, honey is called sweet by receiving sweetness, and a body white by receiving whiteness. So too in the other cases. 78. [9a35] But affective qualities are spoken of not by the things which receive the qualities having been somehow affected, for honey is not called sweet by having been somehow affected; nor any of the other such things. Similarly to these, heat and coldness are called affective qualities not by the things receiving them having been somehow affected, but they are called “affective qualities” because each of the aforesaid qualities is productive of an affection in regard to sensation. For sweetness produces a certain affection in regard to taste, and heat in regard to touch, and similarly the others. 79. [9b10] But whiteness and blackness and the other colors are not called “affective qualities” in the same way as the aforesaid, but by themselves having come to be from an affection. It is clear, therefore, that many changes of colors come to be though affection. For if someone is shamed, he becomes red, and if he fears, pale, and each of such things. Whence, if someone be affected by nature with a certain one of such affections, it is likely he have a similar complexion. For whatever disposition among the ones coming to be about the body is now [produced] in being shamed, the same disposition may also come to be by a natural constitution, so that a similar complexion comes to be by nature. Therefore, of such accidents, whichever ones have taken their beginning from some affections which are difficult to move and constantly remaining, are called “qualities.” For if pallor or blackness come to be in a constitution which is by nature, they are called “qualities.” For how we are is said by these. If the pallor or blackness happens through long sickness or the sun's heat, and are not easily removed or even remain constantly through life, these are called “qualities.” For, in the same way, how we are is said by these. 80. [9b27] But whichever ones come to be from things easily undone and quickly removed are called “affections.” For how things are is not said by these. For he who blushes due to being shamed is not said to be “ruddy,” nor he who pales due to being afraid “pallid,” but rather, “to have been affected” somehow. Whence, such things are called “affections,” but not “qualities.” 81. [9a34] In a way similar to these, affective qualities and affections are spoken of with respect to the soul. For whatever things have come to be right from birth from some affections are called “qualities,” e.g., madness and irascibility and such things. For how men are is said with regard to these, [i.e.,] both “irascible” and “mad.” Similarly too, whatever derangements are not natural but have come to be from some other accidents hard to be rid of or wholly immovable are, such things too, qualities. For how men are is said with regard to these. But whatever things come to be from things quickly removed are called “affections,” e.g., if a man being in pain is more irritable. For the man who is irritable in such an affection is not said to be “irritable,” but rather “to have been affected” somehow. Whence, such things are called “affections,” but not “qualities.” 82. [10a10] A fourth genus of quality is the figure and form which is around each thing; moreover, in addition to these, straightness and curvature, and anything which might be similar to these. For how a thing is in a certain way is said with regard to each of these. For how a thing is in a certain way is said by being a triangle or square, and by [being] straight or curved. And how a thing is in a certain way is said in regard to form. 83. [10a17] But “rare” and “dense” and “rough” and “smooth” might seem to signify how, yet such things appear to be foreign to the division which concerns “how.” For each of these appears rather to manifest a certain position of parts. For [a thing] is dense by the parts being close to each other, rare by being distant from each other; and smooth by the parts lying somehow on a straight line, rough by one being above, one below. 84. [10a25] Perhaps, therefore, some other mode of quality might appear, but those mostly said are practically so many. 85. [10a27] The aforementioned are qualities; but what are said denominatively in regard to these, or in some other way from them, are “how” [something is]. In most cases, therefore, and practically in all, they are said denominatively, e.g., from whiteness, “white,” and from grammar, “grammarian,” and from justice, “just,” and so too in the others. But in some, due to there not being laid down names for the qualities, a thing cannot be said denominatively from them. For example, the runner or the boxer, spoken of in regard to natural ability, is not named denominatively from any quality. For a name is not laid down for those abilities according to which how these men are is said, as there is for the sciences according to which those called boxers or wrestlers in virtue of a disposition are named. For boxing is called a science, and wrestling, and how those who are disposed [according to these sciences] are spoken of is from these. Sometimes, too, though a name is laid down, what is named with regard to the quality is not named denominatively, e.g., the upright man from virtue. For he is called upright by having virtue, but is not named denominatively from virtue. But it is not like this in most cases. What are said denominatively from the aforesaid qualities, therefore, or in some other way from them, are called “how” [something is]. 