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Dr. Zvi Shtauber to Head Jcss 3 BRIG. GEN. (RES) DR. ZVI SHTAUBER TO HEAD JCSS Former Israeli Ambassador to the UK and Senior Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Ehud Barak Succeeds Dr. Shai Feldman who ends Seven-Year Term A NEW SECURITY AGENDA 4 FORUM AMERICA 10 STATE OF THE NATION Dr. Zvi Shtauber, left, listens as TAU President Prof. Itamar Rabinovich announces his appointment as Head of JCSS on January 4, 2005. At right is JCSS Research Fellow, Dr. Yehuda Ben Meir. 14 Dr. Shai Feldman will end his seven-year term as Head of JCSS on January 31, 2005. He will soon assume the post of Director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University, which opens officially in April 2005. Brig. Gen. (res) Dr. Zvi Shtauber, who has been named to replace him, was most recently Israel’s ambassador to the UK Previous to that he was a senior policy advisor to Prime Minister Ehud Barak, held senior positions in the intelligence and strategic planning branches of the Israel Defense Forces, and was Vice President for External NEW PUBLICATIONS Affairs at Ben-Gurion University in the Negev. TAU President Itamar Rabinovich, in announcing the appointment, said that Dr. Shtauber was selected after an intensive search process and that his unique background in diplomacy, the military, academia, and management made him an ideal successor for Shai who, in turn, has left very No. 30 January 2005 solid ground for Dr. Shtauber to build on. A PARTING LETTER Leaving the Jaffee into our region’s dynamics that cannot be Center after having approximated by any number of texts, no served for more than matter how classified. Through these talks, seven years as Head of the Center is not easy. we ascertain our neighbors’ policies and Appreciation from This is particularly so because the Center threat perceptions, we understand how they was the focus of my entire professional view our policies and capabilities, and, on Itamar Rabinovich, career: twenty-seven years ago, I was a occasion, we discuss with them possibilities President TAU firstborn child of the Center, the first young for bridging our differences. researcher recruited by its founder, General In addition to my sense of gratitude for the I regret Shai Feldman’s departure as Head Aharon (Ar’ale) Yariv. As such, my departure opportunity to engage in and sometimes of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies comes with the mixed feelings associated orchestrate the Center’s diverse, fascinating at Tel Aviv University for many reasons. with any closing of a long chapter and any activities, I am also deeply indebted to those It is the end of another chapter, the third, ending of a remarkable journey. whose generosity enabled the many JCSS in the evolution of the Jaffee Center. At the same time, I am leaving the Center pursuits. These individuals – primarily though Maj. Gen Aharon Yariv founded the with a great sense of achievement. I feel that not only the members of the Center’s Center with, among other considerations, my colleagues and I have met most of the International Board – have shown remarkable the lessons of the surprise of the Yom goals I set for the Center when I began my commitment to the Center and interest in its Kippur War in mind. term as its director in November 1997. workings. On more than one occasion, I have He endowed it, built its core team, and, Despite its relatively small budget, the Jaffee been touched by the care they took to ensure not less significantly, created a place in Center has become a major player in the that we in Tel Aviv would have the means the academic world for strategic studies. international discourse on the Middle East. necessary to meet the JCSS goals and fulfill Zeev Maoz linked JCSS to the realm of It produces basic research that meets the its aspirations. social studies, himself having come from highest academic standards. At the same But most of all, I was privileged during my the field of political science. As a time, it has gained considerable access to years at the Center to work with a remarkable distinguished social scientist, he added Israel’s opinion-making and decision- group of people – members of the Center’s significantly to the academic prestige of making circles, allowing it to affect the research and administrative staff. This is a the Center. public debate and governmental team of true patriots: over-worked and Shai, during these past seven years in deliberation of most issues related to Israel’s underpaid, they have dedicated themselves which he has served as Head of JCSS, national security. to their country’s security and survival. Their brought several special assets to the task: In addition, during my tenure, we initiated commitment and unity of purpose is unique his own profound knowledge of security two policy-oriented venues: Strategic among public institutions. Not only am I studies and a deep understanding of Assessment and Tel Aviv Notes. By their grateful for their