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Predicates Or Categories Predicates or Categories Aristotle Chapter 1 1. [1a1] Things are called “equivocal” of which the name alone is common but the account of the substance according to the name is different, as both man and a drawing [are called] “animal,” for, of these, the name alone is common but the account of the substance according to the name is different. For should someone present the “what it is” for each of these to be animal, he will present a unique account for each. 2. [1a7] Things are called “univocal” of which both the name is common and the account of the substance according to the name is the same, as both man and ox [are called] “animal.” For each of these is called by the common name “animal,” and the account of the “what it is” is the same. For should someone present an account of the “what it is” for each of these to be animal, he will present the same account. 3. [1a12] Things are called “denominative,” which have their name according to another’s name, though differing from it by ending {by falling away}, as “the grammarian” from “grammar,” and “the brave man” from “bravery.” Chapter 2 4. [1a16] Of things said, some are said with composition, and some without composition. Those said, then, with composition are like “man runs,” “man wins;” those said without composition are like “man,” “ox,” “runs,” “wins.” 5. [1a20] Of beings, some are said of something underlying, but are in nothing underlying, as man is said of something underlying, of this man, but is in nothing underlying. 6. [1a22] Some, however, are in an underlying thing, but are said of no underlying thing (I call “in an underlying thing” what is in something, not as being a part, [but as] unable to be separately from that in which it is), as this grammar is in an underlying, the soul, but is said of nothing underlying, and this white is in an underlying, the body (for every color is in body), but is said of nothing underlying. 7. [1a28] Some, however, are both said of something underlying and are in something underlying, as science is in something underlying, the soul, but is said of something underlying, grammar. 8. [1b4] Some, however, are neither in something underlying nor are said of something underlying, as this man or this horse. For not one of such things is either in something underlying or said of something underlying. 9. [1b6] Simply, however, those individual and one in number are said of nothing underlying, but nothing prevents some [of these] from being in something underlying, for this grammar is among things in something underlying. Chapter 3 10. [1b10] When one is predicated of another as of an underlying, whatever [things] are said of what is being predicated will also be said of what is underlying, as “man” is predicated of this man, but “animal” of man. Therefore, “animal” will also be predicated of this man. For this man is both man and animal. 11. [1b17] Of things in different genera, and which have not been ordered under each other, the differences also are other in kind1, e.g., of animal and of science. For the differences of animal are “footed” and “winged” and “water-dwelling” and “two-footed,” but not one of these is [a difference] of science. For science does not differ from science by being two-footed. 12. [1b20] But nothing prevents there being the same differences of genera under each other; for the genera above are predicated of the genera under them, whence, whatever things are differences of what is being predicated will also be differences of what is underlying. 1 Elsewhere this word is translated as “species.” Chapter 4 13. [1b25] Of what are said without any composition at all, each signifies either substance, or how much, or how, or toward something, or where, or when, or being positioned, or being outfitted, or acting upon, or undergoing. 14. [1b28] To speak with examples: substance is such as man, horse; how much is such as two foot, three foot; how, such as white, grammatical; toward something, such as double, half, greater; where, such as in the Lyceum, in the agora; when, such as yesterday, last year; being positioned, such as is lying, is seated; being outfitted, such as is shod, is armored; acting upon, such as cutting, burning; undergoing, such as being cut, being burned. 15. [2a5] Each of the things mentioned is not said by itself in any affirmation, but affirmation comes to be by the composition of these with each other. For every affirmation seems to be either true or false, but none of the things said without any composition is either true or false, e.g., “man,” “white,” “runs,” “wins.” Chapter 5 16. [2a10] That is called “substance” chiefly, and first, and most of all, which neither is said of something underlying nor is in something underlying, e.g., this man or this horse. Substances are called “second” in which, as in species, the things called first substances are, both these and the genera of these species, as this man is in the species “man,” but the genus of the species is “animal.” These, e.g., “man” and “animal,” then, are called second substances. 17. [2a19] It is clear from what has been said that, of things said of an underlying, it is necessary that both the name and the account be predicated {kategoretai2} of the underlying, e.g., “man” is said of an underlying, of this man, and the name is predicated of [him], for you will predicate “man” of this man. And the account of “man” will also be predicated of this man, for this man is indeed man. Whence, both the name and the account will be predicated of the underlying. 18. [2a27] But of things in an underlying, for the most part neither the name nor the account will be predicated of the underlying. But in some cases nothing prevents the name being predicated of an underlying, but it is impossible that the account [be said of], e.g., white being in an underlying, the body, it is predicated of an underlying, for the body is called white, but the account of white will never be predicated of body. 19. [2a34] However, all the others either are said of the underlying first substances or are in these underlying things. This is clear from the particular cases at hand. For example, “animal” is predicated of man, and therefore also of this man; for if [it were predicated] of no particular men, neither [would it be predicated] of man as a whole. Again, color is in body, and therefore in a particular body; for if it were not in some one of the particulars, neither would it be in body as a whole. Whence, all the others either are said of the underlying first substances or are in these underlying things. 20. [2b5] Therefore, if the first substances did not exist, it would be impossible that any of the others exist. For all others either are said of these underlying things or are in these underlying things. Whence, if the first substances are not, it is impossible that any of the others be. 21. [2b7] Of second substances, the species is more substance than the genus. For it is closer to first substance. For should someone present what a first substance is, he will present what is more known and more proper in presenting the species than the genus. For example, one would present this man more known in presenting “man” than [in presenting] “animal.” For the one is more proper to this man, the other more common. And rendering this tree, one will render it more known in presenting “tree” than [in presenting] “plant.” 22. [2b15] Moreover, the first substances, because underlying all others and all others being predicated of these or being in these, because of this, they are most of all called substances. But as the first substances are to the others, so is the species to the genus. For the species underlies the genus. For the genus is predicated of the species, but this cannot be turned around and the species [predicated of] the genus. Whence, the species is more substance than the genus also from these [considerations]. 23. [2b23] Among species which are not genera, however, no one is more substance than another. For one will present nothing more proper about this man in presenting 2 Lego – said of; kategoreo - predicated “man” than about this horse [in presenting ] “horse.” 24. [2b26] So too, none of the first substances is more substance than another. For this man is not more substance than this ox. 25. [2b29] It is reasonable that species and genus alone among the others after first substances are called “second substances.” For, of things predicated, these alone make clear first substance. For should someone render, about this man, what he is, he will render properly in presenting species or genus, and he will make it more known in presenting “man” than “animal.” Of the other, however, whichever one might present, he will present something extraneous, e.g., presenting “white” or “runs” or any such thing. Whence, it is reasonable that these alone among the others are called “substances.” 26. [2b37] Moreover, first substances, because they underlie all the others, are most chiefly called substances. But as the first substances are to all the others, so too are the species and the genera of the first substances to all the rest. For all the rest are predicated of these.
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