86. [10b12] There is contrariety with regard to how things are, e.g., justice is contrary to injustice, and whiteness to blackness, and others similarly; and the things called “qualified” with regard to these, e.g., the unjust to the just and the white to the black. But it is not like this in all cases. For, though they are how [a thing is], nothing is contrary to red or yellow or such colors. Moreover, if one of the contraries be how [a thing is], the remaining one will also be how [a thing is]. This is clear by taking in hand the other predicates {categories}, e.g., if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is how [a thing is], then injustice too is how [a thing is]. For none of the other predicates befits injustice, neither “how much” nor “toward something” nor where, nor, generally, any such thing except “how.” So too in the cases of the others contraries which are in virtue of “how” [something is]. 87. [10b25] How [things are] also admit of more and less. For one thing is said to be more white than another, and one more just than another. And the same thing takes on increase. For, being white, it is still able to become whiter; not all, but most. For someone might be at a loss as to whether [one] justice is said to be more than [another] justice, and similarly in the case of the other dispositions. For some men disagree about such things. For they say that [one] justice is not at all said to be more than [another] justice, or [one] health than [another] health. Still, they say that one thing has less health than another, and one thing less justice than another, and so too for grammatical and the other dispositions. But, then, the things spoken of with regard to these indisputably admit of more and less. For one man is called more grammatical than another, and more just, and more healthy, and so too in the other cases. 88. [11a6] But triangle and square do not seem to admit of more, nor any of the other figures. For the things which admit of the account of triangle and that of circle are in entirely the same way triangles or circles, while of those which do not admit [these accounts], none will be so called more than another. For the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for neither admits the account of circle. Simply, however, if both do not admit the account of what is proposed, one will not be so called more than the other. Therefore, not every “how [something is]” admits of more and less. 89. [11a15] Of the things mentioned, therefore, not one is unique to quality. But like and unlike are said of qualities alone. For one thing is like another with regard to nothing other than what says how it is. Whence, it would be unique to quality that like and unlike are said with regard to it. 90. [11a20] One must not fear lest someone say that we, making a statement on qualities, have counted in many of the things which are “toward something.” For habits and dispositions are among things which are “toward something.” For practically in all such cases the genera are said in regard to another, but none of the particulars are. For science, being a genus, is as such said of another. For it is called science of something. But not one of the particulars is as such said to be of another, e.g., the grammatical is not said to be the grammatical of something, nor the musical the musical of something; but if at all, they too are called relatives according to the genus. For example, the grammatical is called science of something, not the grammatical of something, and the musical [is called] science of something, not the musical of something. Whence, the particulars are not in with the things said in regard to another. But how we are is said in virtue of the particulars, for we have these. For we are called “scientists” by having a certain one of the particular sciences. Whence, these particulars would be qualities, with regard to which how we are is sometimes said. But these are not in with things said in regard to another. 91. [11a37] Moreover, if the same thing should happen to be how something is and also toward something, there is nothing strange in its being counted in both genera. Chapter 9
92. [11b15] To act upon and to undergo admit of both contrariety and of the more and less. For heating is contrary to cooling and being heated to being cooled and being pleased to being pained. Whence, they admit contrariety. 93. [11b16] And [they admit] the more and less. For one can heat more and less, and be heated more and less, and be pained more and less. Therefore, acting upon and undergoing admit the more and less. 94. [11b8] Let so much be said about these, therefore. It was said about “being positioned,” in [the discussions about the predicate] “toward something,” that it is said denominatively from positions. 95. [11b10] About the rest, “when” and “where” and “being outfitted,” because of their being clear, nothing else is said about them than what was said in the beginning, that “being outfitted” signifies being shod, being armed, “where,” e.g., in the Lyceum, and whatever else was said about them. Chapter 10