help and cooperation and Israel’s national security universe; his rich nature, these publications necessarily for their contribution to the Center’s success; contacts in the academic and involved us, time and again, in critically I salute them for who they are. policymaking communities, particularly important debates of current policy issues. So, as I leave to assume my next assignment, in the United States; and a great deal of The strategic dialogues initiated during my I am filled with a sense of pride about the enthusiasm, devotion, and leadership. term with the Center’s counterparts in the Jaffee Center’s accomplishments that is tinged He built a new cadre of experts, US, Germany, Britain, France, Poland, and with a measure of sadness that for me, a truly developed a series of very significant Greece, as well as with China, Japan, and remarkable journey has come to an end. I international dialogues with academic South Korea, provided us with unique am confident, however, that under a new and national security establishments in perspectives on world affairs. The dialogues leadership my colleagues will achieve countries important to Israel, and allowed us numerous opportunities to gain additional and even greater gains, taking the cultivated a large group of lay leaders. insights into security issues in other regions, Center into new spheres of activity and In the latter capacity he not only to appreciate how other governments and influence. For their own professional enhanced the Jaffee Center in many ways, societies view Israel’s policies and fulfillment and for the State of Israel, I hope but built a model for others at the predicaments, and to affect, even if only they will further the legacy of the Jaffee university to emulate. minimally, these perceptions. Center’s legendary founder, Ar’ale Yariv, Shai thus leaves a very important legacy Probably even more fascinating has been our which is the legacy that has motivated and at JCSS, and it is hardly surprising that the frequent involvement in Track-II talks – governed my directorship over the past seven search for a successor was a difficult one, informed meetings with our counterparts in years. as is the task of the next head of JCSS. the Middle East, from Rabat to Tehran. The SHAI FELDMAN The assets left by Shai, however, will familiarity achieved with many among these RAMAT AVIV make the success of that person eminently neighbors2 has enabled us to gain insights JANUARY 2005 more within reach.JCSS Bulletin TOWARD A NEW SECURITY AGENDA current strategic situation is “excellent,” with Israel perceived by the Arab world as militarily, economically, and technologically superior. Feldman: “Israel’s Strategic Position has Never Been This situation offers Israel a new set of Stronger - A Time for Opportunity and Change” opportunities and challenges. Key threats to Israel are demography, Iran, and terrorism, more than any conventional conflict. The creation of a Palestinian state is in Israel’s highest interest, notwithstanding the current breakdown of trust between the parties over the past four years. Dr. Feldman argued that movement on the peace process must involve third parties at this stage, and called on Israel to improve its relations with Europe while it maintains its excellent relations with the US. Finally he urged that more civilian control be injected into the formulation of Israel’s defense policies and that these not be left exclusively to the judgment of the security community; rather, the Foreign Ministry and the National Security Council ought to wield significant influence along with the voice of the military Shai Feldman, right, welcomes Head of IDF Military Intelligence, Maj. command. Gen. Aharon Zeevi (Farkash), center, and Knesset Member Matan Vilnai The seminar was followed by a reception and to the post-seminar reception and dinner. dinner in Dr. Feldman’s honor. On January 4, 2005 a seminar titled “The significant advances have been New Security Agenda” was held to mark made in the logistical and civil the end of Dr. Shai Feldman’s seven-year administration spheres. term at the helm of JCSS. It was opened In his final public lecture as by Prof. Itamar Rabinovich, President of Head of JCSS, Dr. Shai Feldman Tel Aviv University, who praised Shai’s addressed the dramatic changes tenure at JCSS. in Israel’s strategic environment The first lecture was given by Prof. Graham over the past three decades. Allison of Harvard University, who spoke Shocked and bruised then by the on “Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear surprise of the Yom Kippur War, Terror: Preventable Catastrophes.” Based isolated internationally, and on his recent book, Prof. Allison addressed confronted with a unified Arab the urgent need for the West to confront – world that enjoyed the support and thereby preempt – the possibility of of the Soviet Union, Israel had nuclear weapons being acquired by lost its deterrence, was suffering terrorists.
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