96. [11b15] About the genera put forth, therefore, what was said is sufficient. But about the opposites, one must say in how many ways they are normally opposed. 97. [11b16] One thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways: as [things which are] “toward something,” or as contraries, or as privation and possession {as lack and having}, or as affirmation and negation. 98. [11b17] To speak in outline, each of such things is opposed, as [being] “toward something,” e.g., the double to the half, as contraries, e.g., bad to good, as [opposed] according to privation and possession, e.g., blindness and sight, as affirmation and negation, e.g., he sits, he does not sit. 99. [11b24] Things, therefore, which are opposed as [being] “toward something,” are, as such, said to be of, or in some other way with regard to, their opposites. For example, the double as such is said to be double of the half. And knowledge is opposed to the knowable as [things which are] “toward something” are, and knowledge as such is of the knowable. And the knowable is as such said to be opposed, as in regard to knowledge, for the knowable is said to knowable by something: by knowledge. Whatever things, therefore, are opposed as [things which are] “toward something” are, are as such said to be of their opposites, or in some other way with regard to each other. 100. [11b34] The things [opposed] as contraries, however, are in no way said to be, as such, with regard to each other; nevertheless, they are called contraries of each other. For the good is not called the good of bad, but [it is called] the contrary [of the bad], nor is the white called the white of the black, but the contrary. Whence, these oppositions differ from each other. 101. [12a1] Among the contraries, there is nothing between those which are such that one or the other of them necessarily belongs to those in which they are naturally apt to come to be or to be predicated. But there is always something between those of which it is not necessary that one or the other belongs. For example, sickness and health are naturally apt to come to be in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that one of them, sickness or health, belong to the body of an animal. And odd and even are predicated of a number, and it is necessary that one of them, odd or even, belong to number. And there is nothing between these, neither between sickness and health nor between odd and even. 102. [12a10] But there is something between those of which it is not necessary that one or the other belong. For example, black and white are naturally apt to come to be in a body, and it is not necessary that one of these belong to a body, for not every body is either white or black. And vicious and virtuous are predicated of both man and many other things, but it is not necessary that one or the other of these belong to each of those of which they are predicated. For not all these are either vicious or virtuous. And there is something between these, e.g., between white and black there is grey and yellow and whatever other colors, between the vicious and the virtuous what is neither vicious or virtuous. In some cases, then, names are laid down for the things in between, e.g., between white and black, grey and yellow. But in some cases, it is not easy to present by name what is between; what is between is defined by negation of each extreme, e.g., what is neither good nor bad, and what is neither just nor unjust. 103. [12a27] Privation and possession are said of the same thing, e.g., sight and blindness of the eye. To speak universally, each of these is said about that in which the possession is naturally apt to come to be. We say of each of the things receptive of a possession that it is deprived when the possession in no way belongs to what it is naturally apt to belong to and when it is naturally apt to have it. For we call “toothless” not what does not have teeth and “blind” not what does not have sight, but what does not have [these] when it is naturally apt to have [them]. For some things from birth do not have sight or teeth, but are not called “toothless” or “blind.” 104. [12a35] Being deprived and having the possession are not privation and possession. For the possession is sight, the privation, blindness. But having sight is not sight, nor is being blind blindness. For blindness is the privation, but being blind is being deprived, not privation. Moreover, if blindness were the same as being blind, both would be predicated of the same thing. But a man is called “blind,” but is never called “blindness.” 105. [12b4] But these, being deprived and having the possession, also seem to be opposed as privation and possession. For the way of opposition is the same; for as blindness is opposed to sight, thus also is being blind opposed to having sight. 106. [12b6] Nor is what underlies an affirmation or negation an affirmation or negation. For an affirmation is an affirmative speech and a negation a negative speech, but not one of the things underlying affirmation or negation is a speech. Yet these are also said to be opposed to each other as affirmation and negation. For in these too the way of opposition is the same. For as the affirmation is sometimes opposed to the negation, e.g., “he is sitting” - “he is not sitting,” thus also the thing underlying each is opposed, sitting - not sitting. 107. [12b16] It is apparent that privation and possession are not opposed as [things which are] “toward something.” For they are not as such said of the opposite. For sight is not the sight of blindness, nor is it said with regard to it in any other way. Similarly, neither can blindness be called blindness of sight, but blindness is called the privation of sight. Moreover, all [things which are] “toward something” are said with regard to what is reciprocal, whence, blindness too, if it were among [things which are] “toward something,” would itself reciprocate with that in regard to which it is said. But it does not reciprocate. For sight is not called sight of blindness. 108. [12b26] It is clear from the following that things said according to privation and possession are not opposed as contraries. For, among contraries of which there is nothing in between, it is necessary that one of them always belong to those in which they are naturally apt to come to be or of which they are predicated. For nothing was in between those of which it was necessary that one of them be in that which is receptive, e.g., in the cases of sickness and health and of odd and even. But of those of which there is something between, it is never necessary that one of them belong to all. For it is not necessary that everything receptive be white or black, nor hot or cold. For nothing prevents something which is in between these from belonging. Moreover, there was something between those of which it was not necessary that one of them belong to what is receptive, unless one of them belongs by nature to those [things which are receptive], as hot is in fire and white in snow, but in those cases it is necessary that one of them belong determinately, and not whichever one chances. For fire cannot be cold nor snow black. Whence, it is not necessary that one of these be in everything receptive of them, but only in those in which one belongs by nature, and in those cases, one determinately and not whichever one [of the two] chances. 109. [13a4] But in the case of privation and possession neither of the things said is true. For it is not necessary that one of them always belong to what is receptive, for what is not yet naturally apt to have sight is not said to have either blindness or sight; whence, these would not be among contraries which are such as to have nothing in between. But neither are they among those of which there is something in between. For it is necessary at some time for one of them to belong to every receptive thing, for when a thing is already naturally apt to have sight, then it will be called either a thing having blindness or having sight, and not determinately one of these, but whichever one chances. For it is not necessary that it be a thing having blindness or having sight, but whichever one chances. But in the case of the contraries of which there is something in between, it was never necessary that one of them belong to everything receptive [of them], but to some, and to these, determinately one [of the two]. Whence, it is clear that what are opposed as privation and possession are not opposed according to either of the ways that contraries are opposed. 110. [13a19] Moreover, in the case of contraries, if what is receptive exists, it is possible that there be change from one to the other, unless one belongs by nature to something, as hot is in fire. For the healthy is able to become sick and the white to become black and the cold hot, and from the virtuous the vicious can come to be and from the vicious the virtuous. For the vicious man, being led to better amusements and discussions, would improve, if only a little, to being better. But if he once make improvement, if only a little, it is apparent that he might change completely or at least make very great improvement. For he will always become more easily moved toward virtue, however slight be his progress in the beginning. Whence, it is likely that he make more improvement. And this always coming about, he would be completely returned to the contrary state, if he be not hindered by time. 111. [13a31] But in the case of privation and possession, it is impossible that there be change from one to the other. For change does come to be from the possession to the privation, but it is impossible [that there be change] from the privation to the possession. For, having gone blind, one does not see again, nor, being bald, does one regain hair, nor, being toothless, does one grow teeth. 112. [13a38] It is apparent that whatever things are opposed as affirmation and negation are opposed in none of the ways mentioned. For only of these is it always necessary that one of them is true but the other false. For neither in the case of contraries is it always necessary that one of them be true, the other false, nor in the case of [things which are] “toward something” nor in the case of possession and privation. For example, health and sickness are contraries, and neither one is true or false. So too, the double and the half are opposed as [things which are] “toward something,” and neither one is true or false. Nor are what are opposed as privation and possession, e.g., sight and blindness. Generally, among things said without any intertwining, not one is either true or false. But all the things mentioned are said without intertwining. 113. [13b14] Not that it does not seem to be so mostly in the case of contraries said with intertwining. For “Socrates is healthy” is contrary to “Socrates is sick.” But not even in these cases is it always necessary that one be true, the other false; for, if Socrates exists, one will be true, the other false; but if he does not, both will be false. For if Socrates himself does not exist at all, neither “Socrates is sick” nor “is healthy” is true. 114. [13b20] In the case of privation and possession, if Socrates does not exist at all, neither is true; if he does, it is not always so that one of them is true. For “Socrates has sight” is opposed to “Socrates is blind” as privation and possession, and even if he exists, it is not necessary that one of them be true or false. For when he is not yet naturally apt to have the possession, both are false. If Socrates does not exist at all, thus also are both false, both “he has sight” and “he is blind.” 115. [13b28] But in the case of affirmation and denial, always, whether he exist or not exist, one will be false, the other true. For “Socrates is sick” and “Socrates is not sick”: if he exists, it is apparent that one of them is true, the other false; and so too if he does not exist. For “what does not exist is sick” is false; “is not sick” is true. Whence, it would be proper to these alone, whatever are opposed as affirmation and denial, that one of them is always true and the other false. Chapter 11
116. [13a38] The contrary to a good thing is by necessity a bad thing. This is clear by induction in each particular case, e.g., sickness [is contrary] to health and injustice to justice and cowardice to courage; and so too in the other cases. But sometimes the contrary to a bad thing is a good thing, sometimes a bad thing. For to defect, a bad thing, excess, a bad thing, is contrary. But so too is moderation, a good thing, contrary to each. In few cases would one see such a thing; in most cases the contrary to a bad thing is always a good thing. Moreover, it is not necessary, among contraries, that if one exist, the other also exist. For if everyone were healthy, health will exist, but not sickness. So too, if everything were white, whiteness would exist, but not blackness. 117. [14a11] Moreover, if Socrates being healthy is contrary to Socrates being sick, but it is not possible that both of these belong to the same thing at the same time, if one of the contraries exist, the remaining one could not also exist. For if Socrates being healthy exist, Socrates being sick would not exist. It is clear that the contraries are naturally apt to come to be in something which is same in species or in genus. For sickness and health are in the body of an animal, whiteness and blackness in body simply, justice and injustice in the soul. 118. [14a19] It is necessary that all the contraries are either in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or are themselves genera. For white and black are in the same genus (for color is their genus); justice and injustice, however, are in contrary genera (for the genus of the one is virtue, of the other, vice); good and bad, however, are not in a genus, but happen to be themselves genera of certain things. Chapter 12
119. [14a26] One thing is said to be before {prior to} another in four ways. First and most chiefly, according to time, according to which one thing is said to be older and more ancient, for it is by its time being longer that a thing is called older and more ancient. 120. [14a30] Second, what does not reciprocate according to consequence of being, as one is before two. For if two exists, it follows right away that one exists; but if one exists, it is not necessary that two exists. Whence, from one existing, the consequence of the being of the remaining [number] does not reciprocate. Such a thing, that from which the consequence of being does not reciprocate, seems to be before. 121. [14a35] Third, what is said to be before according to a certain order, as in the case of sciences and speeches. For in the demonstrative sciences, one is before and another is after by order. For the elements are before the geometrical propositions by order, and in grammatical science, the letters are before the syllables; so too in the case of speeches. For the proemium is before the exposition by order. 122. [14b4] Moreover, besides the ones mentioned, the better and more honorable seems to be before by nature. The common folk are accustomed to say that those who are more honored and more loved by them come before {have priority}. This is perhaps the most removed of the ways [of saying before]. The ways of saying before, then, are this many. 123. [14b10] Besides the ones mentioned, there would seem to be another way to be before. For, among things which do reciprocate according to the consequence of being, the one which is the cause of being in any way for the other would fittingly be said to be before by nature. It is clear that there are some things like this. For the existence of a man reciprocates according to consequence of being with true speech about him. For if a man exists, the speech by which we say that a man exists is true. And it does indeed reciprocate; for if the speech by which we say that the man exists is true, the man exists. But the true speech is in no way the cause of the thing existing, but rather the thing appears to be somehow the cause of the speech being true. For by the thing being or not, the speech is called true or false. Whence, one thing would be said to be before another in five ways. Chapter 13
124. [14b24] Together {simultaneous} is said simply and chiefly of that of which the coming to be is in the same time. For neither is before or after. These are said to be together according to time. 125. [14b27] Whatever things reciprocate according to the consequence of being, neither being in any way the cause of being of the other, are together by nature, as in the case of the double and the half. For these reciprocate (if double is, half is, and if half is, double is), but neither is the cause of being for the other. 126. [14b33] And the things of the same genus which are divided out against each other are said to be together by nature; those are said to be divided out against each other which are according to the same division; e.g., the winged [is together] with the footed and the water-dwelling. These things, being of one genus, are divided out against each other. For animal is divided into these, into the winged and the footed and the water-dwelling. And no one of these is before or after, but such things seem to be together by nature. (Each of these, e.g., the footed and the winged and the water-dwelling, may be again divided into species.) Those things which are from the same genus and are according to the same division, therefore, will be together by nature,. 127. [15a5] But the genera are always before the species. For they do not reciprocate according to the consequence of being. For example, if water-dwelling exists, animal exists; but if animal exists, it is not necessary that water-dwelling exist. 128. [15a9] Therefore, whatever things reciprocate according to the consequence of being, are together by nature, neither being in any way the cause of the being of the other, are together by nature, and also the things which are divided out against each other from the same genus. But those of which the coming to be is in the same time are simply together. Chapter 14
129. [15a13] There are six species of motion, coming to be, destruction, growth, lessening, alteration, and change with regard to place. It is apparent, therefore, that the other motions are different from each other: for coming to be is not destruction nor is growth lessening, nor is change with regard to place [the same as the others], and so too the others. 130. [15a18] But there is a certain difficulty about alteration, whether it is necessary that what is being altered is being altered with regard to some one of the remaining motions. But this is not true. For with regard to practically all or most passions it happens to us to be altered while not sharing any of the other motions. For it is not necessary that the thing moving with regard to passion be growing or lessening; and so too in the other cases. Whence, alteration would be something different, alongside the other motions. For if it were the same, what is altering must right away be growing or lessening, or some one of the other motions would follow. But this is not necessary. So too, what is growing or moving with regard to some other motion would be altering. But there are things growing which are not altering. For example, the square, having a gnomon placed about it, grew, but did not alter. So too in the cases of other such things. Whence, the motions would be other from each other. 131. [15b1] Simply, motion is contrary to rest; but in the particulars, destruction [is contrary] to coming to be, lessening to growing. Rest with regard to place is most fittingly opposed to change with regard to place, even if the change to a contrary place [is also contrary], as the upward to the downward and the downward to the upward. 132. [15b7] It is not easy to present what is the contrary to the other motions mentioned; but it is fitting that nothing be contrary to it, unless, in this case too, one should oppose the rest with regard to “how” something is or the change to the contrary “how,” as also, in the case of change with regard to place, [we present as contrary either] rest with regard to place or the change to the contrary place. For alteration is change with regard to how something is. Whence, to motion with regard to how something is is opposed rest with regard to how something is, or the change to the contrary of how the thing is, e.g., coming to be white to coming to be black. For a thing alters by there being a change to the contraries in how something is. Chapter 15
133. [15b17] Having is said in many ways. For [it is said] as habit and disposition or some other quality (for we are said to have knowledge and virtue); or as how much, e.g., the size which someone happens to have (for one is said to have a size of three or four feet); or as the things which are around the body, e.g., a cloak or a tunic, or as on a part, as the ring on the hand; or as a part, as a hand or foot; or as in a jar, as the measure the wheat and the jar the wine (for the jar is said to have the wine and the measure the wheat; these, then, are said to have as being in a jar; or as property, for we are said to have a house and a field. But we are said also to have a wife and a wife [to have] a husband. The way just now mentioned is seemingly the most removed way of having. For we signify nothing else by having a wife than that they share a home. 134. [15b31] Perhaps some other ways of having may appear, but perhaps all the ones customarily spoken of have been counted up.